The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook to 2024 - Workshop 4 26 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2020 Gateway House, Stevens Street, Colaba

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within India’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Indian perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, Gateway House in Mumbai.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by the International Security Studies Programme at Gateway House.

Read a summary and essay

Network Power in the Asia-Pacific: Making Sense of the New Regionalism and Opportunities for Cooperation 7 February 2020 — 9:45AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. The rise of China and tensions with the US are affecting bilateral relationships and traditional alliances in the region. Whether seen from the perspective of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the US – or the Indo-Pacific concept embraced by a wide range of countries but with no shared consensus on scope and objectives or with ASEAN who insists on the importance of its own centrality, the region is redefining and reconceptualising itself.

With a diverse range of initiatives – including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – there are a plethora of regional agreements and institutional groupings that add further complexity.

As the Bretton Woods architecture continues to be dominated by Western powers, China is also spearheading parallel governance initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of enhancing its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence.

This one-day conference will focus on how such networks and alliances have been built, and sustained, in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand how new regional initiatives might open up opportunities for new forms of international cooperation, the conference will focus on the themes of cyber-technology and innovation, sustainable development and mitigating the impacts of climate change and new infrastructure initiatives. It will assess whether there is a zero-sum conflict between competing networks and agendas or whether a common approach can be developed.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5 18 February 2020 — 12:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 February 2020 Langafonua Centre

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Tonga’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Tongan perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Nuku’alofa and was co-hosted by the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Lady Fane Fakafanua, Director of Operations at the Royal Oceania Institute.

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Virtual Roundtable: The Economic Implications of COVID-19 on Asia 2 April 2020 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a damaging economic impact on Asia, potentially the most serious since the financial crisis two decades ago. While early estimates suggest that a recession is inevitable, differing countries in Asia are generally deploying modest fiscal and monetary measures. This is true even in China, compared with the ‘whatever it takes’ approach pursued by Europe and America.

How effective will these measures be in reviving growth and in easing the pain, particularly on the poor in developing countries in Asia? Is Asia witnessing a sudden but temporary halt in economic activity rather than a prolonged slowdown? At this virtual roundtable, the speakers will consider the likelihood of a recovery for trade in the region and will explore what lessons can be learned from countries like Singapore, who seem to be successfully managing the health and economic aspects of COVID-19.

This event is online only. After registering, you will receive a follow-up confirmation email with details of how to join the webinar.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives until 2024 – Japanese perceptions 24 February 2020 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Chatham House

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Japan’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Japanese perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Tokyo and was organized in partnership with the Indo-Pacific Studies Group.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Hiroki Sekine, Visiting Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House.

Read a summary and essay

Nancy Pelosi in Taiwan: What lies ahead for China and the US? Expert comment GBhardwaj 3 August 2022

Chatham House experts examine the implications for Taiwan, China and the United States of Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island.

China’s fading ties with Washington?

Dr Yu Jie

US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s, visit to Taiwan has plunged China-US relations into a new low as the reservoir of trust forged between the two sides over the last 40 years appears to be almost exhausted.

However, her move will likely not result in the full-scale crisis across the Taiwan strait that some hawkish voices in both Beijing and Washington believe. Instead, Beijing will most likely offer a combination of military posturing toward the US navy and economic sanctions on Taiwanese agricultural and manufacturing products in order to send a clear bellwether to any future potential visits by high-level Western political figures.

Neither Beijing nor Washington has declared a willingness to change the current status quo as the present impasse benefits both governments – but for different reasons. For China, the best approach is to reach a military and economic capability that prevents US engagement with Taiwan without the use of force. For the US, the strategic ambiguity under the Taiwan Relations Act remains an effective card to counter China’s growing military influence in the Indo-Pacific and keep itself relevant within the region as a security guarantor. Yet, both sides have decided to kick the issue of Taiwan’s status down the road, believing that time is ultimately on their side.

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric, China will be careful not to stumble into an accidental conflict which risks colossal damage on all fronts. Chinese President, Xi Jinping, must weigh all of the options before him as Beijing cannot afford to be perceived as unilaterally seeking to change what it agreed with the US back in 1979 when ties were re-established. If that happens, it will provoke the US political establishment to reach a unanimous agreement to change its ‘One China Policy’ and, ahead of the 20th Communist Party Congress where Xi is expected to be crowned for a historic third term, the last thing he wants is an unnecessary conflict with Taiwan.

The road to escalation?

Dr Bill Hayton

Beijing has chosen to take issue over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in a way that it did not do for other recent US Congressional visits to the island. Several high-ranking US senators visited in April and May this year yet none of these visits triggered the prospect of a cross-strait crisis. So why has Beijing chosen to turn Pelosi’s visit into a stand-off?

Pelosi’s visit is part of a performance in which both actors – the US and China – are playing primarily for their domestic audiences. This comes at a time when ruling circles in Beijing are preparing for the five-yearly Communist Party Congress. Amid a slowing economy and successive COVID-19 variants, Xi Jinping cannot afford to look weak as he prepares the ground for his third term of office. Meanwhile, the US, represented either by President Joe Biden or House Speaker Pelosi, cannot back down at this point without looking weak itself.

Both sides have moved military assets into strategic positions near Taiwan to demonstrate their resolve. Neither side wants confrontation yet neither wishes to be humiliated. Currently, Pelosi’s visit, amid posturing by China, will make the US appear strong, but the consequences are likely to play out over a longer period. Xi Jinping will need to appear to have recaptured the initiative between now and the congress in the autumn when the risk of an incident will be at its greatest.

Taiwan controls several isolated islands that could be pressured by Chinese forces in the event of a future crisis. The Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos lie just a few miles off the coast of the mainland and have been at the centre of previous confrontations. There are also two other points of concern. Pratas Island – known as Dongsha – sits halfway between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Itu Aba – known as Taiping – is the largest of the Spratly Islands in the centre of the South China Sea. All would be vulnerable to an attack by the People’s Liberation Army, the principal military force of China, and the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party.

A military confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan, or further south in the South China Sea, would have major impacts on regional and global trade. An estimated $300 billion worth of trade passes through the area every month. Japan and South Korea depend heavily on flows of oil and gas through the sea. Exports from Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines would also be heavily affected by disruptions to shipping, increased insurance costs and interruptions in inflows of raw materials. The impact on a world economy already suffering major disruption because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the lingering effects of COVID-19 would indeed be stark.

Is a shift in US policy on the cards?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will undoubtedly be seen as a provocation by Beijing – even if it should not be. Pelosi’s trip to the Indo-Pacific, which also includes visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan, comes at a time of growing tension between the US and China in the region.

It also comes at a time when the divide among Washington’s foreign policy elite is growing, with some arguing that it is time to abandon the country’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, where it refrains from stating how it would react were China to openly and deliberately attack Taiwan. Indeed, recent statements by President Joe Biden have raised questions about whether the US is set to make a policy change. But, since both its ‘One China Policy’ and policy of strategic ambiguity have been largely successful, it would be wise for the US to maintain them.

During her visit, Pelosi is likely to reaffirm the US’ high regard for Taiwan’s democracy and embrace the language of shared values. She has embraced Biden’s framing of international relations as a contest between democracies and autocracies. This alone will continue to exacerbate tensions. It would be a mistake, though, to signal a major policy change away from strategic ambiguity and towards strategic clarity on Taiwan’s status. Even if the US decides later to embrace a policy shift of this size, such a message should be carefully considered and communicated clearly, and not by chance.

Congress has an important role to play but President Joe Biden and his national security team should make the final decision on US policy towards Taiwan. Getting the signals right in international politics is a key part of deterrence and, especially in East Asia, deterring both China and Taiwan’s ambitions is essential. 

Increasing insecurity in the region?

Dr John Nilsson-Wright and Ben Bland

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has provoked mixed responses from US allies across Asia.

For Japanese policymakers, the Taiwan issue is connected to the wider issue of regional security. Fears that a military conflict over the island will inevitably draw Japanese self-defense forces into a shooting war with China – a development that is neither formally mandated under the terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty nor necessarily constitutionally sanctioned – explains the concerns in Tokyo.

While the Japanese government of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is increasingly worried about China’s growing military presence in the East and South China Seas, Japan’s heavy trade dependence on China and the country’s economic and security vulnerabilities make it imperative to avoid any further escalation of tensions.

Given Tokyo’s non-recognition policy towards Taiwan, Japanese ties with Taipei are handled informally by politicians of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rather than at cabinet or foreign ministry level, and in recent weeks and months there has been an increase in visits by cross party delegations from Japan.

The death of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as removed from public life a vocal advocate in support of enhanced ties between Tokyo and Taipei, but with public opinion in Japan increasingly tilting in an anti-Chinese direction, and with younger politicians favouring a more combative approach towards Beijing, there is a risk that the government will face pressure at home to toughen its language on Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence through increased military cooperation among allies, along with a graduated increase in defence spending, is the best way of limiting risk over Taiwan.

Nevertheless, privately, many officials in Tokyo are likely to have viewed the Pelosi visit as an unhelpful intervention and will be puzzled and perhaps frustrated by the apparent inability of the Biden administration to persuade the US Speaker of the House of Representatives to cancel her visit.

In South Korea, the government of President Yoon Suk-yeol, faces similar pressures to Japan, given the heavy dependence of the South Korean economy on China for trade and investment opportunities.

Pelosi’s visit to the region will strikingly not include meetings with either the president or Foreign Minister Park Jin. With Yoon on vacation and Park attending the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Cambodia, the absence of high profile engagements for Pelosi might seem to be a purely practical matter, but Seoul may also be seeking to avoid antagonizing Beijing at a time when the Chinese government is seeking to pressure South Korea not to enhance alliance coordination with the United States and Japan or to expand its commitment to the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system.

As in Japan, public opinion in South Korea is increasingly anti-Chinese, but the logic of regional economic and security uncertainty, requires the Yoon government to avoid getting trapped in a worsening stand-off with Beijing.

What are the lasting impacts of the AUKUS agreement? Interview LJefferson 15 August 2022

Drawing on their International Affairs article, Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda outline the effect of AUKUS on Australia-France relations and the liberal order.

Almost a year after the surprise announcement of the AUKUS treaty, its full diplomatic implications are still being understood. The security cooperation agreement between Australia, the US and the UK caused outrage in France and was a notable source of discord between states that see themselves as defenders of the liberal international order.

In this interview Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda discuss their recent article in International Affairs and assess the effect of the agreement on relationships between its signatories and France and the EU, the potential for reconciliation in the treaty’s aftermath, as well as the implications it has for trust in world politics.  

What was the AUKUS treaty and why did Australia sign it?

The AUKUS treaty is an agreement between Australia, the US and the UK. Signed in 2021, it facilitates cooperation on security issues in the Indo-Pacific between the three countries – specifically, it concerns the sharing of ‘military capabilities and critical technologies, such as cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea domains’.

A key aspect is that Australia will purchase nuclear-fuelled submarines from either the US or UK. Australia decided to purchase nuclear-powered submarines – and reneged on its 2016 agreement to purchase French-built diesel-propelled submarines – because it believed that the French-made submarines were no longer fit for purpose.

However, the agreement is about more than submarines. Although Australia, the UK and US argue that AUKUS is designed to defend the rules-based international order and help ‘preserve security and stability in the Indo-Pacific’, AUKUS has been largely seen as a response to the rise of China and its military activities in the region. The AUKUS agreement reflects the increased attention that the US, UK and Australia are paying to the Indo-Pacific and their commitment to constraining China’s exercise of power in the region.

What were the effects of the AUKUS treaty on relations between Australia and France?

It led to a serious diplomatic rift. Australian officials, including former Prime Minister Morrison, had visited President Macron in France and told him nothing about AUKUS. Morrison had assured Macron in June 2021 while former Australian foreign and defence ministers had assured their French counterparts that Australia was fully committed to the purchase of French submarines just two weeks before the announcement of AUKUS.

When French officials found out about AUKUS on the day it was announced on 15 September 2021, they declared publicly that they had been betrayed and stabbed in the back. Not only had France built its relationship with Australia on trust, but its relationship was more than just about submarines. It was designed to be central to France’s 50-year engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific. However, France was not only left out of talks but was also betrayed by a country it considered a close ally.

France responded by temporarily recalling its ambassador and stated that it would ‘redefine’ its relationship with Australia. It did not say that it would not work with Australia, but rather downgraded its relationship to one where it would only do so on a case-by-case basis.

In your article you mention that the AUKUS treaty was seen as a betrayal of trust by France in particular. Why use the word ‘betrayal’?

The word betrayal is accurate because Australia’s actions went beyond simply cancelling a business contract. Australia breached France’s trust. Not all agreements involve trust. Some are driven by self-interest while others are simply legal contracts. When these agreements are broken, the usual response is feelings of disappointment and a belief that one party is unreliable and has not lived up to its end of the agreement.

