t How to Fight the Economic Fallout From the Coronavirus By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 04 Mar 2020 03:56:03 +0000 4 March 2020 Creon Butler Research Director, Trade, Investment & New Governance Models: Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme LinkedIn Finance ministries and central banks have a critical role to play to mitigate the threat Covid-19 poses to the global economy. 2020-03-03-TokyoCV.jpg A pedestrian wearing a face mask walks past stock prices in Tokyo on 25 February. Photo: Getty Images. Epidemics, of the size of Covid-19, have huge economic impacts – not just from the costs of managing the health of people, but stopping them, and keeping the economy working. The 10% fall in global stock markets since it became clear that Covid-19 would not be limited to China has boldly highlighted this.Suppressing the epidemic, but allowing the economy to still function, requires key decisions, in which central banks and finance ministries play a part.The role of fiscal and monetary authorities in managing an epidemic economyThe scope to use monetary policy to manage the economic impact of Covid-19 is limited. The fact that the underlying cause of the shock is an infectious disease outbreak (rather than a banking crisis, as in 2008-09) and nominal interest rates are currently close to zero in most major advanced economies reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy.Since 2010, reductions in fiscal deficits mean there is more scope for supportive fiscal action. But even here, high public debt levels and the desire not to underwrite ‘zombie’ companies that may have been sustained by a decade of ultra-low interest rates remain constraints. However, outside broad based fiscal and monetary policies there are six ways in which finance ministries and central banks will play a critical role in responding to the crisis.A first crucial role for finance ministries and central banks is in helping provide the best possible economic evaluation of strict containment measures (trying to isolate each potential case) versus managing the epidemic (delaying the spread of the virus, protecting the most vulnerable and treating the sick, while enabling the majority of people to get on with daily life). Given the economic consequences, they must play a full part, alongside health experts, in advising political leaders on this key decision.Second, if large numbers of staff are required to work from home to manage the epidemic, they have the lead role in doing whatever is necessary to ensure that financial markets – and thus the wider economy – will continue to function smoothly.Third, they need to ensure adequate funding for the public health response. Steps that can make an enormous difference to the success of containment strategies, such as strengthening surveillance, and guaranteeing the availability of testing kits and protective equipment for front line health workers, must not fail because of a lack of funding. Fourth, they have a lead role in designing targeted economic interventions for the wider economy. Some of these are needed immediately to re-enforce and incentivize strict containment strategies, such as ensuring that employees without full or adequate sick leave cover have the financial support to enable them to report and self-isolate when they get sick. Other interventions may help improve the resilience of the economy in accommodating moderate ‘social distancing’ measures; for example, by providing assistance to small firms to help them gear up for home working.Yet others are needed, as a contingency, to safeguard the most vulnerable sectors (such as tourism, retail and transport) in circumstances where there is a prolonged downturn. The latter may include schemes to allow deferral of tax payments by SMEs, or steps to encourage loan extensions and other forms of liquidity support from the banking system, or by moves to underwrite continued provision of business insurance.Fifth, national economic authorities will need to play their part in combatting ‘fake news’ through providing transparent and high-quality analysis. This includes providing forecasts on the likely economic impact of the virus under different scenarios, but also detailed information on the support and contingency measures they are considering, so they can be improved and refined through feedback. Sixth, they will need to ensure that there is generous international support for poor countries, by ensuring the available multilateral support facilities from the international financial institutions and multilateral development banks are adequately funded and fit for purpose. The World Bank has already announced an initial $12 billion financing package, but much more is likely to be needed.They also need to support coordinated bilateral aid where this is more effective, as well as special measures to support particularly vulnerable groups, for example, in refugee camps and prisons. Given the importance of distributing sophisticated medical equipment and expertise quickly, it is also important that every effort is made to avoid delays due to customs and migration checks.Managing the futureThe response to the immediate crisis will rightly take priority now, but economic authorities must also play their part in ensuring the world finally takes decisive steps to prevent a repeat of Covid-19 in future.The experience with SARS, H1N1 and Ebola shows that, while some progress is made after each outbreak, this is often not sustained. This epidemic shows that managing diseases is absolutely critical to the long-term health of global economy, and doubly so in circumstances where traditional central bank and finance ministry tools for dealing with major global economic shocks are limited.Finance ministries and central banks therefore need to push hard within government to ensure sustained long-term funding of research on prevention and strengthening of public health systems. They also need to ensure that the right lessons are drawn by the private sector on making international supply chains more robust.Critical to the overall success of the economic effort will be effective international coordination. The G20 was established as the premier economic forum for international economic cooperation in 2010, and global health issues have been a substantive part of the G20 agenda since the 2017 Hamburg Summit. At the same time, G7 finance ministers and deputies remain one of the most effective bodies for managing economic crises on a day-to-day basis and should continue this within the framework provided by the G20.However, to be effective, the US, as current president of the G7, will need to put aside its reservations on multilateral economic cooperation and working with China to provide strong leadership. Full Article
t The UK Global Tariff By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 06 Mar 2020 09:05:01 +0000 Research Event 18 March 2020 - 9:00am to 10:00am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Michael Gasiorek, Professor of Economics, UKTPO Fellow, University of Sussex; Director, InteranalysisJulia Magntorn Garrett, Research Officer, UKTPO, University of SussexAllie Renison, Head of Europe and Trade Policy at the Institute of DirectorsMaximiliano Mendez-Parra, Senior Research Fellow, Overseas Development InstituteChair: Professor Jim Rollo, Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Department, Chatham House; Deputy Director, UK Trade Policy Observatory The UK government’s public consultation on tariffs closes on 5 March. This meeting will discuss the proposals floated in the consultation document and consider their effects on tariff and protection levels, prices and variety. It will also place tariff policy in the wider context of trade policy, including the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU and the USA. Department/project Global Economy and Finance Programme, UK Trade Policy Observatory Michela Gariboldi Research Assistant, Global Economy and Finance Programme 02073143692 Email Full Article
t Coronavirus: Global Response Urgently Needed By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Sun, 15 Mar 2020 14:33:11 +0000 15 March 2020 Jim O'Neill Chair, Chatham House Robin Niblett Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House @RobinNiblett Creon Butler Research Director, Trade, Investment & New Governance Models: Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme LinkedIn There have been warnings for several years that world leaders would find it hard to manage a new global crisis in today’s more confrontational, protectionist and nativist political environment. 2020-03-15-Korea-Stock-Exchange.jpg A currency dealer wearing a face mask monitors exchange rates in front of a screen showing South Korea's benchmark stock index in Seoul on March 13, 2020. Photo by JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images. An infectious disease outbreak has long been a top national security risk in several countries, but the speed and extent of COVID-19’s spread and the scale of its social and economic impact has come as an enormous and deeply worrying shock.This pandemic is not just a global medical and economic emergency. It could also prove a decisive make-or-break point for today’s system of global political and economic cooperation.This system was built up painstakingly after 1945 as a response to the beggar-thy-neighbour economic policies of the 1930s which led to the Second World War. But it has been seriously weakened recently as the US and China have entered a more overt phase of strategic competition, and as they and a number of the other most important global and regional players have pursued their narrowly defined self-interest.Now, the disjointed global economic response to COVID-19, with its enormous ramifications for global prosperity and economic stability, has blown into the open the urgent need for an immediate reaffirmation of international political and economic cooperation.What is needed is a clear, coordinated and public statement from the leaders of the world’s major countries affirming the many things on which they do already agree, and some on which they should be able to agree.In particular that:they will give the strongest possible support for the WHO in leading the medical response internationally;they will be transparent and tell the truth to their peoples about the progress of the disease and the threat that it represents;they will work together and with the international financial institutions to provide businesses, particularly SMEs, and individuals whatever support they need to get through the immediate crisis and avoid long-term damage to the global economy; they will ensure the financial facilities for crisis support to countries - whether at global or regional level - have whatever resources they need to support countries in difficulty;they will avoid new protectionist policies - whether in trade or finance;they commit not to forget the poor and vulnerable in society and those least able to look after themselves.Such a statement could be made by G20 leaders, reflecting the group’s role since 2010 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation.But it could be even more appropriate coming from the UN Security Council, recognising that COVID-19 is much more than an economic challenge; and also reflecting the practical fact, in a time when international travel is restricted, the UNSC has an existing mechanism in New York to negotiate and quickly agree such a statement.A public statement by leading countries could do a great deal to help arrest a growing sense of powerlessness among citizens and loss of confidence among businesses worldwide as the virus spreads.It could also set a new course for international political and economic cooperation, not just in relation to the virus, but also other global threats with potentially devastating consequences for economic growth and political stability in the coming years. Full Article
t To Advance Trade and Climate Goals, ‘Global Britain’ Must Link Them By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 17:12:54 +0000 19 March 2020 Carolyn Deere Birkbeck Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme, and Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy @carolyndeere LinkedIn Google Scholar Dr Emily Jones Associate Professor, Blavatnik School of Government Dr Thomas Hale Associate Professor, Blavatnik School of Government COVID-19 is a sharp reminder of why trade policy matters. As the UK works to forge new trade deals, it must align its trade policy agenda with its climate ambition. 2020-03-19-Boris-Johnson-COP26.jpg Boris Johnson at the launch of the UK-hosted COP26 UN Climate Summit at the Science Museum, London on February 4, 2020. Photo by Jeremy Selwyn - WPA Pool/Getty Images. COVID-19 is a sharp reminder of why trade and climate policy matters. How can governments maintain access to critical goods and services, and ensure global supply chains function in times of crisis?The timing of many trade negotiations is now increasingly uncertain, as are the UK’s plans to host COP26 in November. Policy work continues, however, and the EU has released its draft negotiating text for the new UK-EU trade deal, which includes a sub-chapter specifically devoted to climate. This is a timely reminder both of the pressing need for the UK to integrate its trade and climate policymaking and to use the current crisis-induced breathing space in international negotiations - however limited - to catch up on both strategy and priorities on this critical policy intersection.The UK government has moved fast to reset its external trade relations post-Brexit. In the past month it formally launched bilateral negotiations with the EU and took up a seat at the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an independent member. Until the COVID-19 crisis hit, negotiations were also poised to start with the US.The UK is also in the climate spotlight as host of COP26, the most important international climate negotiation since Paris in 2015, which presents a vital opportunity for the government to show leadership by aligning its trade agenda with its climate and sustainability commitments in bold new ways.Not just an empty aspirationThis would send a signal that ‘Global Britain’ is not just an empty aspiration, but a concrete commitment to lead.Not only is concerted action on the climate crisis a central priority for UK citizens, a growing and increasingly vocal group of UK businesses committed to decarbonization are calling on the government to secure a more transparent and predictable international market place that supports climate action by business.With COP26, the UK has a unique responsibility to push governments to ratchet up ambition in the national contributions to climate action – and to promote coherence between climate ambition and wider economic policymaking, including on trade. If Britain really wants to lead, here are some concrete actions it should take.At the national level, the UK can pioneer new ways to put environmental sustainability – and climate action in particular - at the heart of its trade agenda. Achieving the government’s ambitious Clean Growth Strategy - which seeks to make the UK the global leader in a range of industries including electric cars and offshore wind – should be a central objective of UK trade policy.The UK should re-orient trade policy frameworks to incentivize the shift toward a more circular and net zero global economy. And all elements of UK trade policy could be assessed against environmental objectives - for example, their contribution to phasing out fossil fuels, helping to reverse overexploitation of natural resources, and support for sustainable agriculture and biodiversity.In its bilateral and regional trade negotiations, the UK can and should advance its environment, climate and trade goals in tandem, and implementation of the Paris Agreement must be a core objective of the UK trade strategy.A core issue for the UK is how to ensure that efforts to decarbonise the economy are not undercut by imports from high-carbon producers. Here, a ‘border carbon adjustment (BCA)’ - effectively a tax on the climate pollution of imports - would support UK climate goals. The EU draft negotiating text released yesterday put the issue of BCAs front and centre, making crystal clear that the intersection of climate, environment and trade policy goals will be a central issue for UK-EU trade negotiations.Even with the United States, a trade deal can and should still be seized as a way to incentivize the shift toward a net zero and more circular economy. At the multilateral level, as a new independent WTO member, the UK has an opportunity to help build a forward-looking climate and trade agenda.The UK could help foster dialogue, research and action on a cluster of ‘climate and trade’ issues that warrant more focused attention at the WTO. These include the design of carbon pricing policies at the border that are transparent, fair and support a just transition; proposals for a climate waiver for WTO rules; and identification of ways multilateral trade cooperation could promote a zero carbon and more circular global economy. To help nudge multilateral discussion along, the UK could also ask to join a critical ‘path finder’ effort by six governments, led by New Zealand, to pursue an agreement on climate change, trade and sustainability (ACCTS). This group aims to find ways forward on three central trade and climate issues: removing fossil fuel subsidies, climate-related labelling, and promoting trade in climate-friendly goods and services.At present, the complex challenges at the intersection of climate, trade and development policy are too often used to defer or side-step issues deemed ‘too hard’ or ‘too sensitive’ to tackle. The UK could help here by working to ensure multilateral climate and trade initiatives share adjustment burdens, recognise the historical responsibility of developed countries, and do not unfairly disadvantage developing countries - especially the least developed.Many developing countries are keen to promote climate-friendly exports as part of wider export diversification strategies and want to reap greater returns from greener global value chains. Further, small island states and least-developed countries – many of which are Commonwealth members – that are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and natural disasters, need support to adapt in the face of trade shocks and to build climate-resilient, trade-related infrastructure and export sectors.As an immediate next step, the UK should actively support the growing number of WTO members in favour of a WTO Ministerial Statement on environmental sustainability and trade. It should work with its key trading partners in the Commonwealth and beyond to ensure the agenda is inclusive, supports achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helps developing countries benefit from a more environmentally sustainable global economy.As the UK prepares to host COP26, negotiates deals with the EU and US, and prepares for its first WTO Ministerial meeting as an independent member, it must show it can lead the way nationally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. And to ensure the government acts, greater engagement from the UK’s business, civil society and research sectors is critical – we need all hands on deck to forge and promote concrete proposals for aligning UK trade policy with the climate ambition our world needs. Full Article
