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'No one should feel completely safe': what experts think of California's reopening plan

As businesses slowly reopen, experts warn that social distancing may need to be dialed back up: ‘It’s not an on-off switch’ * Coronavirus – latest US updates * Coronavirus – latest global updatesSome California businesses on Friday began opening their doors for business – at least partially.As states and counties across the nation contend with pressure to lift the stay-at-home measures that have destroyed local economies, California is taking an especially cautious approach, walking a fine line between political and economic pressure to reopen and the public health imperative to stop the spread of disease.Public health experts told the Guardian that while no US state was equipped with enough coronavirus testing and surveillance to feel fully confident reopening, California’s slow, piecemeal recovery plan – though far from perfect – seemed like the least risky option. The planSeven weeks after the governor, Gavin Newsom, ordered his 40 million constituents to shelter in place and all non-essential businesses to close, California on Friday entered phase two of its grand reopening plan.Some retail stores, including bookshops, florists, music stores, clothing and sporting goods retailers, can reopen if they organize curbside pickup. Some manufacturing and logistics in the retail supply chain can restart as well, as long as they follow safety and hygiene protocols. And local authorities are allowed to ease regulations further than the state guidelines if they meet certain testing and sanitation requirements.Phase three of the plan – potentially months away – could see salons, gyms, movie theaters and in-person church services resume. Phase four would end all restrictions. The timingFriday’s reopenings come as California has avoided the surge of infections states like New York have seen. And although California has seen more than 61,000 cases and 2,500 deaths, its hospitals have not been overwhelmed.Last week, state officials reported the first week-over-week decline in Covid-19 deaths.The new guidelines also follow small but sustained protests across the state to demand a relaxation of regulations to revive the state’s crippled economy, and some rural counties have partially reopened in defiance of the lockdown measures. The caveatsHowever, California still hasn’t seen the two weeks of declining cases that the White House suggested as a criterion for easing restrictions and that several European countries have used as a benchmark.The state also lacks the robust testing and tracking systems that countries such as Germany and South Korea have used.The state has ramped up its ability to administer and process tests, although for now, its rate of 29,414 tests a day is below the figure required by some analyses.Authorities are working to put a robust contact tracing effort in place to make sure those who test positive get the care they need and are able to isolate themselves until they recover. Although some counties and communities have spearheaded community-wide testing and tracing programs, overall, the state isn’t at the point where its system is as widespread or efficient as a country like Germany’s.Experts say California should also have a system in place to make sure vulnerable, unhoused populations have access to shelter and medical care – to prevent infection flare-ups in homeless shelters and encampments. Progress on those measures heavily varies county by county.And ideally, there would be a treatment or a vaccine before reopening, said Dr Richard Jackson, a professor emeritus at the UCLA Fielding School of Public Health and the former head of the California department of public health. While we await a cure, Jackson cautioned, “no one should feel completely safe as we remove restrictions.” The trade-offsCalifornia’s reopening strategy stands in sharp contrast to the approach of states like Georgia, which suddenly allowed gyms, barber shops, hair salons, tattoo parlors and bowling alleys to welcome customers last week.“What certain places have done, where they’ve just thrown open the doors and said, ‘OK, we don’t have to keep our distance any more,’ is a colossal mistake,” Jackson said. Reopening businesses that put lots of people into close contact and speed the spread of disease will reverse the success of shelter-in-place rules, he noted, and overwhelm hospitals as cases surge. “Doing it very cautiously and carefully does make sense at this point in time,” he said.“I get that governors have to balance the public health goals with the economic goals,” said Dr Robert Tsai, surgeon and health policy researcher at Brigham and Women’s hospital in Boston and the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health. “But this stage of the pandemic is really all about trade-offs,” he noted. The weeks aheadIn the coming weeks, state and local leaders will have to watch closely and prepare to dial the distancing back up if the number of cases surges, said Tsai.“Social distancing isn’t an on-off switch. What it needs to be is a dial, which can be turned up or down depending on what the data show on the ground in terms of how the Covid-19 epidemic is progressing.“Reopening is going to be a very complicated process, and it should be complicated,” he added. “Because this is about making sure that people don’t end up in the hospital or dying.”That California’s plan allows for counties to maintain stricter distancing guidelines or ease up measures could be both a strength and a liability.The flexibility has allowed hotspots like the Bay Area and Los Angeles to take a more cautious approach, but it has also already caused confusion. In San Diego, where curbside shopping has already begun, business owners were unsure what, if anything, would change on Friday. 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Engage China to Uphold Multilateralism – But Not at Any Cost

12 June 2019

Harriet Moynihan

Senior Research Fellow, International Law Programme
Where China’s interests align with those of the international community, there are opportunities for the country’s influence and economic power to strengthen the rules-based international order. Where they do not, states that traditionally support that order should join together to push back.

