Yu Xue
Sep 1, 2008; 7:1598-1608
Research

Leigh Anderson
Apr 1, 2006; 5:573-588
Research

Claudio P. Albuquerque
Jul 1, 2008; 7:1389-1396
Research

Ludovic C. Gillet
Jun 1, 2012; 11:O111.016717-O111.016717
Research

Ignat V. Shilov
Sep 1, 2007; 6:1638-1655
Technology

Martin R. Larsen
Jul 1, 2005; 4:873-886
Technology

Jeffrey C. Silva
Jan 1, 2006; 5:144-156
Research

Ulrich Rothbauer
Feb 1, 2008; 7:282-289
Research

Yasushi Ishihama
Sep 1, 2005; 4:1265-1272
Research

Linn Fagerberg
Feb 1, 2014; 13:397-406
Research

Jesper V. Olsen
Dec 1, 2005; 4:2010-2021
Technology

Philip L. Ross
Dec 1, 2004; 3:1154-1169
Research

Jürgen Cox
Sep 1, 2014; 13:2513-2526
Technological Innovation and Resources

Shao-En Ong
May 1, 2002; 1:376-386
Research

Staphylococcus aureus adhesion to the host's skin and mucosae enables asymptomatic colonization and the establishment of infection. This process is facilitated by cell wall-anchored adhesins that bind to host ligands. Therapeutics targeting this process could provide significant clinical benefits; however, the development of anti-adhesives requires an in-depth knowledge of adhesion-associated factors and an assay amenable to high-throughput applications. Here, we describe the development of a sensitive and robust whole cell assay to enable the large-scale profiling of S. aureus adhesion to host ligands. To validate the assay, and to gain insight into cellular factors contributing to adhesion, we profiled a sequence-defined S. aureus transposon mutant library, identifying mutants with attenuated adhesion to human-derived fibronectin, keratin, and fibrinogen. Our screening approach was validated by the identification of known adhesion-related proteins, such as the housekeeping sortase responsible for covalently linking adhesins to the cell wall. In addition, we also identified genetic loci that could represent undescribed anti-adhesive targets. To compare and contrast the genetic requirements of adhesion to each host ligand, we generated a S. aureus Genetic Adhesion Network, which identified a core gene set involved in adhesion to all three host ligands, and unique genetic signatures. In summary, this assay will enable high-throughput chemical screens to identify anti-adhesives and our findings provide insight into the target space of such an approach.

Despite its major importance in human health, the metabolic potential of the human gut microbiota is still poorly understood. We have recently shown that biosynthesis of Ruminococcin C (RumC), a novel ribosomally synthesized and posttranslationally modified peptide (RiPP) produced by the commensal bacterium Ruminococcus gnavus, requires two radical SAM enzymes (RumMC1 and RumMC2) catalyzing the formation of four Cα-thioether bridges. These bridges, which are essential for RumC's antibiotic properties against human pathogens such as Clostridium perfringens, define two hairpin domains giving this sactipeptide (sulfur-to-α-carbon thioether–containing peptide) an unusual architecture among natural products. We report here the biochemical and spectroscopic characterizations of RumMC2. EPR spectroscopy and mutagenesis data support that RumMC2 is a member of the large family of SPASM domain radical SAM enzymes characterized by the presence of three [4Fe-4S] clusters. We also demonstrate that this enzyme initiates its reaction by Cα H-atom abstraction and is able to catalyze the formation of nonnatural thioether bonds in engineered peptide substrates. Unexpectedly, our data support the formation of a ketoimine rather than an α,β-dehydro-amino acid intermediate during Cα-thioether bridge LC–MS/MS fragmentation. Finally, we explored the roles of the leader peptide and of the RiPP precursor peptide recognition element, present in myriad RiPP-modifying enzymes. Collectively, our data support a more complex role for the peptide recognition element and the core peptide for the installation of posttranslational modifications in RiPPs than previously anticipated and suggest a possible reaction intermediate for thioether bond formation.

Leukocidin ED (LukED) is a pore-forming toxin produced by Staphylococcus aureus, which lyses host cells and promotes virulence of the bacteria. LukED enables S. aureus to acquire iron by lysing erythrocytes, which depends on targeting the host receptor Duffy antigen receptor for chemokines (DARC). The toxin also targets DARC on the endothelium, contributing to the lethality observed during bloodstream infection in mice. LukED is comprised of two monomers: LukE and LukD. LukE binds to DARC and facilitates hemolysis, but the closely related Panton–Valentine leukocidin S (LukS-PV) does not bind to DARC and is not hemolytic. The interaction of LukE with DARC and the role this plays in hemolysis are incompletely characterized. To determine the domain(s) of LukE that are critical for DARC binding, we studied the hemolytic function of LukE–LukS-PV chimeras, in which areas of sequence divergence (divergence regions, or DRs) were swapped between the toxins. We found that two regions of LukE's rim domain contribute to hemolysis, namely residues 57–75 (DR1) and residues 182–196 (DR4). Interestingly, LukE DR1 is sufficient to render LukS-PV capable of DARC binding and hemolysis. Further, LukE, by binding DARC through DR1, promotes the recruitment of LukD to erythrocytes, likely by facilitating LukED oligomer formation. Finally, we show that LukE targets murine Darc through DR1 in vivo to cause host lethality. These findings expand our biochemical understanding of the LukE–DARC interaction and the role that this toxin-receptor pair plays in S. aureus pathophysiology.

HIV Type 1 (HIV-1) and simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) display differential replication kinetics in macrophages. This is because high expression levels of the active host deoxynucleotide triphosphohydrolase sterile α motif domain and histidine-aspartate domain–containing protein 1 (SAMHD1) deplete intracellular dNTPs, which restrict HIV-1 reverse transcription, and result in a restrictive infection in this myeloid cell type. Some SIVs overcome SAMHD1 restriction using viral protein X (Vpx), a viral accessory protein that induces proteasomal degradation of SAMHD1, increasing cellular dNTP concentrations and enabling efficient proviral DNA synthesis. We previously reported that SAMHD1-noncounteracting lentiviruses may have evolved to harbor RT proteins that efficiently polymerize DNA, even at low dNTP concentrations, to circumvent SAMHD1 restriction. Here we investigated whether RTs from SIVmac239 virus lacking a Vpx protein evolve during in vivo infection to more efficiently synthesize DNA at the low dNTP concentrations found in macrophages. Sequence analysis of RTs cloned from Vpx (+) and Vpx (−) SIVmac239–infected animals revealed that Vpx (−) RTs contained more extensive mutations than Vpx (+) RTs. Although the amino acid substitutions were dispersed indiscriminately across the protein, steady-state and pre-steady-state analysis demonstrated that selected SIVmac239 Vpx (−) RTs are characterized by higher catalytic efficiency and incorporation efficiency values than RTs cloned from SIVmac239 Vpx (+) infections. Overall, this study supports the possibility that the loss of Vpx may generate in vivo SIVmac239 RT variants that can counteract the limited availability of dNTP substrate in macrophages.

Candida albicans and Aspergillus fumigatus are dangerous fungal pathogens with high morbidity and mortality, particularly in immunocompromised patients. Innate immune-mediated programmed cell death (pyroptosis, apoptosis, necroptosis) is an integral part of host defense against pathogens. Inflammasomes, which are canonically formed upstream of pyroptosis, have been characterized as key mediators of fungal sensing and drivers of proinflammatory responses. However, the specific cell death pathways and key upstream sensors activated in the context of Candida and Aspergillus infections are unknown. Here, we report that C. albicans and A. fumigatus infection induced inflammatory programmed cell death in the form of pyroptosis, apoptosis, and necroptosis (PANoptosis). Further, we identified the innate immune sensor Z-DNA binding protein 1 (ZBP1) as the apical sensor of fungal infection responsible for activating the inflammasome/pyroptosis, apoptosis, and necroptosis. The Zα2 domain of ZBP1 was required to promote this inflammasome activation and PANoptosis. Overall, our results demonstrate that C. albicans and A. fumigatus induce PANoptosis and that ZBP1 plays a vital role in inflammasome activation and PANoptosis in response to fungal pathogens.

Lys234 is one of the residues present in class A β-lactamases that is under selective pressure due to antibiotic use. Located adjacent to proton shuttle residue Ser130, it is suggested to play a role in proton transfer during catalysis of the antibiotics. The mechanism underpinning how substitutions in this position modulate inhibitor efficiency and substrate specificity leading to drug resistance is unclear. The K234R substitution identified in several inhibitor-resistant β-lactamase variants is associated with decreased potency of the inhibitor clavulanic acid, which is used in combination with amoxicillin to overcome β-lactamase–mediated antibiotic resistance. Here we show that for CTX-M-14 β-lactamase, whereas Lys234 is required for hydrolysis of cephalosporins such as cefotaxime, either lysine or arginine is sufficient for hydrolysis of ampicillin. Further, by determining the acylation and deacylation rates for cefotaxime hydrolysis, we show that both rates are fast, and neither is rate-limiting. The K234R substitution causes a 1500-fold decrease in the cefotaxime acylation rate but a 5-fold increase in kcat for ampicillin, suggesting that the K234R enzyme is a good penicillinase but a poor cephalosporinase due to slow acylation. Structural results suggest that the slow acylation by the K234R enzyme is due to a conformational change in Ser130, and this change also leads to decreased inhibition potency of clavulanic acid. Because other inhibitor resistance mutations also act through changes at Ser130 and such changes drastically reduce cephalosporin but not penicillin hydrolysis, we suggest that clavulanic acid paired with an oxyimino-cephalosporin rather than penicillin would impede the evolution of resistance.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

Strategy and Enemies

The structure of an army will depend on the strategy, as strategy will determine the army’s role and tasks. A state which carries out expansion through outright territorial conquest will have large numbers of heavy infantry, combat engineers and artillery, and possibly some heavy cavalry as well (e.g. Roman Empire, 10th century Byzantine Empire). If conquest is done by slowly destroying an opponent’s economic and social structures through constant raiding (such as chevauchee or razzia / ghazw), then majority of the army will be light cavalry, with some heavy cavalry support (e.g. Seljuk and Ottoman Empires), and light infantry will be used if terrain is unsuitable for cavalry. If a state is defending against cavalry raids, then light cavalry will be dominant (e.g. 15th century Hungary), whereas heavy cavalry will predominate if enemy raiders are primarily infantry. If enemy armies are too powerful to face in the field, light and heavy cavalry will be used to harass the invading army and cut off its supplies and foraging. In terrain unsuitable for cavalry operations, heavy infantry will be used instead.

