On Tuesday, May 24, Nigerian Central Bank Governor Godwin Emefiele announced that the country will adopt a more flexible foreign exchange rate system in the near future. This move signals a major policy shift by Emefiele and President Muhammadu Buhari, who had until this point opposed calls to let the naira weaken. Many international oil-related currencies have depreciated against the dollar as oil prices began their decline in 2014. Nigeria, however, has held the naira at a peg of 197-199 per U.S. dollar since March 2015, depleting foreign reserves and deterring investors, who remain concerned about the repercussions of a potential naira devaluation. Following the announcement, Nigerian stocks jumped to a five-month high and bond prices rose in anticipation that a new flexible exchange rate regime would increase the supply of dollars and help attract foreign investors.

For now it remains unclear exactly what a more flexible system will entail for Nigeria, however, some experts suggest that the Central Bank may introduce a dual-rate system, which allows select importers in strategic industries to access foreign currency at the current fixed rate, while more generally foreign currency will be available at a weaker, market-related level. This new regime raises a number of questions, including how it will be governed and who will have access to foreign currency (and at what rate). On Wednesday, Nigeria’s parliament requested a briefing soon from Emefiele and Finance Minister Kemi Adeosun to provide additional clarity on the new system, although the date for such a meeting has not yet been set.

Earlier this month, Kenya announced plans to close the Dadaab refugee camp, located in northeast Kenya, amid security concerns. The move to close the camp has been widely criticized by international actors. United States State Department Press Relations Director Elizabeth Trudeau urged Kenya to “uphold its international obligations and not forcibly repatriate refugees.” The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that the closure of the refugee camp would have “devastating consequences.” Despite these concerns, this week, at the World Humanitarian Summit, Kenya stated that it will not go back on its decision and confirmed the closure of the refugee camps within a six-month period.

The camp houses 330,000 refugees, a majority of whom fled from conflict in their home country of Somalia. Kenya insists that the camp poses a threat to its national security, as it believes the camp is used to host and train extremists from Somalia’s Islamist group al-Shabab. Kenya also argued that the developed world, notably the United Kingdom, should host its fair share of African refugees. This is not the first time Kenya has threatened to close the refugee camp. After the Garissa University attacks last April, Kenya voiced its decision to close the refugee camps, although it did not follow through with the plan.

From May 23-27, Lusaka, Zambia hosted 5,000 delegates and participants for the 2016 Annual Meetings of the African Development Bank (AfDB), with the theme, “Energy and Climate Change.” Held in the wake of December’s COP21 climate agreement and in line with Sustainable Development Goals 7 (ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all) and 13 (take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts), the theme was timely and, as many speakers emphasized, urgent. Around 645 million people in Africa have no access to electricity, and only 16 percent are connected to an energy source. To that end, AfDB President Akinwumi Adesina outlined the bank’s ambitious aim: “Our goal is clear: universal access to energy for Africa within 10 years; Expand grid power by 160 gigawatts; Connect 130 million persons to grid power; Connect 75 million persons to off grid systems; And provide access to 150 million households to clean cooking energy."

As part of a push to transform Africa’s energy needs and uses, Rwandan President Paul Kagame joined Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta on a panel to support the AfDB’s “New Deal on Energy” that aims to deliver electricity to all Africans by 2025. Kenyatta specifically touted the potential of geothermal energy sources. Now, 40 percent of Kenya's power needs come from geothermal energy sources, he said, but there is still room for improvement—private businesses, which make up 30 percent of Kenya’s on-grid energy needs, have not made the switch yet.

As part of the meetings, the AfDB, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also launched their annual African Economic Outlook, with the theme “Sustainable Cities and Structural Transformation.” In general, the report’s authors predict that the continent will maintain an average growth of 3.7 percent in 2016 before increasing to 4.5 percent in 2017, assuming commodity prices recover and the global economy improves.  However, the focus was on this year’s theme: urbanization. The authors provide an overview of urbanization trends and highlight that successful urban planning can discourage pollution and waste, slow climate change, support better social safety nets, enhance service delivery, and attract investment, among other benefits.

For more on urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa, see Chapter 4 of Foresight Africa 2016: Capitalizing on Urbanization: The Importance of Planning, Infrastructure, and Finance for Africa’s Growing Cities.

