u.s.

U.S. Intervention in Russia-Saudi Impasse Isn't Tenable (Radio)

Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, former National Security Council advisor, and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, discusses the oil market plunge, and the Russia-Saudi relationship. Hosted by Lisa Abramowicz and Paul Sweeney.




u.s.

Armed Rebel Groups Lobby in D.C., Just Like Governments. How Does That Influence U.S. Policy?

Armed rebel groups push for funding and recognition, and often get it.




u.s.

Beyond Trade: The Confrontation Between the U.S. and China

Could China and the US be stumbling down the path Germany and the United Kingdom took at the beginning of the last century? The possibility will strike many readers as inconceivable. But we should remember that when we say something is “inconceivable,” this is a claim not about what is possible in the world, but rather about what our limited minds can imagine.

My answer to the question of whether we are sleepwalking toward war is “yes.” 




u.s.

How did COVID-19 disrupt the market for U.S. Treasury debt?

The COVID-19 pandemic—in addition to posing a severe threat to public health—has disrupted the economy and financial markets, and prompted a strong desire among investors for safe and liquid securities. In that environment, one might expect U.S. Treasury securities to be the investment of choice, but for a while in March, the $18 trillion market…

       




u.s.

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




u.s.

The U.S.-China Relationship is at a Crossroads

Joseph Nye writes that some decoupling of interdependence is likely, particularly in areas related to technology that directly affect national security. But will Washington and Beijing go too far?




u.s.

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




u.s.

Joseph S. Nye: U.S. and China Need a More Cooperative Security Stance

Joseph S. Nye: U.S. and China Need a More Cooperative Security Stance




u.s.

So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




u.s.

A U.S.-Egyptian Relationship for a Democratic Era


INTRODUCTION

A year after President Hosni Mubarak’s fall, U.S.-Egypt relations are at an all-time low. Not, as many expected, because of the rise of Islamist parties, but because America’s longtime allies in the Egyptian military have whipped up anti-American sentiment at a feverish pace. It may have started as a political ploy, a way to build support on the street and highlight the army’s nationalist credentials, but the generals soon lost control. In January, the Egyptian government announced that sixteen Americans—including the son of a top U.S. official— would be put on trial, facing up to five years in prison. Their apparent crime was working for American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and Freedom House—that offered support, funding, and election monitoring for Egypt’s uneven transition.

On March 1, the Egyptian government lifted the travel ban on seven Americans who were still in Egypt, allowing them to leave the country. A major diplomatic breach was avoided, giving the impression that the crisis had been resolved. This appears to be the interpretation of the Obama administration, which waived congressional conditions on military aid, citing the importance of maintaining a “strategic partnership” with Egypt.2 However, the charges against the Americans remain, and there is no sign that the American NGOs in question will be able to reopen anytime soon. More importantly, the vast majority of affected NGOs—which are Egyptian rather than American—still find themselves on trial and under attack.

The NGO episode, however worrying it is on its own, reflects something larger and more troubling: the slow descent from the national unity of the revolution to a fog of paranoia, distrust, and conspiracy theorizing. Who is with the revolution, and who isn’t? The roots of the problem lie in the uncertainly inherent in Egypt’s muddled transition. Unlike in Tunisia, where the Higher Committee for the Achievement of Revolutionary Objectives (HCARO)—accepted as legitimate by all of the country’s main political forces—was responsible for managing the transition, Egypt has featured various competing actors claiming their own distinct sources of power. The struggle for legitimacy between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated parliament, and the protest movement has created a fragmented political scene. Everyone wants to lead the transition, but no one wants to take full responsibility for the results.

Downloads

Authors

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters
     
 
 




u.s.

A Series of Unfortunate Events: A Crisis Simulation of a U.S.-Iranian Confrontation


The potential for confrontation between the United States and Iran, stemming from ongoing tensions over Iran’s nuclear program and western covert actions intended to delay or degrade it, remains a pressing concern for U.S. policymakers. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy hosted a one-day crisis simulation in September that explored different scenarios should a confrontation occur.

The Saban Center's new Middle East Memo, A Series of Unfortunate Events: A Crisis Simulation of a U.S.-Iranian Confrontation, authored by senior fellow Kenneth M. Pollack, presents lessons and observations from the exercise.

Key findings include:

• Growing tensions are significantly reducing the “margin of error” between the two sides, increasing the potential for miscalculations to escalate to a conflict between the two countries.

• Should Iran make significant progress in enriching fissile material, both sides would have a powerful incentive to think short-term rather than long-term, in turn reinforcing the propensity for rapid escalation.

• U.S. policymakers must recognize the possibility that Iranian rhetoric about how the Islamic Republic would react in various situations may prove consistent with actual Iranian actions.

Download » (PDF)

Downloads

Image Source: © Fars News / Reuters
      
 
 




u.s.

The Military Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War and Options for Limited U.S. Intervention


The crisis in Syria continues with no end in sight, and in the Saban Center's latest Middle East Memo, Breaking the Stalemate: The Military Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War and Options for Limited U.S. Intervention, Saban Center Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack argues that until there is a breakthrough on the battlefield, there will be no breakthroughs at the negotiating table.

In his paper, Pollack lays out the military advantages and disadvantages of both the opposition and the regime's forces, and looks at how different opportunities for U.S. intervention can affect those critical dynamics. This analysis provides a much-needed counterpoint to the debate over the possible cost of U.S. options in Syria with an analysis of their likely impact on the conflict.

Highlights include:

  • The strengths and weaknesses of the opposition, including: greater numbers, a history of deprivation of political power, the aid of Islamist militias affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups, and support from Arab and Western countries.
     
  • The strengths and weaknesses of the regime, including: motivation to defend against a determined majority, a geographic advantage, the remnants of the Syrian armed forces, help of foreign contingents like Hizballah, and the support of foreign countries like Iran and reportedly Russia and China.
     
  • Options for U.S. interventions to break the stalemate, including:
    • Training and equipping the opposition.
    • Stopping the resupply of the regime in order to diminish its ability to generate firepower.
    • Attacking regime infrastructure targets, such as military bases, power-generation plants and transportation choke points like bridges.
    • Establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone.
    • Engaging in a tactical air campaign against regime ground forces.

Downloads

Image Source: © George Ourfalian / Reuters
      
 
 




u.s.

Hard Road to Damascus: A Crisis Simulation of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation Over Syria


Last September, as part of its annual conference with the United States Central Command, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution conducted a day-long simulation of a confrontation between the United States and Iran arising from a hypothetical scenario in which the Syrian opposition had made significant gains in its civil war and was on the verge of crushing the Assad regime.  

The simulation suggested that, even in the wake of President Rouhani’s ascension to power and the changed atmosphere between Tehran and Washington, there is still a risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation between the two sides.

This new Middle East Memo examines the possible U.S. foreign policy lessons that emerged from this crisis simulation, and stresses the importance of communication, understanding the Saudi-Iran conflict and the difficulty in limited interventions. 

Downloads

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters
      
 
 




u.s.

U.S. South China Sea policy after the ruling: Opportunities and challenges

In spite of the legal complexities of the South China Sea ruling, the verdict was widely seen as a victory of "right" over "might" and a boost for the rules-based international order that the United States has been championing. In reality, the ruling could also pose profound challenges for the future of U.S. South China Sea policy under the Obama administration and beyond.

      
 
 




u.s.

U.S. priorities at the Seventh Summit of the Americas


On Friday, April 3, the Brookings Latin America Initiative hosted Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson to discuss the state of inter-American relations and expectations for the Seventh Summit of the Americas to be held on April 10 to 11 in Panama City, Panama. With Cuba in attendance for the first time, this summit will be a chance for the entire region to have a robust conversation on hemispheric challenges and opportunities.

The event began with a keynote address by Assistant Secretary Jacobson, and was followed with a discussion moderated by Richard Feinberg—dubbed the “godfather” of the Summit process for his role in the first Miami Summit of the Americas in 1994—and Harold Trinkunas. This event also launched a new Brookings policy brief by Richard Feinberg, Emily Miller, and Harold Trinkunas, entitled "Better Than You Think: Reframing Inter-American Relations." 

Assistant Secretary Jacobson began her remarks by highlighting the areas where her own thinking coincides with the arguments in this new policy brief. Principally, she argued that developments in the hemisphere over the past few decades have largely been positive for U.S. interests. Although this does not mean Latin America and the United States will agree on everything, she noted that there are many areas of mutual interests on which the United States can work together with Latin America countries as equal partners.

Jacobson explained that this desire to forge equal partnerships based on common values and interests was precisely the notion expressed by President Obama at the 2009 Summit in Trinidad. The upcoming Summit is a chance to showcase this updated architecture for cooperation and partnership, which includes the CEO Summit of the Americas (initiated in 2012) and the Civil Society and Social Actors Forum (new this year).

Key issues for the U.S. at the Summit of the Americas

Assistant Secretary Jacobson outlined the four priorities for the United States going into the Summit:

  • Democracy and human rights: Jacobson stated that the United States “applauds governments around the hemisphere that have supported a more robust civil society role.” The civil society side event provides a critical feedback loop that is one way for leaders to be held accountable by their citizens. Jacobson noted, however, that there remain very real challenges to democracy in Venezuela. While this is something that should concern the entire hemisphere, it is ultimately up to the Venezuelans to resolve.
  • Global competitiveness: The focus of the United States will be on small businesses, which are important job creators but do not always receive the support they need in terms of access to credit or support in job training. The Small Business Network of the Americas has fostered over 4,000 small business development centers, and in Colombia alone has created nearly 6,000 jobs.
  • Social development: Latin America remains the most unequal region of the world. There have been important reductions in poverty and growth of the middle class, but sustained improvements will require economic diversification and targeted efforts to reach vulnerable populations. To address the education deficit in the region, Jacobson highlighted the 100,000 Strong in the Americas program which connects institutions to institutions and seeks to provide students with actionable and employable skills. 
  • Energy and climate change: The high cost of energy prevents some countries from realizing their full potential and feeds migration, poverty, and violence. Sharing in the enormous energy wealth of other nations must be done responsibly and sustainably, noted Jacobson. The Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas and Connecting the Americas 2022 aim to “promote renewable energy efficiency, cleaner fossil fuels, resilient infrastructure, and interconnection.”

U.S. rationale behind targeted sanctions on Venezuela

When asked about flashpoints or problems areas for the United States in the upcoming summit, Jacobson pointed to the sanctions on seven Venezuelan officials and the concern they have generated. However, she was careful to clarify that the executive order used standard language and was in no way a prelude to invasion or a forced regime change. Moreover, she noted that the legislation had been pending in Congress for two years, during which a dialogue between the opposition and government facilitated by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was attempted but stalled. Jacobson explained that it is important to remember that these sanctions are very targeted and do not intend to harm the Venezuelan people or even the Venezuelan government as a whole.

Engagement with Cuba and Brazil

In Jacobson’s view, there are no large systemic issues that stand to block progress at the Summit. She explained that the Obama administration’s greater flexibility on counter-narcotics policies, reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Cuba, and focus on the Trans-Pacific Partnership have removed many historic obstacles.

There remains work to be done, however. Jacobson stated that while interaction at the Summit between President Obama and Raúl Castro will serve to further the relationship and continue momentum for the normalization process, the engagement with Cuba will not deter the United States from speaking out on human rights violations. The administration’s view is that the human rights situation in Cuba is inadequate. Jacobson reiterated the need to respect international norms of human rights and that the United States will continue to support those who peacefully fight for that space to be open.

Finally, she recognized the importance of U.S. engagement with Brazil. According to Jacobson, the United States sees Brazil as a leader on social inclusion, and even on economic competitiveness as it openly debates how to restart economic growth. Though the United States and Brazil do not see eye-to-eye on issues of climate change, she recognized that working with Brazil will be crucial in this area as well.

A desire for cooperation

With a desire to focus on pragmatic approaches rather than ideology, Jacobson expressed an openness to cooperation: “We’re willing to engage with every country in the hemisphere, every country in the hemisphere, any country that wants to partner with us. Because they’re in all of our interests. And that’s the way partnerships should be based, on mutual interests…that’s what makes them durable.”

For more information, check out Latin America Initiative Director and Senior Fellow Harold Trinkunas's blog on the lessons in global governance the hemisphere has to offer.

Authors

  • Emily Miller
      
 
 




u.s.

A new Americas: Taking Cuba off the U.S. terrorism list


President Obama arrived in Panama for the seventh Summit of the Americas with a clear mission: restore the feel-good atmosphere of his first regional summit in Trinidad. There he received plaudits as the first African-American president, a post-unilateralist leader for a more multipolar world. Six years later, and with a complicated record to defend, he had to work harder for the ovations. But his administration’s efforts paid off, and he left Panama a winner. The President’s decision to remove Cuba from the dreaded U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism is further demonstration that Obama is convinced that U.S. interests in Cuba are best served through constructive engagement and not onerous sanctions. Now he must persuade Congress.

First and foremost, the Panama Summit will be remembered for cementing the historic process of normalization of ties between the United States and Cuba launched by Presidents Obama and Raúl Castro on December 17. The Panama meeting offered a chance not only for the rest of the region to ratify Obama’s overture to Castro, but to close the books on the Cold War and open a new chapter in inter-American relations. Bill Clinton led the way on this track in the 1990s, but the train got derailed in the 2000s under George W. Bush. The ghosts of Washington’s heavy-handed past, on matters such as the war on drugs, immigration, counter-terrorism, and the hangover of the “Washington consensus,” returned to haunt Obama’s second summit in Cartagena in 2012. The White House was determined to re-set course before sitting through another series of harangues against the sins of the past by delivering important progress on several policy fronts in the months leading up to Panama. 

No issue was more representative of U.S. bullying in the region than the decades-old embargo against Cuba. When the region’s presidents said they would not come to Panama unless Cuba was invited as a full participant, the White House was forced to fish or cut bait. Correctly, President Obama chose to fish. The breakthrough of December 17 was rewarded with widespread praise by his counterparts and by publics in both the United States and Cuba. The president’s main task for Panama, then, was to deliver a winning message for the first face-to-face meeting in over five decades of hostilities.

Source: REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

No image better captures the competing narratives of the deep historical differences between the United States and Cuba than the one above. The elder Raúl Castro, who does not have to worry about his state-controlled media, plugs his ears to drown out the clamor of journalists asking questions after the two leaders’ first meeting, while the younger Obama is ready to engage the press, a customary stance for leaders in a democracy.

The contrast between old and new continued in the plenary where Obama gave a focused presentation  about moving beyond “the old grievances that had too often trapped us in the past” to a future based on shared responsibility and mutual respect. “We’re looking to the future and to policies that improve the lives of the Cuban people.”

Castro, on the other hand, multiplied his allotted eight minutes of remarks to 48 (to make up for the six summits Cuba was not invited to, he joked) to recount a long litany of transgressions by previous U.S. governments dating back to 1800. He reminded the audience of Washington’s overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Guatemala in 1954 as the precursor to Cuba’s own popular revolution and invoked his brother Fidel in blaming global poverty on the aggressions of colonial and imperialist powers. Remarkably, however, Castro specifically absolved President Obama from any responsibility for such actions, an important gesture that opens the door for more progress. “President Obama is an honest man…I admire his humble origins,” Castro said, and urged others to support his efforts to eliminate the embargo. Castro also said Cuba was prepared to work with the United States on such issues as climate change, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and poverty eradication.

With the removal of Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the last-minute softening of U.S. rhetoric toward Cuba’s chief ally, Venezuela, the Americas may be entering an unprecedented era of peace and cooperation. That leaves respect for democracy and human rights as the chief area of conflict between the United States and Cuba (and a few other countries).