However, when diplomatic partnerships involve trust, they often contain an emotional element. A key element of trust is that one party makes itself vulnerable to another in the expectation that neither party will take advantage. When that trust is breached, the response is different from a breach of contract.

It involves feelings of betrayal as deeper emotional factors are involved. This could be seen in President Macron’s anger, and his and other French officials’ willingness to publicly call Prime Minister Morrison a liar who had stabbed France in the back. If the previous France-Australia agreement was simply a legal contract, it would have been difficult to explain the emotional element of this diplomatic fallout.

How did the signing of the AUKUS treaty affect wider relations between members of AUKUS and EU member states?

The EU, like France, felt betrayed by the AUKUS announcement. Despite being a key ally of the US, Australia, and the UK, it was left out of AUKUS discussions, and was not aware of the agreement until it was announced in the media.

What made this worse was that the EU was in the process of announcing its Indo-Pacific strategy, which was characterized as ‘maybe one of the [EU’s] most important geopolitical documents’ by High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs, Josep Borrell. For the EU, this was the latest in a long line of recent policy betrayals that had left it uncertain if it could trust key allies on important issues. The result was greater calls from within the EU to more forcefully pursue ‘strategic autonomy’, meaning a more assertive and independent EU foreign policy.

Do betrayals of trust affect the health of the liberal international order?

Yes, they can. While it is common for leaders in liberal democracies to lie to their own people, lying to the leaders of other countries can have serious repercussions for the norms, rules and institutions of international society. A key aspect of international society is the ‘presumption of trust’ that facilitates legal compliance and diplomatic cooperation.

Without this presumption it is difficult for states to engage in long term partnerships or have confidence that diplomatic agreements will be upheld. In our article, we highlight how Australia’s violation of a particular norm, that agreements must be kept, has undermined this presumption of trust. This norm not only helps build trust between states, but also contributes to the maintenance of international order by helping to support the presumption of trust in international society.

Why the UN matters for Britain Interview LJefferson 6 September 2022

In the fourth of a series of interviews with Queen Elizabeth II Academy faculty, Jeremy Greenstock argues that the UN is still important in a polarized world.

For many people looking at the United Nations (UN) today, the institution (and the world) appears to be at an inflection point and the UN seems ill-equipped to meet these challenges. From your vantage point, how does this period look in relative terms? 

I think for an institution like the UN founded on principles and compromises laid down in 1945, the passage of time is bound to be difficult because society changes quicker than an institution can reform. We can talk about reform later, but the UN has challenges. Where do these challenges come from? I see them coming from a crisis in governance, in governments around the world.

The UN is a forum of member states, and the member states carry their national labels at the UN and follow their national interests at the UN. And almost all governments are suffering huge challenges, not just from the circumstances of geopolitics, but from the expectations of their own people, which they find difficult to meet.

The UN is a servant in that sense, of governments, and so what happens at the UN reflects what is happening in and between governments. We need to keep that in perspective. The UN still retains a tremendous value as a forum. It is a natural forum for governments to talk before they shoot, which was not there in previous eras, and that has had a significant effect since 1945 in reducing the incidence of war between states, particularly between the largest states.

It has obviously been more difficult to deal with local and regional conflicts, but the kind of confrontation that threatens to escalate into a global war has been severely restricted by the UN. The habit of talking at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), artificial as it may seem, is an extremely important part of the avoidance of conflict in the modern age.  

There is a deep scepticism about the UN. Many people think there is a lot of talking but that the real action takes place elsewhere. What is the value of the UN?  

Well, there are two aspects to this. One is the fact that leaders must give their reasons for their policymaking to an international public. This has a force in today’s digital world where most people have access to a megaphone of some kind. The legitimacy of what governments do is exposed at the UNGA.

Secondly, alongside the open meetings and the publicized speeches, there are countless side meetings that go on, and it is an opportunity for leaders to test each other out, and to have private words that may differ from the public words they have to produce for their own followers in their own capitals.

It is an opportunity for personal diplomacy which is highly valuable, and which might not otherwise happen, particularly between leaders who have very serious differences. And I think that the testing of the legitimacy of policy in both the public and the private spheres is an important aspect of international diplomacy that the UNGA provides an opportunity for.  

At the UNGA, states are called to account before the UN, and this can expose hypocrisies. But sometimes there are fundamental clashes over interests and also over values. How would you characterize the UN’s handling of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

It is a different audience at the UN from the audience that they have back in their capitals or in their own groups of like-minded people. They must justify themselves in different ways, and there are a whole host of inconsistencies in foreign policy that get exposed at the UN when people must explain themselves in public.

A lot of member states around the world have not condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine; yet underneath their non-condemnation is a general regret because Russia has broken a huge taboo of the UN Charter, which is the sacrosanctity of independent sovereign territories in Article 2.7.

And that article is valuable to member states who feel threatened by more powerful member states. Russia, as a permanent member, has ridden roughshod over sovereign independence. China and India will have equivocal feelings about that, but they can’t say so in public because they want some of the West’s hypocrisies and inconsistencies exposed, and because they find the approach of sanctions very unpalatable.

Sanctions are unpopular, and the use of sanctions has become a major weapon of non-war by the United States in particular. So, the Russian invasion is unpopular, but the approach of the West is also unpopular for not better looking after the interests of emerging economies and lower-income states, particularly on climate change, but also on economic development.

So, a whole host of different considerations come into play over Ukraine at the UNGA.

How do you think the UN could be best repurposed or reformed?  

It is terribly difficult, because if you open the UN Charter for one reason, you are opening it up to a host of demands from member states for other reforms. And remember that no reform of the Charter can happen without a 2/3 majority at the General Assembly, and that is an effective blocker, because you will always find more people opposing a particular reform that supporting it.

So, I think formal reform remains a bit of a dream in the circumstances of a polarized world. I want to divert discussions about UN reform into areas where the Secretary General has a competence without needing a vote from member states.

I am talking about improvement in methodologies, in the meritocracy of appointments, in the day-to-day workings of the UN. It looks unambitious on a large-scale basis, but just improving the competence of the UN and its agencies will ensure the relevance of the UN to people’s material interests in terms of human rights, refugees, food distribution, and children, and all the other things that the agencies look after.

So, I would prefer to concentrate reform energy into competence reforms, management reforms, rather than reforms of the Charter. 

This takes us to the question of the permanent members of the Security Council, and especially the US and the UK. You have experienced first-hand America’s ambivalence towards the UN. How much has this undercut the UN’s relevance?

I was frequently disappointed by the approach of the US to issues of policy at the UN. The US finds it very difficult as a nation to move beyond the primacy of its own domestic public opinion.

That perspective – that we have democracy at home, but we will not, as Americans, allow international democracy – is regarded around the world as an untenable position for the superpower. And I think it is more than untenable, it is against the US’s long-term interests to demand such national exceptionalism.

That exceptionalism is extremely unpopular, and the US’s extraterritorial reach is very unpopular. That loss of legitimacy around the world is affecting American interests, in the Middle East, over Afghanistan, over the reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; America losing the argument with international public opinion has a material effect on American power, influence and interests.

Has America paid the price for asserting its exceptionalism? From your perspective, representing the UK, arguably the closest ally of the US and one with a permanent seat on the Security Council, how did you manage this?

Well, I had a long experience of that in my job in Baghdad. Yes, the UK normally supports the US in international forums because our interests coincide. In foreign policy, interests are more important than values, and sometimes you have to make compromises and shade your values in order to get results and to avoid conflict.

I found myself taking up the US’ arguments and trying to deliver them as the UK, because the US was more unpopular than the UK and we could act more subtly. The US was more unpopular than the UK because the UK – and a lot of the time France – tried a lot harder than other permanent members to work for the common interest of UN members.

There were times I argued publicly against the US at the Security Council because their logic was incompatible with a multilateral approach, over the International Criminal Court for instance, or over some approaches to the Middle East. I would take a different view, not just because I didn’t want to seem like a constant puppet of the US, but because I thought the logic that they were following was constraining for them, and the counter-productiveness washed off on us.

Here, I want to make an important point. You won’t get governments coming together to form a multilateral approach with all the compromises that this entails unless they are confident of their position at home. They can’t otherwise explain those compromises to their domestic public opinion. If governments are insecure at home, they won’t pursue a multilateral approach because of that insecurity.

The UK is seeking to define a new global role for itself. It has been one of the most influential states at the UN. Do you see this changing?

I don’t think the change of leader makes a terrific difference for the UK in the UN because there is cross-party parliamentary agreement that the UN is important.

I was disappointed that the UK did not take the UN more seriously at a political level except when it badly needed it at a particular moment. At an official level, there was plenty of support from London, but I don’t think that politicians ever gave much priority to the health of the UN.

Why America’s midterm elections matter for the world The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 September 2022

The outcome could threaten the fight against climate change and the future of democracy itself, warns Leslie Vinjamuri.

As the November 8 midterm elections in the United States approach, the sense of urgency among the Democrats and Republicans is escalating. Early voter turnout is on track to surpass the 2018 midterms, when a record 122 million Americans voted ahead of election day. The midterms – when congressional, state and local seats are determined – used to pass almost unnoticed, especially outside the US.

Since 2018, though, they have become a matter of global concern. The 2022 midterm elections will be the first major elections in the US since the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol. As such, they will be the first real litmus test for the continued relevance of Donald Trump and Trumpism.

For both parties, winning is more important than ever and it is not only a matter of policy. Today, a majority of members of both parties – 72 per cent of Republicans and 63 per cent of Democrats – see those belonging to the opposing party as immoral, according to a Pew Research Center poll in September, representing a significant rise since 2016.

In many states, the midterms will have a direct impact on the 2024 presidential elections, influencing who decides how voting takes place, how votes are counted and, especially, who controls the certification of election results.

Given this context, the stakes in elections are especially high. The winners will have the upper hand not only in defining many procedural rules but also the values that constitute the nation, such as on abortion rights, education and healthcare.

Republicans and Democrats align on most key foreign policy

Though foreign policy will bear a strong resemblance to its former self even if Republicans gain a majority in the House of Representatives, as many anticipate, the outcome of the elections on US global influence could impact efforts to combat climate change and to support the defence of Ukraine.

The Republican Party has become known for its embrace of climate deniers and the radicalized anti-immigrant rhetoric of many of its party’s most established figures. The failure to address rampant gun violence – and, instead, to defend a historically suspect interpretation of the right to bear arms – and the push for a national abortion ban mean that the party is imposing a version of America onto itself that is out-of-step with virtually all other rich democratic countries.

The choices voters make in November are likely to shape the values that come to the fore in the US, and with this the affinity that America’s closest partners feel for it.

Domestic policy is likely to be more heavily affected by the elections. A Republican majority in the House would stall progress on President Joe Biden’s domestic agenda and undercut his ability to raise the taxes he needs to pay for his spending plans. The drive to hold the former President Trump accountable will also be affected by the choices voters make in November.

A Republican majority in the House would spell an end to congressional investigations of Donald Trump. Instead, Republicans would use their electoral gains to launch their investigations into the Democrats.

One anti-Trump Republican on the January 6 committee investigating the storming of the Capitol building last year warned of a vengeful and obstructive turn against Biden from his Republican colleagues if they took the House. ‘They’re going to demand an impeachment vote on President Biden every week,’ said congressman Adam Kinzinger. It is under this shadow that the January 6 Committee is pressing ahead to finish its proceedings and publish its report.

On foreign policy, the parties are more aligned than divided on most of the key issues. Their differences are a matter of diplomacy, which matters, and degree. Support for Ukraine has had bipartisan backing, but in recent weeks the issue has become politicized. Some congressional Republicans are more hawkish than their Democratic counterparts in their ambition to support Ukraine. Yet, the congressman set to be Speaker of the House if Republicans gain a majority, Kevin McCarthy, is leading an effort to exercise far stronger oversight of any additional funds for Ukraine.

Ultimately, though, the president and his advisers maintain considerable control over foreign policy.  

Bipartisan support for a tougher stance on China was consolidated under Trump. He mobilized US voters by blaming China for the loss of manufacturing jobs. Later he held China responsible for the outbreak of Covid and for covering it up. China’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, its assertiveness in the South China Seas, tensions over Taiwan and reports of human rights abuse against the Uighur in Xinjiang have cemented a bipartisan consensus on America’s China policy. But a more empowered Republican base looks likely to lead to a more ideologically driven anti-China rhetoric. 

The ground has also shifted over Russia. During President Trump’s tenure, Republican attitudes towards Vladimir Putin softened. But the Russian president’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine has entrenched American opposition to him and bolstered support for NATO.

Democrats and Republicans are also more aligned on policy towards Iran today than they were before Trump abandoned the Iran Deal negotiating the Middle Eastern country’s nuclear programme. On some contentious issues, such as immigration reform, progress is already stalled and that is unlikely to change.

