Ray Quiñones has joined the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) as director of Government Relations, effective today. Quiñones will report to Shawn Donilon, executive vice president of Government Relations.

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 29, Parliament Buildings

Room 30, Parliament Buildings

It’s actually good one of the world’s largest cruise ships strayed into the safety zone and delayed a SpaceX rocket launch, Port Canaveral CEO Capt. John Murray says.

In these uncertain times, maintaining frequent communications with employees is as crucial as maintaining and growing your business.

By Stephen Dombroski, Director of Food and Beverage Markets, QAD.

For many business organizations, internal departments working independently of one another is the norm. This norm creates siloed day-to-day functions and rigid disconnects in processes. This is especially true when it comes to sales and operations planning (S&OP).

Vampire bats have complex social relationships.

Location: Electronic Resource- 

The Genetics of Modern Assyrians and their Relationship to Other People of the Middle East

The 'Without Remorse' actress recalls her first meeting with husband, claiming their romance started as a no-strings-attached relationship before it got serious.

After declaring that he is 'focusing' on his romance with his final rose recipient, the season 25 star of 'The Bachelor' is caught on camera wrapping his arm lovingly around her during an outing.

The 'Without Remorse' actress recalls her first meeting with husband, claiming their romance started as a no-strings-attached relationship before it got serious.

A lesson from history.

This week we will look at forgiveness and what it can do for restless human hearts. Without forgiveness, we remain victims. Forgiveness has more to do with ourselves than with the person or persons who have wronged us.

Relations between the more than 25,000 U.S. military forces on Okinawa and that Japanese island's 1.5 million residents have long been strained over pollution, crime and overcrowding associated with the 31 U.S. military bases there. Now a new outbreak of COVID-19 cases among American service members stationed on Japan's southernmost territory is fraying things further. As of Tuesday, 100 new cases of COVID-19 have been detected in the past week at five U.S. bases on Okinawa, according to Japan's independent Kyodo News agency. Beyond those bases, where only three cases had earlier been confirmed, Okinawa has had a relatively low impact from the disease, reporting 148 infections and seven deaths. At a weekend news conference, Okinawa Gov. Denny Tamaki called the surge of coronavirus cases among U.S. military personnel "extremely regrettable," according to the Reuters news agency. "I can't help but have strong doubts about the U.S. military's measures to prevent infections," Reuters

"There was nothing tawdry about it. It was companionship. And they loved music."

Sex expert Shannon T. Boodram explains open relationships.

From Ava Abramowitz: The DC Circuit of the US Court of Appeals is looking for a new director of workplace relations. The director provides confidential and impartial assistance to judges and court employees, including Federal Public Defender’s Office employees, on workplace conduct matters. The director works closely with the Employment Dispute Resolution Coordinators (EDRCs) to … Continue reading Help Wanted: Director of Workplace Relations →

Her new bae has some interesting characteristics.

Garrett runs a tight ship, he cannot be tested.

How do you build mutual respect, a quality that everyone values but few know how to cultivate consistently? We know it’s important—whether it’s in our personal relationships or at work—but actually developing and maintaining it can be challenging. This article is here to help you understand what mutual respect really means, why it matters, and ... Read more

The post Cultivating Mutual Respect: A Guide to Healthy Relationships appeared first on LifeHack.

Empathy is one of those quiet superpowers that can reshape our lives for the better. It isn’t flashy, but it has an impact everywhere—from our closest relationships to the way we interact at work, and even how we perceive our broader society. For example, consider a parent who takes the time to understand their child’s ... Read more

The post Empathy in Action: Techniques to Strengthen Relationships and Well-being appeared first on LifeHack.

Words have the power to lift us up or tear us down, and nowhere is this more true than in our closest relationships. Understanding how language shapes our emotional connections can make all the difference between feeling deeply loved or feeling disconnected. One of the most potent tools for enhancing intimacy and trust in a ... Read more

The post Building Lasting Relationships Through Words of Affirmation appeared first on LifeHack.