Baltimore provides a prime example of how metropolitan areas around the nation are turning to clean, green industries as a source of vibrant, sustainable growth. Expert Jennifer Vey outlines how such communities can identify their assets and capitalize on them to revitalize their economies.

Video

• Baltimore as a Case Study in Metro Economic Recovery

Audio

• @ Brookings Podcast: Baltimore as a Case Study in Metro Economic Recovery

Emerging economies may chafe at international agreements calling for sustainable development, but Nonresident Fellow Nathan Hultman says many governments are putting plans for sustainability and green innovation in place out of self-interest, and cooperating with neighbors across the globe.

Video

• Nathan Hultman: Global Progress in Sustainable Development

The increasing diversification of news media—from online versions of major newspapers to political bloggers, to 24-hour cable news to social media—plus the profession’s changing economics have caused the balance of power between political reporters and presidential candidates to change. Stephen Hess, senior fellow emeritus, says our very good, well-trained reporters are “almost dangerous” to presidential candidates who are trying to stay on message. Thus, says Hess, the way the press covers campaigns has changed as well, and not for the better.

Video

• Stephen Hess: The Changing Balance of Power in Presidential Campaign Reporting

Editor's Note: The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) recently published a self-evaluation of its activities. Besides representing current thinking among evaluation experts at the World Bank, it also more broadly reflects some of the strengths and gaps in the approaches that evaluators use to assess and learn from the performance of the international institutions with which they work. The old question “Quis custodet ipsos custodes?” – loosely translated as “Who evaluates the evaluators?” – remains as relevant as ever. Johannes Linn served as an external peer reviewer of the self-evaluation and provides a bird’s-eye view on the lessons learned.

An Overview of the World Bank’s IEG Self-Evaluation Report

In 2011 the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) carried out and published a self-evaluation of its activities. The self-evaluation team was led by an internal manager, but involved a respected external evaluation expert as the principal author and also an external peer reviewer.

The IEG self-evaluation follows best professional practices as codified by the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG). This group brings together the evaluation offices of seven major multilateral financial institutions in joint efforts designed to enhance evaluation performance and cooperation among their evaluators. One can therefore infer that the approach and focus of the IEG self-evaluation is representative of a broader set of practices that are currently used by the evaluation community of international financial organizations.

At the outset the IEG report states that “IEG is the largest evaluation department among Evaluation Capacity Group (ECG) members and is held in high regard by the international evaluation community. Independent assessments of IEG’s role as an independent evaluation function for the Bank and IFC rated it above the evaluation functions in most other ECG members, international nongovernmental organizations, and transnational corporations and found that IEG follows good practice evaluation principles.”

The self-evaluation report generally confirms this positive assessment. For four out of six areas of its mandate IEG gives itself the second highest rating (“good”) out of six possible rating categories. This includes (a) the professional quality of its evaluations, (b) its reports on how the World Bank’s management follows up on IEG recommendations, (c) cooperation with other evaluation offices, and (d) assistance to borrowing countries in improving their own evaluation capacity. In the area of appraising the World Bank’s self-evaluation and risk management practices, the report offers the third highest rating (“satisfactory”), while it gives the third lowest rating (“modest”) for IEG’s impact on the Bank’s policies, strategies and operations. In addition the self-evaluation concludes that overall the performance of IEG has been “good” and that it operates independently, effectively and efficiently.

The report makes a number of recommendations for improvement, which are likely to be helpful, but have limited impact on its activities. They cover measures to further enhance the independence of IEG and the consistency of evaluation practices as applied across the World Bank Group’s branches – the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) –; to improve the design of evaluations and the engagement with Bank management upstream for greater impact; and monitoring the impact of recent organizational changes in IEG in terms of results achieved. The report also recommends that more be done to evaluate the Bank’s analytical work and that evaluations draw on comparative evidence.

Assessment

In terms of the parameters of self-evaluation set by the prevailing practice among the evaluators on international financial agencies, the IEG self-evaluation is accurate and helpful. From my own experience as an operational manager in the Bank whose activities were evaluated by IEG in years past, and as a user of IEG evaluations (and of evaluations of other international aid organizations) for my research on aid effectiveness, I concur that IEG is independent and effective in meeting its mandate as defined. Moreover, the self-evaluation produces useful quantitative evidence (including survey results, budget analysis, etc.) to corroborate qualitative judgments.

However, the self-evaluation suffers from a number of limitations in approach and gaps in focus, which are broadly representative of the practices prevalent among many of the evaluation offices of international aid agencies.

