The July 4th congressional recess’s pause in 2014’s record pace of judicial confirmations is a good time to explore the reason for the upsurge.

The 54 confirmations at 2014’s half-way point compare to 43 in all of 2013. What’s behind the increase? Some have said that the Senate’s November 2013 rules change—to allow a simple majority to end filibusters on most nominees—“has resulted in [the] sharp increase.” There is a lot of appeal (and even a little truth) to the claim, but beware the “post hoc ergo propter hoc” fallacy that if “B” follows “A”, “A” necessarily caused “B”.

There have been 61 confirmations since November 21. The rules change clearly enabled three of them. Late October and mid-November filibusters of three D.C. circuit appellate nominees were the immediate cause of the change, which in turn allowed their post-November confirmations.

Saying how many of the other post-November confirmations would have failed without the rules change is an exercise in informed speculation. Here’s one way to look at it: how many of those confirmations had enough negative votes to have sustained a filibuster under the old rule?

Invoking cloture—i.e., cutting off debate—under the old rule required 60 votes. Filibuster proponents were often able to prevent that by peeling off, if not 41 Nay votes, at least votes in the 30s, assuming not all 100 senators were present to vote. For this analysis, let’s set the bar at 34—the fewest number of votes that prevented a 60 vote cloture-invocation against any Obama nominee (most filibuster-sustaining votes were in the high 30’s and low 40’s).

Forty five of the 51 post-November district confirmations quite probably would have happened without the rules change. They had fewer than 34 Nays. And it’s hardly automatic that the six with at least 34 Nays would have been filibustered under the old rule. Senators can and do oppose a nominee but oppose filibustering her as well. Prior to the rules change, 12 district judges were confirmed even though they had at least 34 Nays. Only one of those needed a cloture vote to move to confirmation—33 voted against cloture and 44 voted against confirmation. (Cloture votes, a rarity before the rules change, have been routine since then, and they generally get around 30-40 negative notes. But these appear to be protest votes against the rules change, inasmuch as 27 of the 51 district confirmation had no Nays and another 14 had 20 or fewer Nays.)

So it’s reasonable speculation, but still speculation, that the rules change had no direct effect on district confirmations.

Circuit confirmations are a different story. The three D.C. nominees clearly owe their confirmations to the rules change. Three of the seven other circuit confirmations since November had well over 34 Nays (40, 43, and 45, in fact). One nominee had represented challengers to California’s since-overturned same-sex marriage ban; another, also a Californian, was nominated to a long-vacant seat that Republican senators claimed belonged in Idaho. The third, with 45 Nays, had authored Justice Department memos providing legal justifications for drone strikes against U.S. citizens. Successful filibusters against all three, under the old rule, seem quite plausible. (The other four post-rules-change nominees were confirmed with either no, or in one case, three negative votes.)

Bottom line: The rules change likely enabled at most twelve of the 61 post-rules change confirmations, and it more likely enabled only six.

The frenetic pace of 2014 confirmations is due mainly to Senate Democrats’ desire to secure as many as they can before the November elections and the possibility of losing control of the confirmation process.

Justin Wolfers, professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, re-joins Brookings, Vice President and Economic Studies Co-Director Karen Dynan announced today.  Wolfers was a visiting fellow from 2010-2011.

A world-renowned empirical economist, Wolfers will continue in his role as co-editor, along with David Romer of the University of California, of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA), the flagship economic journal of the Institution.  He will continue his focus on labor economics, macroeconomics, political economy, economics of the family, social policy, law and economics, public economics, and behavioral economics. His appointment as senior fellow will last 13 months.

Wolfers is also a research associate with the National Bureau for Economic Research, a research affiliate of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London, a research fellow of the German Institute for the Study of Labor, and a senior scientist for Gallup, among other affiliations. He is a contributor for Bloomberg View, NPR Marketplace, and the Freakonomics website and was named one of the 13 top young economists to watch by the New York Times.  Wolfers did his undergraduate work at the University of Sydney, Australia and received his Master’s and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University.  He is a dual Australian-U.S. national and was once an apprentice to a bookie which led to his interest in prediction markets. 

“We are pleased to re-welcome Justin back to Economic Studies,” said Dynan. “His work continues to challenge the conventional wisdom, and we look forward to collaborating with him once again.” 

“Justin is outstanding at communicating economic ideas to a wide audience, as evidenced by his regular writings for media as well as his large social media presence,” added Ted Gayer, co-director of Economic Studies.

“I have enormous affection for the Brookings Institution, which provides not only a home for deep scholarly research, but also an unmatched platform for engaging the policy debate,” said Wolfers.  “The Economic Studies program has a rich history of being the go-to place for policymakers, and I look forward to coming back and engaging in debate with my colleagues there.”

Saudi Arabia, America’s oldest ally in the Middle East, is in the midst of the most profound changes in decades. The leadership is going through an unprecedented generational change and has adopted an aggressive foreign policy. The driver of change is the king’s favorite son, Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman.

MBS, as he’s often called, is 30 years old, remarkably energetic, and very ambitious. King Salman has promoted him to an array of powerful positions and concentrated power in his hands quickly. In addition to being third in the line of succession behind the king and his cousin Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, he often acts as the country’s top diplomat and he chairs the committee that sets economic and energy policy. He acquires new titles and responsibilities every week. Late in April he became the Saudi chief of a new cooperation council with Jordan, for example, with promises this will lead to stepped-up Saudi financial aid to Jordan.