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This is a paper produced as part of the PROP2 (Practitioner Research: Outcomes and Partnership) programme, a partnership between the Centre for Research on Families and Relationships (CRFR) at the University of Edinburgh and Iriss that was about health and social care in Scotland. This paper was written by Geraldine Ditta from Alzheimer Scotland who participated in the PROP2 programme. People living with dementia are at risk of becoming socially isolated and disconnected from their local communities. Reactions from others on being told someone has dementia can have a significant impact on the person with dementia’s sense of self. This study sought to explore the perceptions of people with dementia in relation to attitudes within their communities and how they subsequently respond. Semi-structured interviews were carried out to examine how they feel about their lives with dementia.

The rise of these treatments has major implications for how we think about obesity, says James Gallagher.

Olivia Nuzzi has withdrawn her protective order request against her ex-fiancé Ryan Lizza months after her relationship with RFK Jr. was made public.

Jude Law added that people in middle age should start to reflect on their relationship patterns.

Elon Musk could have a role in Donald Trump’s White House, and this could mean stricter AI standards. It’s no… Continue reading Musk and Trump’s relationship could lead to tougher AI standards

The post Musk and Trump’s relationship could lead to tougher AI standards appeared first on ReadWrite.

Russia–China defence and security relations: Insights from the expert community 13 September 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 August 2022 Online

Experts share insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations. 

In the defence and security realms, Russia–China relations resemble more pragmatic cooperation based on shared, calculated interests than an alliance.

This event presents and discusses key findings from a recent expert survey conducted by Chatham House with the aim to gather insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations.

Survey responses helped identify areas of bilateral cooperation but also crucial friction points and obstacles that prevent the relationship from developing further, as well as policy pathways for the West.

Russia-China Defence and Security Relations

This project explores the military and security linkages between Russia and China.

The project seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of Russia-China relations in the defence and security realms.

It also seeks to understand Russian political and security perceptions regarding Chinese inroads into what Russia considers its ‘near abroad’, as well as other sources of irritation and tension in the bilateral relationship. It offers recommendations to guide NATO policy responses.

Beijing briefing: China bets on warmer EU relations The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

With the Sino-US Xi relationship cooling, Xi Jinping is sending a new diplomatic team to Europe – but his ties to Putin may mean slow progress, writes Yu Jie.

It has been a momentous year for Beijing. Twelve months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its relations with the West have become more strained than ever. And after President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term in office at the 20th Party Congress, the country has embarked on a chaotic exit from the Covid lockdown amid hopes the economy will rebound quickly.

Some are already asking if Beijing will set a course correction in its diplomatic priorities to spare itself some of the setbacks it incurred in 2022. But when it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. 

The Chinese leadership seeks to create a stable external environment to allow its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was adopted in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi is likely to follow it as a time-honoured recipe for diplomatic reconciliation.

China’s awkward position

Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its failure to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. Xi and his colleagues have begun to realize that cooperation with Russia comes with substantial limits to avoid undermining China’s own political priorities and longer-term economic interests.

Interestingly, pundits interpreted the omission of ‘pursuing new types of great power relations’ in the 20th Party Congress report as an acceptance by the party leadership that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is likely to remain, with little prospect of improvement in the short term.

Chinese diplomatic literature has always presented Russia as a great power, but the abandonment of such terms signals that Beijing is keen to put clear daylight between itself and Vladimir Putin, although international commentators may argue this is not enough and nothing has changed.

There has been little sign of China using its influence to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. Facing, as it feels it now does, a ‘collective West’ and not the Americans alone, Beijing has concluded there are few reasons not to move closer to Russia.

But a reset would appear necessary if China is to tackle its domestic economic woes. So far, Beijing’s main political tactic has been to reassure European countries that it is willing to use its ties with Russia to restrain Putin from entertaining the deployment of nuclear weapons. That was the message conveyed during the visit of Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, and it will be said again when both President Emmanuel Macron of France and Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, each visit later this year.

Economically, China has traditionally relied on its relationships with the European Union and the United States to support innovation and growth. So, a perceived isolation from ‘a collective West’ is not an attractive option given Xi’s hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after dropping the country’s ‘zero-covid’ policy. A precarious bilateral tie with the US has already reduced Beijing’s choice of partners and consumers. Worsening Sino-US relations and a tightening of access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted Beijing not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but to reconfigure its approach to foreign affairs.

