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POSTPONED: Is a 'Geopolitical' Europe Possible?

Invitation Only Research Event

25 March 2020 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Michael Karnitschnig, Director for External Relations, Secretariat-General, European Commission

What role does the EU want to play in a world characterised increasingly by power politics? The new European Commission has explicitly stated its ambition for the EU to become a stronger geopolitical actor. Is it capable of becoming a third pole in an enduring US-China stand-off?

From climate change to trade policy and security, the next 5 years may prove decisive in proving the EU can be a strong player both in its neighbourhood and globally. Given what is at stake, what are the Commission’s strategic and policymaking priorities for the next five years? With the discussions on the future EU budget ongoing, what areas will be prioritized when member states come to make decisions between competing objectives? Does the way the EU is perceived externally depend on its member states’ ability to put on a united front when it comes to the most pressing global challenges?

Finally, is this ambitious geopolitical vision deliverable within the EU’s existing structures? If not, are member states ready to give up more control for a stronger Europe at the EU level?

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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Coronavirus: Why The EU Needs to Unleash The ECB

18 March 2020

Pepijn Bergsen

Research Fellow, Europe Programme
COVID-19 presents the eurozone with an unprecedented economic challenge. So far, the response has been necessary, but not enough.

2020-03-18.jpg

EU President of Council Charles Michel chairs the coronavirus meeting with the leaders of EU member countries via teleconference on March 17, 2020. Photo by EU Council / Pool/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images.

The measures taken to limit the spread of the coronavirus - in particular social distancing -  come with significant economic costs, as the drop both in demand for goods and services and in supply due to workers being at home sick will create a short-term economic shock not seen in modern times.

Sectors that are usually less affected by regular economic swings such as transport and tourism are being confronted with an almost total collapse in demand. In the airline sector, companies are warning they might only be able to hold out for a few months more.

Building on the calls to provide income support to all citizens and shore up businesses, European leaders should now be giving explicit permission to the European Central Bank (ECB) to provide whatever financial support is needed.

Although political leaders have responded to the economic threat, the measures announced across the continent have mainly been to support businesses. The crisis is broader and deeper than the current response.

Support for weaker governments

The ECB already reacted to COVID-19 by announcing measures to support the banking system, which is important to guarantee the continuity of the European financial system and to ensure financially weaker European governments do not have to confront a failing banking system as well.

Although government-subsidised reduced working hours and sick pay are a solution for many businesses and workers, crucially they are not for those working on temporary contracts or the self-employed. They need direct income support.

This might come down to instituting something that looks like a universal basic income (UBI), and ensuring money keeps flowing through the economy as much as possible to help avoid a cascade of defaults and significant long-term damage.

But while this is likely to be the most effective remedy to limit the medium-term impact on the economy, it is particularly costly. Just as an indication, total compensation of employees was on average around €470bn per month in the eurozone last year.

Attempting to target payments using existing welfare payment channels would reduce costs, but is difficult to implement and runs the risk of many households and businesses in need missing out.

The increase in spending and lost revenue associated with these support measures dwarf the fiscal response to the 2008-09 financial crisis. The eurozone economy could contract by close to 10% this year and budget deficits are likely be in double digits throughout the bloc.

The European Commission has already stated member states are free to spend whatever is necessary to combat the crisis, which is not surprising given the Stability and Growth Pact - which includes the fiscal rules - allows for such eventualities.

Several eurozone countries do probably have the fiscal space to deal with this. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have run several years of balanced budgets recently and significantly decreased their debt levels. For countries such as Italy, and even France, it is a different story and the combination of much higher spending and a collapse in tax revenue is more likely to lead to questions in the market over the sustainability of their debt levels. In order to avoid this, the Covid-19 response must be financed collectively.

The Eurogroup could decide to use the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to provide states with the funds, while suitably ditching the political conditionality that came with previous bailout. But the ESM currently has €410bn in remaining lending capacity, which is unlikely to be enough and difficult to rapidly increase.

So this leaves the ECB to pick up the tab of national governments’ increase in spending, as the only institution with effectively unlimited monetary firepower. But a collective EU response is complicated by the common currency, and particularly by the role of the ECB.

The ECB can’t just do whatever it likes and is limited more than other major central banks in its room for manoeuvre. It does have a programme to buy government bonds but this relies on countries agreeing to a rescue programme within the context of the ESM, with all the resulting political difficulties.

There are two main ways that the ECB could finance the response to the crisis. First, it could buy up more or all bonds issued by the member states. A first step in this direction would be to scrap the limits on the bonds it can buy. Through self-imposed rules, the ECB can only buy up to a third of every country’s outstanding public debt. There are good reasons for this in normal times, but these are not normal times. With the political blessing of the European Council, the Eurosystem of central banks could then start buying bonds issued by governments to finance whatever expenditure they deem necessary to combat the crisis.

Secondly, essentially give governments an overdraft with the ECB or the national central banks. Although a central bank lending directly to governments is outlawed by the European treaties, the COVID-19 crisis means these rules should be temporarily suspended by the European Council.

Back in 2012, the then president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, proclaimed the ECB would do whatever it takes, within its mandate, to save the euro, which was widely seen as a crucial step towards solving the eurozone crisis. The time is now right for eurozone political leaders to explicitly tell the ECB that together they can do whatever it takes to save the eurozone economy through direct support for businesses and households.




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Virtual Breakfast: Is a Brexit Delay Possible?

Research Event

7 April 2020 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Event participants

Gavin Barwell, Downing Street Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Theresa May (2017-19)
Chair: Thomas Raines, Director, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Please note this an online-only event.

According to a previously agreed timetable for phase two of Brexit talks, negotiations on the future EU-UK trade relations were scheduled to begin in March. Then a global pandemic hit. Despite the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak, the UK government insists that the Brexit negotiations are on track and there are currently no plans to extend the transition period beyond 2020.

However, the original timetable for trade talks was already widely seen as extremely constrained. Can negotiations still be done in time? With the decision on any possible extension to be made by July at the latest, can the two sides make sufficient progress by that point? Or would the ongoing public health crisis make requesting an extension to the transition period more politically viable for the UK government? Finally, if there is no extension, could Britain still leave the EU with no deal?

In this webinar, the speaker will discuss how the need to manage other challenges, such as the current COVID-19 outbreak, might affect the government’s approach to the negotiations with the EU. He will also share his insights on what to expect from the second phase of negotiations and on the most important lessons from phase one. 

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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Coronavirus and the Future of Democracy in Europe

31 March 2020

Hans Kundnani

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme
The pandemic raises difficult questions about whether liberal democracies can adequately protect their citizens.

2020-03-31-Police-Poland

Police officers wearing protective face masks patrol during coronavirus lockdown enforcement in Wroclaw, Poland. Photo by Bartek Sadowski/Bloomberg via Getty Images.

It is less than a month since we published our research paper on the future of democracy in Europe. But it feels like we now live in a different world. The coronavirus has already killed thousands of people in Europe, led to an unprecedented economic crisis and transformed daily life – and in the process raised difficult new questions about democracy.

The essence of our argument in the paper was that democracy in Europe should be deepened. But now there is a much more basic question about whether democracies can protect their citizens from the pandemic.

There has already been much discussion about whether authoritarian states will emerge stronger from this crisis than democracies. In particular, although the virus originated in China and the government initially seemed to struggle to deal with it, it was able to largely contain the outbreak in Hubei and deploy vast resources from the rest of the country to deal with it.

Come through the worst

China may have come through the worst of the health crisis – though a second wave of infections as restrictions are lifted is possible – and there have already been three times as many deaths in Italy, and twice as many in Spain, as in China (although there is increasing doubt about the accuracy of China’s figures).

However, it is not only authoritarian states that seem so far to have coped relatively well with the virus. In fact, some East Asian democracies appear to have done even better than China. At the time of writing South Korea, with a population of 51.5 million, has had only 144 death rates so far. Taiwan, with a population of nearly 24 million, has had only two deaths.

So rather than thinking in terms of the relative performance of authoritarian states and democracies, perhaps instead we should be asking what we in Europe can learn from East Asian democracies.

It is not yet clear why East Asian democracies were able to respond so effectively, especially as they did not all follow exactly the same approach. Whereas some quickly imposed restrictions on travel (for example, Taiwan suspended flights from China and then prohibited the entry of people from China and other affected countries) and quarantines, others used extensive testing and contact tracing, often making use of personal data collected from citizens.

Whatever the exact strategy they used, though, they did all act quickly and decisively – and the collective memory of the SARS outbreak in 2003 and other recent epidemics seems to have played a role in this. For example, following the SARS outbreak, Taiwan created a central epidemic command center. Europe, meanwhile, was hardly affected by SARS – and we seem to have assumed the coronavirus would be the same (although that does not quite explain why we were still so slow to react in February even after it was clear that the virus had spread to Italy).

However, while the relative success of East Asian democracies may have something to do with this recent experience of epidemics, it may also have something to do with the kind of democracies they are. It may be a simple matter of competence – the bureaucracy in Taiwan and South Korea may function better, and in particular in a more coordinated way, than in many European countries.

But it may also be more than that. In particular, it could be that East Asian democracies have a kind of 'authoritarian residue' that has helped in the initial response to this crisis. South Korea and Taiwan are certainly vibrant democracies – but they are also relatively new democracies compared to many in Europe. As a result, citizens may have a different relationship with the state and be more willing to accept sudden restrictions of freedoms, in particular on movement, and the use of personal data – at least in a crisis.