US climate change policy may depend on the results

The upshot of all this is that the president is unlikely to make radical changes to US foreign policy regardless of the results of the midterms. The most important exception to this is climate change, which continues to be the unwanted stepchild of the Republican Party. Domestic infighting in the US would inevitably detract even further from the bold policy that is needed.

Republicans are unlikely to get the two-thirds majority needed to pass legislation that would undermine President Biden’s climate bill. Republican control of House committees, however, would add more politically driven oversight of any climate spending, including what has already been authorized by the Inflation Reduction Act. 

Policy convergence and clear executive authority cannot mitigate the sheer disruption that would be unleashed if the Republicans were to gain majorities in both the Senate and the House, however. For the rest of the world, and especially within Europe, this would send warning signs about the future trajectory of US foreign policy commitments and set off alarm bells that an ‘America First’ president might return to the White House after 2024.

A Republican majority in the House with a Democratic majority in the Senate would be disruptive, if less so, but would probably spell the end of business as usual, unsettling people, states and markets. All of this is unfolding at a time when many of the world’s rich democracies face internal divisions, rising inequality and populist challenges at home and so are ill-equipped to lead.

Democracies face a trust deficit. This is especially apparent in the US where only 43 per cent of Americans have trust in US institutions, according to the 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer.

Internal threats to democracy also unsettle the promise of US global leadership at a time when concerted and determined leadership is needed to maintain a strong and united response to Russia, and to tackle global food insecurity and the energy, climate and debt crises. In addition, the failure to lead a global response that can help developing countries is feeding a trust deficit between rich and poor countries.

The midterms will reveal a greater truth about the future of the Republican Party. Even more so, it will reveal the values held by the American electorate. In the run-up to the 2020 US presidential elections, Europeans frequently said that they would not give Americans a pass if they voted for Donald Trump twice – and indeed only 17 per cent of those in European Union countries would have cast a vote for Trump if they could.

A Republican midterm victory in both the Senate and the House of Representatives would have ripple effects across the Atlantic at a time when the threat from Russia has intensified.

The US is judged around the world for what it does, but also for who it is. The perception that democracy is failing in America creates a permissive environment for aspiring autocrats. At a time when democracy has been in decline around the world for more than 15 years, it is essential that the US fix its own democracy and that it demonstrates to the rest of the world that democracy can deliver.

The midterms will signal to the world what Americans value, sending a message about what it can expect from the US.

This article was updated on October 31, 2022 to reflect developments such as early voting turnout, and the impact of the midterms on the 2024 presidential election, support for Ukraine and climate change spending.

International relations: The ‘how not to’ guide Expert comment NCapeling 11 October 2022

A centenary special issue of International Affairs explores past foreign policy failures to help policymakers avoid future catastrophes.

Policy decisions in international relations frequently have a long-lasting effect on the world order, shaping the lives of millions. Often acting under pressure and severe time constraints, decision-makers must rely on their own experience and the best expertise available. And so, despite many striving for a more peaceful and prosperous world, policy failures are all too common.

The second of International Affairs’ centenary special issues – devised and guest-edited by Amrita Narlikar and Daniel W. Drezner – is a ‘how not to guide’ for international relations. Focusing on historic failures, 14 experts examine what went wrong, and how policy practitioners and researchers can get it right together.

Between theory and outcome fall two ‘shadows’: one of decision-makers not taking advantage of sound academic policy advice – in some cases ignoring it because they think they already know best – and a second of bias in academic analyses and researchers simply erring, or erring on the side of their own self-importance. Between these two, there lies a joint path toward better policies.

The special issue provides policymakers with cautionary lessons, transforming well-known cases into a guide of what not to do in international politics. Building on that, the collection also suggests ways forward, including borrowing the medical Hippocratic Oath of ‘do no harm’, which in international relations serves as a cautionary warning against action merely for action’s sake, and then going decidedly beyond this minimum requirement.

A series of comics also accompanies the articles, produced in collaboration with Sequential Potential comics.

In their introduction, Drezner and Narlikar draw out four overarching factors which increase the likelihood of foreign policy failure – these are a focus on short-term successes, underestimating the power of narratives, hubris, and technocratic bubbles. If academics and policymakers can work together with these careful considerations, perhaps mistakes can avoid being repeated.

Richard Toye examines three pivotal moments in the UK’s history – the Munich crisis of 1938, the Suez crisis and war of 1956, and the Iraq war of 2003. He finds that in these cases the failures were over-determined, a consequence of Britain’s relative decline rather than its cause.

Daniel W. Drezner reviews two high profile failures of sanction use – United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq during the two Gulf wars, and the US re-imposition of sanctions on Iran in 2018. In both cases the main goals were not achieved and the costs were great. Drezner highlights ten ‘do’s and don’ts’ for sanctions as a result.

Amrita Narlikar shows how the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become an almost perfect example of how not to negotiate, even when taking into account recent limited successes. She identifies three broad categories of bargaining failures and explores the impact of narratives on the course of events, giving a clear list of do’s and don’ts for international negotiation.

Harold James also looks at three historic moments, the financial crises in 1931, 1997, and 2008. While responses to the crises initially looked successful, ironically in each case the drive to avoid past mistakes opened the door for the next crisis.

Cecilia Emma Sottilotta considers recent disasters in the European Union (EU) – the eurozone crisis and COVID-19 pandemic – and recommends for policymakers to find a middle ground between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in crisis situations.

The growth of Chinese influence is a key issue in international relations today. Various articles in the special issue explain how not to deal with a rising China, coming from different angles. Exploring the US-China relationship, Janice Gross Stein is critical of the narrative around US decline and Chinese growth. The world should look beyond GDP as an indicator of a country’s growth and pay attention to strategic choices made by leaders in both states.

Joseph S. Nye Jr also provides a US perspective, arguing that while some historic analogies are misleading, the US should contemplate the cautionary narrative of sleepwalking into World War One when thinking about its relationship with China.

Amitabh Mattoo gives a south Asian view, asserting there is a need to understand Chinese policies in the region. Through examining China’s relations with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka he concludes that because China is adopting aggressive policies in the region, states must start cooperating with like-minded allies.

Yuen Foong Khong answers two questions in his paper tackling which ‘how not to’s’ are relevant when learning from history, and whether policymakers are aware of them. His research points to four things to avoid, which he then applies to how the Cold War analogy is used to understand contemporary US-China relations.

On the theme of foreign interference, Igor Istomin looks at the Soviet support for Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in the 1920s to 1940s. He argues strongly against interfering with major powers, as short-term gains cannot last.

From Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and the Balkans, there have been many failed interventions by the West since the end of the Cold War. Stephanie Carvin asserts the overreliance on automated weaponry has allowed supposedly ‘easy wars’ to turn into ‘forever wars’ – and this is not likely to stop.

Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

This project aims to recommend ways for the US, UK and EU member-states to work together more effectively to achieve shared aims in the Indo-Pacific.

This project is Phase II of a wider research collaboration with the Royal United Services Institute: “An Evolving Transatlantic Agenda to Meet the Challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific”. The work is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Through interviews with policymakers and workshops, the project will:

• Identify specific areas of policy convergence and divergence;
• Establish practical recommendations for how the US, UK and EU member-states can better align and coordinate their activities in the Indo-Pacific.

The project is led at Chatham House by the Asia-Pacific Programme, working with the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the Europe Programme.

The researchers are Ben Bland (project lead), Dr Yu Jie, Dr Gareth Price, Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, and Alice Billon-Galland.

The project builds on research from Phase I, a Transatlantic Dialogue on China, which explored how transatlantic partners are responding to China’s rise and its effects in the Indo-Pacific.

Critical elections and the future of American politics 14 December 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House

This event explores whether the United States is undergoing a critical change in the composition of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Drawing on current and historical events, Paul E. Peterson joins us to examine whether the United States is undergoing a critical change in the composition of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Key questions to consider include:

• What factors might be driving such an evolution within both parties?

• How could these dynamics affect the balance of power in Washington and in states?

This event is co-hosted with the Centre on US Politics at UCL, and the US and Americas programme at Chatham House would like to thank the British Association for American Studies for their generous support of this event.

The near death and uncertain future of the US National Security Council 27 January 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2023 Chatham House

What role should the US National Security Council play in an era of great power competition?

Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00 GMT

Over the last three years, the US National Security Council (NSC) has gone from being neglected to necessary again, in Washington.

After former US President Donald Trump ignored and then tried to dismantle the NSC, current US President Joe Biden has restored the body but chosen not to reform it.

Born in the days before the Cold War and empowered during the War on Terror, what role should the NSC play in an era of great power competition?

Plus, how must it, and the rest of Washington, evolve to meet the challenges and opportunities that remain in the 21st century?

State of the Union has lessons for transatlantic unity Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2023

Analysing key foreign policy aspects of President Joe Biden’s annual address, and what it means for the upcoming Munich Security Conference and the year ahead.

Trade and economics are key areas to watch

Daniel W. Drezner

Russia’s absence from the Munich Security Conference will allow US and European policymakers to brag about their flourishing partnership. The past year has seen repeated predictions of a fracturing transatlantic relationship – only to see repeated agreement on how to sanction Russia and which arms to ship to Ukraine.

Putin invaded because he thought the West was divided. Events have proven him wrong. When one takes a step back, however, and examines the Biden administration’s embrace of geoeconomics, Putin’s assumption becomes easier to comprehend.

The strongest throughline between the Trump and Biden administrations has been their shared mindset on weaponized interdependence. Both administrations have been wary of US interdependence with an increasingly autocratic China.

The primary difference has been that, while the Trump administration talked a good game, the Biden administration has passed laws and issued executive orders making the pivot away from trade liberalization a reality.

The passage of the CHIPS and Science Act, Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) amount to the most ambitious US attempt at industrial policy in decades, accompanied by multiple executive orders examining US supply chain resilience and imposing unprecedented export controls targeting China.

The Biden administration’s restrictions on exchange with China’s semiconductors includes the use of the ‘foreign direct product rule’, essentially a means of applying US export controls in an extraterritorial manner.

The Biden administration’s angry response to the WTO panel ruling against US steel and aluminum tariffs makes it clear the US will apply an expanded definition of national security to restrict trade. In many ways, the sanctions on Russia are a continuation of a US foreign economic policy grounded in geoeconomics.

Several of these measures have rankled European officials. The IRA massively subsidizes the North American production of environmentally-friendly cars, discriminating against European producers. And continued US hostility to the WTO leaves European officials wondering if they are the last bastion of multilateralism left in the world. In Washington and Davos last month, European policymakers made their displeasure clear.

The sanctions against Russia and export controls against China threaten to be additional sore subjects. During the strategic embargo of the Soviet Union, US officials wanted to maximize restrictions while European allies wanted more trade opportunities. Since then, Europeans have suspected that the US uses multilateral export controls regimes to advance its commercial interests, while Americans worry Europe underestimates the risks of business-as-usual with China.

The Biden administration has tried to finesse these trade tensions, and was successful at persuading the Netherlands to join the US in the export controls on China. More generally, Biden officials talk about ‘friendshoring’ and propose mechanisms for greater policy coordination, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. But even in these gestures, US officials have taken greater market access off the table.

In the State of the Union address, Biden bragged about how the US ‘came together to defend a stronger and safer Europe’ as well as defending his ‘buy American’ plans and pledging to make sure the ‘supply chain for America begins in America’. At the upcoming Munich Security Conference, attention should be on how much officials talk about trade and economic issues. The more that topic comes up, the clearer it will be that both sides are subtweeting each other about the future of the transatlantic economic relationship.

Division on China now would bring a high price

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

President Biden has made unity his guiding principle and chief objective, but it is a tall order. His State of the Union address touted past bipartisan backing for investments in infrastructure, climate-friendly technologies, and semiconductor chips, along with a focus on creating jobs for working-class Americans, especially in manufacturing.

Little was said that was explicitly about China, but the Biden administration has said that China is its pacing challenge, and competing with China has shaped the ambition behind these legislative successes.

In fact, the hallmark of the address was its foreign policy minimalism. Biden hailed unity in the US defence of democracy in Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression. And in defending US sovereignty in the face of China’s violations, this time with a balloon.

But the presidents temporary minimalism on foreign policy will be short-lived. And unity with America’s partners and allies will continue to be at the centre of Biden’s strategy. In the past 12 months, it is the yardstick by which he has measured America’s success with respect to Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has so far served as a lubricant for the NATO alliance, and for the US relationship with its non-NATO allies.

This has not automatically sprung from the well of Russia’s aggression. NATO’s success, and transatlantic unity, has been achieved through the sheer force of diplomatic effort, not least by the US.

Now Biden is looking for unity on China. His administration has identified China as its pacing threat. While Ukraine will continue to demand and deserve attention, the US will be looking beyond the urgent to focus on other less urgent but crucially important challenges. That means China.