China is making a renewed push to strengthen ties with the Global South, which does not see the war in Ukraine as black and white as the West does. Such a move is only possible because five decades of engagement with the ‘collective West’ has allowed China to emerge from poverty and become a global economic powerhouse.

A new diplomatic team

In an attempt to reset the tone of China’s relations with the EU, its largest trading partner, Xi has formed a new diplomatic team headed by Qin Gang, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is returning from his post in Washington as ambassador to the US and who has a background in European affairs. Achieving warmer relations will be easier said than done, however, as China has maintained its ‘neutrality’ at Russia’s aggression since February 2022.

India-China relations: Is the Quad the answer? Interview NCapeling 28 March 2023

The threat of China’s military aggression is being felt across the world, but this is a phenomenon India has been contending with for decades.

India’s border with China became the site of tense conflict in 2020, which led to India reinvesting in the Quad. Arzan Tarapore discusses key issues from his International Affairs article, such as how India is responding to increased aggression at the border and how a reinvigorated Quad may hold answers to balancing China in the Indo-Pacific.

What have India-China relations been like in the past?

Relations between India and China have varied over the decades. In the years following World War Two there was some hope they would find common cause in their international outlooks but that was quite quickly extinguished with their border war of 1962.

Since then, the two countries have oscillated between detente and tension. It took decades for them to normalize their relations and slowly build trust through several confidence-building agreements.

More recently it seemed the two countries were both willing to set aside their border dispute in order to profit from their burgeoning economic relationship – as, for both, there is no question development and economic growth is the primary national objective.

The question has been the extent to which their unresolved sovereignty and security issues undermine those goals as, at the same time, they both began paying more attention to the security of their territorial claims.

China in particular matched its explosive economic growth with startling military modernization and assertiveness. Its long-standing military doctrine and terrain advantages means it relies heavily on quality military infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau and it has accelerated the pace of those infrastructure upgrades and expansion.

In the 2010s, India belatedly began to improve its own transport infrastructure near the border, which threatened to reduce China’s military advantages. The earlier quiet on the border began to crack and China began launching border incursions with increasing frequency and scale.

This was a dynamic, iterative process, with incursions prompting India to accelerate its infrastructure development, which in turn probably prompted more incursions by China.

What happened around 2020 to change their relationship?

The cycle of competitive security policies on the border reached a tipping point in 2020 with Chinese incursions at multiple points simultaneously in Ladakh, apparently designed to establish a new status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian and Chinese-controlled territory.

The Indian political leadership played down the incursions but both Indian and Chinese militaries rushed to reinforce their positions near the border. They held multiple rounds of military talks which made halting progress.

On 15 June 2020, a skirmish resulted in the loss of 20 Indian troops, and an unknown number of Chinese troops. In the weeks that followed, both sides further reinforced their positions in a scramble to gain positional advantage.

How has India responded to China’s increasing military might?

The Indian government’s response to the Chinese landgrab was to threaten the entire bilateral relationship. In a reversal of decades of policy, it argued China had demolished the painstakingly constructed confidence-building measures on the border, and so the relationship could not continue as normal until the border crisis was resolved.

It imposed new restrictions on Chinese investment in India – even as overall trade continued to increase – and adopted a more assertive diplomatic posture.

Strategically, the 2020 border crisis had two major effects. First, it reinforced the Indian proclivity to see its northern borders as the primary threat to Indian national security.

India has heavily reinforced the border, reassigning some major formations and making numerous new investments in military capability to manage the threat. The significance of this however is that, in the context of budget scarcity, these military improvements come at the cost of potential increases in India’s capability in the Indian Ocean region – ultimately a more consequential zone of competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The Indian government may yet change course and reallocate resources for power projection but, at this stage, I see no evidence of that.

The second major strategic effect of the crisis was to unleash Indian cooperation with its partners, especially the US and the reinvigorated Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

India has generally avoided formal international alliances, and the Quad was in hiatus for years – why has India invested in it now?