In that sense, the pandemic may be a challenge not to democracy as such but to liberal democracy in particular – in other words, a system of popular sovereignty together with guaranteed basic rights, such as including freedom of association and expression and checks and balances on executive power. There may now be difficult trade-offs to be made between those basic rights and security – and, after the experience of coronavirus, many citizens may choose security.

This brings us back to the issues we discussed in our research paper. Even before the coronavirus hit, there was already much discussion of a crisis of liberal democracy. In particular, there has been a debate about whether liberalism and democracy, which had long been assumed to go together, were becoming decoupled.

In particular, ‘illiberal democracies’ seemed to be emerging in many places including Europe (although, as we discuss in the paper, some analysts argue that the term is incoherent). This model of ‘illiberal democracy’ – in other words, one in which elections continue to be held but some individual rights are curtailed – may emerge stronger from this new crisis.

It is striking that Singapore – also seen as responding successfully to coronavirus – was seen as a paradigmatic ‘illiberal democracy’ long before Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán embraced the idea. In particular, there is little real opposition to the People’s Action Party, which has been in power since 1959.

Since this new crisis began, Orbán has gone further in suspending rights in Hungary. On March 11, he declared a state of emergency – as many other European countries have also done. But he has now gone further by passing legislation that allows him to govern by decree indefinitely and make it illegal to spread misinformation that undermines the government’s response to the pandemic. Clearly, this is a further decisive step in the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Hungary.

So far, though, much of the discussion, particularly in the foreign policy world, has focused mainly on how to change popular perceptions that liberal democracies are failing in this crisis. For example, High Representative Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign minister, wrote last week of a 'battle of narratives'.

But this misses the point. It is not a matter of spinning the European model, but of taking seriously the substantial questions raised by the coronavirus about the ability of liberal democracies to adequately protect their citizens.




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Virtual Breakfast: Engaging with the EU From the Outside: A Perspective From Norway

Invitation Only Research Event

24 April 2020 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Event participants

Niels Engelschiøn, Director-General, Department for European Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chair: Dr Robin Niblett, Director; Chief Executive, Chatham House

Please note this an online-only event.

Norway is one of the few European countries that remains outside of the European Union. After the country’s population rejected the prospect of joining the EU twice, Norway’s relationship with the Union has been based on its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), alongside Iceland and Liechtenstein.

The ‘Norway Model’ was often mentioned in the run up to the Brexit vote as a possible basis for Britain’s future relationship with the bloc, not least because it offers the least disruption to the current arrangement. Equally, Norway is not subject to the EU fisheries policy - an anticipated major issue in the next phase of Brexit talks. Nor is it part of the EU Customs Union.

Even though Prime Minister Johnson has now ruled out the type of deep economic and regulatory integration with the EU that Norway enjoys through its EEA membership, the country’s experience can still offer valuable lessons for the UK as it prepares to exit the transition period at the end of 2020.

In this session, the speaker will share Norway’s experience as a long-standing EEA member and discuss the challenges of engaging with the EU from the outside. What lessons can Norway offer the UK ahead of the negotiations on the future of UK-EU relations? What are the limits of its current arrangement with the EU? And is there any appetite among the Norwegian population to revisit it?

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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Webinar: Turkey’s Challenging Post-COVID 19 Outlook

Invitation Only Research Event

7 May 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Dr Murat Ucer, Turkey Country Analyst, GlobalSource Partners 
Chair: Fadi Hakura, Manager, Turkey Project, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has so far refused to impose a nation-wide lockdown to suppress the spread of coronavirus in the country. In late March, Turkish health officials announced that they expect the virus to peak in three weeks' time and for Turkey to overcome it quickly. At the same time, Turkey has ruled out turning to the IMF for help in dealing with the crisis despite growing pressures on the Lira and the wider economy. The country's relations with its traditional allies, the US and Europe, remain thorny.
 
This event will focus on the likely impact of the epidemic on Turkey's economy and politics. What are the reasons behind Erdogan’s reluctance to implement a comprehensive lockdown to break the chain of virus transmission? Why is Turkey resolutely opposed to agreeing a funding package with the IMF? What is the macro outlook for 2020 and beyond for the country's economy? And how may the government's long-term popularity be affected?

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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Virtual Breakfast: Europe in the Age of COVID-19: Priorities and Debates

Invitation Only Research Event

6 May 2020 - 9:00am to 10:00am

Event participants

Duncan Robinson, Charlemagne Columnist; Brussels Bureau Chief, the Economist
Chair: Pepijn Bergsen, Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

The new European Commission had a bold new agenda when it began its work in December 2019, with climate change, digital transformation and strengthening European democracy among its priorities. Less than six months later, the European continent is in the midst of the worst crisis since the second World War and business as usual has been taken over by crisis management.

Has COVID-19 monopolized the agenda in Brussels? What priorities are still on the table and what debates have fallen victim to the coronavirus? Is the current crisis reigniting and exacerbating existing faultlines in the EU or creating new ones?

Reflecting on his first four months as the Economist’s Charlemagne columnist, the speaker will share what decision-making in Brussels looks like during a pandemic and what debates are dominating conversations in the EU capital today.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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Biochemical and structural insights into how amino acids regulate pyruvate kinase muscle isoform 2 [Enzymology]

Pyruvate kinase muscle isoform 2 (PKM2) is a key glycolytic enzyme involved in ATP generation and critical for cancer metabolism. PKM2 is expressed in many human cancers and is regulated by complex mechanisms that promote tumor growth and proliferation. Therefore, it is considered an attractive therapeutic target for modulating tumor metabolism. Various stimuli allosterically regulate PKM2 by cycling it between highly active and less active states. Several small molecules activate PKM2 by binding to its intersubunit interface. Serine and cysteine serve as an activator and inhibitor of PKM2, respectively, by binding to its amino acid (AA)-binding pocket, which therefore represents a potential druggable site. Despite binding similarly to PKM2, how cysteine and serine differentially regulate this enzyme remains elusive. Using kinetic analyses, fluorescence binding, X-ray crystallography, and gel filtration experiments with asparagine, aspartate, and valine as PKM2 ligands, we examined whether the differences in the side-chain polarity of these AAs trigger distinct allosteric responses in PKM2. We found that Asn (polar) and Asp (charged) activate PKM2 and that Val (hydrophobic) inhibits it. The results also indicate that both Asn and Asp can restore the activity of Val-inhibited PKM2. AA-bound crystal structures of PKM2 displayed distinctive interactions within the binding pocket, causing unique allosteric effects in the enzyme. These structure-function analyses of AA-mediated PKM2 regulation shed light on the chemical requirements in the development of mechanism-based small-molecule modulators targeting the AA-binding pocket of PKM2 and provide broader insights into the regulatory mechanisms of complex allosteric enzymes.




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Evolution, expression, and substrate specificities of aldehyde oxidase enzymes in eukaryotes [Enzymology]

Aldehyde oxidases (AOXs) are a small group of enzymes belonging to the larger family of molybdo-flavoenzymes, along with the well-characterized xanthine oxidoreductase. The two major types of reactions that are catalyzed by AOXs are the hydroxylation of heterocycles and the oxidation of aldehydes to their corresponding carboxylic acids. Different animal species have different complements of AOX genes. The two extremes are represented in humans and rodents; whereas the human genome contains a single active gene (AOX1), those of rodents, such as mice, are endowed with four genes (Aox1-4), clustering on the same chromosome, each encoding a functionally distinct AOX enzyme. It still remains enigmatic why some species have numerous AOX enzymes, whereas others harbor only one functional enzyme. At present, little is known about the physiological relevance of AOX enzymes in humans and their additional forms in other mammals. These enzymes are expressed in the liver and play an important role in the metabolisms of drugs and other xenobiotics. In this review, we discuss the expression, tissue-specific roles, and substrate specificities of the different mammalian AOX enzymes and highlight insights into their physiological roles.




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The heme-regulatory motifs of heme oxygenase-2 contribute to the transfer of heme to the catalytic site for degradation [Protein Structure and Folding]

Heme-regulatory motifs (HRMs) are present in many proteins that are involved in diverse biological functions. The C-terminal tail region of human heme oxygenase-2 (HO2) contains two HRMs whose cysteine residues form a disulfide bond; when reduced, these cysteines are available to bind Fe3+-heme. Heme binding to the HRMs occurs independently of the HO2 catalytic active site in the core of the protein, where heme binds with high affinity and is degraded to biliverdin. Here, we describe the reversible, protein-mediated transfer of heme between the HRMs and the HO2 core. Using hydrogen-deuterium exchange (HDX)-MS to monitor the dynamics of HO2 with and without Fe3+-heme bound to the HRMs and to the core, we detected conformational changes in the catalytic core only in one state of the catalytic cycle—when Fe3+-heme is bound to the HRMs and the core is in the apo state. These conformational changes were consistent with transfer of heme between binding sites. Indeed, we observed that HRM-bound Fe3+-heme is transferred to the apo-core either upon independent expression of the core and of a construct spanning the HRM-containing tail or after a single turnover of heme at the core. Moreover, we observed transfer of heme from the core to the HRMs and equilibration of heme between the core and HRMs. We therefore propose an Fe3+-heme transfer model in which HRM-bound heme is readily transferred to the catalytic site for degradation to facilitate turnover but can also equilibrate between the sites to maintain heme homeostasis.