Here again, the contrast between the behavior of pro- and anti-government Cuban activists emerged in sharp relief in Panama. Highly aggressive actions by “official” Cuban nongovernmental organizationss against dissidents from Cuba and Miami, including physical and verbal insults and attacks, were completely out of tune with the modern era of inclusion and respect of independent civil society voices at such meetings. Their orchestrated disruptions of what should have been a robust but civil debate laid bare the real threat Cuba’s rulers face—from its own public tired of the regime’s broken economic system and closed politics—and the heavy challenge they face in opening economically while maintaining political control. President Obama spoke to this issue when he told the press: “On Cuba, we are not in the business of regime change. We are in the business of making sure the Cuban people have freedom and the ability to…shape their own destiny.” The primary way to do this, Obama added, is through “persuasion” and not sanctions. Cuba’s behavior “does not implicate our national security in a direct way,” foreshadowing this week’s decision to de-list Cuba from the terrorism sponsor category.

Cuban officials claim they are practicing a form of popular democracy that is just as legitimate as representative democracy. But few honestly believe this can be squared with core universal norms like free speech and association. For his part, Castro acknowledged that “[w]e could be persuaded of some things; of others we might not be persuaded.” Patience, he added, is needed, signaling yet again that progress toward normalizing relations will be slow. He then proceeded to instruct his closest assistants to “follow the instructions of both Presidents,” a telling reminder of the continued resistance to change from his own bureaucracy. Obama will now have to persuade his colleagues in Congress that Cuba is no longer the threat it was in the past.

Authors

      
 
 




u.s.

U.S. metros ranked by the 5 characteristics of inclusive economies


Ranking U.S. metro areas, or counties, or even countries, by some fixed metric is a straightforward and often useful way to start a deeper dive into a larger body of research. For example, the top 10 counties by share of taxpayers claiming EITC, or the top 10 metro areas by change in prosperity. But what if the phenomenon being measured is more complex, has interacting characteristics that make a top 10 list less useful?

In new research, Brookings Senior Fellow Alan Berube, along with his colleagues at the Metropolitan Policy Program, and John Irons of the Rockefeller Foundation, ask “What makes an economy inclusive?” Inclusive economies, they say, “expand opportunities for more broadly shared prosperity, especially for those facing the greatest barriers to advancing their well-being.” A new Rockefeller Foundation framework identifies five characteristics of inclusive economies: equity, participation, stability, sustainability, and growth.

A typical ranking approach would list the top 10 inclusive economies (or the bottom 10) based on some score derived from data. It turns out, however, that understanding the “trends and relationships that might reveal the ‘big picture’ of what makes an economy inclusive” doesn’t lend itself to typical ranking techniques, and instead requires looking at relationships among the characteristics to ascertain that “big picture.”

Take, for example, equity, defined as: “More opportunities are available to enable upward mobility for more people.” For this analysis, Brookings researchers used 16 discrete indicators—such as the Gini coefficient, median income of less-educated workers as a share of overall median income, and transportation costs as a share of income—to come up with an equity score for each of the 100 largest U.S. metro areas. (Likewise, each of the other four inclusive economy indicators are composites of many discrete indicators, for a total of about 100 across the five.) Looking at equity alone, the top 10 metro areas are:

  1. Allentown, PA-NJ
  2. Harrisburg, PA
  3. Ogden, UT
  4. Scranton, PA
  5. Des Moines, IA
  6. Salt Lake City, UT
  7. Wichita, KS
  8. Grand Rapids, MI
  9. Pittsburgh, PA
  10. Worcester, MA-CT

Top 10 lists can also be fashioned for the other four dimensions in the inclusive economies research, each showing a different mix of U.S. metro areas. For example, the top three metro areas in the growth characteristic are San Jose, CA; Houston, TX; and Austin, TX. For participation: Madison, WI; Harrisburg, PA; and Des Moines. Stability: Madison; Minneapolis, MN-WI; and Provo, UT. And, sustainability: Seattle; Boston; and Portland, OR-WA. In fact, 30 different metropolitan areas are present in the combination of the five inclusive top 10 lists, spanning the country from Oxnard, to Omaha, to Raleigh. The individual top 10 lists for each inclusive economy characteristic look like this:

Because these rankings each impart useful and distinctive information about metro economies, Brookings researchers next combined the data into an overall ranking of the 100 metro areas “based on their average rankings on individual indicators for each of the five inclusive economy characteristics.” Instead of generating a ranking from 1 to 100, the analysis produces a grid-like chart that shows how metro areas fare not only in terms of inclusiveness (top to bottom), but also along a left-to-right spectrum that demonstrates the trade-offs between growth and equity. Here’s a sample from the chart (visit and study the chart here; note that wealth is depicted but by itself is not part of the inclusive economy score):

One thing that stands out when considering this colorful chart against the disaggregated top 10 lists is how unrelated they seem to be. San Jose sits at the upper right position of the chart, suggesting that it ranks as one of the most inclusive metro economies, and yet it ranks only 51st on equity. By contrast, Allentown, PA—on the left of the second row—ranked first in equity, but lower on other measures. However, taken as a whole, both Allentown and San Jose are in the top 20 metro areas overall for inclusiveness. Detroit sits along the bottom row of the inclusiveness chart. Among the five characteristics, it posts its highest rank in growth (37th overall), with much lower ranks in the other categories, even though it ranks 29th for wealth. Las Vegas, NV, is one of the least wealthy metro areas (91st), but ranks 19th in terms of equity.

Berube and Irons point to what they call “a few important insights” about the chart and these data:

  • Judged across all five characteristics, the “most” and “least” inclusive metro economies are geographically and economically diverse.
  • More equitable metropolitan economies also exhibit higher levels of participation and stability. 
  • Growth and equity vary independently across metropolitan areas. 
  • Metro areas with similar performance across the five characteristics may not possess the same capacity to improve their performance.

For more detailed discussion, and the complete inclusive economies chart, see “Measuring ‘inclusive economies’ in metropolitan America,’ by John Irons and Alan Berube.

See also “A metro map of inclusive economies,” showing metro areas that are similar to others in these outcomes.

Finally, download detailed information on the composition of the 100 indicators used to measure the five inclusive economies indicators.

Authors

  • Fred Dews
      
 
 




u.s.

The U.S. Financial and Economic Crisis: Where Does It Stand and Where Do We Go From Here?

INTRODUCTION

The Obama administration needs to focus on executing its existing financial rescue plans, keep the TARP focused on the banking sector, and create a contingency plan should the banking system destabilize again.

Crystal balls are dangerous, especially when it comes to economic predictions, which is why it is important for the administration to chart a path forward. Public policy must remain focused on the very real possibility that the apparent easing in the economy’s decline may be followed by little or no growth for several quarters and there could possibly be another negative turn. One of the risks is that the United States is very connected to the rest of the world, most of which is in severe recession. The global economy could be a significant drag on U.S. growth.

Cautious optimism should be the order of the day. We fear that the recent reactions of the financial markets and of some analysts carry too much of the optimism without recognizing enough of the uncertainty. There remains a lot of uncertainty and policymakers should not rest on their laurels or turn to other policies, even if they look more exciting. It is vital to follow through on the current financial rescue plans and to have well-conceived contingency plans in case there is another dip down.

We propose three recommendations for the financial rescue plans:

  • Focus on execution of existing programs. The Administration has created programs to deal with each of the key elements necessary to solve the financial crisis. All of them have significant steps remaining and some of them have not even started yet, such as the programs to deal with toxic assets. As has been demonstrated multiple times now since October 2008, these are complex programs that require a great deal of attention. It is time to execute rather than to create still more efforts.
  • Resist the temptation to allocate money from the TARP to other uses—it is essential to maintain a reserve of Congressionally-authorized funds in case they are needed for the banks. It would be difficult to overemphasize the remaining uncertainties about bank solvency as they navigate what will remain a rough year or more. The banks could easily need another $300 billion of equity capital and might need still more. It is essential that the administration have the ammunition readily available.
  • Third, make sure there is a contingency plan to deal with a major setback for the banking system. The plan needs broad support within the administration and among regulators and, ideally, from key congressional leaders. We probably won’t need it, but there is too high a chance that we will require it for us to remain without one. The country cannot afford even the appearance of the ad hoc and changing nature of the responses that were evident last fall.
We also give the administration a thumbs-up for their bank recapitalization as well as the TALF program, while they are much more skeptical of the Treasury’s approaches to toxic assets. The authors also believe it is time to focus on the truly mind-blowing budget deficits given the danger that markets will not be able to absorb the amount of government borrowing needed without triggering a rise in U.S. interest rates and perhaps an unstable decline in the value of the dollar, nor do they believe there should be a another fiscal stimulus except under extreme circumstances.

Downloads

      
 
 




u.s.

Why the U.S. needs a pandemic communications unit

When policymakers consider how to respond to a public health crisis, they tend to think in terms of quarantines, medical equipment supplies, and travel restrictions. Yet they too often miss a vital factor that countries like South Korea and Singapore recognized long ago—that public communications are just as crucial. Effective communication increases compliance with public…

       




u.s.

Sanders' great leap inward: What his rejection of Obama's worldview means for U.S. foreign policy


Bernie Sanders may have had no foreign policy advisers until this week, but he can justly claim to have proposed one of the boldest and radical foreign policy ideas of the 2016 presidential campaign. In what he describes as the most important speech of his campaign—on Democratic Socialism at Georgetown University in November 2015—Sanders called on the United States to fight terrorism in the same way it waged the Cold War. He said: “We must create an organization like NATO to confront the security threats of the 21st century” and we must “expand our coalition to include Russia and members of the Arab League.”

NATO was created in 1949 to give the United States a way to forward-deploy its forces so they would immediately be entangled in a war if the Soviets attacked Western Europe. The most important feature of NATO was the mutual defense clause, whereby an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all. In a new NATO to fight terrorism, the United States could find itself having to deploy tens of thousands of troops throughout the Middle East to fight ISIS. The United States may even be treaty-bound to use its troops to fight alongside Russia in Chechnya. 

If that sounds very unlike Bernie Sanders, it's because it is. It is clear from the speech that Sanders had very little idea what NATO actually is or why it was founded. He was looking for a way to pass the burden of fighting terrorism on to other nations, particularly Muslim nations. Lacking any clear idea as to how to do this, a formal treaty must have seemed as good a way as any. Sanders would surely say that he meant an alliance without a mutual defense pact and without the United States taking the lead. But such an organization currently exists—it is called the counter-ISIS coalition. Presidents Bush and Obama also both sought ways to deepen cooperation with Russia and Arab countries on terrorism without a formal NATO-style alliance, which led to the situation Sanders decries. In any event, the new NATO served its purpose. Sanders could later claim to have given a speech on foreign policy. The specifics of the idea went un-scrutinized. 

Mind the gap

Bernie Sanders’ foreign policy remains a mystery because he has said so little about it. Unlike Donald Trump, who has been vocal about his foreign policy views for many decades, Sanders has focused his message on inequality and the nefarious influence of big money in politics. Recently though, he has begun to come out of his shell. He regularly invokes his opposition to the Iraq War in an effort to negate Hillary Clinton’s superior experience in foreign policy. Sanders clearly hopes that this vote will enable him to win over many Barack Obama supporters who remain suspicious of Clinton. In recent weeks, some foreign policy experts have sketched out how Sanders could build on Obama’s foreign policy legacy and distinguish himself from Clinton. 

Sanders-Obama is the real foreign policy fault-line in the Democratic Party.

The conventional wisdom of the foreign policy debate in the Democratic Party sees an Obama wing that is skeptical of military intervention and a Clinton wing that is more willing to use American power overseas. This is a paradigm that Sanders would certainly endorse and hope to capitalize on but it is not an apt description of the 2016 divide. There is a reason why Obama has come close to endorsing Clinton and has left no doubt that he sees her as his true heir. The gap between Sanders and Obama is much greater than between Clinton and Obama. Obama is an avowed globalist who looked outward, even as he was campaigning in Iowa in 2007. Sanders is a liberal nationalist who looks inward, not just in his rhetoric but in his policy. 

A Sanders nomination would be a striking repudiation not just of Clinton but of Obama’s worldview and message. Sanders-Obama is the real foreign policy fault-line in the Democratic Party. 

Obama 2008: Looking outward

Obama’s 2008 campaign is now shrouded in mythology. He is often described as unlikely a candidate as Sanders. Forgotten is the fact that weeks after he started, he secured the support of major donors and dozens of foreign policy experts. He was always the favorite of a particular part of the establishment. He was young but he had thought about the world and America’s role in it. In 2005, he hired Samantha Power to be his foreign policy adviser in the Senate. His 2006 book "The Audacity of Hope" had a chapter on foreign policy that culled ideas from think tank row. 

In April 2007, a full 18 months before the election, Obama gave a revealing interview to The New York TimesDavid Brooks in which he spoke about the influence that American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr had on his foreign policy. Niebuhr was a seminal figure in U.S. diplomatic thinking during the Cold War and is credited with developing the most sophisticated critique of American idealism. Obama said that Niebuhr provided:

“the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I take away...the sense we have to make these efforts knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naïve idealism to bitter realism.”

Some of these themes would reappear in his extraordinary speech in Oslo in 2010 on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. 

Throughout the 2008 campaign, Obama spoke about reviving American leadership and presenting a new face to the world. In his announcement speech in Springfield in 2007, Obama said “ultimate victory against our enemies will come only by rebuilding our alliances and exporting those ideals that bring hope and opportunity to millions around the globe.” In his acceptance speech in Chicago, he spoke to “those watching tonight from beyond our shores”. “Our stories are singular,” he said, “but our destiny is shared and a new dawn of American leadership is at hand.” 

Obama’s challenge in office, and the challenge of progressives after the Iraq War, was to develop a foreign policy that remained faithful to his internationalist ideals while resisting calls for large-scale military interventions. In this, his record was mixed. The Middle East stands out as a major failure but he had successes elsewhere. He helped rescue the international financial system, he deepened U.S. engagement in Asia, he negotiated several trade deals, and he secured a controversial nuclear deal with Iran. Throughout, he articulated a case for a liberal brand of American exceptionalism and for continued U.S. global leadership. 

Sanders 2016: Drawing inward

That is now at risk, not just by the prospect of a Trump presidency but also from within the Democratic primary. Sanders has had remarkable success with a campaign message that is entirely inwardly focused. Read his speeches, whether at Georgetown or on the stump, and you will see a sharp change of tone from Obama of 2008. Gone are the passages on a new era of American global leadership. Gone are the messages for people beyond these shores. Gone is the optimism about America’s global role. Gone too is the sense that the United States, flawed as it is, has a positive and indispensable role to play in upholding the international order. 

Rhetorically, Sanders is deeply pessimistic about the United States and its role in the world. For Sanders, America is not getting better—it’s getting worse, including on Obama’s watch. And, woe betide those who think that America can be any more successful abroad. In his Georgetown speech, he said that the first element of his foreign policy would be an acknowledgement of how America gets it wrong so frequently. In addition to the Iraq War, he mentioned the toppling of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, of Goulart in Brazil in 1964, and of Allende in Chile in 1973. 

[Sanders] offered no examples of how the United States has made the world a better place.

Apart from the ham-fisted description of NATO, he offered no examples of how the United States has made the world a better place. The toppling of foreign leaders is not, for him, even partially balanced out by successes in promoting democracy in Chile in 1987 or in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, or in Indonesia in 1998. He did not mention the Kosovo intervention in 1999, which he actually supported at the time. The speech was not without irony however. Sanders organized the domestic section, on democratic socialism, around Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union speech but made no mention of FDR’s heroic—and frequently risky—efforts to win the war and the post-war world.

As the campaign has progressed, Sanders has been pressed on what he would do if he were to be elected president. He said in a February Democratic debate that the “key doctrine of the Sanders administration would be no, we cannot continue to do it alone, we need to work in coalition.” The very idea that a Democratic candidate could make the unilateralist charge against Obama, one of the most multilateral presidents in modern American history, is itself remarkable and rather implausible. 

The very idea that a Democratic candidate could make the unilateralist charge against Obama, one of the most multilateral presidents in modern American history, is itself remarkable and rather implausible.

