Toni Annala, Marc Hoyois and Ryomei Iwasa
J. Amer. Math. Soc. 38 (), 243-289.
Abstract, references and article information

Marcelo Campos, Matthew Jenssen, Marcus Michelen and Julian Sahasrabudhe
J. Amer. Math. Soc. 38 (), 179-224.
Abstract, references and article information

Junyi Xie
J. Amer. Math. Soc. 38 (), 1-62.
Abstract, references and article information

Nonphotochemical quenching (NPQ) is a mechanism of regulating light harvesting that protects the photosynthetic apparatus from photodamage by dissipating excess absorbed excitation energy as heat. In higher plants, the major light-harvesting antenna complex (LHCII) of photosystem (PS) II is directly involved in NPQ. The aggregation of LHCII is proposed to be involved in quenching. However, the lack of success in isolating native LHCII aggregates has limited the direct interrogation of this process. The isolation of LHCII in its native state from thylakoid membranes has been problematic because of the use of detergent, which tends to dissociate loosely bound proteins, and the abundance of pigment–protein complexes (e.g. PSI and PSII) embedded in the photosynthetic membrane, which hinders the preparation of aggregated LHCII. Here, we used a novel purification method employing detergent and amphipols to entrap LHCII in its natural states. To enrich the photosynthetic membrane with the major LHCII, we used Arabidopsis thaliana plants lacking the PSII minor antenna complexes (NoM), treated with lincomycin to inhibit the synthesis of PSI and PSII core proteins. Using sucrose density gradients, we succeeded in isolating the trimeric and aggregated forms of LHCII antenna. Violaxanthin- and zeaxanthin-enriched complexes were investigated in dark-adapted, NPQ, and dark recovery states. Zeaxanthin-enriched antenna complexes showed the greatest amount of aggregated LHCII. Notably, the amount of aggregated LHCII decreased upon relaxation of NPQ. Employing this novel preparative method, we obtained a direct evidence for the role of in vivo LHCII aggregation in NPQ.

Beijing briefing: is the Belt and Road going nowhere? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Scaling back infrastructure plans and investment in the Global South could cause China problems, says Yu Jie.

Over the past two decades, China specialists around the world have tried to analyze Beijing’s approach to developing countries in the Global South, including Africa, Latin America, parts of Asia and the Pacific islands.
 
China’s relationships with nations in these regions vary considerably. In some, ideology or geography are the biggest influencing factors; for others, economic and commercial gains matter most. However, many of Beijing’s recent engagements have attracted more criticism than praise. A domestic economic downturn means that Beijing has tightened its belt, spending less on overseas development.

When President Xi Jinping came to power, he was keen to highlight how China’s power could shape and dictate the global agenda across multilateral platforms. His vision was for China to project discursive power and become an agenda-setter rather than a rule-follower. The Global South is the route to fulfilling his proposal.

To this end, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the latest Global Development Initiative are the means to Beijing’s ends. The former, launched in 2013, focuses on building physical infrastructure linking Global South countries; the latter aims to allow development through grants and capacity-building in line with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

China’s engagements with Africa and Latin America seem characterized by the rapid extension of Chinese finance to resource-rich African states, particularly oil producers, since the early 2000s. From 2003, for example, oil-backed infrastructure loans were made to the Angolan government for reconstruction after decades of civil conflict. By 2016, they totalled some $15 billion. 

However, Beijing’s appetite for offering cheap loans in exchange for natural resources has shrunk. It faces a dilemma between protecting the value of its investments while also defending its strategic interests and maintaining its self-image as a partner, not a predator, of Africa.

Beijing has historically preferred bilateral relationships for its development finance and investments over multilateral ones. This allows China control over the terms and conditions, while demonstrating its unwillingness to accept without question rules and frameworks devised years ago by western countries.

China has already realized that some elements of its engagements with the Global South are no longer the flavour of the day, partly because some of its programmes include serious climate and financial risks without proper third-party due diligence in place. 

Growth through gigantic infrastructure investments of the sort that drove China’s own economic miracle is not a panacea applicable everywhere. Nor is relentlessly seeking endorsements from its neighbours and other countries from afar.

China wants to be a ‘brother’ to the Global South

Ideologically, China wants to be seen and respected as a leader of the Global South. Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic has maintained a ‘brotherly’ relationship with developing countries, notably in the UN context, where it remains a member of the G77 group of developing nations. 

The West has responded to China’s development agenda with its own infrastructure programmes, such as Washington’s Build Back Better World and the European Union’s Global Gateway. 

Great power rivalry should not be ignored, but it shouldn’t blind world powers to the need for collaboration in tackling global poverty and sustainable development. Nor should Beijing’s efforts to adjust its diplomatic and aid programmes to become a likeable partner of choice in search of a better economic future, be disregarded.

Since launching BRI, China has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into building infrastructure in the Global South. And many developing countries hope that advanced economies and China can continue to act to alleviate poverty. But the brakes have been applied to Beijing’s spree as a result of China’s domestic economic slowdown. It has no wish to continue spending its foreign reserves.

To go forward, China must remain open to what others want – or fear – from Beijing’s development initiatives and infrastructure investments. Many developing countries, facing insurmountable costs and damage exacerbated by the Covid pandemic, crave meaningful assistance rather than diplomatic rhetoric. 

The ultimate test of Beijing’s economic statecraft is whether it can engage with the Global South beyond relationships built on financial resources and political capital. It must also become more self-aware of how its words and deeds are received – and then act accordingly. Showering dollars and renminbi is not always guaranteed to win hearts and minds. In this respect, Beijing has more bridges to build.

China’s political chessboard: The 20th party congress 14 October 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 August 2022 Online

As the CCP gathers for its quinquennial political event, experts analyse its national, regional and global relevance.

In October, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assembles to appoint new leaders and discuss political, social, economic and foreign policy priorities for the coming 2022–2027 period and beyond.

One of the key outcomes of the meeting of China’s political class is the future of current President Xi Jinping. Technically, as he is at the end of his second five-year term, Xi was due to step down this year. The next generation of leadership was supposed to step in, as the next stage of the party’s evolution takes place.

However, this is unlikely to happen. The president has consolidated his power, manoeuvring allies into key positions and developing a faction of support in the party. With ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ added to the party charter and China’s constitution and term limits removed, Xi shows no intention of stepping down.

However, the president is not all-powerful. Critics and alternative factions operate within the party. His second term has also had to contend with the botched early handling of the pandemic, worsening ties with the US, and a slowing economy.

In an increasingly unpredictable world, events in the 2022 Party Congress will be hugely impactful for China’s and global affairs. What trajectory will Beijing take?

Key questions the panel discuss include:

• How does the Party Congress function and what does it mean for domestic Chinese politics?

• Will President Xi’s political and economic legacies continue under new political leaders and policymakers?

• What does President Xi’s next role in China’s government tell us about his power?

• As the 20th CCP Party Congress takes place, is there unity and cohesion at the top of the political structure?

• Will the Party Congress have any impact on China’s international relations? Particularly the US?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

Russia–China defence and security relations: Insights from the expert community 13 September 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 August 2022 Online

Experts share insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations. 

In the defence and security realms, Russia–China relations resemble more pragmatic cooperation based on shared, calculated interests than an alliance.

This event presents and discusses key findings from a recent expert survey conducted by Chatham House with the aim to gather insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations.

Survey responses helped identify areas of bilateral cooperation but also crucial friction points and obstacles that prevent the relationship from developing further, as well as policy pathways for the West.

A guide to the Chinese Communist Party's National Congress The World Today rescobales.drupal 21 September 2022

In the first of a three-part series examining the global importance of the CCP’s 20th National Congress, Yu Jie explains how it makes its big decisions.

Why does the CCP National Congress matter?

The world’s most populous country and its smallest state have little in common with one exception: how they select their leader. Like the Vatican, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shrouds its leadership selection process in secrecy.

Every five years, a week-long conclave – the Party Congress – is held and at its end a new cohort of leaders is presented that will steer the world’s second largest economy for the next five years.

The congress is the most important date in China’s political calendar. It not only selects China’s leadership team but acts as a signpost indicating the direction the country will be heading in the near future, with implications for decades to come. It also reveals the breadth and depth of power held by Xi Jinping, the party’s general-secretary.

The 20th CCP National Congress, opening on October 16 and expected to last a week, is taking place during unsettling times. While Xi Jinping is expected to embark on his third term as general-secretary of the party after the removal of a two-term limit in February 2018, it is hardly a crowning glory. Xi’s China is battling an economic maelstrom at home while juggling fraught foreign relations abroad.

What does the National Congress do?

Quite simply, the CCP National Congress is the gathering that defines China’s political leadership and sets the tone for its relationship with the rest of the world.

It serves to fulfil three primary functions:

First, it sets the party’s principal agenda across all policy sectors, from macroeconomics to the price of food. During the week, it draws up a consensus-based evaluation of the party’s work over the past five years, which includes a detailed examination of the party’s current situation.

Second, it introduces any revisions to the party constitution deemed necessary, for instance on changes to the criteria for leadership recruitment or amendments to the party’s ‘guiding ideology’.

Third, it selects the leadership team that will steer China for the next five years, a function that attracts the most international attention but is not the sole purpose of the congress.

How is the party leadership team chosen?

The congress comprises 2,300 delegates representing all levels of the party hierarchy across 34 provinces and regions – from the governors of towns and cities, to Olympic champions, astronauts, and even the odd stand-up comedian to mark the ‘inclusiveness’ of the party.

The votes that decide the next cohort of party leaders come from three committees only: the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, with 205 members and 171 alternate members (alternate members are simply substitutes to replace a member if they die, retire or are dismissed); the Central Committee, with 204 members; and the Politburo, with 25 members, only one of whom is a woman.

Unlike multiparty elections in liberal democracies, neither the full 25 members of the Politburo nor the seven members of its Standing Committee are nominated by or directly voted for by constituents.

A procedure known as ‘democratic recommendation’ is essentially a straw poll that includes all congress participants. They are then given a ballot listing the names of around 200 Politburo candidates in stroke order – the Chinese equivalent to alphabetical order. This short-listing process is completed in the run-up to the congress. Some pundits asserted that this process was put on hold after 2017, yet this has not been formally confirmed within the party constitution.

A few senior delegates may express their preferences to their colleagues anonymously during this process. All the shortlisted candidates must meet the criteria for Politburo membership, which means serving at either a ministerial rank or above or in the People’s Liberation Army at military region level or above and being younger than 62.

Based on the result of this straw poll, and more importantly on the preferences of current Politburo members, the incumbent Politburo and its Standing Committee will approve the nominees, conclude the Seventh Plenum of the 19th Party Congress and call for the 20th Congress. The delegates at the Party Congress then ceremonially cast their votes for the Politburo at the Party Congress although the result is pre-agreed, a procedure somewhat similar to the US Electoral College.

What are the rules for choosing Politburo members?

The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) consists of between five and nine members, with seven selected at the 19th Congress. It is the supreme decision-making body of the Communist Party as well as the People’s Republic of China.

If the 20th Congress follows convention, there are three de-facto rules to be followed:

First, Politburo and Standing Committee members must retire at 68. This age limit is known as ‘Eight down, Seven up’.

Second, new appointments to the PSC are drawn exclusively from regular Politburo members. The only exceptions to this rule have been Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, who were appointed at the 17th Party Congress in 2007.

This exception follows the third convention, under which PSC appointees are among the youngest senior party leaders eligible. Potentially three vacancies could arise in 2022, as Xi himself is 69 but it is highly unlikely that he would step down. That would be a radical departure from past precedents.