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An enzyme-based protocol for cell-free synthesis of nature-identical capsular oligosaccharides from Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae serotype 1 [Enzymology]

Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae (App) is the etiological agent of acute porcine pneumonia and responsible for severe economic losses worldwide. The capsule polymer of App serotype 1 (App1) consists of [4)-GlcNAc-β(1,6)-Gal-α-1-(PO4-] repeating units that are O-acetylated at O-6 of the GlcNAc. It is a major virulence factor and was used in previous studies in the successful generation of an experimental glycoconjugate vaccine. However, the application of glycoconjugate vaccines in the animal health sector is limited, presumably because of the high costs associated with harvesting the polymer from pathogen culture. Consequently, here we exploited the capsule polymerase Cps1B of App1 as an in vitro synthesis tool and an alternative for capsule polymer provision. Cps1B consists of two catalytic domains, as well as a domain rich in tetratricopeptide repeats (TPRs). We compared the elongation mechanism of Cps1B with that of a ΔTPR truncation (Cps1B-ΔTPR). Interestingly, the product profiles displayed by Cps1B suggested processive elongation of the nascent polymer, whereas Cps1B-ΔTPR appeared to work in a more distributive manner. The dispersity of the synthesized products could be reduced by generating single-action transferases and immobilizing them on individual columns, separating the two catalytic activities. Furthermore, we identified the O-acetyltransferase Cps1D of App1 and used it to modify the polymers produced by Cps1B. Two-dimensional NMR analyses of the products revealed O-acetylation levels identical to those of polymer harvested from App1 culture supernatants. In conclusion, we have established a protocol for the pathogen-free in vitro synthesis of tailored, nature-identical App1 capsule polymers.




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Structural and mutational analyses of the bifunctional arginine dihydrolase and ornithine cyclodeaminase AgrE from the cyanobacterium Anabaena [Enzymology]

In cyanobacteria, metabolic pathways that use the nitrogen-rich amino acid arginine play a pivotal role in nitrogen storage and mobilization. The N-terminal domains of two recently identified bacterial enzymes: ArgZ from Synechocystis and AgrE from Anabaena, have been found to contain an arginine dihydrolase. This enzyme provides catabolic activity that converts arginine to ornithine, resulting in concomitant release of CO2 and ammonia. In Synechocystis, the ArgZ-mediated ornithine–ammonia cycle plays a central role in nitrogen storage and remobilization. The C-terminal domain of AgrE contains an ornithine cyclodeaminase responsible for the formation of proline from ornithine and ammonia production, indicating that AgrE is a bifunctional enzyme catalyzing two sequential reactions in arginine catabolism. Here, the crystal structures of AgrE in three different ligation states revealed that it has a tetrameric conformation, possesses a binding site for the arginine dihydrolase substrate l-arginine and product l-ornithine, and contains a binding site for the coenzyme NAD(H) required for ornithine cyclodeaminase activity. Structure–function analyses indicated that the structure and catalytic mechanism of arginine dihydrolase in AgrE are highly homologous with those of a known bacterial arginine hydrolase. We found that in addition to other active-site residues, Asn-71 is essential for AgrE's dihydrolase activity. Further analysis suggested the presence of a passage for substrate channeling between the two distinct AgrE active sites, which are situated ∼45 Å apart. These results provide structural and functional insights into the bifunctional arginine dihydrolase–ornithine cyclodeaminase enzyme AgrE required for arginine catabolism in Anabaena.




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Detailed analyses of the crucial functions of Zn transporter proteins in alkaline phosphatase activation [Enzymology]

Numerous zinc ectoenzymes are metalated by zinc and activated in the compartments of the early secretory pathway before reaching their destination. Zn transporter (ZNT) proteins located in these compartments are essential for ectoenzyme activation. We have previously reported that ZNT proteins, specifically ZNT5–ZNT6 heterodimers and ZNT7 homodimers, play critical roles in the activation of zinc ectoenzymes, such as alkaline phosphatases (ALPs), by mobilizing cytosolic zinc into these compartments. However, this process remains incompletely understood. Here, using genetically-engineered chicken DT40 cells, we first determined that Zrt/Irt-like protein (ZIP) transporters that are localized to the compartments of the early secretory pathway play only a minor role in the ALP activation process. These transporters included ZIP7, ZIP9, and ZIP13, performing pivotal functions in maintaining cellular homeostasis by effluxing zinc out of the compartments. Next, using purified ALP proteins, we showed that zinc metalation on ALP produced in DT40 cells lacking ZNT5–ZNT6 heterodimers and ZNT7 homodimers is impaired. Finally, by genetically disrupting both ZNT5 and ZNT7 in human HAP1 cells, we directly demonstrated that the tissue-nonspecific ALP-activating functions of both ZNT complexes are conserved in human cells. Furthermore, using mutant HAP1 cells, we uncovered a previously-unrecognized and unique spatial regulation of ZNT5–ZNT6 heterodimer formation, wherein ZNT5 recruits ZNT6 to the Golgi apparatus to form the heterodimeric complex. These findings fill in major gaps in our understanding of the molecular mechanisms underlying zinc ectoenzyme activation in the compartments of the early secretory pathway.




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Reduction of protein phosphatase 2A (PP2A) complexity reveals cellular functions and dephosphorylation motifs of the PP2A/B'{delta} holoenzyme [Enzymology]

Protein phosphatase 2A (PP2A) is a large enzyme family responsible for most cellular Ser/Thr dephosphorylation events. PP2A substrate specificity, localization, and regulation by second messengers rely on more than a dozen regulatory subunits (including B/R2, B'/R5, and B″/R3), which form the PP2A heterotrimeric holoenzyme by associating with a dimer comprising scaffolding (A) and catalytic (C) subunits. Because of partial redundancy and high endogenous expression of PP2A holoenzymes, traditional approaches of overexpressing, knocking down, or knocking out PP2A regulatory subunits have yielded only limited insights into their biological roles and substrates. To this end, here we sought to reduce the complexity of cellular PP2A holoenzymes. We used tetracycline-inducible expression of pairs of scaffolding and regulatory subunits with complementary charge-reversal substitutions in their interaction interfaces. For each of the three regulatory subunit families, we engineered A/B charge–swap variants that could bind to one another, but not to endogenous A and B subunits. Because endogenous Aα was targeted by a co-induced shRNA, endogenous B subunits were rapidly degraded, resulting in expression of predominantly a single PP2A heterotrimer composed of the A/B charge–swap pair and the endogenous catalytic subunit. Using B'δ/PPP2R5D, we show that PP2A complexity reduction, but not PP2A overexpression, reveals a role of this holoenzyme in suppression of extracellular signal–regulated kinase signaling and protein kinase A substrate dephosphorylation. When combined with global phosphoproteomics, the PP2A/B'δ reduction approach identified consensus dephosphorylation motifs in its substrates and suggested that residues surrounding the phosphorylation site play roles in PP2A substrate specificity.




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Structure of an ancestral mammalian family 1B1 cytochrome P450 with increased thermostability [Enzymology]

Mammalian cytochrome P450 enzymes often metabolize many pharmaceuticals and other xenobiotics, a feature that is valuable in a biotechnology setting. However, extant P450 enzymes are typically relatively unstable, with T50 values of ∼30–40 °C. Reconstructed ancestral cytochrome P450 enzymes tend to have variable substrate selectivity compared with related extant forms, but they also have higher thermostability and therefore may be excellent tools for commercial biosynthesis of important intermediates, final drug molecules, or drug metabolites. The mammalian ancestor of the cytochrome P450 1B subfamily was herein characterized structurally and functionally, revealing differences from the extant human CYP1B1 in ligand binding, metabolism, and potential molecular contributors to its thermostability. Whereas extant human CYP1B1 has one molecule of α-naphthoflavone in a closed active site, we observed that subtle amino acid substitutions outside the active site in the ancestor CYP1B enzyme yielded an open active site with four ligand copies. A structure of the ancestor with 17β-estradiol revealed only one molecule in the active site, which still had the same open conformation. Detailed comparisons between the extant and ancestor forms revealed increases in electrostatic and aromatic interactions between distinct secondary structure elements in the ancestral forms that may contribute to their thermostability. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first structural evaluation of a reconstructed ancestral cytochrome P450, revealing key features that appear to contribute to its thermostability.