India had always been mindful not to embrace external partners too closely so as to maintain its freedom of action and to not provoke a Chinese reaction. But since the Ladakh crisis, New Delhi has a newfound willingness to work more closely with the US, Japan, and Australia – because it calculates correctly that these partnerships enhance its freedom to act, and that China has already adopted the aggressive posture India feared.

It is important to note however that the border crisis was not the only driver of India’s strategic adjustment. The crisis coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic which highlighted to India the ineffectiveness of existing international institutional arrangements.

For New Delhi, then, the twin crises of Ladakh and the pandemic stressed the need for new international arrangements, and the Quad offered the best combination of agility and capability to meet the most pressing challenges of the Indo-Pacific region.

What do the Quad partners hope to achieve in their renewed partnership?

Beginning in 2021, the Quad assumed far greater significance. The first national leader summits happened – which have since continued at regular intervals – and its members have all agreed to a continually expanding agenda of work.

It seeks to provide international public goods, and everything from climate action to telecommunications regulations. Critically, it has limited its security role to some niche and relatively unprovocative areas, such as humanitarian assistance and maritime domain awareness – issues which benefit the Indo-Pacific as a whole and do not intensify security competition. It has certainly eschewed military cooperation.

Interestingly, the four Quad countries have also separately accelerated their military cooperation, bilaterally, trilaterally, and even quadrilaterally. But that cooperation lies outside the formal mechanisms of the Quad.

What impact will these Quad actions have on Chinese aggression and the Indo-Pacific region?

This Quad approach, which I call ‘zone balancing’ in my article, is specifically designed to build the capacity and resilience of regional states, and to not inflame dyadic security competition.

The relatively uncompetitive character of these activities helps to deflate Chinese claims that the Quad is an antagonistic new bloc, and to ameliorate southeast Asian states’ concerns over the potential intensification of strategic competition.

But the Quad’s agenda is not fixed and not bounded. It has expanded year on year and may continue to extend into new areas. This gives it a degree of flexibility and coercive leverage as Beijing cannot be confident about the Quad’s future direction.

This slate of activities has a lot of utility in building the Quad’s regional legitimacy and habits of cooperation among its members. But it conspicuously does not address the region’s most pressing security challenges.

It is not, in its current form, equipped to manage the challenge of territorial disputes or aggression. So the Quad will not address India’s unresolved border dispute with China, potential crises over Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

I would argue, however, that the four members of the Quad have unparalleled advantages of capacity and geography. With further military cooperation, even outside the formal structures of the Quad, they have the potential to deter Chinese aggression, but that remains subject to their political preferences.

Will other countries in different parts of the world adopt similar balancing strategies?

Zone balancing could be an attractive strategy for other countries which want to either avoid the costs of hard military balancing, or to not provoke their rivals.

It has been used in the past – such as the Marshall Plan during the early Cold War – and I would not be surprised if other countries competing with China, or even China itself, use it.

30 Years of Non-Maghreb: What next for Algeria-Morocco relations? 10 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 August 2024 Online

Experts discuss Algeria-Morocco relations and implications for regional actors.

In 1989, the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) brought a promise of economic integration and strengthening of ties between Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia for the benefit and prosperity of their societies.

Decades on, very little has been accomplished in developing the Maghreb project, and the region remains one of the least integrated in the world, despite significant social and cultural similarities between member countries. The last time the full UMA leadership met was back in 1994, with August 2024 marking 30 years of closed borders between Algeria and Morocco.

Relations between the two largest Maghreb countries have deteriorated further since 2020 due to disagreements over issues of Western Sahara, and, most recently, the Abraham Accords, with Algeria cutting diplomatic ties with Morocco in 2021.

In this webinar, experts will discuss:

• Which primary obstacles are hindering Maghreb integration and Algeria-Morocco relations?
• What are the costs and implications for regional countries?
• What are the positions of Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania?
• What is required for a rapprochement and how can external partners support this? 

Brexit: Implications for EU–China Relations Research paper sysadmin 10 May 2017

For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties – with China’s relative focus on Germany becoming even more significant.