Raiding — as a strategy — is generally preferred against a peer opponent, especially if a state cannot have a developed logistical support system.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Strategy & Organization at Mythic Scribes.

Wisdom to my mind is a bit of a paradox. It is subjective and context-dependent, but inherently universal. I say this, because for something to be wise it ought to be applicable across time and space, yet whether the claims are appraised as being “wise” hinges on the perception of a past, present or future audience. It is beyond the self, yet dependent upon the self. So that then begs the fantasy writing question: What if the self is not human? If culture already morphs the form and substance of wisdom, what effect might a different state of being have on it?

That would be terribly dull to prescribe, but I can help get some readers’ creativity going. Below I have listed relevant questions with examples you might consider when building your setting, so you may merrily thread into your fantastic realms to shape oddities rich and strange.

I would advise readers of this article to try and let go of their own presumptions on what is wise for the sake of worldbuilding. There are few cultures in our modern, human world whose philosophers deem obtuse narcissists dressed in mink robes as being wise, but why wouldn’t a race of bobcat-folk?

Continue reading Questions for Worldbuilding the Concept of Wisdom at Mythic Scribes.

New essay anthology examines the future of the international order News release jon.wallace 7 May 2021

Featuring a new essay by Robin Niblett, Chief Executive of Chatham House, and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director of the US and Americas programme.

“Anchoring the World”, a new anthology, features an important new essay by Robin Niblett, Chief Executive of Chatham House, and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director of the US and Americas programme. The essay, “The Liberal Order Begins At Home”, argues powerfully for the revival of a liberal international order.

The essay collection has been produced by the Lloyd George Study Group on World Order, and celebrates the centennial years of Chatham House, Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Robin Niblett said:

“In this excellent collection, some authors argue that the United Nations should continue to anchor the international system, while others argue for the creation of a new Concert of Powers.

“Our essay argues that it is both necessary and possible to revive the idea of a liberal international order: necessary (and urgent) because of heightened global competition with China, and possible only if western democracies repair their deep social and economic problems at home.

“We hope this volume carries forward the fortitude and creative spirit that the School of Foreign Service, Chatham House, and the Council on Foreign Relations have brought to the study and practice of international affairs over the past century.”

The Lloyd George Study Group and book were made possible by the generosity of the family of Robert Lloyd George, the great-grandson of British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George.

Anchoring the World is published by Foreign Affairs magazine.

Saturday Club introduces young people to international affairs News release jon.wallace 24 February 2022

Clubs will help 13-16 year-olds learn more about the forces that are shaping the world and discover how young people can influence the future.

National Saturday Club and Chatham House are delighted to announce the launch of the Society&Change Saturday Club. This new programme creates opportunities for UK 13–16-year-olds to develop a global mindset and build awareness of trends that will shape the world in the coming decades.

Three pilot Society&Change Clubs will be hosted by the University of Sussex, Manchester Metropolitan University, and the University of Huddersfield. Chatham House will provide speakers and generate ideas for the clubs.

National Saturday Club gives 13–16-year-olds across the country the opportunity to study subjects they love at their local university, college or cultural institution, for free.

Society&Change Club members will be introduced to a wide range of careers including policy making and diplomacy, advocacy, media and journalism, international trade and business, and the international development and humanitarian sector.

Weekly classes will be led by led by professional tutors from the host institutions. Club members will also take part in masterclasses with industry professionals, as well as an end of year summer show and graduation ceremonies.

Lucy Kennedy, Chief Executive of the Saturday Club Trust said:

‘We are delighted to be partnering with Chatham House to launch the Society&Change Saturday Club, the sixth subject within the National Saturday Club programme. Over the past 12 years, working nationally with 13–16-year-olds, we have seen that young people are eager to share their hopes and ideas for the future and address the issues the world faces.

‘We hope this new Saturday Club will empower them to shape their own futures and will bring the urgent voice of young people to international debate.’

Rose Abdollahzadeh, Managing Director for Research Partnerships at Chatham House said:

‘We are really excited about the potential for this partnership to encourage young people across the UK to explore their role in the world. The National Saturday Club network will also give Chatham House opportunities to harness the energy, ideas and passion of young people towards positive change.

‘By introducing Club members to contemporary debates on global issues and a range of professions in foreign policy and international relations, our hope is that some Club members will choose to follow a career path into this sector.’

Learn more about the Society&Change Saturday Club.

Mark Carney to chair Chatham House senior advisers News release NCapeling 17 May 2022

Former Bank of England Governor Mark Carney will succeed Sir John Major as chair of Chatham House’s Panel of Senior Advisers.

Chatham House is pleased to announce Mark Carney will succeed Sir John Major as chair of the institute’s Panel of Senior Advisers.

Chatham House senior advisers bring deep, first-hand experience of the policy and business worlds and use their experience, knowledge and networks to advise the institute’s research agenda and disseminate its policy ideas.

Mark Carney is currently United Nations (UN) Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance, UK prime minister Boris Johnson’s special finance adviser on COP26, as well as vice chairman and head of transition investing at Brookfield Asset Management.

He served as Governor of the Bank of England between 2013 and 2020 and as Governor of the Bank of Canada between 2008 and 2013.

Robin Niblett, director and chief executive of Chatham House says: ‘We are delighted to benefit from Mark Carney’s wealth of experience at the highest levels of decision-making on international financial policy, crisis management, and sustainability.

‘His personal commitment to leveraging economic and finance policies to combat climate change aligns with a central plank of the institute’s mission to help governments and societies build a sustainable future.

‘I also want to thank Sir John Major for his invaluable advice and support through such a pivotal time in the institute’s history; we are delighted that he will retain an affiliation as a President Emeritus of Chatham House.’

Sir Nigel Sheinwald, chair of Chatham House, says: ‘Mark Carney is perfectly placed to lead the institute’s Panel of Senior Advisers and help ensure our research is focused on improving international relations in practical ways.

‘His experience and expertise will be of great value as the institute undertakes a leadership transition and welcomes Bronwen Maddox as its new director in the autumn.

‘The Chatham House council greatly appreciates Mark Carney’s engagement in our future success, as we do Sir John’s commitment to the institute these past thirteen years.’

Mark Carney says: ‘I have long respected Chatham House as one of the world’s leading independent institutes on international policy and am honoured to take up the reins from Sir John Major of chairing its eminent Panel of Senior Advisers. Alongside other members of the panel, I look forward to contributing to the relevance and impact of Chatham House’s important work.’

In addition to having been Governor of the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada, Mark Carney also chaired the Financial Stability Board from 2011 to 2018 and, in 2015, established the Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures.

In 2021, he launched the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, to unite net-zero financial sector-specific alliances from across the world into one industry-wide strategic alliance.

Chatham House established the Panel of Senior Advisers in 2009, under Sir John’s Major’s chairmanship, to support the institute in achieving its mission to build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Individually and collectively, members of the panel support the institute in achieving its mission by advising on new topics for debate, offering input to the institute’s research, contributing to its private and public meetings, and disseminating the institute’s ideas across their networks.

The panel does not have governance responsibilities, which reside fully with the Chatham House council.

Europe should become the top priority for Liz Truss Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

Liz Truss has the chance to be a better prime minister than Boris Johnson was, not least in the UK’s foreign policy.

For all the smoke-and-mirrors talk now commonplace about Brexit opportunities, there is real potential that Liz Truss could extract from the aftermath of that upheaval as well as from the turmoil in the world.

But the approach and priorities she revealed during her one year as a better UK foreign secretary than Boris Johnson was – although he did set a low bar – as well as the past three months campaigning for the leadership of her party contain a warning.

She has shown a willingness to aggravate relationships with allies in pursuit of the support of her party faithful, and of a vision of British independence as well as a tendency to dismiss economic analysis when it inconveniently questions her assertions about favoured policies.

At the heart of her political identity is a notion which is both a strength and a potentially calamitous weakness – a love of the notion of being a disrupter which injects a deliberate unpredictability into her approach towards a world in extreme flux.

If she indulges this without good judgment, she could do real damage to Britain’s prospects and standing in the world.

Ukraine and the energy crisis

In foreign policy, Europe should be her starting point and the opportunity here for the UK is clear. The war in Ukraine and crisis in the cost of energy gives it a role – despite having left the European Union (EU) – in talking to EU governments about the future of the continent on many fronts.

Johnson’s emphatic support of President Zelensky gave the UK a position of moral and strategic clarity which Truss can build on through what will be an exceptionally difficult winter for Europe’s governments.

She is in a position to persuade European leaders to remain united in Ukraine’s support while planning better how they are going to source energy. She could expand on that to help the EU find a way through its many other problems, such as upholding democratic values throughout the bloc or finding a response to migration.

There is also a chance for the UK to shape Europe’s thinking on the development and regulation of digital technology and medicine, energy, and the environment.

Truss’s declaration that the UK should now spend three per cent of its GDP on defence could help her in taking that kind of role. However this campaign declaration is not yet credible, given the pressures on the national finances and her silence so far on support for households on energy costs.