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Specificity and affinity of the N-terminal residues in staphylocoagulase in binding to prothrombin [Computational Biology]

In Staphylococcus aureus–caused endocarditis, the pathogen secretes staphylocoagulase (SC), thereby activating human prothrombin (ProT) and evading immune clearance. A previous structural comparison of the SC(1–325) fragment bound to thrombin and its inactive precursor prethrombin 2 has indicated that SC activates ProT by inserting its N-terminal dipeptide Ile1-Val2 into the ProT Ile16 pocket, forming a salt bridge with ProT's Asp194, thereby stabilizing the active conformation. We hypothesized that these N-terminal SC residues modulate ProT binding and activation. Here, we generated labeled SC(1–246) as a probe for competitively defining the affinities of N-terminal SC(1–246) variants preselected by modeling. Using ProT(R155Q,R271Q,R284Q) (ProTQQQ), a variant refractory to prothrombinase- or thrombin-mediated cleavage, we observed variant affinities between ∼1 and 650 nm and activation potencies ranging from 1.8-fold that of WT SC(1–246) to complete loss of function. Substrate binding to ProTQQQ caused allosteric tightening of the affinity of most SC(1–246) variants, consistent with zymogen activation through occupation of the specificity pocket. Conservative changes at positions 1 and 2 were well-tolerated, with Val1-Val2, Ile1-Ala2, and Leu1-Val2 variants exhibiting ProTQQQ affinity and activation potency comparable with WT SC(1–246). Weaker binding variants typically had reduced activation rates, although at near-saturating ProTQQQ levels, several variants exhibited limiting rates similar to or higher than that of WT SC(1–246). The Ile16 pocket in ProTQQQ appears to favor nonpolar, nonaromatic residues at SC positions 1 and 2. Our results suggest that SC variants other than WT Ile1-Val2-Thr3 might emerge with similar ProT-activating efficiency.




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Processivity of dextransucrases synthesizing very-high-molar-mass dextran is mediated by sugar-binding pockets in domain V [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

The dextransucrase DSR-OK from the Gram-positive bacterium Oenococcus kitaharae DSM17330 produces a dextran of the highest molar mass reported to date (∼109 g/mol). In this study, we selected a recombinant form, DSR-OKΔ1, to identify molecular determinants involved in the sugar polymerization mechanism and that confer its ability to produce a very-high-molar-mass polymer. In domain V of DSR-OK, we identified seven putative sugar-binding pockets characteristic of glycoside hydrolase 70 (GH70) glucansucrases that are known to be involved in glucan binding. We investigated their role in polymer synthesis through several approaches, including monitoring of dextran synthesis, affinity assays, sugar binding pocket deletions, site-directed mutagenesis, and construction of chimeric enzymes. Substitution of only two stacking aromatic residues in two consecutive sugar-binding pockets (variant DSR-OKΔ1-Y1162A-F1228A) induced quasi-complete loss of very-high-molar-mass dextran synthesis, resulting in production of only 10–13 kg/mol polymers. Moreover, the double mutation completely switched the semiprocessive mode of DSR-OKΔ1 toward a distributive one, highlighting the strong influence of these pockets on enzyme processivity. Finally, the position of each pocket relative to the active site also appeared to be important for polymer elongation. We propose that sugar-binding pockets spatially closer to the catalytic domain play a major role in the control of processivity. A deep structural characterization, if possible with large-molar-mass sugar ligands, would allow confirming this hypothesis.




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The Escherichia coli cellulose synthase subunit G (BcsG) is a Zn2+-dependent phosphoethanolamine transferase [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Bacterial biofilms are cellular communities that produce an adherent matrix. Exopolysaccharides are key structural components of this matrix and are required for the assembly and architecture of biofilms produced by a wide variety of microorganisms. The human bacterial pathogens Escherichia coli and Salmonella enterica produce a biofilm matrix composed primarily of the exopolysaccharide phosphoethanolamine (pEtN) cellulose. Once thought to be composed of only underivatized cellulose, the pEtN modification present in these matrices has been implicated in the overall architecture and integrity of the biofilm. However, an understanding of the mechanism underlying pEtN derivatization of the cellulose exopolysaccharide remains elusive. The bacterial cellulose synthase subunit G (BcsG) is a predicted inner membrane–localized metalloenzyme that has been proposed to catalyze the transfer of the pEtN group from membrane phospholipids to cellulose. Here we present evidence that the C-terminal domain of BcsG from E. coli (EcBcsGΔN) functions as a phosphoethanolamine transferase in vitro with substrate preference for cellulosic materials. Structural characterization of EcBcsGΔN revealed that it belongs to the alkaline phosphatase superfamily, contains a Zn2+ ion at its active center, and is structurally similar to characterized enzymes that confer colistin resistance in Gram-negative bacteria. Informed by our structural studies, we present a functional complementation experiment in E. coli AR3110, indicating that the activity of the BcsG C-terminal domain is essential for integrity of the pellicular biofilm. Furthermore, our results established a similar but distinct active-site architecture and catalytic mechanism shared between BcsG and the colistin resistance enzymes.




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A Legionella effector kinase is activated by host inositol hexakisphosphate [Enzymology]

The transfer of a phosphate from ATP to a protein substrate, a modification known as protein phosphorylation, is catalyzed by protein kinases. Protein kinases play a crucial role in virtually every cellular activity. Recent studies of atypical protein kinases have highlighted the structural similarity of the kinase superfamily despite notable differences in primary amino acid sequence. Here, using a bioinformatics screen, we searched for putative protein kinases in the intracellular bacterial pathogen Legionella pneumophila and identified the type 4 secretion system effector Lpg2603 as a remote member of the protein kinase superfamily. Employing an array of biochemical and structural biology approaches, including in vitro kinase assays and isothermal titration calorimetry, we show that Lpg2603 is an active protein kinase with several atypical structural features. Importantly, we found that the eukaryote-specific host signaling molecule inositol hexakisphosphate (IP6) is required for Lpg2603 kinase activity. Crystal structures of Lpg2603 in the apo-form and when bound to IP6 revealed an active-site rearrangement that allows for ATP binding and catalysis. Our results on the structure and activity of Lpg2603 reveal a unique mode of regulation of a protein kinase, provide the first example of a bacterial kinase that requires IP6 for its activation, and may aid future work on the function of this effector during Legionella pathogenesis.




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NAD+ biosynthesis in bacteria is controlled by global carbon/nitrogen levels via PII signaling [Microbiology]

NAD+ is a central metabolite participating in core metabolic redox reactions. The prokaryotic NAD synthetase enzyme NadE catalyzes the last step of NAD+ biosynthesis, converting nicotinic acid adenine dinucleotide (NaAD) to NAD+. Some members of the NadE family use l-glutamine as a nitrogen donor and are named NadEGln. Previous gene neighborhood analysis has indicated that the bacterial nadE gene is frequently clustered with the gene encoding the regulatory signal transduction protein PII, suggesting a functional relationship between these proteins in response to the nutritional status and the carbon/nitrogen ratio of the bacterial cell. Here, using affinity chromatography, bioinformatics analyses, NAD synthetase activity, and biolayer interferometry assays, we show that PII and NadEGln physically interact in vitro, that this complex relieves NadEGln negative feedback inhibition by NAD+. This mechanism is conserved in distantly related bacteria. Of note, the PII protein allosteric effector and cellular nitrogen level indicator 2-oxoglutarate (2-OG) inhibited the formation of the PII-NadEGln complex within a physiological range. These results indicate an interplay between the levels of ATP, ADP, 2-OG, PII-sensed glutamine, and NAD+, representing a metabolic hub that may balance the levels of core nitrogen and carbon metabolites. Our findings support the notion that PII proteins act as a dissociable regulatory subunit of NadEGln, thereby enabling the control of NAD+ biosynthesis according to the nutritional status of the bacterial cell.




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Impact of 1,N6-ethenoadenosine, a damaged ribonucleotide in DNA, on translesion synthesis and repair [Enzymology]

Incorporation of ribonucleotides into DNA can severely diminish genome integrity. However, how ribonucleotides instigate DNA damage is poorly understood. In DNA, they can promote replication stress and genomic instability and have been implicated in several diseases. We report here the impact of the ribonucleotide rATP and of its naturally occurring damaged analog 1,N6-ethenoadenosine (1,N6-ϵrA) on translesion synthesis (TLS), mediated by human DNA polymerase η (hpol η), and on RNase H2–mediated incision. Mass spectral analysis revealed that 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA generates extensive frameshifts during TLS, which can lead to genomic instability. Moreover, steady-state kinetic analysis of the TLS process indicated that deoxypurines (i.e. dATP and dGTP) are inserted predominantly opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also show that hpol η acts as a reverse transcriptase in the presence of damaged ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA but has poor RNA primer extension activities. Steady-state kinetic analysis of reverse transcription and RNA primer extension showed that hpol η favors the addition of dATP and dGTP opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also found that RNase H2 recognizes 1,N6-ϵrA but has limited incision activity across from this lesion, which can lead to the persistence of this detrimental DNA adduct. We conclude that the damaged and unrepaired ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA exhibits mutagenic potential and can also alter the reading frame in an mRNA transcript because 1,N6-ϵrA is incompletely incised by RNase H2.




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It takes two (Las1 HEPN endoribonuclease domains) to cut RNA correctly [RNA]

The ribosome biogenesis factor Las1 is an essential endoribonuclease that is well-conserved across eukaryotes and a newly established member of the higher eukaryotes and prokaryotes nucleotide-binding (HEPN) domain-containing nuclease family. HEPN nucleases participate in diverse RNA cleavage pathways and share a short HEPN nuclease motif (RφXXXH) important for RNA cleavage. Most HEPN nucleases participate in stress-activated RNA cleavage pathways; Las1 plays a fundamental role in processing pre-rRNA. Underscoring the significance of Las1 function in the cell, mutations in the human LAS1L (LAS1-like) gene have been associated with neurological dysfunction. Two juxtaposed HEPN nuclease motifs create Las1's composite nuclease active site, but the roles of the individual HEPN motif residues are poorly defined. Here using a combination of in vivo experiments in Saccharomyces cerevisiae and in vitro assays, we show that both HEPN nuclease motifs are required for Las1 nuclease activity and fidelity. Through in-depth sequence analysis and systematic mutagenesis, we determined the consensus HEPN motif in the Las1 subfamily and uncovered its canonical and specialized elements. Using reconstituted Las1 HEPN-HEPN' chimeras, we defined the molecular requirements for RNA cleavage. Intriguingly, both copies of the Las1 HEPN motif were important for nuclease function, revealing that both HEPN motifs participate in coordinating the RNA within the Las1 active site. We also established that conformational flexibility of the two HEPN domains is important for proper nuclease function. The results of our work reveal critical information about how dual HEPN domains come together to drive Las1-mediated RNA cleavage.




