Battle lines being drawn over online freedoms in Asia Expert comment NCapeling 22 March 2021

Social media giants are increasingly clashing with Asian governments over free expression and censorship as the region lurches towards digital authoritarianism.

Freedom of expression was subject to significant restrictions in Asia even before the pandemic, with several governments having enacted laws that stifle online debate. But since COVID-19, restrictions have increased even further due to a rash of so-called ‘emergency measures’ introduced by governments across the region.

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam have all put new laws into place, and many restrictions are already being applied in a draconian fashion, such as in the Philippines and Bangladesh.

As outlined in a new Chatham House research paper, one inspiration behind this trend is China, home to the world’s most sophisticated and restrictive system of internet control. The Chinese government’s restrictive online regime, which has tightened further under COVID-19, relies on a combination of legal regulations, technical controls, and proactive manipulation of online debates.

This model was an inspiration for Vietnam’s cybersecurity law, as well as Myanmar’s new draft cybersecurity bill, proposed by the Military-run State Administration Council in the wake of the military coup last month, which would give the military there extensive powers to access individuals’ data, restrict, or suspend access to the internet.

This ‘sovereignty and control’ model of internet governance is also gaining impetus through China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiative, under which the Chinese government is exporting both its technology – such as through the establishment of smart cities, the installation of AI, and surveillance technology – and its vision of how the internet should be governed.

In November 2020, Xi Jinping pledged to further deepen cooperation with ASEAN through the Digital Silk Road, and the pandemic has expanded the appeal of Chinese surveillance technologies and data collection platforms to governments both in Asia and beyond. China’s Health Silk Road, which aims to promote global health cooperation, is centered on the Chinese government’s high-tech model under which civic freedoms are sacrificed in the name of public health.

An alternative model

This ‘sovereignty and control’ model is increasingly at odds with the more ‘human-centric’ model of tech governance favoured by many democratic states, Western social media companies, and international institutions, especially the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU).

Although this emerging model also involves regulation, it is regulation which aims to be inclusive, risk-based, and proportionate – balancing the need for protection against online harms with the need to preserve freedom of expression. It is a multi-stakeholder, rights-based approach which brings together not just governments but also representatives of the private sector, civil society, and academia. The EU’s draft Digital Services Act and the UK’s proposals for an Online Safety Bill are both reflective of this approach.

Western social media giants such as Facebook and Twitter have recently introduced new policies which seek to identify and mitigate online harms, such as hate speech and disinformation. Industry bodies such as the Global Network Initiative, independent oversight bodies such as the Oversight Board established by Facebook, and civil society advocacy and initiatives such as the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation are also an important part of the picture.

Admittedly, these various digital governance initiatives are in some cases embryonic, and are by no means a silver bullet solution to the complex problem of online content moderation, which continues to be hotly debated in democratic societies. But they are at least underpinned by the same philosophy – that international human rights law standards must continue to apply even during emergencies such as COVID-19. With the Biden administration in the US prioritizing tech governance in its policy agenda, there is added momentum to the international leadership behind this model.

A clash of ideology

These conflicting philosophies are playing out in debates on technology governance at the UN, with one group of countries led by China and Russia advocating for greater government control of the internet, and many Western democracies emphasizing the need for an open, global internet that protects human rights.

These differing ideologies are also creating tensions between Western social media companies operating in Asia and the various governments in that region which have increased restrictions on online expression. And the gulf between the two appears to be widening.

In 2017, the Thailand government threatened Facebook with legal action unless it agreed to remove content critical of Thailand’s royal family and, in 2020, Facebook announced it had been ‘forced to block’ such material. Also in 2020, the Vietnam government pressured state-owned telecom companies to throttle internet traffic to Facebook, effectively restricting access to the platform, until Facebook agreed to take down content the government deemed to be anti-state.

Platforms refuse to silence legitimate criticism

However, Silicon Valley’s social media companies have also been pushing back. Facebook restricted the accounts of Myanmar’s military on the basis of ‘spreading misinformation’ in the wake of the military’s imposition of an internet shutdown that blocked access to Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. And Twitter resisted requests by the Indian government to block accounts involved in protests by farmers.

Twitter stated that while it would block any accounts which it felt incited violence, it would not take action on accounts belonging to news media entities, journalists, activists, and politicians because it believed that would ‘violate the fundamental right to free expression under the Indian law’. The Indian government responded by fast-tracking stringent new social media regulations heavily criticized by rights groups for increasing government power over content on social media platforms, including online news.

So how can social media companies find avenues for operating in Asia and beyond without being co-opted into the lurch towards digital authoritarianism? There are no easy answers here, but collaboration is key. Cooperation between tech companies and local civil society partners can help companies better understand risks to human rights in the country concerned and how they might be mitigated. And tech companies are more effective in alliance with each other than acting on their own, such as the refusal by Facebook, Google, Telegram, and Twitter to hand over data on protestors to the Hong Kong police.

The fact that in many countries in Asia there are no alternatives to Western social media companies – unlike China, where platforms such as WeChat are part of the government’s internet control apparatus – gives the companies concerned some leverage. In February 2020, Facebook, Google, and Twitter together – through the Asia Internet Coalition – threatened to leave Pakistan in response to the government’s draconian proposals to regulate social media. Along with pressure and lawsuits from civil society, this forced the government into retreat, although the tussle over the new rules, introduced in November, continues.

At a time when illiberalism was already on the rise in Asia (including in democracies – Freedom House has just downgraded India’s status from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’), COVID-19 has made tighter state control of online freedom of expression even more attractive to many governments. As it seems increasingly unlikely that restrictions enacted under the guise of pandemic-related emergency measures will be repealed once the COVID-19 crisis ends, it is even more important that tech companies work with civil society on the ground to minimize the censorship of citizen voices.

Facebook's power under scrutiny as Trump ban upheld Expert comment NCapeling 6 May 2021

Keeping Donald Trump’s Facebook ban in place shows the vast power social media platforms hold, raising questions of whether that power is appropriately used.

Kate Jones

From a human rights perspective, the Oversight Board’s decision is a strong one, and not at all surprising. The board decided Facebook was right to suspend the former president’s access to post content on Facebook and Instagram, but not indefinitely.