But that is the opportunity in theory and the signs are this is not her approach to Europe. Her provocative and opportunistic comment that the ‘jury’s out’ on whether President Macron (and France) was a friend or foe shocked both Britain’s allies and opponents.

For those keen to see divisions among democracies, it gave unexpected, heady encouragement, and to those within those countries, it injected a doubt about shared values which was deeply damaging. The chilly poise of Macron’s response – that the UK and France would always be allies – showed how far she had departed from normal protocol.

The episode encapsulated one of the sources of unease about the Truss style – improvisation under the banner of ‘disruption’ without thought of consequences.

However, she has shown consistency over the Northern Ireland Protocol with little sign of compromise, and that alone could cause much unnecessary damage to UK interests. It also puts her on a collision course with the EU and the UK House of Lords, due to consider controversial legislation again in early October after the Conservative party conference.

There is huge opposition in the Lords to two aspects of the legislation. The first target is the intention of the Johnson government – likely to be repeated by a Truss government – to use the bill to jettison aspects of the protocol, which many argue breaks international law. The second is the delegated power the bill would give ministers.

The cost of a new, serious clash – or worse, a full trade war – with the EU is high. There is the loss of trade, the increase in friction for business, which is consistently underestimated by the UK government, and the loss of scientific and research partnerships.

More than that, though, there is the weakening of ties to a set of allies with common values sharing an increasingly troubled neighbourhood.

US, China, and others remain important

And to say Europe should come first is not to dismiss other claims on the UK’s foreign policy. Her instinctive liking for the US will help Truss in relations with Washington at a difficult time, and her apparent intention to designate China as ‘a threat’ will support that relationship too.

After Truss, the UK can still rebuild its global reputation Expert comment NCapeling 20 October 2022

Following a chaotic few weeks as UK prime minister, Liz Truss has stepped down. And that is the best outcome for her party and for the country.

Liz Truss could not command support for her calamitous – and misnamed – mini-budget. And once her new Chancellor Jeremy Hunt had overturned its provisions, she had no mission or credibility left.

The budget pushed interest rates higher and they did not fall much on the scrapping of it, leaving her open to the charge she pushed up mortgage and interest costs for every person and business in the country. Her apology for ‘mistakes made’ was not going to reverse that, so her MPs were right to tell her to go.

Her departure does mark a victory for at least some of the UK’s institutions, even if it might not seem that way to observers around the world.

The position of the UK parliament has been reaffirmed, and so has that of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – it will be a long time before a government tries to dispense with the comments of the independent watchdog of national finances.

This also reinforces the principle that governments must explain how they will pay for their programmes. The Bank of England remains unencumbered – despite Truss’s apparent intentions of giving it a pro-growth addition to its mandate – to pursue its aim of tackling inflation.

New leader needs legitimacy quickly

The Conservative party has a chance – perhaps – to produce another prime minister without being forced into a general election, as that is the constitutional principle in the UK’s parliamentary system.

But the clamour that the new leader, as the third prime minister in one year, lacks legitimacy may prove impossible to resist for long.

In attempting to select a leader with a chance of uniting the party, the Conservatives are right to be considering options for restricting this leadership election to MPs should there be only one candidate with enough support.

But no such candidate may emerge and the pressure within the Commons – and the country – for an early election will not let up.

There is no question the UK’s standing in the world has been severely battered by this episode and by the revolving door of prime ministers. For the UK to regain respect – and an image of reliability – it needs to move fast and find someone capable of putting policies into action.

Those policies need to be based on economic stability but must also include a resolution of the relationship with Europe as much of the current upheaval represents the bitter aftermath of Brexit.

Concluding a deal with Brussels over the Northern Ireland protocol – avoiding ripping up the treaty the UK signed – and continuing to smooth the considerable friction that the exit from the EU has brought for exporters is essential work for the next prime minister.

Pursuing a deal for scientists to take part in the European Union (EU) Horizon research should be a priority. UK universities and researchers are already reluctantly preparing for a future where that does not come, with signs of the feared drain of talent already clear.

UK’s international reputation now at risk

Beyond that, there is much about UK policy which needs clarifying if the country is to regain its international standing. Just weeks from the start of COP27 and less than one year since the Glasgow climate change summit it hosted, the UK position on climate change commitments appears in flux.

The UK government pledge to help Ukraine is clear and has won it gratitude there and respect within Europe, but its intentions for defence spending are less clear.

Independent Thinking: Iran protests, Iraq's invasion legacy Audio NCapeling 17 November 2022

Episode five of our new weekly podcast has a Middle East focus with insights into what is driving the ongoing protests in Iran, and the progress of Iraq in the years since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Since September, Iran has been swept by thousands of women-led protests, demanding an end to the morality police and the even calling for the fall of the Islamic Republic.

Meanwhile at Chatham House this week saw our Iraq Initiative conference 2022, which delved heavily into the multiple challenges facing Iraq two decades on from the invasion which toppled Saddam Hussein.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week are the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa programme deputy director Dr Sanam Vakil and senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour, who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative. They are joined by Sanya Burgess, digital investigations journalist with Sky News.

Independent Thinking: Insurrections and elections in Brazil and the US Audio NCapeling 20 January 2023

Episode 11 examines disinformation in the US and Brazil, the role played by social media platforms, and how conspiracy theories percolate online.

The storming in Brasilia of government institutions by supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro echoed the events seen at the US Capitol building on 6 January 2021. This week’s guests discuss the impact on Brazil.

The panel also examines the state of politics in the US going into 2023. How are things shaping up for Joe Biden’s presidency after the mid-terms now that a new Congress has been sworn in? And what are the challenges being faced more broadly by the American body politic two years on from the insurrection at Capitol Hill.

Joining guest host Leslie Vinjamuri this week from Chatham House is Christopher Sabatini, senior research fellow for Latin America, Serusha Govender, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation academy fellow, and Alex Krasodomski, senior research associate at the Digital Society Initiative.

Independent Thinking: Russia’s invasion one year on Audio NCapeling 23 February 2023

Episode 16 of our weekly podcast examines the global impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine one year on from when Vladimir Putin launched his all-out assault.

Following a decision which unleashed the largest war seen in Europe since 1945, with hundreds of thousands of casualties on all sides, the panel examines the impact of the invasion for Ukraine and its people, but also the world.

Also under discussion are key insights from the recent Munich Security Conference, and the announcement this week by Russian president Vladimir Putin to susend his country’s participation in the vital New START nuclear weapons treaty.

Joining Bronwen on the show this week from the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House is programme director James Nixey and associate fellow Samantha de Bendern, alongside Patricia Lewis, director of our International Security programme. They are joined on the panel by Mariya Ionova, a Ukrainian opposition MP.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: India, International Women's Day Audio NCapeling 9 March 2023

Episode 18 of our weekly podcast examines issues for women working in international affairs, and tackles India’s domestic politics and international standing.

Our panel this week discuss their experiences working professionally in global affairs and what advice they have for other women wanting to work in public policy.

India is also under discussion as Chatham House hosted Rahul Gandhi, leading Indian politician and former president of the Indian National Congress (INC). The panel considers his remarks about India’s internal quandaries and international perceptions of the country, almost a decade on from the 2014 election which brought Narendra Modi and the BJP to power.

Joining Bronwen Maddox from Chatham House are Rashmin Sagoo, director of the International Law programme, Anna Aberg from the Environment and Society programme, Armida van Rij from the International Security programme, and Isabella Wilkinson, research associate on cybersecurity. They are joined by Dr Mukulika Banerjee, who was until recently the director of the LSE South Asia Centre.

Accumulation of the microtubule-associated protein tau is associated with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In AD brain, tau is abnormally phosphorylated at many sites, and phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 plays critical roles in tau accumulation and toxicity. Microtubule affinity–regulating kinase 4 (MARK4) phosphorylates tau at those sites, and a double de novo mutation in the linker region of MARK4, ΔG316E317D, is associated with an elevated risk of AD. However, it remains unclear how this mutation affects phosphorylation, aggregation, and accumulation of tau and tau-induced neurodegeneration. Here, we report that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases the abundance of highly phosphorylated, insoluble tau species and exacerbates neurodegeneration via Ser-262/356–dependent and –independent mechanisms. Using transgenic Drosophila expressing human MARK4 (MARK4wt) or a mutant version of MARK4 (MARK4ΔG316E317D), we found that coexpression of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased total tau levels and enhanced tau-induced neurodegeneration and that MARK4ΔG316E317D had more potent effects than MARK4wt. Interestingly, the in vitro kinase activities of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D were similar. When tau phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 was blocked by alanine substitutions, MARK4wt did not promote tau accumulation or exacerbate neurodegeneration, whereas coexpression of MARK4ΔG316E317D did. Both MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased the levels of oligomeric forms of tau; however, only MARK4ΔG316E317D further increased the detergent insolubility of tau in vivo. Together, these findings suggest that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases tau levels and exacerbates tau toxicity via a novel gain-of-function mechanism and that modification in this region of MARK4 may affect disease pathogenesis.

Synapse loss is associated with motor and cognitive decline in multiple neurodegenerative disorders, and the cellular redistribution of tau is related to synaptic impairment in tauopathies, such as Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia. Here, we examined the cellular distribution of tau protein species in human tau overexpressing line 66 mice, a transgenic mouse model akin to genetic variants of frontotemporal dementia. Line 66 mice express intracellular tau aggregates in multiple brain regions and exhibit sensorimotor and motor learning deficiencies. Using a series of anti-tau antibodies, we observed, histologically, that nonphosphorylated transgenic human tau is enriched in synapses, whereas phosphorylated tau accumulates predominantly in cell bodies and axons. Subcellular fractionation confirmed that human tau is highly enriched in insoluble cytosolic and synaptosomal fractions, whereas endogenous mouse tau is virtually absent from synapses. Cytosolic tau was resistant to solubilization with urea and Triton X-100, indicating the formation of larger tau aggregates. By contrast, synaptic tau was partially soluble after Triton X-100 treatment and most likely represents aggregates of smaller size. MS corroborated that synaptosomal tau is nonphosphorylated. Tau enriched in the synapse of line 66 mice, therefore, appears to be in an oligomeric and nonphosphorylated state, and one that could have a direct impact on cognitive function.