The extent to which past procedure is applied could act as a signal as to whether Xi Jinping is consolidating his power, while the size of the standing committee will be scrutinized to assess how much power Xi wields.

If the procedure for leadership appointments at the 20th Congress deviates from these conventions, it could indicate two things. First, the CCP faces a new set of challenges and requires the introduction of new rules to shape the top leadership. Or, second, Xi has gained substantial personal power that allows him to bypass the collective leadership system endorsed by Deng Xiaoping and choose appointees to suit his own taste. There has thus far been little evidence from the official media to reflect on any changes.

Changes in party institutional constraints, however, raise the danger of undermining governance at home and China’s relations abroad.

Read the two further articles in this series: the second discusses the key domestic policy themes that Xi Jinping is expected to outline at this year’s congress; the third analyses the foreign policy issues likely to be discussed at the congress.   

The new geopolitics of nuclear power The World Today mhiggins.drupal 27 September 2022

States may be looking to build or restore nuclear plants, but they will need to bypass Chinese and Russian sector dominance, says Sung-Mi Kim.

Against the backdrop of a worldwide energy crisis, the global nuclear market may be seeing a renaissance with growing interest in nuclear energy.

Sceptics are being compelled to rethink the trade-off calculus of nuclear power for the first time since the 2011 Fukushima disaster, which prompted countries to postpone or phase out nuclear power. The nuclear option is again being seen as a way of boosting a nation’s energy autonomy and its ability to weather the volatility caused by unpredictable Russian gas supplies.

Adoption or expansion of nuclear energy capability will not allow a country to be free of Russian influence entirely given its dominant presence in the global nuclear sector. Rosatom, Russia’s state-controlled power corporation, and its subsidiaries, make Russia the leading exporter of nuclear power plants. Russia also supplies more than a third of the global fuel-related services, namely uranium conversion and enrichment. Notably, Russia has been capable of building these into an attractive financial package for importing countries, backed by generous state support.

Like Russia, Chinese government-owned nuclear corporations have started to make forays into export markets as part of its Belt and Road Initiative and ‘Go Out’ policy, which encourages companies to invest overseas. Both China and Russia have a strong comparative advantage in offering competitive state-backed financing schemes for nuclear products and services.

In the meantime, nuclear investment in advanced economies in the West have tended to remain stagnant. The International Energy Agency reports that of the 31 reactors built in the past five years, 27 are of Russian or Chinese design.

Given current market conditions and the technological complexity of the nuclear fuel cycle, new entrants will find it difficult to acquire energy autonomy through nuclear power. They will have to rely on foreign suppliers to build, operate and maintain their nuclear plants and supporting infrastructure. It typically takes a decade to build a nuclear plant and start generating electricity, and nuclear plant deals are built on a decades-long commitment of the parties to forge a political, technical, regulatory and scientific partnership that goes beyond purely commercial terms.

Nuclear export, therefore, is often a long-term, whole-of-the-government effort involving diplomatic skills and geopolitical calculations, and is subject to global oversight to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The US is building strategic nuclear partnerships

In response to the Russian and Chinese dominance of the civilian nuclear sector, American nuclear industries are asking the government to streamline the export-licensing process and provide them with support. The US government is also establishing strategic partnerships with nuclear-capable allies such as South Korea to win procurement contracts. South Korea has recently made a U-turn in its nuclear policy. Its new president Yoon Suk-yeol intends to revive the role of nuclear power to help meet the country’s climate targets and has vowed to export 10 nuclear power plants by 2030.

In Japan, where nuclear energy production was halted after the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, a new policy platform was launched in 2019 to enhance public-private collaboration for nuclear research and development.

Intensifying geopolitical tensions between the US and its allies on one side, and Russia and China on the other, will inevitably affect nuclear market dynamics. Domestic economic slowdowns and international sanctions will be a stress test for the export potential of Russia and China.

For instance, in May 2022, Finland eliminated Rosatom from its consortium to build a nuclear power plant, citing delays and increased uncertainties stemming from the invasion of Ukraine. In 2020, Romania cancelled its nuclear deal with China, instead securing an agreement with the US to build two more reactors for its Cernavoda plant. The decision was seen as a move to align Romania with US intentions to sideline China.

 In March 2022, when the Czech Republic officially launched a tender to build a new reactor at the Dukovany nuclear plant, Rosatom and Chinese state-controlled nuclear exporter CGN have been excluded from the tender on security grounds.

As countries try to wean themselves off price-volatile gas and decarbonize their economies to meet climate targets, new commercial opportunities are opening up for the nuclear industry. At least 15 countries are building reactors, according to the World Nuclear Association. Some, such as China, are building more than one.

More than 30 countries are considering, planning or starting a nuclear programme. There is also a growing need for replacing or extending the lives of ageing reactors. It is in this context that the commercial, geopolitical and regulatory aspects of nuclear energy will play an increasing role in the  geopolitical contest for money and influence.

China’s high-stakes incursion in the heights of Bhutan The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 September 2022

Why is Beijing establishing settlements over the Bhutanese border? To undermine India’s strategic security, say John Pollock and Damien Symon.

A confrontation is fomenting on the roof of the world in a country that rarely warrants international attention.

In the tiny Kingdom of Bhutan, China is building villages in isolated, mountainous regions, upping the pressure on the capital Thimphu to yield contested areas to Beijing. In doing so, China risks a collision with South Asia’s largest state and Bhutan’s principal security guarantor, India.

Sitting on top of fragile geopolitical fault lines in the Himalayas, China’s Central Military Commission has seemingly authorized a series of incursions into the Bhutanese regions of Doklam, Jakarlung, and Pasamlung. Beijing has also announced fresh claims in the east towards Sakteng. Taken together, these amount to 12 per cent of Bhutan’s total territory according to Nathan Ruser, an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

India is wary of Beijing’s increased assertiveness in the Himalayas following a large-scale incursion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into Ladakh two years ago when dozens of Indian and Chinese soldiers were killed in a stand-off.

The appearance of Chinese roads, villages and a host of other infrastructure projects within largely uninhabited areas of Bhutan close to Tibet, have, for sections of India’s national security establishment, confirmed their worst fears – Beijing is altering the status quo across the Himalayas in a bid to undermine India’s strategic security through territorial alterations.

As a country of only 780,000 people, Bhutan is greatly influenced by New Delhi when it comes to its foreign affairs. In exchange, India guarantees the defence of the kingdom and trains the Royal Bhutanese Army. The appearance of Chinese villages on its territory risks Bhutan becoming a victim of the wider regional tensions.

The trauma of China-Bhutan border relations

Bhutan is no stranger to the territorial aspirations of its northern neighbour. Thousands of refugees fled into the country after China annexed Tibet, damaging longstanding cultural and religious links between the Tibetan and Bhutanese people – a trauma still being felt today.

Now, Beijing is laying claim to three areas within Bhutan, including Doklam in the west. This plateau is close to the Siliguri Corridor which connects to the ‘Seven Sister’ states in northeast India. Indeed, such is India’s concern over any Chinese presence near Doklam that in 2017 local Indian commanders sent troops into Bhutan to prevent PLA engineers building a road near the Doka La pass, resulting in a 72-day stand-off on Bhutanese soil between India and China, an experience Thimphu is unwilling to repeat.

Once again, China is looking to force the border issue unilaterally, altering the status quo and building villages and outposts on Bhutanese soil. On the available evidence, it has been doing so for at least three years.

The presence of Chinese villages in uninhabited areas of Bhutan serves a strategic purpose. They appear to be intended to pressure Bhutan into accepting an earlier version of a border deal that concedes Doklam to the Chinese.

Bhutan’s increasing concern is that China now views the Sino-Bhutanese border dispute as a way of unravelling India’s strategic position by stealth. Here we see a growing pattern of behaviour across the Himalayas. China is testing the boundaries in isolated and contested areas of India to attain local advantages that ensure New Delhi’s gaze remains fixed on the Himalayas.

The costly choice facing Bhutan

Bhutan for its part has very deliberately opted to remain silent, despite clear violations of its border deal with Beijing. Thimphu has made no public comment on any of the Chinese incursions.

The choice now facing Bhutan is a costly one. To concede Doklam would devastate relations with India, its closest partner. But to ignore China’s ambitions would be to risk further violations of its sovereign territory.

Bhutan may yet agree in principle to a land swap but then delay its implementation in the hope China limits any further advances. Thus Bhutan, India and China stand at a crossroads, with an impending confrontation that has not yet arrived and one that through Thimphu’s delicate diplomacy, Bhutan hopes never does.

China’s incursions into Bhutan

1. Pangda

The most high-profile incursion is in the disputed areas in Doklam. Running adjacent to the previous Doka La stand-off site, a series of Chinese projects are visible, following the Amo Chu River that runs from the Chumbi Valley in Tibet into Bhutan.

The most well-known of these xiaokang – meaning peaceful and prosperous – border projects is Pangda, a village of 124 people that sits roughly two kilometres within Bhutan from the border. First spotted by open-source intelligence analysts in October-November 2020, Chinese state media says that 27 households were moved from the Shangdui village to Pangda in September of that year and that the village is located in Yadong County, Tibet. Pangda, however, lies on territory internationally recognized as belonging to Bhutan.

Since Pangda was first identified, two more villages and an additional excavation site have been noted through satellite photographs taken in March this year, steadily following the river further into Bhutanese territory. In recent reporting by journalist Vishnu Som, a connecting road is also visible that runs 9km into Bhutan.

Given the geopolitical sensitivities of the area vis-a-vis India, speculation points to Chinese attempts to increase pressure on the Jampheri ridge overlooking the 2017 stand-off site, which according to journalist Tenzing Lamsang, is currently occupied by a small Royal Bhutanese Army detachment. As ever in the Himalayas, small tactical alterations have strategic implications. Chinese control of the Jampheri ridge would command views towards Sikkim, increase the scope of China’s surveillance operations near the border and place India’s Eastern Theatre Command at a terrain disadvantage were it to intervene as it did at Doka La.

2. Dramana and Shakhatoe

Further north of Doklam, at Dramana and Shakhatoe, more villages have been identified, with recent photographs taken in November 2021 showing a collection of structures nestled between snow-capped mountains. Varying in size, the largest village identified by journalist Devjyot Ghoshal comprises more than 84 buildings with construction having been started in December 2020 and seemingly completed by December 2021.

Little is known about the nature of these villages or their occupants other than their size and location. However, the Chinese PLA has patrolled these areas aggressively, warning away Bhutanese herders and challenging counter patrols by the Royal Bhutanese Army.

A permanent PLA presence in the area would be a significant change to the status quo. Informed speculation suggests that these may house either civilian contractors brought in from Tibet to oversee construction projects in the area, Tibetan or Chinese citizens brought across the border, or they could even be barracks for the PLA to help facilitate increased patrols in these contested areas.

3. Menchuma Valley

Amid the sustained activity in the west of Bhutan, we are seeing similar levels of activity mirrored in the northern contested areas in Jakarlung, Pasumlung and the Menchuma Valley, a well-known entry point into Tibet for Bhutanese pilgrims.

In May 2021, a team of researchers led by Robert Barnett from the London School of Oriental and African Studies discovered three additional villages in these contested areas, alongside a series of infrastructure projects, sitting between 3km and 5km south of the Chinese border in Bhutan. Barnett identified what appears to be police and military posts near these villages, as well as a communications tower.

While the building efforts at Doklam are seen as having a geopolitical intent towards India, these villages and their locations are seemingly aimed to maximize China’s leverage over Bhutan. They are considered sacred in Tibetan Buddhist teachings as the birthplace of ancient Himalayan cultural heroes, with strong links to the Bhutanese royal family. Today they are the home to holy sites and temples, such as the Singye Dzong.