2019-02-01-China.jpg

Students holding Chinese national flags watch the live broadcast of the 40th anniversary celebration of China's reform and opening-up at Huaibei Normal University on 18 December. Photo: Getty Images.

China’s adherence to the rules-based international system is selective, prioritizing certain rules in favour of others. States supportive of that ‘system’ – or, as some argue, systems[1] – should identify areas of mutual strategic interest so that they can draw China further into the global rules-based order and leverage China as a constructive player that potentially also contributes to improvements in such areas. This is particularly apposite at a time when the US is in retreat from multilateralism and Russia seems bent on disrupting the rules-based international order.

Supportive player

There are many reasons for actively engaging with China on mutual areas of interest. China is a committed multilateralist in many areas, recognizing that often international cooperation and frameworks hold the key to its domestic problems, for example in the fields of environmental sustainability and financial regulation.

China’s economic power is valuable in upholding international institutions: China is the UN’s third-largest donor (after the US and Japan) at a time when the UN is facing budgetary shortfalls. China is also the second-highest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget, and the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

China also has a valuable role to play in the settlement of international disputes over trade and investment. China is a big supporter of the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s dispute settlement mechanism, and one of its most active participants;[2] China is currently playing an active role in negotiations to save the WTO’s appellate mechanism from folding in the wake of the US’s refusal to nominate new judges.

The last 15 years have also seen a major shift in Chinese attitudes to investment arbitration, from a general suspicion and limitation of arbitration rights to broad acceptance and incorporation of such rights in China’s trade and investment treaties. China is actively engaged in multilateral negotiations through the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on reforms to investor–state dispute settlement.

China has shown leadership on global climate change diplomacy, urging nations to remain committed to the Paris Agreement in the wake of the US decision to pull out, and has been an important interlocutor with the UK and the EU on these issues. As a strong supporter of the Paris Agreement, but also as the world’s top emitter of carbon dioxide, China has a crucial role to play in pushing forward implementation of the Paris targets. Despite its high emissions, China remains one of the few major economies on track to meet its targets,[3] giving it greater leverage to peer review other parties’ efforts.

A recent report by the UK parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), on China and the rules-based international order, noted that where a body of trust and goodwill is developed with China, there is the possibility of discovering interests that coincide and the ability to work together on issues mutually regarded as of global importance. The report refers to a number of success stories from UK partnership with China in multilateral forums, including in counterproliferation and global health.[4]

Developing areas of global governance

As well as working with the current system, China is increasingly involved in the shaping of newer areas of international law – whether it be submissions to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on procedural rules for the emerging deep-sea mining regime or pitching for a greater role in Arctic governance.[5]

This enthusiasm should be harnessed to promote the international rule of law, but at the same time there needs to be recognition of the strategic goals that drive China’s engagement. China’s interest in the Arctic, while including the desire to protect its ecology and environment, is also about access to marine resources, as well as about the Arctic’s strategic potential for China’s military.

China’s submissions to ITLOS on the rules of procedure for deep-sea mining are constructive, but also reflect an ambition to secure first-mover advantage when commercial mining eventually takes place. Like other major powers working in this policy area, China’s actions are guided by self-interest, but that doesn’t mean its goals can’t be pursued through multilateral rules.