Alzheimer's disease (AD) is characterized by neuronal loss and accumulation of β-amyloid-protein (Aβ) in the brain parenchyma. Sleep impairment is associated with AD and affects about 25–40% of patients in the mild-to-moderate stages of the disease. Sleep deprivation leads to increased Aβ production; however, its mechanism remains largely unknown. We hypothesized that the increase in core body temperature induced by sleep deprivation may promote Aβ production. Here, we report temperature-dependent regulation of Aβ production. We found that an increase in temperature, from 37 °C to 39 °C, significantly increased Aβ production in amyloid precursor protein-overexpressing cells. We also found that high temperature (39 °C) significantly increased the expression levels of heat shock protein 90 (Hsp90) and the C-terminal fragment of presenilin 1 (PS1-CTF) and promoted γ-secretase complex formation. Interestingly, Hsp90 was associated with the components of the premature γ-secretase complex, anterior pharynx-defective-1 (APH-1), and nicastrin (NCT) but was not associated with PS1-CTF or presenilin enhancer-2. Hsp90 knockdown abolished the increased level of Aβ production and the increased formation of the γ-secretase complex at high temperature in culture. Furthermore, with in vivo experiments, we observed increases in the levels of Hsp90, PS1-CTF, NCT, and the γ-secretase complex in the cortex of mice housed at higher room temperature (30 °C) compared with those housed at standard room temperature (23 °C). Our results suggest that high temperature regulates Aβ production by modulating γ-secretase complex formation through the binding of Hsp90 to NCT/APH-1.

In conversation with the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds 17 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

The Minister of State for Development discusses the new government’s international development priorities.

Following its election victory in July 2024, the new government has set out an ambition to reset its relationships with countries in the Global South. Its stated mission is to modernise the UK’s approach to international development, helping to create ‘a world free from poverty on a liveable planet’.

Where can the UK make a meaningful difference in a more volatile and insecure world? The government is looking to address priorities including unsustainable debt, empowering women and girls, conflict prevention, and unlocking climate finance. But it does this with a much-reduced Official Development Assistance budget, in a world where progress to meet the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is off track. And while the UK has been debating its own approach to development, the landscape has been changing, with non-allied states vying for influence in the Global South, and developing countries themselves becoming more vocal on climate, debt, and global institutional reform. What kind of role can the government set out for the UK in this context?

In this discussion, the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds, Minister of State for Development in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, will lay out her priorities for meeting international development goals over the coming parliament.

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What the US election means for trade policy Expert comment LJefferson 10 October 2024

Kamala Harris and Donald Trump could not be more different when it comes to trade, despite a changed economic landscape.

Trade policy is playing a relatively subdued role in this autumn’s US election. Yes, former president Trump has proposed tariffs of anywhere from 20 per cent to 100 per cent, asserting the revenue could fund policy areas from deficit reduction to childcare, all while growing US employment and promoting world peace.
  
But unlike 2020, or even more 2016, the international trade architecture has not been a lively part of this year’s campaign. The two parties now start from a shared expectation of an international economic landscape shaped more by competition and industrial policy than by continued liberalization. However, the two presidential candidates’ views of which trade tools to use, and whether to proceed with allies and partners or unilaterally, could not be more different.

New set of trade expectations

A large part of the relative calm has to do with the emergence of a new set of expectations on trade that are shared across Republicans and Democrats, and that are unlikely to shift in the next four years regardless of who occupies the White House.

First, neither party can field the support to pass a traditional comprehensive free trade agreement through Congress. While each party still has a wing of elected officials who would like to see the US return to negotiating deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or attempt expansive new deals with Europe or in the Western Hemisphere, they are unlikely to reach critical mass in the immediate future, regardless of who holds the White House – or who controls Congress.

This shift in perception of the relative value of such deals – and their potential to cause political blowback for legislators – also means that the cost to any administration that wanted to propose such a deal would be high.

Second, there is broad bipartisan support to continue measures aimed at promoting US security in the face of high-technology challenges from Beijing that have both military and security applications. This means continued US activism in export controls and other more innovative measures.

Less divergence on clean energy

While there is also cross-party enthusiasm for approaches to building up US manufacturing that fall under the rubric of industrial policy, the parties diverge significantly when it comes to specific content. However, around clean energy that divergence will be less than the campaign trail rhetoric suggests.

Because clean energy generation is spread so broadly across the United States – with a great deal of wind and solar generation in Republican-governed ‘red states,’ and investment from the Inflation Reduction Act flowing to red states as much or more than blue ones – such incentives, and their effects on trade policy, are here to stay. Despite this, a Republican presidency or Congress will certainly seek to water down or eliminate parts of the Inflation Reduction Act that focus specifically on transition away from fossil fuels.
 
Coupled with this commitment to making America a clean energy superpower, there is considerable cross-party interest in trade initiatives that promote clean energy and manufacturing – whether from a climate perspective or a pure economic competitiveness perspective. A wide range of creative proposals are buzzing around Congress and think-tanks – from a carbon border measure, to resuscitating the Global Steel Arrangement, to critical mineral-focused deals. Though the topic is often overlooked in overviews of trade policy, it is the one where we are most likely to see classic trade tools used.

A vast difference between the two candidates

Beyond those broad strokes of an emerging ‘new Washington consensus,’ as former US trade representative and current head of the Council on Foreign Relations Michael Froman describes it: who wins the presidency will make a vast difference in what Washington does on trade – and how it aims to achieve its goals.

A Harris administration will aim to develop shared economic security agendas with allies and partners – quite possibly expanding beyond the Biden Administration’s G7 focus to pursue more deals with a broader range of partners. Trump, on the other hand, has explicitly said he will pursue US economic interests at the expense of allies and partners. ‘Under my leadership,’ he said in a speech in Georgia last month, ‘we’re going to take other countries’ jobs,’ specifically citing allies Germany and South Korea as targets.

While Vice-President Harris has criticized Trump’s tariff proposals, and noted their likely negative effects on consumers, she has not signalled that she would make changes to the tariffs on China first imposed by President Trump and then adjusted by President Biden. 
A Trump administration would use tariffs aggressively, but it remains absolutely unclear how. 

The UK must focus on how the Chagos decision is implemented to gain its benefits and minimize risks Expert comment jon.wallace 11 October 2024

The UK decision was welcomed by India and the US, and shows a capacity for fresh thinking. But the transfer of sovereignty must be handled carefully.

The UK announced on 3 October that it would cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

There are potential strategic and reputation-related upsides for the UK from the decision – but these can only be realized if the deal is implemented in ways that meet the UK’s stated goals.

First, the UK aims to safeguard the utility and security of the joint US–UK base on Diego Garcia. It also intends for the decision to benefit the Chagossians, who were displaced by the British decision in 1965 to separate the Archipelago from Mauritius as part of a deal to grant Mauritian independence.

The decision has already proved deeply controversial in the UK, provoking sustained criticism from former Conservative government ministers and commentary that has branded it naive, dangerous, and a blow to British prestige.

Part of the reason for the welter of criticism may be the apparent suddenness of the announcement. The impression that this was a hasty decision is likely because it came just three months after the Labour government came to office. But this belies the far longer gestation period around the decision.

World opinion

In fact, the previous Conservative UK government decided to begin negotiations over sovereignty of Chagos – following Mauritius bringing the matter to the International Court of Justice. In 2019, the court issued a non-binding opinion in favour of Mauritius.

The same year the UN General Assembly voted 116 in favour to 6 against, and with 56 abstentions, for a resolution ‘welcoming a 25 February 2019 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legal consequences of separating the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, demanding that the UK unconditionally withdraw its colonial administration from the area within six months’ to ‘enable Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory.’

But returning the islands will not necessarily boost the UK’s international standing. Issues relating to the Archipelago are complex, and it will take work to convince interested international parties that the UK is acting fairly against a colonized and displaced population.

Mauritius has no pre-colonial history of controlling the Chagos islands, which are located some 1,500 miles away from Mauritius across a vast sprawl of the Indian Ocean. It is true that the Chagos Islands were a colonial remnant, but to ensure that UK is seen by global audiences to be acting fairly, the handover of sovereignty must be carefully handled. Perhaps the greatest reputational risk will come from failing to adequately account for the rights of Chagossians.  

The more pertinent historical injustice has been to them. And reporting by the BBC has shown that at least some Chagossians were dismayed by not having been consulted in negotiations between the UK and Mauritius.

The UK government announcement on the deal did state that that ‘the welfare of Chagossians’ will be paramount and that ‘the UK will capitalize a new trust fund, as well as separately provide other support, for the benefit of Chagossians’. But for the Chagossians, there will be a clamour to see this realized in full.

Strategic interests

On the strategic question, the utility of the joint US–UK military base on Diego Garcia has been guaranteed in a 99-year lease. As the UK negotiator Jonathan Powell has explained, this deal was reached in close consultation with US officials and puts the base on legally safe ground for the first time in decades. 

Indeed, Powell has explained that Joe Biden was keen to reach agreement ahead of the US elections so that US military access to Diego Garcia was safeguarded against any possible contrary decision by a possible returning Trump presidency.

There are understandable concerns that, as a result of the decision, China may develop commercial ports in the region and seek to compete with India for economic and strategic relationships. But this is a long-term matter of concern to monitor, regardless of the UK’s decision on Chagos.

Chinese naval influence in the Indian Ocean is currently limited, compared to its assertiveness in the South China Sea, where it is building artificial islands, or in the South Pacific where it is pursuing policing assistance deals like that secured with the Solomon Islands.