It found Donald Trump’s posts violated Facebook’s community standards because they amounted to praise or support of people engaged in violence and that, applying a human rights assessment, Facebook’s suspension of Trump was a necessary and proportionate restriction of his right to freedom of expression.

However the board also found Trump’s indefinite suspension was neither in conformity with a clear Facebook procedure nor consistent with its commitment to respect human rights. Its decision requires Facebook to make a new decision on the future of Donald Trump’s account, grounded in its rules.

While opinions on this result will differ, the increased call for clear and accessible rules and respect for human rights in their implementation that the Oversight Board brings to Facebook’s operations is welcome.

But the Oversight Board’s powers are limited to content moderation – Facebook declined to answer the board’s questions about amplification of Trump’s posts through the platform’s design decisions and algorithms. This limitation on the board’s role should be lifted. It is in content amplification, not just content moderation, that Facebook should face scrutiny and accountability for the sake of the human rights of its users.

Fundamentally, human rights is not a veneer which can mask or legitimize underlying power dynamics or public policy – those still fall to be assessed for themselves.

The Trump/Facebook saga does highlight the vast power Facebook and other major social media platforms have over political discussion and persuasion. Through granting or denying, or through amplifying or quietening the voices of political figures, Facebook has the power to shape politics, electorates, and democratic processes. Improving content moderation through the Oversight Board, although important, does little to constrain that power.

Facebook itself, unlike a government, has no accountability to the general public, and the Oversight Board must not distract us from the need for a full conversation about the extent to which Facebook’s power is appropriately held and properly wielded.

Emily Taylor

This decision marks a coming of age for Facebook’s content moderation process. For years, decisions to take down content or ban users have been opaque, conducted by a human workforce that Facebook and other platforms have been hesitant to acknowledge. The platforms have also been worried that being seen to exercise an editorial function might put at risk the legal protections which prevent the platforms being held responsible for user-generated content.

When the Oversight Board was first posited, observers questioned whether a body funded by Facebook could properly exercise a legitimate appeals function. Now there is a reasoned decision which partly supports the decision to de-platform a serving president, but also takes issue with the indefinite nature of the ban.

Facebook specifically asked the Oversight Board to consider specific challenges involved when the person involved is a political leader. The board concluded that Trump’s ‘status as head of state with a high position of trust not only imbued his words with greater force and credibility but also created risks that his followers would understand they could act with impunity’. The storming of the US Capitol and role President Trump played in stirring up the violence underlined that political leaders’ words can motivate others to take harmful actions.

Just as the events of January 6 remain shocking, it remains shocking that private platforms have exercised the power to curb the speech of a US president. It also remains shocking that the platforms sat back and took no action over the previous four years, but waited until the final days of the transition.

The board’s decision is an evolution in private-sector content moderation, with a diverse board giving a reasoned opinion on a Facebook decision. But to fully comply with the principles of open justice, board decisions should include more detail on the individuals who have made the decision – at present, it appears all members of the board review the decision but it is not clear which individuals were involved in its drafting, or that they were clear from conflicts. If the process is to gain respect as a truly independent oversight on the platform’s decisions, greater transparency over the identity of decision-makers will be needed.

Mark Zuckerberg expressed concern about Facebook becoming an arbiter of truth or free speech and, overall, the difficulty of having private companies managing the application of fundamental rights on their platforms has not been solved. Just because companies have the financial resources to do it, does not mean they necessarily should.

Yet no other international governance or arbitration system has emerged to handle the complexities of platform power over speech. In the context of that vacuum, the Oversight Board’s decision is a welcome step.

Monitoring of trade deals needs a risk-based approach Expert comment NCapeling 24 May 2021

On human rights issues, trading partners must do more than trust to luck.

The recent row within the UK government about the treatment of agricultural products in a proposed new trade deal with Australia provides a reminder that changes to trading arrangements can have social and environmental costs, as well as benefits.

Although the UK government clearly feels political pressure to demonstrate its ‘Global Britain’ credentials with some speedily concluded new deals, rushing ahead without a full understanding of the social, environmental, and human rights implications risks storing up problems for later. In the meantime, calls for better evaluation and monitoring of trade agreements against sustainability-related commitments and goals – ideally with statutory backing – will only get stronger.

EU experiences with these kinds of processes are instructive. For more than 20 years the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission (DG Trade) has been commissioning sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) from independent consultants in support of trade negotiations, and since 2012 these assessments have explicitly encompassed human rights impacts as a core part of the analysis.

These processes have since been augmented with a programme of periodic ‘ex post’ evaluations of trade agreements to ‘analyse the observed economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts’ of live trade deals and to make recommendations about any mitigation action which may be needed.

For credibility and objectivity, the Commission outsources much of its sustainability assessment and ex post evaluation activities to independent consultants, who are encouraged to innovate and tailor their approaches subject to broad methodological parameters laid down by the Commission. Over time, experiences with specific assessment and monitoring assignments have enabled external SIA practitioners – and the Commission itself – to progressively strengthen these processes and underlying methodologies.

Yet despite the improvements there remains legitimate questions about whether the human rights aspects of these SIA processes – and subsequent evaluations – are having real policy impact. The difficulty of predicting human rights impacts of trade agreements in advance – as the COVID-19 crisis amply demonstrates – suggests a need for realism about the extent to which a ‘one off’ process, often carried out at a time when there is only ‘agreement in principle’ as to future trading terms, can produce a robust roadmap for heading off future human rights-related risks.

Human rights impact assessments have a potentially valuable role to play in laying down the substantive and structural foundations for future human rights monitoring as part of a broader, iterative, human rights risk management strategy. But the fragmented manner in which many trade agreements approach human rights issues, and the fact that outcomes are the product of negotiation rather than necessarily design, make it difficult to turn this vision into reality.