The prince is the author of “Saudi Vision 2030,” an ambitious plan to wean the country of its dependence on oil income and create a more diverse economy. On May 7 the king issued 51 royal orders restructuring the government to implement his son’s plan, including sacking the oil minister, Ali Naimi, who had run the portfolio for two decades. The new orders also seek to encourage more foreign pilgrimage to the two holy cities of Mecca and Medinah by highlighting the opportunity for pilgrimage not just during the traditional Haj holy month, but year-round as well. Encouraging tourism is a major part of “Vision 2030.” All of the changes bear MBS’s stamp.

MBS effectively makes Saudi oil policy now. He sabotaged Naimi’s efforts to freeze or reduce OPEC oil production last month. His plan to open ARAMCO to outside investment is the centerpiece of “Vision 2030.” Oil is being used as a weapon by keeping production high to keep Iran from getting an oil bonus after the nuclear deal lifted sanctions.

The king has other and older sons with more experience than Prince Mohammed. One is Saudi Arabia’s only astronaut and another is governor of Medinah. But King Salman apparently has unique confidence in the young prince who controls access to his father and the Royal Court.

Other Saudis have been given great responsibility at an early age before. The modern kingdom’s founder, Abdelaziz ibn Saud, captured Riyadh when he was only in his late twenties. His son Faisal represented the kingdom after the First World War in London and Paris at the age of 14 and commanded an army three years later in battle. Prince Bandar became ambassador to the U.S. in his early forties. But MBS’s rise is unique for an heir to the throne in the last half-century. He is the symbol of youth in a nation where most of the population is his age or younger.

The prince is also the hand behind the creation of a new Islamic military alliance based in the kingdom. Some three dozen countries have joined. The prince envisioned the alliance as both a counter to terrorist groups like the so-called Islamic State and al Qaida as well as a counter to Iran and its allies like Hezbollah and Bashar Assad. It held large military exercises called “Northern Thunder” in the kingdom this winter.

MBS is also the architect of Saudi Arabia’s year-old war in Yemen. Initially it was called Operation Decisive Storm but then the war settled into a stalemate so the name was changed. The Saudis and their allies, especially the United Arab Emirates, captured the southern port of Aden but have been unable to wrest control of the capital Sanaa from Zaydi Shia rebels called Houthis and their partner, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

A fragile cease-fire began last month. Political talks are underway in Kuwait between the rival Yemeni groups but there has been little progress. Meanwhile the Saudis and Emiratis have driven al Qaeda out of several cities along the southeast coast of Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is regrouping and is far from destroyed. But it no longer is the main beneficiary of the war.

The Yemeni people have paid an enormous cost. Both sides have been guilty of egregious violence. The Saudi blockade has left millions of Yemenis at risk of malnutrition and without medical help. The rebels have starved the city of Taiz for months.

The Saudis claim they acted to prevent Iran from creating a puppet regime on the kingdom’s southern border. They were concerned when the Houthis set up direct air links from Sanaa to Tehran and offered use of the port of Hodeida to Iran. Hezbollah and Iran have provided some military advisers to the Houthis, but their influence on the rebels is limited.

The king and his son are pro-American but disenchanted with President Barack Obama. He has sold the kingdom over $100 billion in arms on his watch, according to the Congressional Research service. Obama has backed the Saudi-Yemen war with diplomatic, logistical, and intelligence support. U.S. advisers are now on the ground fighting al Qaeda.

But the Saudis cannot forgive Obama for abandoning Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. If one autocrat could be thrown under the bus, who might be next? They don’t like the Iran nuclear deal and believe Obama has been indecisive in Syria. MBS says he wants America to do more, not less, in the region. He is courting American journalists and think tanks.

King Salman has already dismissed one succesor. His half-brother, Crown Prince Muqrin, was removed from office a year ago without warning or explanation. The 80-year-old king could remove the current crown prince, his nephew Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, and elevate MBS at any time. The old guard in the royal family, which believes MBS is reckless and inexperienced, won’t like it, but they have few options to resist. If the king does put his son in the crown prince position the kingdom will skip a whole generation. It’s already been a remarkable journey for MBS.

This piece was originally published in The Daily Beast.

A number of policymakers and analysts in the United States have called for countries like China and India to “do more” in the Middle East. Arguably, both Beijing and Delhi are doing more—though perhaps not in the way these advocates of greater Asian engagement in the Middle East might have wanted. President Xi Jinping recently traveled to the region and India’s Prime Minister Modi will return there over the weekend. After quick trips to Brussels for the India-EU Summit and a bilateral, as well as to Washington for the Nuclear Security Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will head to Riyadh tomorrow. The trip reflects not just the importance of Saudi Arabia for India but also the Middle East (or what India calls West Asia) and the opportunity this particular moment offers to Indian policymakers.

The Middle East has been crucial for India for decades. It’s been a source of energy, jobs, remittances, and military equipment, and holds religious significance for tens of millions of Indians. It’s also been a source of concern, with fears about the negative impact of regional instability on Indian interests. But today, as Modi visits, there’s also opportunity for Indian policymakers in the fact that, for a number of reasons, India is important to Saudi Arabia and a number of Middle Eastern countries in a way and to an extent that was never true before. 

It’s a two-way street

As it has globally, India has a diversified set of partnerships in the Middle East, maintaining and balancing its relationships with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iran, and Israel. The region remains India’s main source of imported oil and natural gas (58 percent of its oil imports and 88 percent of its liquefied natural gas imports in 2014-15 came from the Middle East). In addition, as of January 2015, there were 7.3 million non-resident Indians in the region (64 percent of the total). These non-resident Indians remitted over $36 billion in 2015 (52 percent of the total remittances to India). Add to that India’s Sunni and Shiite populations (among the largest in the world), counter-terrorism cooperation with some countries, India’s defense relationship with Israel, the desire to connect with Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran, and the potential market and source of capital it represents for Indian companies, and it becomes clear why this region is important for India. 