China is also interested in creating new international structures and instruments that further its strategic aims. For example, with Russia (through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) it has proposed an International Code of Conduct for Information Security in the UN.[6]

China is also pondering an array of options for dispute-resolution mechanisms for its Belt and Road projects, including the possibility of an Asian version of the international Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which might sit under the auspices of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).[7]

The creation of new instruments and institutions need not be a threat to the rules-based international order in itself. We have already seen a combination of the creation of parallel complementary regimes alongside the reform of existing institutions, for example in development financing through the AIIB or the New Development Bank (often referred to as the ‘BRICS Bank’); these two banks are relatively conventionally structured along the lines of Western-dominated institutions, albeit with greater Chinese control. Based on these examples, selective adaptation seems more likely than a hostile ‘Eastphalian’ takeover.[8]

Risks

There is, however, a real risk that in certain areas China may promote a rival authoritarian model of governance, assisted by an opportunistic convergence with Russia on issues such as human rights, development and internet governance. In areas where China’s core interests clash with those of the rules-based international order, China has shown itself to be unbending, as in its refusal to abide by the July 2016 decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in its dispute with the Philippines over the South China Sea.[9]

China is becoming more assertive at the UN, but while it seeks to project itself there as a responsible emerging global leader, it is promoting a vision that weakens international norms of human rights, transparency and accountability,[10] while also carrying out practices domestically that raise serious human rights concerns (not least the detention of hundreds of thousands of Uighurs in re-education camps in Xinjiang).[11]

China’s increased dominance geographically and geopolitically through its Belt and Road infrastructure projects carries with it a number of social and economic risks, including smaller states becoming trapped in unsustainable financial debts to China.

But at a recent Chatham House conference on Asia and international law, participants highlighted the limitations on how far China can shape an alternative governance model.[12] China currently lacks soft power, cultural power and language power, all of which are needed in order to embed an alternative model abroad. China also currently lacks capacity and confidence to build coalitions with other states in the UN.

Where it has tried to get buy-in from the international community for its new institutions, such as the China International Commercial Court (CICC) announced in July 2018, there has been scepticism about the standards to be applied.[13] Unless the court can demonstrate sufficient due process, international parties are likely to prefer other centres with a strong reputation for upholding the rule of law, such as those in London, Dubai and Singapore.

Where China does promote its own governance model at the expense of the rules-based international order, states are starting to push back, often in concert. EU member states so far have adopted a joined-up approach to the Belt and Road Initiative. With the exception of Italy, they have refused to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on participation unless China provides much greater transparency on its compliance with international standards.

The EU also recently presented a coordinated response to China on the situation in Xinjiang.[14] Similarly, members of the so-called ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence-sharing alliance (comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US) have acted together in relation to certain incidents of cyber interference attributed to China.[15]

There are also signs of pushback from smaller states closer to home in relation to challenges to national sovereignty, debt diplomacy and financial viability arising from Belt and Road projects. The Sri Lankan government recently reversed the award of a $300 million housing deal to China, instead opting for a joint venture with an Indian company.

China has been downscaling its investments as a way to counter some of the backlash it has received: the most recent Belt and Road summit put forward a more modest set of aspirations. This suggests that there is some scope for states to stand up to China and use leverage to secure better deals.

Many international institutions have been Western-dominated for years;[16] China, together with many emerging and middle powers, has felt for some time that the international architecture does not reflect the world we live in. Given that context, states that champion the rules-based international order should acknowledge China’s desire to update the international order to reflect greater multipolarity, globalization and technological change, while being clear-eyed about their engagement with China. This involves investing in a proper understanding of China and how it works.[17]

Where possible, cooperation with China should lead to outcomes that are backed up by international standards and transparency. The above-mentioned FAC report cites evidence that the UK’s support, and that of other developed countries, had a positive impact in shaping the governance and standards of the AIIB.[18] China has brought in international experts to advise on disputes before the CIIC, which may reassure would-be litigants.

China’s relationship with the rules-based international order needs to be assessed pragmatically and dynamically. China can be a valuable partner in many areas where its objectives are closely aligned with those of the international community – from trade to climate change to peacekeeping.

But where the country’s core interests are at odds with those of the wider international community, an increasingly confident China will strongly resist pressure, including on the South China Sea and human rights. In these areas, states supportive of international law can most powerfully push back through alliances and by ensuring that their own core values are not compromised in the interests of economic benefits.