For China to intrude on this area, and in some cases even deny entry to parts of it, is suppression of Bhutanese history, culture and traditions. By design or by default, Beijing is managing Tibetan religion and culture beyond the borders of the Tibetan Administrative Region.

Why a more inward-looking China is bad news for the world economy Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2022

The increased role of geopolitics and ideology in Beijing’s economic decision-making is bad news not just for China but for the world.

This quote by President Xi clearly outlines the inward tilt of Chinese economic policymaking that is now becoming increasingly obvious to the rest of the world. But it actually has deep roots. Ever since the 2008 global financial crisis, when the West’s reliability as a trading partner was thrown into question, self-reliance has become a more decisive organizing principle for Chinese officials.

As a result, the export-dependent growth model on which China built its economic rise in recent decades has been fraying. Exports as a share of China’s GDP peaked at 35 per cent in 2007 but had fallen to around 20 per cent by last year, a level not seen since before China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. This shows that net exports no longer make any meaningful contribution to Chinese GDP growth.

Although China’s inward tilt may have started out as a response to purely economic phenomena – the post-crisis global recession, belt-tightening in the West, the eurozone crisis, and a general softening of global trade growth in the post-crisis years – geopolitical considerations are now dominant in shaping this shift toward self-reliance.

The role of geopolitics in pushing China towards a more inward-looking development path became clear in China’s response to the aggressive tariffs and export controls introduced by the Trump administration in the US. Because of these new constraints on China’s access to international markets and technology, Beijing sought to limit its dependence on the rest of the world.   

The most obvious result of this was the introduction of the ‘dual circulation’ strategy in May 2020, which sets out a rebalancing of China’s economy away from a reliance on external demand as a stimulus to growth (‘international circulation’) towards increased self-dependence (‘domestic circulation’). 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided another geopolitical impetus to China’s pursuit of self-reliance. Since it is not far-fetched to think that China, like Russia, might one day also face coordinated sanctions, Chinese authorities must be thinking hard about how to respond to such a risk. 

The only credible strategy that China can adopt is to reduce its economic dependence on the West by creating, in effect, a kind of economic fortress, as its dependence on imported technology, food, and fossil fuels in particular, has created a substantial strategic vulnerability.

Over the next few years, Chinese policymakers will likely attempt to build up the country’s ability to supply its own semi-conductors, food, and green energy sources.

This new approach to economic policymaking isn’t just about China’s relationship with the rest of the world. Within China itself, a new emphasis on the role of the state is increasingly apparent – and seemingly rooted in ideology. 

The previous National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in October 2017, made a push for ‘stronger, better, and bigger’ state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the past five years have indeed seen a measurable rise in the role that SOEs play in the Chinese economy. These firms now account for more fixed investment in the economy than private firms, for the first time since 2005.

Xi Jinping shows the world he is taking a tougher line Expert comment NCapeling 16 October 2022

Xi opens the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party with a political report which demonstrates both change and continuity in the approach of his leadership.

The 20th Party Congress report is significantly shorter than the 19th, which is a clear indication of Xi’s success in centralizing power. The report acts as a summary of the party’s achievements and its plans – expressed as the lowest common denominator of consensus between competing factions. A shorter political report would seem to represent fewer factions now seeking consensus.

In the 20th Party Congress report, the language on Taiwan has been revised, reflecting the changes in tone and the policies of the CCP senior leadership. In addition to the conventional ‘peaceful reunification’ term, there is also an addition of more hawkish language on Taiwan to ‘not exclude the use of force as a last resort’.

Xi also suggested that ‘resolving Taiwan Question should be in hands of the Chinese’, sending a further warning to the US and other Western allies which are perceived as interfering in Taiwan affairs.

In his remarks, Xi suggested the ‘zero-COVID’ strategy has worked for China although he gave no clear timeline on when the policy will end. He also proposed building a healthcare system able to cope with future pandemics. This implies that China is still in short supply of sufficient healthcare resources to cope with a disease like COVID.

Economic policy reveals anxiety

On economic policy, much of the emphasis is given to the extent to which security and economic growth should go hand in hand, which illustrates Beijing’s deep anxieties on supply chains and the high-tech sector. These supply chains need to become more ‘self-determined, self-controlled’, voicing frustration that the highest value-added elements of the Chinese tech sector remain reliant on overseas suppliers and vulnerable to geopolitical tensions.

Also, he expected the Common Prosperity Initiative will further adjust uneven income distribution to increase the amount of middle-income population. He gave little favours for financial services and fin-tech companies but insisted that China should remain as a manufacturing-led economy with qualitative growth. That implies Beijing will tolerate much slower growth so long as the income gap between the rich and poor is closing.

On foreign affairs, Xi has completely abandoned the ‘new types of great power relations’ – instead he has stressed that China should further develop its ties with the Global South through the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative.

Xi Jinping prepares the Communist party for new reality Expert comment NCapeling 20 October 2022

Political report reflects a worsened economic and diplomatic position as Xi knows his unprecedented third term as leader will be judged on results.

In stark contrast to the aura of triumphant glory that greeted Xi Jinping at the last National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017, this week’s convocation opened with an air of sobriety.

Amid a domestic economic downturn and a return to enmity with Western liberal democracies, Xi offered his own recipe for party legitimacy and the country’s economic survival in the lengthy executive summary of his political report to the CCP congress. The prime keyword was security, with some 73 mentions, underscored with a message of self-reliance.

The periodic report acts as a summary of the party’s achievements and of its future plans, with both expressed as the lowest common denominator of consensus between competing voices in the CCP. It thus typically sheds some light on relationships among senior party members and insights into the political fortunes of important intraparty groups.

Most portions of the new report combined Xi’s personal preferences with concessions to the reality of what is necessary for China’s economic survival. Both ends point to an urgent prioritization of economic and political self-reliance for Xi’s third term as party general secretary.

Holistic concept of security

On the domestic front, much emphasis was given to enhancing national security and promoting equitable growth.

Since even before COVID-19, Xi has advocated a holistic conceptualization of security that includes food, the internet, energy and manpower. Reflecting Beijing’s deep anxieties about high-tech development and its frustrations with dependence on overseas suppliers vulnerable to the vagaries of geopolitical tensions, the political report noted the need for China’s supply chains to become more “self-determined and self-controlled.”

Xi, though, went further to stress the importance of improving scientific education and grooming and attracting the necessary talent to accelerate China’s quest to achieve breakthroughs in semiconductor production and overcome development choke points created by Western technological monopolies.

As China has traditionally relied on connectivity with the rest of the world to support innovation and attract talent, a turn toward autarky is not a viable option, given Xi’s technological priorities. Yet the renewed mention of his ‘dual circulation’ strategy in the report signals that Beijing is indeed turning to domestic consumption and homegrown technological prowess as the means to provide the rising wealth that the Chinese people have come to expect from the Communist Party.

Worsening Sino-US relations and tightening access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted party leaders not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but have also forced them to reconfigure their approach to foreign affairs.

Judging by his report summary, Xi has completely abandoned the ‘new type of great power relations’ concept used repeatedly in the last two editions of his congressional update to refer to his preferred approach to relations with the US-led West.

The omission shows that Beijing has concluded that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is here to stay, with little prospect of improvement soon. To this end, China needs to prepare for the worst of decoupling and become more self-reliant in terms of markets and technologies.

In place of the discarded concept, Xi stressed that China should further develop its ties with the global South through the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative he announced earlier this year. These efforts aim to reshape the global governance agenda in multilateral forums and to project Beijing’s influence on the developing world.

Meanwhile, the party’s latest official rhetoric about the Belt and Road Initiative shows it is no longer a one-size-fits-all slogan but on its way to becoming a genuine tool of trade and investment promotion with China’s near neighbors but with provincial governments taking the lead rather than Beijing.

With the central government grappling with the country’s domestic economic woes, its spending spree on development assistance has had to come to an end. The new political report clearly signals this change.

A modern socialist society is still the aim

The current economic downturn and dangerous geopolitical tensions have not dented the CCP’s ambitions to build a modern socialist society by 2035 and thus join the world’s club of upper middle-income countries, but this is easier said than done.

The G20 will survive but needs major repair Expert comment NCapeling 15 November 2022

Russia’s attack on Ukraine is the biggest challenge to the existence of the G20 since its foundation.

The leader-level version of the G20 was founded in 2008 to coordinate the international response to the global financial crisis across advanced and major emerging economies.

At the outset it was judged a great success. The 2009 London Summit demonstrated a high degree of unity among the world’s largest economies on a comprehensive action plan to tackle the crisis.

The group’s subsequent performance has disappointed. Particularly during the pandemic and the Donald Trump presidency in the US, the group made only a limited additional contribution to policies which national governments were pursuing in any case.

Nonetheless, its members continued to see it as an essential forum without which it would be even harder to tackle a growing list of global economic challenges. This faith was partly repaid when, following the election of the Joe Biden administration in the US, agreement was reached on the $650 billion special drawing rights (SDR) general allocation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in summer 2021.

Impact of the war in Ukraine

Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine earlier this year, leading western members of the group called for Russia to be suspended from the G20 as Russia’s action ran directly against the key principles of the rules-based international system on which the G20 was founded.

Western countries also walked out of meetings of the G20 Finance Ministers’ and International Monetary and Financial Committee this spring rather than sit at the same table as Russian representatives.

This contrasted with 2014 when Russia was suspended indefinitely from the G7 for its takeover of Crimea but no action was taken against it in the G20.

However, China and India, supported by several other emerging economies declined to suspend Russia, creating a standoff which could have resulted in a rapid collapse of the G20, particularly as its informal structure means that, in contrast to the international financial institutions (IFIs), there are no legal principles or procedures to determine how to address such a situation.

It appears the West has now concluded (rightly) that the G20 is too important as a forum for working with China and the other major emerging economies to be allowed to disappear.

This is likely to be because there are no straightforward alternatives. The G7 is too narrow to fill the role and China is now highly unlikely to attend a future G7 Summit as a guest. The boards of the IFIs are not equipped to coordinate across institutions, which is a vital role of the G20, and the United Nations (UN) system does not offer the scope, speed, leader-level engagement, or flexibility of the G20.

Moreover, as evidenced by the chair’s summary of the third G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ meeting in July, once the group gets past the dispute over how to handle Russia, there is a worthwhile agenda of issues which can be agreed on.

As the 2022 president of the G20, Indonesia has been determined to produce a final communique for the leaders’ summit and it looks increasingly like this will be achieved, even though it was impossible to agree concluding statements for some earlier G20 ministerial meetings.

The key will be to deal with the differences over Ukraine between the West and emerging economies with a short opening paragraph reflecting both views. This would then be followed by a consensus text on all the areas where the two groups do agree.

Russia is unlikely to play a disruptive role as preserving its membership of the group will be its key objective, and it will not want to undermine support among other emerging economies by blocking issues that all agree on.

However, even with a final communique achieved, returning to a fully functioning agenda setting, coordination, and decision-making role for G20 will be very challenging, particularly while the war in Ukraine continues.

Tackling sovereign debt distress should be a top priority

There are critically important issues on which G20 action is urgently needed. Top of the list is the acute problem of sovereign debt distress. Some 60 per cent of low-income countries are now judged to be in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress.

But the existing G20 approach for tackling debt distress in low-income countries, the ‘Common Framework’, is progressing far too slowly, and there is no agreed mechanism for handling the growing list of emerging economies in debt distress.