But, with many Middle Eastern countries pivoting to Asia or at least giving it a fresh look, India arguably has more leverage than it has ever had in the past. There have been a number of reasons why these countries have been looking east recently: 

• traditional strategic partnerships in flux and questions about the U.S. role in the region; 
• the economic slowdown in Europe and the U.S. following the 2008 financial crisis; 
• changing global energy consumption patterns; 
• growing concerns about terrorism in the region; 
• And, in Israel’s case, the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement. 

In this context, India has some advantages. Its economy is doing relatively well compared to that of other countries and offers a market for goods and services, as well as potentially an investment destination. India, for example, has become Israeli defense companies’ largest foreign customer. 

Crucially for the oil and natural gas-producing states in the region, India also continues to guzzle significant—and growing—quantities of both. But, today, Delhi has buyer’s power. Why? Because oil prices are relatively low and there’s a lot of gas on the market, traditional buyers are looking elsewhere for fossil fuels or looking beyond them to cleaner energy sources. India, too, has more options and has been diversifying its sources of supply (compare India’s 74 percent dependence on the Middle East for oil in 2006-07 to the lower 58 percent that it gets from there now). 

India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market.

Thus, India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market. This has altered dynamics—and India’s increased leverage has been evident, for example, in the renegotiated natural gas supply deal between Qatar’s RasGas and India’s Petronet, which came with lower prices and waived penalties. Even countries like Iran, which now have more options for partners and have not hesitated to point that out to Delhi, still have an interest in maintaining their India option. Regional rivalries might have made Delhi’s balancing act in the region more complicated, but it also gives each country a reason to maintain its relationship with India. 

And the Modi government has been looking to take advantage of this situation. While its Act East policy received a lot more attention over the last couple of years—from policymakers and the press—this region hasn’t been missing from the agenda or travel itineraries. For example, Modi has traveled to the United Arab Emirates and met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of the last Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference, and the Indian president has traveled to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories. The Indian foreign minister has visited Bahrain, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Oman, and the UAE and also participated the first ministerial meeting of the Arab-India Cooperation Forum in Manama earlier this year. The Modi government has also hosted the emir of Qatar, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the Bahraini, Iranian, Omani, Saudi, Syrian, and UAE foreign ministers, as well as the Israeli defense minister to India.

China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action.

But there have been concerns that this engagement is not sufficient, particularly relative to that of some countries. For example, China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action. The Indian foreign secretary’s recent comment that “we are no longer content to be passive recipients of outcomes” in this region also seemed to reflect the understanding that Delhi needs to be more proactive about deepening its relationships with the countries in the region, rather than waiting for them to take shape organically or just reacting to events as they occur. 

The Saudi connection

It is in this context that Modi travels to Riyadh. The relationship with Saudi Arabia is one of the key pillars of India’s Middle East policy. A major source of oil, jobs, and remittances, it is also a destination for over 400,000 Indians who go to the country for Hajj or Umra every year. In addition, in recent years, there has been more security cooperation, with Riyadh handing over individuals wanted in India and the two countries working together on countering money laundering and terrorism financing. 

The relationship has not been without problems from Delhi’s perspective. Just to list a few: 

• the Saudi-Pakistan relationship; 
• diaspora-related issues, including the treatment of Indian workers in-country and efforts towards Saudization that might limit employment opportunities for Indian expatriates;
• ideology-related concerns, particularly funding from Saudi Arabia for organizations in India, which might be increasing the influence of Wahhabism in the country; and
• regional dynamics, including Saudi Arabia’s rising tensions with Iran that has had consequences for Indian citizens, for example, in Yemen from where Delhi had to evacuate 4,640 Indians (as well as 960 foreigners).

More recently, incidents involving Saudi diplomats in India have also negatively affected (elite) public perceptions of the country, though the broader impact of this, if any, is unclear. Over the medium-to-long term, there are also concerns about potential instability within Saudi Arabia.

During Modi’s trip, however, the emphasis will be on the positives—not least in the hope that these might help alleviate some of the problems. The prime minister will be hosted by King Salman, who visited India as crown prince and defense minister just before Modi took office. He will also meet a slate of Saudi political and business leaders. The Indian wish-list will likely include diversification of economic ties, greater two-way investment, as well as more and better counter-terrorism cooperation. 

There will not be a large diaspora event—as Modi has done in Australia, Singapore, the UAE, United Kingdom, and the United States—but the prime minister will engage privately with members of the Indian community. He will also meet with Indian workers employed by an Indian company that is building part of the Riyadh metro. It is not hard to assess the reason for this particular engagement, given increased sensitivity in India (particularly in the media) about the treatment of citizens abroad, as well as the government’s interest in making a pitch for Indian companies to get greater market access. But, with Riyadh’s interest in creating jobs for Saudis, Modi will also try to highlight that Indian companies are contributing to the training and employment of locals (especially women) by visiting another Indian company’s all-female business process service center.

This will reflect the broader theme of highlighting to Riyadh and Saudis that it is not just India that benefits from the relationship—they do too. Some in India hope this has an additional effect: of giving Riyadh a reason not to let its relationship with Pakistan limit that with India, and perhaps occasionally making it willing to use some of its leverage with that country to India’s benefit. Despite recent irritants in the Saudi-Pakistan relationship, however, Delhi is realistic about the limits of weaning Riyadh away from Islamabad.