What needs to happen

  • China’s rising power and selective commitment to multilateralism make it a potentially influential ally in modernizing international governance.
  • China is increasingly involved in shaping newer areas of international law. This enthusiasm could be harnessed in the service of institutional development and reform.
  • Other states should identify areas of mutual strategic interest where China may offer a constructive role, including dispute settlement, health and climate change.
  • However, engagement must not ignore the strategic calculations that drive China’s agenda, or its poor record on civil and political rights, transparency and accountability.
  • Cooperation with China should lead to outcomes that are backed up by international standards and transparency.
  • Where China’s actions undermine the rules-based international order, coordinated action by states supportive of that order is likely to be more effective than acting individually.

Notes

[1] Chalmers, M. (2019), Which Rules? Why There is No Single ‘Rules-Based International System’, RUSI Occasional Paper, April 2019, London: Royal United Services Institute, https://rusi.org/occasional-papers/Which-Rules-Why-There-Is-No-Single-Rules-Based-International-System.

[2] See, for example, Moynihan, H. (2017), China’s Evolving Approach to International Dispute Settlement, Briefing, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/chinas-evolving-approach-international-dispute-settlement.

[3] UN Environment (2018), Emissions Gap Report 2018, p. XVII, https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018.

[4] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2019), China and the Rules-Based International System: Sixteenth Report of Session 2017–19, p. 32, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/612/612.pdf.

[5] Moynihan, H. (2018), ‘China Expands Its Global Governance Ambitions in the Arctic’, Expert Comment, 15 October 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/china-expands-its-global-governance-ambitions-arctic.

[6] Updated version proposed 9 January 2015.

[7] Moynihan, H. (2018), ‘Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four’, Meeting Summary, 3 June 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/exploring-public-international-law-issues-chinese-scholars-part-four.

[8] Chatham House (2019, forthcoming, ‘Security and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of International Law’, conference summary, https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/security-and-prosperity-asia-pacific-role-international-law.

[9] Permanent Court of Arbitration Case No. 2013-19 (Philippines v China), Award of 12 July 2016, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf.

[10] Piccone, T. (2018), China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009_china_human_rights.pdf.

[11] Wye, R. (2018), ‘‘The entire Uyghur population is seemingly being treated as suspect’: China’s persecution of its Muslim minority’, LSE Religion and Global Society blog, 18 September 2018, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionglobalsociety/2018/09/the-entire-uyghur-population-is-seemingly-being-treated-as-suspect-chinas-persecution-of-its-muslim-minority/.

[12] Chatham House (2019, forthcoming, ‘Security and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of International Law’.

[13] Walters, M. (2018), ‘Jury is out over China’s new commercial court, say lawyers’, Law Society Gazette, 1 November 2018, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/jury-is-out-over-chinas-new-commercial-court-say-lawyers/5068125.article.

[14] The Economist (2019), ‘Hope remains for Western solidarity. Look at embassies in Beijing’, 17 April 2019, https://www.economist.com/china/2019/04/20/hope-remains-for-western-solidarity-look-at-embassies-in-beijing.

[15] In December 2018, the Five Eyes attributed the activities of a Chinese cyber espionage group targeting intellectual property and sensitive commercial property to China’s Ministry of State Security.

[16] Roberts, A. (2017), Is International Law International?, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[17] Parton, C. (2019), China–UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference?, RUSI Occasional Paper, February 2019, London: Royal United Services Institute, p. 30, https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/china-uk-relations-where-draw-border-between-influence-and.

[18] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2019), China and the Rules-Based International System, p. 15.

This essay was produced for the 2019 edition of Chatham House Expert Perspectives – our annual survey of risks and opportunities in global affairs – in which our researchers identify areas where the current sets of rules, institutions and mechanisms for peaceful international cooperation are falling short, and present ideas for reform and modernization.




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Power Politics Could Impede Progress on Responsible Regulation of Cyberspace

3 December 2019

Harriet Moynihan

Senior Research Fellow, International Law Programme
A new Chatham House paper examines the prospects of countries reaching agreement on issues of sovereignty and non-intervention in cyberspace in the face of persistent, low-level, state-to-state cyber attacks.

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A computer hacked by a virus known as Petya. The Petya ransomware cyberattack hit computers of Russian and Ukrainian companies on 27 June 2017. Photo: Getty Images.

In discussions to date about how international law applies in cyberspace, commentators have tended to focus their attention on how the rules on the use of force, or the law of armed conflict, apply to cyber activities conducted by states that give rise to physical damage, injury or death.