Without tackling debt distress, it is extremely hard to see how it will be possible to generate the vast flow of private sector climate finance necessary to help the developing world progress to net zero.

And yet the G20 is one of the few forums in which a high-level approach to debt distress can be defined because China – along with the IFIs and the western-based private sector – is a key player in any solution.

Urgent repairs needed

However, there is a critical lack of trust among G20 participants which, although in part a reflection of the disagreements over handling Russia, is also about longer-term factors such as the growing geopolitical tensions between China and the US on trade and investment in high tech.

An example of how this has played out was the action China and India took at the Rome G20 Summit in 2021 in blocking Italy’s efforts to establish a new ministerial task force designed to address the threat of future pandemics – a subject which all G20 countries agree is important.

Russia and China in Antarctica: Implications for the Five Eyes 15 December 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 December 2022 Online

This event explores Russia’s and China’s postions on the Antarctic and offers a critical assessment of their actions in the region.

Ever since the 1959 Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), signed at the height of Cold War, Antarctica has remained a demilitarized continent.

Today, even though the ATS is not in immediate danger of collapse, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are no longer insulated from wider geopolitical tension, with China and Russia posing challenges to regional governance. 
 
This event also discusses key recommendations for the Five Eyes regarding Russian and Chinese current and future efforts at undermining the ATS and Antarctic governance. 

The discussion is informed by Mathieu Boulègue’s paper ‘Russia and China in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean: Implications for the Five Eyes’ published by the Sea Power Centre of the Royal Australian Navy.

Review: The Cultural Revolution still haunts China The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

Tania Branigan’s searching ‘Red Memory’ reveals the costs to Chinese society of not addressing that upheaval’s lingering injustices, writes Nathan Law.

Red Memory: Living, Remembering and Forgetting China’s Cultural Revolution
Tania Branigan, Faber, £20

The Cultural Revolution, a decade-long socio-political upheaval initiated by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966, caused as many as two million deaths and reshaped China. Under the influence of Mao’s personality cult, an entire nation was mobilized to purge the ‘reactionary elements’ in society and the Chinese Communist Party through public denunciation and demolition of traditional heritages.

Children turned on their parents; pupils murdered their teachers, and those who survived the summary public trials were often banished – as a young Xi Jinping himself was, living in a cave for seven years, after his father fell from favour.

Impossible moral choices

In her engaging and sensitive narrative account of the revolution’s upheaval and its consequences, Tania Branigan, the Guardian’s China correspondent between 2008 and 2015, speaks to some of those who survived those terrible years, considers their impossible moral choices and explores the far-reaching legacy of the revolution in present-day China.

Mao urged the party to cleanse itself of its ‘class enemies’: ‘capitalists’ such as landowners and shopkeepers, but also artists, farmers and university professors. Often their family members were tainted by association and persecuted. Branigan captures the awful sense of intimate betrayal and tragedy nowhere more than in the testimony of Zhang Hongbing, a lawyer turned zealous Red Guard.

Zhang denounced his mother, a hospital worker, as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ because her father owned land. She was eventually executed but not before her son struck her twice during her arrest to show his party loyalty. ‘What I did to my mother was worse even than to an animal,’ the remorseful Zhang tells Branigan.

Zhang points out that his actions were far from uncommon: ‘The whole country was doing it.’ This unreconciled sense of betrayal and fear still blights China: ‘Our society is ethically hollow. If we trace these problems to their roots, we are likely to find them in the Cultural Revolution,’ one survivor is quoted as writing.

Branigan encapsulates the difficulties around reconciliation and remembering in the story of Song Binbin. As a schoolgirl in 1966, she and two classmates were the first to pin up a poster attacking teachers for urging students to focus on their work instead of the revolution. Song’s classmates then beat the school vice principal Bian Zhongyun to death in the playground. The case was never properly investigated, and the death was dismissed as an accident.

The pain of remembering

In 2014, Song apologized publicly for the poster and expressed a sense of guilt for not intervening on Bian’s behalf. But Bian’s widower rejected the apology. Song did not speak to Branigan herself, instead allowing her friends to speak in her defence. ‘They had spoken of truth and reconciliation, but not once of justice. Every remark brought them towards closure, not accountability,’ Branigan writes.

The inability to come to terms with the past pervades the book, most of whose interviewees express feelings of resentment, fear and shame about the Cultural Revolution. I sensed the same emotions when, as a boy, I talked to a neighbour in Hong Kong who was then in his 70s. He escaped from China in the late 1960s due to political and economic strains. He simply nodded and fell silent when I asked him to elaborate.

As Branigan writes: ‘Most Cultural Revolution survivors had learnt to bend with the will of the time; not only to do as they were told but to imply that doing so was their own idea. It was better – safer – to stay silent or lie.’

This collective trauma is exacerbated by official unwillingness to address the past. The Cultural Revolution warrants no more than a few paragraphs in official textbooks with no mention of the suffering it unleashed. Documents of the period that might tarnish the CCP remain unavailable; any attempts to interrogate the Cultural Revolution are condemned as ‘historical nihilism’ by the party.

India-China relations: Is the Quad the answer? Interview NCapeling 28 March 2023

The threat of China’s military aggression is being felt across the world, but this is a phenomenon India has been contending with for decades.

India’s border with China became the site of tense conflict in 2020, which led to India reinvesting in the Quad. Arzan Tarapore discusses key issues from his International Affairs article, such as how India is responding to increased aggression at the border and how a reinvigorated Quad may hold answers to balancing China in the Indo-Pacific.

What have India-China relations been like in the past?

Relations between India and China have varied over the decades. In the years following World War Two there was some hope they would find common cause in their international outlooks but that was quite quickly extinguished with their border war of 1962.

Since then, the two countries have oscillated between detente and tension. It took decades for them to normalize their relations and slowly build trust through several confidence-building agreements.

More recently it seemed the two countries were both willing to set aside their border dispute in order to profit from their burgeoning economic relationship – as, for both, there is no question development and economic growth is the primary national objective.

The question has been the extent to which their unresolved sovereignty and security issues undermine those goals as, at the same time, they both began paying more attention to the security of their territorial claims.

China in particular matched its explosive economic growth with startling military modernization and assertiveness. Its long-standing military doctrine and terrain advantages means it relies heavily on quality military infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau and it has accelerated the pace of those infrastructure upgrades and expansion.

In the 2010s, India belatedly began to improve its own transport infrastructure near the border, which threatened to reduce China’s military advantages. The earlier quiet on the border began to crack and China began launching border incursions with increasing frequency and scale.

This was a dynamic, iterative process, with incursions prompting India to accelerate its infrastructure development, which in turn probably prompted more incursions by China.

What happened around 2020 to change their relationship?

The cycle of competitive security policies on the border reached a tipping point in 2020 with Chinese incursions at multiple points simultaneously in Ladakh, apparently designed to establish a new status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian and Chinese-controlled territory.

The Indian political leadership played down the incursions but both Indian and Chinese militaries rushed to reinforce their positions near the border. They held multiple rounds of military talks which made halting progress.

On 15 June 2020, a skirmish resulted in the loss of 20 Indian troops, and an unknown number of Chinese troops. In the weeks that followed, both sides further reinforced their positions in a scramble to gain positional advantage.

How has India responded to China’s increasing military might?

The Indian government’s response to the Chinese landgrab was to threaten the entire bilateral relationship. In a reversal of decades of policy, it argued China had demolished the painstakingly constructed confidence-building measures on the border, and so the relationship could not continue as normal until the border crisis was resolved.

It imposed new restrictions on Chinese investment in India – even as overall trade continued to increase – and adopted a more assertive diplomatic posture.

Strategically, the 2020 border crisis had two major effects. First, it reinforced the Indian proclivity to see its northern borders as the primary threat to Indian national security.

India has heavily reinforced the border, reassigning some major formations and making numerous new investments in military capability to manage the threat. The significance of this however is that, in the context of budget scarcity, these military improvements come at the cost of potential increases in India’s capability in the Indian Ocean region – ultimately a more consequential zone of competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The Indian government may yet change course and reallocate resources for power projection but, at this stage, I see no evidence of that.

The second major strategic effect of the crisis was to unleash Indian cooperation with its partners, especially the US and the reinvigorated Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

India has generally avoided formal international alliances, and the Quad was in hiatus for years – why has India invested in it now?

India had always been mindful not to embrace external partners too closely so as to maintain its freedom of action and to not provoke a Chinese reaction. But since the Ladakh crisis, New Delhi has a newfound willingness to work more closely with the US, Japan, and Australia – because it calculates correctly that these partnerships enhance its freedom to act, and that China has already adopted the aggressive posture India feared.

It is important to note however that the border crisis was not the only driver of India’s strategic adjustment. The crisis coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic which highlighted to India the ineffectiveness of existing international institutional arrangements.

For New Delhi, then, the twin crises of Ladakh and the pandemic stressed the need for new international arrangements, and the Quad offered the best combination of agility and capability to meet the most pressing challenges of the Indo-Pacific region.

What do the Quad partners hope to achieve in their renewed partnership?

Beginning in 2021, the Quad assumed far greater significance. The first national leader summits happened – which have since continued at regular intervals – and its members have all agreed to a continually expanding agenda of work.

It seeks to provide international public goods, and everything from climate action to telecommunications regulations. Critically, it has limited its security role to some niche and relatively unprovocative areas, such as humanitarian assistance and maritime domain awareness – issues which benefit the Indo-Pacific as a whole and do not intensify security competition. It has certainly eschewed military cooperation.

Interestingly, the four Quad countries have also separately accelerated their military cooperation, bilaterally, trilaterally, and even quadrilaterally. But that cooperation lies outside the formal mechanisms of the Quad.

What impact will these Quad actions have on Chinese aggression and the Indo-Pacific region?

This Quad approach, which I call ‘zone balancing’ in my article, is specifically designed to build the capacity and resilience of regional states, and to not inflame dyadic security competition.

The relatively uncompetitive character of these activities helps to deflate Chinese claims that the Quad is an antagonistic new bloc, and to ameliorate southeast Asian states’ concerns over the potential intensification of strategic competition.

But the Quad’s agenda is not fixed and not bounded. It has expanded year on year and may continue to extend into new areas. This gives it a degree of flexibility and coercive leverage as Beijing cannot be confident about the Quad’s future direction.

This slate of activities has a lot of utility in building the Quad’s regional legitimacy and habits of cooperation among its members. But it conspicuously does not address the region’s most pressing security challenges.

It is not, in its current form, equipped to manage the challenge of territorial disputes or aggression. So the Quad will not address India’s unresolved border dispute with China, potential crises over Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

I would argue, however, that the four members of the Quad have unparalleled advantages of capacity and geography. With further military cooperation, even outside the formal structures of the Quad, they have the potential to deter Chinese aggression, but that remains subject to their political preferences.

Will other countries in different parts of the world adopt similar balancing strategies?

Zone balancing could be an attractive strategy for other countries which want to either avoid the costs of hard military balancing, or to not provoke their rivals.

It has been used in the past – such as the Marshall Plan during the early Cold War – and I would not be surprised if other countries competing with China, or even China itself, use it.

Chinese supply chains could tip the balance in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 29 March 2023

Disrupting supply chains of critical minerals to those supporting Ukraine could give China a key advantage in its wider international trade competition.

Direct military intervention from China into the war on Ukraine, with Chinese troops and airmen appearing at the front line, would be highly escalatory and highly unlikely.

Equipping Russia with weapons and equipment is much more likely – if indeed it hasn’t already happened – and considering the West is supplying armaments to Ukraine, a joust with western technologies would be an interesting development to follow.