Summary

• The extent of current UK relations with China means that Brexit will notably reduce the scale and diversity of overall EU–China economic and commercial interactions. But the impact will vary across different areas.
• In policy terms, liberal voices on economic policy towards China will be somewhat weaker among the post-Brexit EU27. Brexit will not be the most important factor determining the future level of strategic coherence in EU policy towards China.
• The impact on post-Brexit EU27 trade with China will be felt both in the volume of trade and its composition. Following Brexit the EU will no longer be China’s largest trading partner.
• There will be some relative shift in Chinese investment in Europe away from the UK, though over time the impact of Europe-wide policy approaches to Chinese investment will have more impact than Brexit per se.
• EU–China educational exchanges will be weakened after Brexit, but inbound Chinese tourism will be less affected by Brexit.
• By 2025, the EU will have compensated for Brexit’s impact in some areas, but much depends on the EU’s own trajectory over the next decade.
• For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties. Within the EU, China’s relative focus on Germany will be even more significant.

China's Evolving Economic Relations with North Africa: Before and After COVID-19 10 September 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 August 2020 Online

China’s economic presence across North Africa has grown in recent years. The global power has forged close economic relationships with Egypt and Algeria, while also continuing to develop ties with Morocco and Tunisia.

Beijing, which views the region as a geostrategic intersection between Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa, has primarily focused its efforts on developing bilateral relations, while also working within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF).

All countries of the region have agreed to participate in China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), which has raised concerns among Western powers. As North African countries grapple with fiscal constraints as part of the fallout from COVID-19 (and the oil price drop for hydrocarbon exporters such as Algeria), it is yet to be seen whether China’s ambitions and relations within the region will continue to develop at the same pace going forward.

In this webinar, organized by Chatham House’s MENA and Asia-Pacific Programmes, experts will discuss the evolving economic relationship between China and North African states, and explore the impact of China’s pandemic diplomacy across the region.

How asymmetric are economic relations between China and North African states? Which sectors are most important, and what are the prospects for China to develop the region’s digital and healthcare infrastructure? Will China’s increasing economic interests necessitate an increasing political and security engagement? Should North African states be wary of Chinese loans? What is the public opinion of China’s economic presence in North Africa? Have Chinese ‘soft power’ efforts helped to bolster economic (and political) ties? What will be the likely fallout of COVID-19 on BRI and infrastructure projects in the region?

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

International relations: The ‘how not to’ guide Expert comment NCapeling 11 October 2022

A centenary special issue of International Affairs explores past foreign policy failures to help policymakers avoid future catastrophes.

Policy decisions in international relations frequently have a long-lasting effect on the world order, shaping the lives of millions. Often acting under pressure and severe time constraints, decision-makers must rely on their own experience and the best expertise available. And so, despite many striving for a more peaceful and prosperous world, policy failures are all too common.

The second of International Affairs’ centenary special issues – devised and guest-edited by Amrita Narlikar and Daniel W. Drezner – is a ‘how not to guide’ for international relations. Focusing on historic failures, 14 experts examine what went wrong, and how policy practitioners and researchers can get it right together.

Between theory and outcome fall two ‘shadows’: one of decision-makers not taking advantage of sound academic policy advice – in some cases ignoring it because they think they already know best – and a second of bias in academic analyses and researchers simply erring, or erring on the side of their own self-importance. Between these two, there lies a joint path toward better policies.

The special issue provides policymakers with cautionary lessons, transforming well-known cases into a guide of what not to do in international politics. Building on that, the collection also suggests ways forward, including borrowing the medical Hippocratic Oath of ‘do no harm’, which in international relations serves as a cautionary warning against action merely for action’s sake, and then going decidedly beyond this minimum requirement.

A series of comics also accompanies the articles, produced in collaboration with Sequential Potential comics.

In their introduction, Drezner and Narlikar draw out four overarching factors which increase the likelihood of foreign policy failure – these are a focus on short-term successes, underestimating the power of narratives, hubris, and technocratic bubbles. If academics and policymakers can work together with these careful considerations, perhaps mistakes can avoid being repeated.