China’s balloon helps ensure unity will be an easy victory at home. For several days, the balloon floated across the US, captivating the American public, seizing the headlines, and hardening US attitudes towards its only peer competitor.

Republican leaders in Congress are determined to scrutinize US policy to ensure it is tough on China, especially on technology and deterrence. This intense domestic focus on China could put Biden in a bind as he seeks to resume diplomacy. It also explains why he was careful not to inflate the China threat in his address. Secretary Blinken’s visit to Beijing has already been postponed.

As the Munich Security Conference approaches, the president’s unity agenda will turn to Europe, but the timing is difficult. China is opening and a charm offensive across Europe is likely. Europe is vulnerable as it seeks to recover its economies, continue to hold Russia back, and inhibit greater alignment between Russia and China.

The risk for the US is that domestic pressure to take a harder line on China escalates and Europe refuses to keep up. But dividing on China would come at a high price, both for Europe and the US, so to avoid this, they should take a pragmatic and sequenced approach to cooperation.

The goal for now should be policy coordination, as success is vital to momentum and managing expectations in the current environment is critical. Alignment may be possible with discrete partners on specific topics. But the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

The US has postponed, not cancelled, Blinken’s trip while Europe is preparing to ramp up its diplomacy with China. A collective but temporary and shared transatlantic pause on diplomacy would offer low hanging fruit to give momentum to transatlantic cooperation.

It would also signal to China a unity that has a power of its own. A clear and coordinated signal, soon, that Europe and the US are moving forward with diplomacy is essential.

Munich can move the talk into action on Ukraine

James Nixey

Russia’s excommunication from this year’s Munich Security Conference is an opportunity. The principle of inclusivity may have pros and cons, but the cons have been evident since at least 2007 – its use as a platform for Russia’s leadership to launch broadsides about ‘western injustice’ and a reflexive default to increasingly inappropriate and harmful diplomatic courtesies and allowances.

Without the distraction of listening to Russian lies, there is at least now the remote possibility of a more unified West agreeing to specific action beyond the talk. As at the recent Ramstein talks, it is unlikely Munich will result in an agreement to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. That may prove a step too far for the West or it will need further Russian atrocities inflicted upon Ukrainians on a scale horrendous enough to prick consciences once again.

However, although President Biden’s State of the Union address has promised nothing new or innovative regarding Ukraine or Russia, it did re-establish the fundamentals of US support and so can serve as a ‘pre-read’ for a newfound resolve.

Although some European countries are a lost cause, others – Germany for example – have proved able to be guilted into action. The key lesson for everyone to understand is that Ukraine is sovereign. Or at least ‘nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine’. The difference is moot but, from these simple precepts, all else flows.

Ukrainians will be their impassioned selves at Munich. But although publicly gracious and thankful, privately they are distraught at the West’s collective failure to affirm these principles and back them with the necessary support, not just to force a stalemate or a ‘frozen conflict’ but to engineer victory.

Most Ukrainian officials would privately argue that the danger to their country comes more from the West and forums such as the Munich Security Conference than it does from Russia, which can be defeated with the requisite tangible assistance. In Munich, beyond fine words of support – watertight from some, ambiguous from others – there lurks the ever-present danger of the politician who simply wants it all to go away by offering Putin an off-ramp.

The irony of the host city of this forum is that many times over the past year compromise ‘solutions’ have been described as having ‘a whiff of Munich’ about them – a reference of course to appeasement in 1938, which still haunts.

As it should, because the failure to ensure Ukraine’s victory with an outcome the Ukrainian government and people are content with and which convinces Russia it was a disastrous mistake to escalate, will lead to a global security collapse too catastrophic to contemplate.

Middle East security challenges must be dealt with

Dr Sanam Vakil

A trifecta of security concerns – Iran’s advancing nuclear programme, the export of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to support Russia in the war in Ukraine, and a heavy-handed response towards protests in Iran – has raised alarm bells in Washington, Europe and the UK. These intersecting challenges lay bare the lack of a broader Iran strategy and the deprioritization of Middle East security among transatlantic partners.

This downgrading of the Middle East was evident in President Biden’s State of the Union speech as, for the first time in decades, the region was not even mentioned. The upcoming Munich Security conference provides a much needed opportunity for the transatlantic community to align on next steps and multilateral policy responses.

Transatlantic partners have long relied on the prism of the JCPOA negotiations as the pathway to both separate and manage nuclear tensions from broader regional challenges associated with Iran’s export of lethal aid and sponsorship of proxy groups.

Despite repeated negotiation efforts led by the Biden administration since April 2021, the JCPOA has languished due to Tehran’s fears over another US retreat. The promise of sanctions relief has also failed to incentivise Iran’s return to the deal. Tehran’s nuclear programme has accelerated without the consistent IAEA oversight which was part of the initial deal and is now at a level where it can produce enough uranium enrichment for four nuclear weapons.

Tehran’s decision to send drones to support Moscow’s war effort has further elevated transatlantic concerns, and reports have circulated that Tehran may also export its missile capabilities and build a drone factory in Russia. In tandem, the two sanctioned states have begun to strengthen their economic arrangements.

Japan’s G7 leadership: Defending the liberal order amid crisis 28 February 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Online

How G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

In May 2023 Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima, where leaders of the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy come to discuss the most urgent challenges facing the world.

This year’s summit takes place against a backdrop of continued global economic and political instability from the war in Ukraine to intensifying competition between China and the West.

The speakers discuss Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s priorities at the summit and consider how G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

This event is the third of a three-part series held in partnership with Japan House London.

Watch the first event which looked at Africa-Japan relations here, and the second event, on the UK and Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia, here.

Offsetting the North Korean strategic challenge 16 March 2023 — 9:30AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 March 2023 Online

This event explores what balance between pressure and dialogue is most likely to incentivise North Korea to limit its provocations.

With North Korea having steadily increased its nuclear and conventional security capabilities over the course of recent months, the speakers explore practical options for lowering tensions on the Korean peninsula.

They consider how best to re-engage diplomatically with North Korea, including the role of key actors such as the US, South Korea, Japan, and European states, in advancing a constructive resolution of current tensions.

The discussion explores finding a balance between pressure and dialogue which is most likely to incentivise North Korea to limit its provocations, assess the risks of a possible seventh nuclear test, and consider the viability of multilateral cooperation in enhancing regional security in north-east Asia.

This event forms part of the Korea Foundation Korea Fellowship, funded by the Korea Foundation and Taejae Academy.

US and Europe Strategic Security Cooperation: The View from Washington 27 March 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership?

Thank you for your interest in joining our event. Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00.

The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise of a globally assertive China, as articulated in the 2022 US national strategy, is to ‘constrain Russia and out-compete China’. It needs Europe as a partner and ally for both – yet Europe is also an object and a battleground in this era of strategic competition.

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership? Can Europeans, in particular, move from deepening dependency to greater agency and self-reliance? What is the role for Germany – and for the UK?

Europe's response to the US Inflation Reduction Act 27 March 2023 — 2:00PM TO 3:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the implications of the US Inflation Reduction Act, how Europe can respond and what options the UK has.

While the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has led to an outcry in the EU, member states have different concerns and preferences for how to respond. The European Commission’s proposed ‘Green Deal Industrial Plan’ includes the relaxation of state aid rules to drive funding. But will this lead to a ‘subsidies race’ between the US and EU and is a ‘green trade war’ brewing?  
 
The UK’s response to the IRA has been much more muted than the EU’s. But caught between US subsidies and EU subsidies, can the UK compete and create an independent response to the IRA? And what steps can be taken to facilitate global cooperation and to make trade work for the green transition?

Dr Martin Porter, Executive Chair at the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, will kick off the discussion with short remarks followed by an interactive discussion among all participants

This discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. We would like to take this opportunity to thank our founding partner and supporting partners for their generous support of the forum.  

The interconnected impacts of the Iraq war Expert comment LJefferson 22 March 2023

Relying on weak intelligence for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility with several consequences that persist to this day.

20 years on from the fateful decision to invade Iraq, it is generally accepted that the US and UK governments overstated the evidence available for them to justify military action. The central claim to defend invading Iraq was that the country had continued its illicit nuclear weapons programme and had retained illegal stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. None of these claims supported an imminent threat justification nor could any hidden caches of WMD be found by the US Iraq Survey Group after the invasion.  

In the US, President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney hinted at additional evidence which could not be shared publicly to suggest that if only people knew what the government knew, they would agree that Iraq posed a significant threat to the West and needed to be disarmed.

In the UK, the Blair government acted similarly, focusing on a narrow interpretation of the evidence provided by the intelligence services and ignoring many of the dire warnings offered by academics and other experts. The Chilcot Inquiry found that the Blair government greatly exaggerated the threat Iraq posed to the UK, and that government arguments were based on the prime minister’s personal beliefs, as well as his promise to President Bush to support the US invasion. 

Relying on inadequate information and a biased analysis for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility in the international security policy environment and domestically with ramifications that persist to this day.  

Impacts on soft power and trust

The invasion had an impact on US and UK soft power due to negative perceptions of the decision to go to war and the competence of the UK and US: public opinion polling by the Pew Center showed that perceptions of the US declined significantly as a result of the invasion of Iraq, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This is undoubtedly a challenge for the US, but arguably an even bigger challenge for the UK, which due to its size and power relies much more on diplomacy and coalition-building in order to achieve its goals within various international treaty frameworks.   

Over nearly two decades, the US and the UK no longer seemed to enjoy the same foundation of trust, even with close allies, as they did previously. This changed in February 2022.

Towards the end of 2021, both the US and the UK were sounding the alarm about an impending Russian invasion of Ukraine based on information and analysis from their intelligence services. Despite the amassing of Russian troops, tanks and artillery on the border clearly visible from the air and by satellite imagery, several allies remained unconvinced until the invasion happened.  

This was in part due to their own assessments which indicated that Russia would stop short of an invasion, and in part because allies were unwilling to take US and UK statements on faith, without being able to assess the information themselves.

US officials found this frustrating as it meant that NATO and the EU were slower off the mark with support for Ukraine than they might otherwise have been. However, the accuracy of the US/UK intelligence on Russia’s invasion, coupled with their sharing it openly, may well have restored faith in their capabilities and analysis.  

A more open approach to intelligence  

Over the last few years, there seems to have been a change in accepted practice regarding sharing and using intelligence. The UK Ministry of Defence has taken a much more open approach to intelligence in the war in Ukraine, sharing the most recent defence information publicly in order to counter Russian disinformation.  

This is a positive step to ensure that intelligence can be discussed and assessed critically. Being more open about secret intelligence may also be linked to the increasing capabilities of open-source intelligence (OSINT). Non-governmental and international organizations and the media all now have access to data from, for example, imaging satellites and can independently verify information coming from governments. 

Perceived double standards 

A reduction of trust in US and UK intelligence was not the only impact of the invasion of Iraq. Russia and China have repeatedly called out the US and UK for acting without a second UN Security Council mandate. Putin uses the decision to invade Iraq, as well as the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, to justify Russia’s actions in Crimea. He invokes parallel language to spread disinformation about a ‘responsibility to protect life’ of the (‘ethnically Russian’) Crimean population. Russia has also repeatedly used the WMD trope to create false narratives around Ukrainian biosecurity laboratories to justify Russian military actions against Ukraine.  

Deciding to invade Iraq under what turned out to be a false pretext has weakened the application of the international rule of law and has led to a perceived double standard whereby powerful states can use UN processes in their favour, or completely disregard them if they do not deliver their goals.

As the Chilcot Inquiry found, there was very little preparation for the post-invasion period either in the US or the UK. Confirmation bias led not only to trusting shaky intelligence but also to believing in a best-case scenario and a ‘relatively benign security environment’ once the invasion had prevailed. Mismanaging the country’s occupation afterwards also led to the perception that the UK and US are less competent than projected. 

Problems for the international order  

The Iraq War has left many smaller and medium-sized states outside Europe and North America with the impression that powerful states are not committed to an equitable international system and instead will bend the rules to suit them while nonetheless holding other states to account. This dynamic poses a serious problem for the international system. 

It opens the door to ‘whataboutism’ in Russia’s false justifications for invading Ukraine and undermines faith in international law, destabilizing the international order in the longer term. Beyond the immediate challenges of dealing with the war in Ukraine, reforming and strengthening the international order to make it more equitable will be one of the most significant challenges the US and UK will face over the next decade. 

A trust deficit  

Domestically, for already disappointed citizens, the deceit over intelligence it is yet another piece of evidence which suggests that their government is not trustworthy and may not have their best interests at heart. This has profound implications for US and UK democracies, making it harder for governments to counter citizens’ susceptibilities to disinformation campaigns. 