t COVID-19: How Do We Re-open the Economy? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 14:41:47 +0000 21 April 2020 Creon Butler Research Director, Trade, Investment & New Governance Models: Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme LinkedIn Following five clear steps will create the confidence needed for both the consumer and business decision-making which is crucial to a strong recovery. 2020-04-21-Shop-Retail-Closed Chain wrapped around the door of a Saks Fifth Avenue Inc. store in San Francisco, California, during the COVID-19 crisis. Photo by David Paul Morris/Bloomberg via Getty Images With the IMF forecasting a 6.1% fall in advanced economy GDP in 2020 and world trade expected to contract by 11%, there is intense focus on the question of how and when to re-open economies currently in lockdown.But no ‘opening up’ plan has a chance of succeeding unless it commands the confidence of all the main actors in the economy – employees, consumers, firms, investors and local authorities.Without public confidence, these groups may follow official guidance only sporadically; consumers will preserve cash rather than spend it on goods and services; employees will delay returning to work wherever possible; businesses will face worsening bottlenecks as some parts of the economy open up while key suppliers remain closed; and firms will continue to delay many discretionary investment and hiring decisions.Achieving public confidenceTaken together, these behaviours would substantially reduce the chances of a strong economic bounce-back even in the absence of a widespread second wave of infections. Five key steps are needed to achieve a high degree of public confidence in any reopening plan.First, enough progress must be made in suppressing the virus and in building public health capacity so the public can be confident any new outbreak will be contained without reverting to another full-scale lockdown. Moreover, the general public needs to feel that the treatment capacity of the health system is at a level where the risk to life if someone does fall ill with the virus is at an acceptably low level.Achieving this requires the government to demonstrate the necessary capabilities - testing, contact tracing, quarantine facilities, supplies of face masks and other forms of PPE (personal protective equipment) - are actually in place and can be sustained, rather than relying on future commitments. It also needs to be clear on the role to be played going forward by handwashing and other personal hygiene measures.Second, the authorities need to set out clear priorities on which parts of the economy are to open first and why. This needs to take account of both supply side and demand side factors, such as the importance of a particular sector to delivering essential supplies, a sector’s ability to put in place effective protocols to protect its employees and customers, and its importance to the functioning of other parts of the economy. There is little point in opening a car assembly plant unless its SME suppliers are able to deliver the required parts.Detailed planning of the phasing of specific relaxation measures is essential, as is close cooperation between business and the authorities. The government also needs to establish a centralised coordination function capable of dealing quickly with any unexpected supply chain glitches. And it must pay close attention to feedback from health experts on how the process of re-opening the economy sector-by-sector is affecting the rate of infection. Third, the government needs to state how the current financial and economic support measures for the economy will evolve as the re-opening process continues. It is critical to avoid removing support measures too soon, and some key measures may have to continue to operate even as firms restart their operations. It is important to show how - over time - the measures will evolve from a ‘life support’ system for businesses and individuals into a more conventional economic stimulus.This transition strategy could initially be signalled through broad principles, but the government needs to follow through quickly by detailing specific measures. The transition strategy must target sectors where most damage has been done, including the SME sector in general and specific areas such as transport, leisure and retail. It needs to factor in the hard truth that some businesses will be no longer be viable after the crisis and set out how the government is going to support employees and entrepreneurs who suffer as a result.The government must also explain how it intends to learn the lessons and capture the upsides from the crisis by building a more resilient economy over the longer term. Most importantly, it has to demonstrate continued commitment to tackling climate change – which is at least as big a threat to mankind’s future as pandemics.Fourth, the authorities should explain how they plan to manage controls on movement of people across borders to minimise the risk of new infection outbreaks, but also to help sustain the opening-up measures. This needs to take account of the fact that different countries are at different stages in the progress of the pandemic and may have different strategies and trade-offs on the risks they are willing to take as they open up.As a minimum, an effective border plan requires close cooperation with near neighbours as these are likely to be the most important economic counterparts for many countries. But ideally each country’s plan should be part of a wider global opening-up strategy coordinated by the G20. In the absence of a reliable antibody test, border control measures will have to rely on a combination of imperfect testing, quarantine, and new, shared data requirements for incoming and departing passengers. Fifth, the authorities must communicate the steps effectively to the public, in a manner that shows not only that this is a well thought-through plan, but also does not hide the extent of the uncertainties, or the likelihood that rapid modifications may be needed as the plan is implemented. In designing the communications, the authorities should develop specific measures to enable the public to track progress.Such measures are vital to sustaining business, consumer and employee confidence. While some smaller advanced economies appear close to completing these steps, for many others there is still a long way to go. Waiting until they are achieved means higher economic costs in the short-term. But, in the long-term, they will deliver real net benefits.Authorities are more likely to sustain these measures because key economic actors will actually follow the guidance given. Also, by instilling confidence, the plan will bring forward the consumer and business decision-making crucial to a strong recovery. In contrast, moving ahead without proper preparation risks turning an already severe economic recession into something much worse. Full Article
t IMF Needs New Thinking to Deal with Coronavirus By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 08:59:48 +0000 27 April 2020 David Lubin Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme @davidlubin The IMF faces a big dilemma in its efforts to support the global economy at its time of desperate need. Simply put, the Fund’s problem is that most of the $1tn that it says it can lend is effectively unusable. 2020-04-27-IMF-Virtual-News Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), speaks during a virtual news conference on April 15, 2020. Photo by Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg via Getty Images There were several notable achievements during last week’s Spring meetings. The Fund’s frank set of forecasts for world GDP growth are a grim but valuable reminder of the scale of the crisis we are facing, and the Fund’s richer members will finance a temporary suspension on payments to the IMF for 29 very poor countries.Most importantly, a boost to the Fund’s main emergency facilities - the Rapid Credit Facility and the Rapid Financing Instrument - now makes $100bn of proper relief available to a wide range of countries. But the core problem is that the vast bulk of the Fund’s firepower is effectively inert.This is because of the idea of 'conditionality', which underpins almost all of the IMF’s lending relationships with member states. Under normal circumstances, when the IMF is the last-resort lender to a country, it insists that the borrowing government tighten its belt and exercise restraint in public spending.This helps to achieve three objectives. One is to stabilise the public debt burden, to ensure that the resources made available are not wasted. The second is to limit the whole economy’s need for foreign exchange, a shortage of which had prompted a country to seek IMF help in the first place. And the third is to ensure that the IMF can get repaid.Role within the international monetary systemSince the IMF does not take any physical collateral from countries to whom it is lending, the belt-tightening helps to act as a kind of collateral for the IMF. It helps to maximise the probability that the IMF does not suffer losses on its own loan portfolio — losses that would have bad consequences for the Fund’s role within the international monetary system.This is a perfectly respectable goal. Walter Bagehot, the legendary editor of The Economist, established modern conventional wisdom about managing panics. Relying on a medical metaphor that feels oddly relevant today, he said that a panic 'is a species of neuralgia, and according to the rules of science you must not starve it.' Managing a panic, therefore, requires lending to stricken borrowers 'whenever the security is good', as Bagehot put it. The IMF has had to invent its own form of collateral, and conditionality is the result. The problem, though, is that belt-tightening is a completely inappropriate approach to managing the current crisis.Countries are stricken not because they have indulged in any irresponsible spending sprees that led to a shortage of foreign exchange, but because of a virus beyond their control. Indeed, it would seem almost grotesque for the Fund to ask countries to cut spending at a time when, if anything, more spending is needed to stop people dying or from falling into a permanent trap of unemployment.The obvious solution to this problem would be to increase the amount of money that any country can access from the Fund’s emergency facilities well beyond the $100bn now available. But that kind of solution would quickly run up against the IMF’s collateral problem.The more the IMF makes available as 'true' emergency financing with few or no strings attached, the more it begins to undermine the quality of its loan portfolio. And if the IMF’s senior creditor status is undermined, then an important building block of the international monetary system would be at risk.One way out of this might have been an emergency allocation of Special Drawing Rights, a tool last used in 2009. This would credit member countries’ accounts with new, unconditional liquidity that could be exchanged for the five currencies that underpin the SDR: the dollar, the yen, the euro, sterling and the renminbi. That will not be happening, though, since the US is firmly opposed, for reasons bad and good.So in the end the IMF and its shareholders face a huge problem. It either lends more money on easy terms without the 'collateral' of conditionality, at the expense of undermining its own balance sheet - or it remains, in systemic terms, on the sidelines of this crisis.And since the legacy of this crisis will be some eye-watering increases in the public debt burdens of many emerging economies, the IMF’s struggle to find a way to administer its medicine will certainly outlive this round of the coronavirus outbreak.This article is a version of a piece which was originally published in the Financial Times Full Article
t Coronavirus: Could a People’s Bailout Help? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 May 2020 12:42:49 +0000 7 May 2020 Jim O'Neill Chair, Chatham House Lyndsey Jefferson Digital Editor, Communications and Publishing Department @LyndseyLdn The coronavirus crisis has resulted in an unprecedented economic downturn. Conventional quantitative easing measures used after the 2008 financial crisis will not be enough this time. 2020-05-06-Coronavirus-Food-Bank-NYC.jpg Local residents line up outside a food pantry during the COVID-19 pandemic on 23 April 2020 in Brooklyn, New York. Due to increased levels of unemployment, the lines at the daily food pantry have been getting longer. Photo: Getty Images. What is quantitative easing? How was it used after the 2008 financial crisis?Quantitative easing (QE) has been in existence since the Japanese central bank introduced it at the turn of the millennium. The simplest way to think about it is this: when interest rates can't go down anymore and play their normal role of stimulating growth, central banks try to expand the money supply. So, they're expanding the quantitative amount of money they put into the system. Of course, after 2008 because of the scale of the financial and economic collapse, many Western countries resorted to QE. Some have never gotten rid of it. Others have started to, but as a result of this crisis, have gone straight back to that playbook.33 million Americans have now filed for unemployment and one in five American workers have lost their jobs due to COVID-19. These are levels not seen since the Great Depression. You recently called for G20 countries to provide income support for all citizens. Why is this so urgent to implement now?It is incredible to reflect back on the short time since I published that piece. I entitled it the need for a so-called people's QE, and in some ways a number of European countries, including the UK, have executed some aspects of what I was suggesting. The United States has not, even though the absolute amounts of money the US authorities have put through their fiscal system to try and support the economy is actually bigger as a percentage of GDP than many in Europe. What they haven't done is support ongoing employment through various schemes that many European countries have done, of which the UK has, to some degree, been one of the most ambitious.That’s partly why you see such enormous filing for unemployment claims in the US. There’s no direct support to encourage employers to keep their employees on, in complete contrast to what you see in many Scandinavian countries who were the first to do it in Europe, and something the UK has since done. On a practical level, what might a smart people’s QE look like? We are living in an extraordinary time. Like many others in my generation, it’s nothing that any of us have gone through. Perhaps economically, the only parallel one can find is from the 1920s and 1930s.It became obvious to me in early March that governments are going to have to essentially force as many of us as possible, if we weren't doing absolutely crucial necessities, to stop working or to work from home. It was pretty obvious that the consequences could be horrific. So, the idea of a people's QE that I suggested then, some would have regarded as quite audacious. The most dramatic thing that could be done was, to put it simply, governments effectively pay for every business and every employee to have a two month paid holiday. Obviously, this would cost a very large amount of money for governments, but it would be the least disruptive way of getting us all to stay home.And when the time is right to start letting us get back to anything vaguely like normality, there wouldn't be as much permanent disruption. I think about six weeks have passed since I wrote that piece. Actually, given the policies many governments have announced, I'm not sure undertaking the audacity in generosity of what I suggested would have cost any more. Over the long term, it might have actually turned out to be less. Of course, there are ethics issues around whether the system could be gamed or not, amongst other issues. But six weeks later, I still believe that would have been the smartest thing to do. It certainly would have been much better than trying to encourage many businesses, particularly smaller ones, to take out loans.A couple of countries got close to what I was suggesting – Germany and Switzerland were very quick to give 100% government guarantees to business, as well as generous wage support systems. But a number of other countries haven't, like the US, even though they wrote a $1200 check for each citizen. Should a people’s QE involve the purchase and write off of consumer debt and student debt by a central bank? I think these things might have to be considered. I remember being on a conference call to Chatham House members where we discussed what would be the likely economic consequences and what policymakers should do. One person on the call was talking about quite conventional forms of policy just through various forms of standard QE. During the Q&A, someone asked whether we thought the US Federal Reserve might end up buying equities. And I said, well, why not? Eventually, it might come to that. Actually, before that discussion was over, the Fed coincidentally announced they were going to buy high-yield corporate bonds, or very risky company debt. This is something that would have been unheard of even by the playbook of 2008. So, I don't think ideas like a kind of provision to help student debtors is entirely crazy. These are things that our policymakers are going to have to think about as we go forward in the challenging and unpredictable days and weeks ahead. Poorer countries like El Salvador have gone as far as cancelling rent and major utility bills for its citizens. Do you think countries like the US and UK have gone far enough to help people during the crisis?Going one step further than a people’s QE and postponing major payments is a pretty interesting concept. I think in reality, it would be very disruptive to the medium to long-term mechanism of our societies. It could be very, very complicated. But, of course, some parts of the G20 nations, including the UK, have moved significantly in these areas as it relates to rent payments or mortgage payments. There have been significant mortgage holidays being introduced for many sectors of our community. I think the British government has been quite thoughtful about it without doing the whole hog of potentially getting rid of our transaction system for two months or beyond.You know, this may well be something that has to be considered if, God forbid, there is a second peak of the virus. If countries come out of a lockdown and all that results in is a dramatic rise in infections and then death again, we're going to end up right back where we are. Policymakers may have to implement more generous versions of what we've done already, despite what the long term debt consequences could be.The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act in the US has been criticized as a corporate bailout while offering little to the American people. It was recently reported that hedge fund managers are applying for bailouts as ‘small businesses.’ Do you think more oversight is needed in how the stimulus funds are allocated? The speed at which many countries have responded and introduced policies means that there's going to be some gaping holes which allow people to unfairly benefit from the system. And if indeed, that were to be the case, I cannot see why a hedge fund should benefit from government generosity.A true hedge fund is supposed to be a form of investment manager that thrives in times of great volatility, and knows how to better navigate such financial markets than more conventional funds. So this shouldn’t be an environment where hedge funds seek the same kind of help as small businesses. That is certainly something the government should be very careful about.Some economists argue that central banks are not independent as they finance fiscal spending through purchase of government bonds. Do the strong measures taken by central banks in response to the crisis undermine the argument for central bank independence? In my view, an effective central bank has to do whatever is necessary, including doing very unconventional things, when the society in which that central bank operates needs it. Most of the time, central banks are pretty boring places, but they really become crucial organizations when we go through times like the 1920s, 1930s, 2008, and of course, this current crisis. If they want to maintain their legitimacy, whatever the true parliamentary or congressional legal standing is, they have to do things quickly and as we've seen in this case, differently than the convention in order to do what our societies need. Somebody was asking me just last week whether the Fed buying high grade debt was legal or not. I think that’s a pretty irrelevant conversation because if it’s not legal now, it will be made legal tomorrow. So, I think central banks have to keep their legitimacy and they have to do what is necessary when the time requires it. In that sense, I think most central banks have handled this crisis so far pretty well. Full Article