Controversies surrounding the SIA process for the EU-Mercosur agreement illustrate why striving for more coherence in the identification and subsequent management of human rights-related risks is important. In June 2019, the Commission decided to wrap up negotiations with the South America Mercosur bloc, even though the SIA process for the proposed agreement was still incomplete and the interim and final SIA reports yet to be delivered. Frustrated NGOs made their feelings clear in the form of a formal complaint – and a slap on the wrist from the EU Ombudsman duly followed.

However, when it eventually appeared in December 2020, the final SIA report for the EU-Mercosur deal did include a number of interesting recommendations for responding to specific areas of human rights-related risk identified through the pre-signing assessment process – such as flanking measures designed to address issues pertaining to health, equality, and protection of indigenous peoples, and stressing the need for ‘continuous monitoring’.

Hopefully these recommendations will be proactively followed up, but there are reasons not to be overly optimistic about that. To the extent that these recommendations might have required, or benefitted from, some tweaks to the terms of the trade agreement itself, it was clearly too late. And while there may be opportunities for EU institutions to follow up the recommendations through unilateral ex post evaluation processes, current legal, policy, and institutional arrangements provide few guarantees this will take place.

The credibility of the EU SIA programme has clearly taken a knock because of the problems with the EU-Mercosur process, and stakeholders could be forgiven for questioning whether expending time and effort on engaging in these processes is actually worthwhile. As a first step towards rectifying this, the Commission should be transparent about how it plans to respond to the EU-Mercosur SIA recommendations regarding flanking measures and follow up – ideally consulting with stakeholders about the various human rights monitoring options available.

Looking further ahead, the Commission should be urging SIA practitioners to deal more expansively with the options for follow up human rights monitoring in future SIA reports, setting out recommendations not just on the need for ongoing monitoring of human rights-related issues but on the detail of how this might be done, and how progress towards human rights-related goals could be tracked. And creativity should be encouraged because, as detailed in a newly-published Chatham House research paper, there may be more opportunities for human rights monitoring than first appear.

The SIA process could also provide a forum for exploring complementary measures needed to make future monitoring efforts as effective as possible – jointly and unilaterally; politically, structurally, and resources-wise; both within the framework of the trading relationship and extraneously. The credibility of the process – and hence stakeholder trust – would be further enhanced by commitments from the Commission to be more transparent in future about how different human rights monitoring recommendations laid out in SIAs have been taken into account in subsequent negotiations, in the supervisory arrangements developed for specific trading relationships, and in the implementation of EU trade policy more generally.

Counter-terrorism measures and sanctions: How to avoid negative consequences for humanitarian action? 9 September 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 July 2021 Online

Exploring current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

Counter-terrorism measures  address broad forms of support to terrorist acts. Their expansion, internationally and domestically, has given rise to new points of friction with international humanitarian law. Unless the measures include adequate safeguards, they  can impede humanitarian action. Country-specific sanctions imposed for other objectives, such as ending conflicts or protecting civilians, raise similar challenges for humanitarian action. 

These problems are not new, but solutions at international and national level remain elusive. 

At this panel event, which marks the launch of a new Chatham House research paper, panellists explore current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

• What are the current dynamics and developments at Security Council level?  
• What are the opportunities now that the UK is developing its independent sanctions strategy? 
• What challenges do counter-terrorism requirements in funding agreements for humanitarian action  pose? 
• What is necessary to make progress?

Learnings must become practice as the Taliban return Expert comment NCapeling 7 September 2021

There is greater awareness of the adverse impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions on humanitarian action. It is time to apply lessons learned.

The 9/11 attacks prompted the international community to adopt a wide range of counterterrorism measures. Debate continues over their compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law, and their effectiveness.

What has become clear is that some of these measures have made it difficult for humanitarian assistance to be provided to the millions of people living in areas under the control of armed groups designated as terrorist, or where such groups have a significant presence.

These include Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s Arabian peninsula, ISIL affiliates in Syria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Hamas in Gaza, and various Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel. The lessons painfully learned need to be applied to Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

Impeding humanitarian work

Traditionally, legal counterterrorism measures criminalized acts of violence but, in recent years, measures adopted by the UN Security Council, the European Union (EU), and some states unilaterally, have expanded to address broader forms of support for terrorist acts and to groups designated as terrorist.

When these measures apply in situations of armed conflict – and in the absence of adequate safeguards – they can impede humanitarian organizations from operating as foreseen by IHL and in accordance with humanitarian principles, which require life-saving assistance to be provided in an impartial manner. Restrictions in sanctions imposed for policy objectives other than counterterrorism create similar tensions.

Prohibitions on making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to persons or groups designated as terrorist can capture incidental payments made during humanitarian operations and relief consignments which are diverted and end up in the hands of these designated groups.

The most extreme restrictions cover the provision of medical assistance, in violation of the foundational principle of IHL that everyone who is wounded and sick – civilian or fighter – is entitled to medical care without discrimination, and those who provide it must not be punished.

Humanitarian organizations have been highlighting these problems for more than a decade. Recent developments give cause for cautious optimism that a turning point has been reached, as the bodies imposing counterterrorism measures and sanctions internationally and domestically have begun to demand compliance with international law and IHL.

In 2019 the UN Security Council unanimously issued a binding demand to member states to ensure all counterterrorism measures they adopt comply with obligations under international law, including IHL.

Recent renewals of UN country-specific sanctions have included similar demands with regards to measures taken by member states to give effect to them. Although this still falls short of an express exception for humanitarian action, it is a significant development, and a strong encouragement to include appropriate safeguards when implementing UN measures domestically.

Similar encouraging practice is discernible at EU level, and new domestic counterterrorism laws adopted by several states include safeguards for humanitarian action.

Applying lessons learned to Afghanistan

It is too soon to know what policies the Taliban will adopt, and the measures that the international community will take to promote compliance with IHL, human rights, and counterterrorism objectives. Nonetheless, policymakers implementing sanctions – and considering their expansion – cannot ignore their potential adverse impact on humanitarian action. They must bear in mind five key lessons.

First, there must be clarity on current legal restrictions, starting from who is designated under sanctions and counterterrorism measures. The UN Security Council has never designated the Taliban per se. Instead, it has listed ‘individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban’. At present this list includes 135 individuals and five entities, four of which are ‘hawalas’ – money changers – the other being the Haqqani Network, a Sunni Islamist group.