And the strategic situations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are not at all alike. Indeed, the Chagos Islands are far closer to India and its economic influence than they are to any other major economic power. 

The fact that India has welcomed the UK’s decision over Chagos sovereignty is noteworthy, given the UK’s separate attempts to modernize and expand its bilateral relations with New Delhi.

In the long run, it is likely that India will play a leading role in Indian Ocean security, and the UK will want to be well-placed to explore how to play a role as an effectively partner.

The more pertinent immediate concern is the implications for other overseas UK territorial responsibilities. There are legitimate questions to be raised over setting a precedent that could undermine RAF Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, which remained sovereign UK bases after Cyprus’s independence in 1960.

Grassroots to global: Young changemakers against violence 24 October 2024 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 October 2024 Chatham House

As part of Black History Month, this event will look at how youth activism against violence can influence change.

To address the alarming increase knife crime, a 10% rise in knife-related homicides between April 2022 and March 2023, the UK government launched a coalition of community leaders, campaigners and policy makers to tackle this tragic loss of life.

With people under 25 disproportionately affected, the ‘knife crime epidemic’ represents an example of how youth activist groups are central to tackling the problem. Organisations for and operated by young people form a key part of the strategy to ensure people are better protected from violent crime.

Around the world, a network of youth groups are similarly striving to make a difference and build a better life for future generations. Operating in different political and economic conditions, there are learnings to be found in groups working across the world.

This session will discuss how grassroot activism and youth organisations can influence governments to prevent young people falling into crime, the role of race and religion, and whether organisations are improving in their effectiveness around the world.

This event is a collaboration with Integrate UK.

India–Russia relations Explainer LToremark 14 October 2024

Explaining the history and current state of the relationship between India and Russia, its geopolitical significance, the importance of trade and defence cooperation, and the impact of the war in Ukraine.

What is the history of India’s relationship with Russia? 

The two countries established diplomatic relations in April 1947, shortly before India gained independence. India was on a quest to achieve economic self-sufficiency, so the then-Soviet Union was an important partner in terms of providing support for the country’s heavy industry, with investment in mining, energy and steel production. India’s economic planning model was also based on the Soviet five-year plan.

There is a high degree of historical affinity towards Russia in India, particularly among the older generation of policy elites. This is because the Soviet Union supported India during the Cold War, notably during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, in which the US and China sided with Pakistan. This was arguably the peak of the Indo–Soviet relationship and also the year that the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

But even before that, the Soviet Union had supported India. During the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the USSR played a mediating role and hosted the so-called Tashkent summit in 1966 where a peace treaty was signed.

The Soviet Union also used its UN Security Council veto several times in support of India, half a dozen times between 1957 and 1971. This was usually on the issue of Kashmir and once with respect to India’s military intervention in Goa to end Portuguese rule. It was also routine for the Indian prime minister to stop over in Moscow on the way back from Washington.

The relationship has continued into the post-Cold War period. Annual summits have been held since 2000, when a strategic partnership was signed (and subsequently upgraded in 2010). India and Russia have also been holding so-called 2+2 meetings – joint meetings with foreign and defence ministers – since 2021.

India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has referred to the India–Russia relationship as the one constant in global politics over the last half century.

What is the current relationship between India and Russia? 

Russia remains a key strategic partner for India for both practical and ideological reasons. On the practical side, India benefits significantly from access to discounted Russian crude oil, which has increased from less than 2 per cent of India’s total imports before the Russian invasion of Ukraine to over 40 per cent in June 2024. Indian companies have also benefitted from exporting refined Russian oil products, some of which have found their way onto Western markets.

But energy cooperation is not confined to oil. It also includes cooperation in the nuclear space, where there is a strong historical foundation. When India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, the Soviet Union did not shun cooperation with India – unlike the US. Compared to the US, Russia has also been able to better navigate India’s civil nuclear liability law, which was put in place in 2010. In February 2024, India and Russia upgraded an agreement to build six civil nuclear power plants in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

The other area of practical cooperation is defence. Russia accounts for over 50 per cent of India’s in-service military platforms. India is also the largest recipient of Russian arms exports, including the S400 missile defence system. There has been joint production of several platforms, such as the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which has been exported to third countries, starting with the Philippines. 

Russia has been a preferred arms supplier for India for many years because it provides arms at reasonable prices without end user constraints, and is often able to supply sensitive technologies, which other countries are not.

There is also a long-standing economic relationship. India and Russia aim to increase bilateral trade from $68 billion to $100 billion by the end of this decade. Connectivity initiatives include the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor and the International North-South Transport Corridor.

There are regular interactions between the leaders of the two countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin have met 17 times in the last decade and have held annual summits since 2000, with a few exceptions – and a notable gap following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

There is also a push to try and negotiate bilateral visa free access for Indians to increase people-to-people and tourism exchanges between the two countries.

There is also an ideological component to the relationship, which is often overlooked. One aspect is that India has a long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, which means engaging all major poles of influence in the international system – including Russia. There is also the aforementioned historical affinity due to Soviet support for India during the Cold War.

But the relationship is undergoing a managed decline. It does not have the same level of strategic importance as it did during the Cold War.

Although India still depends on Russia for a large proportion of its military hardware, since the 1990s there has been a push to diversify. As part of the ‘Make in India’ campaign, there is an attempt to strengthen domestic defence production as well as diversify to other countries. Between 2009 and 2013, 76 per cent of India’s arms imports were from Russia, but this has dropped to 36 per cent between 2019 and 2023 according to SIPRI.

While this trend predates the war in Ukraine, it has been accelerated by the war. There has been a delay in the delivery of several defence platforms, most notably the S400 missile defence system, as well as spare parts for fighter jets. The prolonged war of attrition in Ukraine has also undermined Indian confidence in some Russian military hardware.

There is decline on the ideological side too. India is trying to project a world view that is non-Western but not explicitly anti-Western. This puts it out of sync with Russia’s world view, and that of countries like China and Iran. 

India is increasingly aloof or estranged from forums where Russia plays a prominent role, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Modi did not attend the July 2024 SCO summit. When India held the presidency of the SCO in 2023 it was a low-profile presidency and there was a virtual summit. In contrast, India’s high-profile G20 presidency in 2023 was framed as the country’s ‘coming out party’.

While Modi and Putin met in July 2024, it was the first time that they had met since September 2022, a significant gap.

What is more, their economic interactions are highly skewed. There is roughly $68 billion in trade between the two countries but $60 billion of that is oil imports. India’s large share of Russian crude imports also means that Russia holds a surplus of Indian rupees, which has caused some friction in terms of rouble-rupee trade.

On the Indian side, there have also been concerns about a number of Indian nationals that have been duped into fighting for Russia in the Ukraine conflict.

But although the relationship is not what it once was, Russia will remain a key strategic partner for India for the foreseeable future.

Does India support Russia’s war on Ukraine? 

India has neither condoned nor condemned Russia’s actions. The Indian government has been vocal in expressing its displeasure of the war and Modi has said that now is ‘not an era of war’. He has also expressed sorrow for the bombing of a children’s hospital, hit by Russian airstrikes in July 2024. During his August 2024 visit to Ukraine, Modi said that India’s position is not neutral, but that it stands on the side of peace.

But there is a gap between rhetoric and reality. India in fact maintains quite a neutral position. It has abstained in UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. It did not endorse the joint communique produced at a peace conference in Switzerland in June 2024, which Modi also did not attend. And the G20 leaders’ declaration that was concluded under India’s G20 presidency had no mention of Russian actions in Ukraine.

India has also emerged as the second-biggest supplier of restricted critical technologies to Russia (behind China), helping to fuel Russia’s war machine.

This reflects India’s practical or pragmatic considerations, including its dependence on Russian military hardware and access to discounted Russian crude. But there is also a degree of sympathy in New Delhi for the Russian narrative of the war, that Moscow’s actions were sparked by NATO expansion into Russia’s self-perceived sphere of influence.

In theory, India is well positioned to play the role of a potential mediator. It maintains close ties with both Moscow and Washington, unlike other countries that have close relations with Russia, such as China, Iran or North Korea. The West has been understanding of India’s strategic constraints in terms of its dependence on Russian military hardware and its energy needs. But so far, India’s actions have been largely driven by self-interest. Despite its statements, it has not made any peace proposals like those of Turkey or China.

Indian symbolism over substance was also clear in Modi’s summer 2024 meetings with Putin and Zelenskyy.

Modi visited Putin in July 2024 – a visit that coincided with Russian airstrikes in Ukraine. Zelenskyy called the meeting a devastating blow to peace efforts. And the optics of Modi hugging Putin while a Ukrainian children’s hospital was bombed prompted a degree of damage control by New Delhi, leading to Modi’s visit to Ukraine in August 2024.

His visit to Ukraine was an attempt to reaffirm India’s position of neutrality on the war and its long-standing position of strategic autonomy. It was also an attempt at a course correction in India’s relationship with Ukraine. Modi was the first Indian prime minister to visit Ukraine since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1993.

How does China impact India–Russia relations? 

China is an important consideration in terms of India’s strategic calculations towards Russia. One of the reasons New Delhi is eager to maintain engagement with Russia is fears that Moscow is becoming increasingly beholden to Beijing following its invasion of Ukraine. India wants to provide Russia with strategic options as it becomes increasingly isolated and wants to deter it from becoming a client state of China. In parts of the West, that is already seen as a foregone conclusion, but Russia is not yet seen as a lost cause in India.

The other point to keep in mind is that China and India largely see eye to eye on the Ukraine war. Neither see their close relationship with Moscow as translating into overt support for Russian actions in Ukraine. Both countries believe they are playing a constructive role through their purchase of discounted Russian crude, which is helping to control global energy prices.