But in practice, the vast majority of state cyberattacks fall below this threshold. Far more common are persistent, low-level attacks that may leave no physical trace but that are capable of doing significant damage to a state’s ability to control its systems, often at serious economic cost.

Such cyber incursions might include network disruptions in the operation of another government’s websites; tampering with electoral infrastructure to change or undermine the result; or using cyber means to destabilize another state’s financial sector.

For these kinds of cyber operation, the principle of sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention in another state’s internal affairs, are the starting point.

A UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) agreed in 2013 and 2015 that the principles in the UN Charter, including sovereignty and the prohibition on intervention in another state’s affairs, apply to states’ activities in cyberspace. The 2015 GGE also recommended eleven (non-binding) norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

However, states have not yet reached agreement on how to apply these principles. Until recently, there has also been very little knowledge of what states actually do in cyberspace, as they usually conduct cyber operations covertly and have been reluctant to put their views on record.

A new Chatham House research paper analyses the application of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to state cyberattacks that fall below the principle of use of force. As well as analysing the application of the law in this area, the paper also makes recommendations to governments on how they might best make progress in reaching agreement in this area.

Existing rules or new rules?

As the research paper makes clear, there is currently some debate, principally between countries in the West, about the extent to which sovereignty is a legally binding rule in the context of cyberspace and, if so, how it and the principle of non-intervention might apply in practice.

In the last few years, certain states have put on record how they consider international law to apply to states’ activities in cyberspace, namely the UK, Australia, France and the Netherlands. While there may be some differences in their approaches, which are discussed in the paper, there also remains important common ground: namely, that existing international law already provides a solid framework for regulating states’ cyber activities, as it regulates every other domain of state-to-state activity.

There is also an emerging trend for states to work together when attributing cyberattacks to hostile states, enabling them to call out malign cyber activity when it violates international law. (See, for example, the joint statements made in relation to the NotPetya cyber attack and malicious cyber activity attributed to the Russian government).

However, other countries have questioned whether existing international law as it stands is capable of regulating states’ cyber interactions and have called for ‘new legal instruments’ in this area.

This includes a proposal by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (led by Russia and China) for an International Code of Conduct on Information Security, a draft of which was submitted to the UN in 2011 and 2015, without success. The UN has also formed a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) under a resolution proposed by Russia to consider how international law applies to states’ activities in cyberspace.

The resolution establishing the OEWG, which began work earlier this year, includes the possibility of the group ‘introducing changes to the rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States’ agreed in the 2013 and 2015 GGE reports. In the OEWG discussions at the UN in September, several countries claimed that a new legal instrument was needed to fill the ‘legal vacuum’ (Cuba) or ‘the gap of ungoverned areas’ (Indonesia).

It would be concerning if the hard-won consensus on the application of international law to cyberspace that has been reached at past GGEs started to unravel. In contrast to 2013 and 2015, the 2017 meeting failed to reach an agreement.

On 9 December, a renewed GGE will meet in New York, but the existence of the OEWG exploring the same issues in a separate process reflects the fact that cyber norms have become an area of geopolitical rivalry.

Aside from the application of international law, states are also adopting divergent approaches to the domestic regulation of cyberspace within their own territory. The emerging trend towards a ‘splinternet’ – i.e. between states that believe the internet should be global and open on the hand, and those that favour a ‘sovereignty and control’ model on the other  – is also likely to make discussions at the GGE more challenging.

Distinct from the international law concept of sovereignty is the notion of ‘cybersovereignty’, a term coined by China to describe the wide-ranging powers it assumes under domestic law to regulate its citizens’ access to the internet and personal data within its territory. This approach is catching on (as reflected in Russia’s recently enacted ‘Sovereign Internet Law’), with other authoritarian states likely to follow suit.

The importance of non-state actors

In parallel with regional and UN discussions on how international law applies, a number of initiatives by non-state actors have also sought to establish voluntary principles about responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, a multi-stakeholder body that has proposed principles, norms and recommendations to guide responsible behaviour by all parties in cyberspace, recently published its final report. The Cybersecurity Tech Accord  aims to promote collaboration between tech companies on stability and resilience in cyberspace. President Macron’s ‘Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace’ has to date received the backing of 67 states, 139 international and civil society organizations, and 358 private-sector organizations.