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Spectral and photochemical diversity of tandem cysteine cyanobacterial phytochromes [Plant Biology]

The atypical trichromatic cyanobacterial phytochrome NpTP1 from Nostoc punctiforme ATCC 29133 is a linear tetrapyrrole (bilin)-binding photoreceptor protein that possesses tandem-cysteine residues responsible for shifting its light-sensing maximum to the violet spectral region. Using bioinformatics and phylogenetic analyses, here we established that tandem-cysteine cyanobacterial phytochromes (TCCPs) compose a well-supported monophyletic phytochrome lineage distinct from prototypical red/far-red cyanobacterial phytochromes. To investigate the light-sensing diversity of this family, we compared the spectroscopic properties of NpTP1 (here renamed NpTCCP) with those of three phylogenetically diverged TCCPs identified in the draft genomes of Tolypothrix sp. PCC7910, Scytonema sp. PCC10023, and Gloeocapsa sp. PCC7513. Recombinant photosensory core modules of ToTCCP, ScTCCP, and GlTCCP exhibited violet-blue–absorbing dark-states consistent with dual thioether-linked phycocyanobilin (PCB) chromophores. Photoexcitation generated singly-linked photoproduct mixtures with variable ratios of yellow-orange and red-absorbing species. The photoproduct ratio was strongly influenced by pH and by mutagenesis of TCCP- and phytochrome-specific signature residues. Our experiments support the conclusion that both photoproduct species possess protonated 15E bilin chromophores, but differ in the ionization state of the noncanonical “second” cysteine sulfhydryl group. We found that the ionization state of this and other residues influences subsequent conformational change and downstream signal transmission. We also show that tandem-cysteine phytochromes present in eukaryotes possess similar amino acid substitutions within their chromophore-binding pocket, which tune their spectral properties in an analogous fashion. Taken together, our findings provide a roadmap for tailoring the wavelength specificity of plant phytochromes to optimize plant performance in diverse natural and artificial light environments.




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Crystallographic and kinetic analyses of the FdsBG subcomplex of the cytosolic formate dehydrogenase FdsABG from Cupriavidus necator [Molecular Biophysics]

Formate oxidation to carbon dioxide is a key reaction in one-carbon compound metabolism, and its reverse reaction represents the first step in carbon assimilation in the acetogenic and methanogenic branches of many anaerobic organisms. The molybdenum-containing dehydrogenase FdsABG is a soluble NAD+-dependent formate dehydrogenase and a member of the NADH dehydrogenase superfamily. Here, we present the first structure of the FdsBG subcomplex of the cytosolic FdsABG formate dehydrogenase from the hydrogen-oxidizing bacterium Cupriavidus necator H16 both with and without bound NADH. The structures revealed that the two iron-sulfur clusters, Fe4S4 in FdsB and Fe2S2 in FdsG, are closer to the FMN than they are in other NADH dehydrogenases. Rapid kinetic studies and EPR measurements of rapid freeze-quenched samples of the NADH reduction of FdsBG identified a neutral flavin semiquinone, FMNH•, not previously observed to participate in NADH-mediated reduction of the FdsABG holoenzyme. We found that this semiquinone forms through the transfer of one electron from the fully reduced FMNH−, initially formed via NADH-mediated reduction, to the Fe2S2 cluster. This Fe2S2 cluster is not part of the on-path chain of iron-sulfur clusters connecting the FMN of FdsB with the active-site molybdenum center of FdsA. According to the NADH-bound structure, the nicotinamide ring stacks onto the re-face of the FMN. However, NADH binding significantly reduced the electron density for the isoalloxazine ring of FMN and induced a conformational change in residues of the FMN-binding pocket that display peptide-bond flipping upon NAD+ binding in proper NADH dehydrogenases.




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Quantification of the affinities of CRISPR-Cas9 nucleases for cognate protospacer adȷacent motif (PAM) sequences [Molecular Biophysics]

The CRISPR/Cas9 nucleases have been widely applied for genome editing in various organisms. Cas9 nucleases complexed with a guide RNA (Cas9–gRNA) find their targets by scanning and interrogating the genomic DNA for sequences complementary to the gRNA. Recognition of the DNA target sequence requires a short protospacer adjacent motif (PAM) located outside this sequence. Given that the efficiency of target location may depend on the strength of interactions that promote target recognition, here we sought to compare affinities of different Cas9 nucleases for their cognate PAM sequences. To this end, we measured affinities of Cas9 nucleases from Streptococcus pyogenes, Staphylococcus aureus, and Francisella novicida complexed with guide RNAs (gRNAs) (SpCas9–gRNA, SaCas9–gRNA, and FnCas9–gRNA, respectively) and of three engineered SpCas9–gRNA variants with altered PAM specificities for short, PAM-containing DNA probes. We used a “beacon” assay that measures the relative affinities of DNA probes by determining their ability to competitively affect the rate of Cas9–gRNA binding to fluorescently labeled target DNA derivatives called “Cas9 beacons.” We observed significant differences in the affinities for cognate PAM sequences among the studied Cas9 enzymes. The relative affinities of SpCas9–gRNA and its engineered variants for canonical and suboptimal PAMs correlated with previous findings on the efficiency of these PAM sequences in genome editing. These findings suggest that high affinity of a Cas9 nuclease for its cognate PAM promotes higher genome-editing efficiency.




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Roles of active-site residues in catalysis, substrate binding, cooperativity, and the reaction mechanism of the quinoprotein glycine oxidase [Enzymology]

The quinoprotein glycine oxidase from the marine bacterium Pseudoalteromonas luteoviolacea (PlGoxA) uses a protein-derived cysteine tryptophylquinone (CTQ) cofactor to catalyze conversion of glycine to glyoxylate and ammonia. This homotetrameric enzyme exhibits strong cooperativity toward glycine binding. It is a good model for studying enzyme kinetics and cooperativity, specifically for being able to separate those aspects of protein function through directed mutagenesis. Variant proteins were generated with mutations in four active-site residues, Phe-316, His-583, Tyr-766, and His-767. Structures for glycine-soaked crystals were obtained for each. Different mutations had differential effects on kcat and K0.5 for catalysis, K0.5 for substrate binding, and the Hill coefficients describing the steady-state kinetics or substrate binding. Phe-316 and Tyr-766 variants retained catalytic activity, albeit with altered kinetics and cooperativity. Substitutions of His-583 revealed that it is essential for glycine binding, and the structure of H583C PlGoxA had no active-site glycine present in glycine-soaked crystals. The structure of H767A PlGoxA revealed a previously undetected reaction intermediate, a carbinolamine product-reduced CTQ adduct, and exhibited only negligible activity. The results of these experiments, as well as those with the native enzyme and previous variants, enabled construction of a detailed mechanism for the reductive half-reaction of glycine oxidation. This proposed mechanism includes three discrete reaction intermediates that are covalently bound to CTQ during the reaction, two of which have now been structurally characterized by X-ray crystallography.




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Thioredoxin regulates human mercaptopyruvate sulfurtransferase at physiologically-relevant concentrations [Enzymology]

3-Mercaptopyruvate sulfur transferase (MPST) catalyzes the desulfuration of 3-mercaptopyruvate (3-MP) and transfers sulfane sulfur from an enzyme-bound persulfide intermediate to thiophilic acceptors such as thioredoxin and cysteine. Hydrogen sulfide (H2S), a signaling molecule implicated in many physiological processes, can be released from the persulfide product of the MPST reaction. Two splice variants of MPST, differing by 20 amino acids at the N terminus, give rise to the cytosolic MPST1 and mitochondrial MPST2 isoforms. Here, we characterized the poorly-studied MPST1 variant and demonstrated that substitutions in its Ser–His–Asp triad, proposed to serve a general acid–base role, minimally affect catalytic activity. We estimated the 3-MP concentration in murine liver, kidney, and brain tissues, finding that it ranges from 0.4 μmol·kg−1 in brain to 1.4 μmol·kg−1 in kidney. We also show that N-acetylcysteine, a widely-used antioxidant, is a poor substrate for MPST and is unlikely to function as a thiophilic acceptor. Thioredoxin exhibits substrate inhibition, increasing the KM for 3-MP ∼15-fold compared with other sulfur acceptors. Kinetic simulations at physiologically-relevant substrate concentrations predicted that the proportion of sulfur transfer to thioredoxin increases ∼3.5-fold as its concentration decreases from 10 to 1 μm, whereas the total MPST reaction rate increases ∼7-fold. The simulations also predicted that cysteine is a quantitatively-significant sulfane sulfur acceptor, revealing MPST's potential to generate low-molecular-weight persulfides. We conclude that the MPST1 and MPST2 isoforms are kinetically indistinguishable and that thioredoxin modulates the MPST-catalyzed reaction in a physiologically-relevant concentration range.