Approach of the IEG self-evaluation

The core of the self-evaluation report is about the evaluation process followed by IEG, with very little said about the substance of IEG’s evaluations. The following questions could have usefully been raised, but were not: do evaluations cover the right issues with the right intensity, such as growth and poverty; environmental, governance, and gender impacts; regional dimensions versus exclusive country or project focus; effectiveness in addressing the problems of fragile and conflict states; effectiveness in dealing with global public goods; sustainability and scaling up; etc. Therefore the report does not deal with the question of whether IEG effectively responds in its evaluations to the many important strategic debates and issues with which the development community is grappling.

Related to this limitation is the fact that the report assessed the quality of IEG’s mostly in terms of (a) whether its approach and processes meet certain standards established by the Evaluation Cooperation Group; and (b) how it is judged by stakeholders in response to a survey commissioned for this evaluation. Both these approaches are useful, but they do not have any basis in professional assessments of the quality of individual products. This is equivalent to IEG evaluating the World Bank’s projects on the quality of its processes (e.g., appraisal and supervision processes) and on the basis of stakeholder surveys, without evaluating individual products and their impacts.

Gaps in the Self-Evaluation and in Evaluation Practice

Careful reading of the report reveals six important gaps in the IEG self-evaluation, in the prevailing evaluation practice in the World Bank, and more generally in the way international financial organizations evaluate their own performance. The first three gaps relate to aspects of the evaluation approach used and the second three gaps relate to lack of focus in the self-evaluation on key internal organizational issues:

1. Impact Evaluations: The report notes that IEG carries out two to three impact evaluations per year, but it sidesteps the debate in the current evaluation literature and practice as to what extent the “gold standard” of randomized impact evaluation should occupy a much more central role. Given the importance of this debate and divergence of views, it would have been appropriate for the self-evaluation to assess IEG’s current practice of very limited use of randomized evaluations.

2. Evaluation of Scaling Up: The report does not address the question of to what extent current IEG practice not only assesses the performance of individual projects in terms of their outcomes and sustainability, but also in terms of whether the Bank has systematically built on its experience in specific projects to help scale up their impact through support for expansion or replication in follow-up operations or through effective hand-off to the government or other partners. In fact, currently IEG does not explicitly and systematically consider scaling up in its project and program evaluations. For example, in a recent IEG evaluation of World Bank funded municipal development projects (MDPs) , IEG found that the Bank has supported multiple MDPs in many countries over the years, but the evaluation did not address the obvious question whether the Bank systematically planned for the project sequence or built on its experience from prior projects in subsequent operations. While most other evaluation offices like IEG do not consider scaling up, some (in particular those of the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the United Nations Development Program) have started doing so in recent years.

3. Drawing on the Experience of and Benchmarking Against Other Institutions: The self-evaluation report does a good job in benchmarking IEG performance in a number of respects against that of other multilateral institutions. In the main text of the report it states that “IEG plans to develop guidelines for approach papers to ensure greater quality, in particular in drawing on comparative information from other sources and benchmarking against other institutions.” This is a welcome intention, but it is inadequately motivated in the rest of the report and not reflected in the Executive Summary. The reality is that IEG, like most multilateral evaluation offices, so far has not systematically drawn on the evaluations and relevant experience of other aid agencies in its evaluations of World Bank performance. This has severely limited the learning impact of the evaluations.

4. Bank Internal Policies, Management Processes and Incentives: IEG evaluations traditionally do not focus on how the Bank’s internal policies, management and incentives affect the quality of Bank engagement in countries. Therefore evaluations cannot offer any insights into whether and how Bank-internal operating modalities contribute to results. Two recent exceptions are notable exceptions. First, the IEG evaluation of the Bank’s approach to harmonization with other donors and alignment with country priorities assesses the incentives for staff to support harmonization and alignment. The evaluation concludes that there are insufficient incentives, a finding disputed by management. Second, is the evaluation of the Bank’s internal matrix management arrangements, which is currently under way. The self-evaluation notes that Bank management tried to quash the matrix evaluation on the grounds that it did not fall under the mandate of IEG. This is an unfortunate argument, since an assessment of the institutional reasons for the Bank’s performance is an essential component of any meaningful evaluation of Bank-supported programs. While making a good case for the specific instance of the matrix evaluation, the self-evaluation report shies away from a more general statement in support of engaging IEG on issues of Bank-internal policies, management processes and incentives. It is notable that IFAD’s Independent Office of Evaluation appears to be more aggressive in this regard: It currently is carrying out a full evaluation of IFAD’s internal efficiency and previous evaluations (e.g., an evaluation of innovation and scaling up) did not shy away from assessing internal institutional dimensions.