So does all this mean India will “do more” in the Middle East? For all the reasons mentioned above, the country has been involved in the region for a number of years—though, as the Indian foreign secretary has noted, this involvement was not in large part the product of active state policy. Indian interests in the region will likely increase in the future and, thus, so will its corporate and official engagement. But that engagement might not be what some American observers have in mind. As India’s capabilities grow, it might do more in terms of providing maritime security, intelligence sharing, evacuating expatriates when necessary, and contributing to U.N. peacekeeping operations. It could also potentially do more in terms of capacity building within these countries with the support of the host governments. There might also be scope for India to expand its West Asia dialogue with countries like the United States. But it will likely remain wary of picking sides or getting involved in non-U.N.-sanctioned military interventions in the region unless its interests are directly affected (the previous BJP-led coalition government did briefly consider—and then reject—joining the United States coalition in the Iraq war, for instance).

Event Information

The United States alliance with Saudi Arabia dates back to 1943, making the U.S. relationship with the Kingdom one of America's longest-standing in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is a key counterterrorism and diplomatic partner within the region, yet the alliance has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, especially in the period following the 9/11 attacks, when questions about Saudi support for extremist causes emerged. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution of the war in Yemen has added to the criticism, with many observers blaming the Kingdom for the unfolding humanitarian crisis within the Arab world's poorest state. In recent comments, President Barack Obama has been critical of Saudi policies, despite U.S. logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia’s war effort in Yemen.

On April 21, the Intelligence Project and Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted U.S. Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut to discuss the U.S.-Saudi alliance with Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Cofman Wittes. Senator Murphy has urged a more rigorous approach to cooperation with Riyadh that balances U.S. counterterrorism interests, strategic imperatives, and human rights concerns, and has led efforts on Capitol Hill to debate the war in Yemen. Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. 

 Join the conversation on Twitter at #USSaudi.

Video

• Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership

Audio

• Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160421_us_saudi_transcript

A number of policymakers and analysts in the United States have called for countries like China and India to “do more” in the Middle East. Arguably, both Beijing and Delhi are doing more—though perhaps not in the way these advocates of greater Asian engagement in the Middle East might have wanted. President Xi Jinping recently traveled to the region and India’s Prime Minister Modi will return there over the weekend. After quick trips to Brussels for the India-EU Summit and a bilateral, as well as to Washington for the Nuclear Security Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will head to Riyadh tomorrow. The trip reflects not just the importance of Saudi Arabia for India but also the Middle East (or what India calls West Asia) and the opportunity this particular moment offers to Indian policymakers.

The Middle East has been crucial for India for decades. It’s been a source of energy, jobs, remittances, and military equipment, and holds religious significance for tens of millions of Indians. It’s also been a source of concern, with fears about the negative impact of regional instability on Indian interests. But today, as Modi visits, there’s also opportunity for Indian policymakers in the fact that, for a number of reasons, India is important to Saudi Arabia and a number of Middle Eastern countries in a way and to an extent that was never true before. 

It’s a two-way street

As it has globally, India has a diversified set of partnerships in the Middle East, maintaining and balancing its relationships with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iran, and Israel. The region remains India’s main source of imported oil and natural gas (58 percent of its oil imports and 88 percent of its liquefied natural gas imports in 2014-15 came from the Middle East). In addition, as of January 2015, there were 7.3 million non-resident Indians in the region (64 percent of the total). These non-resident Indians remitted over $36 billion in 2015 (52 percent of the total remittances to India). Add to that India’s Sunni and Shiite populations (among the largest in the world), counter-terrorism cooperation with some countries, India’s defense relationship with Israel, the desire to connect with Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran, and the potential market and source of capital it represents for Indian companies, and it becomes clear why this region is important for India. 

But, with many Middle Eastern countries pivoting to Asia or at least giving it a fresh look, India arguably has more leverage than it has ever had in the past. There have been a number of reasons why these countries have been looking east recently: 

• traditional strategic partnerships in flux and questions about the U.S. role in the region; 
• the economic slowdown in Europe and the U.S. following the 2008 financial crisis; 
• changing global energy consumption patterns; 
• growing concerns about terrorism in the region; 
• And, in Israel’s case, the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement. 

In this context, India has some advantages. Its economy is doing relatively well compared to that of other countries and offers a market for goods and services, as well as potentially an investment destination. India, for example, has become Israeli defense companies’ largest foreign customer. 

Crucially for the oil and natural gas-producing states in the region, India also continues to guzzle significant—and growing—quantities of both. But, today, Delhi has buyer’s power. Why? Because oil prices are relatively low and there’s a lot of gas on the market, traditional buyers are looking elsewhere for fossil fuels or looking beyond them to cleaner energy sources. India, too, has more options and has been diversifying its sources of supply (compare India’s 74 percent dependence on the Middle East for oil in 2006-07 to the lower 58 percent that it gets from there now). 

India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market.

Thus, India might still be dependent on the Middle East for energy, but now the Middle East also depends on India as a market. This has altered dynamics—and India’s increased leverage has been evident, for example, in the renegotiated natural gas supply deal between Qatar’s RasGas and India’s Petronet, which came with lower prices and waived penalties. Even countries like Iran, which now have more options for partners and have not hesitated to point that out to Delhi, still have an interest in maintaining their India option. Regional rivalries might have made Delhi’s balancing act in the region more complicated, but it also gives each country a reason to maintain its relationship with India. 

And the Modi government has been looking to take advantage of this situation. While its Act East policy received a lot more attention over the last couple of years—from policymakers and the press—this region hasn’t been missing from the agenda or travel itineraries. For example, Modi has traveled to the United Arab Emirates and met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of the last Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference, and the Indian president has traveled to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories. The Indian foreign minister has visited Bahrain, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Oman, and the UAE and also participated the first ministerial meeting of the Arab-India Cooperation Forum in Manama earlier this year. The Modi government has also hosted the emir of Qatar, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the Bahraini, Iranian, Omani, Saudi, Syrian, and UAE foreign ministers, as well as the Israeli defense minister to India.

China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action.