UN financial sanctions require states to freeze the assets of designated persons and groups and ensure no funds, financial assets, or economic resources are made available to them, either directly or indirectly.

EU and UK sanctions simply replicate the restrictions and designations imposed by the UN, but the US has designated the Taliban as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’ which makes the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations applicable. These prohibit US nationals from making any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for, the benefit of the Taliban.

Second, while listed individuals may play a role in the forthcoming Taliban administration, sanctions do not prohibit providing resources to a government department headed by a designated person.

There is a distinction between an individual and a department, and prohibitions in counterterrorism measures or sanctions on the provision of funds or other assets apply to the designated person, not to the department they may head.

Problems may arise if a designated person appropriates resources for personal benefit or to undermine policy objectives for which the sanctions were imposed. But this does not bring the department within the scope of the designation. Instead, the issue must be addressed from a prevention of diversion perspective.

Third, sanctions and counterterrorism measures must be designed so as to minimize their adverse impact on humanitarian action. One way of doing so is designating leadership figures rather than groups. The new US administration took this approach towards the Houthi in Yemen, with the designation of the group being revoked and new designations focusing on its leaders.

The chilling effect of sanctions is far broader than the actual restrictions they impose. Commercial actors in particular limit their activities in areas they perceive as high risk. In view of this, the effect of expanding existing designations to list the Taliban, now that it is in control of Afghanistan, would be to turn targeted sanctions into comprehensive ones.

In parallel, sanctions or counterterrorism measures should include express safeguards, which exclude funds, assets, and other support provided during humanitarian action from the restrictions – ideally in the form of exceptions or, if an option, general licences.

The adverse impact of the US Global Terrorism Sanctions has been limited until now, as only a small number of humanitarian actors subject to US measures operated in areas under Taliban control. This has now changed, and it is imperative the US issue a broad general licence to exclude assistance provided during humanitarian action from the sanctions.

Fourth, restrictions in funding agreements must not be more onerous than the underlying measures they aim to promote compliance with – in particular, they must not require screening or exclusion of final beneficiaries from the assistance they have been determined as requiring.

Finally, engagement with non-state armed groups for humanitarian purposes is essential for conducting operations effectively and safely, both for humanitarian organizations and the people they are trying to assist. Counterterrorism measures and sanctions do not prohibit such contact even when such groups or their members have been designated.

The past two decades have given states ample time to learn to avoid the adverse impact of sanctions and counterterrorism measures on humanitarian action. The people of Afghanistan deserve that these lessons now be applied.

Our research paper IHL and the humanitarian impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions identifies the principal points of friction between these bodies of law, clarifies outstanding issues and misunderstandings, and offers practical recommendations for resolving tensions.

The trickle-up effect of rights-based climate litigation Expert comment NCapeling 16 November 2021

With governments failing in their pledges and companies accused of ‘green-washing’, human rights-based litigation is increasingly important for accountability.

Tuvalu’s foreign minister addressing COP26 while standing knee-deep in seawater was a stark illustration of how the climate emergency directly and imminently threatens the most basic human rights protected under international law – including to the right to life, self-determination and cultural rights.

Human rights are now a fundamental component of more than 90 per cent of the climate litigation currently taking place outside the US, highlighting the international reach of human rights law and how its emphasis on protecting the most vulnerable helps diverse communities find common arguments for shared goals.

Cases are set to continue and to evolve but three types of claim are emerging, each of which is examined in a new Chatham House briefing paper.

1. Enforcing commitments

One category of cases seeks to hold states accountable for pledges they have made on climate change, such as emission reduction targets made under the framework of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Drawing on human rights obligations, governments can be charged with not taking sufficient steps to implement these pledges.

The case of Leghari v Pakistan (2015) concerned the government’s failure to carry out the National Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014-2030). The Lahore High Court held that several of the human rights enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution cover climate change and ‘provide the necessary judicial toolkit to address the government’s response to climate change’.

The court ordered the government to carry out measures such as publishing an adaptation action plan realizable within a few months of the order and establishing a Climate Change Commission to monitor progress.

2. Positive duties to mitigate risks

Many rights-based climate cases are being brought to clarify the scope of states’ positive duties under human rights law to take meaningful steps to protect their citizens against foreseeable risks to life and other rights.

This ‘trickle-up’ effect of human rights was prominent in the case of State of the Netherlands vs the Urgenda Foundation (2019) where the Dutch Supreme Court held that reducing emissions with the highest possible level of ambition amounts to a ‘due diligence standard’ for states to comply with their positive duties to adopt adequate measures to address climate change. Human rights law was also used by the court to fill in the content of the due diligence standards.

There is also a growing trend for rights-based actions to be brought against corporations, such as a recent case which drew on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to define the parameters of Shell’s duty of care and due diligence obligations in relation to carbon emissions under Dutch law. The court ordered Shell to reduce emissions by a net rate of 45 per cent by the end of 2030 – relative to 2019 figures – through its group corporate policy.

3. Avoiding harm in climate action

The global human rights regime is also increasingly invoked in litigation concerning states’ negative obligations to ensure that their climate mitigation and adaptation activities do not themselves contribute to human rights violations (including discrimination) and that states prioritize adaptation measures for those most at risk in a just and equitable way.

As Chatham House’s paper makes clear, this kind of litigation ‘puts pressure on governments to expand their approach to tackling climate change beyond purely a regulatory one to a more holistic strategy’.

Closing the climate justice gap

Climate and environmental litigation grounded in human rights is set to continue given the overwhelming scientific evidence of risks associated with human-induced climate change and the limited confidence in pledges made by states and corporations alike – including those made recently at COP26.

A growing collaboration between civil society organizations and vulnerable communities in relation to both the protection of nature and the enjoyment of their land and cultural rights was evident at COP26, and this alliance will add further momentum to the trend for rights-based climate litigation based on the rights of indigenous and other vulnerable communities, especially on issues such as deforestation.

But more challenges are coming. International human rights law recognizes a duty of international cooperation but there remain significant hurdles for climate-vulnerable communities in developing countries to compel action by richer nations despite the vast debts of ‘carbon colonialism.’