But if Chinese weapons underperform in the heat of battle, this may have implications for the current situation with Taiwan and the US, as a poor outcome on the Ukraine front could give the West more confidence over the tensions in the South China Sea. And the use of Chinese weapons in Ukraine would also be a feast for Western technical intelligence to capture.

Creating economic disruption

A much more likely development for China is to put in place export controls on critical minerals for Western powers supplying arms to Ukraine. This is a significant lever which China has used before during its fishing dispute with Japan in 2010 when hi-tech industrial production in Japan was affected by shortages of China-sourced critical minerals. Once normal supplies were resumed, Japan started to stockpile critical mineral reserves.

In October 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) passed a new statute enabling – when necessary – restriction of critical mineral supplies to third party nations intending to use them for defence and security applications, adding a ‘versatile weapon to Beijing’s arsenal’ in its trade competition with the US.

That legal control has been applied to Lockheed Martin production of Taiwan-bound F-35s and it applies not only to critical minerals mined on the Chinese mainland, but also to Chinese-controlled enterprises within international supply chains, of which there are many.

Responding to any such restrictions by opening up new mines and setting up new supply chains can take more than a decade, so the countries involved may need to start stockpiling critical materials as Japan has been doing since 2010.

Commodity markets also need to be ready for some interesting price wobbles – a persistent problem in critical minerals extractives investment as is overcoming environmental, social, and governance (ESG) challenges in this new game of global supplies.

In addition, those markets include the London Metal Exchange, now owned by Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing whose biggest shareholder is the Hong Kong government which is struggling to operate with complete independence from Beijing.

Splitting the West’s consensus

By extending the thinking on China’s potential to throttle global critical mineral supply chains and the ensuing latency of extraction from new mining resources, progress to the Paris Agreement 2050 goals on climate change will inevitably be affected.

Given there are no supply chain assurance mechanisms, such as distributed ledger technologies, in place within global mining supply chains, a key issue to overcome would be how the West assures China that critical mineral supplies are not destined for military applications.

But if China’s default position becomes a total refusal to supply client nations unless end-to-end assurances can be achieved to prove non-military use, the West’s aspirations regarding the Paris 2050 goals will certainly be put in jeopardy, or even made unachievable.

Epoxide hydrolases (EHs) have been characterized and engineered as biocatalysts that convert epoxides to valuable chiral vicinal diol precursors of drugs and bioactive compounds. Nonetheless, the regioselectivity control of the epoxide ring opening by EHs remains challenging. Alp1U is an α/β-fold EH that exhibits poor regioselectivity in the epoxide hydrolysis of fluostatin C (compound 1) and produces a pair of stereoisomers. Herein, we established the absolute configuration of the two stereoisomeric products and determined the crystal structure of Alp1U. A Trp-186/Trp-187/Tyr-247 oxirane oxygen hole was identified in Alp1U that replaced the canonical Tyr/Tyr pair in α/β-EHs. Mutation of residues in the atypical oxirane oxygen hole of Alp1U improved the regioselectivity for epoxide hydrolysis on 1. The single site Y247F mutation led to highly regioselective (98%) attack at C-3 of 1, whereas the double mutation W187F/Y247F resulted in regioselective (94%) nucleophilic attack at C-2. Furthermore, single-crystal X-ray structures of the two regioselective Alp1U variants in complex with 1 were determined. These findings allowed insights into the reaction details of Alp1U and provided a new approach for engineering regioselective epoxide hydrolases.

The QT interval is a recording of cardiac electrical activity. Previous genome-wide association studies identified genetic variants that modify the QT interval upstream of LITAF (lipopolysaccharide-induced tumor necrosis factor-α factor), a protein encoding a regulator of endosomal trafficking. However, it was not clear how LITAF might impact cardiac excitation. We investigated the effect of LITAF on the voltage-gated sodium channel Nav1.5, which is critical for cardiac depolarization. We show that overexpressed LITAF resulted in a significant increase in the density of Nav1.5-generated voltage-gated sodium current INa and Nav1.5 surface protein levels in rabbit cardiomyocytes and in HEK cells stably expressing Nav1.5. Proximity ligation assays showed co-localization of endogenous LITAF and Nav1.5 in cardiomyocytes, whereas co-immunoprecipitations confirmed they are in the same complex when overexpressed in HEK cells. In vitro data suggest that LITAF interacts with the ubiquitin ligase NEDD4-2, a regulator of Nav1.5. LITAF overexpression down-regulated NEDD4-2 in cardiomyocytes and HEK cells. In HEK cells, LITAF increased ubiquitination and proteasomal degradation of co-expressed NEDD4-2 and significantly blunted the negative effect of NEDD4-2 on INa. We conclude that LITAF controls cardiac excitability by promoting degradation of NEDD4-2, which is essential for removal of surface Nav1.5. LITAF-knockout zebrafish showed increased variation in and a nonsignificant 15% prolongation of action potential duration. Computer simulations using a rabbit-cardiomyocyte model demonstrated that changes in Ca2+ and Na+ homeostasis are responsible for the surprisingly modest action potential duration shortening. These computational data thus corroborate findings from several genome-wide association studies that associated LITAF with QT interval variation.

Business Briefing: Assessing the geopolitical implications of EU AI regulation 17 September 2024 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 August 2024 Chatham House

Join us for this critical discussion of how the EU AI Act will shape the world’s approach to the technology.

Join us for this critical discussion of how the EU AI Act will shape the world’s approach to the technology

Governments, technology companies and civil society groups across the world are now advocating firmer AI regulation. Machine learning algorithms have changed the way we interact with technology and powered much of our online lives for decades: why has this pendulum swung back so far toward greater control, and why now?

In 2023 the UK government seized the initiative with its Bletchley AI Safety Summit. The event attempted to address the so called ‘frontier risks’ associated with AI development. Global competition on AI is reflected in AI governance efforts in China, US, the Gulf and beyond. But to date, it is the EU that has led the West in passing AI legislation. The EU AI Act, has separated AI systems into graded risk categories carrying different regulatory requirements, and it remains to be seen whether global AI will feel the Brussels effect.

This conversation will cover the following questions:

• Critics have painted regulation including the AI Act as anti-innovation. Is this a fair assessment?
• What lessons can we learn from the successes and shortcomings of GDPR?
• How do we tackle the challenge of low public trust in AI and low public trust in government technology projects, particularly in Western democracies?
• Does the proliferation of safety institutes, and the AI office, point to the emergence of a new type of technical governance institution? What is its future?

What is the future of cross-border data flows? 16 September 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

Navigating long-standing tensions and newfound difficulties for unlocking shared prosperity among modern, digital economies.

Cross-border data flows can unlock shared prosperity among digital economies, advance international security, and address cybercrime and global crises. But ensuring the free flow of data across borders involves navigating complex regulatory, security, trust, political, and technical challenges. Developing effective frameworks and agreements to support data flows is a significant undertaking.

Recent bilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives have advanced data-sharing, respecting the right to privacy and upholding notions of sovereignty. This has contributed to clearer rules and (potentially) better solutions such as the OECD declaration on government access to data held by companies. Further progress, supportive of public safety and national security, is on the horizon, like G7 support for data free flow with trust and industry-led, trusted cloud principles on protecting human rights and competitiveness.

More work is needed to operationalize commitments and advance ongoing negotiations, like US–EU negotiations on e-evidence in criminal proceedings. This is key for ensuring ‘hard’ legal and regulatory mechanisms complement OECD principles. Stakeholders from law enforcement, national security, data protection and industry must confront tensions between sovereign prerogatives and cooperation. They must also overcome traditional silos between law enforcement and national security work. On the horizon are newfound challenges (for example, in harmonizing legal frameworks and responding to advances in technology). All the while, stakeholders must work together to promote economic interests, data protection, privacy and cybersecurity.

This expert panel discusses the future of cross-border data-sharing, raising questions including:

• What value does cross-border data-sharing bring and where are its current ‘pain points’?
• To enable data free flows, how should principles complement ‘hard’ legal and regulatory mechanisms?
• Beyond states, law enforcement, major industry players and international organizations, what roles should SMEs, the technical community and civil society stakeholders play in shaping and operationalizing principles?
• Looking ahead, where is progress in data-sharing principles and arrangements expected or possible?

A drinks reception follows the event.

This event is supported by Microsoft as part of a project on data sharing. The project has benefited greatly from the insights of a multi-stakeholder taskforce and concludes with an open-access special issue of the Journal of Cyber Policy.

A world in transition and the future of the global workforce 15 October 2024 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 22 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

How are migration and global megatrends shaping international labour?

As the fallout of 2024’s ‘Election Super-Year’ becomes clearer, international policymakers and business leaders must now equip themselves to face the challenges and opportunities of the three key transitions that will dominate the next few decades: the journey toward a greener and healthier world; the transition to a more technologically adept society; and the development of a secure and productive economy for all.

The adaption and evolution of the global workforce is an essential component of all three of these transitions and therefore a prescient analysis of how migration, workforce policies and modern technology trends will impact this ecosystem is essential.

Upskilling the workforce will no doubt remain a key focus for stakeholders. But the question remains, how do these plans move beyond the ‘ideas-phase’ and become policies that will keep pace in the fast-paced, modern and digital workplace?

It may prove harder than ever for these ideas to come to fruition, with the rise of populist and nationalist political thinking fragmenting the balance between local and international labour. Indeed, this often leads to reduced attractiveness of skilled foreign labour in domestic markets.

This puts global business in a very powerful position though, as companies can play an important role in readdressing these narratives, shaping the future of workforce policies and using examples of best practice to improve access, mobility and ultimately economic productivity, for the benefit of all.

Through this event, in partnership with EY, the panel analyses how migration, skills development agendas and global megatrends, such as technology, sustainability and the global economy, will shape developments in the years to come.

A networking breakfast precedes this event, served between 0800 and 0900 BST.

Director’s Briefing: Assessing foreign policy challenges for the next US president 5 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

This briefing will explore what challenges might await the winner of 2024 US presidential election.

As the 2024 US Presidential election draws closer, the future direction of American foreign policy seems ever more uncertain. Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential candidate, appears to be embracing many of Biden’s policies, but she brings a different background, and most likely a different team, so change is likely.  Donald Trump has more well-known views on foreign policy, but the context for a second Trump administration would be very different than the first.

The next U.S. President will be confronted a world in need of leadership with two major wars, a more assertive and capable China, a climate crisis, ungoverned technological change, emerging powers that demand a seat at the table, and debt distress across much of the developing world.

Please join us for this critical conversation covering:

• How will US-China strategic competition and the threat of conflict over Taiwan challenge US policy makers?
• What are the risks and challenges posed by Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
• How does war in the Middle East and the threat of regional escalation shape US foreign policy?

Member’s question time: Is Russia losing the South Caucasus? 22 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 September 2024 Online

Join us and ask Chatham House Senior Research Fellow, Natalie Sabanadze anything about the situation in the Caucasus. Submit your questions in advance.

Whilst Russia focuses on its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the situation at its southern border is evolving. Relations between the three states in the South Caucasus and Moscow have never been easy as Russia tried to maintain its dominance by leveraging vulnerabilities, playing one side against another to keep conflicts simmering and even engaging in open military aggression.  Although the violence seen in the 1990s and early 2000s has abated, the war in Ukraine has had an indirect impact on the region, bringing a change to the status quo.

Russia abandoned its long-standing support for Armenia, allowing for the collapse of Nagorny-Karabakh and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with the backing of Turkey. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as a dominant regional player with Baku recently declaring its interest to join BRICS.  Turkey’s influence has grown, while Armenia frustrated by Russia’s change of heart has been turning cautiously towards the EU and the US.