t A comprehensive evaluation of a typical plant telomeric G-quadruplex (G4) DNA reveals the dynamics of G4 formation, rearrangement, and unfolding [Plant Biology] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-17T00:06:05-07:00 Telomeres are specific nucleoprotein structures that are located at the ends of linear eukaryotic chromosomes and play crucial roles in genomic stability. Telomere DNA consists of simple repeats of a short G-rich sequence: TTAGGG in mammals and TTTAGGG in most plants. In recent years, the mammalian telomeric G-rich repeats have been shown to form G-quadruplex (G4) structures, which are crucial for modulating telomere functions. Surprisingly, even though plant telomeres are essential for plant growth, development, and environmental adaptions, only few reports exist on plant telomeric G4 DNA (pTG4). Here, using bulk and single-molecule assays, including CD spectroscopy, and single-molecule FRET approaches, we comprehensively characterized the structure and dynamics of a typical plant telomeric sequence, d[GGG(TTTAGGG)3]. We found that this sequence can fold into mixed G4s in potassium, including parallel and antiparallel structures. We also directly detected intermediate dynamic transitions, including G-hairpin, parallel G-triplex, and antiparallel G-triplex structures. Moreover, we observed that pTG4 is unfolded by the AtRecQ2 helicase but not by AtRecQ3. The results of our work shed light on our understanding about the existence, topological structures, stability, intermediates, unwinding, and functions of pTG4. Full Article
t Spectral and photochemical diversity of tandem cysteine cyanobacterial phytochromes [Plant Biology] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 The atypical trichromatic cyanobacterial phytochrome NpTP1 from Nostoc punctiforme ATCC 29133 is a linear tetrapyrrole (bilin)-binding photoreceptor protein that possesses tandem-cysteine residues responsible for shifting its light-sensing maximum to the violet spectral region. Using bioinformatics and phylogenetic analyses, here we established that tandem-cysteine cyanobacterial phytochromes (TCCPs) compose a well-supported monophyletic phytochrome lineage distinct from prototypical red/far-red cyanobacterial phytochromes. To investigate the light-sensing diversity of this family, we compared the spectroscopic properties of NpTP1 (here renamed NpTCCP) with those of three phylogenetically diverged TCCPs identified in the draft genomes of Tolypothrix sp. PCC7910, Scytonema sp. PCC10023, and Gloeocapsa sp. PCC7513. Recombinant photosensory core modules of ToTCCP, ScTCCP, and GlTCCP exhibited violet-blue–absorbing dark-states consistent with dual thioether-linked phycocyanobilin (PCB) chromophores. Photoexcitation generated singly-linked photoproduct mixtures with variable ratios of yellow-orange and red-absorbing species. The photoproduct ratio was strongly influenced by pH and by mutagenesis of TCCP- and phytochrome-specific signature residues. Our experiments support the conclusion that both photoproduct species possess protonated 15E bilin chromophores, but differ in the ionization state of the noncanonical “second” cysteine sulfhydryl group. We found that the ionization state of this and other residues influences subsequent conformational change and downstream signal transmission. We also show that tandem-cysteine phytochromes present in eukaryotes possess similar amino acid substitutions within their chromophore-binding pocket, which tune their spectral properties in an analogous fashion. Taken together, our findings provide a roadmap for tailoring the wavelength specificity of plant phytochromes to optimize plant performance in diverse natural and artificial light environments. Full Article
t Repression of sphingosine kinase (SK)-interacting protein (SKIP) in acute myeloid leukemia diminishes SK activity and its re-expression restores SK function [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-17T00:06:05-07:00 Previous studies have shown that sphingosine kinase interacting protein (SKIP) inhibits sphingosine kinase (SK) function in fibroblasts. SK phosphorylates sphingosine producing the potent signaling molecule sphingosine-1-phosphate (S1P). SKIP gene (SPHKAP) expression is silenced by hypermethylation of its promoter in acute myeloid leukemia (AML). However, why SKIP activity is silenced in primary AML cells is unclear. Here, we investigated the consequences of SKIP down-regulation in AML primary cells and the effects of SKIP re-expression in leukemic cell lines. Using targeted ultra-HPLC-tandem MS (UPLC-MS/MS), we measured sphingolipids (including S1P and ceramides) in AML and control cells. Primary AML cells had significantly lower SK activity and intracellular S1P concentrations than control cells, and SKIP-transfected leukemia cell lines exhibited increased SK activity. These findings show that SKIP re-expression enhances SK activity in leukemia cells. Furthermore, other bioactive sphingolipids such as ceramide were also down-regulated in primary AML cells. Of note, SKIP re-expression in leukemia cells increased ceramide levels 2-fold, inactivated the key signaling protein extracellular signal-regulated kinase, and increased apoptosis following serum deprivation or chemotherapy. These results indicate that SKIP down-regulation in AML reduces SK activity and ceramide levels, an effect that ultimately inhibits apoptosis in leukemia cells. The findings of our study contrast with previous results indicating that SKIP inhibits SK function in fibroblasts and therefore challenge the notion that SKIP always inhibits SK activity. Full Article
t The FKH domain in FOXP3 mRNA frequently contains mutations in hepatocellular carcinoma that influence the subcellular localization and functions of FOXP3 [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-17T00:06:05-07:00 The transcription factor forkhead box P3 (FOXP3) is a biomarker for regulatory T cells and can also be expressed in cancer cells, but its function in cancer appears to be divergent. The role of hepatocyte-expressed FOXP3 in hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) is unknown. Here, we collected tumor samples and clinical information from 115 HCC patients and used five human cancer cell lines. We examined FOXP3 mRNA sequences for mutations, used a luciferase assay to assess promoter activities of FOXP3's target genes, and employed mouse tumor models to confirm in vitro results. We detected mutations in the FKH domain of FOXP3 mRNAs in 33% of the HCC tumor tissues, but in none of the adjacent nontumor tissues. None of the mutations occurred at high frequency, indicating that they occurred randomly. Notably, the mutations were not detected in the corresponding regions of FOXP3 genomic DNA, and many of them resulted in amino acid substitutions in the FKH region, altering FOXP3's subcellular localization. FOXP3 delocalization from the nucleus to the cytoplasm caused loss of transcriptional regulation of its target genes, inactivated its tumor-inhibitory capability, and changed cellular responses to histone deacetylase (HDAC) inhibitors. More complex FKH mutations appeared to be associated with worse prognosis in HCC patients. We conclude that mutations in the FKH domain of FOXP3 mRNA frequently occur in HCC and that these mutations are caused by errors in transcription and are not derived from genomic DNA mutations. Our results suggest that transcriptional mutagenesis of FOXP3 plays a role in HCC. Full Article
t Inhibition of the erythropoietin-producing receptor EPHB4 antagonizes androgen receptor overexpression and reduces enzalutamide resistance [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-17T00:06:05-07:00 Prostate cancer (PCa) cells heavily rely on an active androgen receptor (AR) pathway for their survival. Enzalutamide (MDV3100) is a second-generation antiandrogenic drug that was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 2012 to treat patients with castration-resistant prostate cancer (CRPC). However, emergence of resistance against this drug is inevitable, and it has been a major challenge to develop interventions that help manage enzalutamide-resistant CRPC. Erythropoietin-producing human hepatocellular (Eph) receptors are targeted by ephrin protein ligands and have a broad range of functions. Increasing evidence indicates that this signaling pathway plays an important role in tumorigenesis. Overexpression of EPH receptor B4 (EPHB4) has been observed in multiple types of cancer, being closely associated with proliferation, invasion, and metastasis of tumors. Here, using RNA-Seq analyses of clinical and preclinical samples, along with several biochemical and molecular methods, we report that enzalutamide-resistant PCa requires an active EPHB4 pathway that supports drug resistance of this tumor type. Using a small kinase inhibitor and RNAi-based gene silencing to disrupt EPHB4 activity, we found that these disruptions re-sensitize enzalutamide-resistant PCa to the drug both in vitro and in vivo. Mechanistically, we found that EPHB4 stimulates the AR by inducing proto-oncogene c-Myc (c-Myc) expression. Taken together, these results provide critical insight into the mechanism of enzalutamide resistance in PCa, potentially offering a therapeutic avenue for enhancing the efficacy of enzalutamide to better manage this common malignancy. Full Article
t A peroxisome deficiency-induced reductive cytosol state up-regulates the brain-derived neurotrophic factor pathway [Metabolism] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-17T00:06:05-07:00 The peroxisome is a subcellular organelle that functions in essential metabolic pathways, including biosynthesis of plasmalogens, fatty acid β-oxidation of very-long-chain fatty acids, and degradation of hydrogen peroxide. Peroxisome biogenesis disorders (PBDs) manifest as severe dysfunction in multiple organs, including the central nervous system (CNS), but the pathogenic mechanisms in PBDs are largely unknown. Because CNS integrity is coordinately established and maintained by neural cell interactions, we here investigated whether cell-cell communication is impaired and responsible for the neurological defects associated with PBDs. Results from a noncontact co-culture system consisting of primary hippocampal neurons with glial cells revealed that a peroxisome-deficient astrocytic cell line secretes increased levels of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), resulting in axonal branching of the neurons. Of note, the BDNF expression in astrocytes was not affected by defects in plasmalogen biosynthesis and peroxisomal fatty acid β-oxidation in the astrocytes. Instead, we found that cytosolic reductive states caused by a mislocalized catalase in the peroxisome-deficient cells induce the elevation in BDNF secretion. Our results suggest that peroxisome deficiency dysregulates neuronal axogenesis by causing a cytosolic reductive state in astrocytes. We conclude that astrocytic peroxisomes regulate BDNF expression and thereby support neuronal integrity and function. Full Article
t Heterotrimeric Gq proteins as therapeutic targets? [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-17T00:06:05-07:00 Heterotrimeric G proteins are the core upstream elements that transduce and amplify the cellular signals from G protein–coupled receptors (GPCRs) to intracellular effectors. GPCRs are the largest family of membrane proteins encoded in the human genome and are the targets of about one-third of prescription medicines. However, to date, no single therapeutic agent exerts its effects via perturbing heterotrimeric G protein function, despite a plethora of evidence linking G protein malfunction to human disease. Several recent studies have brought to light that the Gq family–specific inhibitor FR900359 (FR) is unexpectedly efficacious in silencing the signaling of Gq oncoproteins, mutant Gq variants that mostly exist in the active state. These data not only raise the hope that researchers working in drug discovery may be able to potentially strike Gq oncoproteins from the list of undruggable targets, but also raise questions as to how FR achieves its therapeutic effect. Here, we place emphasis on these recent studies and explain why they expand our pharmacological armamentarium for targeting Gq protein oncogenes as well as broaden our mechanistic understanding of Gq protein oncogene function. We also highlight how this novel insight impacts the significance and utility of using G(q) proteins as targets in drug discovery efforts. Full Article
t N{alpha}-Acetylation of the virulence factor EsxA is required for mycobacterial cytosolic translocation and virulence [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-24T06:08:45-07:00 The Mycobacterium tuberculosis virulence factor EsxA and its chaperone EsxB are secreted as a heterodimer (EsxA:B) and are crucial for mycobacterial escape from phagosomes and cytosolic translocation. Current findings support the idea that for EsxA to interact with host membranes, EsxA must dissociate from EsxB at low pH. However, the molecular mechanism by which the EsxA:B heterodimer separates is not clear. In the present study, using liposome-leakage and cytotoxicity assays, LC-MS/MS–based proteomics, and CCF-4 FRET analysis, we obtained evidence that the Nα-acetylation of the Thr-2 residue on EsxA, a post-translational modification that is present in mycobacteria but absent in Escherichia coli, is required for the EsxA:B separation. Substitutions at Thr-2 that precluded Nα-acetylation inhibited the heterodimer separation and hence prevented EsxA from interacting with the host membrane, resulting in attenuated mycobacterial cytosolic translocation and virulence. Molecular dynamics simulations revealed that at low pH, the Nα-acetylated Thr-2 makes direct and frequent “bind-and-release” contacts with EsxB, which generates a force that pulls EsxB away from EsxA. In summary, our findings provide evidence that the Nα-acetylation at Thr-2 of EsxA facilitates dissociation of the EsxA:B heterodimer required for EsxA membrane permeabilization and mycobacterial cytosolic translocation and virulence. Full Article
t ER stress increases store-operated Ca2+ entry (SOCE) and augments basal insulin secretion in pancreatic beta cells [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-24T06:08:45-07:00 Type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) is characterized by impaired glucose-stimulated insulin secretion and increased peripheral insulin resistance. Unremitting endoplasmic reticulum (ER) stress can lead to beta-cell apoptosis and has been linked to type 2 diabetes. Although many studies have attempted to link ER stress and T2DM, the specific effects of ER stress on beta-cell function remain incompletely understood. To determine the interrelationship between ER stress and beta-cell function, here we treated insulin-secreting INS-1(832/13) cells or isolated mouse islets with the ER stress–inducer tunicamycin (TM). TM induced ER stress as expected, as evidenced by activation of the unfolded protein response. Beta cells treated with TM also exhibited concomitant alterations in their electrical activity and cytosolic free Ca2+ oscillations. As ER stress is known to reduce ER Ca2+ levels, we tested the hypothesis that the observed increase in Ca2+ oscillations occurred because of reduced ER Ca2+ levels and, in turn, increased store-operated Ca2+ entry. TM-induced cytosolic Ca2+ and membrane electrical oscillations were acutely inhibited by YM58483, which blocks store-operated Ca2+ channels. Significantly, TM-treated cells secreted increased insulin under conditions normally associated with only minimal release, e.g. 5 mm glucose, and YM58483 blocked this secretion. Taken together, these results support a critical role for ER Ca2+ depletion–activated Ca2+ current in mediating Ca2+-induced insulin secretion in response to ER stress. Full Article
t Mechanistic insights explain the transforming potential of the T507K substitution in the protein-tyrosine phosphatase SHP2 [Signal Transduction] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-01T00:06:09-07:00 The protein-tyrosine phosphatase SHP2 is an allosteric enzyme critical for cellular events downstream of growth factor receptors. Mutations in the SHP2 gene have been linked to many different types of human diseases, including developmental disorders, leukemia, and solid tumors. Unlike most SHP2-activating mutations, the T507K substitution in SHP2 is unique in that it exhibits oncogenic Ras-like transforming activity. However, the biochemical basis of how the SHP2/T507K variant elicits transformation remains unclear. By combining kinetic and biophysical methods, X-ray crystallography, and molecular modeling, as well as using cell biology approaches, here we uncovered that the T507K substitution alters both SHP2 substrate specificity and its allosteric regulatory mechanism. We found that although SHP2/T507K exists in the closed, autoinhibited conformation similar to the WT enzyme, the interactions between its N-SH2 and protein-tyrosine phosphatase domains are weakened such that SHP2/T507K possesses a higher affinity for the scaffolding protein Grb2-associated binding protein 1 (Gab1). We also discovered that the T507K substitution alters the structure of the SHP2 active site, resulting in a change in SHP2 substrate preference for Sprouty1, a known negative regulator of Ras signaling and a potential tumor suppressor. Our results suggest that SHP2/T507K's shift in substrate specificity coupled with its preferential association of SHP2/T507K with Gab1 enable the mutant SHP2 to more efficiently dephosphorylate Sprouty1 at pTyr-53. This dephosphorylation hyperactivates Ras signaling, which is likely responsible for SHP2/T507K's Ras-like transforming activity. Full Article
