The view from the Gulf

Neil Quilliam

There has been no coordinated response among states of the GCC, but the messages have been universal, and surprisingly each one has welcomed US efforts to restart peace talks and praised this particular US administration for doing so. But in each case, the same set of issues and concerns has been highlighted, namely the status of Jerusalem, the situation of refugees and ultimately a simple absence of a revival contiguous Palestinian state.

While much has been made of younger Gulf generation’s apparent disconnect from the emotive issues around Palestinian statehood, the state of Jerusalem and the larger refugee issue, older leaders in the Gulf continue to pay them heed. And despite a desire to coordinate with Israel on matters of security, intelligence sharing and tech, they will not advance the relationship under the terms of the so-called ‘deal of the century’.

Put simply, the deal forces Palestinians to concede ground on all matters of importance. And should the Arab Gulf states sign up to it, they will be judged harshly by history for not only selling out Palestine for $50 billion, but also footing the bill. As such, they all feel compelled to hedge and pay salutary lip-service to US efforts but know quietly they will die on the vine and that the Arab Peace Initiative is the only viable framework for advancing talks.

Even younger leaders know that the greater risk will come from signing up to the deal rather than twitter wrath of the US president.

Kuwaiti Parliament Speaker Marzouq Al-Ghanim threw a copy in the bin, emphasizing that it ‘was born dead’ and ‘should be thrown in the dustbin of history’.

While the Saudi official position towards the deal was one of qualified support, the Saudi press reported that King Salman had spoken with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who has rejected the plan, to ‘stress to him the Kingdom's steadfast position vis-à-vis the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people’. The king reportedly added: ‘The Kingdom stands alongside the Palestinian people and supports its choices and what[ever] will actualize its hopes and aspirations.’

Turki Al-Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief, described the deal’s idea of a Palestinian state as ‘a brutal conception’ and the deal itself as a ‘modern-day Frankenstein’. ‘For Palestine, it is definitely a step back,’ Al-Faisal said. ‘[The Trump administration has] given up the legitimate history and weight of the United Nations Security Council resolutions and adopted a unilateral path.’

The view from Europe

Reni Zhelyazkova

The initial EU response to President Trump’s ‘Peace to Prosperity’ plan was one of caution. An official statement soon after the announcement declared that the proposal needs to be studied and assessed but only a few days later the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, condemned the plan for being out of line with internationally agreed parameters.

Some member states like Luxembourg have expressed support for the foreign policy chief’s position. Ireland, historically a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause, and Sweden, the only country to recognize the Palestinian state after becoming an EU member, have responded negatively to the US proposal, expressing concern over mentions of Israeli annexation of Palestinian land and stating that it falls short from previous international agreements.

Other EU countries, however, have been much more guarded in their reactions. Responses from Germany and France have so far been lukewarm – on the one hand, welcoming US attempts at re-igniting peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians, and, on the other, warning that any future negotiations and agreements must be carried out in accordance with internationally established parameters and legal frameworks.

A strong voice of support for Trump’s proposal was that of Hungary, whose minister of foreign affairs and trade, Péter Szijjártó, commended White House adviser Jared Kushner on the plan during a meeting in Washington last week. Other EU countries are yet to respond publicly to the proposal but unity among all EU countries is far from certain.

The EU’s official position is that a two-state solution based on pre-1967 borders and in line with previous agreements and UN resolutions is the only viable option for lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

However, Israeli foreign policy under Netanyahu has focused on strengthening bilateral relations with countries in eastern and central Europe. Cooperation with Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and most recently Slovakia and Hungary has improved in all areas – from security and trade to tourism and cultural exchanges.

Five of these countries, namely, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria recognized the State of Palestine prior to joining the EU, but the rise of populist nationalism, concerns over migration and terrorism, and improving relations with the Trump administration in the US have contributed to an alignment in views between Israel and the right-leaning governments in southern and eastern Europe, as well as those in Italy and Austria.

Improved bilateral relations have translated into political acts of good will towards Israel with a number of EU countries expressing support for Israel in the United Nations and other international forums. Austria, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic defied official EU position and attended the US embassy opening in Jerusalem in May 2018.

In this sense, Israel’s strategy in eastern and central Europe can be seen as a deliberate effort to break up consensus within the EU, and, ideally, reverse the bloc’s position towards the Middle East conflict, but also towards Iran. 

At a time when the EU is managing Brexit, a complex internal agenda, including arguments over the EU budget, and with its relationship with the US strained over Iran, trade and other issues, it is unlikely that the bloc will contribute significant efforts to the Middle East Peace Process. It is even more difficult to see the EU coming up with its own proposal and even less likely that all member states will be able to agree on such an initiative given internal divisions. 

Under the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine for the period 2017-20 has focused on supporting the Palestinian Authority (PA) with institutional reform, economic development and service delivery. Progress, however, has been limited as the success of programming is dependent on Israeli policy towards the West Bank and Gaza. This has hardened under Netanyahu, who enjoys the full support of the current US administration and sees the EU as biased towards the Palestinians. 

Any plan that replaces the 2017-20 joint strategy will most likely be a continuation of the current approach which focuses on conflict management and supporting the already crumbling two-state solution by keeping the PA alive. 