In Georgia, meanwhile, the ruling party has been consolidating its grasp on power, rolling back democratic reforms and pivoting away from the West. Georgia’s long-awaited European integration process has been suspended, following the adoption of the Russian-style foreign agents legislation.

Join us as our Senior Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme answers your questions in this quick-fire session assessing the extent to which the Russian influence has changed since the start of the invasion of Ukraine and who is there to fill the vacuum; how geopolitical contestation in the region is going to impact aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and much more.

Submit your questions to Natalie Sabanadze in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.

Making the circular economy work for global development: how the UN Summit of the Future can deliver 23 September 2024 — 6:15PM TO 9:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2024 Online

This policy roundtable focusses on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.

As the world looks beyond the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) towards the post-2030 era, integrating the principles of the circular economy into the future global development agenda becomes imperative.  

A new Chatham House research paper about the role of the circular economy for the SDGs and their possible extension into the post-2030 development agenda will be launched in September 2024 during the UN Summit of the Future and the New York Climate Week. The paper outlines the rationale for the integration of circular economy goals into for the next crucial phase of international development and how to meet net-zero 2050 targets. It provides actionable recommendations on international cooperation mechanisms for policymakers and stakeholders at the UN Summit for the Future in 2024 and beyond.

The aim of the roundtable is to bring together stakeholders and leaders from intergovernmental organisations, business, governments and civil society. The focus of the roundtable meeting is: 

• Reflections on the Summit of the Future and the role of circularity for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.
• Discussion on key aspects of the institutional arrangements and international coordination that are needed for a globally coordinated approach to achieve an inclusive circular economy that supports SDG implementation. 
• Development of joint strategies on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy as a follow-up from the Summit of the Future.

The objective is to emerge from the roundtable with a clearer roadmap for translating the recommendations for international coordination into concrete actions, with a shared commitment to driving meaningful change on the international level.

The event is co-hosted by Chatham House and partners from the Global Circular Economy Roadmap initiative including the African Circular Economy Network, the African Development Bank, Circular Change, Circular Innovation Lab, Circle Economy, EU CE Stakeholder Platform, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Institute of Global Environmental Strategies, Sitra, UNIDO, World Business Council on Sustainable Development, World Economic Forum and the Wyss Academy for Nature.

Further background information is available on the initiative website.

More speakers to be announced.

In conversation with Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK 17 October 2024 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

The former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine offers insight into the evolution of Russia’s war against his country, and what to expect next.

More than two and a half years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Ukraine has consistently adapted to Moscow’s advances by implementing new strategies.

Ukraine’s recent incursion into Russia’s Kursk region demonstrated operational tactical ingenuity, surprising both Russia and Ukraine’s Western supporters. Success against the Russian Black Sea Fleet has already showcased how Ukraine can skilfully beat back Russian aggression. And increasing numbers of targeted strikes on Russian supply depots and airfields are disrupting Russian operations behind the front lines.

Critical Western supplies continue to resource Ukraine’s military. But questions linger over the quantity and sustainability of these supplies. Kyiv will be watching the US presidential election in November as its biggest backer goes to the polls with the possibility of an outcome that could seriously affect the war. Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to edge forward in Donbas, despite heavy casualties, and strike at Ukrainian towns and cities from the air, demonstrating that President Putin has no intention of relinquishing the fight.

Amid these complexities, Ambassador Zaluzhnyi will discuss how the war is changing both sides, advances on the battlefield, and what dangers lie ahead for Ukraine in the coming months. Other key questions include:

• What kind of enemy is Russia today and how to secure its strategic defeat in Ukraine;
• How have new strategies, such as the recent incursion into the Kursk region, affected the state of play on the battlefield?
• What technologies and armaments does Ukraine need from its Western allies in both the short and long term?

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The 2024 US Election: Global Consequences 26 September 2024 — 5:30PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 September 2024 Online

This webinar explores what is at stake for US policy in key regions around the globe.

In the lead up to the 2024 US presidential election, Chatham House experts discuss:

• What is at stake for US policy towards China, Europe, and Latin America and what challenges will confront the next US president?

• Can the US lead when its partners and allies are continually dissatisfied by the new turn in its trade and economic policy?

• What are the core humanitarian challenges and how can they be addressed?

US domestic polarization and implications for the presidential election 30 September 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 September 2024 Online

This webinar explores the rise of polarization amongst the US public and implications for the upcoming election.

Domestic polarization has been on the rise in the US in recent years, with Democrats and Republicans moving further away from the centre on key policy issues. As polarization increases, so too do concerns about the state of US democracy and prospects of political violence surrounding the upcoming presidential election. 

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• What are the driving forces of the growing political divide in the US?
• How far apart are voters on key election issues, from healthcare to immigration to national security?
• How is partisan polarisation altering the effectiveness of US foreign policy and influencing America’s role in the world?

Looking ahead to the 2024 US Presidential Election 2 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

This panel explores the state of the US presidential election following the vice presidential debate.

With only weeks to go, this panel looks at the state of the 2024 US presidential election.

Harris and Trump are campaigning to drive up voter enthusiasm and bring undecided voters to their side.

What are the key issues shaping voter’s preferences and how may this impact voter turnout? What can we expect in the weeks ahead?

Shaping modern Britain: the role of African and Caribbean communities 24 October 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

As part of Black History Month, this event celebrates the enduring contributions of African and Caribbean communities to the UK.

When British colonial rule ended, newly independent countries in Africa and the Caribbean retained influences such as the English language and governance systems modelled on that of the UK. Initially, these post-independence relations were largely marked by the UK’s soft power, shaping the nation-building processes in these regions.

Over time, however, this influence has become a two-way exchange. African and Caribbean cultures have profoundly shaped modern Britain – from music and food to sports, arts, literature and beyond. These evolving dynamics have not only enriched the UK’s cultural landscape but also provided significant benefits for diaspora communities, fostering a sense of belonging and promoting cultural exchange. Diaspora groups and civil society organizations have adeptly utilised these connections to advocate for their communities and advance their interests.

At this event, speakers will explore how African and Caribbean influences rose to prominence in the UK and how this cultural momentum can be harnessed to build stronger, forward-looking partnerships. By highlighting the shared histories and more vibrant present-day exchanges, this event will explore how these ties can be used to break down stereotypes, promote social cohesion, and contribute to a more inclusive future.

This event forms part of our series of events celebrating Black History Month, including a photo exhibition and drinks reception.

Civilian priorities for ending the war in Sudan 31 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Dr Abdalla Hamdok, former prime minister of Sudan and chairperson of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadum), will discuss the prospects for conflict resolution in Sudan.

The intensification of fighting across Sudan demonstrates that both warring parties and their allies are continuing to pursue an outright military victory in the war, with little regard for the human cost. Diplomatic efforts, including the US-led Geneva talks in August, have produced little progress towards a ceasefire.  Meanwhile, the conflict has resulted in widespread devastation, mass displacement, and an escalating hunger crisis.

Civilian perspectives on ending the war, their vital efforts in providing lifesaving humanitarian assistance, and the aspiration of many Sudanese for a more inclusive and democratic Sudan, have been sidelined by the interests and actions of the belligerent parties.

At this event, Dr Abdalla Hamdok will discuss options for reaching a ceasefire and seeking a peaceful political resolution to the conflict. He will also address the urgent need for an international response to what has become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must ‘register interest’ in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Monday 28 October at 15:00.

Is the world ready for the next pandemic? 29 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

In a joint event with The Elders, Helen Clark, Ban Ki-moon and other experts discuss the policies needed to prevent the next health catastrophe. A drinks reception will follow this event.

The world faces multiple interlinked existential threats such as pandemics and the climate crisis, exacerbated by conflict and extreme poverty. However, the multilateral system is failing to respond with sufficient urgency or impact. As the fifth anniversary of the COVID-19 pandemic approaches, Chatham House and The Elders will discuss the risk of a general slide into complacency. 

Amid the expanding outbreak of mpox in Africa, rich countries continue to withhold stockpiled mpox vaccines. The failure to release the required amount is contributing to the diseases spread across the continent. 

Meanwhile, the Pandemic Accord negotiations are in overtime, with nations unable to reach agreement over concerns around sovereignty and resource distribution in any future pandemic. Similarly, a proposal to include a UN Emergency Platform in the recent Summit of the Future to strengthen the multilateral response to complex global shocks was shelved due to political deadlock.

Can the world learn from past mistakes and break the cycle of panic and neglect? In today’s fractious and polarized geopolitical context, what would it take for leaders to do what’s necessary? And why is it so critical to have equity at the heart of any sustainable global response?

Join Chatham House for this event in which the panel discuss key questions including:

• Five years on from COVID-19, who is showing global leadership today in preparing for future pandemics?
• Are international organizations and institutions fit for purpose to respond to pandemics in a multipolar geopolitical environment? How can they best adapt?
• What can be done to clarify and detoxify current debates around sovereignty to improve global pandemic prevention, preparedness and response?

Dilated cardiomyopathy (DCM) is associated with mutations in cardiomyocyte sarcomeric proteins, including α-tropomyosin. In conjunction with troponin, tropomyosin shifts to regulate actomyosin interactions. Tropomyosin molecules overlap via tropomyosin–tropomyosin head-to-tail associations, forming a continuous strand along the thin filament. These associations are critical for propagation of tropomyosin's reconfiguration along the thin filament and key for the cooperative switching between heart muscle contraction and relaxation. Here, we tested perturbations in tropomyosin structure, biochemistry, and function caused by the DCM-linked mutation, M8R, which is located at the overlap junction. Localized and nonlocalized structural effects of the mutation were found in tropomyosin that ultimately perturb its thin filament regulatory function. Comparison of mutant and WT α-tropomyosin was carried out using in vitro motility assays, CD, actin co-sedimentation, and molecular dynamics simulations. Regulated thin filament velocity measurements showed that the presence of M8R tropomyosin decreased calcium sensitivity and thin filament cooperativity. The co-sedimentation of actin and tropomyosin showed weakening of actin-mutant tropomyosin binding. The binding of troponin T's N terminus to the actin-mutant tropomyosin complex was also weakened. CD and molecular dynamics indicate that the M8R mutation disrupts the four-helix bundle at the head-to-tail junction, leading to weaker tropomyosin–tropomyosin binding and weaker tropomyosin–actin binding. Molecular dynamics revealed that altered end-to-end bond formation has effects extending toward the central region of the tropomyosin molecule, which alter the azimuthal position of tropomyosin, likely disrupting the mutant thin filament response to calcium. These results demonstrate that mutation-induced alterations in tropomyosin–thin filament interactions underlie the altered regulatory phenotype and ultimately the pathogenesis of DCM.

In their comment (1) on our publication (2), the authors make two points: (i) they raise concerns about the possible effect of residual NONOate in our study, and (ii) they promote nitrosylcobalamin (NOCbl) supplied by their own company. Both points lack merit for the following reasons. The authors make the astonishing claim that the spectra of nitric oxide (NO•) and cobalamins overlap. Unlike NO•, cobalamin absorbs in the visible region, permitting unequivocal spectral assignment of NOCbl as reported (3). We demonstrated that whereas NOCbl is highly unstable in solution, it is stabilized by the B12 trafficking protein CblC. So even if present, residual NONOate (which is unstable at neutral pH and is removed during the work-up (3)) could not account for the observed difference.The authors then misrepresent our synthetic method, claiming that anaerobic conditions were used to generate nitrocobalamin (NO2Cbl), which results in the transient formation of NOCbl. We synthesized NO2Cbl aerobically using nitrite as described (4); NOCbl is not an intermediate in this ligand exchange reaction. The aerobic instability of NOCbl has been rigorously described by inorganic chemists (3, 5) and raises obvious questions about its purported biological effects as exemplified by the authors' own 2003 JBC publication, which was later withdrawn.As to promoting NOCbl from their company, the authors refer to a synthetic route from a mixture of NO• gas and aquocobalamin. The authors' method (6) has been described as “dubious” by chemists (5). Whereas DEAE NONOate used in our method is widely known as an NO• donor,...