t Prominins control ciliary length throughout the animal kingdom: New lessons from human prominin-1 and zebrafish prominin-3 [Cell Biology] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-01T00:06:09-07:00 Prominins (proms) are transmembrane glycoproteins conserved throughout the animal kingdom. They are associated with plasma membrane protrusions, such as primary cilia, as well as extracellular vesicles derived thereof. Primary cilia host numerous signaling pathways affected in diseases known as ciliopathies. Human PROM1 (CD133) is detected in both somatic and cancer stem cells and is also expressed in terminally differentiated epithelial and photoreceptor cells. Genetic mutations in the PROM1 gene result in retinal degeneration by impairing the proper formation of the outer segment of photoreceptors, a modified cilium. Here, we investigated the impact of proms on two distinct examples of ciliogenesis. First, we demonstrate that the overexpression of a dominant-negative mutant variant of human PROM1 (i.e. mutation Y819F/Y828F) significantly decreases ciliary length in Madin–Darby canine kidney cells. These results contrast strongly to the previously observed enhancing effect of WT PROM1 on ciliary length. Mechanistically, the mutation impeded the interaction of PROM1 with ADP-ribosylation factor–like protein 13B, a key regulator of ciliary length. Second, we observed that in vivo knockdown of prom3 in zebrafish alters the number and length of monocilia in the Kupffer's vesicle, resulting in molecular and anatomical defects in the left-right asymmetry. These distinct loss-of-function approaches in two biological systems reveal that prom proteins are critical for the integrity and function of cilia. Our data provide new insights into ciliogenesis and might be of particular interest for investigations of the etiologies of ciliopathies. Full Article
t Modification of a PE/PPE substrate pair reroutes an Esx substrate pair from the mycobacterial ESX-1 type VII secretion system to the ESX-5 system [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-01T00:06:09-07:00 Bacterial type VII secretion systems secrete a wide range of extracellular proteins that play important roles in bacterial viability and in interactions of pathogenic mycobacteria with their hosts. Mycobacterial type VII secretion systems consist of five subtypes, ESX-1–5, and have four substrate classes, namely, Esx, PE, PPE, and Esp proteins. At least some of these substrates are secreted as heterodimers. Each ESX system mediates the secretion of a specific set of Esx, PE, and PPE proteins, raising the question of how these substrates are recognized in a system-specific fashion. For the PE/PPE heterodimers, it has been shown that they interact with their cognate EspG chaperone and that this chaperone determines the designated secretion pathway. However, both structural and pulldown analyses have suggested that EspG cannot interact with the Esx proteins. Therefore, the determining factor for system specificity of the Esx proteins remains unknown. Here, we investigated the secretion specificity of the ESX-1 substrate pair EsxB_1/EsxA_1 in Mycobacterium marinum. Although this substrate pair was hardly secreted when homologously expressed, it was secreted when co-expressed together with the PE35/PPE68_1 pair, indicating that this pair could stimulate secretion of the EsxB_1/EsxA_1 pair. Surprisingly, co-expression of EsxB_1/EsxA_1 with a modified PE35/PPE68_1 version that carried the EspG5 chaperone-binding domain, previously shown to redirect this substrate pair to the ESX-5 system, also resulted in redirection and co-secretion of the Esx pair via ESX-5. Our results suggest a secretion model in which PE35/PPE68_1 determines the system-specific secretion of EsxB_1/EsxA_1. Full Article
t Structure-based discovery of a small-molecule inhibitor of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus virulence [Molecular Biophysics] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-01T00:06:09-07:00 The rapid emergence and dissemination of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) strains poses a major threat to public health. MRSA possesses an arsenal of secreted host-damaging virulence factors that mediate pathogenicity and blunt immune defenses. Panton–Valentine leukocidin (PVL) and α-toxin are exotoxins that create lytic pores in the host cell membrane. They are recognized as being important for the development of invasive MRSA infections and are thus potential targets for antivirulence therapies. Here, we report the high-resolution X-ray crystal structures of both PVL and α-toxin in their soluble, monomeric, and oligomeric membrane-inserted pore states in complex with n-tetradecylphosphocholine (C14PC). The structures revealed two evolutionarily conserved phosphatidylcholine-binding mechanisms and their roles in modulating host cell attachment, oligomer assembly, and membrane perforation. Moreover, we demonstrate that the soluble C14PC compound protects primary human immune cells in vitro against cytolysis by PVL and α-toxin and hence may serve as the basis for the development of an antivirulence agent for managing MRSA infections. Full Article
t Zinc promotes liquid-liquid phase separation of tau protein [Protein Structure and Folding] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-01T00:06:09-07:00 Tau is a microtubule-associated protein that plays a major role in Alzheimer's disease (AD) and other tauopathies. Recent reports indicate that, in the presence of crowding agents, tau can undergo liquid–liquid phase separation (LLPS), forming highly dynamic liquid droplets. Here, using recombinantly expressed proteins, turbidimetry, fluorescence microscopy imaging, and fluorescence recovery after photobleaching (FRAP) assays, we show that the divalent transition metal zinc strongly promotes this process, shifting the equilibrium phase boundary to lower protein or crowding agent concentrations. We observed no tau LLPS-promoting effect for any other divalent transition metal ions tested, including Mn2+, Fe2+, Co2+, Ni2+, and Cu2+. We also demonstrate that multiple zinc-binding sites on tau are involved in the LLPS-promoting effect and provide insights into the mechanism of this process. Zinc concentration is highly elevated in AD brains, and this metal ion is believed to be an important player in the pathogenesis of this disease. Thus, the present findings bring a new dimension to understanding the relationship between zinc homeostasis and the pathogenic process in AD and related neurodegenerative disorders. Full Article
t Effects of deficiency in the RLBP1-encoded visual cycle protein CRALBP on visual dysfunction in humans and mice [Cell Biology] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 Mutations in retinaldehyde-binding protein 1 (RLBP1), encoding the visual cycle protein cellular retinaldehyde-binding protein (CRALBP), cause an autosomal recessive form of retinal degeneration. By binding to 11-cis-retinoid, CRALBP augments the isomerase activity of retinoid isomerohydrolase RPE65 (RPE65) and facilitates 11-cis-retinol oxidation to 11-cis-retinal. CRALBP also maintains the 11-cis configuration and protects against unwanted retinaldehyde activity. Studying a sibling pair that is compound heterozygous for mutations in RLBP1/CRALBP, here we expand the phenotype of affected individuals, elucidate a previously unreported phenotype in RLBP1/CRALBP carriers, and demonstrate consistencies between the affected individuals and Rlbp1/Cralbp−/− mice. In the RLBP1/CRALBP-affected individuals, nonrecordable rod-specific electroretinogram traces were recovered after prolonged dark adaptation. In ultrawide-field fundus images, we observed radially arranged puncta typical of RLBP1/CRALBP-associated disease. Spectral domain-optical coherence tomography (SD-OCT) revealed hyperreflective aberrations within photoreceptor-associated bands. In short-wavelength fundus autofluorescence (SW-AF) images, speckled hyperautofluorescence and mottling indicated macular involvement. In both the affected individuals and their asymptomatic carrier parents, reduced SW-AF intensities, measured as quantitative fundus autofluorescence (qAF), indicated chronic impairment in 11-cis-retinal availability and provided information on mutation severity. Hypertransmission of the SD-OCT signal into the choroid together with decreased near-infrared autofluorescence (NIR-AF) provided evidence for retinal pigment epithelial cell (RPE) involvement. In Rlbp1/Cralbp−/− mice, reduced 11-cis-retinal levels, qAF and NIR-AF intensities, and photoreceptor loss were consistent with the clinical presentation of the affected siblings. These findings indicate that RLBP1 mutations are associated with progressive disease involving RPE atrophy and photoreceptor cell degeneration. In asymptomatic carriers, qAF disclosed previously undetected visual cycle deficiency. Full Article
t {alpha}-Synuclein filaments from transgenic mouse and human synucleinopathy-containing brains are maȷor seed-competent species [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 Assembled α-synuclein in nerve cells and glial cells is the defining pathological feature of neurodegenerative diseases called synucleinopathies. Seeds of α-synuclein can induce the assembly of monomeric protein. Here, we used sucrose gradient centrifugation and transiently transfected HEK 293T cells to identify the species of α-synuclein from the brains of homozygous, symptomatic mice transgenic for human mutant A53T α-synuclein (line M83) that seed aggregation. The most potent fractions contained Sarkosyl-insoluble assemblies enriched in filaments. We also analyzed six cases of idiopathic Parkinson's disease (PD), one case of familial PD, and six cases of multiple system atrophy (MSA) for their ability to induce α-synuclein aggregation. The MSA samples were more potent than those of idiopathic PD in seeding aggregation. We found that following sucrose gradient centrifugation, the most seed-competent fractions from PD and MSA brains are those that contain Sarkosyl-insoluble α-synuclein. The fractions differed between PD and MSA, consistent with the presence of distinct conformers of assembled α-synuclein in these different samples. We conclude that α-synuclein filaments are the main driving force for amplification and propagation of pathology in synucleinopathies. Full Article
t Non-photopic and photopic visual cycles differentially regulate immediate, early, and late phases of cone photoreceptor-mediated vision [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 Cone photoreceptors in the retina enable vision over a wide range of light intensities. However, the processes enabling cone vision in bright light (i.e. photopic vision) are not adequately understood. Chromophore regeneration of cone photopigments may require the retinal pigment epithelium (RPE) and/or retinal Müller glia. In the RPE, isomerization of all-trans-retinyl esters to 11-cis-retinol is mediated by the retinoid isomerohydrolase Rpe65. A putative alternative retinoid isomerase, dihydroceramide desaturase-1 (DES1), is expressed in RPE and Müller cells. The retinol-isomerase activities of Rpe65 and Des1 are inhibited by emixustat and fenretinide, respectively. Here, we tested the effects of these visual cycle inhibitors on immediate, early, and late phases of cone photopic vision. In zebrafish larvae raised under cyclic light conditions, fenretinide impaired late cone photopic vision, while the emixustat-treated zebrafish unexpectedly had normal vision. In contrast, emixustat-treated larvae raised under extensive dark-adaptation displayed significantly attenuated immediate photopic vision concomitant with significantly reduced 11-cis-retinaldehyde (11cRAL). Following 30 min of light, early photopic vision was recovered, despite 11cRAL levels remaining significantly reduced. Defects in immediate cone photopic vision were rescued in emixustat- or fenretinide-treated larvae following exogenous 9-cis-retinaldehyde supplementation. Genetic knockout of Des1 (degs1) or retinaldehyde-binding protein 1b (rlbp1b) did not eliminate photopic vision in zebrafish. Our findings define molecular and temporal requirements of the nonphotopic or photopic visual cycles for mediating vision in bright light. Full Article
t Pro-515 of the dynamin-like GTPase MxB contributes to HIV-1 inhibition by regulating MxB oligomerization and binding to HIV-1 capsid [Microbiology] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 Interferon-regulated myxovirus resistance protein B (MxB) is an interferon-induced GTPase belonging to the dynamin superfamily. It inhibits infection with a wide range of different viruses, including HIV-1, by impairing viral DNA entry into the nucleus. Unlike the related antiviral GTPase MxA, MxB possesses an N-terminal region that contains a nuclear localization signal and is crucial for inhibiting HIV-1. Because MxB previously has been shown to reside in both the nuclear envelope and the cytoplasm, here we used bioinformatics and biochemical approaches to identify a nuclear export signal (NES) responsible for MxB's cytoplasmic location. Using the online computational tool LocNES (Locating Nuclear Export Signals or NESs), we identified five putative NES candidates in MxB and investigated whether their deletion caused nuclear localization of MxB. Our results revealed that none of the five deletion variants relocates to the nucleus, suggesting that these five predicted NES sequences do not confer NES activity. Interestingly, deletion of one sequence, encompassing amino acids 505–527, abrogated the anti-HIV-1 activity of MxB. Further mutation experiments disclosed that amino acids 515–519, and Pro-515 in particular, regulate MxB oligomerization and its binding to HIV-1 capsid, thereby playing an important role in MxB-mediated restriction of HIV-1 infection. In summary, our results indicate that none of the five predicted NES sequences in MxB appears to be required for its nuclear export. Our findings also reveal several residues in MxB, including Pro-515, critical for its oligomerization and anti-HIV-1 function. Full Article
t A neuroglobin-based high-affinity ligand trap reverses carbon monoxide-induced mitochondrial poisoning [Molecular Biophysics] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 Carbon monoxide (CO) remains the most common cause of human poisoning. The consequences of CO poisoning include cardiac dysfunction, brain injury, and death. CO causes toxicity by binding to hemoglobin and by inhibiting mitochondrial cytochrome c oxidase (CcO), thereby decreasing oxygen delivery and inhibiting oxidative phosphorylation. We have recently developed a CO antidote based on human neuroglobin (Ngb-H64Q-CCC). This molecule enhances clearance of CO from red blood cells in vitro and in vivo. Herein, we tested whether Ngb-H64Q-CCC can also scavenge CO from CcO and attenuate CO-induced inhibition of mitochondrial respiration. Heart tissue from mice exposed to 3% CO exhibited a 42 ± 19% reduction in tissue respiration rate and a 33 ± 38% reduction in CcO activity compared with unexposed mice. Intravenous infusion of Ngb-H64Q-CCC restored respiration rates to that of control mice correlating with higher electron transport chain CcO activity in Ngb-H64Q-CCC–treated compared with PBS-treated, CO-poisoned mice. Further, using a Clark-type oxygen electrode, we measured isolated rat liver mitochondrial respiration in the presence and absence of saturating solutions of CO (160 μm) and nitric oxide (100 μm). Both CO and NO inhibited respiration, and treatment with Ngb-H64Q-CCC (100 and 50 μm, respectively) significantly reversed this inhibition. These results suggest that Ngb-H64Q-CCC mitigates CO toxicity by scavenging CO from carboxyhemoglobin, improving systemic oxygen delivery and reversing the inhibitory effects of CO on mitochondria. We conclude that Ngb-H64Q-CCC or other CO scavengers demonstrate potential as antidotes that reverse the clinical and molecular effects of CO poisoning. Full Article
t Reactive dicarbonyl compounds cause Calcitonin Gene-Related Peptide release and synergize with inflammatory conditions in mouse skin and peritoneum [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 The plasmas of diabetic or uremic patients and of those receiving peritoneal dialysis treatment have increased levels of the glucose-derived dicarbonyl metabolites like methylglyoxal (MGO), glyoxal (GO), and 3-deoxyglucosone (3-DG). The elevated dicarbonyl levels can contribute to the development of painful neuropathies. Here, we used stimulated immunoreactive Calcitonin Gene–Related Peptide (iCGRP) release as a measure of nociceptor activation, and we found that each dicarbonyl metabolite induces a concentration-, TRPA1-, and Ca2+-dependent iCGRP release. MGO, GO, and 3-DG were about equally potent in the millimolar range. We hypothesized that another dicarbonyl, 3,4-dideoxyglucosone-3-ene (3,4-DGE), which is present in peritoneal dialysis (PD) solutions after heat sterilization, activates nociceptors. We also showed that at body temperatures 3,4-DGE is formed from 3-DG and that concentrations of 3,4-DGE in the micromolar range effectively induced iCGRP release from isolated murine skin. In a novel preparation of the isolated parietal peritoneum PD fluid or 3,4-DGE alone, at concentrations found in PD solutions, stimulated iCGRP release. We also tested whether inflammatory tissue conditions synergize with dicarbonyls to induce iCGRP release from isolated skin. Application of MGO together with bradykinin or prostaglandin E2 resulted in an overadditive effect on iCGRP release, whereas MGO applied at a pH of 5.2 resulted in reduced release, probably due to an MGO-mediated inhibition of transient receptor potential (TRP) V1 receptors. These results indicate that several reactive dicarbonyls activate nociceptors and potentiate inflammatory mediators. Our findings underline the roles of dicarbonyls and TRPA1 receptors in causing pain during diabetes or renal disease. Full Article
t Brain manganese and the balance between essential roles and neurotoxicity [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 Manganese (Mn) is an essential micronutrient required for the normal development of many organs, including the brain. Although its roles as a cofactor in several enzymes and in maintaining optimal physiology are well-known, the overall biological functions of Mn are rather poorly understood. Alterations in body Mn status are associated with altered neuronal physiology and cognition in humans, and either overexposure or (more rarely) insufficiency can cause neurological dysfunction. The resultant balancing act can be viewed as a hormetic U-shaped relationship for biological Mn status and optimal brain health, with changes in the brain leading to physiological effects throughout the body and vice versa. This review discusses Mn homeostasis, biomarkers, molecular mechanisms of cellular transport, and neuropathological changes associated with disruptions of Mn homeostasis, especially in its excess, and identifies gaps in our understanding of the molecular and biochemical mechanisms underlying Mn homeostasis and neurotoxicity. Full Article