It remains to be seen in the long term whether the parallel processes at the UN will work constructively together or be competitive. But notwithstanding the challenging geopolitical backdrop, the UN GGE meeting next week at the least offers states the opportunity to consolidate and build on the results of past meetings; to increase knowledge and discussion about how international law might apply; and to encourage more states to put their own views of these issues on the record.




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Bulletin updated at 19:45 HKT - 03/05/2020

There is no warning in force.




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Glucocerebrosidases catalyze a transgalactosylation reaction that yields a newly-identified brain sterol metabolite, galactosylated cholesterol [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

β-Glucocerebrosidase (GBA) hydrolyzes glucosylceramide (GlcCer) to generate ceramide. Previously, we demonstrated that lysosomal GBA1 and nonlysosomal GBA2 possess not only GlcCer hydrolase activity, but also transglucosylation activity to transfer the glucose residue from GlcCer to cholesterol to form β-cholesterylglucoside (β-GlcChol) in vitro. β-GlcChol is a member of sterylglycosides present in diverse species. How GBA1 and GBA2 mediate β-GlcChol metabolism in the brain is unknown. Here, we purified and characterized sterylglycosides from rodent and fish brains. Although glucose is thought to be the sole carbohydrate component of sterylglycosides in vertebrates, structural analysis of rat brain sterylglycosides revealed the presence of galactosylated cholesterol (β-GalChol), in addition to β-GlcChol. Analyses of brain tissues from GBA2-deficient mice and GBA1- and/or GBA2-deficient Japanese rice fish (Oryzias latipes) revealed that GBA1 and GBA2 are responsible for β-GlcChol degradation and formation, respectively, and that both GBA1 and GBA2 are responsible for β-GalChol formation. Liquid chromatography–tandem MS revealed that β-GlcChol and β-GalChol are present throughout development from embryo to adult in the mouse brain. We found that β-GalChol expression depends on galactosylceramide (GalCer), and developmental onset of β-GalChol biosynthesis appeared to be during myelination. We also found that β-GlcChol and β-GalChol are secreted from neurons and glial cells in association with exosomes. In vitro enzyme assays confirmed that GBA1 and GBA2 have transgalactosylation activity to transfer the galactose residue from GalCer to cholesterol to form β-GalChol. This is the first report of the existence of β-GalChol in vertebrates and how β-GlcChol and β-GalChol are formed in the brain.




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Deletion of fatty acid transport protein 2 (FATP2) in the mouse liver changes the metabolic landscape by increasing the expression of PPAR{alpha}-regulated genes [Lipids]

Fatty acid transport protein 2 (FATP2) is highly expressed in the liver, small intestine, and kidney, where it functions in both the transport of exogenous long-chain fatty acids and the activation of very-long-chain fatty acids. Here, using a murine model, we investigated the phenotypic impacts of deleting FATP2, followed by a transcriptomic analysis using unbiased RNA-Seq to identify concomitant changes in the liver transcriptome. WT and FATP2-null (Fatp2−/−) mice (5 weeks) were maintained on a standard chow diet for 6 weeks. The Fatp2−/− mice had reduced weight gain, lowered serum triglyceride, and increased serum cholesterol levels and attenuated dietary fatty acid absorption. Transcriptomic analysis of the liver revealed 258 differentially expressed genes in male Fatp2−/− mice and a total of 91 in female Fatp2−/− mice. These genes mapped to the following gene ontology categories: fatty acid degradation, peroxisome biogenesis, fatty acid synthesis, and retinol and arachidonic acid metabolism. Targeted RT-quantitative PCR verified the altered expression of selected genes. Of note, most of the genes with increased expression were known to be regulated by peroxisome proliferator–activated receptor α (PPARα), suggesting that FATP2 activity is linked to a PPARα-specific proximal ligand. Targeted metabolomic experiments in the Fatp2−/− liver revealed increases of total C16:0, C16:1, and C18:1 fatty acids; increases in lipoxin A4 and prostaglandin J2; and a decrease in 20-hydroxyeicosatetraenoic acid. We conclude that the expression of FATP2 in the liver broadly affects the metabolic landscape through PPARα, indicating that FATP2 provides an important role in liver lipid metabolism through its transport or activation activities.