5. World Bank Governance: The IEG self-evaluation is even more restrictive in how it interprets its mandate regarding the evaluation of the World Bank’s governance structures and processes (including its approach to members’ voice and vote, the functioning of its board of directors, the selection of its senior management, etc.). It considers these topics beyond IEG’s mandate. This is unfortunate, since the way the Bank’s governance evolves will substantially affect its long-term legitimacy, effectiveness and viability as an international financial institution. Since IEG reports to the Bank’s board of directors, and many of the governance issues involve questions of the board’s composition, role and functioning, there is a valid question of how effectively IEG could carry out such an evaluation. However, it is notable that the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office, which similarly reports to the IMF board of directors, published a full evaluation of the IMF’s governance in 2008, which effectively addressed many of the right questions.

6. Synergies between World Bank, IFC and MIGA: The self-evaluation report points out that the recent internal reorganization of IEG aimed to assure more effective and consistent evaluations across the three member branches of the World Bank Group. This is welcome, but the report does not assess how past evaluations addressed the question of whether the World Bank, IFC and MIGA effectively capitalized on the potential synergies among the three organizations. The recent evaluation of the World Bank Group’s response to the global economic crisis of 2008/9 provided parallel assessments of each agency’s performance, but did not address whether they work together effectively in maximizing their synergies. The reality is that the three organizations have deeply engrained institutional cultures and generally go their own ways rather than closely coordinating their activities on the ground. Future evaluations should explicitly consider whether the three effectively cooperate or not. While the World Bank is unique in the way it has organizationally separated its private sector and guarantee operations, other aid organizations also have problems of a lack of cooperation, coordination and synergy among different units within the agency. Therefore, the same comment also applies to their evaluation approaches.

Conclusions

Self-evaluations are valuable tools for performance assessment and IEG is to be congratulated for carrying out and publishing such an evaluation of its own activities. As for all self-evaluations, it should be seen as an input to an independent external evaluation, a decision that, for now, has apparently been postponed by the Bank’s board of directors.

IEG’s self-evaluation has many strengths and provides an overall positive assessment of IEG’s work. However, it does reflect some important limitations of analysis and of certain gaps in approach and coverage, which an independent external review should consider explicitly, and which IEG’s management should address. Since many of these issues also likely apply to most of the other evaluation approaches by other evaluation offices, the lessons have relevance beyond IEG and the World Bank.

Key lessons include:

• An evaluation of evaluations should focus not only on process, but also on the substantive issues that the institution is grappling with.
• An evaluation of the effectiveness of evaluations should include a professional assessment of the quality of evaluation products.
• An evaluation of evaluations should assess:
  o How effectively impact evaluations are used;
  o How scaling up of successful interventions is treated;
  o How the experience of other comparable institutions is utilized;
  o Whether and how the internal policies, management practices and incentives of the institution are effectively assessed;
  o Whether and how the governance of the institution is evaluated; and
  o Whether and how internal coordination, cooperation and synergy among units within the organizations are assessed.

Evaluations play an essential role in the accountability and learning of international aid organizations. Hence it is critical that evaluations address the right issues and use appropriate techniques. If the lessons above were reflected in the evaluation practices of the aid institutions, this would represent a significant step forward in the quality, relevance and likely impact of evaluations.

There will always be winners and losers as the global economy shifts and evolves. For a long period in the mid- to late 20th century, those losers were cities. Across the developed world, suburbanization shrank inner-city populations just as the industrial base that had once fueled growth succumbed to globalization.

At the end of the 20th century, as global cities such as New York and London pulled themselves out of the malaise of the 1970s, economic growth still eluded many smaller, formerly industrial cities across the United States and Europe. Catalyzing recovery in those older industrial areas was the focus of a decade-long effort of the London School of Economics and the Brookings Institution. As is clear in Cities for a Small Continent, a new book from Anne Power at LSE, the potential in these cities is greater now than ever. In our contribution to the volume, we examine the why and the how of economic transformation in several U.S. cities. 