Richard Toye examines three pivotal moments in the UK’s history – the Munich crisis of 1938, the Suez crisis and war of 1956, and the Iraq war of 2003. He finds that in these cases the failures were over-determined, a consequence of Britain’s relative decline rather than its cause.

Daniel W. Drezner reviews two high profile failures of sanction use – United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq during the two Gulf wars, and the US re-imposition of sanctions on Iran in 2018. In both cases the main goals were not achieved and the costs were great. Drezner highlights ten ‘do’s and don’ts’ for sanctions as a result.

Amrita Narlikar shows how the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become an almost perfect example of how not to negotiate, even when taking into account recent limited successes. She identifies three broad categories of bargaining failures and explores the impact of narratives on the course of events, giving a clear list of do’s and don’ts for international negotiation.

Harold James also looks at three historic moments, the financial crises in 1931, 1997, and 2008. While responses to the crises initially looked successful, ironically in each case the drive to avoid past mistakes opened the door for the next crisis.

Cecilia Emma Sottilotta considers recent disasters in the European Union (EU) – the eurozone crisis and COVID-19 pandemic – and recommends for policymakers to find a middle ground between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in crisis situations.

The growth of Chinese influence is a key issue in international relations today. Various articles in the special issue explain how not to deal with a rising China, coming from different angles. Exploring the US-China relationship, Janice Gross Stein is critical of the narrative around US decline and Chinese growth. The world should look beyond GDP as an indicator of a country’s growth and pay attention to strategic choices made by leaders in both states.

Joseph S. Nye Jr also provides a US perspective, arguing that while some historic analogies are misleading, the US should contemplate the cautionary narrative of sleepwalking into World War One when thinking about its relationship with China.

Amitabh Mattoo gives a south Asian view, asserting there is a need to understand Chinese policies in the region. Through examining China’s relations with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka he concludes that because China is adopting aggressive policies in the region, states must start cooperating with like-minded allies.

Yuen Foong Khong answers two questions in his paper tackling which ‘how not to’s’ are relevant when learning from history, and whether policymakers are aware of them. His research points to four things to avoid, which he then applies to how the Cold War analogy is used to understand contemporary US-China relations.

On the theme of foreign interference, Igor Istomin looks at the Soviet support for Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in the 1920s to 1940s. He argues strongly against interfering with major powers, as short-term gains cannot last.

From Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and the Balkans, there have been many failed interventions by the West since the end of the Cold War. Stephanie Carvin asserts the overreliance on automated weaponry has allowed supposedly ‘easy wars’ to turn into ‘forever wars’ – and this is not likely to stop.

India–Russia relations Explainer LToremark 14 October 2024

Explaining the history and current state of the relationship between India and Russia, its geopolitical significance, the importance of trade and defence cooperation, and the impact of the war in Ukraine.

What is the history of India’s relationship with Russia? 

The two countries established diplomatic relations in April 1947, shortly before India gained independence. India was on a quest to achieve economic self-sufficiency, so the then-Soviet Union was an important partner in terms of providing support for the country’s heavy industry, with investment in mining, energy and steel production. India’s economic planning model was also based on the Soviet five-year plan.

There is a high degree of historical affinity towards Russia in India, particularly among the older generation of policy elites. This is because the Soviet Union supported India during the Cold War, notably during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, in which the US and China sided with Pakistan. This was arguably the peak of the Indo–Soviet relationship and also the year that the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

But even before that, the Soviet Union had supported India. During the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the USSR played a mediating role and hosted the so-called Tashkent summit in 1966 where a peace treaty was signed.

The Soviet Union also used its UN Security Council veto several times in support of India, half a dozen times between 1957 and 1971. This was usually on the issue of Kashmir and once with respect to India’s military intervention in Goa to end Portuguese rule. It was also routine for the Indian prime minister to stop over in Moscow on the way back from Washington.

The relationship has continued into the post-Cold War period. Annual summits have been held since 2000, when a strategic partnership was signed (and subsequently upgraded in 2010). India and Russia have also been holding so-called 2+2 meetings – joint meetings with foreign and defence ministers – since 2021.

India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has referred to the India–Russia relationship as the one constant in global politics over the last half century.