But there have been concerns that this engagement is not sufficient, particularly relative to that of some countries. For example, China’s increased activity in the region, as well as Pakistan’s engagement with Iran and the rush of European leaders to the latter, have led to calls for speedier action. The Indian foreign secretary’s recent comment that “we are no longer content to be passive recipients of outcomes” in this region also seemed to reflect the understanding that Delhi needs to be more proactive about deepening its relationships with the countries in the region, rather than waiting for them to take shape organically or just reacting to events as they occur. 

The Saudi connection

It is in this context that Modi travels to Riyadh. The relationship with Saudi Arabia is one of the key pillars of India’s Middle East policy. A major source of oil, jobs, and remittances, it is also a destination for over 400,000 Indians who go to the country for Hajj or Umra every year. In addition, in recent years, there has been more security cooperation, with Riyadh handing over individuals wanted in India and the two countries working together on countering money laundering and terrorism financing. 

The relationship has not been without problems from Delhi’s perspective. Just to list a few: 

• the Saudi-Pakistan relationship; 
• diaspora-related issues, including the treatment of Indian workers in-country and efforts towards Saudization that might limit employment opportunities for Indian expatriates;
• ideology-related concerns, particularly funding from Saudi Arabia for organizations in India, which might be increasing the influence of Wahhabism in the country; and
• regional dynamics, including Saudi Arabia’s rising tensions with Iran that has had consequences for Indian citizens, for example, in Yemen from where Delhi had to evacuate 4,640 Indians (as well as 960 foreigners).

More recently, incidents involving Saudi diplomats in India have also negatively affected (elite) public perceptions of the country, though the broader impact of this, if any, is unclear. Over the medium-to-long term, there are also concerns about potential instability within Saudi Arabia.

During Modi’s trip, however, the emphasis will be on the positives—not least in the hope that these might help alleviate some of the problems. The prime minister will be hosted by King Salman, who visited India as crown prince and defense minister just before Modi took office. He will also meet a slate of Saudi political and business leaders. The Indian wish-list will likely include diversification of economic ties, greater two-way investment, as well as more and better counter-terrorism cooperation. 

There will not be a large diaspora event—as Modi has done in Australia, Singapore, the UAE, United Kingdom, and the United States—but the prime minister will engage privately with members of the Indian community. He will also meet with Indian workers employed by an Indian company that is building part of the Riyadh metro. It is not hard to assess the reason for this particular engagement, given increased sensitivity in India (particularly in the media) about the treatment of citizens abroad, as well as the government’s interest in making a pitch for Indian companies to get greater market access. But, with Riyadh’s interest in creating jobs for Saudis, Modi will also try to highlight that Indian companies are contributing to the training and employment of locals (especially women) by visiting another Indian company’s all-female business process service center.

This will reflect the broader theme of highlighting to Riyadh and Saudis that it is not just India that benefits from the relationship—they do too. Some in India hope this has an additional effect: of giving Riyadh a reason not to let its relationship with Pakistan limit that with India, and perhaps occasionally making it willing to use some of its leverage with that country to India’s benefit. Despite recent irritants in the Saudi-Pakistan relationship, however, Delhi is realistic about the limits of weaning Riyadh away from Islamabad.

So does all this mean India will “do more” in the Middle East? For all the reasons mentioned above, the country has been involved in the region for a number of years—though, as the Indian foreign secretary has noted, this involvement was not in large part the product of active state policy. Indian interests in the region will likely increase in the future and, thus, so will its corporate and official engagement. But that engagement might not be what some American observers have in mind. As India’s capabilities grow, it might do more in terms of providing maritime security, intelligence sharing, evacuating expatriates when necessary, and contributing to U.N. peacekeeping operations. It could also potentially do more in terms of capacity building within these countries with the support of the host governments. There might also be scope for India to expand its West Asia dialogue with countries like the United States. But it will likely remain wary of picking sides or getting involved in non-U.N.-sanctioned military interventions in the region unless its interests are directly affected (the previous BJP-led coalition government did briefly consider—and then reject—joining the United States coalition in the Iraq war, for instance).

One unintended but very important consequence of the Iran nuclear deal has been to aggravate and intensify Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iran's regional goals and intentions. This fueling of Saudi fears has in turn fanned sectarian tensions in the region to unprecedented levels.

Of course stoking Saudi angst and perhaps even paranoia was not the intention of the deal’s negotiators. They sought to reduce tensions and prevent a nuclear arms race. A combination of circumstances outside their control exacerbated the problem of Saudi-Iranian rivalry that dates back before the Iranian revolution. But the results are likely to haunt the region for years to come.

An array of worries

Riyadh's concerns about Iran have never been primarily focused on the nuclear danger. The Saudis have long calculated the risk of Iranian use of nuclear weapons as low. They also believe the American nuclear umbrella protects them. The key Saudi concern is their belief that Iran seeks regional hegemony and uses terrorism and subversion to achieve it.

The deal deliberately does not deal with this issue. In Saudi eyes it actually makes the situation worse, because lifting sanctions removed Iran's isolation as a rogue state and gives it more income. Iran's ambition to be the region's hegemon is fueled not reduced by the deal.

The debate over the deal that ended a year ago coincided with two key developments in the Kingdom in early 2015. First was the succession of King Salman Abd al Aziz. His predecessor and half-brother Abdullah was a hardliner on Iran, but he was also risk-averse and cautious by nature. He had experimented with detente with Iran in the 1980s, even sending a Saudi Shiite as ambassador to Tehran. He wanted American soldiers to deal with Iran, not Saudis, a posture that greatly irritated Americans like former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates who likened it to using his soldiers as mercenaries. King Abdullah sought to avoid confrontation not embrace it.