t Inhibition of the polyamine synthesis enzyme ornithine decarboxylase sensitizes triple-negative breast cancer cells to cytotoxic chemotherapy [Molecular Bases of Disease] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-08T03:41:14-07:00 Treatment of patients with triple-negative breast cancer (TNBC) is limited by a lack of effective molecular therapies targeting this disease. Recent studies have identified metabolic alterations in cancer cells that can be targeted to improve responses to standard-of-care chemotherapy regimens. Using MDA-MB-468 and SUM-159PT TNBC cells, along with LC-MS/MS and HPLC metabolomics profiling, we found here that exposure of TNBC cells to the cytotoxic chemotherapy drugs cisplatin and doxorubicin alter arginine and polyamine metabolites. This alteration was because of a reduction in the levels and activity of a rate-limiting polyamine biosynthetic enzyme, ornithine decarboxylase (ODC). Using gene silencing and inhibitor treatments, we determined that the reduction in ODC was mediated by its negative regulator antizyme, targeting ODC to the proteasome for degradation. Treatment with the ODC inhibitor difluoromethylornithine (DFMO) sensitized TNBC cells to chemotherapy, but this was not observed in receptor-positive breast cancer cells. Moreover, TNBC cell lines had greater sensitivity to single-agent DFMO, and ODC levels were elevated in TNBC patient samples. The alterations in polyamine metabolism in response to chemotherapy, as well as DFMO-induced preferential sensitization of TNBC cells to chemotherapy, reported here suggest that ODC may be a targetable metabolic vulnerability in TNBC. Full Article
t Five Lessons From the New Arab Uprisings By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 09:11:56 +0000 12 November 2019 Dr Georges Fahmi Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @GeorgesFahmi Georges Fahmi examines how protesters across the region have adapted their tactics after the experiences of the Arab Spring. 2019-11-12-Lebanon.jpg The second wave of Arab uprisings that started in Sudan in December last year and extended to Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq this year have built on past experiences of political transitions during the Arab Spring, both its mistakes and achievements. Protesters from this new wave have already learned five lessons from previous transitions.The first lesson is that toppling the head of a regime does not mean that the political regime has fallen. In Tahrir Square on 11 February 2011, Egyptian protesters celebrated the decision of Hosni Mubarak to step down and left the square, thinking his resignation was enough to allow a democratic transition to take place. In contrast, in Sudan and Algeria, protesters continued to demonstrate after the resignation of Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the military-led ousting of Omar al-Bashir.Protesters understood the lesson that the regime is found not only in the head of the state, but rather in the rules that govern the political sphere. By extension, political change requires changing the rules, not just the names of those in charge of implementing them.The second lesson is that resorting to violence is the fastest way to end any hope for democratic change. Protesters who decided to take up arms offered their regimes the chance to reframe the political uprisings as civil war, as was the case in Syria. Even when armed groups manage to bring down the regime, their presence endangers the transitional phase afterwards, as is the case in Libya.Although protesters in Sudan and Iraq have been faced with government violence and repression, they have insisted on their non-violent approach. In Sudan, the protesters responded to the massacre outside of the General Command of the Armed Forces on 3 June by organizing a mass demonstration on 30 June, which put pressure on the military to resume talks with the revolutionary forces. The third lesson is that once the old regime has fallen, the transition period must be a collective decision-making process in which the opposition has, at least, veto power. The example of Tunisia after 2011 is a case in point. The Higher Authority for Realization of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, which formulated the planned course of the transition, included representatives from across the political spectrum and civil society.Although the military forces in Algeria and Sudan will not cease to play a political role any time soon, this does not have to mean exerting complete control over the transitional period. Sudan could offer a positive example in this regard, if it succeeds in implementing a power-sharing deal according to which a joint civilian-military sovereign council will govern Sudan during the transitional period.The fourth lesson is that political transitions should achieve agreement on the rules of the game before proceeding to elections. In Egypt after 2011, rushed elections served to divide the political opposition and dramatically increase polarization in society. In this second wave, protesters have perceived elections as a trap which enable old regimes to reproduce themselves with new names.In both Algeria and Sudan, protesters have resisted attempts by the military to hold elections as soon as possible. In Sudan, the agreement between the revolutionary forces and the military council postponed the elections until after the end of a three-year transitional period of technocratic rule. In Algeria, protesters are taking to the streets every Friday to demonstrate against the authorities’ decision to hold presidential elections in December.The fifth and final lesson is that the call for change in the region goes beyond electoral democracy and extends to deep socioeconomic reforms. Iraq and Lebanon show this clearly: relatively free and fair elections have already been held but have served only to reinforce corrupt sectarian regimes.According to the fifth wave of the Arab Barometer, the economic situation and corruption are perceived as the main challenge for Algerians (62.2%), Sudanese (67.8%), Lebanese (57.9%), and Iraqis (50.2%), while democracy is perceived as the main challenge for only 2.3%, 3.9%, 5% and 1.4% respectively. The experience of the Arab Spring has shown people that democratic measures are only a means to an end.Unlike in 2011, when the Arab Spring revolts enjoyed broad international support, this second wave is taking place in a hostile environment, with stronger Russian and Iranian presences in the region and an indifferent international climate. But where protesters have the advantage is in experience, and across the region they are clearly adapting their tactics to lessons learned from the early part of the decade. Full Article
t Report Launch – Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt's Military Economy By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 10:45:01 +0000 Research Event 12 December 2019 - 5:30pm to 6:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Yezid Sayigh, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Middle East CenterDavid Butter, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham HouseChair: Lina Khatib, Head, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House The Egyptian military accounts for far less of the national economy than is commonly believed but transformations in its role and scope since 2013 have turned it into an autonomous economic actor that can reshape markets and influence government policy and investment strategies. Will the military economy contract to its former enclave status if Egypt achieves successful economic growth or has it acquired a permanent stake that it will defend or even expand?This roundtable will mark the London launch of a Carnegie Middle East Center report on Egypt’s military economy. The report author, Yezid Sayigh, will begin the discussion with remarks on Egypt’s military economy model and offer thoughts on how external actors can engage the country’s formal and informal networks. David Butter will serve as discussant and the roundtable will be moderated by Lina Khatib.To attend this event, please e-mail Reni Zhelyazkova. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
t The Struggle for Reform in Iraq and Lebanon By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 19 Nov 2019 16:45:01 +0000 Research Event 3 December 2019 - 9:30am to 10:45am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Renad Mansour, Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham HouseAlia Moubayed, Managing Director, JefferiesChair: Lina Khatib, Head, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House Over recent weeks, widespread popular protests have engulfed Iraq and Lebanon. What began as calls for reform in the context of high unemployment and endemic corruption have evolved into direct challenges to the existing political order in both countries.In response, ruling elites have moved to protect the systems from which they draw power. In Iraq, the state has responded to protests with violence, killing more than 300 people and injuring over 15,000. In Lebanon, protesters are facing attempts at co-optation and intransigence by their leaders. These developments have served to underline the widening gap between elites and ordinary citizens and to highlight geopolitical tensions in the region that have contributed to both countries' woes.This event will delve into what is at stake for those mobilizing in Iraq and Lebanon. Speakers will discuss the obstacles to meaningful reform and possible routes out of the current crises.To attend this event, please e-mail Reni Zhelyazkova. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
t Libya Needs an Economic Commission to Exit From Violence By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 14:11:20 +0000 20 November 2019 Tim Eaton Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @el_khawaga LinkedIn A new effort to manage the economy, one that brings together both sides of the war with international partners, is an essential step forward. 2019-11-20-LD.jpg Angela Merkel greets Fayez al-Serraj, prime minister of the Government of National Accord of Libya, in May. Photo: Getty Images. There has been a stark contrast between messaging coming from the international community and trends on the ground as Libya’s latest bout of civil war enters its eighth month.Led by Germany, some states have been trying to build consensus for a ceasefire ahead of a summit that is expected to be held in Berlin in the next few months. Today marks the date of one of the final planning meetings for the summit.The increasing use of drone technology, airstrikes and further influxes of fighters trend points in the opposite direction. Warring groups in Libya continue to receive support from external states, undermining international efforts to de-escalate the conflict. A UN arms embargo goes largely unenforced. As the Berlin process unfolds, there is little evidence to suggest that these external states will shift their positions.The launch of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) offensive on Tripoli in April sunk a UN-planned ‘national conference’, intended to be held less than two weeks later, to negotiate a framework for transition out of Libya’s governance crisis. Yet, Haftar has so far failed in his objective of capturing Tripoli. While his offensive continues, had he the capacity to capture the city, he would have done so already.This has created a conundrum for peace talks: there appears to be little chance of negotiating a deal with Haftar, while it is also hard to see how a deal could be reached without him.The field marshal has little interest in accepting a withdrawal, even a partial one, of his forces. His opponents – who have found unity in their shared efforts to defeat Haftar’s forces – will not accept a ceasefire that leaves the LAAF on the hinterlands of the capital. Similarly, a deal apparently agreed in Abu Dhabi between Haftar and Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj in February is also dead in the water.Amid this logjam, there has been an increasing interest in the economic content of the Berlin summit. Countries supportive of Haftar argue that his alliance has legitimate concerns over the management of Libya’s economy and, particularly, the dominant role of the Tripoli-based central bank and its governor in supporting armed groups.For some within these countries, changing the leadership of the central bank and a finding means of limiting the dominance of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) over the state’s resources – thus reducing flows of funding to armed groups fighting Haftar – could present a point of agreement in Berlin.But their focus on financial management in Tripoli is not mirrored by interest in holding the rival central bank in the eastern city of Bayda – an institution unrecognized by the international community – to account for its pursuit of its own monetary policy. This is built on approximately $23 billion of unsecured debt from commercial banks and $11 billion of currency supplied by Russia.Indeed, very few of the conversations surrounding parameters for Berlin contain details of what would be asked of eastern-based actors beyond pursuit of an audit of the Tripoli and Bayda central banks (only the Tripoli bank is recognized by the international community).Clearly, the GNA and its allies would have no incentive to accept provisions that limit their means to mobilize resources for the war while its opponents do not receive the same scrutiny. However, it is possible to capitalize on the broad interest in economic content to reach some points of agreement over the management of the economy and state institutions. Rather than seeking to replace individuals aligned with one faction for those aligned with another, or expecting asymmetrical concessions from the GNA and its allies, this effort must instead focus on structures and processes that exacerbate the conflict and represent major grievances for the warring parties.Importantly, this would include the establishment of a system of transparency and accountability for the management of Libya’s finances. The opacity of current processes enables the support of patronage-based networks with no effective oversight.Linked to this, the development of effective processes for budgeting and allocating funds could help to reduce graft.And, finally, rationalizing the role of state institutions to agree their roles and responsibilities, creating the room for reforms to Libya’s system of state employment and subsidies through provision of direct payments to Libyan citizens, is essential. An economic commission that comprises members from across political and institutional divides – receiving political support from international powers and technical support from international financial institutions – could be an effective approach. Such a commission could match an inclusive, Libyan-led process with international support to progressively harmonize economic and financial policy between rival authorities and develop consensus for a process of institutional reunification in Libya.This would constitute a major element of an eventual political settlement and reduce the risk of a limited set of actors capturing the system at the expense of the others – an outcome which would likely result in future bouts of violence.Such a commission would offer a means of addressing a key driver of the conflict by decentralizing aspects of Libya’s governance, moving away from the dominance of Tripoli and the current winner-take-all system. These issues cannot be put to one side, to follow progress on the security front. The remarkable resilience that Libya’s economy has shown over the last seven months should not be taken for granted. It has become increasingly difficult for Libya’s institutions to insulate themselves from the conflict as both sides seek to mobilize resources to sustain their war effort.The LAAF is increasingly looking to sideline civilian authorities in eastern Libya. On the other side, the GNA has found means of routing funds to armed groups fighting Haftar.In September, a dispute over the supply of jet fuel between the LAAF and the National Oil Corporation resulted in the establishment of a parallel Brega Petroleum Marketing Company, the state-owned company that possesses a monopoly over fuel distribution.Meanwhile, other major problems lurk under the surface. The banking sector is in an increasingly perilous state and debts continue to mount all around, with those in the east not accounted for by Tripoli’s official authorities. Through the establishment of an economic commission, the Berlin process provides an opportunity and – most importantly – a mechanism to address these problems while also helping to maintain the basic functionality of the state. Even if a ceasefire deal does not materialize, initiating negotiations about the future shape of the state and its economy would be a significant step forward. Full Article
t Webinar – Analysis: Protests in Iraq and Lebanon By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 26 Nov 2019 10:45:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 3 December 2019 - 2:30pm to 3:00pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Dr Lina Khatib, Head, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham HouseDr Renad Mansour, Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House Over recent weeks, widespread popular protests have engulfed Iraq and Lebanon. What began as calls for reform in the context of high unemployment and endemic corruption have evolved into direct challenges to the existing political order in both countries. How have the ruling elites responded to the popular uprisings? What do these developments mean for the future of the two countries and the region more broadly?Dr Lina Khatib and Dr Renad Mansour will discuss what is at stake for protesters and what are the obstacles to meaningful and sustainable reform in Iraq and Lebanon.Please note this webinar is for Middle East and North Africa Programme supporters only and will be taking place online. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