But this has not deterred Sanders. He has repeatedly argued that the Obama administration has not done enough to get Muslim nations to fight ISIS. At Georgetown he declared, “We need a commitment from these [Muslim] countries that the fight against ISIS takes precedence over the religious and ideological differences that hamper the kind of cooperation we desperately need.” Quite how Sanders would accomplish this was left unsaid. The reason ISIS is difficult to defeat is because Muslim nations see other challenges, particularly the sectarian struggle with Iran, as a much greater threat to their vital interests. 

Simply saying that the president can will other countries to act contrary to what they see as their vital interests is about as plausible as Trump persuading Mexico to pay for his wall. Clinton has repeatedly recognized the challenges associated with persuading Muslim countries to take on more of the anti-ISIS fight, but Sanders has just doubled down on his charge against Obama. “I’ll be dammed,” he told CNN, “if the kids of Vermont have to defend the Royal Saudi family” and take the lead in the fight against ISIS, even if is just with air power. 

On economic policy, Sanders offers an even more radical departure from Obama’s legacy. Sanders has opposed all U.S. trade agreements throughout his political career, including General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In 2005, he sponsored a bill calling on the United States to withdraw from the World Trade Organization. He has called for tariffs to prevent American industry from investing in China, Vietnam, and Mexico. He was the only Democrat to vote against the Import-Export Bank and he opposed the expansion of the H1-B visa program for high-skilled workers. 

He has offered no positive vision for the world economy and sees it as a zero sum game—either American workers’ win or other nations do. Obama indulged in anti-trade rhetoric, as has Clinton, in the heat of a primary campaign, but Sanders is different. He has consistently sought to disengage from the global economy—the same one that Obama did so much to save in 2009. This is no small matter. As the global economy flirts with recession and a new crisis, this time originating in China, the rest of the world is asking if America can continue to lead or if it is all tapped out. 

He has consistently sought to disengage from the global economy.

A President Sanders would not try to destroy America’s alliances like Donald Trump or leave the Middle East entirely like Rand Paul. But, he would surely try to hide from the world and tend to matters at home. He will be immediately tested by allies and adversaries alike as they try to find the limits of his commitments. All presidents are tested of course—especially those, including Obama and Clinton, who promise to focus on the home front— but they usually try to respond in a resolute way to dispel the concerns. Obama sent additional troops to Afghanistan in 2009, for example. Sanders will probably resist the pressure and focus on his domestic agenda, thus exacerbating foreign crises. He would surely feel a sense of betrayal as America’s allies failed to take up what he considered to be a fair share of the burden. 

America in the world?

2016 is a very different world than 2008. Then, Obama and Democrats saw a world that was full of opportunity, despite the financial crisis and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They believed the United States could offer a new face, and a new form of leadership, to the world. When we look back on 2016, it will surely be the year when the United States and much of the rest of the world faced a choice about whether to look outward or turn inward. It is not just the Republican and Democratic primary. Britain will vote on June 23 whether to leave the European Union. Germany and much of the rest of Europe will decide whether to close its borders to refugees.

When we look back on 2016, it will surely be the year when the United States and much of the rest of the world faced a choice about whether to look outward or turn inward.

Of all these tests, the biggest by far is in the United States. Republican and Democratic foreign policy populism is different, of course. Trump and his supporters are both terrified by threats from overseas and determined to lash out as viciously as possible against anything and everything associated with them. To his great credit, Sanders has not peddled fear of the other. His supporters are not frightened by the world. But they are disappointed in it and largely agnostic about what happens outside the United States. The left used to be inherently internationalist, but today Sanders sees no opportunity to lead, only risks of becoming embroiled in someone else’s problems. Sanders will not tear down the liberal international order but he does want to avoid doing much to uphold it. 

Sanders, his aspiring advisers, and much of the media have an interest in situating his foreign policy worldview within the Obama-Clinton paradigm but it is simply not consistent with what he is saying or with what he has done in the very recent past (never mind decades ago). Obama and Clinton obviously differ on some elements on U.S. foreign policy. It is not about large-scale invasions, as is commonly thought. Clinton is not about to send tens of thousands of ground troops to Syria. Rather, she tends to favor small-scale action early on in a conflict to tip the balance while Obama is extremely cautious about a slippery slope. Clinton also tends to see world politics more in terms of power politics while Obama often speaks as if we are headed toward a post-national, more global system. But this all pales in comparison to fundamental questions about whether the United States ought to be engaged in the world, not just militarily but also economically. Obama was elected on a platform of renewing American leadership in the world. He will soon find out if Democrats want to stay on the broad path he set.

Authors

       




u.s.

The case for reinvigorating U.S. efforts in Afghanistan


President Obama is right to keep at it in Afghanistan, argues a new policy brief by Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research for the Brookings Foreign Policy program.

Some have criticized the president’s decision to maintain a significant troop presence there (5,500 troops), instead of following through on the planned military withdrawal. But Afghanistan remains very important to American security, O’Hanlon contends, and the situation in the country is far from hopeless in spite of recent setbacks. We should reinvigorate American efforts in Afghanistan, he argues—not returning to levels seen in previous years, but ramping up somewhat from our current posture.

O’Hanlon calls Obama’s resolve in Afghanistan commendable, but writes that he and his administration are still making mistakes on U.S. policy toward the war-torn country. He advises that Washington make two specific changes to its military strategy in Afghanistan:

  1. Allow U.S. and NATO airpower to target the Islamic State and the Taliban (currently, they can only fight those groups if directly attacked). The narrow rules of engagement constraining foreign forces were intended to push Afghan armed forces to defend their territory themselves. While a worthy goal, O’Hanlon says, these rules often prevent us from attacking ISIS (though the targeting strategy towards the group may be changing) as well as the Taliban. They also impose unrealistically high demands on Afghan forces and make too fine a distinction between an array of aligned extremist groups operating in the country.
  2. Expand U.S. force presence from the current 5,500 troops to around 12,000 for a few years. In O’Hanlon’s opinion, our current numbers are not enough to work with fielded Afghan forces, and skimping on ground forces has contributed to security challenges in places like Helmand, for instance, which experienced new setbacks in 2015. More broadly, leaders in Washington and Brussels should stress the value of a long-term NATO-Afghanistan partnership, rather than emphasizing an exit strategy. This will signal Western resolve to the Taliban and other groups. While the next commander in chief should set the United States on a gradual path toward downsizing American troops in Afghanistan, he believes it would be a mistake for Obama to do so in the short term.

The long haul

O’Hanlon also argues that the United States needs to take a longer-term perspective on key political and economic issues in Afghanistan. On the economic front, there seems to be little thinking about an agricultural development plan for Afghanistan, associated infrastructure support, and land reform, among other challenges. On the political front, conversations often tend to focus on shorter-term issues like organizing parliamentary elections, reforming the Independent Election Commission, or modifying the current power-sharing arrangement. In the process, conversations about foundational political strategy focusing on Afghan institutions and the health of its democracy get short-changed. The parliament is in need of reforms, for instance, as is the political party system (which should encourage Afghans to group around ideas and policy platforms, rather than tribes and patronage networks).

O’Hanlon concludes that the situation in Afghanistan today, while fraught, is understandable given the Taliban’s resilience and NATO’s gradual withdrawal of 125,000 troops. We should not be despondent, he writes—rather, we should identify specific strategies that can help improve the situation. At the end of the day, Afghans must make the big decisions about the future of their country. But as long as the United States and its partners are still providing tremendous resources—and as long as security threats emanating from South Asia continue to threaten the United States—leaders in Washington should use their influence wisely.

Authors

  • Anna Newby
     
 
 




u.s.

U.S. policy toward South Asia: Past, present, and future


Event Information

May 19, 2016
3:30 PM - 5:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Register for the Event

U.S. policy towards South Asia has changed considerably over the last seven decades. The nature of U.S. engagement with different countries in the region has varied over time, as has the level of U.S. interest. While India and Pakistan have received the most attention from Washington, the United States has also been engaging with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, albeit to different degrees. 

On May 19, The India Project at Brookings hosted a panel discussion exploring the past and present U.S approaches towards South Asia, based on Senior Fellow Stephen Cohen’s new book, “The South Asia Papers: A Critical Anthology of Writings” (Brookings Institution Press, 2016). Panelists also assessed the Obama administration’s policies toward the region, and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the next U.S. administration. Fellow Tanvi Madan, director of The India Project, moderated the discussion.

After the discussion, the panelists took questions.

Video

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

     
 
 




u.s.

Uncertainties and black swans in the U.S.-India relationship


Editors’ Note: International relations almost never progress in a linear fashion. In this excerpt from a new Brookings India briefing book titled “India-U.S. Relations in Transition,” Tanvi Madan examines some of the high-impact but low-probability events that may affect the relationship in the future: so-called “black swans.”

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recently said that the U.S.-India defense partnership would become “an anchor of global security.” But in an increasingly uncertain world, the partnership between these two large and relatively stable democracies can also potentially be a critical anchor of stability more broadly. Here are some black swans—low-probability, high-impact and, in hindsight, predictable events—that could exacerbate regional and global uncertainty and instability, and affect both countries’ interests and, potentially, their relationship. 

  • Regional Assertiveness: What might be the impact of greater Chinese or Russian assertiveness—even aggression? How might Russian actions against Ukraine, Georgia, or even a NATO member change not just U.S. calculations, but India’s as well? How will it affect their bilateral relationship? What about a China-U.S. confrontation over Taiwan or in the South China Sea? Or Chinese action against a country like Vietnam, with which India has close ties and which the United States is increasingly engaging? What if there is a sudden or serious deterioration of the situation in Tibet, perhaps in the context of a leadership transition? 
  • Chaos in India’s West: What happens if there is political uncertainty in Saudi Arabia, a country with which the United States has close—albeit tense—ties, and which is India’s largest oil supplier and home to millions of Indian citizens? How will the United States and India react if Iran, after all, decides to acquire nuclear weapons? What about the chain reaction either of these scenarios would set off in the Middle East? Closer to India, what if Afghanistan relapses into a total civil war? Or if there is a sharp downturn in stability within Pakistan, with the establishment challenged, the threat of disintegration, and challenges posed by the presence of nuclear weapons? 
  • Shocks to the Global Economy: What if a confluence of circumstance leads to a major spike in oil prices? What will the impact be of a major economic crisis in China, not just on the global economy or Chinese domestic stability, but also in terms of how Beijing might react externally? How will the United States and India deal with this scenario? And what if the eurozone collapses under the weight of refugee flows, Britain’s threatened exit, or national financial crises? 
  • The Epoch-Defining Security Shock: Both the United States and India have suffered major attacks relatively recently—the United States on September 11, 2001 and India on November 26, 2008. But what if there is another major terrorist attack in either country or on the two countries’ interests or citizens elsewhere? Or a major cyber incident that takes down critical infrastructure? 
  • Environmental Challenges: What if rising sea levels cause a catastrophe in Bangladesh resulting in thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, crossing over into India? And then there are the various climate change-related challenges that can perhaps be considered “white swans”—more-certain events, whose effects can be more easily estimated. 

In addition, one could think of domestic black swans in each country and some in the bilateral context. These might include dramatic domestic political developments, or a spark causing a major backlash against immigrants in the United States or American citizens in India. 

As the U.S.-India partnership has developed, and India’s regional and global involvements have increased, the U.S.-India conversation—and not just the official one—has assumed greater complexity. This will help the two countries tackle black swans in the future. So will the further institutionalization of discussions on global and regional issues of the sort already underway. Amid the day-to-day priorities, there should be room for discussing contingencies for black swans in dialogues between the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and the Indian Foreign Secretary, in the two countries’ dialogue on East Asia, and in discussions between the two policy planning units.

Authors

      
 
 




u.s.

Modi’s speech to Congress: Bullish on India, bullish on the U.S.


Quoting Walt Whitman in his speech to a joint meeting of Congress last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared: “there is a new symphony in play.” He was referring to the relationship, but there were some new themes in his speech as well, in addition to a few familiar, predictable ones.

The old

Shared Democratic Values. Modi’s speech covered some of the same ground on shared democratic values as his predecessors. Referring to Congress as a “temple of democracy”—a phrased he’s used in the past for the Indian parliament—and to India’s constitution as its “real holy book,” he stressed that freedom and equality were shared beliefs. In a section that elicited laughter, he also commented that the two countries shared certain practices—legislatures known for bipartisanship and operating harmoniously. Also par for the course was Modi’s emphasis on India’s diversity. An implicit response to critics of India on human rights (including minority rights), freedom of the press, and tolerance of dissent, Modi noted that India’s constitution protected the equal rights of all citizens and enshrined freedom of faith. Echoing former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s words on unity in diversity, he asserted “India lives as one; India grows as one; India celebrates as one.” 

Terrorism. Like Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh before him, Modi highlighted the challenge of terrorism, stressing it was globally the “biggest threat.” Acknowledging existing India-U.S. counter-terrorism cooperation, he called for more, including an approach “that isolates those who harbor, support and sponsor terrorists; that does not distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorists; and that delinks religion from terrorism.” Like his predecessors, Modi did not explicitly mention Pakistan, but alluded to it. He asserted that while it was a global problem, terrorism was “incubated” in India’s neighborhood. In what seemed like a reference to the Congressional hold on the subsidized sale of F-16s to Pakistan, the Indian prime minister also lauded that body for “sending a clear message to those who preach and practice terrorism for political gains. Refusing to reward them is the first step towards holding them accountable for their actions.” 

The Indian Economy. From Jawaharlal Nehru onward, prime ministers have outlined their domestic objectives in speeches to Congress, highlighting the reforms they’ve undertaken. Modi did too, highlighting India’s growth rate and economic opportunities, while acknowledging that much remained to be done. And there were also subtle responses to criticisms of Indian economic policy: for example, the remark about legislative gridlock suggested that American policymakers should understand why some reforms in India are taking time; the quip about India not claiming intellectual property rights on yoga was a rejoinder to those who give India a hard time about intellectual property rights (especially in the pharmaceutical sector). He also noted that in the past “wagers were made on our failure,” and yet Indians have time and again found a way to survive and succeed.

The new

Anti-Declinism. For those promising to make America great again, Modi had a message: it already is. In a speech to the U.S.-India Business Council the day before, he exuded optimism—not just about India, but the United States as well, asserting that, to him, “America is not just a country with a great past; it is a country with an exciting future.” In his speech to Congress, he referred to the U.S. as “great” at least four times and spoke of its “innovative genius.” Recalling that he’d thus far visited half of all American states, he noted what he believed was the United States’ “real strength”: Americans’ ability to dream big and be bold. 

In an election year when the nature and extent of American engagement with the world is being debated, Modi acknowledged the country’s global contributions and called for a continued U.S. role in the world. He applauded—and led members of Congress in a round of applause—for “the great sacrifices of the men and women from ‘The Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave’ in service of mankind.” With the exception of Nehru, who paid his respects at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Indian premiers have tended not to mention American troops—partly a result of differing views on the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraq wars. Modi, on the other hand, explicitly mentioned U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, where “the sacrifices of Americans have helped create a better life.” 

In a more challenging, complex, and uncertain world, he asserted that U.S.-Indian engagement could make an impact, by “promoting cooperation not dominance; connectivity not isolation; respect for global commons; inclusive not exclusive mechanisms; and above all adherence to international rules and norms.” (No prizes for guessing the country that went unnamed). 

The Open Embrace. Modi-Obama hugs have fueled many a tweet. But the speech signaled and reflected a much broader embrace—an India-U.S. one that has been in the works for at least the last 17 years but has become much more visible in the last two. In 2000, addressing Congress, Vajpayee called for the two countries to “remove the shadow of hesitation that lies between us and our joint vision.” Not all his compatriots will agree, but Modi declared: “Today, our relationship has overcome the hesitations of history” and recalled Vajpayee labeling the two as “natural allies.” Listing the ways the relationship had grown closer, he emphasized that this “remarkable story” was not a partisan effort: “[t]hrough the cycle of elections and transitions of administrations the intensity of our engagements has only grown.” He also talked about what the two countries could do together, and stressed that the relationship was good for India. While he’s previously called the United States “a principal partner in the realization of India’s rise as a responsible, influential world power,” he went further this time, stating: “In every sector of India’s forward march, I see the U.S. as an indispensable partner.” 