There has been a lot of focus on the shift in location preferences that is bringing people back to cities. Significant shares of millennials as well as empty nesters are voting for urban communities where they can live, work, and play. At least as important is the restructuring of the U.S. economy—from a closed innovation system where corporations operated isolated research facilities, to an open, networked economy where corporations innovate in collaboration with universities, researchers, entrepreneurs, and investors. Innovation is critical, because as Antoine van Agtmael and Fred Bakker assert in The Smartest Places on Earth, “the era of cheap [in manufacturing] is over; the era of smart has begun.”

These shifts in social preferences and market forces revalue cities and “cityness”—proximity, density, vibrancy, authenticity, and diversity. In particular, population and employment growth is occurring in downtowns and midtowns that have key institutions and assets: universities, medical campuses, cultural venues, historic buildings, walkable streets, and transit connectivity.

This regeneration is being delivered through a new localism in U.S. governance. Every day brings new bottom-up, city-led approaches to the training of workers, the education of children, the mitigation of climate change, the financing of infrastructure, and the development of affordable housing for our workers and quality places for our young and elderly populations.

Across this wide range of activity are some common characteristics.

Cities are harnessing the power of networks of government, business, civic, philanthropic, university, and community institutions and leaders rather than relying on public-sector solutions alone. The focus of the new American localism on unlocking the latent capacity and creativity of public, private, and civic networks differs markedly from the focus of traditional federalism on relationships between levels of government, particularly the federal government and the states.

Cities and metropolitan areas are also deploying capital from an array of public, private, and civic sources at the local, national, and even global levels. With federal investment dwindling, financing of critical projects will increasingly come from public-private collaboration and require experimentation around new forms of innovative finance.

Our chapter highlights four cities in the United States—Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Detroit—where this new localism has delivered tangible results. Though each city is at a different point of recovery, all have experienced growth in their cores that has been enabled and co-led by anchor institutions, major philanthropies, private-sector leaders, and civic groups. The biggest investments and decisions in these places have been the results of collaborative processes—proof that cities and the institutions that invest in them can be a source of long-term, strategic thinking that ultimately leads to healthier and more prosperous urban economies.

Similar efforts are spreading across the United Kingdom and Europe, though the systems there tend more toward public-sector leadership. In Sheffield, England, a concerted effort by business and academic institutions to “upskill” the manufacturing base, enabled by the flexibility of a “city deal” from the central government, has made the city a global center of advanced manufacturing. Bilbao, Spain evolved from a manufacturing base to a vibrant urban cultural hub by leveraging the value of publicly owned land and other assets for regeneration purposes. Stories such as these are featured throughout Cities for a Small Continent, as well as in a new series of seven case studies from LSE.

We are still in the early stages of this rebalancing of growth. Cities and metropolitan areas experienced decades of population and employment decentralization, poverty concentration, racial separation, and de-industrialization. Such patterns do not get changed overnight. But they are changing. As cities innovate, those solutions must be captured and codified and then replicated across the world.

Watch the May 24, 2016 LSE launch event for Cities for a Small Continent here: 

A recent blog suggested that CMS’ efforts to standardize assessment data was based on a goal of “….creating a functional measurement tool that could be used throughout the industry.” In fact, CMS has been working since 2005 to meet the Congressional directive to standardize assessment information at hospital discharge, and post-acute care (PAC) admission and discharge for payment and quality reporting purposes (Deficit Reduction Act of 2005). The CARE tool was developed as part of the national Post-Acute Care Payment Reform Demonstration (PAC PRD). The conceptual domains and items were selected with the input of the wide range of stakeholder communities working with PAC populations. Clinicians from acute hospitals and each of the four PAC settings, including long term care hospitals (LTCHs), inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs), skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), and home health agencies (HHAs) identified items to test in four areas: medical status, functional status, cognitive status, and some social support factors. Input was given by physicians, nurses, physical therapists, occupational therapists, speech and language pathologists, social workers and case managers working in each of the different levels of care. Initial item selection was based on a review of existing assessment items, including those in the three Federally-mandated instruments, (the IRF-PAI, MDS 2.0, and OASIS-B which were in effect at this time) and the input of each of the scientific communities working in these areas.

Developers of proprietary systems such as the UDS-MR©, Inter-RAI ©, and AM-PAC ©, as well as public domain items tested in clinical trials such as the PROMIS items, were all reviewed as part of this process. The selected items needed to be in the public domain so the measures could be modified as science advanced practice.