t As Parliamentary Elections Loom, the Legitimacy of Iran’s Regime Has Been Shaken By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 05 Dec 2019 15:58:49 +0000 5 December 2019 Dr Sanam Vakil Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @SanamVakil The latest wave of protests highlights a fracturing social contract in the Islamic Republic. 2019-12-05-Iran.jpg Iranian protesters block a road during a demonstration against an increase in gasoline prices in Isfahan on 16 November. Photo: Getty Images. For four decades, the rule of Iran’s Islamic Republic has rested on the pillars of redistributive social justice, foreign policy independence, Islam and a managed form of electoral legitimacy. These pillars, each of equal importance, have served as guiding principles bolstering Iran’s domestic and foreign policy decisions. Amid the latest round of protests to have gripped Iran, it is clear that these pillars are fracturing. On 15 November at midnight, the Iranian government, in a move supported by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani, Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Head of the Judiciary Ebrahim Raisi, announced a 200 per cent increase in fuel prices – a redistributive measure designed to provide cash transfers to the population.In immediate reaction, Iranian citizens took to the streets to express their discontent with this policy move alongside mounting economic and political grievances.What ensued over the subsequent days was an outbreak of protests through 100 Iranian cities, including at universities and bazaars, that was followed by a weeklong internet blackout and a brutal crackdown that has left at least 200 people dead and 7,000 arrested. Initially, public anger focused on the price increases but quickly targeted the political leadership, lack of government accountability, effective governance and corruption.This wave of protests is the fourth in a two-decade period – 1999, 2009, 2017 and 2019 – for the Islamic Republic and comes at time when the Iranian government is under severe economic strain from Washington’s maximum pressure campaign. It is equally burdened by endemic factional politicking.These protests are one of many reminders of the shattered social contract between state and society in Iran, which without repair will continue to resurface.With internet connectivity resumed and news of the regime’s brutality spreading, conservatives and reformists are both trying to distance themselves from this internal crisis and reposition themselves in advance of the 2020 parliamentary elections.Parliamentary elections for Iran’s 290-person legislature are expected to be held on 21 February. Amid concerns over public apathy and lower political participation, both reformists and conservatives are trying to develop strategies to maximize gains at their ballot box.Even before these protests, voter turnout was anticipated to be lower than normal. Participation in the July 2019 Tehran municipality election was at a nadir of 9 per cent. To prepare for this challenge, Iran’s parliament has lowered the vote threshold for a valid result from 25 to 20 per cent.Elections in Iran, while by no means completely free and fair due to the vetting of candidates by the Guardian Council, have repeatedly been an important barometer of public support and participation. Electoral participation, which is traditionally higher than in most Western democracies, and compared to the lack of electoral opportunities in the Middle East, is heralded as a sign of public legitimacy. Voter participation is generally higher in presidential elections than in legislative ones.For example, 73% voted in the 2017 presidential elections, 72% in 2013, 80% in the contested 2009 elections, and 59% in 2005 elections that brought Mahmood Ahmadinejad to office. Comparatively, in the 2016 parliamentary elections 62% voted, in 2012, 66%, in 2008, 47%, and in 2004, 51% participated.Voter turnout in the 2008 parliamentary elections, reflective of public apathy, mounting international tensions over the nuclear programme, and Guardian Council vetting of reformist candidates, could be emblematic of what to expect next year. In the run up to the election, conservative groups are trying to capitalize on popular economic frustrations, disappointment with reformists, wider regional security concerns and tensions with the United States to rally voters. Reformists associated with the Rouhani government, who also supported the Iran nuclear agreement, have been severely weakened by the US maximum pressure campaign and the return of US sanctions. They are also blamed for the current economic downturn and remain frustrated by their ability to affect change in a political system that affords more power to unelected figures.Amidst this stalemate, Rouhani has continued to call for a national referendum to no avail, while reformist groups are debating how to position themselves – some even calling for greater accountability – so as not be tainted by the government crackdown. Leading reformist politicians such as Mohammad Khatami have called on reformists to stay united and avoid boycotting the elections. It remains to be seen how their strategy will develop after the protests.Should the Guardian Council bar too many reformists from running, calls for a boycott could snowball and even incite new protests. Together with low turnout at the ballot box, the outcome of this election could further damage the regime’s already fragile electoral pillar and weaken its claims to legitimacy. Full Article
t Iraq's Reconstruction: In Conversation with Governor of Anbar Ali Farhan Hamid By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 09 Dec 2019 16:30:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 18 December 2019 - 9:00am to 10:30am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Ali Farhan Hamid, Governor of Anbar ProvinceChair: Dr Renad Mansour, Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House In the aftermath of the liberation from ISIS, the government of Iraq was left to count the cost of three years of brutal conflict, only the most recent phase in the ongoing cycle of conflict and stabilization that has plagued Iraq for 16 years. While reconstruction has been a focus of both the Iraqi government and international policymakers since 2003, billions of dollars in pledged funds have continually failed to reach the places they are most needed. At this roundtable, Ali Farhan Hamid will discuss the efforts of his provincial government to rebuild the cities and towns worst-hit by the conflict. He will provide insights into the practical and structural impediments to reconstruction efforts in both Anbar and neighbouring provinces such as Ninewah where the worst damage was sustained under ISIS but where little in the way of reconstruction has been achieved thereby leaving the door open to the potential resurgence of conflict.The roundtable is part of the Chatham House Iraq Initiative. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Iraq Initiative Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
t How the Soleimani Assassination Will Reverberate Throughout the Middle East By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 06 Jan 2020 12:59:23 +0000 6 January 2020 Dr Sanam Vakil Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @SanamVakil Dr Renad Mansour Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative @renadmansour Dr Lina Khatib Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme @LinaKhatibUK Regional experts examine how Iran benefits from the fallout of the killing, the implications for politics in Iraq and how Tehran might respond with its proxies in the region. 2020-01-06-Soleimani.jpg Protesters hold up an image of Qassem Soleimani during a demonstration in Tehran on 3 January. Photo: Getty Images. An unexpected bounty for IranSanam VakilThe assassination of Qassem Soleimani has been an unexpected bounty for the Islamic Republic at a time when Iran was balancing multiple economic, domestic and regional pressures stemming from the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.Coming on the heels of anti-Iranian demonstrations in Iraq and Lebanon, and following Iran’s own November 2019 protests that resulted in a brutal government crackdown against its own people, the Soleimani killing has helped the Iranian government shift the narrative away from its perceived regional and domestic weaknesses to one of strength. The massive funeral scenes in multiple Iranian cities displaying unending waves of mourners chanting against the United States has provided the Islamic Republic with a unique opportunity to showcase its mobilizing potential. This potential is not limited to Iran but also extends to Iraq and Lebanon, where Tehran’s transnational summoning power has also been visible. The Iraqi parliamentary vote to end the American military presence is one early negative consequence. While the region awaits Iran’s response, further anti-American rallying cries will continue to reverberate. Domestically, Soleimani’s death and President Donald Trump’s continued provocations on Twitter, including threats to attack 52 Iranian cultural sites, are being used as a nationalist rallying cry. This sentiment should not be seen solely as Islamic or ideological, but rather an opportunity for the state to pivot to an Iranian-based nationalism that is more inclusive and empowering for much of the country’s disgruntled youth.Iran’s notoriously divided political factions have also unified in the face of this crisis. With parliamentary elections looming in February and turnout previously expected to be low, the political establishment is likely to use this crisis to mobilize voters in favour of conservative candidates. How Tehran chooses to respond to Qassem Soleimani’s death will very much determine its ability to continue to control the narrative and manage its swell of domestic and regional support. For these benefits to continue to manifest, it is important for Tehran to balance the mix of public sympathy and international anxiety and not overplay its hand in its quest for revenge.A reset for Iraqi politicsRenad MansourThe US strike which killed Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis has grave implications for Iraq. The act jeopardizes Iraq’s recently stabilized security situation, and threatens to reshape the country’s political environment, moving backwards to the days of anti-Americanism and sect-based mobilization. If Baghdad loses relations with the US and other diplomatic representations, it risks turning into a pariah state. Over the past few years, and notably since October 2019, young Iraqis have taken to the streets demanding reform and the downfall of the political establishment, and its main external backer Iran. The political establishment, including political parties and militias close to Tehran, failed to appease or suppress these protests. Now, these political elites are using the deaths of Muhandis and Soleimani to (re)gain popularity from their own population, by drawing on the old tool of anti-Americanism. Following the attacks, Shia populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr – who until recently had called for an end to Iranian and pro-Iranian militia influence in Iraq – has called to revamp the Mehdi Army that he led until 2008 and is calling for ‘Islamic resistance’ to the US. In seeking to regain control of his former movement, he is coming closer to former Shia foes.For years, pro-Iranian groups attempted to push the US out of Iraq. Their calls often fell on deaf ears, as public opinion in Iraq did not consider the US as a threat and some even supported the US and international effort against ISIS. Following the attacks, however, anti-American voices have gained more ammunition.A complete American withdrawal would not only have direct security implications but force other countries and organizations, from European states to NATO, to reconsider their positions and role.Limited options for ‘revenge’ in the LevantLina KhatibIran’s use of Lebanon and Syria as spaces for revenge against the US is unlikely.On Sunday, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed revenge for Soleimani’s death by singling out American soldiers as a target. However, Hezbollah’s options are limited. Lebanon is in the middle of wide-ranging protests against the country’s ruling political class, of which Nasrallah is a key figure.Unlike in 2006, when Hezbollah’s military actions against Israel rallied the public around it, today there is no public appetite for dragging Lebanon into a war. Were Hezbollah to instigate one, it would incur public anger, if only for the economic repercussions that would exacerbate an already severe financial crisis in Lebanon. Lebanon also does not have any US military bases that could be a target for Hezbollah.In theory, Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed groups could attack American bases in Syria. But these bases are staffed by multinational forces from the international anti-ISIS coalition. Attacking them would therefore put Iran in confrontation with other countries besides the US, which is not in Iran’s interest.Attacking US soldiers in northeast Syria would also go against Kurdish interests because it would weaken the anti-ISIS coalition front of which Kurdish forces are part. It would, furthermore, anger Arab tribes in the area, opening up possibilities for ISIS to take advantage of public dissent to stage a comeback. Iran would then find itself fighting on several fronts at once, which it does not have the capacity to handle. More likely, Iran’s allies and proxies in the Levant are going to engage in strong rhetoric without taking hasty actions. When a key Hezbollah leader, Imad Mughniyeh, was assassinated in Damascus on 2008, there were strong words and public vows to seek revenge for his killing, but ultimately there was no response. Full Article
t The Middle East and North Africa Region in 2020 By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 07 Jan 2020 12:15:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 15 January 2020 - 8:15am to 9:30am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Chair: Dr Lina Khatib, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House 2019 was a turbulent year for the Middle East and North Africa. The region was swept by a wave of anti-government protests with popular unrest erupting across Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. Tensions in the Gulf escalated following clashes between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States. Nearly a decade after the Arab Spring, civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen continue to rage with little hope for political solutions to the crises.At this breakfast briefing, Chatham House's Middle East and North Africa Programme researchers will discuss possible scenarios for the region in the year ahead. The experts will explore key trends relevant to the business community and will share insights from recent research trips and discussions with key stakeholders in the MENA region. Please note that participation in this event is only open to supporters of the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme and selected guests. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
t The Struggle for the State in Syria By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 10:50:01 +0000 Research Event 11 March 2020 - 9:00am to 6:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE This conference brings together policymakers, experts, academics and civil society leaders to explore the current condition of the state in Syria. It examines the structure, interrelations and importance of the regime’s core institutions and their interactions with international actors. It also highlights the regime’s different approaches in dealing with state institutions and non-state actors.The speakers discuss governance dynamics in north-western Syria and the east Euphrates region and will analyse governance variations between regions within the regime-controlled areas after the dramatic changes in 2018 and 2019.The conference also aims to evaluate the possibility for Syrians to move from a regime-led state to one that is accountable to its citizens and is governed by the rule of law. Event attributes Livestream Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Syria from Within Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
t Oman’s New Sultan Needs to Take Bold Economic Steps By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 11:20:41 +0000 16 January 2020 Dr John Sfakianakis Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme The country is in a good regional position, but the economy is at a crossroads. 2020-01-16-SultanHaitham2.jpg Sultan Haitham bin Tariq speaks during a swearing in ceremony as Oman's new leader. Photo: Getty Images. The transition of power in Oman from the deceased Sultan Qaboos to his cousin and the country’s new ruler, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, has been smooth and quick, but the new sultan will soon find that he has a task in shoring up the country’s economic position.Above all, the fiscal and debt profile of the country requires careful management. Fiscal discipline was rare for Oman even during the oil price spike of the 2000s. Although oil prices only collapsed in 2014, Oman has been registering a fiscal deficit since 2010, reaching a 20.6 per cent high in 2016. As long as fiscal deficits remain elevated, so will Oman’s need to finance those deficits, predominately by borrowing in the local and international market.Oman’s Debt-to-GDP ratio has been rising at a worrying pace, from 4.9 per cent in 2014 to an IMF-estimated 59.8 per cent in 2019. By 2024, the IMF is forecasting the ratio to reach nearly 77 per cent. A study by the World Bank found that if the debt-to-GDP ratio in emerging markets exceeds 64 per cent for an extended period, it slows economic growth by as much as 2 per cent each year.Investors are willing to lend to Oman, but the sultanate is paying for it in terms of higher spreads due to the underlying risk markets are placing on the rising debt profile of the country. For instance, Oman has a higher sovereign debt rating than Bahrain yet markets perceive it to be of higher risk, making it costlier to borrow. Failure to address the fiscal and debt situation also risks creating pressure on the country’s pegged currency.If oil revenues remain low, Sultan Haitham will have to craft a daring strategy of diversification and private sector growth. He is well placed for this: Sultan Haitham headed Oman’s Vision 2040, which set out the country’s future development plans and aspirations, the first Gulf country to embark on such an assessment. However, like all vision documents in the Gulf, Oman’s challenge will be implementation.In the age of climate change, renewable energy is a serious economic opportunity, which Oman has to keep pursuing. If cheap electricity is generated it could also be exported to other Gulf states and to south Asia. In Oman, the share of renewables in total electricity capacity was around 0.5 per cent in 2018; the ambition is to reach 10 per cent by 2025.However, in order to reach this target, Oman would have to take additional measures such as enhancing its regulatory framework, introducing a transparent and gradual energy market pricing policy and integrating all stakeholders, including the private sector, into a wider national strategy.Mining could provide another economic opportunity for Oman’s diversification efforts, with help from a more robust mining law passed last year. The country has large deposits of metals and industrial minerals and its mountains could have gold, palladium, zinc, rare earths and manganese.Oman’s strategic location connecting the Gulf and Indian Ocean with east Africa and the Red Sea could also boost the country’s economy. The Duqm special economic zone, which is among the largest in the world, could become the commercial thread between Oman, south Asia and China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative.’Oman has taken important steps to make its economy more competitive and conducive to foreign direct investment. Incentives include a five-year renewable tax holiday, subsidized plant facilities and utilities, and custom duties relief on equipment and raw materials for the first 10 years of a firm’s operation in Oman.A private sector economic model that embraces small- and medium-sized enterprises as well as greater competition and entrepreneurship would help increase opportunities in Oman. Like all other Gulf economies, future employment in Oman will have to be driven be the private sector, as there is little space left to grow the public sector.Privatization needs to continue. Last year’s successful sale of 49 per cent of the electricity transmission company to China’s State Grid is a very positive step. The electricity distribution company as well as Oman Oil are next in line for some form of partial privatization.The next decade will require Oman to be even more adept in its competitiveness as the region itself tries to find its new bearings. Take tourism for instance; Oman hopes to double its contribution to GDP from around 3 per cent today to 6 per cent by 2040 and the industry is expected to generate half a million jobs by then. Over the next 20 years, Oman will most likely be facing stiff competition in this area not only by the UAE but by Saudi Arabia as well.The new sultan has an opportunity to embark on deeper economic reforms that could bring higher growth, employment opportunities and a sustainable future. But he has a big task. Full Article