Not a Free-Rider. But throughout the speech, Modi asserted that this relationship benefited both countries “in great measure,” with a “positive impact on the lives” of people in each. Echoing Singh, he noted that many members of Congress indeed believed that “a stronger and prosperous India is in America’s strategic interest.” Modi made the case that India is not a free rider—that through its businesses, market, talent, and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society. The day before, in his speech to business leaders, he stressed that India was also “poised to contribute as a new engine of global growth” (and made a pitch for support to such “democratic” engines).

Modi furthermore highlighted Indian contributions to global and regional peace and prosperity, noting, for example, that its “soldiers too have fallen in distant battlefields” for freedom and democracy (alluding to the millions that fought in the World Wars). He also highlighted India’s efforts in Afghanistan, its troop contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations, its role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and its evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued Americans as well. In addition, Modi noted India’s contributions of ideas, whether yoga or non-violent protest. And he stressed that India would be a responsible stakeholder and security provider—one that, in partnership with the United States, could “anchor peace, prosperity and stability from Asia to Africa and from Indian Ocean to the Pacific. It can also help ensure security of the sea lanes of commerce and freedom of navigation on seas.” But he also called for international institutions to reflect this role and “the realities of today.”

Members of Congress, for their part, will look to see whether and how Modi’s rhetoric will translate into reality. The prime minister suggested that it won’t always be the way the United States would like. He didn’t use the term “strategic autonomy,” but talked of “autonomy in decision-making”—while noting that it, as well as “diversity in our perspectives,” weren’t bad things for the partnership. And, as is his preferred style, he came up with 3Cs to characterize the state of the relationship: “comfort, candor, and convergence.” Whether they remain characteristic of the partnership, and to what degree, will partly depend on who is the next U.S. president and how she or he sees the U.S. role in the world and India’s place in it.

Authors

      
 
 




u.s.

The 2017 U.S. foreign aid budget and U.S. global leadership: The proverbial frog in a slowly heating pot


On February 9, President Obama submitted his FY 2017 budget request to Congress. The proposed international affairs budget is down 1 percent from current funding levels and 12 percent (in constant dollars) since 2010, better than many domestic accounts. In addition, outside the regular budget, the administration is proposing $1.8 billion ($376 million from the international affairs budget account) to meet the latest pandemic—the Zika virus. Given the budget environment, the proposed amounts for the international affairs budget seem reasonable.

But from a long-term perspective, the budget is alarming. It seems unable to take account of global trends, it relies on fractured and ad hoc processes, and it is excessively siloed into pre-determined sectors.

Being satisfied with relatively small budget cuts does not face the reality of far greater and more pressing challenges today than in 2010. Today, Iraq and Afghanistan are still demanding sizable budget resources. We need to respond to Russia’s muscle-flexing by demonstrating our commitment to its independent neighbors. The effort to move HIV/AIDS to a more sustainable model is commendable but showing minimal success, so U.S. funding cannot slip. The Ebola crisis has been succeeded by the Zika virus. The Middle East is unstable and violent, with half the population of Syria killed or displaced. Sixty million displaced persons is the highest level ever reached. The world is addressing four Level 3 humanitarian crises, an unprecedented number. The fear of terrorism is spreading and disrupting rational political dialogue. Domestic violence and civil strife is increasing in Central America. Free expression is under siege in many countries and civil societies are in need of reinforcement.

Many of these challenges reflect an underinvestment in development in the past. We are using a Rube Goldberg budget system that cobbles together funding from multiple sources for a single objective and locks in funding several years before a penny flows, making it difficult to adjust to changing circumstances.

The budgeting system problem

The 2017 budget uses a gimmick that may not be sustainable. To fund the Iraq war, the Bush administration invented an off-budget account (Overseas Contingent Operations, or OCO, a successor to earlier emergency funding) that does not count against the annual budget caps. The State Department and USAID got part of their budgets starting in 2012 from this account. OCO for FY 2017 is proposed at one-quarter of the international affairs budget. The problem is that OCO cannot be counted on in the long-term, and the sustainable base budget for FY 2017 is down 30 percent from FY 2010 in constant dollars.

The budget process is also absurdly long. The Obama administration began planning the FY 2016 budget in the spring of 2014, roughly 18 months before Congressional appropriations. Typically, it could take another six months for agency officials and appropriation committees to agree on country and program allocations. Only then, 30 months later, can U.S. development professionals working overseas get on with the business of putting those resources to work.  

This budget process, with its long timeframes and pre-determined earmarks and presidential initiatives, means that despite best efforts by USAID, it is difficult to respect “local ownership” of development—something that development experience demonstrates is fundamental to successful and sustainable development.

Presidential initiatives have their place as a way to bring along political allies and the American populace. It is also appropriate and constructive for Congress to weigh in on funding priorities. But it can be counterproductive to effective development when presidential initiatives and congressional earmarks dictate at the micro level and restrict flexibility in implementation, especially in a rapidly changing world with frequent crises. 

Another problem with the current budget system is that most but not all sectors are protected by budget accounts or earmarks. Health is protected and the funding divided into various sub-accounts. Education and agriculture get earmarks. New in the FY 2016 appropriations bill is a separate line item for democracy.

Another structural issue is the crisis-reactive nature of our assistance programs. Health, which garners the lion’s share of U.S. economic assistance, has been dominated for nearly two decades by responses to global crises — first massive funding for combatting HIV/AIDS, followed by significant funding to tackle malaria, Ebola, and now the Zika virus. It is funding by individual disease. Crisis galvanizes political and popular support for the here and now. But what if we had focused on building up national health systems for the last 20 years rather than fighting one-off diseases? If we moved to more preventive approaches now, maybe in 10 or 20 years the pandemic of the day could be met less by the U.S. ramping up in a crisis mode and more by the health systems in those countries affected, with the U.S. playing a supportive and technical role rather than the core funding role. 

These issues are examples of why it is imperative for the next administration and congress to engage in a strategic dialogue on the objectives and priorities of foreign assistance programs, both in funding levels and how the funds are used. It is time to move away from the current structure that resembles building a Cadillac from parts of models stretching from 1949 to 1973, as in the Johnny Cash song "One Piece at A Time.”

Figure 1: How we build our budget

Source: Abernathyautoparts, CC BY-SA 2.5

It is not unrealistic to envisage a more strategic approach. One option is to return to the approach in the 1970s, when all development funding was put into one of just five or six functional accounts, and provide some flexibility in moving funds between accounts.

Policymakers who believe that America is an exceptional or indispensable nation and that world problems do not get solved without American involvement need to take a hard look at whether they are providing the U.S. government with the required diplomatic and development tools. It is high time for U.S. policymakers to take a more strategic approach to the level of funding of international affairs and how the U.S. uses its foreign assistance. The inauguration of a new president and Congress in 2017 offers the opportunity to seize this challenge.

Authors

     
 
 




u.s.

Five years after Busan—how does the U.S. stack up on data transparency?


Publish What You Fund’s 2016 Aid Transparency Index is out. And as a result, today we can assess whether major donors met the commitments they made five years ago at Busan to make aid transparent by the end of 2015. The index is also a window into the state of foreign aid transparency and how the U.S.—the world’s largest bilateral donor—stacks up.

The global picture

On the positive side, the index found that ten donors of varied types and sizes, accounting for 25 percent of total aid, have met the commitment to aid transparency. And more than half of the 46 organizations included in the 2016 index now publish data to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) registry at least quarterly.

At the same time, the index’s assessments show more than half of the organizations still fall into the lowest three categories, scoring below 60 percent in terms of the transparency of their information.

The U.S. picture

Continuing its leadership on transparency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation comes in second overall in the index, meeting its Busan commitment and once again demonstrating that the institutional commitment to publishing and using its data continues.

Otherwise, at first glance, U.S. progress seems disappointing. The five other U.S. donors included in the 2016 index are all in the “fair” category. Seen through a five-year lens, however, these same five U.S. donors were either in the “poor” or “very poor” categories in the 2011 index. So, all agencies have moved up, and three of them—U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief—are on the cusp of “good.”

In the two biggest U.S. agencies that administer foreign assistance, USAID and the State Department, the commitment is being institutionalized and implemented through more systematic efforts to revamp their outdated information systems. Both have reviewed the gaps in their data reporting systems and developed a path forward. USAID’s Cost Management Plan identifies specific steps to be taken and is well under way. The State Department Foreign Assistance Data Review (FADR) involves further reviews that need to be executed promptly in order to lead to action. Both are signs of a heightened commitment to data transparency and both require continued agency leadership and staff implementation.

The Department of Defense, which slid backwards in the last three assessments (and began at the "very poor" category in 2011), has for the first time moved into the "fair" category.  It is still the lowest performing U.S. agency in the index, but it is now publishing 12 new IATI fields. It is moving in the right direction, but significant work remains to be done.

The third U.S. National Action Plan (NAP) announced last fall—the strongest issued by the U.S. to date—calls for improvements to quality and comprehensiveness of U.S. data and commits the U.S. to doing more to raise awareness, accessibility, and demand for foreign assistance data. This gives all U.S. agencies the imperative to do much more to make their aid information transparent and usable.  

Going forward—what should the U.S. being focusing on?

The overall challenge has been laid out in the third NAP:

  • Almost all of the U.S. agencies need to improve the breadth and depth of the information they are publishing to meet IATI standards. Far too often, basic information—such as titles—are either not published or are not useful.
  • The Millennium Challenge Corporation should continue its leadership role, especially on data use. All agencies should be promoting the use of data among their own staff and by external stakeholders, especially at country level. Feedback will go a long way toward helping them improve the quality of the data they are publishing and thereby help them meet the IATI standards.
  • USAID must finish the work on its Cost Management Plan, including putting IATI in the planned Development Information Solution. Additionally, more progress needs to be made on the follow-up to the Aid Transparency Country Pilot Assessment to meet the needs of partners.   
  • The State Department needs to follow through on including IATI in the new integrated solution mapped out in its data review.

The leadership of all foreign affairs agencies needs to work harder to make the business case for compiling, publishing, and using data on foreign aid programs. Open data, particularly when it is comparable, timely, accessible, and comprehensive, is an extremely valuable management asset.  Agency leadership should be its champion. So far, we have not seen enough.

U.S. progress on aid transparency was slow to start. It is still not where it needs to be. But with a modest but concerted push, three additional agencies will be in the “good” category and that is a story we can start to be proud of.   

We look forward to continued progress and to the day when all U.S. foreign aid meets transparency standards—a day I believe will be an important one for the cause of greater development, better governance, democratic participation, and reduced poverty worldwide.

Authors

      
 
 




u.s.

Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership


Event Information

April 21, 2016
9:30 AM - 10:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Register for the Event

The United States alliance with Saudi Arabia dates back to 1943, making the U.S. relationship with the Kingdom one of America's longest-standing in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is a key counterterrorism and diplomatic partner within the region, yet the alliance has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, especially in the period following the 9/11 attacks, when questions about Saudi support for extremist causes emerged. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution of the war in Yemen has added to the criticism, with many observers blaming the Kingdom for the unfolding humanitarian crisis within the Arab world's poorest state. In recent comments, President Barack Obama has been critical of Saudi policies, despite U.S. logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia’s war effort in Yemen.

On April 21, the Intelligence Project and Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted U.S. Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut to discuss the U.S.-Saudi alliance with Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Cofman Wittes. Senator Murphy has urged a more rigorous approach to cooperation with Riyadh that balances U.S. counterterrorism interests, strategic imperatives, and human rights concerns, and has led efforts on Capitol Hill to debate the war in Yemen. Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. 

 Join the conversation on Twitter at #USSaudi.

Video

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

       




u.s.

No better alternative: The U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism relationship

The U.S.-Saudi relationship has come under hard times this year. In testimony before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dan Byman reviewed U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation, examined several of the persistent challenges, and offered some commentary on the relationship going forward.

      
 
 




u.s.

Civil wars and U.S. engagement in the Middle East

In this episode of “Intersections,” Kenneth Pollack, senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and Shadi Hamid, senior fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World and author of "Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle over Islam is Reshaping the World," discuss the current state of upheaval in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, and how and why the United States should change its approach to the Middle East.

      
 
 




u.s.

U.S. leadership in the Arctic


Event Information

March 12, 2015
10:30 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Register for the Event

This April, the United States will assume chairmanship of the Arctic Council for a two-year term. Since the last U.S. chairmanship fifteen years ago, the Arctic has changed dramatically. Melting sea ice has impacted indigenous communities as well as wildlife in significant ways. New Arctic transportation corridors have opened and new prospects for offshore oil and gas development have emerged. The region’s growing strategic, economic, and environmental importance has made U.S. policy toward the Arctic more of a priority than ever before. Recent statements from the White House have emphasized the opportunity for the United States to lead in global efforts to mitigate climate change impacts in the region, govern resources responsibly, and protect Arctic ecosystems and inhabitants.

On March 12, the Energy Security and Climate Initiative (ESCI) at Brookings will host Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., the U.S. special representative for the Arctic, for a keynote address on the future of U.S. policy for the region. Deputy Director for Foreign Policy at Brookings Bruce Jones will provide introductory remarks, and ESCI Senior Fellow Charles Ebinger will moderate the discussion and audience Q&A. 

 Join the conversation on Twitter using #USArctic

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

     
 
 




u.s.

U.S. chairmanship of the Arctic Council: The challenges ahead


This weekend the United States will assume the chairmanship of the Arctic Council for a two-year term. While the Obama administration has been preparing for this for several years, it remains to be seen how the president will balance the concerns of most Arctic residents who view development of the region as vital to improving their economic and social livelihood and those individuals inside and outside the administration who want to limit development out of concern for the how economic development may cause local environmental degradation while also accelerating climate change.

The National Strategy for the Arctic Region

As part of this preparation, in May 2013, the president launched a new National Strategy for the Arctic Region based on three principles

  1. Advancement of U.S. security interests defined as ensuring the ability of our aircraft and vessels to operate, in a manner consistent with international law through, under, and over the airspace and waters of the Arctic; to support lawful commerce; to achieve greater awareness of activities in the region; and to intelligently evolve our Arctic infrastructure and capabilities including ice-capable platforms as needed;
  2. Pursue responsible Arctic regional stewardship defined as protection of the Arctic environment and conservation of its resources, establishment of an integrated Arctic management framework, charting of the Arctic region, and employment of scientific research and traditional knowledge to increase understanding of the Arctic;
  3. Strengthen international cooperation defined as working through bilateral relationships and multilateral institutions, including the Arctic Council, to advance collective interests, promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic environment, and enhance regional security, and to work toward U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Undergirding these principles were commitments to make decisions using the best available information, to foster cooperation with the state of Alaska, other international partners, the private sector, and to consult and coordinate with Alaskan natives to gain traditional knowledge. As part of this new strategy, the president appointed Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr. as the U.S. special representative for the Arctic in July 2014. Shortly after his appointment, and in several major speeches since, including one at Brookings, the admiral has stated that the administration’s agenda centers on stewardship of the Arctic Ocean including insuring its safety and security, improving economic and living conditions for the regions’ inhabitants, and addressing the impacts of climate change on the region. 

The administration’s new policy was buttressed in January 2015 by an executive order designed to enhance coordination of all the various agencies responsible for different aspects of federal oversight of the Arctic (Alaska). Paradoxically, however, the fact that the reorganization came nearly in tandem with the announcement of new wilderness restrictions on the exploration of oil and gas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and the Arctic Coastal Plain. This announcement left many Alaskans skeptical on how further restrictions on development of the state’s resources could be viewed as improving economic and living conditions of people in the region. In a February 2015 meeting of Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) in Yellowknife, Canada, the administration looked to put meat on the bones of what it intended to pursue upon assumption of the chairmanship of the Arctic Council. This resulted in an additional elucidation of 15 broad themes that had originally been presented in a Virtual Stakeholder Outreach Forum on December 2, 2014 in Washington, D.C..