The second coincidence was the takeover of the Yemeni capital Sanaa by the alliance of Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh early last year. The rebels opened direct air links to Tehran and proposed other concessions to Iran. They marched on the southern port of Aden, Sunni territory. Iran hailed their victories. The Saudis and other Gulf states saw an Iranian foothold emerging in the Achilles heel of the Arabian Peninsula.

The new king and his young Defense Minister Prince Muhammad bin Salman reacted angrily and firmly. An Arab coalition was created rapidly to intervene and fight the rebels. The result, Operation Decisive Storm, was distinctly unlike anything in recent Saudi history. Bold and aggressive in design, it stopped the rebels’ advance and prevented any Iranian intrusion into Yemen—but it also created a humanitarian disaster and a bloody stalemate. The United States and United Kingdom, eager to quiet Saudi objections to the nuclear deal, provided crucial support to the Saudi war. Pakistan, a longtime ally with a large Shiite minority, voted unanimously in parliament to stay out because it was worried about intensified sectarianism. 

A year ago Saudi intelligence renditioned Ahmed Mughassil after he debarked from a flight from Tehran to Beirut. The Saudi Shiite Mughassil was the mastermind of the Khobar attack twenty years ago in Saudi Arabia that killed nineteen American airmen. He was also involved in the assassination of several Saudi diplomats in the 1980s. He is the epitome of Iranian support and direction of terror. No doubt his interrogation has underscored Saudi concern about Iran's clandestine actions in the Gulf.

In January this year, the Saudis executed a prominent Shite dissident for allegedly supporting terrorism. An Iranian mob attacked the Saudi embassy—probably encouraged by regime hardliners—and then the Saudis broke diplomatic relations. Since then, Riyadh has encouraged its allies to follow suit. Iranian pilgrims will not attend this year's Hajj.

Saudi concern about Iranian conspiracies is reaching new heights. At least one prominent Saudi commentator has argued the terrorist attack on the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina on July 4th was a false flag operation controlled by Iranian intelligence to discredit the king's standing as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. His column is getting wide attention.

Former intelligence chief and Ambassador to the United States Prince Turki al Faysal last weekend attended a large demonstration in France sponsored by the Mujahideen e Khalq group and called for the regime to be overthrown. Turki's backing for the MeK and his open call for regime change escalates the rivalry even further.

Entrenched position?

The combination of a new leadership in Riyadh that is more prepared to take firm action and the crisis in Yemen have added to Saudi disagreement over the Iran deal. As the Pakistanis feared, it has polarized an already deeply divided Muslim world. The Islamic State and al-Qaida benefit from the Muslim Cold War and the escalating sectarian violence.

Washington has tried hard to reassure the Saudis that they are not alone in their legitimate concerns about Iran's terrorist activities and destabilizing subversion. President Obama has wisely sought to build confidence with the king and his young son. The Iran deal is a good one, and I've supported it from its inception.

But it has had consequences that are dangerous and alarming. In the end, Riyadh and Tehran are the only players who can deescalate the situation. The Saudis show no sign of interest in that road. 

The announcement of King Abdullah’s death puts Saudi Arabia in the hands of his designated successor, Prince Salman. Salman has his own health issues and faces an immediate crisis on the kingdom’s southern border in Yemen. Continuity will be Salman’s hallmark, including close ties to Washington.

Now King Salman, born Dec. 31, 1935, who is also defense minister, has been chairing cabinet meetings for several months and handling almost all foreign travel responsibilities for the monarchy since he became the heir in 2012. He has visited China, Japan, India, Pakistan, the Maldives, and France since becoming crown prince after the death of his predecessor, Prince Nayif. He has hosted a series of Saudi allies like Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who paid their last respects quietly to Abdullah in the last week.

Before becoming crown prince, Salman was governor of Riyadh province for 48 years. When he became governor in 1963, Riyadh had 200,000 inhabitants; today, it has more than seven million. Salman presided over this remarkable transformation with a record for good governance and a lack of corruption. Since most of the royal princes and princesses live in Riyadh, he was also the family sheriff, ensuring any transgressions were dealt with smoothly and quietly with no publicity. He knows where all the bodies are hidden.

Salman also oversaw the collection of private funds to support the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s, working very closely with the kingdom’s Wahhabi clerical establishment. In the early years of the war, before the U.S. and the kingdom ramped up their secret financial support for the anti-Soviet insurgency, this private Saudi funding was critical to the war effort. At the war’s peak, Salman was providing $25 million a month to the mujahideen. He was also active in raising money for the Bosnian Muslims in the war with Serbia.

Salman’s sons include the first Muslim astronaut, Prince Sultan, and the governor of Medinah, Prince Faysal. Another son, Prince Khaled, is a fighter pilot in the Royal Saudi Air Force and led the first RSAF mission against Islamic State targets in Syria last year. The family controls much of the Saudi media. All will now be up-and-comers.

Salman has his own health issues and has had a stroke. (Persistent rumors of dementia are denied by the palace.) His successor was announced in February 2013 to ensure continuity. Second Deputy Prime Minister Prince Muqrin was born Sept. 15, 1945 and was educated at the Royal Air Force College in England before becoming a pilot in the Royal Saudi Air Force. Later, he was governor of Medinah province and then head of Saudi intelligence. Muqrin is now crown prince.

Abdullah, Salman, and Muqrin are sons of the modern kingdom’s founder, Abdelaziz Ibn Saud, who had 44 recognized sons. The survivors and their heirs constitute the Allegiance Council, which Abdullah created in 2007 to help choose the line of succession. In practice it has only ratified the king’s decisions after the fact.