t Synergy in North Africa: Furthering Cooperation By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 15:57:54 +0000 21 January 2020 Discussions of North African integration have evoked ideas of a shared identity and a common destiny in the region. However, recent attempts to build regional blocs in North Africa have been unsuccessful. This paper examines the benefits of a ‘synergistic’ approach to North African cooperation. Read online Download PDF in English Download PDF in Arabic Dr Mohammed Masbah Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @MasbahMohammed LinkedIn Google Scholar Mohamed El Dahshan Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @eldahshan LinkedIn Google Scholar 2020-01-21-Market.jpg A Tunisian vendor poses as he sells white truffles at a market in the town of Ben Guerdane, 40km west of the Libyan border, in February 2016. Photo: Getty Images. SummaryNorth African integration is not a new idea. However, countries in the region have so far struggled to form a cohesive bloc with deep political, economic and social ties. Political instability has effectively deprioritized North African integration. A focus on thematic (political, economic and security) ‘synergies’ may provide a better framework for cooperation than seeking opportunities for all-encompassing ‘deep’ and ‘comprehensive’ integration.Governments of North Africa dedicate considerable resources to domestic security. Much of their efforts are conducted at the national-level and directed towards threats from terrorists, insurgents and militias. Improved security cooperation would achieve better outcomes and economies of scale, including efforts to tackle human trafficking.A new generation of jihadis has emerged in North Africa since 2011. Nearly 27 per cent of the 30,000 fighters who travelled to Syria are from the Maghreb. While government counterterrorism operations have been effective, countries have failed to address the root causes of radicalization.Border economies have suffered as a consequence of a security focus on terrorism and smuggling, which has rendered many previously accepted cross-border trade activities illegal. States have struggled to provide alternative livelihoods for those who have lost this source of income. Border forces tend to lack the right combination of capacity, training and equipment to secure borders and often resort to heavy-handed tactics.New thinking is required to develop a more human-centric and proactive approach to migration issues in the region, which continues to witness huge flows of migrants. The migration policy of Morocco, introduced through legislation in 2014, could be a model for North Africa.The countries of North Africa have varying economic profiles, ranging from economically diverse Morocco to oil-and-gas-dependant Libya. However, they all face similar challenges including unemployment (particularly among the young), poor public-service delivery, low FDI levels, an oversized public sector, ineffective tax collection, and high informality.Fostering entrepreneurship and the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are priorities for North African countries, particularly regarding job creation. Regulatory cooperation – such as harmonizing SME definitions, legislation and support institutions – across North Africa is an obvious area where further integration would encourage the development of start-ups and small businesses.With the advent of the fourth industrial revolution, North African governments must address their technological gaps and work to improve public–private cooperation. In some sectors, such as the fintech industry, North African countries can build upon nascent synergies that have developed organically, such as those of start-up incubators and angel investors that work across the region.Renewables, particularly solar energy production, are a promising development for North Africa. While regional initiatives, such as Desertec, have stalled due to political differences between countries, the sector has witnessed exponential growth in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, where the involvement of the private sector has proved successful. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, North Africa Dialogues Full Article
t Local Pathways Towards De-escalation of Libya's Conflict By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 10:20:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 28 January 2020 - 3:00pm to 4:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Usama Otman Essed, Libya Center for Strategic & Future StudiesChair: Tim Eaton, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House A shaky truce remains broadly in place among rival Libyan forces fighting for control of Tripoli. However, a durable ceasefire to bring an end to the current bout of conflict, which was initiated by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ (LAAF) offensive on the capital in April 2019, has not been reached. In recent weeks attention has focused on talks hosted in Moscow and Berlin, with the former aimed at agreeing a ceasefire and the latter seeking to reach agreement among international actors to bring an end to external military support for Libyan warring actors, and to craft a way forward for future intra-Libyan talks. Yet, there has been little emphasis on Libyan actors – beyond Haftar and prime minister Fayez al-Serraj – in this process. This roundtable will bring together experts and policymakers to discuss means of de-escalating the conflict and seeking a lasting resolution through the development of interconnected intra-Libyan social and security negotiation tracks. Mr Usama Otman Essed of the Libya Center for Strategic and Future Studies (LCSFS) will present his research group’s ideas on these issues and discuss their ongoing efforts to promote dialogue among social and security actors.Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
t Prospects for Reforming Libya’s Economic Governance: Ways Forward By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 27 Jan 2020 15:45:02 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 6 February 2020 - 10:30am to 12:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Jason Pack, Non-Resident Fellow, Middle East InstituteTim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham HouseChair: Elham Saudi, Director, Lawyers for Justice Libya There is a broad consensus that Libya’s rentier, patronage-based system of governance is a driver, and not only a symptom, of Libya’s continuing conflict. The dysfunction of Libya’s economic system of governance has been exacerbated by the governance split that has prevailed since 2014 whereby rival administrations of state institutions have emerged. Despite these challenges, a system of economic interdependence, whereby forces aligned with Field Marshal Haftar control much of the oil and gas infrastructure and the UN-backed Government of National Accord controls the means of financial distribution, has largely prevailed. Yet, at the time of writing, this is under threat: a damaging oil blockade is being implemented by forces aligned with Haftar and those state institutions that do function on a national basis are finding it increasingly difficult to avoid being dragged into the conflict.This roundtable will bring together analysts and policymakers to discuss these dynamics and look at possible remedies. Jason Pack, non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, will present the findings of his latest paper on the issue which recommends the formation of 'a Libyan-requested and Libyan-led International Financial Commission vested with the requisite authorities to completely restructure the economy.' Tim Eaton, who has been leading Chatham House’s work on Libya’s conflict economy, supporting UNSMIL’s efforts in this field, will act as respondent.Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Libya’s Conflict Economy Full Article
t After Latest Turn, Is Muqtada al-Sadr Losing Influence in Iraq? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 12 Feb 2020 14:23:04 +0000 12 February 2020 Dr Renad Mansour Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative @renadmansour Ben Robin-D'Cruz Researcher on Iraqi Politics, University of Edinburgh The populist cleric has repositioned himself in Iraqi politics multiple times, but his recent shift against youth-led protestors may signal his decline as an autonomous political force. 2020-02-12-Sadr.jpg Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf in October. Photo: Getty Images. Following the US strike on Qassem Solaimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis, populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has violently cracked down on youth-led protests in Iraq.His paramilitaries and ‘blue hats’ – supposedly created to protect protestors from state and allied parastatal security forces – sought to end the months-long demonstrations by attacking the places where protesters have camped since October. In Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, they successfully captured the famous Turkish restaurant which had become a symbol of Iraq’s ‘October revolution’. Once the champion of Iraq’s protest movement, Sadr has seemingly changed course and now leads the counter-protests. This reversal has mystified many, from Iraqis who saw Sadr as an ally in their struggle for reform against an impenetrable elite to foreign diplomats who hoped Sadr could help pushback against Iranian influence in Iraq. Yet this is not the first time that Sadr has drastically redefined his position. Since 2003, he has gone from Shia sectarian militia leader to pro-democracy reformist and Iraqi nationalist.And in the past few months, he has given mixed signals, both supporting and criticising the protesters. The most recent incidents of Sadrist violence targeting demonstrators provoked a societal backlash, prompting Sadr to change tack once more and announce that he would disband the blue hats and investigate their crimes against protesters.Sadr and the paramilitariesSadr’s latest change of course may seem to flow directly from the US assassination of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and the ensuing vacuum in the Shia paramilitary sphere. Prior to this move, the Sadrists were on the defensive, outflanked and outgunned by the growing coercive and political power of a constellation of Shia armed groups coalescing under Muhandis’s de facto leadership. Many of these groups competed for Sadr’s base, including Qais al-Khazali’s Asa’ib ahl al-Haq and Akram al-Kaabi’s Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. With Muhandis out of the picture, Sadr could reclaim the space by pushing his own right hand, Kadhem al-Issawi (Abu Do’a), to be the new centre of the paramilitary field and forcing competitors, including Khaza’li and Kaabi, to rally around his leadership.Iran, in the short term, appears to be going along with this solution to bring more coherence to its allied forces in Iraq as it seeks to counter what it regards as US aggression. Iran also hopes that bringing Sadr back in will help neutralize the protest movement which threatens its stake in Iraqi politics. The most visible sign of this Iran-brokered rapprochement was the 13 January meeting in Qom attended by Sadr, Issawi and several senior militia commanders including Laith al-Khazali (Qais al-Khazali’s brother). Following the Qom meeting, a pattern of tit-for-tat violence and assassinations between the Sadrists’ Saraya al-Salam and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq – ongoing since the start of the October protests in Iraq – ceased.A fragmented movement?However, while the US strikes certainly changed Sadr’s political calculations, there are more persistent fundamentals at work that help explain his change of course. The first of these relates to long-standing fragmentation within the movement. This exists not only within Sadrist paramilitaries, but within the movement’s clerical networks, and also applies to the ties that bind the Sadrist leadership to its popular base. This fragmentation makes it difficult for Sadr to impose a coherent politics on his followers from the top down.There are signs that Sadr’s recent shift in position has exacerbated this fragmentation. His attempt to reposition the movement’s base within the ‘resistance axis’ that supports the Shia militias in Iraq has only been partially successful. On 24 January, responding to the US assassinations, Sadr called for a million-man march focused on expelling US forces from Iraq. However, turnout was poor, especially given the huge logistical support for the march, and it lasted only a few hours.Equally revealing, when Sadr called on his supporters to vacate the squares, many refused. One Sadrist protester in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square told the authors: ‘We’ve been camping with our brothers and sisters for four months. Why should we leave them to die?’Meanwhile, fissures have also opened up within the Sadrists’ clerical elite. One senior Sadrist cleric, for example, is openly defying Sadr’s authority and siding with the revolutionaries in Nasiriyah. Sadr’s attempt to dominate the paramilitary sphere is also unlikely to prove any more successful than his many previous failed attempts since 2003. He is neither trusted nor respected by the leaders of other groups. The Iran-brokered rapprochement is already showing signs of weakness. Two recent assassinations of Saraya al-Salam leaders in Basra and Maysan indicate a potential renewal of power struggles between the Sadrist militia and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. Sadr is not a revolutionarySadr has never been a revolutionary, but someone who seeks to leverage a role as both ‘spoiler’ and ‘stabilizer’ to maximise his political leverage. This strategy is ultimately oriented towards sustaining Iraq’s extant political system, not its overthrow. Forced to choose between the roles of revolutionary or maintainer of the status quo, he has opted for the latter. The protests that erupted in 2019 were not the same movement that Sadr led from 2015. The 2015 protests were an elite-driven phenomenon, integrated into the political field and carefully calibrated to exert pressure on the elite towards gradual reform. By contrast, the 2019 demonstrations spring from a youth-led, bottom-up mobilization that rejects politicization and seeks a more radical form of change. Chatham House surveys in a forthcoming paper reveal that the protesters are younger that those who protested in 2015-16. Fewer have permanent employment. Instead of demanding better services or jobs, they are focusing wholesale transformation of the post-2003 political system.A Sadrist official told the authors that their movement initially joined the protests in October 2019 expecting a similar reform-orientation to the protests which Sadr had previously led. However, according to him, the protesters failed to come forward with reasonable demands or alternative names for prime minister. He believed the protests would fade, and many would regret the ‘wasted time and blood’. Sadr’s relations with IranA final long-term factor at play is Sadr’s receding autonomy from Iran. Ever since his movement’s electoral victory in May 2018, Sadr came under enormous pressure to reconcile with the political wing of the Iranian-allied parastatal armed groups in the formation of a new government acceptable to Iran.Over the last year, Sadr has moved even closer to Iran, spending more time in Qom. Iran has offered Sadr security from his paramilitary rivals (such as Asa’ib ahl al-Haq), convincing Sadr that he is safer in Iran than Iraq. Moreover, Sadr is undertaking religious training in Qom, and may see this as a chance to enhance his standing in the Shia religious field as many look towards a future beyond the elderly Najaf-based marja Ali al-Sistani.By keeping Sadr in Qom, Iran appears to be trying to isolate him from what they regard as negative influences. As tensions between the Sadrists and other protest groups intensified, efforts were made by some protest leaders and allied political groups to reach Sadr in Qom and try to persuade him to change course or restrain the worst abuses of his forces. However, this delegation was unable to make contact with Sadr. Those involved told the authors they have resorted to communicating with local Sadrist leaders in Najaf, Babil, Basra and Baghdad. Crossing a lineThis is a transformative moment for the Sadrists. Sadr is now defying the popular sentiments driving protests across central and southern Iraq. The sense of betrayal among former allies and friends of the Sadrists is palpable. One senior activist involved in cooperation with the Sadrists wrote that, no matter what moves Sadr makes next, the cleric has ‘terminated all partnership with the protesters,’ and ‘shattered the framework for cooperation’. A line has thus been crossed that Sadr cannot reverse; he will not be able to recover what he has now lost. Iran, also, does not see Sadr as a dependable ally, and will look to isolate and side-line the cleric when the opportunity arises. Thus, in seeking to exploit a crisis for short-term gain, Sadr may well have sealed his fate – in the long term – as a declining force in Iraqi politics. Full Article