Streamlining Arctic policy and key questions

The announced reorganization of government agencies and lines of authority dealing with U.S. Arctic and Arctic Council policy has done little or nothing to streamline the overlapping and sometimes conflicting policies governing natural resource development or energy projects in Alaska. These overlapping jurisdictions are well highlighted in a major new National Petroleum Council (NPC) report, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources. This report was prepared at the request of Energy Secretary Moniz to address how best to pursue prudent development of Alaska’s offshore oil and gas resources and ironically issued shortly after the president’s closing of ANWR. Whether or not the White House was even aware of the NPC’s report, which represented months of substantive work by many people, remains open to question.

The Arctic reorganization plan did little to resolve some key questions as to actually who is in charge of Arctic policy in the United States. While Admiral Papp was named “Coordinator” of the U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship, this position is not listed in the Council’s enabling documents. Historically, the foreign minister or the secretary of state of the country chairs the Council while a career diplomat chairs the meetings of the senior officials dealing with the day-to-day activities of the Council. It appears that Admiral Papp has neither of these positions. In any case, it looks from the organizational chart that the White House science advisor will be the real coordinator of U.S. Arctic policy.

The chief problem that U.S. Arctic policy must resolve is that while in the Arctic Council we have to address issues affecting the entire Circumpolar North, our domestic Arctic policy centers only on Alaska, where a slew of domestic agencies have overlapping and often conflicting oversight and regulatory responsibilities. The situation is made still more complex by the large amount of the state that is owned by the federal government. This makes it almost inevitable that any resource development project by private or state interests will run into federal government restrictions, in terms of needing to cross federal land to get a resource to market, permitting to ensure that water resources are not polluted, or making sure that fish and wildlife habitats are not disturbed, etc.

Our Arctic policy also suffers from an acute lack of awareness by most Americans that we are an Arctic nation with a huge maritime boundary and very limited resources (ice-worthy ships, proper navigation charts and aids, lack of port facilities, lack of search and rescue capabilities, lack of knowledge of what fishery resources we possess) to protect it. While many of these issues lie outside the scope of the Arctic Council, many are cross-cutting with our Arctic neighbors, most notably with increased traffic in the region (from tourism, fishing, energy development, and shipping) comes the increased possibility of an accident. Currently, the United States does not have the capable means (both in terms of timely response and adequate infrastructure) to respond to an accident in the Arctic, which could be catastrophic, as all of these industries are active and gaining popularity every day.

Core questions for the administration

As the United States takes the helm of the Arctic Council, there are several core issues that the administration must address. Some critical questions are: What is the U.S. position on the development of the Arctic’s oil, gas, mineral, and fishery resources? What specific action is the United States prepared to support in the Arctic Council to uplift the standard of living of Arctic people across the Circumpolar North? Given that each icebreaker costs at least $700 million and that we only have one in operation, what resources are we prepared to expand to build a fleet capable to respond to events in the Arctic? Should any of these expenses be viewed as vital to our national security and defense, and if so, which budget should they be taken out of? What role does the United States in its chairmanship role see for closer interaction between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council? Would the United States support the closing off of certain ecologically sensitive parts of the Arctic to all commercial exploitation? Finally, how does the administration in its Arctic Council leadership role get its Arctic policy in sync with that of the state of Alaska in its recently released Alaska Arctic Policy Implementation Plan?

Other Arctic nations surpass the United States in terms of Arctic policies. Norway, Russia, Canada, and even Denmark (through complicated ties with Greenland’s claim on the Arctic) all have the Arctic at the front and center of policymaking decisions. I hope to see these issues addressed as the United States moves to enact effective policy on the Arctic over the next two years as the alternative is too great a risk and too great a wasted opportunity. 

     
 
 




u.s.

The U.S. still needs Arctic energy


Editors' Note: America has fallen behind its economic competitors—namely Russia and China—in Arctic resource and infrastructure investment. Charles Ebinger argues that the United States must better define its resource development policies and priorities in order to ensure U.S. leadership in the Arctic. This piece was originally published on Forbes

The recent decision by the United States to allow energy exploration drilling to re-commence in the Alaskan Arctic’s Chukchi Sea this summer is a welcome development. Here’s why: Federal waters in offshore Alaska are estimated to hold roughly 27 billion barrels of oil and 132 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the vast majority of which is located in the Arctic. Experts believe that the Chukchi in particular, which holds more resources than any other undeveloped U.S. energy basin, may represent one of the world’s largest sources of untapped oil and gas.

Until now America has regrettably been on the sidelines of Arctic resource and infrastructure investment while our economic competitors—Russia and China included—have moved forward. This policy vacuum was highlighted in a recent National Petroleum Council (NPC) report to the U.S. Secretary of Energy in which I participated and which warned that if we effect no policy changes on an urgent basis we will not stay ahead of or even keep pace with our foreign rivals, remain globally competitive, or provide global leadership and influence in this critical region.

America is more energy self-sufficient than it has ever been

The report comes at a time when the U.S. has cut imports, drastically transforming our nation into the biggest producer of oil and natural gas by tapping huge reserves in shale rock formations across the country. As such, America is more energy self-sufficient than it has ever been. Even so, as evidenced by strong public support for Arctic offshore development in states ranging from Alaska to Iowa, South Carolina and New Hampshire, the American people recognize that we cannot rely solely on shale oil and gas to meet our energy needs.

To that point, as the NPC noted, if we fail to develop the enormous trove of reserves in Arctic waters off Alaska, the U.S. risks a renewed reliance on overseas energy in the future and will have missed a prime opportunity to keep domestic production high and imports and consumer costs low.

As President Obama rightly stated shortly after the Chukchi drilling plan was conditionally approved in May, “When it can be done safely and appropriately, U.S. production of oil and natural gas is important. I would rather us—with all the safeguards and standards that we have—be producing our oil and gas, rather than importing it, which is bad for our people, but is also potentially purchased from places that have much lower environmental standards than we do.

We have to take actions that allow exploration to commence now 

Indeed, given the long lead time necessary to develop resources in this region, the NPC study stressed that it is vital for the U.S. to take actions now that allow exploration in Alaskan Arctic waters to commence. In that regard, the recent approval for Arctic offshore drilling to occur this summer was a win for both Alaska, which is dependent on the petroleum industry to fund approximately 90 percent of its coffers, and the country at large, which leans on Alaskan energy to meet our daily needs, especially on the West Coast.

To ensure the long-term feasibility of offshore development in the region, Interior Department regulations for the U.S. Arctic in part must facilitate the use of proven technologies and also encourage innovation by providing the flexibility to incorporate future technologies as advances occur and their capacities are demonstrated. In addition, and all the more significant given our accession to chairmanship of the Arctic Council in May, U.S. policies governing natural resource development in the Arctic must be defined and streamlined.

Questions Washington has to answer if the U.S. wants to ensure its leadership in the Arctic

For example, what is the country’s official position on the development of oil, gas, mineral and fishery resources in the Arctic? Does it align with Alaska’s policies? How will resource development affect standards of living for those residing in the region?

In addition to resource development policies, other important questions must be addressed to ensure U.S. leadership in the Arctic. With Prudhoe Bay production in serious decline and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System running at historically low throughput levels, how will the U.S. ensure access to new sources like Alaska’s Arctic offshore that can help all Americans? With just one heavy icebreaker in operation, and the cost of another tallying at least $700 million, what actions are we prepared to take to build a fleet capable of meeting the demands in an increasingly active region?

These are just a few of the questions and concerns that Washington, D.C. will have to answer soon if the U.S. stands a chance of catching up to or surpassing other nations that have so far leapt ahead to the front of the Arctic line. Will President Obama rise to the occasion and make the right decisions?

      
 
 




u.s.

The halfway point of the U.S. Arctic Council chairmanship


Event Information

April 25, 2016
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Register for the Event
An address from U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr.

On April 24, 2015, the United States assumed chairmanship of the Arctic Council for a two-year term. Over the course of the last year, the United States has outlined plans within three central priorities: improving economic and living conditions for Arctic communities; Arctic Ocean safety, security, and stewardship; and addressing the impacts of climate change. Working with partners on the Council, U.S. leaders have moved forward policies ranging from joint efforts to curb black carbon emissions to guidelines for unmanned aerial systems conducting scientific research. With half of its short chairmanship behind it, what has the United States accomplished over the last 12 months? What work remains to be done?

On April 25, the Energy Security and Climate Initiative (ESCI) at Brookings hosted U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr. for a keynote address on the state and future of U.S. leadership in the Arctic. ESCI Senior Fellow Charles Ebinger moderated the discussion and audience Q&A.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USArctic

Video

Audio

      
 
 




u.s.

The top 10 metropolitan port complexes in the U.S.


The United States exported and imported $4.0 trillion worth of international goods in 2014, making it the world’s second-largest trader, after China. The responsibility for moving all those products falls to the country’s 400-plus seaports, airports, and border-crossing facilities, though a smaller group does most of the country’s heavy lifting. In fact, ports in just 10 metropolitan areas move 60 percent of all international goods by value.

This level of concentrated port activity creates a spatial mismatch in the country’s trade flows. While a few ports handle a majority of international trade, few of the goods leaving or entering those ports start or end their journey in that port’s local market: 96 percent actually move to or from other parts of the United States. As a result, problems within and outside certain port facilities—whether a labor dispute like the recent West Coast port strike or congestion near Philadelphia’s seaport or airport—quickly become logistical costs borne by the entire country.

The 10 largest metropolitan port complexes represent a wide range of U.S. geographies, modal specialties, and international connections. Total volumes for these port complexes, listed below, are based on an aggregation of imports and exports across all sea, air, truck, rail, and pipeline facilities in each region. All data are from 2010, and you can find more detailed metrics within the Metro Freight interactive.

10. Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-IN-WI

Total Value: $92.8 billion
Local Share: 4.6 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($41.5 billion)

A traditional Midwest powerhouse of production, metropolitan Chicago is home to a variety of industries and infrastructure assets that connect it to the Midwest and global marketplace. The proximity of factories, warehouses, and rail lines to its major port facilities, particularly O'Hare International Airport, places Chicago at a strategic crossroads for goods distribution.

9. San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA

Total Value: $103.9 billion
Local Share: 4.4 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($77.6 billion)

The San Francisco metro area—and the Bay Area as a whole—may be more well-known as a center for tech innovation, but it also contains some of the largest port facilities in the country. The Port of Oakland and the Port of San Francisco  account for the bulk of water traffic ($55.3 billion overall) moving through the area, while Oakland International Airport and San Francisco International Airport help transport nearly $48.6 billion in electronics, precision instruments, and other high-value goods.

8. Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA

Total Value: $116.9 billion
Local Share: 8.2 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($89.4 billion)

The Seattle metro area plays a critical role cycling goods throughout the Pacific Northwest and the rest of the country, largely owing to the key connections its port facilities have forged with China ($47.9 billion) and Japan ($22.0 billion). Valuable transportation equipment and electronics represent a large chunk of these port volumes ($52.7 billion), although sizable amounts of machinery, textiles, and agricultural products are also processed through area facilities. The Port of Seattle and the Port of Tacoma are especially important in this respect, as they look to partner more closely in years to come.

7. Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL

Total Value: $123.7 billion
Local Share: 2.0 percent
Top Trade Region: Latin America ($97.2 billion)

Miami is the country’s primary gateway to Latin America, especially when excluding petroleum-related trade moving through Gulf Coast ports. And while the region and state have made impressive investments at the Port Miami seaport, it is actually Miami International Airport that generates the most regional trade ($74.8 billion). Miami’s facilities are a key component of Florida’s statewide strategy to use trade and logistics to grow local industries.

6. Laredo, TX

Total Value: $124.4 billion
Local Share: 0.0 percent
Top Trade Region: NAFTA ($121.0 billion)

Laredo may only house 250,000 people, but it might be the most important Texas metro area you’ve never heard of, considering that virtually every international good passing through it heads somewhere else in the U.S. The border town is the southernmost point of Interstate 35—the so-called NAFTA superhighway—and handles almost half of U.S./Mexican surface trade. With automotive and other supply chains continuing to stretch across the binational border, Laredo is poised to grow in importance over the coming years.

5. Anchorage, AK

Total Value: $137.4 billion
Local Share: 0.2 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($136.0 billion)

Anchorage may be thousands of miles from the closest U.S. market, but it has a long legacy as a major connector to the Pacific marketplace, resting less than 9.5 hours by air from 90 percent of the industrialized world. In particular, Ted Stevens International Airport was the cargo hub for Northwest Airlines Cargo, once the country’s largest carrier, and still has a vibrant freight business led by FedEx Express and UPS hubs. Continued growth in high-value, low-weight goods trade with Asia can only benefit Anchorage’s cargo business.

4. Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX

Total Value: $168.1 billion
Local Share: 10.6 percent
Top Trade Region: Latin America ($48.3 billion)

As one of the world’s leading centers for energy and chemical production, the Houston metro area—along with other parts of the Gulf Coast region—depends on an enormous set of seaport facilities to transport these goods. Collectively, $100.6 billion of energy products and chemicals/plastics pass through these ports annually, accounting for about 60 percent of all their international goods. Stretching more than 25 miles in length and situated close to the Gulf of Mexico, the Port of Houston houses many of the area’s marine terminals.

3. Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI

Total Value: $206.7 billion
Local Share: 4.9 percent
Top Trade Region: NAFTA ($186.6 billion)

Although the Detroit metro area contains a number of freight facilities, such as the Port of Detroit, that unite the Great Lakes region, its land border crossings to Canada make it one of the busiest sites of commerce in North America and beyond. Each year, nearly $175.8 billion in international goods travel by truck and rail between Detroit and Canada—relying almost exclusively on the aging Ambassador Bridge and the Michigan Central Railway Tunnel. The planned New International Trade Crossing (NITC), however, holds promise for expanding capacity at this crucial junction.

2. New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA

Total Value: $349.2 billion
Local Share: 9.7 percent
Top Trade Region: Europe ($153.9 billion)

The Port of New York and New Jersey, which spans several marine facilities including the Port Newark-Elizabeth Marine Terminal, is one of the biggest freight assets in the country, cementing the New York metro area’s role as the chief East Coast seaport complex ($185.0 billion). Remarkably, almost the same value of goods ($162.7 billion) flows through the area’s expansive air cargo facilities, including John F. Kennedy International Airport and Newark Liberty International Airport. Combined with New York’s enormous amount of global corporate headquarters, New York is the country’s most globally fluent metro area.

1. Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA

Total Value: $417.5 billion
Local Share: 6.0 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($362.2 billion)

The Los Angeles metropolitan area not only boasts two of the largest seaports in the Western Hemisphere—the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach—but also has one of the busiest cargo airports nationally, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Together, these port facilities channel a wide range of international goods like electronics, machinery, and textiles across the country, many of which come from Asian trade partners like China ($211.3 billion) and Japan ($58.5 billion). Still, only a fraction of these goods actually start or end locally (6 percent), speaking to the port complex’s extensive geographic reach in the U.S.

Authors

      
 
 




u.s.

How did COVID-19 disrupt the market for U.S. Treasury debt?

The COVID-19 pandemic—in addition to posing a severe threat to public health—has disrupted the economy and financial markets, and prompted a strong desire among investors for safe and liquid securities. In that environment, one might expect U.S. Treasury securities to be the investment of choice, but for a while in March, the $18 trillion market…

       




u.s.

Carbon Offsets, Reversal Risk and U.S. Climate Policy

Abstract

Background: One controversial issue in the larger cap-and-trade debate is the proper use and certification of carbon offsets related to changes in land management. Advocates of an expanded offset supply claim that inclusion of such activities would expand the scope of the program and lower overall compliance costs, while opponents claim that it would weaken the environmental integrity of the program by crediting activities that yield either nonexistent or merely temporary carbon sequestration benefits. Our study starts from the premise that offsets are neither perfect mitigation instruments nor useless "hot air."