One big issue is the problem of extraterritoriality, as the extent to which states owe obligations to individuals outside their territory is contested. Courts in both Germany and the Netherlands have rejected claimants from developing countries in domestic class actions on this basis. But a recent decision of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on a complaint brought by Greta Thunberg and other youth activists against five countries opens the door for further litigation.

One of a number of cases being brought by youth claimants across the world, the committee concluded that a state’s human rights duties can – in some instances – extend to children in other countries. This includes any activities on the territory that host states have the power to prevent from causing ‘transboundary harm’ – such as emissions from the territory – where these activities ‘significantly’ impact the enjoyment of human rights of persons outside the territory.

To date, high-profile rights-based cases have argued for policy change and stronger targets underpinned by binding legislation responsive to the science. Claims are set to become more complex and contested. Building on scientific developments in climate attribution, rights-based litigation is now tackling other difficult questions such as apportioning responsibility and remedial action.

These cases examine both historically high emitters and the public and private actors who either continue specific activities or refrains from action in the face of the overwhelming science linking human activities such as extraction and burning of fossil fuels to deforestation and climatic consequences.

Courts are also likely to explore the duties that states and corporations owe to deliver a ‘just transition’ away from carbon-intensive industries, given the benefits of growth and climate action are already unevenly distributed.

A holistic human-rights based approach

Several states together with civil society are leading the charge for global recognition of the right to a healthy, clean, and sustainable environment in the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, and multi-stakeholder processes are defining what effective corporate due diligence looks like.

In addition, UN-appointed special rapporteurs are delivering practical guidance on how to devise solutions which are fair, non-discriminatory, participatory, and climate-resilient without exacerbating inequality – including difficult issues of planned relocation – and UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies are unpacking the duty of international cooperation to act in good faith to address loss and damage.

Recently the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommended the Marshall Islands, in order to meet its duty to its citizens, should actively seek international cooperation and assistance – including climate change financing – from other countries but in particular the US, whose ‘extraterritorial nuclear testing activities have exacerbated the adverse effects of climate change and natural disasters’ in the islands.

Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world Feature jon.wallace 17 February 2023

Chatham House experts examine the shifts in geopolitical alliances, security, energy, and supply chains and whether these changes are likely to be long-lasting.

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine one year ago was a global shock which ‘marked an abrupt end to 30 years of globalization and all the international co-operation that made that possible’ with serious implications for countries around the world, outlined Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox in her inaugural lecture.

Not only has the war threatened the stability of Europe but it has also impacted food and energy security globally including in the Middle East and Africa, creating shock waves in a world barely recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

CARM1 is a protein arginine methyltransferase (PRMT) that acts as a coactivator in a number of transcriptional programs. CARM1 orchestrates this coactivator activity in part by depositing the H3R17me2a histone mark in the vicinity of gene promoters that it regulates. However, the gross levels of H3R17me2a in CARM1 KO mice did not significantly decrease, indicating that other PRMT(s) may compensate for this loss. We thus performed a screen of type I PRMTs, which revealed that PRMT6 can also deposit the H3R17me2a mark in vitro. CARM1 knockout mice are perinatally lethal and display a reduced fetal size, whereas PRMT6 null mice are viable, which permits the generation of double knockouts. Embryos that are null for both CARM1 and PRMT6 are noticeably smaller than CARM1 null embryos, providing in vivo evidence of redundancy. Mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs) from the double knockout embryos display an absence of the H3R17me2a mark during mitosis and increased signs of DNA damage. Moreover, using the combination of CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitors suppresses the cell proliferation of WT MEFs, suggesting a synergistic effect between CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitions. These studies provide direct evidence that PRMT6 also deposits the H3R17me2a mark and acts redundantly with CARM1.

Hepatocyte nuclear factor-1β (HNF-1β) is a tissue-specific transcription factor that is required for normal kidney development and renal epithelial differentiation. Mutations of HNF-1β produce congenital kidney abnormalities and inherited renal tubulopathies. Here, we show that ablation of HNF-1β in mIMCD3 renal epithelial cells results in activation of β-catenin and increased expression of lymphoid enhancer–binding factor 1 (LEF1), a downstream effector in the canonical Wnt signaling pathway. Increased expression and nuclear localization of LEF1 are also observed in cystic kidneys from Hnf1b mutant mice. Expression of dominant-negative mutant HNF-1β in mIMCD3 cells produces hyperresponsiveness to exogenous Wnt ligands, which is inhibited by siRNA-mediated knockdown of Lef1. WT HNF-1β binds to two evolutionarily conserved sites located 94 and 30 kb from the mouse Lef1 promoter. Ablation of HNF-1β decreases H3K27 trimethylation repressive marks and increases β-catenin occupancy at a site 4 kb upstream to Lef1. Mechanistically, WT HNF-1β recruits the polycomb-repressive complex 2 that catalyzes H3K27 trimethylation. Deletion of the β-catenin–binding domain of LEF1 in HNF-1β–deficient cells abolishes the increase in Lef1 transcription and decreases the expression of downstream Wnt target genes. The canonical Wnt target gene, Axin2, is also a direct transcriptional target of HNF-1β through binding to negative regulatory elements in the gene promoter. These findings demonstrate that HNF-1β regulates canonical Wnt target genes through long-range effects on histone methylation at Wnt enhancers and reveal a new mode of active transcriptional repression by HNF-1β.

The molecular mechanisms of reduced frataxin (FXN) expression in Friedreich's ataxia (FRDA) are linked to epigenetic modification of the FXN locus caused by the disease-associated GAA expansion. Here, we identify that SUV4-20 histone methyltransferases, specifically SUV4-20 H1, play an important role in the regulation of FXN expression and represent a novel therapeutic target. Using a human FXN–GAA–Luciferase repeat expansion genomic DNA reporter model of FRDA, we screened the Structural Genomics Consortium epigenetic probe collection. We found that pharmacological inhibition of the SUV4-20 methyltransferases by the tool compound A-196 increased the expression of FXN by ∼1.5-fold in the reporter cell line. In several FRDA cell lines and patient-derived primary peripheral blood mononuclear cells, A-196 increased FXN expression by up to 2-fold, an effect not seen in WT cells. SUV4-20 inhibition was accompanied by a reduction in H4K20me2 and H4K20me3 and an increase in H4K20me1, but only modest (1.4–7.8%) perturbation in genome-wide expression was observed. Finally, based on the structural activity relationship and crystal structure of A-196, novel small molecule A-196 analogs were synthesized and shown to give a 20-fold increase in potency for increasing FXN expression. Overall, our results suggest that histone methylation is important in the regulation of FXN expression and highlight SUV4-20 H1 as a potential novel therapeutic target for FRDA.