t How Donald Trump’s Peace Plan Looks to the Gulf and Europe By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 13:09:01 +0000 19 February 2020 Dr Neil Quilliam Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @NeilQuilliam1 Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme Neil Quilliam and Reni Zhelyazkova examine how the GCC states and the EU have reacted to the US president’s proposed plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace. 2020-02-19-Gaza.jpg Palestinians watch the televised press conference of Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu on 28 January 2020 at a barber shop in Gaza City. Photo: Getty Images. The view from the GulfNeil QuilliamThere has been no coordinated response among states of the GCC, but the messages have been universal, and surprisingly each one has welcomed US efforts to restart peace talks and praised this particular US administration for doing so. But in each case, the same set of issues and concerns has been highlighted, namely the status of Jerusalem, the situation of refugees and ultimately a simple absence of a revival contiguous Palestinian state.While much has been made of younger Gulf generation’s apparent disconnect from the emotive issues around Palestinian statehood, the state of Jerusalem and the larger refugee issue, older leaders in the Gulf continue to pay them heed. And despite a desire to coordinate with Israel on matters of security, intelligence sharing and tech, they will not advance the relationship under the terms of the so-called ‘deal of the century’.Put simply, the deal forces Palestinians to concede ground on all matters of importance. And should the Arab Gulf states sign up to it, they will be judged harshly by history for not only selling out Palestine for $50 billion, but also footing the bill. As such, they all feel compelled to hedge and pay salutary lip-service to US efforts but know quietly they will die on the vine and that the Arab Peace Initiative is the only viable framework for advancing talks.Even younger leaders know that the greater risk will come from signing up to the deal rather than twitter wrath of the US president.Kuwaiti Parliament Speaker Marzouq Al-Ghanim threw a copy in the bin, emphasizing that it ‘was born dead’ and ‘should be thrown in the dustbin of history’.While the Saudi official position towards the deal was one of qualified support, the Saudi press reported that King Salman had spoken with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who has rejected the plan, to ‘stress to him the Kingdom's steadfast position vis-à-vis the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people’. The king reportedly added: ‘The Kingdom stands alongside the Palestinian people and supports its choices and what[ever] will actualize its hopes and aspirations.’Turki Al-Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief, described the deal’s idea of a Palestinian state as ‘a brutal conception’ and the deal itself as a ‘modern-day Frankenstein’. ‘For Palestine, it is definitely a step back,’ Al-Faisal said. ‘[The Trump administration has] given up the legitimate history and weight of the United Nations Security Council resolutions and adopted a unilateral path.’The view from EuropeReni ZhelyazkovaThe initial EU response to President Trump’s ‘Peace to Prosperity’ plan was one of caution. An official statement soon after the announcement declared that the proposal needs to be studied and assessed but only a few days later the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, condemned the plan for being out of line with internationally agreed parameters.Some member states like Luxembourg have expressed support for the foreign policy chief’s position. Ireland, historically a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause, and Sweden, the only country to recognize the Palestinian state after becoming an EU member, have responded negatively to the US proposal, expressing concern over mentions of Israeli annexation of Palestinian land and stating that it falls short from previous international agreements.Other EU countries, however, have been much more guarded in their reactions. Responses from Germany and France have so far been lukewarm – on the one hand, welcoming US attempts at re-igniting peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians, and, on the other, warning that any future negotiations and agreements must be carried out in accordance with internationally established parameters and legal frameworks.A strong voice of support for Trump’s proposal was that of Hungary, whose minister of foreign affairs and trade, Péter Szijjártó, commended White House adviser Jared Kushner on the plan during a meeting in Washington last week. Other EU countries are yet to respond publicly to the proposal but unity among all EU countries is far from certain.The EU’s official position is that a two-state solution based on pre-1967 borders and in line with previous agreements and UN resolutions is the only viable option for lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.However, Israeli foreign policy under Netanyahu has focused on strengthening bilateral relations with countries in eastern and central Europe. Cooperation with Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and most recently Slovakia and Hungary has improved in all areas – from security and trade to tourism and cultural exchanges.Five of these countries, namely, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria recognized the State of Palestine prior to joining the EU, but the rise of populist nationalism, concerns over migration and terrorism, and improving relations with the Trump administration in the US have contributed to an alignment in views between Israel and the right-leaning governments in southern and eastern Europe, as well as those in Italy and Austria.Improved bilateral relations have translated into political acts of good will towards Israel with a number of EU countries expressing support for Israel in the United Nations and other international forums. Austria, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic defied official EU position and attended the US embassy opening in Jerusalem in May 2018.In this sense, Israel’s strategy in eastern and central Europe can be seen as a deliberate effort to break up consensus within the EU, and, ideally, reverse the bloc’s position towards the Middle East conflict, but also towards Iran. At a time when the EU is managing Brexit, a complex internal agenda, including arguments over the EU budget, and with its relationship with the US strained over Iran, trade and other issues, it is unlikely that the bloc will contribute significant efforts to the Middle East Peace Process. It is even more difficult to see the EU coming up with its own proposal and even less likely that all member states will be able to agree on such an initiative given internal divisions. Under the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine for the period 2017-20 has focused on supporting the Palestinian Authority (PA) with institutional reform, economic development and service delivery. Progress, however, has been limited as the success of programming is dependent on Israeli policy towards the West Bank and Gaza. This has hardened under Netanyahu, who enjoys the full support of the current US administration and sees the EU as biased towards the Palestinians. Any plan that replaces the 2017-20 joint strategy will most likely be a continuation of the current approach which focuses on conflict management and supporting the already crumbling two-state solution by keeping the PA alive. Some room for cautious hope remains, as much depends on the outcome of the Israeli election on 2 March and the US presidential election in November. Changes in leadership could open up space for EU to actively support the reinvigoration of peace talks and regain its relevance as a mediator in the Middle East Peace Process. Full Article
t Iran Workshop Series: Domestic, Regional and International Outlook By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 15:05:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 17 December 2019 - 10:00am to 3:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE After a summer of regional tensions and continued uncertainty regarding the future of the JCPOA, the Chatham House MENA Programme held a closed workshop to examine the impact of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.Discussions focused on the domestic developments and challenges inside Iran, prospects for new negotiations with Iran, and the regional issues facing the country. Participants also considered the differences between American and European approaches towards Iran. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Iran Forum Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
t Conflict and the Water Crisis in Iraq By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 13:15:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 9 March 2020 - 9:00am to 10:30am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Dr Azzam Alwash, Founder & CEO, Nature IraqPeter Schwartzstein, Independent Journalist; Non-Resident Fellow, Centre for Climate SecurityDiscussant: Dr Jehan Baban, Founder & President, The Iraqi Environment and Health Society-UKChair: Dr Glada Lahn, Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Department, Chatham House Water is a critical issue for Iraq’s future stability and prosperity. Only a few decades ago, the country was one of the most fertile in the region, with two major rivers flowing through it. Today, national and transboundary pollution, mismanagement, and debilitating cycles of conflict have contributed to a situation where only half of current water needs are being met, and where an 80% reduction in the flow of water down the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has led to the loss of millions of acres of formerly productive land and the displacement of rural communities.Water scarcity can be a driver of violence and conflict. Tribal conflicts over water sources have erupted sporadically in the south and the contamination of municipal water which led to the hospitalization of some 118,000 citizens was a trigger for the large-scale protests in Basra in late 2018. Without concerted action by national and local governments, companies and international agencies, the situation will only worsen as higher temperatures and reduced rainfall drive rural-to-urban migration and increase the risk of drought, food insecurity and water-related diseases.At this roundtable, part of the Chatham House Iraq Initiative, experts will discuss the domestic, regional and international factors that continue to exacerbate the water crisis in Iraq, and propose solutions, including technical innovation, public sector capacity-building and greater international cooperation, that might contribute to effective state-building, build resilience to the effects of climate change and reduce the risk of further conflict. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Iraq Initiative Georgia Cooke Project Manager, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7957 5740 Email Full Article
t Lebanon Is Paying the Cost of Its Dysfunctional Politics By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 05:27:10 +0000 26 February 2020 Nadim Shehadi Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @Confusezeus A series of fights to political stalemate have led its economy to the brink and cut it off from its natural economic partners in the Gulf. 2020-02-25-Leb1.jpg Protests against economic conditions and government inaction turned violent in January. Photo: Getty Images. To understand Lebanon’s financial collapse, look to its politics.The country has been deeply damaged by an increasingly dysfunctional political system. A series of compromises have alienated it from its main markets in the Gulf and strangled its economy; anyone that has glanced at fluctuations in Lebanese bank deposits over the last 10 years can see the correlation.Imagine if Boris Johnson or Donald Trump were obliged to form joint governments with Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders. The result would be paralysis and lack of accountability as each party pulls the country in opposite directions and blames the other for the state of limbo. This has been the state of affairs in Lebanon since the Doha agreement of 2008. That agreement followed an 18-month siege that paralyzed Beirut and an attack on the city by Hezbollah’s ‘black shirts’. The Doha formula imposed governments of national unity between Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s pro-Saudi camp and Hezbollah’s pro-Iran camp and their respective internal allies.The pattern was set: each period of subsequent paralysis was followed by further compromise as the tug of war pulled the country away from its principal economic partners, the Arab Gulf states, with the regional balance of power tilting towards Hezbollah. It was not supposed to be like this. The Baabda Declaration in June 2012, reached after a process of national dialogue, was meant to secure Lebanon’s neutrality in regional conflicts, with both sides promising to hold back on external alliances and coexist despite difference over major regional issues like the war in Syria, the standoff between the US and Iran or relations with Israel or the Gulf states.This has worn away. The Baabda declaration itself became a sham when Hezbollah inserted itself into the war in Syria in support of the Assad regime and overtly got involved in Iraq and Yemen as an Iranian proxy. This was followed by Saudi opposition to concessions by Hariri that led to the election of General Michel Aoun, an ally of Hezbollah, as president in October 2016; again, after a political paralysis that lasted 29 months with no active government and no head of state. The Saudis were also furious when President Aoun’s son-in-law, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, abstained from condemning the burning of the Saudi embassy in Tehran at an Arab League meeting in Cairo in January 2016, citing the need to preserve national unity.Fearing that he was simply providing Hezbollah with protection in the guise of compromise, the Saudis pressured Hariri to resign in November 2017 during a trip to Riyadh, but he later challenged that by retracting on his resignation when back in Beirut. Lebanon was caught between two sides, and as the regional conflict intensified from tension to open confrontation, neutrality was no longer an option.Gulf connectionsAn estimated 350,000 Lebanese expats live and work in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. These countries are also the main clients for Lebanese contractors, consultants and advertising companies, some of which have offices there. The domestic tourism industry relies heavily on Arab Gulf visitors and they are a principal source of foreign investments especially in the real estate sector.Lebanon also enjoyed a certain degree of political and economic protection from the US and the Gulf, and Hezbollah benefited indirectly from that protection, as it also shielded it to a certain degree from sanctions.The deterioration of relations meant that the country was cut off by its Gulf partners. This was manifested in travel bans for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals to Lebanon and a decrease in investments and bank deposits, as well as a decrease in remittances from Lebanese expats, partly because of economic crisis in the Gulf countries themselves.Saudi Arabia withdrew $4 billion of aid to the Lebanese army and internal security forces, and no aid or deposits were forthcoming as the economic and financial situation deteriorated. The costs to the Lebanese economy include the opportunity cost created by the annual threat of war with Israel, after which trips are cancelled and projects postponed. Hezbollah also controls a section of Beirut port where it pays no duty or taxes. Add to that the economic fallout from the war in Syria, such as the impact on exports, the inflow of refugees and the cost of Hezbollah’s involvement.The burden of these political factors is difficult to estimate but it constitutes the ransom that the Lebanese economy bears as a cost of the compromise. This is not to absolve Lebanese politicians from corruption or bankers of mismanagement but to add that political factors cannot be ignored.The cumulative cost and economic impact of being cut off from its main economic partner eventually bankrupted the country. The fiscal and financial aspects, with Lebanon’s inability to service its debt, are but a reflection of these political factors. In the long run, the key to avoiding complete collapse is to restore relations with the GCC and free Lebanon from that very costly grip. Full Article
t Expanding Sino–Maghreb Relations: Morocco and Tunisia By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 12:49:01 +0000 26 February 2020 Over the past two decades, China has increased its presence in North Africa in terms of trade and investment. This paper looks at China’s policy within the context of its Africa and Middle East policies to better understand its approach to Morocco and Tunisia. Read online Download PDF Yahia H. Zoubir Senior Professor of International Studies, KEDGE Business School, France and Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center 2020-02-26-Xi-Jinping-King-Mohammed.jpg Chinese President Xi Jinping and King Mohammed VI of Morocco wave during a welcoming ceremony outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 11 May 2016. Photo: Getty Images. SummaryChina’s presence in the Maghreb has increased in recent years, raising concerns among Western powers. China has focused on bilateral relations with these countries while also working within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). However, this engagement has limited strategic value compared to relations China has with Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has shown greater interest in the Maghreb as an entry point to European and African markets. China has pursued commercial relations over political influence in the region. Morocco and Tunisia are still dependent on France, their former colonial power, and the European Union, which exert great political, economic, security and cultural influence over the two countries.The Maghreb countries’ economic relations with China have grown exponentially, with Algeria forming the closest relationship. However, Morocco and Tunisia are keen to attract China’s investment and involvement in major construction and infrastructure projects to boost industrial and economic development. While China’s investments in Morocco and Tunisia remain at a low level, trade relations with both countries have grown steadily. Politically, China’s policy of noninterference in domestic affairs appeals to Maghreb states, which resent Western interference.China’s influence in the Maghreb remains minimal. Its soft power push has struggled to promote advantages of strong relations with China beyond economics. Furthermore, Morocco and Tunisia’s populations have generally scant knowledge about China’s politics and culture. China has tried to address this lack of familiarity through the establishment of Confucius Institutes and other cultural activities. However, language and cultural barriers still impede the development of close relations, compared to those China has with other countries in Africa. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Economic Transformation in North Africa Full Article
t POSTPONED: The Development of Libyan Armed Groups since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 04 Mar 2020 14:15:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 18 March 2020 - 9:00am to 10:30am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Abdul Rahman Alageli, Associate Fellow, MENA Programme, Chatham HouseEmaddedin Badi, Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East InstituteTim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, MENA Programme Chatham HouseValerie Stocker, Independent Researcher Since the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths. While many of these have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. In the west and south of the country, armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks.In the east, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will need to address the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities, even while the development of armed groups’ capacities dilutes their accountability to those communities.This roundtable will discuss the findings of a forthcoming Chatham House research paper, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests’, which presents insights from over 200 interviews of armed actors and members of local communities and posits how international policymakers might seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy.PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Countering Conflict Economies in MENA, Libya’s Conflict Economy Georgia Cooke Project Manager, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7957 5740 Email Full Article