The evolution of the Pepe the Frog meme The World Today rescobales.drupal 29 March 2023

From laidback comic book character to alt-right villain and more, the Pepe the Frog meme is emblematic of the relationship between politics and online culture.

The evolution of the Pepe the Frog meme provides a case study of how online meme culture can appropriate non-political imagery, codify it and redeploy it, sometimes for extreme political purposes. American artist Matt Furie created Pepe the Frog, with his catchphrase ‘Feels good man’, for his comic series Boy’s Club in 2005.

The laidback character was quickly adapted as a meme on internet forums such as 4chan and Reddit. By 2014 and 2015 politicized Pepe memes began appearing against Furie’s wishes, notably from the emerging ‘alt-right’. Late in 2015, Donald Trump retweeted a caricature of himself as Pepe at a US presidential lectern.

A stream of racist and anti-semitic Pepe renderings led to the meme being added to the Anti-Defamation League’s database of hate symbols in 2016. Three years later, democracy activists in Hong Kong began using images of Pepe in protests.

In their book, Meme Wars: The Untold Story of the Online Battles Upending Democracy in America, the authors Joan Donovan, Emily Dreyfuss and Brian Friedberg chart how democracy disrupters and conspiracy theorists use memes such as Pepe the Frog as weapons of mass disinformation. Donovan charted this timeline of his evolution from comic strip good guy to Covid anti-vaxxer.

2005: Pepe the Frog

2012: Sad Pepe

 2014: Smug Pepe

 2014: Rage Pepe

2014 & 2015: Nazi Pepe

 2015: Donald Trump as Pepe

2017: Pepe and the alt-right

2017: Groyper and Kekistan

2019: QAnon Pepe

2020: Hong Kong Pepe

2020: Covid-19 Pepe

China’s renewed influence in the Gulf Interview LJefferson 14 April 2023

By disseminating narratives of its own supremacy, China deepened relations with the Gulf during the COVID-19 pandemic.

China has used the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to rebrand its international role as a ‘responsible’ and ‘great’ power by voicing narratives of its own supremacy to regions like the Gulf.

In this interview, Julia Gurol-Haller draws on her International Affairs article to trace how the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran have responded to China’s narratives, with key implications for Sino-US competition and regional autonomy for the Gulf. This illustrates how words and narratives help bolster authoritarian power.

What have the China-Gulf relations looked like in context of the COVID-19 pandemic?

Bilateral relations between China and the Gulf countries have grown in importance over the past decade, particularly since 2013 with the Belt and Road Initiative. The Gulf plays a crucial role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its westward expansion, owing to its favourable geographic position and proximity to the Red Sea. 

In the beginning, transregional relations were mainly economic partnerships since China has a growing appetite for oil and gas and the Gulf monarchies fulfil these needs. China is one of the most important markets for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to export these goods.

Over time, we’ve seen the Sino-Gulf relations expand beyond just economic ties and towards policy fields like security and cultural relations. While these processes were already in place, they were boosted during the COVID-19 pandemic, not only in material terms but also in respect of Chinese attempts to advance its soft power, leverage, and influence in the Gulf region.

When COVID-19 began to ravage the globe, China took that window of opportunity to rebrand its international role. Through efforts such as mask diplomacy, vaccine diplomacy and the strategic diffusion of narratives, China tried to project its image as a ‘global saviour’ and a responsible and great power.

The Gulf monarchies and Iran were among the main target audiences for this public diplomacy campaign. So, the COVID-19 pandemic has been a catalysing factor for deepening relations between China and the Gulf region.

What exactly are narratives and why are they important in China’s approach to the Gulf states during the COVID-19 pandemic?

Through diplomatic statements, news outlets and social media, China has engaged in, what I call, a ‘narrative power-play’. To understand what that is, we need to understand the political importance of narratives.

Narratives are deliberately constructed by (political) actors to influence a certain target audience. In authoritarian contexts, narratives are a useful resource for political actors to bind audiences to their rule and to appeal to people’s emotions by strategically projecting certain images. 

Ultimately, this creates linkages via attraction or persuasion that enhance the actors’ legitimacy and consolidate their power. So, in the narrative power-play, authoritarian leaders function as ‘storytellers-in-chief’, shaping reality in their favour.

What kinds of narratives has China disseminated to the Gulf region in backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic?

There are two sets of narratives that China disseminated to the Gulf: narratives of supremacy and narratives of a new world order.

China disseminates narratives of systemic supremacy which include praising the overall efficiency of its governance structures. For instance, the Chinese political system is presented as highly efficient and centralized. It has high amounts of ‘state capacity’ for mobilization and the ability to ‘quickly adapt’ to changing situations.

Narratives of performative supremacy refer to the tangible performance of the Chinese Communist Party or China as a whole, such as economic performance, performance in governance, provision of public goods or pandemic response. The performance narratives also highlight the ‘incredible logistical efficacy’, the highly professionalized medical sector and the innovative scientific sector. 

Narratives of normative supremacy are often informed by nationalist notions such as the reclaiming of China’s rightful position in the world and negative feelings towards Western imperial powers who are depicted as having inflicted great pains on China during the ‘century of humiliation’. Overall, these narratives serve to depict China as a responsible, caring and loyal world power that helps other states. The whole idea of mask diplomacy was also carved into that notion of China’s normative supremacy.

Together, China has used these narratives to construct the idea of a new world order in which China is believed to play a much bigger role. The world order narratives are closely linked to stories about the failure of the Western system and show the intertwinement of practices of othering and self-glorification that can also be observed in Chinese official media narratives in other contexts such as diplomatic stand-offs with the United States.

What do these narratives tell us about how China understands the world order?

The narratives China disseminated to the Gulf region show that in the Chinese understanding of politics, the world order is in flux and undergoing major power reconfigurations. For China, this implies a window of opportunity to position itself as a responsible and great power and move from the side-lines to the centre stage of international politics.

This is a trend that has been long in the making in Chinese foreign policy. For instance, the launch of the Chinese Global Security Initiative or the recent brokering of the Iran-Saudi rapprochement agreement show clearly that China is becoming much more than an economic powerhouse and is adopting a more proactive foreign policy.

During the recent state visit of Xi Jinping to Moscow, he said at one point that China stands ready to ‘safeguard (…) the international order underpinned by international law ’. These examples are quite telling regarding the role China ascribes itself on the international stage.

How have the Gulf countries responded to China’s power narratives during the COVID-19 pandemic?

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Iran all picked up the narrative of China’s superior performance during the global crisis. That was a unified response, but they did that to different degrees and by highlighting different aspects.

The strongest reproduction of Chinese narratives can be found in the Emirati media. They buy into the story of the COVID-19 pandemic as evoking a global power shift, which includes a decline of US hegemony and a corresponding rise of China. The explicit wording of Chinese narratives such as ‘community of shared future of humankind’ has been picked up word-for-word by some Emirati media outlets.

Iranian newspapers have also reproduced Chinese narratives. However, the difference is that they also praise China’s unconditional solidarity during the COVID-19 pandemic, which is believed to be superior and more ‘responsible’ than the ostensible individualism of the West. This tells us a lot about Iran’s relationship with the West and how China is believed to be a lifeline or anchor for stability.

Saudi Arabia has been more cautious in reproducing the Chinese narratives. While it does not contest China’s role in containing the COVID-19 pandemic, Saudi Arabia has adopted a more inward-looking perspective, stressing its own role as a responsible regional player during the pandemic.

This might be explained by the kingdom’s own regional leadership claims and the attempt to use the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen this role. The most pressing questions seem to be whether the post-COVID world will be a multipolar order, and what Saudi Arabia’s own position within it might be. 

Alexander S. Hebert
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Jonathan C. Trinidad
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Qin Liu
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Yi Zhang
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Timothy J. Griffin
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Sean R. Collins
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Roland Bruderer
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Alexey I. Nesvizhskii
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Ludovic C. Gillet
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Ignat V. Shilov
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Albrecht Gruhler
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N. Leigh Anderson
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Yasushi Ishihama
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Linn Fagerberg
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Despite its major importance in human health, the metabolic potential of the human gut microbiota is still poorly understood. We have recently shown that biosynthesis of Ruminococcin C (RumC), a novel ribosomally synthesized and posttranslationally modified peptide (RiPP) produced by the commensal bacterium Ruminococcus gnavus, requires two radical SAM enzymes (RumMC1 and RumMC2) catalyzing the formation of four Cα-thioether bridges. These bridges, which are essential for RumC's antibiotic properties against human pathogens such as Clostridium perfringens, define two hairpin domains giving this sactipeptide (sulfur-to-α-carbon thioether–containing peptide) an unusual architecture among natural products. We report here the biochemical and spectroscopic characterizations of RumMC2. EPR spectroscopy and mutagenesis data support that RumMC2 is a member of the large family of SPASM domain radical SAM enzymes characterized by the presence of three [4Fe-4S] clusters. We also demonstrate that this enzyme initiates its reaction by Cα H-atom abstraction and is able to catalyze the formation of nonnatural thioether bonds in engineered peptide substrates. Unexpectedly, our data support the formation of a ketoimine rather than an α,β-dehydro-amino acid intermediate during Cα-thioether bridge LC–MS/MS fragmentation. Finally, we explored the roles of the leader peptide and of the RiPP precursor peptide recognition element, present in myriad RiPP-modifying enzymes. Collectively, our data support a more complex role for the peptide recognition element and the core peptide for the installation of posttranslational modifications in RiPPs than previously anticipated and suggest a possible reaction intermediate for thioether bond formation.

Lys234 is one of the residues present in class A β-lactamases that is under selective pressure due to antibiotic use. Located adjacent to proton shuttle residue Ser130, it is suggested to play a role in proton transfer during catalysis of the antibiotics. The mechanism underpinning how substitutions in this position modulate inhibitor efficiency and substrate specificity leading to drug resistance is unclear. The K234R substitution identified in several inhibitor-resistant β-lactamase variants is associated with decreased potency of the inhibitor clavulanic acid, which is used in combination with amoxicillin to overcome β-lactamase–mediated antibiotic resistance. Here we show that for CTX-M-14 β-lactamase, whereas Lys234 is required for hydrolysis of cephalosporins such as cefotaxime, either lysine or arginine is sufficient for hydrolysis of ampicillin. Further, by determining the acylation and deacylation rates for cefotaxime hydrolysis, we show that both rates are fast, and neither is rate-limiting. The K234R substitution causes a 1500-fold decrease in the cefotaxime acylation rate but a 5-fold increase in kcat for ampicillin, suggesting that the K234R enzyme is a good penicillinase but a poor cephalosporinase due to slow acylation. Structural results suggest that the slow acylation by the K234R enzyme is due to a conformational change in Ser130, and this change also leads to decreased inhibition potency of clavulanic acid. Because other inhibitor resistance mutations also act through changes at Ser130 and such changes drastically reduce cephalosporin but not penicillin hydrolysis, we suggest that clavulanic acid paired with an oxyimino-cephalosporin rather than penicillin would impede the evolution of resistance.

It sounds like an oxymoron: “How to keep blood-sports interesting?” You’ve got blood and you’ve got sports, the term does its own advertising! And yet, fighting promotions rise and fall, where Pride and Strikeforce once reigned, now stand One and Bellator, but one promotion stands above all its competitors. The world of MMA knows one promotion which has clawed its way to the international top and established itself as the gold standard upon whose hallowed surface skulls are crushed and blood is poured. I’m talking about none other than the UFC.

Having established itself over the years as a beacon of both quality matches and consistent drama, the UFC attracts the lion’s share of international talent in the MMA world, and with it the eyes and ears of MMA fans everywhere. Having well and truly stroked the ego of the promotion, you might be wondering what on earth any of this has to do with writing or fantasy?

Well, does your world happen to feature prizefighting, ritual combat, or the eternally popular fantasy fixture called the gladiatorial arena? If so, there are a lot of writing and worldbuilding lessons you can learn from observing the biggest promotion in the biggest modern blood-sport of the world.

Continue reading Lessons from the UFC: How to Keep Blood-Sports Interesting at Mythic Scribes.

Wisdom to my mind is a bit of a paradox. It is subjective and context-dependent, but inherently universal. I say this, because for something to be wise it ought to be applicable across time and space, yet whether the claims are appraised as being “wise” hinges on the perception of a past, present or future audience. It is beyond the self, yet dependent upon the self. So that then begs the fantasy writing question: What if the self is not human? If culture already morphs the form and substance of wisdom, what effect might a different state of being have on it?

That would be terribly dull to prescribe, but I can help get some readers’ creativity going. Below I have listed relevant questions with examples you might consider when building your setting, so you may merrily thread into your fantastic realms to shape oddities rich and strange.

I would advise readers of this article to try and let go of their own presumptions on what is wise for the sake of worldbuilding. There are few cultures in our modern, human world whose philosophers deem obtuse narcissists dressed in mink robes as being wise, but why wouldn’t a race of bobcat-folk?