What is the current relationship between India and Russia? 

Russia remains a key strategic partner for India for both practical and ideological reasons. On the practical side, India benefits significantly from access to discounted Russian crude oil, which has increased from less than 2 per cent of India’s total imports before the Russian invasion of Ukraine to over 40 per cent in June 2024. Indian companies have also benefitted from exporting refined Russian oil products, some of which have found their way onto Western markets.

But energy cooperation is not confined to oil. It also includes cooperation in the nuclear space, where there is a strong historical foundation. When India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, the Soviet Union did not shun cooperation with India – unlike the US. Compared to the US, Russia has also been able to better navigate India’s civil nuclear liability law, which was put in place in 2010. In February 2024, India and Russia upgraded an agreement to build six civil nuclear power plants in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

The other area of practical cooperation is defence. Russia accounts for over 50 per cent of India’s in-service military platforms. India is also the largest recipient of Russian arms exports, including the S400 missile defence system. There has been joint production of several platforms, such as the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which has been exported to third countries, starting with the Philippines. 

Russia has been a preferred arms supplier for India for many years because it provides arms at reasonable prices without end user constraints, and is often able to supply sensitive technologies, which other countries are not.

There is also a long-standing economic relationship. India and Russia aim to increase bilateral trade from $68 billion to $100 billion by the end of this decade. Connectivity initiatives include the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor and the International North-South Transport Corridor.

There are regular interactions between the leaders of the two countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin have met 17 times in the last decade and have held annual summits since 2000, with a few exceptions – and a notable gap following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

There is also a push to try and negotiate bilateral visa free access for Indians to increase people-to-people and tourism exchanges between the two countries.

There is also an ideological component to the relationship, which is often overlooked. One aspect is that India has a long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, which means engaging all major poles of influence in the international system – including Russia. There is also the aforementioned historical affinity due to Soviet support for India during the Cold War.

But the relationship is undergoing a managed decline. It does not have the same level of strategic importance as it did during the Cold War.

Although India still depends on Russia for a large proportion of its military hardware, since the 1990s there has been a push to diversify. As part of the ‘Make in India’ campaign, there is an attempt to strengthen domestic defence production as well as diversify to other countries. Between 2009 and 2013, 76 per cent of India’s arms imports were from Russia, but this has dropped to 36 per cent between 2019 and 2023 according to SIPRI.

While this trend predates the war in Ukraine, it has been accelerated by the war. There has been a delay in the delivery of several defence platforms, most notably the S400 missile defence system, as well as spare parts for fighter jets. The prolonged war of attrition in Ukraine has also undermined Indian confidence in some Russian military hardware.

There is decline on the ideological side too. India is trying to project a world view that is non-Western but not explicitly anti-Western. This puts it out of sync with Russia’s world view, and that of countries like China and Iran. 

India is increasingly aloof or estranged from forums where Russia plays a prominent role, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Modi did not attend the July 2024 SCO summit. When India held the presidency of the SCO in 2023 it was a low-profile presidency and there was a virtual summit. In contrast, India’s high-profile G20 presidency in 2023 was framed as the country’s ‘coming out party’.

While Modi and Putin met in July 2024, it was the first time that they had met since September 2022, a significant gap.

What is more, their economic interactions are highly skewed. There is roughly $68 billion in trade between the two countries but $60 billion of that is oil imports. India’s large share of Russian crude imports also means that Russia holds a surplus of Indian rupees, which has caused some friction in terms of rouble-rupee trade.

On the Indian side, there have also been concerns about a number of Indian nationals that have been duped into fighting for Russia in the Ukraine conflict.

But although the relationship is not what it once was, Russia will remain a key strategic partner for India for the foreseeable future.

Does India support Russia’s war on Ukraine? 

India has neither condoned nor condemned Russia’s actions. The Indian government has been vocal in expressing its displeasure of the war and Modi has said that now is ‘not an era of war’. He has also expressed sorrow for the bombing of a children’s hospital, hit by Russian airstrikes in July 2024. During his August 2024 visit to Ukraine, Modi said that India’s position is not neutral, but that it stands on the side of peace.