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Histone recognition by “reader” modules serves as a fundamental mechanism in epigenetic regulation. Previous studies have shown that Spindlin1 is a reader of histone H3K4me3 as well as “K4me3-R8me2a” and promotes transcription of rDNA or Wnt/TCF4 target genes. Here we show that Spindlin1 also acts as a potent reader of histone H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent methylation pattern. Calorimetric titration revealed a binding affinity of 16 nm between Spindlin1 and H3 “K4me3-K9me3” peptide, which is one to three orders of magnitude stronger than most other histone readout events at peptide level. Structural studies revealed concurrent recognition of H3K4me3 and H3K9me3/2 by aromatic pockets 2 and 1 of Spindlin1, respectively. Epigenomic profiling studies showed that Spindlin1 colocalizes with both H3K4me3 and H3K9me3 peaks in a subset of genes enriched in biological processes of transcription and its regulation. Moreover, the distribution of Spindlin1 peaks is primarily associated with H3K4me3 but not H3K9me3, which suggests that Spindlin1 is a downstream effector of H3K4me3 generated in heterochromatic regions. Collectively, our work calls attention to an intriguing function of Spindlin1 as a potent H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent mark reader, thereby balancing gene expression and silencing in H3K9me3/2-enriched regions.

Phospholipase Cε (PLCε) is activated downstream of G protein–coupled receptors and receptor tyrosine kinases through direct interactions with small GTPases, including Rap1A and Ras. Although Ras has been reported to allosterically activate the lipase, it is not known whether Rap1A has the same ability or what its molecular mechanism might be. Rap1A activates PLCε in response to the stimulation of β-adrenergic receptors, translocating the complex to the perinuclear membrane. Because the C-terminal Ras association (RA2) domain of PLCε was proposed to the primary binding site for Rap1A, we first confirmed using purified proteins that the RA2 domain is indeed essential for activation by Rap1A. However, we also showed that the PLCε pleckstrin homology (PH) domain and first two EF hands (EF1/2) are required for Rap1A activation and identified hydrophobic residues on the surface of the RA2 domain that are also necessary. Small-angle X-ray scattering showed that Rap1A binding induces and stabilizes discrete conformational states in PLCε variants that can be activated by the GTPase. These data, together with the recent structure of a catalytically active fragment of PLCε, provide the first evidence that Rap1A, and by extension Ras, allosterically activate the lipase by promoting and stabilizing interactions between the RA2 domain and the PLCε core.

In animals, the response to chronic hypoxia is mediated by prolyl hydroxylases (PHDs) that regulate the levels of hypoxia-inducible transcription factor α (HIFα). PHD homologues exist in other types of eukaryotes and prokaryotes where they act on non HIF substrates. To gain insight into the factors underlying different PHD substrates and properties, we carried out biochemical and biophysical studies on PHD homologues from the cellular slime mold, Dictyostelium discoideum, and the protozoan parasite, Toxoplasma gondii, both lacking HIF. The respective prolyl-hydroxylases (DdPhyA and TgPhyA) catalyze prolyl-hydroxylation of S-phase kinase-associated protein 1 (Skp1), a reaction enabling adaptation to different dioxygen availability. Assays with full-length Skp1 substrates reveal substantial differences in the kinetic properties of DdPhyA and TgPhyA, both with respect to each other and compared with human PHD2; consistent with cellular studies, TgPhyA is more active at low dioxygen concentrations than DdPhyA. TgSkp1 is a DdPhyA substrate and DdSkp1 is a TgPhyA substrate. No cross-reactivity was detected between DdPhyA/TgPhyA substrates and human PHD2. The human Skp1 E147P variant is a DdPhyA and TgPhyA substrate, suggesting some retention of ancestral interactions. Crystallographic analysis of DdPhyA enables comparisons with homologues from humans, Trichoplax adhaerens, and prokaryotes, informing on differences in mobile elements involved in substrate binding and catalysis. In DdPhyA, two mobile loops that enclose substrates in the PHDs are conserved, but the C-terminal helix of the PHDs is strikingly absent. The combined results support the proposal that PHD homologues have evolved kinetic and structural features suited to their specific sensing roles.

DNA polymerases are today used throughout scientific research, biotechnology, and medicine, in part for their ability to interact with unnatural forms of DNA created by synthetic biologists. Here especially, natural DNA polymerases often do not have the “performance specifications” needed for transformative technologies. This creates a need for science-guided rational (or semi-rational) engineering to identify variants that replicate unnatural base pairs (UBPs), unnatural backbones, tags, or other evolutionarily novel features of unnatural DNA. In this review, we provide a brief overview of the chemistry and properties of replicative DNA polymerases and their evolved variants, focusing on the Klenow fragment of Taq DNA polymerase (Klentaq). We describe comparative structural, enzymatic, and molecular dynamics studies of WT and Klentaq variants, complexed with natural or noncanonical substrates. Combining these methods provides insight into how specific amino acid substitutions distant from the active site in a Klentaq DNA polymerase variant (ZP Klentaq) contribute to its ability to replicate UBPs with improved efficiency compared with Klentaq. This approach can therefore serve to guide any future rational engineering of replicative DNA polymerases.