But a key watch point is what would Russia’s position be on possible future hostilities between China and India. Historically, Moscow has played a relatively neutral position and has occasionally offered to play a mediating role. It has even leaned in India’s favour on occasion and has provided it with more advanced military platforms than it has provided China. 

The fear in New Delhi is that this could be shifting and in the future Moscow could side with China in a potential conflict or tensions with India. That would be a game changer for India and would prompt it to rethink its relationship with Russia.

China’s economic policy pendulum has swung towards stimulus – but keep expectations low Expert comment jon.wallace 14 October 2024

Beijing historically swings between stimulus and frugality. But Xi Jinping’s ambition for self-reliance will constrain any new efforts to boost the economy.

Policymakers in Beijing have spent the past three weeks trying to convince the world that they are determined to deliver meaningful support to China’s sagging economy. 

Since late September statements have come from the central bank, which promised to cut interest rates, release liquidity, and provide funding to securities firms; from the politburo, which said it wanted to stabilize the real estate market, boost the capital market and shift towards looser fiscal and monetary policy; from the government’s main planning body, which promised a package of policies to support domestic demand; and from the finance minister himself, who at the weekend committed to issue more debt to recapitalize banks, support local governments and aid unhappy consumers.

Though details have been scant, the Chinese stock market has responded enthusiastically to this flurry of rhetoric. But the bigger question for the global economy is whether a boost in Chinese demand can return the country to its former status as a reliable destination for global exports and capital.

With that measure of success in mind, it is worth keeping expectations low. For the past 15 years, Chinese authorities have been wrestling with two conflicting objectives: to grow the economy, and to minimize the risk of financial instability. Those goals sit uneasily with each other because the effort to boost growth has relied on borrowing; and yet a rise in debt can increase the risk of a debt crisis.  

Chinese policymaking has responded to this dilemma by taking on a pendulum-like quality. Sometimes the authorities boost the economy by funding more investment spending. At other times that stimulus gets reined back as policymakers worry about the economy’s indebtedness.

In the aftermath of the great financial crisis of 2008, for example, Beijing’s over-riding priority was to protect the Chinese economy from the risk of recession by implementing a huge credit-financed stimulus to spur investment in infrastructure and real estate. 

By 2012, though, concerns about over-indebtedness began to dominate, and a withdrawal of stimulus saw the Chinese economy sag. In late 2015,a new round of stimulus measures emerged, only to be withdrawn again around 2018.

With that pendulum in mind, the optimistic take on what policymakers have said in recent weeks is that we are now back in stimulus mode. That’s true in part, but three factors suggest that this time is a little different.

Different times

First, China’s rising debt burden increases authorities’ worries about financial stability. Data from the BIS show that China’s private sector debt almost doubled in the past 15 years to 200 per cent of GDP at the end of 2023. The comparable debt stock for the US and the Eurozone was much lower, at 150 per cent each.

Second, ideology is playing a growing role in shaping Chinese economic policy. The most visible effect has been to prioritize Chinese state-owned enterprises, at the expense of the private sector. This became especially visible in 2021 with a campaign against the ‘unrestrained expansion of capital’ – Beijing’s way of expressing its anxiety that China’s corporate sector was behaving in a manner inconsistent with Chinese Communist Party goals. 

Although that phrase is no longer current, entrepreneurs’ animal spirits remain in the doldrums. They are likely to stay there as long as President Xi Jinping’s preference is for ‘bigger, better, stronger’ state-owned enterprises, which use capital much less efficiently than private firms.

Third, today Chinese policy is shaped by Beijing’s perception of geopolitical risks that it faces. Those risks became starkly apparent in February 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when essentially every country that prints a reserve currency joined to freeze Russia’s access to its foreign exchange reserves. That enveloped the Russian economy in a network of sanctions that sharply constrained its access to a whole range of imports.

It is not difficult to consider a similar scenario confronting China. Beijing’s approach to economic policy is therefore heavily influenced by the need to insulate itself from that kind of risk (though Chinese policy had in any case been tilting in this direction for years).

‘Asymmetric decoupling’

This policy can be described as ‘asymmetric decoupling’: a simultaneous effort on the one hand to reduce China’s reliance on the rest of the world by substituting imports with domestic production; and, on the other hand, to increase the rest of the world’s reliance on China by establishing itself as a ‘zhizao qiangguo’, or manufacturing powerhouse.

This is the right context in which to understand a central economic goal of the authorities, which is to reduce the economy’s dependence on real estate investment. 

The intention is to allow capital and credit resources to migrate to new sectors of the economy that will help to build that manufacturing powerhouse: high-tech and green energy, in particular. What that means in practice is that any forthcoming support for the real estate sector will be rather limited.

What are the top economic priorities for the new US President? 19 November 2024 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 15 October 2024 Chatham House

A post-US election discussion on the outlook for US economic policy and implications for the global economy.

A fortnight on from the US Presidential and Congressional elections, this expert panel, organised by Chatham House’s Global Economy and Finance Programme in collaboration with the Society of Professional Economists, will consider the outlook for US economic policy and implications for the global economy.

Questions for discussion will include:

• What will the economic priorities of the new President be? What will be the role of industrial strategy/green transition, regulation, trade, migration and fiscal policy?
• How far will the President be constrained by other branches of the US government, including Congress, the courts and state governments?
• What will the implications be for the global economy broadly and through the specific channels of trade, investment, monetary policy and debt?
• How will the new President handle economic and financial relations with the US’s traditional G7 allies, China and the Global South?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

The US election could create the need for a G7 alternative – without American representation Expert comment jon.wallace 15 October 2024

Traditional allies of the US need to find a way to work together on some global policy issues even when the US itself is not engaged. A ‘G6 plus’ group could provide an answer.

When Jamaica pulled out of the nascent West Indies Federation in 1961, Trinidad and Tobago’s then prime minister, Dr Eric Williams, famously said ‘One from ten leaves nought’. In the run up to the US elections on 5 November, the US’s longstanding allies need to ask themselves if the same logic must apply to the G7. 

A Donald Trump victory will result in stark differences between the US and its closest partners on key global economic issues. US allies would no doubt try and persuade the new president to moderate his position, but experience suggests that this will have little, if any, effect.  

They may then want to work around the US, or on a parallel track. But doing so will be very hard unless they have a framework for discussing and developing ideas collectively. Could some form of ‘G6 plus’ forum help?

The role of the G7 today

The G7 no longer acts as a steering group for the global economy. However, it remains a critical forum for the US and its allies to coordinate their efforts to help solve global problems, to defend common Western interests, to resolve internal disputes and to underpin information exchange. 

In the past two years, the G7 has come to be seen by the US and other members as one of the most effective international mechanisms. It has played a critical role coordinating Western efforts to recover from the last pandemic and prepare for future ones.  

It has been pivotal in weakening Russia’s economy following the attack on Ukraine and has acted to strengthen Western economic security and resilience more broadly.  

The G7 has also responded to ‘Global South’ calls for help in dealing with the pandemic aftermath and the Ukraine war. 

Trump’s approach to the G7

The problem is that the G7’s effectiveness depends critically on full US engagement, sometimes as a leader of initiatives (such as the decision to impose an ‘oil price cap’ on Russia in autumn 2022) or as an essential partner. 

If elected, former President Trump is likely to abandon the G7 as an instrument of international economic policy. This is effectively what happened during his first presidency and there are reasons to expect this to be repeated. 

Many of Trump’s international economic policies are highly controversial with US allies, including his apparent determination to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, impose across the board 10-20 per cent tariffs and even punish countries for not using the dollar. His domestic policies, including mass deportation of undocumented immigrants and aggressive deregulation and fiscal easing could lead to further sharp disagreements.  

Furthermore, Trump demonstrates general antipathy towards multilateralism. Under his presidency, US representatives in the G7 and G20 sought to weaken core values and policies that have underpinned international economic cooperation for decades – including the importance of a rules based international system, the IMF’s global safety net role, and the responsibility of the advanced world to assist the poorest countries financially.  

Other G7 and G20 countries tried to preserve as much as possible of the previous consensus. But in the case of climate change, the only solution was to have a separate text for the US. Critically, such efforts diverted time and attention from the enormous challenges facing the world at the time. 

Trump went through four different G7/G20 Sherpas during his presidency and disowned the final declaration of the 2018 Canadian G7 summit after hundreds of hours of negotiation, and despite previously signing off on the text. The US failed to host a final leaders’ summit, even virtually, during his administration’s G7 presidency.  

Of course, how far Trump carries through his most radical policies will depend, among other things, on the outcome of the Congressional elections and the stance taken by US courts. 

He may also have second thoughts if elected. His first administration sometimes supported significant multilateral economic initiatives, notably the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative and ‘Common Framework’ for debt rescheduling. 

But, in the event of a second Trump administration, the most likely scenario for the G7 is a repeat of the paralysis of 2017-20, which would be even more costly today.

Should Vice President Kamala Harris win on 5 November, the situation should in theory be very different. She will likely continue with President Joe Biden’s collaborative approach to the G7.

Nonetheless, major issues may still arise where America’s allies want to take a fundamentally different approach and need a mechanism to do so. These could include policy on the WTO, de-risking the economic relationship with China, restricting carbon leakage, and regulating US-dominated big tech.  

How should US allies respond?

No US ally will want to be seen to be leading development of a new ‘G6’ that excludes the US. The top priority will be securing the best possible relationship with the incoming president. Political weakness and/or new governments in France, Germany, the UK and Japan will add to this hesitancy.

Any new forum will therefore need to be as low profile as possible. The concept should initially be discussed in private by sherpas from each participating country. Once established, officials should as far as possible meet online. Leaders should only meet online, at least initially.  

Participants should be fully transparent about the forum’s existence and avoid any grand ‘framing’ along the lines of the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’. Instead, it should be described as a practical, largely technocratic forum intended to coordinate activity among Western economic powers in those areas where the US chooses not to engage. A suitably innocuous name – such as the ‘the sustainable growth club’ could help.