Continue reading Questions for Worldbuilding the Concept of Wisdom at Mythic Scribes.

New essay anthology examines the future of the international order News release jon.wallace 7 May 2021

Featuring a new essay by Robin Niblett, Chief Executive of Chatham House, and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director of the US and Americas programme.

“Anchoring the World”, a new anthology, features an important new essay by Robin Niblett, Chief Executive of Chatham House, and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director of the US and Americas programme. The essay, “The Liberal Order Begins At Home”, argues powerfully for the revival of a liberal international order.

The essay collection has been produced by the Lloyd George Study Group on World Order, and celebrates the centennial years of Chatham House, Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Robin Niblett said:

“In this excellent collection, some authors argue that the United Nations should continue to anchor the international system, while others argue for the creation of a new Concert of Powers.

“Our essay argues that it is both necessary and possible to revive the idea of a liberal international order: necessary (and urgent) because of heightened global competition with China, and possible only if western democracies repair their deep social and economic problems at home.

“We hope this volume carries forward the fortitude and creative spirit that the School of Foreign Service, Chatham House, and the Council on Foreign Relations have brought to the study and practice of international affairs over the past century.”

The Lloyd George Study Group and book were made possible by the generosity of the family of Robert Lloyd George, the great-grandson of British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George.

Anchoring the World is published by Foreign Affairs magazine.

Time to accelerate the sustainability pivot Expert comment NCapeling 26 May 2021

Higher stakes make it more important than ever to safeguard the integrity of sustainability commitments, and ensure high quality in delivery and implementation.

Regular headlines reaffirm the rise of sustainability on the global stage. Political momentum behind climate action has not been derailed by COVID-19, sustainability is increasingly central to national political debates, and what once might have been confined to scientific pursuits and UN conferences has now percolated through to international financial affairs and the wider political summits.

Much is made of the scale of the challenge, from climate change, water stresses, and biodiversity loss to the looming spectre of environment-induced societal breakdown triggering unprecedented civilizational challenges on the back of decades of systemic neglect over the true cost of social and environmental imbalances and unencumbered consumption.

But the good news is that talk of sustainability solutions is picking up pace and growing in its reach into the mainstream. The Wall Street Journal recently charted the shift of sustainable finance from being a niche interest of socially conscious investors into a sustainable ‘gold rush’, further bolstering its financial credentials with trillions of dollars designated for the global energy transition.

Assets in investment funds with links to the environment came to almost $2 trillion globally in the first quarter of 2021, more than tripling in just three years, and investors are putting some $3 billion a day into these funds while bonds and loans worth $5 billion looking to bankroll green initiatives are issued every day.

Climate ambitions and power diplomacy

Should the number of zeros fail to persuade, other signs of a sustainability pivot abound. Climate ambition was the driving force in major power diplomacy as France, Germany, China, and the US jostled for leadership positions in a high octane theatre of ‘climate one upmanship’ in the run-up to the Climate Summit hosted by US president Joe Biden. The G7 has agreed to stop international financing of coal projects, and an International Energy Agency report says delivering net zero emissions by 2050 means no new coal, oil, or gas development from now on.

Governments are sending unmistakable policy signals which are redrawing multiple frontiers of the real economy, such as the banning of single use plastic in multiple jurisdictions from Europe, China, and more than 30 African states as well as New York and California. The sale of internal combustion engine vehicles is also set to end by 2035 or sooner in the EU, the UK, and California, and China is expected to follow suit with similar plans. France has proposed a ban on domestic flights when there are less carbon intensive alternatives on the ground.

But these signals did not spring out of a political vacuum. A global climate poll conducted by the United Nations (UN) in 50 countries showed two-thirds of the 1.2 million people polled thought there is a global climate emergency, and most indicated their support for stronger climate action even in countries with strong fossil energy interest.

Real economy responses to noticeable changes in risk calculus and political appetite will likely underpin further rapid shifts in market sentiment as investors begin to fully factor in the scale of the challenge and escalate their interrogation of company-level climate action plans.

Rapid pace of change still needed

But despite this ever-clearer direction of travel and growing availability of new technology and policy options, the need for speed remains. The rationale for moving fast in the next decade and a half to avoid the clear and present threats of environmental and breakdown is increasingly clear.

Getting up to scale is an ongoing and daunting challenge not least because exponential growth has brought growing pains. The recent spat over the definition and the usefulness of net zero targets for corporations and investors as seen in the shareholder votes over the climate plans put forward by Shell and other companies are all testimony to the challenge of mainstreaming.

While some have characterized these debates as political infighting, the reality is higher stakes simply mean it is more important than ever to safeguard the integrity of sustainability commitments as well as the quality of their delivery and implementation.

The move from ‘what’ to ‘how’ points to a clear demand for new, innovative collaborative efforts to help mitigate myriad political economy challenges associated with the upcoming great transition and ensure this sustainability pivot will deliver the promised outcomes. Launching the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator in support of these once-in-a-generation efforts is a proud moment for the institute, and a clear sign that this pivot to sustainability is here to stay.

The Chatham House Centenary Award winners announced News release jon.wallace 29 July 2021

Black Lives Matter, Greta Thunberg and Sir David Attenborough have been recognized for their achievements tackling racial inequality, climate change and biodiversity loss.

As Chatham House wraps up its centenary activities, the institute has made three Centenary Awards recognizing outstanding contributions to confronting the critical challenges facing the world today.

The awards are unique as they were voted on by the institute’s staff and pay tribute to the individual or organization they believe has played a significant role in progressing the Chatham House mission: to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Greta Thunberg has been awarded the Chatham House Centenary Changemakers Award in recognition of her vanguard role in mobilizing young people to take up climate activism.

Greta’s message has cut through where politicians and scientists have failed time and time again. She has commanded the attention of world leaders, addressed intergovernmental organizations and inspired millions of people to join the global climate strike. She has demonstrated the electrifying power of young voices speaking truth to power and focused the world’s attention on environmental injustices.

Sir David Attenborough has been named as the Chatham House Centenary Lifetime Award winner for his tireless commitment to conservation and raising public and political awareness of the growing climate crisis.

Together with the BBC, he has pioneered the way in which we experience and understand life on this planet, bringing the wonders of the natural world into our homes. Over the last 60 years, from black-and-white to 4K TV, his pioneering documentaries have been broadcast around the world and have sounded the alarm on the devastating impact humanity has had on the environment.

He has become one of the most compelling voices on important issues such as biodiversity loss, climate change and the destruction of natural habitats. Sir David was previously awarded the Chatham House Prize in 2019 for his work on Blue Planet II and tackling ocean plastic pollution.

Melina Abdullah, one of the co-founders of the Los Angeles chapter of the Black Lives Matter movement and co-director of Black Lives Matter Grassroots, has accepted the Chatham House Centenary Diversity Champion Award on behalf of the movement.

This award is in recognition of the momentous work Black Lives Matter has done towards empowering black people and promoting a more inclusive approach to race in policy-making. The movement has brought global attention to systemic injustice against black lives and is helping to build a better world that draws on more diverse voices and inclusive approaches.

Dr Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House said:

‘We are delighted to recognise three special centenary awards today in recognition of the individuals who our staff believe are redefining the ways in which each of us can drive positive global change.

‘The vision and achievements of each of the winners echo Chatham House’s own goals for its second century and demonstrate a shared commitment to building a more sustainable and inclusive world.

‘We are inspired by the ways the award winners are leading global efforts to combat climate change, protect biodiversity and bring about more equal and inclusive societies.’

For more information, please contact: pressoffice@chathamhouse.org

The aftermath: Navigating a Taliban-led Afghanistan Expert comment NCapeling 20 August 2021

In the coming weeks, governments and international organizations must work through an approach to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. It will not be simple.

A failure to acknowledge that the legitimate, elected representatives of Afghanistan are no longer in control of territory or institutions, and to refuse to deal with those that are, will only make for further misery for a population which has already endured decades of violence and poverty.

But to recognize the Taliban risks condemning tens of thousands of Afghan women, children, and men to brutal repression and, for some, potential death, as well as mocking the human rights and rule of law which the US and its allies sought to promote in Afghanistan, and globally, as cornerstones of values-based foreign policies.

The dilemma western governments find themselves in is one they have studiously sought to avoid despite mounting evidence that, without a negotiated deal, a Taliban takeover was only a matter of time. As late as 6 August, the UN Security Council refused to countenance appeals by the UN mission and Afghan civil society activists to press the Taliban and the government to negotiate a ceasefire.

The US reiterated its refrain that it ‘will not accept a military takeover of Afghanistan’ and the UK stressed the Taliban’s only route to power was through meaningful engagement in a peace process. Meanwhile, not until 11 August did Germany and the Netherlands stop deporting Afghan migrants despite the pleas of Afghan authorities and refugee organizations that the country was on the brink of crisis.

Delaying the inevitable

Belief that a military takeover was still some months away may have led diplomats to view dealing with the Taliban as a distant task. The unilateral nature of the US deal with the Taliban and the resistance of the Ghani government to any suggestion of power-sharing arrangements compounded a lack of international coordination and planning on what the conditions for engagement might be.

It cannot be delayed further. The scale of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan is daunting, with more than half a million displaced by fighting in 2021 alone, almost 17 million facing crisis levels of food insecurity, and nearly half of all children under five malnourished as a consequence of drought and the COVID-19 pandemic.

With one of the highest global refugee populations and an estimated up 20-30,000 Afghans fleeing the country weekly – even before the government collapsed – Afghanistan evokes still raw memories of the 2015 Syria migrant crisis for Europe. Pakistan and Turkey, home to some of the largest Afghan refugee communities, have already closed their borders to more.

The ongoing chaos at Kabul airport highlights the challenges ahead. But there is a small window – before the UN Security Council is scheduled to review the mandate of the UN mission in Afghanistan by 17 September – for the US and its allies to craft an approach to dealing with the Taliban.

Formal recognition of a Taliban-led government is simply not an option, even for those maintaining a diplomatic presence in Kabul such as China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia. Technically the Afghan republic has not yet dissolved with vice-president Amrullah Saleh, reportedly in hiding in the Panjshir valley, claiming he is the country’s ‘caretaker’ president.

Conditions for international acceptance

Afghanistan’s ‘enduring partners’ must now focus on building a consensus around five conditions for international acceptance of a Taliban-administered Afghanistan and prevent the Taliban again reaping the benefits of international divisions. The G7 began to articulate some of these conditions but they need to be set out and negotiated with Afghanistan’s neighbours before being formally articulated by the UN Security Council.

1. Adherence to Afghanistan’s human rights obligations. This must specify the rights of women and girls to education and work, the protection of ethnic and religious minorities, and safe passage for all Afghans and internationals leaving the country.
2. Amnesty for all individuals who worked for the Afghan government or international embassies, forces, or aid organizations since 2001.
3. No harbouring of terrorist groups. This has been the central condition for the US deal with the Taliban, and the overriding concern for both China and Russia.
4. Non-lethal public order. The provision of public order to enable supply routes to open, evacuations to continue, and aid to be delivered, is essential and one that Russia has made as a condition for its future relations.
5. Negotiation of inclusive political arrangements with Afghanistan’s political and ethnic factions.

The UN mission in Afghanistan, including its human rights component, and the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team should be mandated with reporting monthly on the progress toward these five conditions. Their assessments should form the basis for any reconsideration of the Taliban’s status as a terrorist organization. And a negotiated political settlement must be a precondition to the release of the government’s foreign reserves, estimated to be $9.5 billion.

Before this, the humanitarian and development aid on which Afghanistan is almost completely reliant must be recalibrated to flow through international agencies. Models such as Hamas-run Gaza, Assad’s Syria, or Aristide’s Haiti, show that while far from effective, it is possible to provide urgent assistance outside government channels.

This is one of the reasons why the Taliban has sought to retain a strong UN presence across Afghanistan and why the UN must be given a more significant political mandate and resources. The World Bank-administered Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund should remain the principal channel for international funds.

It is difficult in the short-term to see the US leading this collective effort, given its defensive and domestic-focused position. It could be a moment for the UK and EU to demonstrate their multilateral commitments and forge a coordinated conditions-based approach to a Taliban-administered Afghanistan at the UN.

Going beyond handwringing or gesture politics will be difficult and messy and, ultimately, Afghanistan’s future must be decided by Afghans. Until that day, however, this will save lives.

AUKUS reveals much about the new global strategic context Expert comment NCapeling 17 September 2021

The new AUKUS partnership as well as the furore in Paris surrounding its announcement says a lot about the new geopolitical landscape.

The growing diplomatic drama surrounding the announcement of the new Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) risks concealing rather than highlighting what the deal reveals about profound changes in the global strategic context. Several elements stand out.