RecQ family helicases are highly conserved from bacteria to humans and have essential roles in maintaining genome stability. Mutations in three human RecQ helicases cause severe diseases with the main features of premature aging and cancer predisposition. Most RecQ helicases shared a conserved domain arrangement which comprises a helicase core, an RecQ C-terminal domain, and an auxiliary element helicase and RNaseD C-terminal (HRDC) domain, the functions of which are poorly understood. In this study, we systematically characterized the roles of the HRDC domain in E. coli RecQ in various DNA transactions by single-molecule FRET. We found that RecQ repetitively unwinds the 3'-partial duplex and fork DNA with a moderate processivity and periodically patrols on the ssDNA in the 5'-partial duplex by translocation. The HRDC domain significantly suppresses RecQ activities in the above transactions. In sharp contrast, the HRDC domain is essential for the deep and long-time unfolding of the G4 DNA structure by RecQ. Based on the observations that the HRDC domain dynamically switches between RecA core- and ssDNA-binding modes after RecQ association with DNA, we proposed a model to explain the modulation mechanism of the HRDC domain. Our findings not only provide new insights into the activities of RecQ on different substrates but also highlight the novel functions of the HRDC domain in DNA metabolisms.

Pyruvate kinase muscle isoform 2 (PKM2) is a key glycolytic enzyme and transcriptional coactivator and is critical for tumor metabolism. In cancer cells, native tetrameric PKM2 is phosphorylated or acetylated, which initiates a switch to a dimeric/monomeric form that translocates into the nucleus, causing oncogene transcription. However, it is not known how these post-translational modifications (PTMs) disrupt the oligomeric state of PKM2. We explored this question via crystallographic and biophysical analyses of PKM2 mutants containing residues that mimic phosphorylation and acetylation. We find that the PTMs elicit major structural reorganization of the fructose 1,6-bisphosphate (FBP), an allosteric activator, binding site, impacting the interaction with FBP and causing a disruption in oligomerization. To gain insight into how these modifications might cause unique outcomes in cancer cells, we examined the impact of increasing the intracellular pH (pHi) from ∼7.1 (in normal cells) to ∼7.5 (in cancer cells). Biochemical studies of WT PKM2 (wtPKM2) and the two mimetic variants demonstrated that the activity decreases as the pH is increased from 7.0 to 8.0, and wtPKM2 is optimally active and amenable to FBP-mediated allosteric regulation at pHi 7.5. However, the PTM mimetics exist as a mixture of tetramer and dimer, indicating that physiologically dimeric fraction is important and might be necessary for the modified PKM2 to translocate into the nucleus. Thus, our findings provide insight into how PTMs and pH regulate PKM2 and offer a broader understanding of its intricate allosteric regulation mechanism by phosphorylation or acetylation.

Myosins generate force and motion by precisely coordinating their mechanical and chemical cycles, but the nature and timing of this coordination remains controversial. We utilized a FRET approach to examine the kinetics of structural changes in the force-generating lever arm in myosin V. We directly compared the FRET results with single-molecule mechanical events examined by optical trapping. We introduced a mutation (S217A) in the conserved switch I region of the active site to examine how myosin couples structural changes in the actin- and nucleotide-binding regions with force generation. Specifically, S217A enhanced the maximum rate of lever arm priming (recovery stroke) while slowing ATP hydrolysis, demonstrating that it uncouples these two steps. We determined that the mutation dramatically slows both actin-induced rotation of the lever arm (power stroke) and phosphate release (≥10-fold), whereas our simulations suggest that the maximum rate of both steps is unchanged by the mutation. Time-resolved FRET revealed that the structure of the pre– and post–power stroke conformations and mole fractions of these conformations were not altered by the mutation. Optical trapping results demonstrated that S217A does not dramatically alter unitary displacements or slow the working stroke rate constant, consistent with the mutation disrupting an actin-induced conformational change prior to the power stroke. We propose that communication between the actin- and nucleotide-binding regions of myosin assures a proper actin-binding interface and active site have formed before producing a power stroke. Variability in this coupling is likely crucial for mediating motor-based functions such as muscle contraction and intracellular transport.

Centrioles are key eukaryotic organelles that are responsible for the formation of cilia and flagella, and for organizing the microtubule network and the mitotic spindle in animals. Centriole assembly requires oligomerization of the essential protein spindle assembly abnormal 6 (SAS-6), which forms a structural scaffold templating the organization of further organelle components. A dimerization interaction between SAS-6 N-terminal “head” domains was previously shown to be essential for protein oligomerization in vitro and for function in centriole assembly. Here, we developed a pharmacophore model allowing us to assemble a library of low-molecular-weight ligands predicted to bind the SAS-6 head domain and inhibit protein oligomerization. We demonstrate using NMR spectroscopy that a ligand from this family binds at the head domain dimerization site of algae, nematode, and human SAS-6 variants, but also that another ligand specifically recognizes human SAS-6. Atomistic molecular dynamics simulations starting from SAS-6 head domain crystallographic structures, including that of the human head domain which we now resolve, suggest that ligand specificity derives from favorable Van der Waals interactions with a hydrophobic cavity at the dimerization site.

L. Oeding
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 227-250.
Abstract, references and article information

H. G. Kazaryan and V. N. Margaryan
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 151-181.
Abstract, references and article information

A. V. Silantyev
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 75-149.
Abstract, references and article information

N. R. Ikonomov and S. P. Suetin
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 33-54.
Abstract, references and article information

Fossil Fuels Expert Roundtable: Forecasting Forum 2018 12 February 2018 — 2:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 December 2017 Chatham House, London

This forum will present the latest thinking from senior researchers on the dynamics that will affect fossil fuels investment and markets in the year ahead. The first session will assess the various factors keeping oil and gas prices from bouncing back and will consider conditions and political developments that could influence markets in the year ahead. The second session will assess the future of the power sector and what this means for the fossil fuels industry.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Forecasting Forum 2019 29 January 2019 — 2:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

This annual forum, previously held as part of the Fossil Fuels Expert Roundtable but now re-branded under the Energy Transitions Roundtable, presents the latest thinking from the Energy, Environment and Research Department’s senior research team on the dynamics that will affect fossil fuels investment and markets in the year ahead. This year, the forum will have three sessions:

Session 1 | 14:05 - 15:00 | Climate Trends

In December, a ‘playbook’ to implement the 2015 Paris Agreement was agreed by 196 countries at the UN’s COP24 in Poland. Despite this success, challenges surrounding common reporting requirements, degree-pathways to pursue, increasing ambition and the implementation of NDCs still remain. In this session, Pete Betts, former Head of International Climate and Energy at the UK Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, will reflect on developments in the climate agenda and what action should be taken both in the UK and internationally against the backdrop of Brexit.