Topics should be limited to those requiring urgent collective global action, such as climate, health, tech governance, development finance and trade – and where the US federal government is not an ‘essential’ partner. Such a forum should not therefore address defence.  

Moldova and Georgia face crucial elections – and diverging paths Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2024

The two countries face unusually consequential elections where their populations must choose between moving unambiguously towards the West – or towards closer ties with Russia.

Moldova and Georgia both go to the polls at the end of October; Moldova for presidential elections on the 20^th and Georgia for parliamentary elections on the 26^th. The two countries share a number of similarities – beyond their justified reputation as world-class wine producers. They are both small, low- to middle-income countries that have struggled to consolidate their democracies and have experienced oligarchic political influence. Both are candidate countries for EU membership, with Moldova a step ahead having been invited to start negotiations. 

For both countries these elections represent a fork in the road: either move unambiguously into the Western world, or step back from it and become more closely tied to Russia again and its way of governance. However, the second option has caused yet-to-be-resolved territorial conflicts in both countries – Transnistria for Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia.

Some would say it should not be such a ‘zero sum’ choice. Why must a nation choose between Russia and the West? While that may be a fair statement for countries like India or South Africa, it does not work for Russia’s former colonies, which Moscow wishes to control. 

Moldova and Georgia’s final similarity is that they face Russian interference and attempts to manipulate votes in their elections. In Moldova this has been especially brazen with the uncovering in September of a $15 million vote-buying scheme, including instructions on who to vote for distributed to over 130,000 citizens. Russian interference in Georgia’s election is less overt but at the same time more endemic considering its government has in effect been captured by pro-Russia forces.

Diverging paths

But this is where the similarities end and the contrasts become clear.

Moldova has a young, pro-Western and equality-conscious government, and 44 of the 100 MPs in its parliament are women. In this election, Maia Sandu is seeking her second and final term as president. The election is combined with a referendum asking the people if they wish to embed Moldova’s EU aspirations into the country’s constitution. The results of both the presidential election and the EU referendum will be close, reflecting a genuine split in attitudes (and debate) in the country. 

Georgia’s EU aspirations, meanwhile, are already embedded in its constitution – but that has not prevented Tbilisi from pivoting away from the West. Polls show   that around 80 per cent of Georgia’s population desires EU (and NATO) membership – rising to 90 per cent among the under 30s – but its government seems determined to deny them that future. 

Its new ‘foreign agents’ law is seemingly copy-pasted from Russia – and incompatible with EU membership. The election can be seen as a de facto referendum on the EU too. Georgia’s accession is suspended until its political crisis is resolved. 

Georgia faces other challenges to its democracy. Due to the country’s limited presidential powers, Georgia is in effect run by the unelected Bidzina Ivanishvili – founder of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party – whose relationship with Russia is murky at best. Judging by his recent speeches, Ivanishvili now blames the Western world not just for igniting the war in Ukraine, but also for the war in Georgia 16 years ago which resulted in the loss of 20 per cent of its territory at the hands of Russia. This extraordinary position is both factually incorrect and out of step with the Georgian people.

Both countries are now at a critical point. Whatever the outcome in Moldova, the election will pass off peacefully and competently. Its problems (Russia aside) are demographic and economic, and the country’s pro-Russian opposition is relatively weak.

Georgia’s election looks like it is going to be messy. Ivanishvili’s party will likely manipulate the election to a win. There is still a chance that Georgia’s pro-Western but also weak opposition will regain power and return the country to its European path. But if the manipulation by the incumbency is heavy, people will likely take to the streets in protest, as in April this year – and in the 2003 Rose Revolution.

Regime change via popular revolution shows political immaturity but the Georgian people may feel it is the only way they can have their views represented and their ambitions realised. 

Resetting Africa-Europe relations: From self-deception to economic transformation 28 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts assess the status of ties between Africa and Europe in a rapidly changing world, launching a new book that explores how misconceptions in the relationship can harm Africa’s economic agenda.

The relationship between Africa and Europe has long been shaped by colonial legacies, power imbalance and shifting geopolitical interests.

Almost three years on from the last EU-AU summit in Brussels in February 2022, questions remain over the delivery of headline commitments under the continent-to-continent partnership – ranging from the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure strategy to wider climate financing promises.

As Africa seeks to strengthen its standing on the global stage, marked by the African Union’s upcoming debut at the G20 summit in November, a critical reassessment of these dynamics is needed to examine whether the continent’s relationship with Europe can overcome stigmatized narratives in search of genuine economic benefit.

At this event, which launches a new book by Professor Carlos Lopes: The Self-Deception Trap: Exploring the Economic Dimensions of Charity Dependency within Africa-Europe Relations, speakers assess the prospects for a transformative shift towards a more equitable and mutually beneficial Africa-Europe partnership.

Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering

This project examines the nature of the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Iran in relation to Middle Eastern countries and in the context of broader regional dynamics.

The 2016–21 period in Turkish–Iranian relations, which was marked by both sides’ structured cooperation through the Astana Process and Sochi summits on conflict management in Syria, and their largely shared opposition to US policy in Syria and at the broader regional level, to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referendum, and to the blockade of Qatar, has run its course. 

However, the new shape of these bilateral relations remains undefined, and understanding them is essential to effective policymaking in the region. How they will evolve will have direct ramifications for Iraq, Syria, regional Kurdish geopolitics, and the process of regional reordering and connectivity in the Middle East and South Caucasus. They will also have direct implications for US and European policymaking and role in the region. 

This project studies the evolving nature of Turkish–Iranian relations through Iraq, Syria and regional Kurdish politics. It examines how Turkey and Iran approach regional connectivity projects and major regional initiatives, and how ongoing regional developments, including the war in Gaza, have and may impact Turkey–Iran relations and EU, US and UK security considerations and policy towards the two countries.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey. 

Evolving Turkey–Iran Relations and Implications for Regional Reordering is a project of the CATS Network.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s foreign policy priorities 29 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs discusses the country’s approach to regional stability and the role of international partnerships in securing economic prosperity.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss DRC’s regional diplomatic priorities and international agency, including its ambitions around global critical mineral supply chains.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faces foreign policy tests as it manages a complex security crisis and regional tensions, alongside global economic and trade partnerships.

Entrenched conflict in eastern DRC continues to have wider regional implications. Troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployment are tackling a growing mandate as the UN’s peacekeeping mission prepares to withdraw. Tensions with Rwanda also remain high despite mediation efforts under the Luanda process.

As a major producer of critical minerals for the global energy transition, the DRC seeks to benefit from growing international demand without sacrificing value addition. New and existing frameworks with international partners will remain key to this vision, including for the development of regional infrastructure networks such as the Lobito Corridor.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss the DRC’s regional diplomacy and international agency, including the country’s positioning in global critical mineral supply chains.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must register interest in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Friday 25 October.

Sinwar’s death does not make Hamas–Fatah reconciliation more likely, whoever his successor may be Expert comment jon.wallace 22 October 2024

The killing may aid Hamas recruitment – but it will not make agreement with Fatah any easier to achieve.

Western political leaders were quick to argue that Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on 17 October presented an opportunity for a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Israeli hostages.

US President Joe Biden immediately called on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to seize the moment to negotiate, now that Israel has achieved one of its war aims.

However, that ‘moment’ has already passed. Israel’s military assault on Gaza has intensified since Sinwar was killed, leading UN Peace Process Co-ordinator Tor Wennesland to say that ‘nowhere is safe in Gaza’. It is abundantly clear Netanyahu is intent on further degrading Hamas, resetting a new ‘power balance’ and carving out a buffer zone, no matter the cost in Palestinian lives or Israeli hostages. 

But there are other implications of Sinwar’s assassination beyond the zero-sum analysis of will there or won’t there be a ceasefire.

Hamas’s ability to fight

At present, everyone has an opinion on how Sinwar’s killing will affect Hamas and its ability to resist and respond to Israel’s military. His death will have been a major blow – symbolically, operationally, and psychologically. Hamas has been downgraded and its capacity to respond compromised.

But it will recover, regenerate and retaliate in time – and Sinwar’s death will have been no surprise to Palestinians in Gaza or elsewhere. Hamas is accustomed to seeing its leaders assassinated. Since its formation in 1987, it has been ‘decapitated’ many times, only to continue with its mission to ‘liberate Palestine’.

Hamas’s portrayal of Sinwar dying in his fatigues, head wrapped in a keffiyeh and resisting until the end will persuade many young Palestinians that he died as a martyr serving the Palestinian cause. Many will be inspired to join and fortify the ranks of Hamas as a result.

The IDF’s release of drone footage showing Sinwar’s last moments will have done nothing to undermine his credibility. 

On the contrary, it will serve as a rallying call to disaffected and disenfranchised young Palestinians horrified by Israel’s bombing of civilian targets in Gaza and disaffected with Fatah’s inability to prevent Israeli settler expansion and violence in the West Bank.

Reconciliation

Some hope that if Sinwar is replaced by a more ‘moderate’ leader, his killing may smooth the path to Hamas–Fatah reconciliation – and that this could provide a foundation for a patchwork political solution when Israel and Gaza arrive at the ‘day after.’  

But the idea that a downgraded and ‘leaderless’ Hamas will be susceptible to international pressure to reconcile with Fatah is divorced from reality.  

Prospective new Hamas leaders such as Khaled al Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya are based in Qatar. 

They may be more pliable to external pressure to reconcile with Fatah in search of a political outcome, but their ability to influence events on the ground in Gaza will be limited. That was demonstrated by the Sinwar-orchestrated attacks on 7 October 2023, which took place without the blessing of the exiled leadership in Doha.