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The transcriptional regulator MEIS2 sets up the ground state for palatal osteogenesis in mice [Gene Regulation]

Haploinsufficiency of Meis homeobox 2 (MEIS2), encoding a transcriptional regulator, is associated with human cleft palate, and Meis2 inactivation leads to abnormal palate development in mice, implicating MEIS2 functions in palate development. However, its functional mechanisms remain unknown. Here we observed widespread MEIS2 expression in the developing palate in mice. Wnt1Cre-mediated Meis2 inactivation in cranial neural crest cells led to a secondary palate cleft. Importantly, about half of the Wnt1Cre;Meis2f/f mice exhibited a submucous cleft, providing a model for studying palatal bone formation and patterning. Consistent with complete absence of palatal bones, the results from integrative analyses of MEIS2 by ChIP sequencing, RNA-Seq, and an assay for transposase-accessible chromatin sequencing identified key osteogenic genes regulated directly by MEIS2, indicating that it plays a fundamental role in palatal osteogenesis. De novo motif analysis uncovered that the MEIS2-bound regions are highly enriched in binding motifs for several key osteogenic transcription factors, particularly short stature homeobox 2 (SHOX2). Comparative ChIP sequencing analyses revealed genome-wide co-occupancy of MEIS2 and SHOX2 in addition to their colocalization in the developing palate and physical interaction, suggesting that SHOX2 and MEIS2 functionally interact. However, although SHOX2 was required for proper palatal bone formation and was a direct downstream target of MEIS2, Shox2 overexpression failed to rescue the palatal bone defects in a Meis2-mutant background. These results, together with the fact that Meis2 expression is associated with high osteogenic potential and required for chromatin accessibility of osteogenic genes, support a vital function of MEIS2 in setting up a ground state for palatal osteogenesis.




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Bulletin updated at 00:00 HKT 10/May/2020

General Situation:
A trough of low pressure will edge towards the coast of Guangdong today and linger over the region in the following couple of days. There will be thundery showers over Guangdong. With the anticyclone aloft strengthening in the middle and latter parts of this week, the weather over southern China will improve and it will be hot.

Date/Month: 10/05 (Sunday)
Wind: South force 3.
Weather: Sunny intervals and a few showers. Isolated thunderstorms later.
Temp range: 28 - 32 C
R.H. range: 65 - 95 per Cent

Date/Month: 11/05 (Monday)
Wind: South force 2 to 3.
Weather: Mainly cloudy with occasional showers and a few squally thunderstorms.
Temp range: 26 - 30 C
R.H. range: 70 - 95 per Cent

Date/Month: 12/05 (Tuesday)
Wind: Light winds force 2.
Weather: Mainly cloudy with a few showers and thunderstorms.
Temp range: 25 - 29 C
R.H. range: 70 - 95 per Cent

Date/Month: 13/05 (Wednesday)
Wind: Southeast force 3.
Weather: Sunny intervals and one or two showers.
Temp range: 26 - 30 C
R.H. range: 65 - 90 per Cent

Date/Month: 14/05 (Thursday)
Wind: Southeast force 3.
Weather: Sunny periods.
Temp range: 26 - 31 C
R.H. range: 60 - 85 per Cent

Date/Month: 15/05 (Friday)
Wind: South to southeast force 3.
Weather: Sunny periods.
Temp range: 27 - 32 C
R.H. range: 60 - 85 per Cent

Date/Month: 16/05 (Saturday)
Wind: South force 3.
Weather: Sunny periods.
Temp range: 27 - 32 C
R.H. range: 60 - 85 per Cent

Date/Month: 17/05 (Sunday)
Wind: South force 3 to 4.
Weather: Sunny periods.
Temp range: 28 - 32 C
R.H. range: 70 - 90 per Cent

Date/Month: 18/05 (Monday)
Wind: South force 3 to 4.
Weather: Sunny periods and isolated showers.
Temp range: 28 - 32 C
R.H. range: 70 - 90 per Cent

Sea surface temperature at 2 P.M. 09/05/2020 at North Point was 25 degrees C.
Soil temperatures at 7 A.M. 09/05/2020 at Hong Kong Observatory :
0.5 M below surface was 27.6 degrees C
1.0 M below surface was 26.4 degrees C




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Bulletin updated at 00:45 HKT 10/05/2020

An anticyclone aloft brought hot weather to southern China yesterday. Locally, it was hot with sunny periods and isolated showers. A trough of low pressure will edge towards the coast of Guangdong today and linger over the region in the following couple of days. There will be thundery showers over Guangdong.