After a thorough read of this paper (1), we wish to clarify that the authors' anaerobic method of synthesis for the production of nitrocobalamin results in the transient formation of nitrosylcobalamin, an unstable intermediate upon exposure to air. We concur that the authors' method results in the production of nitrocobalamin based on the UV-visible data as shown. The authors' adapted anaerobic method consists of mixing hydroxocobalamin hydrochloride with diethylamine NONOate diethylammonium salt in aqueous solution. Of concern, the UV spectrum of nitric oxide overlaps that of all cobalamin species under anaerobic conditions, making any assignments of the binding of nitric oxide to hydroxocobalamin suspect (2). Additionally, the use of acetone to precipitate the authors' product causes precipitation of diethylamine NONOate, resulting in an impure product. As a result, its utility for drawing experimental conclusions is faulty.The product from the authors' anaerobic synthetic method has not been assessed for purity, and the synthetic method itself has not been validated using a stability-indicating method as required by the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) (ICH Q2B, Validation of Analytical Procedures) methodology, which is a hallmark for analytical characterization. Our nitrosylcobalamin synthesis involves reacting nitric oxide gas with hydroxocobalamin acetate as a heterogeneous mixture in a non-electron-donating solvent followed by rotary evaporation. Our nitrosylcobalamin product is stable in air, releases nitric oxide gas in situ (3), and meets ICH stability guidelines (4). Additionally, our nitrosylcobalamin product demonstrates biological activity, which has not been observed for nitrocobalamin (3, 5).

IQGAP1 is a key scaffold protein that regulates numerous cellular processes and signaling pathways. Analogous to many other cellular proteins, IQGAP1 undergoes post-translational modifications, including phosphorylation. Nevertheless, very little is known about the specific sites of phosphorylation or the effects on IQGAP1 function. Here, using several approaches, including MS, site-directed mutagenesis, siRNA-mediated gene silencing, and chemical inhibitors, we identified the specific tyrosine residues that are phosphorylated on IQGAP1 and evaluated the effect on function. Tyr-172, Tyr-654, Tyr-855, and Tyr-1510 were phosphorylated on IQGAP1 when phosphotyrosine phosphatase activity was inhibited in cells. IQGAP1 was phosphorylated exclusively on Tyr-1510 under conditions with enhanced MET or c-Src signaling, including in human lung cancer cell lines. This phosphorylation was significantly reduced by chemical inhibitors of MET or c-Src or by siRNA-mediated knockdown of MET. To investigate the biological sequelae of phosphorylation, we generated a nonphosphorylatable IQGAP1 construct by replacing Tyr-1510 with alanine. The ability of hepatocyte growth factor, the ligand for MET, to promote AKT activation and cell migration was significantly greater when IQGAP1-null cells were reconstituted with IQGAP1 Y1510A than when cells were reconstituted with WT IQGAP1. Collectively, our data suggest that phosphorylation of Tyr-1510 of IQGAP1 alters cell function. Because increased MET signaling is implicated in the development and progression of several types of carcinoma, IQGAP1 may be a potential therapeutic target in selected malignancies.

The Critical Transition: China’s Priorities for 2021 Research paper sysadmin 31 January 2017

This paper sets out the core issues for the Xi leadership, and focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president.

In 2017 Xi Jinping will complete his first full five-year term as China’s leader. Towards the end of the year, in autumn, the country is due to hold its 19th Party Congress. This major meeting usually marks the moment when the Communist Party of China (CPC) assesses its performance over the previous five years, sets out political goals for the coming five-year period and makes new appointments.

Xi Jinping’s leadership has been characterized by a number of significant domestic and international policy strategies. China’s economic growth rate is slowing, and the country’s economy is undergoing major restructuring. Export-led manufacturing growth and capital investment in fixed assets are now being replaced by consumer-led and service-dominated expansion. Meanwhile, the role of the CPC has been rearticulated with a major anti-corruption struggle since 2013 that has sought to clear away a raft of different networks and senior officials and connected business people. Xi has proved a more communicative, more populist and more nationalistic leader than his predecessors. He is also crafting an image of himself as a more visionary leader.

Internationally, China is striving for a relevance and role that it has never had before. Its reach is felt in international organizations, regionally, and through its economic and resource needs. It has a role in global affairs that embraces places once considered on its periphery, such as Latin America, the Arctic and Antarctic Circles, and the Middle East. Its impact in Asia is particularly striking, marked by activity in the South China Sea, and a new kind of relationship with Russia, India and the US. The major Belt and Road Initiative, in particular, has started to outline a new expansiveness in China’s relations with the outside world, despite the largely abstract nature of its overall shape and form at the moment.

The themes and viewpoints in this collection of essays are particularly geared towards those with an interest in policy engagement with China. While setting out the core issues for the Xi leadership, it also focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president. As the UK seeks a new kind of relationship with a rapidly changing China, this group of expert opinions maps out the key markers in the run up to 2021, when China is due to celebrate achieving the first of its centennial goals: the delivery of middle-income status and a moderately prosperous society.

A Digital India Must Embrace the Circular Economy Expert comment sysadmin 15 January 2018

A growing amount of e-waste should draw attention to the broader sustainability of a digital society.

The latest Global E-Waste Monitor places India as one of the highest contributors to global e-waste, generating over 2 million metric tonnes in 2016. Posing serious health and environmental risks, growing e-waste represents the hidden cost of increasingly digital lives in an information society.

With just 33 per cent of the population owning a smart phone, India already has the second largest number of smart phone users in the world, nearly 4 times that of the United States. The amount of e-waste generated will exponentially increase in the coming decade as the cost of consumer electronics decline, middle-class incomes rise, and the frequency at which devices are discarded increases.

As governance instruments are increasingly digitized and industry re-repositions itself to leverage Industry 4.0 solutions, the generation of e-waste will become a byproduct of institutional choices rather than consumer consumption and behaviour alone.

India is already a leader in the management and recycling of e-waste. But over 90 per cent is managed in the unorganized sector by small businesses and individual entrepreneurs, typically from low-income marginalized communities, and often women. E-waste contains various toxic substances such as mercury and lead, prolonged exposure to which can lead to major health problems.

Almost 80 per cent of e-waste workers in India suffer from respiratory ailments due to improper standards and nearly 500,000 children are engaged in e-waste collection without adequate protection and safeguards. The bulk of the dirty and dangerous work supporting India’s march towards an increasingly digital society is done by those who have the least access to technology gains. Government regulations for the management of e-waste, on the other hand, are becoming more relaxed, presumably as a result of industry pressure. To streamline e-waste management, the government notified Electronic Waste Rules in 2011, based on the concept of extended producer responsibility (EPR).

EPR makes manufacturers of electronic products responsible for the end-of-life management of their products, including setting up collection centres. By shifting the burden to manufacturers, the EPR framework, in theory, creates incentives for more environmentally friendly design. But the impact of EPR rules on manufacturers has been minimal, at best. The recently released Draft Notification (2017) by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change further relaxes the EPR rule by reducing the e-waste collection targets for industries.

While the efficiency and productivity gains of Digital India are to be welcomed, growing e-waste should draw attention to the broader sustainability of a digital society. Data centres, for example, are one the largest contributors to global warming, contributing a similar amount to global greenhouse emissions as the aviation industry.

This amount is expected to triple in the next decade. In many ways, the sustainability challenge is a ‘wicked problem’ – where possible solutions create a new set of additional challenges and the choice between available alternatives is largely about competing values.

For example, data centres powered by renewable sources of energy such as solar provide a greener alternative, but will also create new forms of e-waste in the form of photovoltaic cells and panels. An unverified estimate suggests that India’s projected solar capacity of 100 gigawatts by 2022 will create 7.76 million tonnes of e-waste. Without adequate and preemptive consideration of how this waste should be disposed and recycled, renewable energy solutions can create new negative externalities.

For Digital India to be sustainable, we need to develop anticipatory knowledge for preemptive solutions. It is an opportune moment to think of the broader architecture of a digital society, one that avoids getting locked into unsustainable models of production and consumption, as is the case with many industrialized economies.

The argument that such considerations are premature for India, given high levels of poverty and unemployment, are misplaced. Enquiries into the sustainability of Digital India are no less urgent than the need for sustained job-creating economic growth. These issues should not be addressed in a sequential or linear manner, but in parallel, or else we will be only partially aware of available choices and their consequences, creating new forms of technological and economic lock-ins.

The value-based choice demanded by the ‘wicked problem’ at hand is one that embraces the idea of a circular economy — one that departs from the linear economic growth model predicated on ‘take, make, dispose’ to embrace a growth model based on creating closed loops of production, consumption and re-use. A circular economy model is built on the idea of designing out waste and pollution; keeping products and materials in use; and regenerating natural systems. In many ways, India is already a leader in the circular economy.

Alongside, the management of e-waste and other forms of recycling, high levels of repair and reuse are distinctly observable. A number of reports note that the informal waste management sector in India works better than systems in many industrialized economies.

A circular economy vision for Digital India would include organizing informal waste management systems, including safety and social protection initiatives for workers; revising and tightening existent e-waste rules for increased accountability by manufacturers both in terms of durable design and responsible disposal; green data centres; and building future smart cities with a view towards energy and water efficiency, among others.

A recent report by the Ellen McArthur Foundation and the World Economic Forum also estimates that a circular economy path to development could bring India annual benefits of $624 billion by 2050. Greenhouse gas emissions could also be 44 per cent lower in 2050, compared with current development path.

Unsurprisingly, Nordic countries are leading the way in promoting the idea of a circular economy. Sweden recently announced tax breaks for repair related activities and Finland hosted the first global conference on the circular economy earlier this year. The circular economy provides an opportunity for India to capitalize and leverage an already existing culture of circular activities, and promote it as a policy agenda that will create new forms of employment while facilitating sustainable environmental management.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

India Budget 2018: Who are the Biggest Winners and Losers? Expert comment sysadmin 2 February 2018

Any claims to boost farmers’ prospects will inevitably be seen as political, coming ahead of a series of key elections. But this budget recognises India’s most pressing concerns - and seeks to address them.

In 2016 India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, pledged to double farmers’ incomes by 2022. While the pledge may have been aspirational, reliant on good weather as much as government policy, the 2018/19 budget demonstrates the depth of the government’s commitment to the agriculture sector.

There’s clearly a political edge to any moves to bolster agriculture: any solace to rural India will be described as political opportunism until most people in India are not engaged directly or indirectly in the agricultural sector.

And with a number of state elections coming up this year and a general election next – suggestions that it will be brought forward have increased in volume since the budget – a politically-astute budget is unsurprising. At the same time, there is a real sense of crisis in Indian agriculture which the budget is attempting to ameliorate.

Significant hike in infrastructure spending

The budget – which has Keynesian undertones – announces both direct and indirect support for rural India; it increases significantly the price at which the government purchases agricultural produce, and offers a range of further support through initiatives in areas such as irrigation. Furthermore, there is a significant hike in spending on infrastructure – roads, railways, ports and waterways – with a major allocation for rural infrastructure.