Results: We show that offsets provide a useful cost containment function, even when there is some threat of reversal, by injecting additional "when-flexibility" into the system. This allows market participants to shift their reduction requirements to periods of lower cost, thereby facilitating attainment of the least-cost time path without jeopardizing the cumulative environmental integrity of the system. By accounting for market conditions in conjunction with reversal risk, we develop a simple offset valuation methodology, taking into account the two most important factors that typically lead offsets to be overvalued or undervalued.

Conclusions: The result of this paper is a quantitative "model rule" that could be included in future legislation or used as a basis for active management by a future "carbon fed" or other regulatory authority with jurisdiction over the US carbon market to actively manage allowance prices.

Downloads

Authors

      
 
 




u.s.

Prime Minister Modi returns to the U.S.


Event Information

September 25, 2015
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Register for the Event

On September 23, 2015, close on the heels of the U.S.-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi will arrive in New York on his second trip to the United States in that role. Along with his presence at the U.N. General Assembly opening and bilateral meetings, his trip will also include a visit to California. His agenda there will include meetings with several technology companies and interactions with the Indian diaspora.

On September 25, The India Project at Brookings hosted an event to discuss Modi’s visit and assess developments in India and the U.S.-India relationship in the year, his last U.S. visit. The panel explored the state of the Indian economy and foreign policy, the political landscape, and how the Modi government is perceived at home and abroad. Panelists will also outline the next few months in terms of Indian domestic politics and policy, as well as its foreign policy.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #ModiInUS

Video

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

      
 
 




u.s.

U.S.–India relations: A conversation with U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma


Event Information

December 11, 2015
11:00 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorim
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachuetts, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

Register for the Event

The past year has been one of intense engagement in U.S -India relations with several high-level visits exchanged and working-level dialogues held between the two countries. Most recently, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met at the Paris climate change summit and Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar will visit the United States to discuss the bilateral defense relationship.

On December 11, The India Project at Brookings hosted a conversation with U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma to reflect on developments in U.S.-India relations in 2015. He also discussed the recent high-level engagements on defense policy and climate change, as well as the road ahead for the bilateral relationship. Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project and fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings moderated the discussion. Bruce Jones, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings provided introductory remarks.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USIndia

Video

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

      
 
 




u.s.

What can the U.S. Congress' interest in Prime Minister Modi's visit translate to?


On his fourth trip to the U.S. as Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi will spend some quality time on Capitol Hill on Wednesday, where he'll address a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress. House Speaker Paul Ryan will also host the Indian premier for a lunch, which will be followed by a reception hosted jointly by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees and the India Caucus. What's the significance of this Congressional engagement and what might be Modi's message? 

Given that all the most-recent Indian leaders who've held five-year terms have addressed such joint meetings of Congress, some have asked whether Ryan's invitation to Modi is a big deal. The answer is, yes, it is an honour and not one extended all that often. Since 1934, there have been only 117 such speeches. Leaders from France, Israel and the United Kingdom have addressed joint meetings the most times (8 each), followed by Mexico (7), and Ireland, Italy and South Korea (6 each). With this speech, India will join Germany on the list with leaders having addressed 5 joint meetings of Congress: Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, P.V. Narashima Rao in 1994, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000 and Manmohan Singh in 2005. India's first premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, spoke to the House and Senate in separate back-to-back sessions in 1949 as well. 

Congress is a key stakeholder in the U.S.-India relationship and can play a significant supportive or spoiler role. While American presidents have a lot more lee-way on foreign policy than domestic policy, Congress is not without influence on U.S. foreign relations, and shapes the context for American engagement abroad. Moreover, the breadth and depth of the U.S.-India relationship, as well as the blurring of the line between what constitutes domestic and foreign policy these days means that India's options can be affected by American legislative decisions or the political mood on a range of issues from trade to immigration, energy to defense. 

The Indian Foreign Secretary recently said that the U.S. legislature was at "very much at the heart" of the relationship today. He noted it has been "very supportive" and "even in some more difficult days where actually the Congress has been the part of the US polity which has been very sympathetic to India." But India's had rocky experiences on the Hill as well--which only heightens the need to engage members of Congress at the highest levels. 

The speech and the other interactions offer Modi an opportunity to acknowledge the role of Congress in building bilateral relations, highlight shared interests and values, outline his vision for India and the relationship, as well as tackle some Congressional concerns and note some of India's own. He'll be speaking to multiple audiences in Congress, with members there either because of the strategic imperative for the relationship, others because of the economic potential, yet others because of the values imperative--and then there are those who'll be there because it is important to their constituents, whether business or the Indian diaspora. There is also the audience outside Congress, including in India, where the speech will play in primetime. What will Modi's message be? A glimpse at previous speeches might offer some clues, though Modi is likely also to want to emphasize change. 

The speeches that came before

The speeches of previous prime ministers have addressed some common themes. They've acknowledged shared democratic values. They've mentioned the two-way flow of inspiration and ideas with individuals like Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King getting multiple mentions. They've noted the influence of American founding documents or fathers on the Indian constitution. They've highlighted India's achievements, while stressing that much remains to be done. 

They've noted their country's diversity, and the almost-unique task Indian leaders have had--to achieve development for hundreds of millions in a democratic context. Since Gandhi, each has mentioned the Indian diaspora, noting its contributions to the U.S. Each prime minister has also expressed gratitude for American support or the contribution the U.S. partnership has made to India's development and security. They've acknowledged differences, without dwelling on them. They've addressed contemporary Congressional concerns that existed about Indian policy--in some cases offering a defense of them, in others' explaining the reason behind the policy.

Many of the premiers called for Congress to understand that India, while a democracy like the U.S. and sharing many common interests, would not necessarily achieve its objectives the same way as the U.S. And each subtly has asked for time and space, accommodation and support to achieve their goals--and argued it's in American interests to see a strong, stable, prosperous, democratic India.

In terms of subjects, each previous speech has mentioned economic growth and development as a key government priority, highlighting what policymakers were doing to achieve them. Since Gandhi, all have mentioned nuclear weapons though with different emphases: he spoke of disarmament; Rao of de-nuclearization and concerns about proliferation; two years after India's nuclear test, Vajpayee noted India's voluntary moratorium on testing and tried to reassure Congress about Indian intentions; and speaking in the context of the U.S.-India civil nuclear talks, Singh noted the importance of civil nuclear energy and defended India's track record on nuclear non-proliferation.

Since Rao, every prime minister has mentioned the challenge that terrorism posed for both the U.S. and India, with Vajpayee and Singh implicitly noting the challenge that a neighboring country poses in this regard from India's perspective. And Rao and Singh made the case for India to get a permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council.

The style of the speeches has changed, as has the tone. Earlier speeches were littered with quotes from sources like Christopher Columbus, Swami Vivekananda, Abraham Lincoln, Lala Lajpat Rai and the Rig Veda. Perhaps that was reflective of the style of speechwriting in those eras, but perhaps it was also because there were fewer concrete issues in the bilateral relationship to address. The evolution in the areas of cooperation is evident in the speeches. 

Rao's speech about two decades ago, for instance, listed U.S.-India common interests as peacekeeping, environmental crises, and combating international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Compare that to Singh's address which talked of cooperation on a range of issues from counterterrorism, the economy, agriculture, energy security, healthy policy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), democracy promotion, and global governance.

The speech yet to come

Modi will likely strike some similar themes, acknowledging the role that the U.S. Congress has played in shaping the relationship and expressing gratitude for its support. Like Vajpayee, particularly in a U.S. election year, Modi might note the bipartisan support the relationship has enjoyed in recent years. He'll undoubtedly talk about shared democratic values in America's "temple of democracy"--a phrase he used for the Indian parliament when he first entered it after his 2014 election victory. Modi will not necessarily mention the concerns about human rights, trade and investment policies, non-proliferation or India's Iran policy that have arisen on the Hill, but he will likely address them indirectly. 

For example, by emphasizing India's pluralism and diversity and the protection its Constitution gives to minorities, or the constructive role the country could play regionally (he might give examples such as the recently inaugurated dam in Afghanistan). Given the issues on the bilateral agenda, he'll likely mention the strategic convergence, his economic policy plans, terrorism, India's non-proliferation record, defense and security cooperation, and perhaps--like Vajpayee--the Asia-Pacific (without directly mentioning China). And like Vajpayee, he might be more upfront about Indian concerns and the need to accommodate them. 

While he might strike some similar themes as his predecessors and highlight aspects of continuity, Modi will also want to emphasize that it's not business as usual. He'll likely try to outline the change that he has brought and wants to bring. In the past, he has noted the generational shift that he himself represents as the first Indian prime minister born after independence and the Modi government's latest tag line is, of course, "Transforming India." And he might emphasize that this changed India represents an opportunity for the U.S.

He won't wade directly into American election issues, but might note the importance of U.S. global engagement. He might also try to address some of the angst in the U.S. about other countries taking advantage of it and being "takers." He could do this by making the case that India is not a free rider--that through its businesses, market, talent and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society, through its economic development it will contribute to global growth, and through Indian prosperity, security and a more proactive international role--with a different approach than another Asian country has taken--it'll contribute to regional stability and order. He might also suggest ways that the U.S. can facilitate India playing such a role.

Unlike previous leaders, he has not tended to appeal to others not to ask India to do more regionally and globally because it's just a developing country and needs to focus internally. The Modi government has been highlighting the contributions of India and Indians to global and regional peace and prosperity--through peacekeeping, the millions that fought in the World Wars, HADR operations in its neighborhood, evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued not just Indian citizens, but Americans as well.

His government has been more vocal in joint contexts of expressing its views on the importance of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions--and we might hear more on this in his address. Overall, a theme will likely be that India is not just a "taker," and will be a responsible, collaborative stakeholder.

It'll be interesting to see whether the Indian prime minister notes the role that his predecessors have played in getting the relationship to this point. With some exceptions--for example, he acknowledged Manmohan Singh's contribution during President Obama's visit to India last year--he has not tended to do so. But there's a case to be made for doing so--it can reassure members of Congress that the relationship transcends one person or party and is based on a strategic rationale, thus making it more sustainable. Such an acknowledgement could be in the context of noting that it's not just Delhi and Washington that have built and are building this relationship, but the two countries' states, private sectors, educational institutions and people. 

This wouldn't prevent Modi from highlighting the heightened intensity of the last two years, particularly the progress in defense and security cooperation. (From a more political perspective, given that there has been criticism in some quarters of India-U.S. relations becoming closer, it can also serve as a reminder that the Congress party-led government followed a similar path).

Modi will be competing for media attention in the U.S. thanks to the focus in the U.S. on the Democratic primaries this week, but he'll have Congressional attention. But it's worth remembering that Indian prime ministers have been feted before, but if they don't deliver on the promise of India and India-U.S. relations that they often outline, disillusionment sets in. Modi will have to convince them that India is a strategic bet worth making--one that will pay off.

This piece was originally published by Huffington Post India.

Authors

Publication: Huffington Post India
      
 
 




u.s.

Electoral Districting in the U.S.: Can Canada Help?

Executive Summary

In the concluding chapter of Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America’s Polarized Politics (Brookings Press, 2007), Pietro S. Nivola and William A. Galston lay out a series of changes aimed at “depolarizing” the politics of the United States. One of their recommendations calls on the states to introduce fundamental changes to the process of redistricting congressional electoral districts. A handful of states have already established redistricting commissions, so the first steps have been taken in reforming one of the most important pillars of the electoral process.

This paper explores the possibility that the United States could build on those initial moves. Additionally, would it be possible to “import” the Canadian model of independent electoral boundary redistricting commissions? For the first 100 years of Canadian history redistricting seats in the federal House of Commons followed a pattern familiar to Americans. It was a process firmly under the control of the politicians, and the results reflected that. Wide disparities in population size were a tell-tale sign of the extent to which Canada’s parliamentary districts were gerrymandered.

Starting at the provincial level in the 1950s, partisan redistricting eventually gave way in all jurisdictions to nonpartisan commissions. How that change came about and why the Canadian commission-directed redistricting commends itself to Americans concerned about the highly politicized state of redistricting in the United States are the subjects of this study.

Downloads

Authors

  • John C. Courtney
     
 
 




u.s.

Five Myths About the 2010 Census and the U.S. Population


Every 10 years, we have to count people. At least that's what Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution says. It doesn't sound too complicated. But it is. Who gets counted, and how, determines not only congressional representation but how funding is distributed for a slew of federal programs that affect all of us. As we prepare to stand and be counted in 2010 -- and the U.S. Census Bureau is spending a lot of advertising money to make sure that everyone is -- let's note a few misconceptions about our population and the efforts to tally us up.

1. Immigration is the biggest force behind the nation's racial and ethnic diversity.

If immigration stopped today, we would still see substantial gains in our minority populations for decades to come. Recent Census Bureau projections showed that under a "no further immigration" scenario, the minority share of our population would rise from about 35 percent today to 42 percent in 2050. The preschool (under age 5 ) population would become minority white. The greater minority presence would arise from higher natural-increase rates for minorities than for the aging white population. This momentum is already in place: Since 2000, natural population increase accounted for 62 percent of the growth of Hispanics, the country's largest minority group, with immigration responsible for the rest.

Already, the District and four states (Hawaii, New Mexico, California and Texas) are minority white, and in six more, whites are less than 60 percent of the population. Minorities now make up more than 30 percent of the residents in half of the nation's congressional districts, compared with a quarter in 1992.

The census will tell us more about the dispersal of Hispanics and other groups to traditional white enclaves -- suburbs and the country's midsection. A majority of all Hispanic, black and Asian residents of major metro areas now live in the suburbs. And since 2000, according to recent estimates, the fastest Hispanic growth occurred in South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee and Arkansas.

Color lines within our population are blurring in a different way, too, with people who identify with more than one race. The number of mixed-race married couples more than doubled since 1990, and they make up nearly 8 percent of all marriages.

2. The country is getting uniformly older.

As a baby boomer, I am part of a demographic mob. As we age over the next 20 years, the nation as a whole will see a surge in senior citizens. But different parts of the country will be aging at different rates, largely because selective "younging" is going on. This is evident from census estimates showing that during the first nine years of this decade, 25 states -- mostly in the Northeast, Midwest and Great Plains -- and the District exhibited absolute declines in their child populations, while 25 others, led by Nevada and Arizona, showed gains.

This variation in where families and children live is poised to shape a young-old regional divide that could intensify over time. Census projections for 2020, made earlier this decade, showed median ages over 40 in Maine, West Virginia and Pennsylvania, compared with below 36 in Utah, Texas, Georgia and California.

3. Big states will keep getting bigger -- especially in Congress.

For much of the postwar period, the Sunbelt megastates of California, Florida and Texas just kept growing: They led all other states in adding congressional seats based on censuses since World War II. But the economic turbulence of this past decade will affect their political fortunes. Florida was one of the nation's growth leaders for the first half of the decade and was poised to gain as many as three congressional seats after the 2010 Census, tying or overtaking New York's congressional delegation. But the mortgage meltdown led to an unprecedented exodus from the state in the past two years. Florida's likely gain of one seat will be its smallest addition since the 1940 Census.

California is not positioned to gain any seats for the first time since statehood in 1850. Despite its status as an immigration magnet, the Golden State lost large numbers of people fleeing high housing costs during the bubble years. California might have even lost a seat had that bubble not burst.

Of the three Sunbelt behemoths, Texas will take the biggest prize, probably four congressional seats -- its largest increase since the 1880 Census. It was largely immune from the housing crisis late in the decade, while it gained Katrina-driven migrants from Louisiana.

4. The census is the main source of information about our population.

Not as much as before. Unlike previous censuses, the 2010 count will provide only bare-bones information that does little more than fulfill its constitutional mandate. The questions will include the age, sex, race, Hispanic origin and household relationship status of each individual, and the size and homeownership status of each household.

What happened to all the rich data on poverty, income, ancestry, immigration, marital status and some 30 other categories we have come to expect from the census? Those "long form" questions have been given to a sample of census respondents in every count going back to 1940 -- but they won't be handed out this year. The queries have been diverted to the Census Bureau's American Community Survey.

In 2005, the bureau began administering the ACS to 3 million households each year to elicit the same kind of information that was previously available only every 10 years. This large and sophisticated survey has already provided important and timely insights on changing poverty, immigration and migration patterns in this economic roller coaster of a decade.