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A single amino acid substitution uncouples catalysis and allostery in an essential biosynthetic enzyme in Mycobacterium tuberculosis [Enzymology]

Allostery exploits the conformational dynamics of enzymes by triggering a shift in population ensembles toward functionally distinct conformational or dynamic states. Allostery extensively regulates the activities of key enzymes within biosynthetic pathways to meet metabolic demand for their end products. Here, we have examined a critical enzyme, 3-deoxy-d-arabino-heptulosonate 7-phosphate synthase (DAH7PS), at the gateway to aromatic amino acid biosynthesis in Mycobacterium tuberculosis, which shows extremely complex dynamic allostery: three distinct aromatic amino acids jointly communicate occupancy to the active site via subtle changes in dynamics, enabling exquisite fine-tuning of delivery of these essential metabolites. Furthermore, this allosteric mechanism is co-opted by pathway branchpoint enzyme chorismate mutase upon complex formation. In this study, using statistical coupling analysis, site-directed mutagenesis, isothermal calorimetry, small-angle X-ray scattering, and X-ray crystallography analyses, we have pinpointed a critical node within the complex dynamic communication network responsible for this sophisticated allosteric machinery. Through a facile Gly to Pro substitution, we have altered backbone dynamics, completely severing the allosteric signal yet remarkably, generating a nonallosteric enzyme that retains full catalytic activity. We also identified a second residue of prime importance to the inter-enzyme communication with chorismate mutase. Our results reveal that highly complex dynamic allostery is surprisingly vulnerable and provide further insights into the intimate link between catalysis and allostery.




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Wish you were here: Meetings, no meetings, meeting reports [Editorial]

We've all been saying it: These are unprecedented times. The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are incredibly wide-ranging and affect all facets of life. One that is hitting the scientific community very hard is the cancellation of meetings, large and small. While we are well-versed in connecting with colleagues and collaborators across a variety of online platforms, these do not replace the immensely gratifying aspects of attending meetings in person: the pleasure of catching up with old friends and making new ones, the insights gained from having real-time conversations with others working on the same topic but with different expertise and perspectives, and the stimulating new scientific ideas we carry home. We have all been feeling the disappointment as we learn that one meeting after another is forced to cancel, from the vibrant ASBMB annual meeting to summer conferences of all types.Another loss from the appropriate but painful decision to cancel the ASBMB annual meeting was the chance to hear from our Herbert Tabor Early Career Investigator Awardees, who represent the best science published in JBC in the preceding year. This year, the competition was particularly fierce. We hope and anticipate that we will be able to hear from the winners at next year's ASBMB annual meeting. But in the meantime, we want to raise a toast to Wenchao Zhao, Yue Yang, Manisha Dagar, Febin Varghese, and Ayumi Nagashima-Kasahara as our 2020 winners. We've captured their award-winning 2019 papers (1–5) on the JBC website (6), and extended profiles of the...




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Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2020

Members Event

12 February 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Robert Malley, President & CEO, International Crisis Group

Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Dean, Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs; Director, US and the Americas Programme

Following a year of protests, extreme politics and the emergence of new and sophisticated security challenges, Robert Malley and Leslie Vinjamuri examine the International Crisis Group’s Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2020.

They identify key challenges for international relations, discuss the potential for national and regional political instability and consider how these issues may impact foreign policy, international security and democratic governance.

Members Events Team




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Trump’s Threat to Target Iran’s Cultural Heritage Is Illegal and Wrong

7 January 2020

Héloïse Goodley

Army Chief of General Staff Research Fellow (2018–19), International Security
Targeting cultural property is rightly prohibited under the 1954 Hague Convention.

2020-01-07-Trump.jpg

Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago in December. Photo: Getty Images

As tensions escalate in the Middle East, US President Donald Trump has threatened to strike targets in Iran should they seek to retaliate over the killing of Qassem Soleimani. According to the president’s tweet, these sites includes those that are ‘important to Iran and Iranian culture’.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper was quick on Monday to rule out any such action and acknowledged that the US would ‘follow the laws of armed conflict’. But Trump has not since commented further on the matter.

Any move to target Iranian cultural heritage could constitute a breach of the international laws protecting cultural property. Attacks on cultural sites are deemed unlawful under two United Nations conventions; the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property during Armed Conflict, and the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.

These have established deliberate attacks on cultural heritage (when not militarily necessary) as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in recognition of the irreparable damage that the loss of cultural heritage can have locally, regionally and globally.

These conventions were established in the aftermath of the Second World War, in reaction to the legacy of the massive destruction of cultural property that took place, including the intense bombing of cities, and systematic plunder of artworks across Europe. The conventions recognize that damage to the cultural property of any people means ‘damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind’. The intention of these is to establish a new norm whereby protecting culture and history – that includes cultural and historical property – is as important as safeguarding people.

Such historical sites are important not simply as a matter of buildings and statues, but rather for their symbolic significance in a people’s history and identity. Destroying cultural artefacts is a direct attack on the identity of the population that values them, erasing their memories and historical legacy. Following the heavy bombing of Dresden during the Second World War, one resident summed up the psychological impact of such destruction in observing that ‘you expect people to die, but you don’t expect the buildings to die’.

Targeting sites of cultural significance isn’t just an act of intimidation during conflict. It can also have a lasting effect far beyond the cessation of violence, hampering post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction, where ruins or the absence of previously significant cultural monuments act as a lasting physical reminder of hostilities.

For example, during the Bosnian War in the 1990s, the Old Bridge in Mostar represented a symbol of centuries of shared cultural heritage and peaceful co-existence between the Serbian and Croat communities. The bridge’s destruction in 1993 at the height of the civil war and the temporary cable bridge which took its place acted as a lasting reminder of the bitter hostilities, prompting its reconstruction a decade later as a mark of the reunification of the ethnically divided town.

More recently, the destruction of cultural property has been a feature of terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban’s demolition of the 1,700-year-old Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001, eliciting international condemnation. Similarly, in Iraq in 2014 following ISIS’s seizure of the city of Mosul, the terrorist group set about systematically destroying a number of cultural sites, including the Great Mosque of al-Nuri with its leaning minaret, which had stood since 1172. And in Syria, the ancient city of Palmyra was destroyed by ISIS in 2015, who attacked its archaeological sites with bulldozers and explosives.

Such violations go beyond destruction: they include the looting of archaeological sites and trafficking of cultural objects, which are used to finance terrorist activities, which are also prohibited under the 1954 Hague Convention.

As a war crime, the destruction of cultural property has been successfully prosecuted in the International Criminal Court, which sentenced Ahmad Al-Faqi Al-Mahdi to nine years in jail in 2016 for his part in the destruction of the Timbuktu mausoleums in Mali. Mahdi led members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to destroy mausoleums and monuments of cultural and religious importance in Timbuktu, irreversibly erasing what the chief prosecutor described as ‘the embodiment of Malian history captured in tangible form from an era long gone’.

Targeting cultural property is prohibited under customary international humanitarian law, not only by the Hague Convention. But the Convention sets out detailed regulations for protection of such property, and it has taken some states a lot of time to provide for these.

Although the UK was an original signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention, it did not ratify it until 2017, introducing into law the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017, and setting up the Cultural Protection Fund to safeguard heritage of international importance threatened by conflict in countries across the Middle East and North Africa.

Ostensibly, the UK’s delay in ratifying the convention lay in concerns over the definition of key terms and adequate criminal sanctions, which were addressed in the Second Protocol in 1999. However, changing social attitudes towards the plunder of antiquities, and an alarming increase in the use of cultural destruction as a weapon of war by extremist groups to eliminate cultures that do not align with their own ideology, eventually compelled the UK to act.

In the US, it is notoriously difficult to get the necessary majority for the approval of any treaty in the Senate; for the Hague Convention, approval was achieved in 2008, following which the US ratified the Convention in 2009.

Destroying the buildings and monuments which form the common heritage of humanity is to wipe out the physical record of who we are. People are people within a place, and they draw meaning about who they are from their surroundings. Religious buildings, historical sites, works of art, monuments and historic artefacts all tell the story of who we are and how we got here. We have a responsibility to protect them.




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The recalibration of Chinese assertiveness: China's responses to the Indo-Pacific challenge

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Feng Liu

In response to the changing geopolitical landscape in Asia, both China and the United States attempt to alter the regional order in their own favour, both in the economic and security realms. This article shows how diverging views on future arrangements are leading to strategic shifts and increasing tension between these two Great Powers. As part of its quest for Great-Power status, China has been actively pushing its regional initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as adopting assertive security policies towards its neighbours. In contrast, in order to counter China's growing influence America's regional strategy is undergoing a subtle shift from ‘rebalancing to Asia’ to focusing on the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region. However, amid an intensifying trade war and other challenges facing the region, China has chosen to moderate its proactive foreign policy-orientation in the past few years. In particular, China has made attempts to downplay its domestic rhetoric, rebuild strategic relationship with India and Japan, and to reassure ASEAN states in the South China Sea. In response to the Indo-Pacific strategy, it would be more effective for China to articulate a more inclusive regional vision and promote an institutional framework that also accommodates a US presence in the region.