Over 200 providers participated nationwide to submit over 53,000 CARE assessments over the course of the PAC PRD. Participating clinicians also provided feedback during training and exit interviews. In general, positive feedback was provided on most items. Feedback showed that almost all items were commonly collected on existing instruments in hospitals and PAC providers, although some of the information may have been informally noted in charts rather than provided in the structured form of the CARE items.

The items were tested for reliability so they could be applied consistently across populations and settings. Most of the items were previously tested and found reliable in at least one of the five levels of care. Two types of reliability tests were conducted on the final CARE tool item set used in the PAC PRD. The results showed that most items when applied to the other four settings were at least as reliable as the existing Federal assessment items (Kappa scores of 0.6 or better) ensuring their reliable use in future quality measures or payment models would reach consistent results. Complete reports on item reliability and PAC PRD results can be found here.

Data standardization is critical to allow providers to exchange information as they follow the patient. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 directed CMS to use standardized assessment items at acute hospital discharge and PAC admission and discharge to allow for empirical comparisons of key questions arising out of changing incentives in the Medicare payment policies. The standardized CARE items are consensus-based versions of the items already collected by clinicians. These and additional items being incorporated into CMS’ assessment item library represent the “best in class.” The team developing the CARE item set represented the leading experts in each of the areas – Dr. Margaret Stineman of the University of Pennsylvania, developer of the function-related groups associated with the proprietary FIM©, Dr. Deborah Saliba, UCLA, lead developer of the MDS 3.0, and Dr. Chris Murtaugh of the Visiting Nurse Service of New York. Team members included Drs. Anne Deutsch and Trudy Mallinson of the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago. Input was also given by Dr. David Hittle, of the University of Colorado who has worked closely with the OASIS tool, Dr. Samuel Markello, formerly of the UDS-MR©, and Dr. Patrick Murray of Case Western University.

The blog suggested that, “the early reviews of the CARE tool have been poor.” While this clearly is not true, it is worth pointing out that the author owns one of the key proprietary assessment instruments. The CARE items have been evaluated for reliability and they meet the national standards; they allow providers and others the opportunity to download the e-specification of the items without charge and to have the clinicians trained for free under CMS’ regular assessment training initiatives. CMS is currently developing quality measures using the “best in class” assessment items which all meet scientific standards. The quality measure development process already requires CMS to submit measures for endorsement by the National Quality Forum. The “loophole” identified by the UDS-MR© author is non-existent. The Measures Application Partnership is part of the existing NQF process included in the IMPACT legislation. Further, use of uniform data elements across settings, such as those used in the currently collected pressure ulcer measure, allows for exchangeability and improves communication across the system, finally creating a “data follows the person” system.

Event Information

While the future impact of rising powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China is uncertain and the shifting political landscape in the Arab world is still playing out, the influence of these emerging nations is a central fact of geopolitics.

Already the global financial crisis, the Copenhagen climate negotiations, and the debate over Iran sanctions have illustrated the potential, the pitfalls, and above all the centrality of the relationship between American power and the influence of these rising actors and developing democracies.

In a new paper, Senior Fellow Bruce Jones, director of the Managing Global Order Project at Brookings, argues the greatest risk lies not in a single peer competitor but in the erosion of cooperation on issues vital to U.S. interests and a stable world order. U.S. power is indispensible for that purpose but not sufficient. No longer the CEO of Free World Inc., the United States is now the largest minority shareholder in Global Order LLC.

On March 15, the Brookings Institution and Foreign Policy magazine hosted the launch of Bruce Jones’s paper "Largest Minority Shareholder in Global Order LLC: The Changing Balance of Influence and U.S. Strategy." Panelists explored the prospects for cooperation on global finance and transnational threats; the need for new investments in global economic and energy diplomacy; and the case for new crisis management tools to help de-escalate inevitable tensions with emerging powers.

Susan Glasser, editor in chief of Foreign Policy, moderated the discussion. After the presentations, panelists took audience questions.

Video

• Relative Shift in U.S. Balance of Power
• Shifting Coalitions of Consensus
• Paradox of Power for U.S.
• U.S. Needs To Get Serious about Development and Energy

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• Shifting Balance of Power: Has the U.S. Become the Largest Minority Shareholder in the Global Order?

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20110315_global_order

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