While government spending on infrastructure had been growing, the 2018/19 budget appears to accept that innovative funding models to fund rural projects are unlikely to work – instead, rural highways will have to be funded from overall taxation, as is generally the norm.

The other bold initiative focuses on healthcare. One hundred million poor families (so around half a billion Indians in total) will receive up to Rs500,000 for medical care under a health insurance programme. Given the correlation between ill health and poverty, this should have implications for the economy as well as healthcare itself. At the moment poverty effectively excludes many Indians from private healthcare.

Education too received a boost, with several proposals including teacher training. There have long been concerns over the quality of Indian education. In particular, even where schools exist physically, teachers themselves are absent.

As is often the case with India, the question will be in the implementation. While there are bound to be hiccups, the current Indian government does appear to realise the need for on-the-ground, visible change.

The recent state election in Gujarat demonstrated that while the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is clearly favourite to win another term, it is not invulnerable. If the changes do not reach the “last mile”, then they will accrue neither the economic nor the political benefits.

The downsides? Increased taxes will raise inflation, potentially exacerbated by sustained government borrowing; a 20% rise in customs duty will affect imports of mobile phones (though benefit domestic producers and encourage other foreign firms to set up manufacturing plants in India) and some of the revenue projections appear optimistic.

On balance though, this is a budget that recognises the most pressing challenges which India faces, and attempts to provide solutions to them.

This article was originally published in The Independent.

Managing Risks Along the Belt and Road 27 March 2018 — 8:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 5 March 2018 Chatham House, London

China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ offers potential benefits in connectivity, infrastructure and trade, through significantly increased Chinese engagement across many different countries. However, many of these countries face internal tensions and have relatively underdeveloped market structures, legal systems and governance frameworks. While Belt and Road investments can make positive contributions in host countries, there is also the potential for these investments to exacerbate tensions and risks.

This roundtable, held in partnership with the Security & Crisis Management International Centre (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences-UNITO), will seek to examine risk management along the Belt and Road, differentiating between roles that can be played by public sector and private sector actors.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Arguments Over Innovation Capacity Miss How Much the US and China Are Intertwined Expert comment sysadmin 30 May 2018

Most discussions of current US–China trade tensions fundamentally misrepresent the globalized nature of innovation.

Among the many issues at play in the ongoing economic and trade tensions between the US and China are questions of technological capability and innovation.

Two of the main complaints in the US Section 301 report were that American companies have been forced to transfer technology to China and been the subject of cyber espionage. The presentation of the issues in this report has been disputed, but behind it lies concern in the US that Chinese innovative and technological capability is catching up with that in the US, thanks partly to the support of state policies set out in the Made in China 2025 initiative.

One important feature of the package of measures announced by the US last month is that it was designed to contain China’s technological development as much as to reduce the trade deficit, even though the latter has been the focus of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric.

(Some have cast doubt on this picture of Chinese innovation, suggesting that China is more of a ‘fat tech dragon’ whose massive inputs into research and development do not translate into real innovative capacity.)

The problem with the debate comparing Chinese and American technological capability is that it misunderstands or misrepresents the globalized nature of innovation in today’s world.

Contrary to the economic nationalist rhetoric emanating mainly from Washington, and to a lesser extent from Beijing, the US and China are not two separate economies competing for economic hegemony. As part of the globalization of manufacturing and production over the last 40 years and the more recent globalization of consumption, the shape and structure of innovation has also changed.

As we argue in a new paper, the key to understanding this is to think of innovation as being carried out through global or transnational networks linking economic actors, not within separated economies. What the recent phase of globalization has demonstrated is that innovation is achieved most effectively and efficiently when those engaged in innovation are connected not just within national borders but across them.

China has become integrated into these global innovation networks in ways which reflect its relative strengths and weaknesses in research and development. China’s extensive manufacturing ecosystem has enabled its companies to perform well in production-related and efficiency-driven innovation. Moreover the rapid growth in its large and dynamic consumer market provides fertile ground for consumer-related innovation by Chinese and foreign-invested enterprises alike. The rapidly increasing talent pool in China also provides additional human capital for innovation and technology.

Apart from the increased emphasis by Chinese enterprises on innovation, multinationals have also been stepping up their research and development (R&D) efforts in China. These now consitute a significant part of China’s R&D landscape, and are an increasingly important part of the global innovation by multinationals.

Things are of course changing. China’s overall innovation capacity is improving, and there are concerns in both in the US and Europe that Chinese policy is moving backwards towards the promotion of ‘indigenous innovation’ – or self-reliant innovation – and away from openness. In other words, we may be seeing a more ‘techno-nationalist’ China as well as a protectionist US.

China has also been criticized for inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, though the establishment of special courts for such disputes marks a commitment to improve – and the rights of Chinese companies increasingly need protection too.

As the benefits of globalization increasingly come under question, and with some degree of nationalist political pressure in both the West and China, it is not going to be possible – or politically desirable – to do away with national borders when it comes to innovation. But at the same time, the extent to which businesses and consumers have globalized means that fully ‘indigenous’ innovation is not possible, even if it were politically desirable.

EU-China innovation relations, as well as those between Washington and Beijing, therefore need careful management. But both Americans and Europeans should have more confidence in their innovation capability, given the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chinese innovation.

Americans and Europeans should acknowledge and promote the opportunities that come from globally networked innovation processes. Taking advantage of the comparative advantage of all the players in these networks means working with China as an innovation partner.

China: End of the Reform Era 20 July 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The speaker will argue that China’s reform era is ending, and that core factors which characterized it - including political stability, ideological openness and rapid economic growth - are unravelling.

Since the 1990s, Beijing’s leaders have firmly rejected any fundamental reform of their authoritarian one-party political system, even as a decades-long boom has reshaped China’s economy and society. On the surface, their efforts have been a success, but Carl Minzner says a closer look at China’s reform era reveals a different truth.

He outlines how over the past three decades, a frozen political system has fuelled both the rise of entrenched interests within the Communist Party and the systematic underdevelopment of institutions of governance among state and society at large. Economic gaps have widened, social unrest has worsened and ideological polarization has deepened.

The speaker will discuss how China’s leaders are attempting to address these looming challenges, including institutional reforms and a shift back towards single-man rule. The speaker will also consider the question of regime stability given that China’s era of ‘reform and opening up’ is ending and there is now a renewed uncertainty over Beijing’s future.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Mobile Ecosystems as a Driver of Innovation and Growth in the Asia-Pacific 19 September 2018 — 12:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

China Needs to Make the Belt and Road Initiative More Transparent and Predictable Expert comment sysadmin 29 April 2019

The global infrastructure project must move beyond mish-mash of opaque bilateral deals

As China welcomes dozens of world leaders to Beijing for its second Belt and Road forum, it has one simple aim: relaunching President Xi Jinping’s controversial global infrastructure drive.

Since it began five years ago, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sunk hundreds of billions into port, railway and power projects stretching from south-east Asia to central Europe. But its path has been bumpy, drawing sharp criticism over the ruinous debts that some countries have racked up amid Chinese largesse.

Xi will stress sustainable financing and transparency this week, amid the usual talk of ‘win win’ cooperation. Yet BRI’s problems are structural, not presentational. For any pledges to be meaningful, China must move beyond its present mish-mash of opaque, bilateral deals.

After bad headlines last year, BRI has in fact enjoyed a good run in recent weeks. Malaysia announced it would resume a previously cancelled high-speed rail project, while Italy’s decision to join up last month marked a further European incursion. Indeed, if attendance is any guide to success, BRI looks in fine fettle. The first forum in 2017 attracted 29 world leaders. China says 37 will turn up this week. Phillip Hammond, UK chancellor, arrives hunting deals too, just a day after news that Chinese technology group Huawei will be allowed to help build 5G networks in Britain.

Even so, three interlinked problems remain at the heart of President Xi’s pet project, all of which must be addressed if BRI is to move beyond the pitfalls that have damaged its reputation.

The first and most obvious is debt. Critics allege that China ‘traps’ its BRI partners financially, often pointing to a debt-for-equity deal that handed China control of a port in Sri Lanka. These claims are exaggerated — few other projects have ended up this way. Yet poorer nations from Laos to Tajikistan are still signing up to vastly expensive Chinese schemes that offer poor value for money while straining their public finances.

The second problem is transparency. Despite its grand scale there is still no reliable list of BRI projects, no disclosure of the lending standards China follows, nor even the amount China has invested. Beijing claims more than $1 trillion; independent estimates suggest perhaps a few hundred billion. Either way, it will be hard for China to convince doubters on debts until it is open about the criteria it uses in deciding who to lend to and why.

BRI’s third and most important challenge is its muddled organization. Despite BRI’s image as a centrally run mega-project, China has allowed many deals to be struck locally, via a mix of state-backed companies, public sector banks and freewheeling regional governments. And it is here that the problems began.

Infrastructure deals are notoriously complex, especially for transnational projects like high-speed rail. Renegotiations are common, even for experienced bodies like the World Bank. Yet BRI has repeatedly seen terms negotiated behind closed doors, in countries such as Malaysia and Pakistan, come unstuck in the face of public outcry.

Rather than seeking to trap others with debt, China’s central government more often has to step in to fix dubious projects agreed by underlings lower down the chain.

These negotiations go one of two ways. Either China’s partners complain and win terms, as was true in Malaysia and in Myanmar over a multibillion-dollar deep-sea port. Or, as in the case of Sri Lanka, the renegotiations go in China’s favour, but at the cost of accusations of debt trickery. In both cases China looks bad.

Speaking last year, Xi responded to criticism of BRI by describing it as ‘an open platform for cooperation’. Yet, so far, he has proved resistant to the step that would deliver on that vision — namely turning BRI into an institution with open standards and international partners.

The reasons for his reluctance are obvious. Ending BRI’s reliance on loose bilateral deals would limit Beijing’s room for geopolitical manoeuvre. Yet what might be lost in political flexibility could easily be gained in economic credibility, while avoiding some of the painful renegotiations that have dogged many BRI projects.

At a time when China’s economy is slowing and its current account surplus is shrinking, formalising and institutionalising, BRI could also help avoid wasting scarce public resources on white elephant projects. China even has an easy template in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Beijing-based institution that has won plaudits for its project quality and openness since it started in 2016.

Whichever model is chosen, a dose of Chinese-style central planning is called for, along with more openness. Without it, the oddly chaotic and decentralised model pioneered in BRI’s first five years is unlikely to help the project thrive over the next five.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-24 – Workshop 2 24 September 2019 — 9:00AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the UK strategic and policymaking communities to explore British perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024.

The roundtable took place at Chatham House in London. The report below contains a summary of the discussions.

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The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-20 – Workshop 1 11 September 2019 — 10:00AM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 East-West Center, 1819 L St., NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036, USA

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the US strategic and policymaking communities to explore American perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the East-West Center in Washington D.C.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Satu Limaye, Vice President and Director of the East-West Center in Washington, DC.

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Development Prospects in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of the Asian Development Bank 25 September 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The speaker will discuss development prospects in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Europe and the UK. He will outline prospects for the region’s growth, the impact of the current US-China trade conflict as well as other challenges faced by the region. He will also discuss the future role of the Asian Development Bank and how it plans to support the further development of the region.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives to 2024 - Workshop 3 17 October 2019 — 9:30AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2019 Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 27 rue de la Procession, 75740 Paris Cedex 15, France

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the French strategic and policymaking community to explore French perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the Institut français des relations internationals in Paris.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Céline Pajon, Research Fellow, Center for Asian Studies, Institut français des relations internationals.

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