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Non-traditional security cooperation between China and south-east Asia: implications for Indo-Pacific geopolitics

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Xue Gong

The ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy, actively promoted by the United States with support from its allies and partners, is a significant geopolitical response to China's growing power and expanding influence in Asia and beyond. Beijing has adopted various new strategies to cope with the challenges related to FOIP. One of these strategies is to secure a robust relationship with south-east Asia in order to make these regional states either neutral to or less supportive of the Indo-Pacific vision. In addition to economic statecraft and soft power, Beijing believes that it can also tap into the domain of non-traditional security (NTS) to strengthen relations with this region to position itself better in the intensifying regional geopolitical competition. The article addresses the following question: what is the impact of China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asia on Beijing's geopolitical rivalry with other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region? The article argues that China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asian countries may help China maintain its geopolitical standing in the region, but it is unlikely to lead to any dramatic increase of China's strategic influence in the region. This essentially means that Beijing may be able to prevent ASEAN or most ASEAN member states from lending substantive and strong support to the Indo-Pacific construct, but it will not be able to stop ASEAN states from supporting some elements of the FOIP.




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Japan's ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Kei Koga

Japan's primary objective of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called ‘tactical hedging’. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future.




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Evasive balancing: India's unviable Indo-Pacific strategy

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Rajesh Rajagopalan

India has adopted the Indo-Pacific concept with uncharacteristic speed. This article examines India's Indo-Pacific strategy, which evolved out of its earlier ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East’ policies but is much more focused on strategic concerns than on trade or connectivity. As such, the strategy is subset of its China policy, and includes contradictory elements of balancing China by building partnerships with the United States as well as with regional powers, while simultaneously pursuing a reassurance strategy to convince Beijing that India is not really balancing China. The combination of these contradictory elements is characterized as evasive balancing, which is a more useful concept than either pure balancing or hedging for understanding the policies of India and of many other countries in the region that are trying to manage China's rise. However, reassurance strategies rarely work and the combination of balancing and reassurance is even less likely to be viable.




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Is Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy an illusion?

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Brendan Taylor

Australia has been among the most prominent advocates of the increasingly popular Indo-Pacific concept. This article argues that Canberra's enthusiasm for the concept stems from its appeal to the two dominant traditions of Australian foreign policy—a ‘dependent ally’ tradition and a ‘middle power’ approach. While these two traditions are typically seen as being in tension, the Indo-Pacific concept provides a rare point of convergence between them. The article begins by outlining the appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept to each of these traditions. Using a case-study of recent Australian policy toward the South China Sea disputes, however, the article then demonstrates that Australia has in practice implemented its stated Indo-Pacific strategy far less consistently than its very vocal support would appear to suggest. This disjuncture is attributed to the growing influence of a third, generally understudied, ‘pragmatic’ Australian foreign policy tradition. Because Australia has been such a prominent champion of the Indo-Pacific concept, the article concludes that this divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to have a negative impact on the concept's broader international appeal and sustainability, particularly among Australia's south-east Asian neighbours.




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Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Indonesia has taken a leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in drafting a common outlook on the Indo-Pacific concept. The widening of Indonesia's geostrategic canvas from the Asia–Pacific to the Indo-Pacific is in line with President Joko Widodo's intent to make Indonesia a Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). In view of the rivalry between the US and China and the emergence of various Indo-Pacific initiatives from other countries, Indonesia believes that ASEAN must try to maintain its centrality. The draft of Indonesia's perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific: towards a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive region was submitted for considerations by ASEAN, and after 18 months of intensive lobbying by Indonesia the concept was finally adopted at the ASEAN Summit in June 2019. The ASEAN outlook promotes the principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, respect for international law and ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. It proposes a building-block approach, seeking commonalities between existing regional initiatives in which ASEAN-led mechanisms will act as a fulcrum for both norm-setting and concrete cooperation. Rather than creating a new regional architecture, the East Asia Summit (EAS) is proposed as the platform for advancing the Indo-Pacific discourse and cooperation. Indonesia's ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific marks its renewed foreign policy activism as a middle power and underlines the continuing importance that Indonesia places on ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, emphasising ASEAN's centrality as the primary vehicle for managing relations with the major powers in the Indo-Pacific region.




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Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America's ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

See Seng Tan

This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.




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The institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific: problems and prospects

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Kai He and Huiyun Feng

Although the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has become popular in the foreign policy discourse of some countries, we have yet to see any significant institution-building in the Indo-Pacific region. Borrowing insights from functional institutionalism and political leadership studies of international regimes, we introduce a ‘leadership–institution’ model to explore the problems and prospects of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific. Through a comparative case study of the institutionalization of the Asia–Pacific vs the Indo-Pacific, we argue that two crucial factors contributed to the slow institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific as a regional system in world politics: the lack of ideational leadership from an epistemic community and the weak executive leadership from a powerful state. While ideational leaders can help states identify and expand common interests in cooperation, executive leadership will facilitate states to overcome operational obstacles in cooperation, such as the ‘collective action’ problem and the ‘relative gains’ concern. The future of institution-building in the Indo-Pacific will depend on whether and how these two leadership roles are played by scholars and states in the region. In the conclusion, we discuss the challenges of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific and highlight China as a wild card in the future of Indo-Pacific regionalism.




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The Belt and Road Initiative: geo-economics and Indo-Pacific security competition

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Mingjiang Li

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been regarded by international society as a major policy tool in China's geo-economic strategy. Under this policy platform, Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructure and industrial sectors across Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific nations. It is widely believed that such huge amount of investment will inevitably generate significant geostrategic repercussions in these regions. In response to the BRI, the United States and other powers have come up with a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. This article attempts to address the following question: what impact is the BRI likely to have on the security ties between China and the other major players in the Indo-Pacific? The author finds that the BRI may significantly transform China's international security policy and the expansion of Beijing's security influence may further intensify the security competition between China and other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The article also proposes a new analytical angle for the study of geo-economics that unpacks the role of economic activities and processes in generating geopolitical intentions and catalysing geopolitical competition.




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Developmental peace in east Asia and its implications for the Indo-Pacific

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Ling Wei

This article adopts a constructive approach to examining the problem of the Indo-Pacific construct. Through reflection on the east Asian experience, it proposes an analytical framework of developmental peace as a constellation of international practices, which means that the more economic development is prioritized by states in regional processes, the more likely it is that a sustainable peace will be achieved. States participating in regional integration comprise a community of practice. On the basis of a shared understanding that development is of overriding importance and underpins security and state legitimacy, the community takes economic development as the anchoring practice; this practice embodies and enacts constitutive rules and fundamental norms for a broader set of practices in regional processes, such as peaceful coexistence and non-interference. The more economic development is prioritized on domestic and regional agendas, the more likely it is that conflicts in the security realm will be relaxed or even resolved to protect security interests. The author draws some useful implications from the developmental peace in east Asia for the Indo-Pacific construct, among which the most important include building shared understandings on the prioritization of economic development, taking advantage of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and using the code of conduct process as a vehicle and best practice to facilitate rule-making for the maritime order. Finally, the author briefly discusses the contributions of the study and limitations of the model.




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Review essay: Where is the Anthropocene? IR in a new geological epoch

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Dahlia Simangan

Several disciplines outside the natural sciences, including International Relations (IR), have engaged with the Anthropocene discourse in order to theorize their relevance and translate their practical value in this new phase of the Earth's history. Some IR scholars have called for a post-humanist IR, planet politics, a cosmopolitan view, and ecological security, among other approaches, to recalibrate the theoretical foundations of the discipline, making it more attuned to the realities of the Anthropocene. Existing discussions, however, tend to universalize human experience and gravitate towards western ontologies and epistemologies of living in the Anthropocene. Within this burgeoning scholarship, how is the IR discipline engaging with the Anthropocene discourse? Although the Anthropocene has become a new theoretical landscape for the conceptual broadening of conventional IR subjects, this review reveals the need for sustained discussion that highlights the differentiated human experiences in the Anthropocene. The existing IR publications on the Anthropocene locates the non-spatial narratives of vulnerability and historical injustice, the non-modernist understanding of nature, the agency of the vulnerable, and the amplification of security issues in the Anthropocene. It is in amplifying these narratives that the IR discipline can broaden and diversify the discourse on the Anthropocene and, therefore, affirm its relevance in this new geological age.




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Understanding the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US–China strategic competition, regional actors, and beyond

6 November 2019 , Volume 96, Number 1

The first issue of International Affairs in 2020 explores the geopolitics of the 'Indo-Pacific' region.

Kai He and Mingjiang Li

As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.




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Building LGBTIQ+ Inclusivity in the Armed Forces, 20 Years After the Ban Was Lifted

16 January 2020

Will Davies

Army Chief of General Staff Research Fellow, International Security Programme
Change was slow to come but progress has since been swift. Not only can a continuing focus on inclusivity benefit service people and the organization, it is also an essential element of a values-based foreign policy.

2020-01-16-Westminster.jpg

Crew members from HMS Westminster march through Admiralty Arch as they exercise their freedom of the city in August 2019 in London. Photo: Getty Images.

The new UK government will conduct a review of foreign, security and defence policy in 2020. If the UK decides to use values as a framework for foreign policy this needs to be reflected in its armed forces. One area where this is essential is continuing to deepen inclusivity for LGBTIQ+ personnel, building on the progress made since the ban on their service was lifted in 2000.