5. New technology gives us much more demographic data than the census can.

Not true. Technological developments and data collected via the Internet do give us new ways of looking at the population, and complex surveys and estimates conducted by the Census Bureau and other organizations allow us to monitor change over the decade -- but there is no substitute for counting everyone. Aside from the census's constitutional mandate to provide the basis for congressional apportionment, a national headcount also allows us to know how many people live in the nation's cities, suburbs and neighborhoods and to break them down according to race, age and gender.

There are plenty of examples of a decennial census surprising the experts. The 2000 Census, for instance, discovered sharp population surges in many old, large cities. This was unanticipated for Chicago, which had experienced decades of decline. And the spread of the nation's Hispanic population into new states such as North Carolina far exceeded expectations.

Many government and private surveys, including the ACS, rely on the decennial census to make sure their work accurately reflects the population as a whole.

This census will also tell us more about small but growing groups, such as same-sex married partners and multiracial populations, whose presence and interests can change laws and public policies.

The Census Bureau's ad campaign urges Americans to answer "10 Questions in 10 Minutes" -- and those are still 10 very important questions, whose responses will guide us for the next 10 years.

Authors

Publication: The Washington Post
     
 
 




u.s.

What the U.S. can do to guard against a proliferation cascade in the Middle East


When Iran and the P5+1 signed a deal over Tehran’s nuclear program last July, members of Congress, Middle East analysts, and Arab Gulf governments all warned that the agreement would prompt Iran’s rivals in the region to race for the bomb.

In a report that Bob Einhorn and I released this week, we assessed this risk of a so-called proliferation cascade. We look at four states in particular—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey—and Bob briefly explores each case in another blog post out today. In the paper, we argue that although the likelihood of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East is fairly low, and certainly lower than a number of critics of the Iran deal would have you believe, it is not zero. Given that, here are eight steps that leaders in Washington should take to head off that possibility:

  1. Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously monitored, strictly enforced, and faithfully implemented;
  2. Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on Iranian proliferation-related activities and intelligence-sharing on those activities with key partners;
  3. Deter a future Iranian decision to produce nuclear weapons;
  4. Seek to incorporate key monitoring and verification provisions of the JCPOA into routine IAEA safeguards as applied elsewhere in the Middle East and in the global nonproliferation regime;
  5. Pursue U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with Middle East governments on terms that are realistic and serve U.S. nonproliferation interests;
  6. Promote regional arrangements that restrain fuel cycle developments and build confidence in the peaceful use of regional nuclear programs;
  7. Strengthen security assurances to U.S. partners in the Middle East; and
  8. Promote a stable regional security environment.

Taken together, these steps deal with three core challenges the United States faces in shoring up the nonproliferation regime in the region.

The first is that the central test of nonproliferation in the Middle East will come from how the JCPOA is believed to be meeting its core objective of preventing Iranian nuclear weapons development and Iranian establishment of regional hegemony. It cannot be stressed enough that the decision to pursue nuclear weapons by any state, including those in the region, starts with a sense of vulnerability to core security threats and an inability to address those threats through any other means. The history of nuclear proliferation is one of tit-for-tat armament in the face of overriding security imperatives. Both finished and aborted nuclear programs bear the hallmarks of a security dilemma impelling states to make the political, economic, and security investments into nuclear weapons.

This is no less true for countries across the region than for Iran. To the extent that the overall security environment can be stabilized, there will be less impetus for any Middle Eastern state to develop nuclear weapons. The United States should focus on:

  • Fully implementing and enforcing all sides of the JCPOA (nuclear restrictions, transparency, and sanctions relief);
  • Creating a strong sense of deterrence toward Iran, manifest most clearly in the passage of a standing Authorization to Use Military Force if Iran is determined to be breaking out toward acquisition of a nuclear weapon;
  • Providing security assurances and backing them up with the mechanisms to make them actionable like joint exercises, logistical planning, and cooperation with a range of regional and extra-regional actors; and,
  • Working to promote a more stable regional environment by seeking the resolution of simmering conflicts.

But, these latter two factors also point to another resonant theme in our research: the need for the United States to be a player. After decades of involvement in the region, the United States has yet to settle upon the right balance between involvement and remove. Yet, establishing this equilibrium is essential. States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

In part for this reason, the United States should not only pursue deeper security relationships, but also civil nuclear cooperation with interested states throughout the region. Such a relationship both ensures a closer link between the United States and its partners and discourages the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology by disincentivizing countries from “going it alone.” In the Middle East, the United States would need to find a formulation that offers some flexibility (such as by building in language that would permit the United States to terminate any nuclear cooperation arrangements in the face of sensitive fuel cycle development by the other side).

The United States should also share intelligence more closely with its partners in the region. This is helpful in the short term, of course, but also helps the United States understand the mindset of and intelligence picture of its regional partners in a broader sense. It also helps leaders in Washington address concerns brought about by unfounded rumors or speculation as to Iran’s intentions or capabilities.

Changing how we do business

Even more important than how the JCPOA was negotiated will be how we transition from its restrictions and transparency mechanisms into a new world in 15 to 20 years. 

The United States seek to incorporate elements of the JCPOA into normal international monitoring practices and should negotiate new arrangements to help govern the future development of nuclear technology in the region. 

To achieve the former, the IAEA will need to make some changes to how it does business. For example, the IAEA determines how best to implement its monitoring mission, contingent on acceptance by the country being inspected. The United States and its partners should work with the IAEA (and other countries with significant nuclear activities) to make some parts of the JCPOA standard operating practice, such as online monitoring of enrichment levels. Other elements of the JCPOA may require agreements at the IAEA and beyond for how nuclear-related activities, including those that could have value for nuclear weaponization, are handled. It might be hard to get agreement, not least because there is clear language in the JCPOA that states that it will not be seen as a precedent for future nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, it should still be the ambition of the United States to make such steps part of the norm. 

A far more difficult lift would be organizing a regional approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. This is not the same as creating a multilateral fuel cycle, though some elements that approach would be helpful. Rather, the United States should find ways to craft regional agreements or, failing that, moratoria on aspects of the fuel cycle that others in the region would find threatening. It would be easier to negotiate constraints some aspects than others. For example, spent fuel reprocessing is rare in the Middle East, with only Israel having been known to do it to a significant degree. It may therefore be an attractive first place to begin. Enrichment would be altogether more difficult, but it may be possible to convince states in the region to forego the expansion of their enrichment programs beyond their status quo. For Iran, it would continue to possess uranium enrichment but with constraints that limit the utility of this program for weapons production; its incentive would be to avoid creating the rationale for regional competition. For other countries in the region, it would involve holding off on enrichment, but also on the financial and political investment enrichment would involve—as well refraining from creating a security dilemma for Iran that could produce miscalculation in the future.

While some of these recommendations are more challenging (and may prove impossible), others are potentially easier. By taking a multifaceted approach, the United States increases the chances that no further weapons of mass destruction proliferate in the Middle East down the road. 

Editors’ Note: Richard Nephew and Bob Einhorn spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

Authors

     
 
 




u.s.

What can the U.S. Congress' interest in Prime Minister Modi's visit translate to?


On his fourth trip to the U.S. as Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi will spend some quality time on Capitol Hill on Wednesday, where he'll address a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress. House Speaker Paul Ryan will also host the Indian premier for a lunch, which will be followed by a reception hosted jointly by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees and the India Caucus. What's the significance of this Congressional engagement and what might be Modi's message? 

Given that all the most-recent Indian leaders who've held five-year terms have addressed such joint meetings of Congress, some have asked whether Ryan's invitation to Modi is a big deal. The answer is, yes, it is an honour and not one extended all that often. Since 1934, there have been only 117 such speeches. Leaders from France, Israel and the United Kingdom have addressed joint meetings the most times (8 each), followed by Mexico (7), and Ireland, Italy and South Korea (6 each). With this speech, India will join Germany on the list with leaders having addressed 5 joint meetings of Congress: Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, P.V. Narashima Rao in 1994, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000 and Manmohan Singh in 2005. India's first premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, spoke to the House and Senate in separate back-to-back sessions in 1949 as well. 

Congress is a key stakeholder in the U.S.-India relationship and can play a significant supportive or spoiler role. While American presidents have a lot more lee-way on foreign policy than domestic policy, Congress is not without influence on U.S. foreign relations, and shapes the context for American engagement abroad. Moreover, the breadth and depth of the U.S.-India relationship, as well as the blurring of the line between what constitutes domestic and foreign policy these days means that India's options can be affected by American legislative decisions or the political mood on a range of issues from trade to immigration, energy to defense. 

The Indian Foreign Secretary recently said that the U.S. legislature was at "very much at the heart" of the relationship today. He noted it has been "very supportive" and "even in some more difficult days where actually the Congress has been the part of the US polity which has been very sympathetic to India." But India's had rocky experiences on the Hill as well--which only heightens the need to engage members of Congress at the highest levels. 

The speech and the other interactions offer Modi an opportunity to acknowledge the role of Congress in building bilateral relations, highlight shared interests and values, outline his vision for India and the relationship, as well as tackle some Congressional concerns and note some of India's own. He'll be speaking to multiple audiences in Congress, with members there either because of the strategic imperative for the relationship, others because of the economic potential, yet others because of the values imperative--and then there are those who'll be there because it is important to their constituents, whether business or the Indian diaspora. There is also the audience outside Congress, including in India, where the speech will play in primetime. What will Modi's message be? A glimpse at previous speeches might offer some clues, though Modi is likely also to want to emphasize change. 

The speeches that came before

The speeches of previous prime ministers have addressed some common themes. They've acknowledged shared democratic values. They've mentioned the two-way flow of inspiration and ideas with individuals like Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King getting multiple mentions. They've noted the influence of American founding documents or fathers on the Indian constitution. They've highlighted India's achievements, while stressing that much remains to be done. 

They've noted their country's diversity, and the almost-unique task Indian leaders have had--to achieve development for hundreds of millions in a democratic context. Since Gandhi, each has mentioned the Indian diaspora, noting its contributions to the U.S. Each prime minister has also expressed gratitude for American support or the contribution the U.S. partnership has made to India's development and security. They've acknowledged differences, without dwelling on them. They've addressed contemporary Congressional concerns that existed about Indian policy--in some cases offering a defense of them, in others' explaining the reason behind the policy.

Many of the premiers called for Congress to understand that India, while a democracy like the U.S. and sharing many common interests, would not necessarily achieve its objectives the same way as the U.S. And each subtly has asked for time and space, accommodation and support to achieve their goals--and argued it's in American interests to see a strong, stable, prosperous, democratic India.

In terms of subjects, each previous speech has mentioned economic growth and development as a key government priority, highlighting what policymakers were doing to achieve them. Since Gandhi, all have mentioned nuclear weapons though with different emphases: he spoke of disarmament; Rao of de-nuclearization and concerns about proliferation; two years after India's nuclear test, Vajpayee noted India's voluntary moratorium on testing and tried to reassure Congress about Indian intentions; and speaking in the context of the U.S.-India civil nuclear talks, Singh noted the importance of civil nuclear energy and defended India's track record on nuclear non-proliferation.

Since Rao, every prime minister has mentioned the challenge that terrorism posed for both the U.S. and India, with Vajpayee and Singh implicitly noting the challenge that a neighboring country poses in this regard from India's perspective. And Rao and Singh made the case for India to get a permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council.

The style of the speeches has changed, as has the tone. Earlier speeches were littered with quotes from sources like Christopher Columbus, Swami Vivekananda, Abraham Lincoln, Lala Lajpat Rai and the Rig Veda. Perhaps that was reflective of the style of speechwriting in those eras, but perhaps it was also because there were fewer concrete issues in the bilateral relationship to address. The evolution in the areas of cooperation is evident in the speeches. 

Rao's speech about two decades ago, for instance, listed U.S.-India common interests as peacekeeping, environmental crises, and combating international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Compare that to Singh's address which talked of cooperation on a range of issues from counterterrorism, the economy, agriculture, energy security, healthy policy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), democracy promotion, and global governance.

The speech yet to come

Modi will likely strike some similar themes, acknowledging the role that the U.S. Congress has played in shaping the relationship and expressing gratitude for its support. Like Vajpayee, particularly in a U.S. election year, Modi might note the bipartisan support the relationship has enjoyed in recent years. He'll undoubtedly talk about shared democratic values in America's "temple of democracy"--a phrase he used for the Indian parliament when he first entered it after his 2014 election victory. Modi will not necessarily mention the concerns about human rights, trade and investment policies, non-proliferation or India's Iran policy that have arisen on the Hill, but he will likely address them indirectly. 

For example, by emphasizing India's pluralism and diversity and the protection its Constitution gives to minorities, or the constructive role the country could play regionally (he might give examples such as the recently inaugurated dam in Afghanistan). Given the issues on the bilateral agenda, he'll likely mention the strategic convergence, his economic policy plans, terrorism, India's non-proliferation record, defense and security cooperation, and perhaps--like Vajpayee--the Asia-Pacific (without directly mentioning China). And like Vajpayee, he might be more upfront about Indian concerns and the need to accommodate them. 

While he might strike some similar themes as his predecessors and highlight aspects of continuity, Modi will also want to emphasize that it's not business as usual. He'll likely try to outline the change that he has brought and wants to bring. In the past, he has noted the generational shift that he himself represents as the first Indian prime minister born after independence and the Modi government's latest tag line is, of course, "Transforming India." And he might emphasize that this changed India represents an opportunity for the U.S.

He won't wade directly into American election issues, but might note the importance of U.S. global engagement. He might also try to address some of the angst in the U.S. about other countries taking advantage of it and being "takers." He could do this by making the case that India is not a free rider--that through its businesses, market, talent and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society, through its economic development it will contribute to global growth, and through Indian prosperity, security and a more proactive international role--with a different approach than another Asian country has taken--it'll contribute to regional stability and order. He might also suggest ways that the U.S. can facilitate India playing such a role.

Unlike previous leaders, he has not tended to appeal to others not to ask India to do more regionally and globally because it's just a developing country and needs to focus internally. The Modi government has been highlighting the contributions of India and Indians to global and regional peace and prosperity--through peacekeeping, the millions that fought in the World Wars, HADR operations in its neighborhood, evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued not just Indian citizens, but Americans as well.

His government has been more vocal in joint contexts of expressing its views on the importance of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions--and we might hear more on this in his address. Overall, a theme will likely be that India is not just a "taker," and will be a responsible, collaborative stakeholder.

It'll be interesting to see whether the Indian prime minister notes the role that his predecessors have played in getting the relationship to this point. With some exceptions--for example, he acknowledged Manmohan Singh's contribution during President Obama's visit to India last year--he has not tended to do so. But there's a case to be made for doing so--it can reassure members of Congress that the relationship transcends one person or party and is based on a strategic rationale, thus making it more sustainable. Such an acknowledgement could be in the context of noting that it's not just Delhi and Washington that have built and are building this relationship, but the two countries' states, private sectors, educational institutions and people. 

This wouldn't prevent Modi from highlighting the heightened intensity of the last two years, particularly the progress in defense and security cooperation. (From a more political perspective, given that there has been criticism in some quarters of India-U.S. relations becoming closer, it can also serve as a reminder that the Congress party-led government followed a similar path).

Modi will be competing for media attention in the U.S. thanks to the focus in the U.S. on the Democratic primaries this week, but he'll have Congressional attention. But it's worth remembering that Indian prime ministers have been feted before, but if they don't deliver on the promise of India and India-U.S. relations that they often outline, disillusionment sets in. Modi will have to convince them that India is a strategic bet worth making--one that will pay off.

This piece was originally published by Huffington Post India.

Authors

Publication: Huffington Post India
     
 
 




u.s.

The top 10 metropolitan port complexes in the U.S.


The United States exported and imported $4.0 trillion worth of international goods in 2014, making it the world’s second-largest trader, after China. The responsibility for moving all those products falls to the country’s 400-plus seaports, airports, and border-crossing facilities, though a smaller group does most of the country’s heavy lifting. In fact, ports in just 10 metropolitan areas move 60 percent of all international goods by value.