Muqrin is widely believed to be the last capable son of Ibn Saud. So now that Muqrin has ascended to the crown prince position the kingdom will face the unprecedented challenge of picking a next in line from the grandsons of Ibn Saud. That will raise questions of legitimacy not faced in the last century of Saudi rule.

Abdullah has been the de facto ruler of the kingdom since King Fahd suffered a debilitating stroke in 1995; he became king a decade later when Fahd passed away. A progressive reformer by Saudi standards, Abdullah gave the kingdom 20 years of stability. Salman is likely to provide continuity. The House of Saud values family collegiality and harmony highly. The two previous Saudi kingdoms in the 18th and 19th centuries were wracked by family internal squabbles which their foreign enemies exploited. Eleven of 14 successions were contested and the Saudis ended up in exile in Kuwait until Ibn Saud created the modern kingdom in 1902.

With the Arab world facing its worst crisis in decades, the royals will want to present an image of stability and strength. This is especially true with the collapse of the pro-Saudi government in Yemen, which will be Salman’s first crisis.

The Zaydi Houthi rebels who have all but disposed the pro-American government in Yemen this week have a slogan which reads, “Death to America, death to Israel, curses to the Jews and victory to Islam.” The collapse of President Abd Rabdu Mansour Hadi’s government, which openly supported American drone strikes in Yemen against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Pennisula for the last couple of years, puts a pro-Iranian anti-American Shia militia as the dominant player in a strategically important country. The Bab El Mandab, the straits between Asia and Africa, are one of the choke points of global energy and geopolitics. The leader of the Houthis gave a triumphal speech Tuesday and Iranian diplomats hailed his victory. The Houthis have fought a half-dozen border wars with the Saudis, who spent billions trying to keep them out of power.

The Houthis’ victory also ironically benefits AQAP by polarizing Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, between Shia and Sunni with AQAP emerging as the protector of Sunni rights. AQAP is fresh off its attack on Paris and has grown since 2009 into the most dangerous al Qaeda affiliate in the world. It is dedicated to overthrowing the House of Saud. Salman will have his hands full immediately.

This piece was originally published by The Daily Beast. 

Less than four months after ascending the throne, Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud has made unprecedented changes in the line of succession that benefit his own son Prince Mohammed bin Salman. These shifts come as Salman pursues the most assertive foreign policy in recent Saudi history.

The king removed the sitting Crown Prince Muqrin, his half brother, and promoted the third in line Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, his nephew, up to number two. Salman made his own son, Mohammed bin Salman, the new number three. The King also replaced the ailing foreign minister, Prince Saud al Faisal with a non-royal, the current ambassador to Washington, Adel al Jubeir. Prince Saud had been Foreign Minister since 1975.

According to the royal palace, Prince Muqrin asked to be replaced, but no reason was given. No crown prince has ever given up the position in the history of the modern kingdom, founded in 1902. When Salman ascended the throne in January, the press trumpeted Muqrin as heir and there was no sign he was not eager to be the next in line. Many will assume he was asked to quit.

Speculation will be intense about why that might be. Muqrin was a protégé of the late King Abdullah. He is not close to Salman's branch of the family, the Sudeiris. He also appeared less enthusiastic about Salman's war in Yemen. As a former fighter pilot Muqrin understands the limits of air power, and he may have had doubts about the wisdom of what was initially called Operation Decisive Storm, but has now become a stalemate.

The new crown prince, 55-year-old Mohammed bin Nayef, is famous for defeating Al Qaeda's violent attempt to overthrow the House of Saud a decade ago. MBN, as he is known, led a four-year counter-terrorist campaign that decimated Al Qaeda in the Kingdom and drove its remnants into Yemen. In the process MBN survived at least four assassination plots. His father, the late Crown Prince Nayef, was so reactionary he was nicknamed the Black Prince. But MBN studied in Oregon and with the FBI and Scotland Yard before joining the Saudi interior ministry. He also holds the position of chairman of the Kingdom’s security and political committee coordinating all security issues.

Mohammed bin Salman, MBS, is the face of the Yemen war. He became defense minister in January and has been constantly on Saudi TV appearing to direct the war effort and meeting with foreign leaders to win support for the campaign against the pro-Iranian Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels. He is considered ruthlessly ambitious and is very close to his father. He has given up his position as chief of the royal court but he will undoubtedly keep control of access to the king.

Unlike most Saudi princes, MBS was not educated in the west. Instead he studied at King Saud University. There is controversy over his age, reputed to be anywhere from 29 to 34 (officially his birthday is July 24, 1980). He is chairman of a number of young people's organizations in the Kingdom and seeks to portray himself as the leader of the next generation of Saudis. He also chairs the powerful development and economics committee that coordinates economic policies, including oil price and supply.

In promoting his nephew and son, King Salman is passing the torch to the next generations of royals. Since 1902 the Kingdom has been ruled by the founder of the modern Kingdom Ibn Saud Abd Al Aziz or his sons. Now, Salman will be the last son to reign.

These changes have all been endorsed by the Allegiance Council, the committee of the sons and grandsons of Ibn Saud, but the legitimacy of selecting the next generation has been a question mark over the succession process for years. The king hopes it is now all settled.

The late King Abdullah's own son, Prince Mitab, has kept his powerful position as commander of the Saudi National Guard. The SANG is the family’s praetorian guard, it defends the capital, the holy mosques in Mecca and Medina and the oil industry. SANG troops have occupied Bahrain, the Kingdom’s tiny island neighbor, since the Arab Spring in 2011 to keep a minority Sunni monarchy in power.

The new lineup is solidly pro-American but riven with doubts about American reliability. The royals believe George W. Bush foolishly let Iran gain dominance in Iraq and fear Barack Obama is too eager for a nuclear deal with Iran and a grand rapprochement with Tehran. Repeated assurances by Obama and concrete support for the Yemen war have not altered Saudi doubts about America.