Weather forecast for Hong Kong:
Mainly cloudy with a few showers. Sunny intervals during the day. There will be isolated thunderstorms later. Hot with temperatures ranging between 28 and 32 degrees. Moderate southerly winds.

Outlook: There will be showers and thunderstorms on Monday and Tuesday. The weather will improve gradually in the following couple of days.




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Genetic Profile and Functional Proteomics of Anal Squamous Cell Carcinoma: Proposal for a Molecular Classification

Lucía Trilla-Fuertes
Apr 1, 2020; 19:690-700
Research




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A Quantitative Tri-fluorescent Yeast Two-hybrid System: From Flow Cytometry to In cellula Affinities

David Cluet
Apr 1, 2020; 19:701-715
Technological Innovation and Resources




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Modulation of natural HLA-B*27:05 ligandome by ankylosing spondylitis-associated endoplasmic reticulum aminopeptidase 2 (ERAP2)

Elena Lorente
Apr 7, 2020; 0:RA120.002014v1-mcp.RA120.002014
Research




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HIGD2A is required for assembly of the COX3 module of human mitochondrial complex IV

Daniella H Hock
Apr 21, 2020; 0:RA120.002076v1-mcp.RA120.002076
Research




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Dysregulation of Exosome Cargo by Mutant Tau Expressed in Human-Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell (iPSC) Neurons Revealed by Proteomics Analyses

Sonia Podvin
Apr 15, 2020; 0:RA120.002079v1-mcp.RA120.002079
Research




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Identification of an Unconventional Subpeptidome Bound to the Behcet's Disease-associated HLA-B*51:01 that is Regulated by Endoplasmic Reticulum Aminopeptidase 1 (ERAP1)

Liye Chen
May 1, 2020; 19:871-883
Research




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Arginine in C9ORF72 Dipolypeptides Mediates Promiscuous Proteome Binding and Multiple Modes of Toxicity

Mona Radwan
Apr 1, 2020; 19:640-654
Research




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Discovery of a Redox Thiol Switch: Implications for Cellular Energy Metabolism

Xing-Huang Gao
May 1, 2020; 19:852-870
Research




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Proteome and phosphoproteome analysis of brown adipocytes reveals that RICTOR loss dampens global insulin/AKT signaling

Samuel W Entwisle
Apr 6, 2020; 0:RA120.001946v2-mcp.RA120.001946
Research




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How Regulation Could Break the Internet: In Conversation with Andrew Sullivan

Research Event

19 June 2019 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Andrew Sullivan, President and CEO Internet Society
Chair: Emily Taylor, Associate Fellow, International Security Department, Chatham House; Editor, Journal of Cyber Policy

Internet regulation is increasing around the world creating positive obligations on internet providers and exerting negative unintended consequences on the internet infrastructure. In some ways, most of this regulatory activity is justifiable. Governments are concerned about the increased risk that the use of the internet brings to societies. As a response, many governments have been enacting regulations as their main approach to dealing with these concerns. The main challenge is that most of the current regulations are either ill-defined or unworkable.  

On the one hand, several governments have established procedures that seek to analyze the impacts of new regulatory proposals before they were adopted. However, there hasn’t been enough attention aimed at analyzing regulations after they have been adopted and only a few have measures in place to evaluate the impacts of the procedures and practices that govern the regulatory process itself.

On the other hand, much of the regulation creates unintended consequences to the internet itself. It undermines many of its fundamental properties and challenges the integrity and resiliency of its infrastructure.  

This event discusses current practices in internet-related regulation and the related challenges. Panellists will discuss how governments can enforce regulations that achieve their intended purpose while at the same time protecting the internet’s core infrastructure and its properties, including its openness, interoperability and global reach.

Calum Inverarity

Research Analyst and Coordinator, International Security Department
+44 (0) 207 957 5751