But there is a gap between rhetoric and reality. India in fact maintains quite a neutral position. It has abstained in UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. It did not endorse the joint communique produced at a peace conference in Switzerland in June 2024, which Modi also did not attend. And the G20 leaders’ declaration that was concluded under India’s G20 presidency had no mention of Russian actions in Ukraine.

India has also emerged as the second-biggest supplier of restricted critical technologies to Russia (behind China), helping to fuel Russia’s war machine.

This reflects India’s practical or pragmatic considerations, including its dependence on Russian military hardware and access to discounted Russian crude. But there is also a degree of sympathy in New Delhi for the Russian narrative of the war, that Moscow’s actions were sparked by NATO expansion into Russia’s self-perceived sphere of influence.

In theory, India is well positioned to play the role of a potential mediator. It maintains close ties with both Moscow and Washington, unlike other countries that have close relations with Russia, such as China, Iran or North Korea. The West has been understanding of India’s strategic constraints in terms of its dependence on Russian military hardware and its energy needs. But so far, India’s actions have been largely driven by self-interest. Despite its statements, it has not made any peace proposals like those of Turkey or China.

Indian symbolism over substance was also clear in Modi’s summer 2024 meetings with Putin and Zelenskyy.

Modi visited Putin in July 2024 – a visit that coincided with Russian airstrikes in Ukraine. Zelenskyy called the meeting a devastating blow to peace efforts. And the optics of Modi hugging Putin while a Ukrainian children’s hospital was bombed prompted a degree of damage control by New Delhi, leading to Modi’s visit to Ukraine in August 2024.

His visit to Ukraine was an attempt to reaffirm India’s position of neutrality on the war and its long-standing position of strategic autonomy. It was also an attempt at a course correction in India’s relationship with Ukraine. Modi was the first Indian prime minister to visit Ukraine since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1993.

How does China impact India–Russia relations? 

China is an important consideration in terms of India’s strategic calculations towards Russia. One of the reasons New Delhi is eager to maintain engagement with Russia is fears that Moscow is becoming increasingly beholden to Beijing following its invasion of Ukraine. India wants to provide Russia with strategic options as it becomes increasingly isolated and wants to deter it from becoming a client state of China. In parts of the West, that is already seen as a foregone conclusion, but Russia is not yet seen as a lost cause in India.

The other point to keep in mind is that China and India largely see eye to eye on the Ukraine war. Neither see their close relationship with Moscow as translating into overt support for Russian actions in Ukraine. Both countries believe they are playing a constructive role through their purchase of discounted Russian crude, which is helping to control global energy prices.

But a key watch point is what would Russia’s position be on possible future hostilities between China and India. Historically, Moscow has played a relatively neutral position and has occasionally offered to play a mediating role. It has even leaned in India’s favour on occasion and has provided it with more advanced military platforms than it has provided China. 

The fear in New Delhi is that this could be shifting and in the future Moscow could side with China in a potential conflict or tensions with India. That would be a game changer for India and would prompt it to rethink its relationship with Russia.

Resetting Africa-Europe relations: From self-deception to economic transformation 28 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts assess the status of ties between Africa and Europe in a rapidly changing world, launching a new book that explores how misconceptions in the relationship can harm Africa’s economic agenda.

The relationship between Africa and Europe has long been shaped by colonial legacies, power imbalance and shifting geopolitical interests.

Almost three years on from the last EU-AU summit in Brussels in February 2022, questions remain over the delivery of headline commitments under the continent-to-continent partnership – ranging from the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure strategy to wider climate financing promises.

As Africa seeks to strengthen its standing on the global stage, marked by the African Union’s upcoming debut at the G20 summit in November, a critical reassessment of these dynamics is needed to examine whether the continent’s relationship with Europe can overcome stigmatized narratives in search of genuine economic benefit.

At this event, which launches a new book by Professor Carlos Lopes: The Self-Deception Trap: Exploring the Economic Dimensions of Charity Dependency within Africa-Europe Relations, speakers assess the prospects for a transformative shift towards a more equitable and mutually beneficial Africa-Europe partnership.