Hamas has long gone to ground in Gaza and become far more decentralized than it was before 7 October. It is now more typical of an insurgency, where Hamas cadres exercise a great degree of operational autonomy.

In other words, the disconnect between Hamas in Gaza and its political leadership in Qatar has only grown wider since this round of conflict started.

International efforts

That will undermine international efforts made by Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and others to bring about a reconciliation. Moscow and Beijing already hosted reconciliation talks in February and April early this year but made no progress in closing the chasm between the two parties. Saudi Arabia has also hosted talks.

The three Arab states, none of which have so far commented publicly on Sinwar’s killing, will likely view his death as an opportunity to bolster the political wing of Hamas – backing it with pledges of political, diplomatic and financial support.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt will have next to no influence over the succession process, but Qatar’s long-established relationship with the political wing of Hamas affords it leverage over the organization, albeit limited. They may be able to strengthen the hand of those based in Doha by promising to work harder at securing a ceasefire, guaranteeing the provision of humanitarian relief, and working towards a political solution.

Trust in US democracy is at stake in this election Expert comment rgold.drupal 23 October 2024

A narrow win for either side could make things worse. The rest of the world should be prepared for a disruptive transition.

With less than two weeks to election day in the United States, polls suggest the gap between Harris and Trump has narrowed even further in the swing states where the election will be decided. A fierce contest has ensued as each campaign seeks to drive voter turnout. In such a tight race, this will be decisive. But in an election that many Americans perceive as being existential for the country’s future, a narrow victory by either side will heighten the risk of a contested election.

Many Americans are pessimistic about the ability of democracy to deliver a reliable result. Two thirds of Republican voters continue to believe that the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump and for many of these, Biden’s inauguration may have demonstrated the weakness, not the strength, of US democracy. 

This environment has contributed to widespread anticipation of a contested election, as well as preparations for the possibility of a delayed result. Political disinformation and deep polarization across the country could mean that a narrow victory leads to more legal challenges and even political violence.  6 January, the anniversary of the assault on the US Capitol and the day Congress will certify the Electoral College has been designated a National Special Security Event. 

The issue of how quickly and reliably votes are certified has become an arena for argument. In the 2022 midterms, 22 county officials in key states voted to delay certification. Democrats have noted with alarm that this year, around 70 pro-Trump election ‘conspiracists’ are positioned to review the results in swing states.

Those nervous about the possibility of a narrow vote being overturned will be watching to see if Republicans maintain or increase their majority in the House of Representatives, since the newly elected House will shape who holds the gavel when a joint session of Congress returns to certify the US presidential election result. Republican control of the House could give the former president more ability to influence this vote. 

A resilient democracy

But there should be room for optimism. Democracy in America has been remarkably resilient. In 2016, Democrats swallowed their unease with Donald Trump. Despite rumours of Russian interference in the election, they accepted the election result.

Four years later, the US was far more polarized, trust in institutions had decreased, and challenges to the elections reflected this. The Trump campaign filed more than 60 lawsuits in 9 states challenging election processes and voter certification. In every single case, courts confirmed the results.  After the 6 January insurrection on the US Capitol, Congress returned to its chambers and, on the very same day, confirmed the electoral results. 

If fears of another contested election materialise, it will be the third time in recent history that the US has struggled to confirm a result. In 2000, the Supreme Court intervened to decide on a recount in Florida, effectively delivering victory to George W Bush – a memory alongside the 6 January Capitol riots contributing to America’s anxiety ahead of polling day. 

International response

The US’s partners and rivals may be ill-prepared for a contested election. 

If Trump or Harris, or both, claim victory before it is clearly settled, world leaders will need to decide how to react. Diplomatic protocol may dictate that leaders wait until the US confirms the results through official channels but there are concerns that not everyone will play by these rules. 

US election rhetoric on migration undermines Washington’s soft power in Latin America Expert comment jon.wallace 23 October 2024

As US public opinion hardens, the Democratic party takes a tougher stance, and Donald Trump proposes mass deportations, Latin American leaders note a lack of long-term policy.

The US’s broken immigration system has become a central theme of the 2024 election campaign. But the discussion on immigration, undocumented immigrants, and asylum seekers – increasingly lurching into dehumanizing rhetoric – extends beyond US borders. 

As one former senior director of the National Security Council told me, ‘when the president travels or meets with heads of state from Latin America what comes up –regardless of the country – isn’t US–Cuba policy or even trade. It’s immigration’. How the US talks about and treats citizens of Latin American and the Caribbean matters to elected politicians in the region. 

The roots of the US immigration debate go deep and will not be easily resolved, even with a sweeping reform of the system. 

According to a January 2024 Pew survey, 78 per cent of Americans ‘say the large number of migrants seeking to enter the country at the Mexico border is either a crisis (45 per cent) or a major problem (32 per cent)’. Worries about the border are not limited to Republican voters: 73 per cent of Democrats feel that the issue is either a crisis or major problem. 

Despite the heated popular temperature, the numbers of undocumented immigrants encountered at the US–Mexico border has actually dropped in recent months. US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) reported 301,981 encounters with irregular border crossings in December 2023; by August 2024 this had dropped to 107,473.  

Nevertheless, illegal border crossings have increased under Biden. During his administration USCBP reported 8 million encounters along the Mexico border compared to 2.5 million under Donald Trump. 

Mexico

Any attempt to address the issue promises to affect US relations with Mexico, requiring the cooperation of newly elected president Claudia Sheinbaum. Her predecessor and founder of her Morena party, leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), proved an unexpectedly cooperative partner for the previous Trump administration and Biden White House. 

But that came at a cost, particularly for Biden. In return for AMLO’s cooperation, the US soft-pedalled criticism over his failures to disrupt narcotics trafficking and criminal networks and for his steady weakening of checks on executive power. 

Mexico’s borders with other countries are also under pressure. Mexico remains the primary sending country to the US. But political repression and insecurity in countries including Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela has pushed their citizens to travel across Mexico to the US. Economic collapse and humanitarian crises in Cuba and Venezuela have further fuelled the flight.

Rhetoric

The Kamala Harris and Trump campaigns have struck different positions on how to stem the flow of illegal immigration. But as US public opinion shifts, both parties are talking tougher. 

Harris is continuing Biden’s hardening stance, including the controversial move to bar those who cross the border illegally from applying for asylum. 

Biden’s early ‘roots’ strategy, to provide economic and security support in countries from where migrants are travelling, has fallen by the wayside. 

The Trump campaign is taking more extreme positions. The Republican presidential candidate mentions immigration in almost every campaign speech. 

He proposes to carry out the ‘largest deportation in US history’, using ICE personnel, the National Guard and local police forces to round up undocumented immigrants, including in their workplaces. 

The campaign has also pledged to end birth-right citizenship and Biden’s programme of parole for humanitarian reasons. Trump also plans to restore his first term policies including construction of the border wall. 

Trump’s proposals provide little opportunity for a broad, bipartisan consensus on immigration. Should he win in November he is likely, as he did in his first term, to attempt to push his policies via executive action, opening up challenges in federal court. 

A Harris victory would at least create space for the resurrection of the Biden administration’s 2024 immigration enforcement bill, originally supported by moderate Republican leadership in the Senate, but defeated following pressure from Trump. 

The bill would have toughened enforcement at the border – increasing funding for detention centres, asylum hearings and for local governments and border patrols. It would also permit ICE to shut down the border when crossings surpassed an average of 5,000 per day or 8,500 on a single day.

Undermining US influence

But such legislation, while promising to address domestic US perceptions of the crisis, threatens to reduce US soft power in Latin America. That would be counterproductive at a time when the US is attempting to consolidate global support in its competition with China and conflict with Russia. 

For Latin American leaders, US rhetoric on immigration rankles. The priorities of Latin American and Caribbean leaders and their voters are long term: economic growth, improved security, and climate change. These issues require investment and commitment from an engaged and reliable US partner. Sadly, Latin Americans can see such issues are not on the domestic agenda in US politics. 

To improve regional perceptions of US intentions after the election, new policy should seek to address the root causes of migration. That will require a multi-pronged, bipartisan approach that focuses attention and resources on US neighbours south of the border.  

The US’s immigration system will need to broaden paths for legal immigration to meet US labour needs, while delivering increased support for border security, and accelerated (and humane) processes for detaining and repatriating illegal border crossers and asylum claims.  

But any sustainable answer also requires addressing the multifaceted reasons driving migrants north. Any future US administration will need to risk unpopularity with some voters at home and engage with sending countries and their neighbours. 

In conversation with James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology and Society at Google 12 December 2024 — 11:15AM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

A conversation on AI’s global, societal and economic impacts.

2024 has been a landmark year for Artificial Intelligence (AI) development, deployment and use, with significant progress in AI-driven science, governance and cooperation. Looking ahead, AI continues to demonstrate economic promise and potential to expand on scientific breakthroughs in areas such as climate and health. This wave of innovation is occurring against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty and not all countries are fully able to participate. Heading into 2025, there are urgent questions about how best to maximise shared opportunities when it comes to AI and to advance global cooperation.

James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology & Society at Google, will unpack what 2025 will bring for AI in science, economics, global governance and international cooperation. 

Key questions include:

• What will be AI’s global societal and economic impact in 2025 and beyond? 
• What are the ways AI could help increase economic growth and economy-wide productivity? What factors must be in place for this to happen?
• How best can we maximise shared opportunities and advance global cooperation when it comes to AI? Where can public-private partnerships unlock scientific breakthroughs for societal progress, combatting shared global challenges such as climate change and global health issues?  
• What are the principles of safe, responsible AI, and how should companies remain responsive to their evolution and integrate them into technology design and implementation? 
• What is the current – and ideal – role of technology companies in emerging mechanisms for global cooperation and national governance on AI?

This event is being held in partnership with Google.

You will receive notice by 13:00 on Wednesday 11 December if you have been successful in securing an in-person place.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.