First, Australia’s decision to break off the $66 billion contract it signed with France in 2016 to purchase a new fleet of diesel electric submarines underscores the heightened level of concern in Canberra about China’s growing naval capabilities.

Despite all the industrial, legal, and diplomatic disruption, the Australian government has decided only the stealthy nuclear-powered submarines developed by Britain with US support can provide the genuine naval capability it needs long-term.

Next, in helping Australia resolve this conundrum, the British government has revealed the versatility of its new foreign policy. Part of the reason UK prime minister Boris Johnson eschewed the concept of a formal foreign policy and security treaty in the post-Brexit deal with the European Union (EU) was to pursue freely new ventures such as the recent ‘G7-plus’ summit in Cornwall, and enhanced cooperation among the Five Eyes allies. AUKUS reveals that this approach can produce real results.

Europe or the Indo-Pacific

During this week’s Polish-British Belvedere Forum in Warsaw, one of the main Polish concerns was that this ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific could overstretch Britain’s scarce resources when it should be focusing on Europe, where they are most needed.

But AUKUS does not over-extend Britain. There is no military commitment involved in the agreement. The UK also remains outside the Quad – made up of the US, India, Japan, and Australia. And the ongoing stately voyage of its new aircraft carrier from the Mediterranean into the South China Sea provides better insight into the substance of the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt.

Much derided for not carrying enough of its own aircraft – and for depending on US and Dutch escort vessels – the UK has in fact managed to coalesce a flexible group of allies around the Queen Elizabeth while enabling it to fly the British flag in Asian waters and strengthening interoperability with its allies for future joint operations.

Despite the hype, Britain’s main defence investments and deployments remain firmly focused in Europe, as laid out by the recent Integrated Review. And the decision to draft a new NATO Strategic Concept – midwifed by Britain at the 70th anniversary NATO summit hosted in London in December 2019 and confirmed during Joe Biden’s visit to NATO headquarters in June – will give Britain’s role in European security a new purpose and focus in the coming years.

Alone on the strategic landscape

For France, of course, the cancellation of its submarine deal is a painful humiliation, and a severe blow to thousands of workers in its hi-tech defence industry. It also comes at a sensitive moment politically, with Emmanuel Macron keen to demonstrate his international standing ahead of the 2022 presidential election. Instead, France now looks rather lonely on the strategic landscape alongside the more homogeneous and collectively powerful AUKUS trio.

But, rather than take the high road, a furious French reaction has compared Biden to Donald Trump and argued that this defence industrial failure for France should drive an acceleration towards European – for which, read EU – strategic autonomy.

This implies France sees European strategic autonomy as protecting and extending its own sovereign power and industrial interests rather than as a process for EU members to achieve more together in security and foreign policy than they can alone – thereby undermining rather than enhancing its case.

The gap between European strategic rhetoric and practical action was further highlighted by the AUKUS partnership being announced the evening before the EU launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy, and on the same day as China refused to allow a German frigate its first planned port visit to Shanghai.

America is still back

There is still a long way to go before the new submarine deal becomes reality. Australia needs to extricate itself from the French deal, decide how to secure the highly enriched uranium to power its new nuclear submarines, decide with the US and UK the division of labour and technology transfer of production, and assuage the International Atomic Energy Agency’s concerns about the precedent this deal sets. The fruits of this dramatic announcement will, therefore, be a long time in coming.

But, however the details play out, 15 September 2021 was a consequential day. The AUKUS announcement showed that China’s growing hard power is now eliciting a genuinely tough and structural political-military reaction.

Across the Atlantic, it also allowed President Biden – flanked ‘virtually’ by the British and Australian prime ministers – to send the global message that America is indeed back, just three weeks after the ignominious retreat from Afghanistan and chaotic exit from Kabul. And it offered him the opportunity to remind the world that the Indo-Pacific is where the US will be putting its main effort in the future.

For many in China, AUKUS now confirms their belief that the US and its principal allies are determined to contain China’s rise in its own ‘backyard’, where it believes it has the right to flex its muscles. For others, it will confirm Xi Jinping has overreached and China is now paying the price of his more assertive strategy. Either way, the Chinese are on notice that the ambivalent nature of the Obama pivot to Asia has given way to a more determined pivot under Biden.

While the US is stepping up, the UK has shown it is in the mix, leveraging opportunities as they arise. For example, the goodwill the UK has generated in Tokyo with this new partnership with Australia could help its case as it pursues membership of the Transpacific Partnership trade area in 2022.

The EU looks like a bystander in comparison and ill-equipped for the geopolitical competition inherent in this new strategic context. It is essential, therefore, once the dust has settled from these fraught few days, that the US and UK reach out to find ways to involve France and its EU partners in a meaningful, shared transatlantic approach to the Indo-Pacific.

How the world has changed on my watch The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

As Robin Niblett steps down from his role as Director of Chatham House he reflects on the past 15 years of international affairs

International relations had resumed a steadier rhythm in January 2007 when I became Director of Chatham House. The aftershock of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the Bush administration’s contentious responses in Iraq and its ‘global war on terror’ had settled down somewhat.

That year President George W Bush’s second administration was mending fences with its European allies. China’s GDP growth hit a three-decade peak of 14 per cent, and the idea that this could drive a ‘win-win’ economic cycle did not yet grate. Financial regulators had not woken up to the credit crisis that they had enabled. And the European Union was still obsessed with ‘widening versus deepening’, while Britain tried to have its cake and eat it on the sidelines.

With hindsight, 2007 acted as the fulcrum between a cautiously optimistic post-Cold War world and the contested environment we live in today. Russian President Vladimir Putin chose that year’s Munich Security Conference to deliver a tirade against the injustices of a US-led world, with arguments that presaged this year’s invasion of Ukraine.

By the start of 2008, Alan Greenspan’s belief in the rationality of financial markets turned out to be a fallacy as US and European banks imploded. The subsequent economic turmoil, followed by monetary easing and fiscal austerity, sowed the seeds for the populist politics that emerged on both sides of the Atlantic.

Nevertheless, world leaders did not give up on the promise of international cooperation. The global financial crisis led to the elevation of the G20 as the premier forum for coordinating global economic policy between the world’s major economies.

By 2015, with Barack Obama in the White House, two landmark deals were reached: the Paris Agreement and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an example of truly global cooperation between all five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The next year, China’s first female chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, Fu Ying, pointed to a ‘decentralization of world power’ that might lead to a more inclusive world order.

But this sense of relative optimism about the future masked two fundamental changes. The first was the erosion of the cohesion of democratic societies under the pressures of globalization and the aftershocks of the financial crisis.

Instant access to unintermediated and often manipulated information ended up stimulating and polarizing societies in equal measure, deepening the divide between those searching for the certainties of the past and those open to the uncertainties of a more globalized future.

The second change is the end of the global hierarchy that followed the Second World War, in which the US and the West remained at the top, even with the advent of a more polycentric world. This change is driven by several factors, above all the growing economic and technological parity between China and the US, and by America’s schizophrenic response.

The Obama administration sought to restore a more inclusive form of global leadership, but it unwittingly revealed the limits of US power by breaking its red lines over Bashir al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria and by turning a blind eye to China’s takeover of disputed islands in the South China Sea. Donald Trump’s America First policies then flipped the US into an overbearing version of other self-interested powers. After this zigzagging by the US, leaders in the Middle East have developed their own assertive foreign policies, while two nascent democracies in Southeast Asia, Thailand and Myanmar, are again ruled by military juntas.

EU leaders became obsessed with the idea of strategic autonomy. And, although Joe Biden’s election was welcomed across most of Europe, it could not assuage concerns about the potentially transitory nature of his claim that ‘America is back’.

Putin has seized on this moment of transatlantic uncertainty and post-Covid navel-gazing to try to create a personal legacy as the leader who reunited a greater Russia out of the rubble of the Soviet Union. Instead, he has united Ukrainians and reunited the world’s liberal democracies in opposition to his brutal invasion and blatant rupture of international law. His actions have also drawn the contours of a new, trilateral international system.

Some 40 democracies across North America, Europe and the Indo-Pacific now see Putin and Xi Jinping – given China’s rhetorical support for Putin’s invasion – as interconnected threats to their long-term security. They are organizing to resist, using a re-energized Nato, new structures for Indo-Pacific cooperation and cross-linkages between these two spheres. For their part, Putin and Xi, though not formal allies, are tied together by each one’s need that the other survives and prospers while they are in confrontation with the liberal democracies.

The third, largest and most diverse group of countries are the newly non-aligned. India stands proudly in the foreground, but other major democracies such as Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, and non-democracies such as Egypt and Vietnam, are triangulating strategically between the world’s dominant democratic and authoritarian poles. Multilateral institutions will be weaker as a result.

Does this more divided world presage major conflict between the great powers? Hopefully not; after all, nuclear weapons remain a potent deterrent. Does global division herald the end of economic globalization and of the international cooperation needed to manage shared global challenges? Not necessarily.

While Russia will be excluded from liberal democratic markets for as long as Putin is in the Kremlin, China’s reliance on global markets and the importance of its market to the world make it unlikely that we will return to a new Cold War. Global supply chains and foreign investment will be more tightly circumscribed than today, but they will persist. And international cooperation to combat climate change and manage the environment will continue.

Meanwhile, technological innovation will accelerate, opening new prospects for sustainable development and employment, even as it sharpens the facets of geopolitical competition. And we may soon cross the tipping point at which women hold a critical mass of positions of political and community leadership in many parts of the world. Given that male leaders are, once again, the instigators of the latest spasms of violence, a more gender-balanced approach to leadership holds the prospect of greater political stability and more inclusive and sustainable development.

As I step down as Chatham House Director, I find myself torn between fury at the senseless human tragedy of a drawn-out war in Ukraine and the way its spillover effects are devastating the welfare of hundreds of millions across the globe, and hope that human courage, resilience and ingenuity will nevertheless sustain us on the path to a better future.

I am reassured in this by the knowledge that Chatham House’s researchers, professional staff and increasingly diverse membership mean that it is well placed to help decision-makers and societies navigate this complex world.

The Platinum Jubilee of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II News release NCapeling 1 June 2022

The staff, associate fellows and Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House send congratulations and warmest wishes to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II on the occasion of her momentous Platinum Jubilee.

As the Patron of the institute since her accession to the throne in 1952, HM The Queen has underpinned Chatham House’s independence for seven decades and thereby strengthened the impact of our work on the critical issues facing the world.

HM The Queen lent her personal support to the establishment of the annual Chatham House Prize in 2005 and has presented the award in person on behalf of the institute’s members on three occasions.

Among her other direct engagements with Chatham House, HM The Queen has helped us engage the next generation by supporting and then attending the launch of the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs in 2014, when she met the first intake of Academy fellows.

We are enormously grateful for her continued involvement as Patron of the institute and wish her and the Royal Family a memorable Platinum Jubilee.

Europe should become the top priority for Liz Truss Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

Liz Truss has the chance to be a better prime minister than Boris Johnson was, not least in the UK’s foreign policy.

For all the smoke-and-mirrors talk now commonplace about Brexit opportunities, there is real potential that Liz Truss could extract from the aftermath of that upheaval as well as from the turmoil in the world.

But the approach and priorities she revealed during her one year as a better UK foreign secretary than Boris Johnson was – although he did set a low bar – as well as the past three months campaigning for the leadership of her party contain a warning.

She has shown a willingness to aggravate relationships with allies in pursuit of the support of her party faithful, and of a vision of British independence as well as a tendency to dismiss economic analysis when it inconveniently questions her assertions about favoured policies.

At the heart of her political identity is a notion which is both a strength and a potentially calamitous weakness – a love of the notion of being a disrupter which injects a deliberate unpredictability into her approach towards a world in extreme flux.

If she indulges this without good judgment, she could do real damage to Britain’s prospects and standing in the world.

Ukraine and the energy crisis

In foreign policy, Europe should be her starting point and the opportunity here for the UK is clear. The war in Ukraine and crisis in the cost of energy gives it a role – despite having left the European Union (EU) – in talking to EU governments about the future of the continent on many fronts.

Johnson’s emphatic support of President Zelensky gave the UK a position of moral and strategic clarity which Truss can build on through what will be an exceptionally difficult winter for Europe’s governments.

She is in a position to persuade European leaders to remain united in Ukraine’s support while planning better how they are going to source energy. She could expand on that to help the EU find a way through its many other problems, such as upholding democratic values throughout the bloc or finding a response to migration.

There is also a chance for the UK to shape Europe’s thinking on the development and regulation of digital technology and medicine, energy, and the environment.

Truss’s declaration that the UK should now spend three per cent of its GDP on defence could help her in taking that kind of role. However this campaign declaration is not yet credible, given the pressures on the national finances and her silence so far on support for households on energy costs.