This level of concentrated port activity creates a spatial mismatch in the country’s trade flows. While a few ports handle a majority of international trade, few of the goods leaving or entering those ports start or end their journey in that port’s local market: 96 percent actually move to or from other parts of the United States. As a result, problems within and outside certain port facilities—whether a labor dispute like the recent West Coast port strike or congestion near Philadelphia’s seaport or airport—quickly become logistical costs borne by the entire country.

The 10 largest metropolitan port complexes represent a wide range of U.S. geographies, modal specialties, and international connections. Total volumes for these port complexes, listed below, are based on an aggregation of imports and exports across all sea, air, truck, rail, and pipeline facilities in each region. All data are from 2010, and you can find more detailed metrics within the Metro Freight interactive.

10. Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-IN-WI

Total Value: $92.8 billion
Local Share: 4.6 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($41.5 billion)

A traditional Midwest powerhouse of production, metropolitan Chicago is home to a variety of industries and infrastructure assets that connect it to the Midwest and global marketplace. The proximity of factories, warehouses, and rail lines to its major port facilities, particularly O'Hare International Airport, places Chicago at a strategic crossroads for goods distribution.

9. San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA

Total Value: $103.9 billion
Local Share: 4.4 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($77.6 billion)

The San Francisco metro area—and the Bay Area as a whole—may be more well-known as a center for tech innovation, but it also contains some of the largest port facilities in the country. The Port of Oakland and the Port of San Francisco  account for the bulk of water traffic ($55.3 billion overall) moving through the area, while Oakland International Airport and San Francisco International Airport help transport nearly $48.6 billion in electronics, precision instruments, and other high-value goods.

8. Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA

Total Value: $116.9 billion
Local Share: 8.2 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($89.4 billion)

The Seattle metro area plays a critical role cycling goods throughout the Pacific Northwest and the rest of the country, largely owing to the key connections its port facilities have forged with China ($47.9 billion) and Japan ($22.0 billion). Valuable transportation equipment and electronics represent a large chunk of these port volumes ($52.7 billion), although sizable amounts of machinery, textiles, and agricultural products are also processed through area facilities. The Port of Seattle and the Port of Tacoma are especially important in this respect, as they look to partner more closely in years to come.

7. Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL

Total Value: $123.7 billion
Local Share: 2.0 percent
Top Trade Region: Latin America ($97.2 billion)

Miami is the country’s primary gateway to Latin America, especially when excluding petroleum-related trade moving through Gulf Coast ports. And while the region and state have made impressive investments at the Port Miami seaport, it is actually Miami International Airport that generates the most regional trade ($74.8 billion). Miami’s facilities are a key component of Florida’s statewide strategy to use trade and logistics to grow local industries.

6. Laredo, TX

Total Value: $124.4 billion
Local Share: 0.0 percent
Top Trade Region: NAFTA ($121.0 billion)

Laredo may only house 250,000 people, but it might be the most important Texas metro area you’ve never heard of, considering that virtually every international good passing through it heads somewhere else in the U.S. The border town is the southernmost point of Interstate 35—the so-called NAFTA superhighway—and handles almost half of U.S./Mexican surface trade. With automotive and other supply chains continuing to stretch across the binational border, Laredo is poised to grow in importance over the coming years.

5. Anchorage, AK

Total Value: $137.4 billion
Local Share: 0.2 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($136.0 billion)

Anchorage may be thousands of miles from the closest U.S. market, but it has a long legacy as a major connector to the Pacific marketplace, resting less than 9.5 hours by air from 90 percent of the industrialized world. In particular, Ted Stevens International Airport was the cargo hub for Northwest Airlines Cargo, once the country’s largest carrier, and still has a vibrant freight business led by FedEx Express and UPS hubs. Continued growth in high-value, low-weight goods trade with Asia can only benefit Anchorage’s cargo business.

4. Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX

Total Value: $168.1 billion
Local Share: 10.6 percent
Top Trade Region: Latin America ($48.3 billion)

As one of the world’s leading centers for energy and chemical production, the Houston metro area—along with other parts of the Gulf Coast region—depends on an enormous set of seaport facilities to transport these goods. Collectively, $100.6 billion of energy products and chemicals/plastics pass through these ports annually, accounting for about 60 percent of all their international goods. Stretching more than 25 miles in length and situated close to the Gulf of Mexico, the Port of Houston houses many of the area’s marine terminals.

3. Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI

Total Value: $206.7 billion
Local Share: 4.9 percent
Top Trade Region: NAFTA ($186.6 billion)

Although the Detroit metro area contains a number of freight facilities, such as the Port of Detroit, that unite the Great Lakes region, its land border crossings to Canada make it one of the busiest sites of commerce in North America and beyond. Each year, nearly $175.8 billion in international goods travel by truck and rail between Detroit and Canada—relying almost exclusively on the aging Ambassador Bridge and the Michigan Central Railway Tunnel. The planned New International Trade Crossing (NITC), however, holds promise for expanding capacity at this crucial junction.

2. New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA

Total Value: $349.2 billion
Local Share: 9.7 percent
Top Trade Region: Europe ($153.9 billion)

The Port of New York and New Jersey, which spans several marine facilities including the Port Newark-Elizabeth Marine Terminal, is one of the biggest freight assets in the country, cementing the New York metro area’s role as the chief East Coast seaport complex ($185.0 billion). Remarkably, almost the same value of goods ($162.7 billion) flows through the area’s expansive air cargo facilities, including John F. Kennedy International Airport and Newark Liberty International Airport. Combined with New York’s enormous amount of global corporate headquarters, New York is the country’s most globally fluent metro area.

1. Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA

Total Value: $417.5 billion
Local Share: 6.0 percent
Top Trade Region: Asia Pacific ($362.2 billion)

The Los Angeles metropolitan area not only boasts two of the largest seaports in the Western Hemisphere—the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach—but also has one of the busiest cargo airports nationally, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Together, these port facilities channel a wide range of international goods like electronics, machinery, and textiles across the country, many of which come from Asian trade partners like China ($211.3 billion) and Japan ($58.5 billion). Still, only a fraction of these goods actually start or end locally (6 percent), speaking to the port complex’s extensive geographic reach in the U.S.

Authors

      
 
 




u.s.

U.S. concentrated poverty in the wake of the Great Recession


      
 
 




u.s.

Cyber runs: How a cyber attack could affect U.S. financial institutions

Cyber risks to financial stability have received significant attention from policy makers. These risks are worsened by the increasing diversity of perpetrators—including state and non-state actors, cyber terrorists, and “hacktivists”—who are not necessarily motivated by financial gain. In fact, for some actors, the potential of exploiting a cyber event to inject systemic risk into our…

       




u.s.

What’s at stake at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue?

The seventh meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue—or S&ED—takes place June 23 to 24 in Washington, D.C. Since 2009, the S&ED has offered a platform for both countries to address bilateral, regional, and global challenges and opportunities. Brookings John L. Thornton China Center scholars Cheng Li, Richard Bush, David Dollar, and Daniel Wright offer insight into this significant meeting.

      
 
 




u.s.

What’s at stake in Hong Kong for the U.S.?

In a recent episode of the Brookings Cafeteria podcast, Senior Fellow Richard Bush talked about the origins of Hong Kong’s “umbrella movement” in 2014, the territory’s relationship with Beijing, and his thoughts on electoral reform.

      
 
 




u.s.

How Poor Are America's Poorest? U.S. $2 A Day Poverty In A Global Context


In the United States, the official poverty rate for 2012 stood at 15 percent based on the national poverty line which is equivalent to around $16 per person per day. Of the 46.5 million Americans living in poverty, 20.4 million live under half the poverty line. This begs the question of just how poor America’s poorest people are.

Poverty, in one form or other, exists in every country. But the most acute, absolute manifestations of poverty are assumed to be limited to the developing world. This is reflected in the fact that rich countries tend to set higher poverty lines than poor countries, and that global poverty estimates have traditionally excluded industrialized countries and their populations altogether.

An important study on U.S. poverty by Luke Shaefer and Kathryn Edin gently challenges this assumption. Using an alternative dataset from the one employed for the official U.S. poverty measure, Shaefer and Edin show that millions of Americans live on less than $2 a day—a threshold commonly used to measure poverty in the developing world. Depending on the exact definitions used, they find that up to 5 percent of American households with children are shown to fall under this parsimonious poverty line.

Methodologies for measuring poverty differ wildly both within and across countries, so comparisons and their interpretation demand extreme care.

These numbers are intended to shock—and they succeed. The United States is known for having higher inequality and a less generous social safety net than many affluent countries in Europe, but the acute deprivations that flow from this are less understood. A crude comparison of Shaefer and Edin’s estimates with the World Bank’s official $2 a day poverty estimates for developing economies would place the United States level with or behind a large set of countries, including Russia (0.1 percent), the West Bank and Gaza (0.3 percent), Jordan (1.6 percent), Albania (1.7 percent), urban Argentina (1.9 percent), urban China (3.5 percent), and Thailand (4.1 percent). Many of these countries are recipients of American foreign aid. However, methodologies for measuring poverty differ wildly both within and across countries, so such comparisons and their interpretation demand extreme care.

This brief is organized into two parts. In the first part, we examine the welfare of America’s poorest people using a variety of different data sources and definitions. These generate estimates of the number of Americans living under $2 a day that range from 12 million all the way down to zero. This wide spectrum reflects not only a lack of agreement on how poverty can most reliably be measured, but the particular ways in which poverty is, and isn’t, manifested in the U.S.. In the second part, we reexamine America’s $2 a day poverty in the context of global poverty. We begin by identifying the source and definition of poverty that most faithfully replicates the World Bank’s official poverty measure for the developing world to allow a fairer comparison between the U.S. and developing nations. We then compare the characteristics of poverty in the U.S. and the developing world to provide a more complete picture of the nature of poverty in these different settings. Finally, we explain why comparisons of poverty in the U.S. and the developing world, despite their limitations and pitfalls, are likely to become more common.

Downloads

Authors

      
 
 




u.s.

What do China’s global investments mean for China, the U.S., and the world?


China’s economic rise is one of the factors creating strains in the international financial order. China is already the largest trading nation and the second largest economy. It is likely to emerge in the next few years as the world’s largest net creditor. It is already #2 behind Japan. Until recently, China’s main foreign asset has been central bank reserves, mostly invested in U.S. Treasury bonds and similar instruments.

In the last couple of years, however, this pattern has started to change. China’s reserves peaked at about $4 trillion at the end of 2014. Since then, the People’s Bank of China has sold some reserves, but the country as a whole is still accumulating net foreign assets as evidenced by the large current account surplus. What is new is that the overseas asset purchases are coming from the private sector and state enterprises, not from the official sector. The Institute for International Finance estimated that the net private capital outflow from China was $676 billion in 2015. (That estimate includes outward investments by China’s state enterprises, which strictly speaking are not “private”; the point is to distinguish between official holding of foreign assets at the central bank and more commercial transactions.) As investment opportunities diminish in China owing to excess capacity and declining profitability, this commercial outflow of capital from China is likely to continue at a high level.

Tilted playing field

Most of the major investing countries in the world are developed economies; in addition to making direct investments elsewhere, they tend to be very open to inward investment. China is unusual in that it is a developing country that has emerged as a major investor. China itself is an important destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), and opening to the outside world has been an important part of its reform program since 1978. However, China’s policy is to steer FDI to particular sectors. In general, it has welcomed FDI into most but not all of manufacturing. However, other sectors of the economy are relatively closed to FDI, including mining, construction, and most modern services. It is not surprising that China is less open to FDI than developed economies such as the United States. But it is also the case that China is relatively closed among developing countries.

The OECD calculates an index of FDI restrictiveness for OECD countries and major emerging markets. The index is for overall FDI restrictiveness, and also for restrictiveness by sector. China in 2014 was more restrictive than the other BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa). Brazil and South Africa are highly open, similar to advanced economies with measures around 0.1 (on a scale of 0=open and 1=closed). India and Russia are less open with overall measures around 0.2. China is the most closed with an index above 0.4. Some of the key sectors in which China is investing abroad, such as mining, infrastructure, and finance, are relatively closed at home.

This lack of reciprocity creates problems for China’s partners. China has the second largest market in the world. In these protected sectors, Chinese firms can grow unfettered by competition, and then use their domestic financial strength to develop overseas operations. In finance, for example, China’s four state-owned commercial banks operate in a domestic market in which foreign investors have been restricted to about 1 percent of the market. The four banks are now among the largest in the world and are expanding overseas. China’s monopoly credit card company, Union Pay, is similarly a world leader based on its protected domestic market. A similar strategy applies in mining and telecommunications.

China is unusual in that it is a developing country that has emerged as a major investor.

This lack of reciprocity creates an unlevel playing field. A concrete example is the acquisition of the U.S. firm Smithfield by the Chinese firm Shuanghui. In a truly open market, Smithfield, with its superior technology and food-safety procedures, may well have taken over Shuanghui and expanded into the rapidly growing Chinese pork market. However, investment restrictions prevented such an option, so the best way for Smithfield to expand into China was to be acquired by the Chinese firm. Smithfield CEO Larry Pope stated the deal would preserve "the same old Smithfield, only with more opportunities and new markets and new frontiers." No Chinese pork would be imported to the United States, he stated, but rather Shuanghui desired to export American pork to take advantage of growing demand for foreign food products in China due to recent food scandals. Smithfield's existing management team is expected to remain intact, as is its U.S. workforce. 

The United States does not have much leverage to level the playing field. It does have a review process for acquisitions of U.S. firms by foreign ones. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is chaired by Treasury and includes economic agencies (Commerce, Trade Representative) as well as the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. By statute, CFIUS can only examine national security issues involved in an acquisition. It reviewed the Smithfield deal and let it proceed because there was no obvious national security issue. CFIUS only reviews about 100 transactions per year and the vast majority of them proceed. This system reflects the U.S. philosophy of being very open to foreign investment.

A thorn in the relationship

Chinese policies create a dilemma for its partners. Taking those policies as given, it would be irrational for economies such as the United States to limit Chinese investments. In the Shuanghui-Smithfield example, the access to the Chinese market gained through the takeover makes the assets of the U.S. firm more valuable and benefits its shareholders. Assuming that the firm really does expand into China, the deal will benefit the workers of the firm as well. It would be even better, however, if China opened up its protected markets so that such expansions could take place in the most efficient way possible. In some cases, that will be Chinese firms acquiring U.S. ones, but in many other cases it would involve U.S. firms expanding into China. 

This issue of getting China to open up its protected markets is high on the policy agenda of the United States and other major economies. The United States has been negotiating with China over a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that would be based on a small negative list; that is, there would be a small number of agreed sectors that remain closed on each side, but otherwise investment would be open in both directions. So far, however, negotiations on the BIT have been slow. It is difficult for China to come up with an offer that includes only a small number of protected sectors. And there are questions as to whether the U.S. Congress would approve an investment treaty with China in the current political environment, even if a good one were negotiated.

The issue of lack of reciprocity between China’s investment openness and the U.S. system is one of the thorniest issues in the bilateral relationship.

The issue of lack of reciprocity between China’s investment openness and the U.S. system is one of the thorniest issues in the bilateral relationship. A new president will have to take a serious look at the CFIUS process and the enabling legislation and consider what combination of carrots and sticks would accelerate the opening of China’s markets. In terms of sticks, the United States could consider an amendment to the CFIUS legislation that would limit acquisitions by state enterprises from countries with which the United States does not have a bilateral investment treaty. In terms of carrots, the best move for the United States is to approve the Trans-Pacific Partnership and implement it well so that there is deeper integration among like-minded countries in Asia-Pacific. Success in this will encourage China to open up further and eventually meet the high standards set by TPP. Greater investment openness is part of China’s own reform plan but it clearly needs incentives to make real progress. 

For more on this and related topics, please see David Dollar's new paper, "China as a global investor."

Authors