Some room for cautious hope remains, as much depends on the outcome of the Israeli election on 2 March and the US presidential election in November. Changes in leadership could open up space for EU to actively support the reinvigoration of peace talks and regain its relevance as a mediator in the Middle East Peace Process.

Events over the past 18 months, in particular with the UK’s decision to leave the European Union and the election of Donald Trump, have elevated concerns among many Europeans and Americans over the health of the transatlantic relationship. With the EU looking inward and President Trump’s rejection of a number of historically common US-European interests, such as NATO, the JCPOA on Iran, and the Paris Agreement, the continuation of close transatlantic collaboration is in question.

Xenia Wickett will discuss the future of the transatlantic relationship. Is there a clear structural divergence between the US and the UK or is the partnership merely going through a temporary hiccup? She will explore the importance of recent events as well as structural, long-term factors that affect the US and Europe similarly. And what actions, if any, can be taken to mitigate differences and best manage the current situation of uncertainty?

Please note, this event is online only. Members will be able to watch the webinar from a computer or other internet-ready device and do not need to come to Chatham House to attend.

There has been a renaissance in the study of how the backgrounds of individual leaders affect foreign policy outcomes. Donald Trump's presidency highlights the limits of this approach. Trump's psychology is so unique, and so akin to that of a small child, that studying his background alone is insufficient to explain his decision-making. The evidence for this characterization of Trump's leadership comes not from his political opponents, but his allies, staffers and subordinates. Trump's lack of impulse control, short attention span and frequent temper tantrums have all undercut his effectiveness as president as compared to his predecessors. Nonetheless, the 45th president helps to clarify ongoing debates in American politics about the relative strength of the presidency as an institution. In particular, the powers of the presidency have become so enhanced that even comparatively weak and inexperienced leaders can execute dramatic policy shifts. The formal checks on presidential power, from the legislative, judicial and executive branches have all eroded. Similarly, the informal checks on the presidency had also degraded before Trump's inauguration. This article uses Trump's presidency—and his severe limitations as a decision-maker—to highlight the ways in which even a weak leader can affect change by holding a powerful office.

On 7 November, as governments reconvened in Marrakech for the first major round of climate talks since the momentous Paris summit, they had the wind in their sails. The sense of momentum that had built in the run-up to Paris had continued, with recent global deals to phase out HFCs (potent greenhouse gases used in refrigeration and air conditioning) and tackle emissions from aviation. However, by the morning of 9 November the mood changed to one of unease and trepidation, as news of Donald Trump’s US election victory sunk in. Only days after entering into force, the Paris Agreement was faced with the possibility of the world’s second largest emitter, and a key dealmaker and architect of the regime, withdrawing.

Although details of Trump’s positions on climate and energy policy are scarce, his statements on the campaign trail appear to signal a marked departure from the Obama administration’s approach. The president-elect has said he would ‘cancel’ the Paris Agreement and ‘rescind’ the Climate Action Plan which underpins US action to reduce emissions. On the basis of these statements, it is hard to view the election result as anything other than a major setback for the climate. The new international climate regime now faces a very early and very big test.

Paris’s first test

The response from governments has been swift. Statement after statement emphasized a clear and consistent message: countries remain committed to the Paris Agreement and to delivering their emissions reductions. While there is hope that the US will remain a part, the message was that the process will continue regardless. Importantly, there have as yet been no indications that recusant parties to the agreement might use a US withdrawal as cover to do the same.

This display of unity is arguably Marrakech’s defining success. Progress in talks to flesh out the so-called ‘rulebook’ for how the Paris Agreement will operate come 2020 was modest in some areas and disappointing in others; on finance, the perennial tensions between developed and developing countries were as clear as ever. But when the time came to uphold the nascent regime in the face of a threat, powerful international norms on climate action meant there were no divisions.

Two important questions

The prospect of US disengagement from the international regime, whether de jure or de facto, raises two important questions: one for the US and another for the rest of the world.

For the international community, the question is one of leadership. In the run-up to Paris, the US and China together set expectations for a global agreement, signalling their intent through a series of joint announcements that set the bar for ambition and carried other countries with them. Progressive countries hoped this partnership would re-emerge in 2018, when talks begin on closing the gap between national emission reduction plans and what is needed to achieve the Paris goal of containing warming ‘well below’ 2°C. A wholesale step change in ambition is required if the 2°C goal is to remain within reach, requiring intense climate diplomacy of the kind witnessed before Paris. Will China be prepared to unilaterally set the pace and raise ambition first? Will a new partner come forward, or new coalition emerge, to fill the vacuum left by the US and work alongside China to provide leadership?

The US faces a question of national interest. With the rest of the world apparently united on climate change, what costs might the US incur were it to withdraw from the global regime? To fly in the face of strong international norms on climate action would certainly erode American soft power and concede global status to China, which continues to signal its ambition to decarbonize. And with the US expected to take a more protectionist approach to trade, it is possible that other countries, frustrated at US free-riding on the emissions reductions of others, might impose tariffs on American imports to adjust for the lower emissions costs of US exporters. Nor will American prosperity be served by the US economy remaining shackled to fossil fuels while the rest of the world’s economy transitions away from them. All countries stand to lose if the US backslides on climate change, most of all the US.

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