But that is the opportunity in theory and the signs are this is not her approach to Europe. Her provocative and opportunistic comment that the ‘jury’s out’ on whether President Macron (and France) was a friend or foe shocked both Britain’s allies and opponents.

For those keen to see divisions among democracies, it gave unexpected, heady encouragement, and to those within those countries, it injected a doubt about shared values which was deeply damaging. The chilly poise of Macron’s response – that the UK and France would always be allies – showed how far she had departed from normal protocol.

The episode encapsulated one of the sources of unease about the Truss style – improvisation under the banner of ‘disruption’ without thought of consequences.

However, she has shown consistency over the Northern Ireland Protocol with little sign of compromise, and that alone could cause much unnecessary damage to UK interests. It also puts her on a collision course with the EU and the UK House of Lords, due to consider controversial legislation again in early October after the Conservative party conference.

There is huge opposition in the Lords to two aspects of the legislation. The first target is the intention of the Johnson government – likely to be repeated by a Truss government – to use the bill to jettison aspects of the protocol, which many argue breaks international law. The second is the delegated power the bill would give ministers.

The cost of a new, serious clash – or worse, a full trade war – with the EU is high. There is the loss of trade, the increase in friction for business, which is consistently underestimated by the UK government, and the loss of scientific and research partnerships.

More than that, though, there is the weakening of ties to a set of allies with common values sharing an increasingly troubled neighbourhood.

US, China, and others remain important

And to say Europe should come first is not to dismiss other claims on the UK’s foreign policy. Her instinctive liking for the US will help Truss in relations with Washington at a difficult time, and her apparent intention to designate China as ‘a threat’ will support that relationship too.

Redefine the Commonwealth now to safeguard its future Expert comment NCapeling 6 October 2022

Although seen as one of the Queen’s greatest legacies, the Commonwealth must provide tangible benefits to its citizens in an era of geopolitical competition.

The Commonwealth’s breadth allows a wide diversity of countries of different sizes, geographies, cultures, and values to be members – it is both rich and poor, north and south, and ethnically diverse. This makes it more interesting than many other multilateral institutions such as the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU).

But it suffers from an unclear purpose. Since its inception, successive UK governments have grappled with its role – whether it is a preferential trading bloc or merely a source of most of Britain’s post-war immigration.

This lack of purpose – and structure – has left the Commonwealth impotent in dealing with a host of bilateral difficulties between the UK, its overseas territories, and Commonwealth partners in recent years.

Brexit could induce Britain to re-prioritize the Commonwealth, but so far the UK has only signed two new trade deals with Commonwealth members – Australia and New Zealand – while development aid, one of the most tangible ways the UK worked with many Commonwealth countries, has been cut and the UK’s defence focus has pivoted towards the Indo-Pacific and Europe’s Eastern front.

The UK also suffered embarrassing and overwhelming defeats in both the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of its continued occupation of the Chagos Islands and has avoided directly challenging India’s tacit support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the hope of securing a trade deal.

At the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), Boris Johnson reportedly attempted to depose Baroness Scotland, the Commonwealth’s Secretary General, but suffered a humiliating defeat in a vote of Commonwealth members.

These challenges are likely to continue, especially in the wake of the death of HM The Queen which could be seen by republican movements as an opportune time to rally support. Australia and New Zealand’s leaders, both republicans, downplayed the idea of a poll on the monarchy immediately after the Queen’s death, but it would be a mistake to assume this has gone quiet forever. Antigua and Barbuda’s prime minister has already said there will be a referendum on becoming a republic within three years.

Defining a new vision for the future

A concrete vision for the Commonwealth is long overdue and there is no better time to cast one than now. HM The Queen was more than just a figurehead for the Commonwealth and it remains unknown exactly what role King Charles III will see for himself.

But, unlike his mother who was a young, modern Queen heralding a post-imperial future, Charles takes the throne at a later age and at a time when important questions need to be addressed in an increasingly fractured world.

Most importantly the UK should avoid the temptation to define the Commonwealth in terms of shared principles and values. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh all abstained on the United Nations (UN) motion condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Commonwealth members are likely to be similarly divided over China’s territorial claims, the US-China conflict, the net-zero agenda, and nuclear non-proliferation.

The Commonwealth’s breadth – its greatest strength – means consensus is often impossible, and so should not be the goal. Instead the Commonwealth should focus on tangible areas of cooperation where there is mutual interest such as trade, aid, and migration.

The UK and its allies may find that diplomatic efforts – such as condemning China or Russia for human rights abuses – are more successful if they have listened to and acted on fellow Commonwealth countries’ concerns, from post-COVID vaccine provision to climate financing. Boosting the aid budget and opening borders may prove more important in engaging developing country partners than traditional diplomatic avenues.

Liz Truss’s British International Investment project could be a valuable vehicle for financing, especially if it leverages private sector funding, but many Commonwealth countries are feeling the more immediate impact of the UK’s aid cuts. In these circumstances many have already turned to Chinese infrastructure financing.

This is where the Commonwealth could be valuable. In the Pacific, it links certain island nations to the UK, Australia, and New Zealand at a time of renewed geopolitical competition with China in the Pacific. The fact the Commonwealth is not explicitly about promoting a particular ideology or countering China is helpful.

Commonwealth should be less UK-centric

There is also no reason why all the Commonwealth operations need to be based in London, which is not only expensive but also reinforces an approach to governance that assumes everything must be decided by civil servants in London. As the world’s largest democracy, India is an obvious alternative candidate although its reluctance to condemn Russia’s invasion and its domestic political tensions may count against it.

It is also important the Commonwealth’s wealthier members – the UK, Canada, and Australia – provide financing for countries such as India to take on extra responsibilities. The Commonwealth Games is a good place to start – despite having 72 competing nations and territories, the games have only been held three times outside the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The Commonwealth also needs to be forward-looking and one of its most exciting assets is its demographic youthfulness. Europe, China, and the US have ageing populations whereas Nigeria, India, and Bangladesh have some of the world’s largest young populations.

The UK must avoid conflict with Europe and China Expert comment NCapeling 10 October 2022

Liz Truss says she wants to take a tough line but any freedom to forge her own foreign policy is a casualty of the economic turmoil following her first budget.

The tax-cutting budget from new UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng was clearly not inhibited by any apparent concern for the markets’ response. But the interest rate rise it contributed to and the scepticism raining down on the Truss government should force a recognition that economic vulnerability now constrains what the UK tries to do abroad.

That would mean taking a more cautious approach than the new UK prime minister seems to want to adopt. The Treasury and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) may sit next to each other in Whitehall’s parade of 18th century buildings, but a huge gulf lies between them.

When talking to officials, it is striking how those in one building make decisions without reference to the other. Foreign policy is made with no consideration of the UK’s need to borrow money in the markets, and budgets are written with little calculation of the effect of decisions next door – although the Cabinet Office does at least try to reconcile these.

But that approach is a luxury which the budget response and the sharp rise in national debt it will bring makes no longer affordable.

Repairing EU trade relations is priority

The first lesson is that any worsening of trade relations with the European Union (EU) is not now something the UK can afford to contemplate. The markets would take an even dimmer view of national finances if the UK were to become embroiled in an even more fractious trade dispute with its closest and largest trading partner.

When campaigning for the Conservative party leadership, Liz Truss talked tough on the Northern Ireland protocol and her unwillingness to compromise much with the EU. Since she became prime minister, sounds from both the UK and EU have been much more conciliatory, with suggestions that a deal could be just a few details away.

And yet the Truss government is still pressing ahead with the controversial legislation which would enable the UK unilaterally to walk away from parts of the treaty it signed – the House of Lords will debate the bill and its most contentious measures, such as the extensive new powers it gives ministers, on 11 October.

But there are suggestions from officials that, although Truss would lose too much face by withdrawing the legislation, the government may choose not to contest any Lords amendments vigorously.

That would be wise. The prime minister should know the financial path she has chosen with her chancellor makes carrying out the threats of walking away from a deal too costly to afford. As it is, the markets are hardly looking with equanimity on the prospect of the UK borrowing £100 billion to shield consumers from rising gas prices.

A £43 billion package of proposed tax cuts with no explanation – yet – of how the government will pay for them would be even less comfortable were the UK to take such a hard line on the Northern Ireland protocol that it provokes a trade war with the EU. Brussels can also make those calculations and, for all the recent talk of concessions, is expected to hold fast to its new position.

For the same reasons, the UK cannot afford to talk about taking a tougher line on China – as the prime minister has already done – without clearly knowing what the economic impact would be and being sure voters are prepared to pay this price. Years of courting commercial links with China mean they now weave their way through the UK economy.

The dependence of universities on Chinese students and the income they bring is already well-known and heavily debated – but the exposure of the UK economy to digital technology and components from China is even greater, and China is now the largest source of imports for the UK with £63.6 billion or 13.3 per cent of all goods imports according to the Office for National Statistics.

Much of that was laptops, computers, telecoms and phones as well as toys and clothes; there are few households or offices that will not have these products. China is also the sixth largest destination for UK exports, with £18.8 billion or 5.8 per cent of goods exports, much of it machinery and cars.

Scottish Liberal Democrat peer Lord Purvis expressed concern at these figures because of the implication that the UK’s ability to take a tough line with China on human rights was now enormously circumscribed. And defence and intelligence chiefs are also warning of the UK’s vulnerability.

Taking a hard line needs context

There are signs the government is concerned enough to begin to map out this economic vulnerability but no signs that it yet has a full picture. Without knowing the economic hit of a frostier relationship, and confidence the House of Commons accepts it, Liz Truss would be brave to label China ‘a threat to national security’ – as her supporters indicated during the leadership campaign – when she updates the integrated review of defence and security in the coming months.

Of course, foreign policy should not be inspired by commercial concerns alone. There are wider reasons to develop a clearer China strategy to help lay out a more consistent future path. On his recent trip to East Asia, UK foreign secretary James Cleverly heard from UK partners that they were disconcerted by the lurch from George Osborne’s ‘golden years’ to the Truss charge of a China ‘threat’.

When Liz Truss was UK foreign secretary, some forecast she would pursue mercantilism given her focus on forging post-Brexit trade deals but, as it turned out, that was not the spirit of her tenure.

After Truss, the UK can still rebuild its global reputation Expert comment NCapeling 20 October 2022

Following a chaotic few weeks as UK prime minister, Liz Truss has stepped down. And that is the best outcome for her party and for the country.

Liz Truss could not command support for her calamitous – and misnamed – mini-budget. And once her new Chancellor Jeremy Hunt had overturned its provisions, she had no mission or credibility left.

The budget pushed interest rates higher and they did not fall much on the scrapping of it, leaving her open to the charge she pushed up mortgage and interest costs for every person and business in the country. Her apology for ‘mistakes made’ was not going to reverse that, so her MPs were right to tell her to go.

Her departure does mark a victory for at least some of the UK’s institutions, even if it might not seem that way to observers around the world.

The position of the UK parliament has been reaffirmed, and so has that of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – it will be a long time before a government tries to dispense with the comments of the independent watchdog of national finances.

This also reinforces the principle that governments must explain how they will pay for their programmes. The Bank of England remains unencumbered – despite Truss’s apparent intentions of giving it a pro-growth addition to its mandate – to pursue its aim of tackling inflation.

New leader needs legitimacy quickly

The Conservative party has a chance – perhaps – to produce another prime minister without being forced into a general election, as that is the constitutional principle in the UK’s parliamentary system.

But the clamour that the new leader, as the third prime minister in one year, lacks legitimacy may prove impossible to resist for long.

In attempting to select a leader with a chance of uniting the party, the Conservatives are right to be considering options for restricting this leadership election to MPs should there be only one candidate with enough support.

But no such candidate may emerge and the pressure within the Commons – and the country – for an early election will not let up.

There is no question the UK’s standing in the world has been severely battered by this episode and by the revolving door of prime ministers. For the UK to regain respect – and an image of reliability – it needs to move fast and find someone capable of putting policies into action.

Those policies need to be based on economic stability but must also include a resolution of the relationship with Europe as much of the current upheaval represents the bitter aftermath of Brexit.

Concluding a deal with Brussels over the Northern Ireland protocol – avoiding ripping up the treaty the UK signed – and continuing to smooth the considerable friction that the exit from the EU has brought for exporters is essential work for the next prime minister.

Pursuing a deal for scientists to take part in the European Union (EU) Horizon research should be a priority. UK universities and researchers are already reluctantly preparing for a future where that does not come, with signs of the feared drain of talent already clear.

UK’s international reputation now at risk

Beyond that, there is much about UK policy which needs clarifying if the country is to regain its international standing. Just weeks from the start of COP27 and less than one year since the Glasgow climate change summit it hosted, the UK position on climate change commitments appears in flux.

The UK government pledge to help Ukraine is clear and has won it gratitude there and respect within Europe, but its intentions for defence spending are less clear.