I witnessed the ban first-hand as a young officer in the British Army in 1998. As the duty officer I visited soldiers being held in the regimental detention cells to check all was well. One day a corporal, who I knew, was there awaiting discharge from the army having been convicted of being gay. On the one hand, here was service law in action, which was officially protecting the army’s operational effectiveness and an authority not to be questioned at my level. On the other, here was an excellent soldier in a state of turmoil and public humiliation. How extreme this seems now.

On 12 January 2000 Tony Blair’s Labour government announced an immediate lifting of the ban for lesbian, gay and bisexual personnel (LGB) and introduced a new code of conduct for personal relationships. (LGB is the term used by the armed forces to describe those personnel who had been banned prior to 2000.) This followed a landmark ruling in a case taken to the European Court of Human Rights in 1999 by four LGB ex-service personnel – supported by Stonewall – who had been dismissed from service for their sexuality.

Up to that point the Ministry of Defence's long-held position had been that LGB personnel had a negative impact on the morale and cohesion of a unit and damaged operational effectiveness. Service personnel were automatically dismissed if it was discovered they were LGB, even though homosexuality had been decriminalized in the UK by 1967.

Proof that the armed forces had been lagging behind the rest of society was confirmed by the positive response to the change among service personnel, despite a handful of vocal political and military leaders who foresaw negative impacts. The noteworthy service of LGBTIQ+ people in Iraq and Afghanistan only served to debunk any residual myths.

Twenty years on, considerable progress has been made and my memories from 1998 now seem alien. This is a story to celebrate – however in the quest for greater inclusivity there is always room for improvement.

Defence Minister Johnny Mercer last week apologized following recent calls from campaign group Liberty for a fuller apology. In December 2019, the Ministry of Defence announced it was putting in place a scheme to return medals stripped from veterans upon their discharge.

The armed forces today have a range of inclusivity measures to improve workplace culture including assessments of workplace climate and diversity networks supported by champions drawn from senior leadership.

But assessing the actual lived experience for LGBTIQ+ people is challenging due to its subjectivity. This has not been helped by low participation in the 2015 initiative to encourage people to declare confidentially their sexual orientation, designed to facilitate more focused and relevant policies. As of 1 October 2019, only 20.3 per cent of regular service people had declared a sexual orientation.

A measure of positive progress is the annual Stonewall Workplace Equality Index, the definitive benchmarking tool for employers to measure their progress on LGBTIQ+ inclusion in the workplace; 2015 marked the first year in which all three services were placed in the top 100 employers in the UK and in 2019 the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force were placed 15th=, 51st= and 68th respectively.

Nevertheless, LGBTIQ+ service people and those in other protected groups still face challenges. The 2019 Ministry of Defence review of inappropriate behaviour in the armed forces, the Wigston Report, concluded there is an unacceptable level of sexual harassment, bullying and discrimination. It found that 26-36% of LGBTIQ+ service people have experienced negative comments or conduct at work because of their sexual orientation.

The Secretary of State for Defence accepted the report’s 36 recommendations on culture, incident reporting, training and a more effective complaints system. Pivotal to successful implementation will be a coherent strategy driven by fully engaged leaders.

Society is also expecting ever higher standards, particularly in public bodies. The armed forces emphasise their values and standards, including ‘respect for others’, as defining organisational characteristics; individuals are expected to live by them. Only in a genuinely inclusive environment can an individual thrive and operate confidently within a team.

The armed forces also recognize as a priority the need to connect to and reflect society more closely in order to attract and retain talent from across all of society. The armed forces’ active participation in UK Pride is helping to break down barriers in this area.

In a post-Brexit world, the UK’s values, support for human rights and reputation for fairness are distinctive strengths that can have an impact on the world stage and offer a framework for future policy. The armed forces must continue to push and promote greater inclusivity in support. When operating overseas with less liberal regimes, this will be sensitive and require careful handling; however it will be an overt manifestation of a broader policy and a way to communicate strong and consistent values over time.

The armed forces were damagingly behind the times 20 years ago. But good progress has been made since. Inclusion initiatives must continue to be pushed to bring benefits to the individual and the organization as well as demonstrate a values-based foreign policy.




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Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region

Members Event

5 March 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

HE George Vella, President, Republic of Malta

Chair: Dr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

The president of Malta discusses the current security challenges in the Mediterranean region, reflecting on the role of international cooperation in addressing climate change, migration and refugee flows.

Members Events Team




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The Commonwealth Cyber Declaration: Achievements and Way Forward

Invitation Only Research Event

4 February 2020 - 9:15am to 5:30pm

Chatham House, London

In April 2018, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), held in London, saw the creation and the adoption of the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration. The declaration outlines the framework for a concerted effort to advance cybersecurity practices to promote a safe and prosperous cyberspace for Commonwealth citizens, businesses and societies. 

The conference will aim to provide an overview on the progress made on cybersecurity in the Commonwealth since the declaration was announced in 2018. In addition, it will examine future challenges and potential solutions going forward.

This conference is part of the International Security Programme's project on Implementing the Commonwealth Cybersecurity Agenda and will convene a range of senior Commonwealth representatives as well as a selection of civil society and industry stakeholders. This project aims to develop a pan-Commonwealth platform to take the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration forward by means of a holistic, inclusive and representative approach.

Please see below meeting summaries from previous events on Cybersecurity in the Commonwealth:  

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Esther Naylor

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
+44 (0)20 7314 3628




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Global Security and the US

Corporate Members Event Director's Breakfast Briefing Partners and Major Corporates

12 February 2020 - 8:00am to 9:15am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

General David Petraeus, Partner, KKR; Chairman, KKR Global Institute; Director, CIA (2011-12)
Chair: Dr Robin Niblett, Director, Chatham House

Drawing on his experience as commander of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and director of the CIA, General David Petraeus (Ret) will reflect on the current state of global security focusing in particular on the role of the US within the international security infrastructure and the world order.

This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations of Chatham House. If you'd like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford.

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Members Events Team




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The Smart Peace Initiative: An Integrated and Adaptive Approach to Building Peace

Invitation Only Research Event

12 May 2020 - 10:00am to 11:30am
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Smart Peace brings together global expertise in conflict analysis and research, peacebuilding and mediation programming, and behavioural science and evaluation. Together, Smart Peace partners are developing integrated and adaptive peace initiatives, working with local partners to prevent and resolve complex and intractable conflicts in Central African Republic, Myanmar and northern Nigeria.
 
This roundtable is an opportunity for Smart Peace partners to share the Smart Peace concept, approach and objectives, and experiences of the first phases of programme implementation. Roundtable discussions among participants from policy, practice and research communities will inform future priorities and planning for Smart Peace learning, advocacy and communication.
 
Smart Peace partners include Conciliation Resources, Behavioural Insights Team, The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Chatham House, ETH Zurich, International Crisis Group and The Asia Foundation.

Nilza Amaral

Project Manager, International Security Programme




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POSTPONED: Working Towards Cyber Resilience in the GCC: Opportunities and Challenges

Invitation Only Research Event

12 March 2020 - 9:00am to 5:00pm

Muscat, Oman

The GCC states have invested significantly in cybersecurity and have made large strides in protecting governments, businesses and individuals from cyber threats, with the aim of delivering on their ambitious national strategies and future visions. However, several challenges to cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the region persist, putting those ambitious plans at risk.

These challenges include the uneven nature of cybersecurity protections, the incomplete implementation of cybersecurity strategies and regulations, and the issues around international cooperation. Such challenges mean that GCC states need to focus on the more difficult task of cyber resilience, in addition to the simpler initial stages of cybersecurity capacity-building, to ensure they harness the true potential of digital technologies and mitigate associated threats.

Set against this background, this workshop will explore opportunities and challenges to cyber resilience in the GCC focusing on four main pillars:

1. Cyber resilience: in concept and in practice
2. Building an effective cybersecurity capacity
3. The potential of regional and international cooperation to cyber resilience
4. Deterrence and disruption: different approaches

This event will be held in collaboration with the Arab Regional Cybersecurity Centre (ARCC) and OMAN CERT.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Esther Naylor

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
+44 (0)20 7314 3628




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Religious violence, gender and post-secular counterterrorism

4 March 2020 , Volume 96, Number 2

Katherine E. Brown

This article argues that despite the framing of religion in the discipline and practice of International Relations (IR) as a force for good, or a cause of evil in the world, IR fails to treat religion on its own terms (as sui generis). With a few exceptions, the discipline has pigeonholed religion as a variable of IR, one that can be discussed as one might GDP, HIV, or numbers of nuclear missiles: measurable, with causality and essential properties. IR has also tended to treat religion as equivalent to features of global politics that it already recognizes—as an institution or community or ideology, for example—but in doing so, it misses intrinsic (and arguably unique) elements of religion. Drawing on feminist insights about how gender works in IR, namely that gender is a construct, performative and structural, this article argues a similar case for religion. A reframing of religion is applied to the case of Daesh (so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) to show how our understanding of the organization changes when we view religion differently. The implications for counterterrorism policies if religion is viewed as more than a variable are explored in light of recent territorial and military losses for Daesh. The article therefore proposes a post-secular counterterrorism approach.