Salman's decision to wage war in Yemen so soon after coming to the throne reflected his acute concern that Iran was gaining a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula in what has always been the soft underbelly of Saudi Arabia, Yemen. The Zaydi Houthi rebels are not pawns of Tehran but they did initiate direct air flights between Sanaa and Tehran early this year, offered Iran port facilities and negotiated a lucrative oil deal. A few Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisers have been assisting the Zaydis for the last few years covertly. From Riyadh's view Iran already dominated decision-making in Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut, it does not want a fourth Arab capital to be aligned with Tehran.

But Salman's intense effort to secure wide Islamic backing for the war has been less than a success. Oman, Yemen's other neighbor, has opted not to join with the other five members of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the fighting, instead staying on the sidelines. The Pakistani parliament voted unanimously to keep neutral and rebuff repeated Saudi requests for ground troops to aid the war effort. Pakistani officials have privately suggested Salman panicked into the war without a viable strategy to get the Houthis out of Sanaa. Even Egypt, which benefits from billions in GCC aid, has opted not to send troops. although it's navy is supporting the Saudi blockade of Yemen.

The Yemen war is part Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry, part the unfinished business of the Arab Spring revolutions and part sectarian Sunni-Shia animosity. It is above all the Salmans’ war, father and son together. The surprise elevation of MBN and MBS underscores how the stakes in this war are crucial, not only to Yemen's future but increasingly to the future of the House of Saud.

This piece was originally published by The Daily Beast.

Now well into the final year of his presidency, President Barack Obama recently gave a surprisingly frank and poignant review of his foreign policy record in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic.

There were a number of notable takeaways from their discussion, such as Obama’s critique of European allies and their lack of follow-through in regard to the Libya conflict. But a central element of the discussion was Obama’s rebuke to many critics of his foreign policy. He complained that much of the “establishment” seems to have a foreign policy playbook that requires frequent and excessive use of force whenever a crisis arises that displeases the United States. Instead, Obama called for a much more restrained, selective, and strategic approach in the employment of American military power.

Making the grade?

In many ways, I think the president is right. As I have written before, Obama’s original and very lofty goals for his presidency have generally proven elusive. Barack Obama may not be able to heal the planet, rid the Earth of nuclear weapons, or stop the oceans’ rise as his signature legacies. 

But, in fact, there is a strategy, even if it is more often implied than explicit, and even if it falls short of the president’s own preferences of what writers and historians might say about his two terms in office. It is more mundane but nonetheless important. Obama is attempting to be strategic in the most literal and relevant senses of the word—defining priorities and holding to them, even when that makes him appear indifferent or indecisive in response to certain types of crises or challenges. Yet he has shown himself willing to employ significant amounts of force when persuaded that there is no alternative.

Consider just a few of the cases that seemed to be on the president’s mind in the conversation with Goldberg:

• Syria. Obama did not use force against Syria after President Bashar Assad violated his “red line” and used chemical weapons. Here I tend to agree with the president; the key point is that Assad had to give up all (or nearly all) of his arsenal. If that could be achieved without U.S. military strikes against chemical weapons depots, so much the better (there is more to say about Syria, however, and I return to that in a minute).
• Russia. Obama did not use force against Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. The president is right: Ukraine is not an American ally, and Russia has a larger stake in its future than does America. As such, economic responses are the preferred policy tool here as well.
• China. Obama stayed firm but restrained towards China in the South China Sea. He took longer to undertake freedom of navigation exercises in response to China’s growing claims than some would have preferred. But his no-drama Obama approach has been correct, as he has left little doubt that America is committed to freedom of these international waterways. 
• Afghanistan. Obama made it harder than it had to be, and still has not given U.S. forces adequate authorities to attack the Taliban. Moreover, the U.S. military footprint there is somewhat too small. But Obama ultimately and rightly concluded that America needed to stay committed beyond his presidency.
• Iran. There is no doubt: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is preferable to a military conflict with Iran, even for those of us who think that the deal could probably have been negotiated with tougher and better terms.
• Iraq. Yes, Obama pulled U.S. forces out too soon—but he was willing to return in 2014 once the situation deteriorated.
• Libya. We mishandled this badly and left too soon after the fall of Moammar Gadhafi. Obama is right that European allies should have done more, but he is wrong to have assumed they would get it right on their own in the first place. If we’re assessing his worldview (as opposed to his actual record), Obama has been honest and fair and acknowledged a mistake at least—though, alas, he has not found a way to meaningfully correct the policy situation since 2011.

These cases add up to a far from perfect record. But they represent a much more credible foreign policy than Obama’s critics often allege. And he has avoided unnecessary escalation in a number of situations where a less judicious president might have erred.

I give Obama reasonable marks for carefulness and strategic thinking.

Finally, however, returning to the Syria issue: On balance, Obama has been more wrong than right. Yes, he achieved a modest success in eliminating chemical weapons. Yet the war has been a travesty. Staying out has not worked any better than President George W. Bush’s approach to Iraq (even if it has of course cost far fewer American lives). Worse, Obama seems to justify his Syria policy largely by invoking Iraq—as if the 2003 invasion and occupation there were the only alternative to his minimalist approach. There have been other approaches that would involve significantly more force than we are employing now, yet far less than we used in Iraq or Afghanistan. Obama continues to refuse to consider them seriously, hinging everything on a diplomatic process that is in many ways a substitute for a real policy.

So, as with any presidency, there is more work to do, and as with any president, there is no untarnished record of systematic accomplishment. But I give Obama reasonable marks for carefulness and strategic thinking. He has been a proficient commander in chief, and it is possible that we will someday badly miss his judiciousness.