Session 2 | 15:15 - 16:15 | An Outlook for Oil in 2019

The future of crude oil prices for 2019 is perhaps more uncertain than it has been for several years. Following a period between 2014-17 when over-supply banished geopolitics from influencing the oil price, the market appears to be struggling to price political risk. Recently the OPEC Plus agreement was renewed in an effort to curtail production and defend prices but its effectiveness is in question as the shale technology revolution in the US continues to add to global supply - but for how long? Meanwhile, US relations with Saudi Arabia remain uncertain in the aftermath of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi: how might Saudi oil policy unfold? Similarly, how might Iran respond to President Trump’s unilateral abrogation of the JCPOA agreement? In this session, Paul Stevens looks at the geopolitical factors that might influence crude oil prices in 2019.

Session 3 | 16:30 - 17:30 | An Outlook for Coal

The rapid phase-out of coal-fired power stations is crucial to the delivery of the goals of the Paris Agreement and to the safeguarding of clean air and water and public health. Some policy and economic developments show that the coal sector is in structural decline, and there is growing international momentum behind coal phase-out. At the same time, many of the largest coal trading countries and companies continue to argue the short-term profitability of the sector but at what cost? This session will explore the national and international risks that continued investment in coal present and the developments that could change this in the year ahead.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Plant-based 'Meat' and Cultured Meat: Revolutionizing the Livestock Sector 10 April 2019 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 March 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Consensus is building across the scientific, environmental and public health communities that a radical shift away from excessive meat-eating patterns is urgently needed to tackle the unsustainability of the livestock sector. Recognizing the scale of the challenge ahead, public policymakers, civil society and innovators have increasingly sought to prompt shifts in consumer food choices – away from the most resource-intensive meat products and towards more sustainable alternatives.

Meat analogues – plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat also known as ‘lab-grown’ meat – mark a departure from traditional meat alternatives. Both are intended to be indistinguishable from – and in the case of cultured meat biologically equivalent to – animal-derived meat and are marketed principally at meat-eaters. Innovation and investment in meat analogues have increased significantly, but the direction and pace of growth in the meat analogue industry will depend upon a multitude of factors, including public acceptance, civil society support and incumbent industry responses.

This event will explore the challenges of scaling up production and generating demand for meat alternatives. It will also look at the ways policymakers in the UK and EU can impact the direction of the industry while examining what factors will influence consumer acceptance of plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat as substitutes for animal-derived meat.

Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation: Power of Siberia I and II and Implications for Global LNG Supplies 27 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

In a new event in the Sustainable Transitions series, the speaker will present an update of Sino-Russian gas cooperation.

To give a comprehensive account of their impact on global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, he will discuss the following points:

• Gas is scheduled to start flowing from the Power of Siberia I (POS) on 2 December 2019. But what is the background of development of POS 1 and what is its current status and prospects?
• What are the chances of exporting gas through the proposed Altai pipeline? Why is the Mongolia export route so significant? And how will it affect the Central Asian Republics and in particular Turkmenistan’s gas export to China?
• What are the implications of both POS I and Altai gas via Mongolia route in the context of global LNG supply?
• What are the prospects for multilateral pipeline gas cooperation in northeast Asia?
• What are the implications for other Arctic onshore LNG supply, in particular, for Novatek’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 1 and 2 to China on top of POS 1 and Altai gas?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Forecasting Forum 2020 17 February 2020 — 2:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Forecasting Forum 2020 will present the latest thinking from the Chatham House Energy, Environment and Resources Department’s senior research team on the dynamics that will affect fossil fuel and energy investments and markets in the year ahead.

14:00 - 14:30 | Introduction and Climate Risks Outlook

In the last decade, following the financial crisis, the literature on systemic risks has grown. Systemic risks occur when complex, non-linear, interconnected systems fail, often through relatively small perturbations, as their impacts cascade and amplify across the system. Within this context, climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’ with the risks increasing in scale, frequency and magnitude. Just as complex systems can pass thresholds and tip from a functional state to a non-functional state, so can societies and people’s attitudes. Together risk cascades or systemic risks and attitudinal tipping points have the potential to rapidly change the way the world works.

Professor Tim Benton will open the Forecasting Forum 2020 with reflections on what this might mean for the pace and linearity of the fossil fuel transition.

14:30 - 15:30 | Session 1: An Outlook on Oil Prices in 2020

In this session, Professor Paul Stevens will argue that the recent events associated with the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani have exacerbated the sensitivity of oil markets to political events and brought ‘geopolitics’ back into global oil prices. Up to 2014, geopolitics played a key role in determining oil prices in the paper markets where perceptions and expectations ruled. By 2014, the world was so oversupplied with real oil barrels that the oil price collapsed and little attention was given to geopolitical events as geopolitics became marginalized in the determination of crude oil prices. However, recent events in the Middle East suggest that prices will become increasingly volatile but, at the same time, benefit from a rising geopolitical premium.

15:45 - 16:45 | Session 2: An Outlook for Energy in 2020

Recent years have brought significant disruption to the European power sector. Not only are many of Europe’s major utilities restructuring their businesses in light of decarbonization and technological developments but Brexit has distracted - and detracted from - efforts to create more systemic energy linkages between the UK and the rest of Europe. During his presentation, Antony Froggatt will draw on his ongoing research to outline what he believes are the prevailing challenges and opportunities for the European power sector over the coming year while highlighting some of the most significant global trends.

Please note, attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Environmental Change and Emerging Diseases 28 October 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 October 2020 Online

Understanding how environmental changes are directly and indirectly affecting the emergence and spread of disease has assumed global importance.

There is growing awareness that deforestation and land-use conversion, urbanization, human migration, international commerce, and climate change are having significant impacts on human health, but their impact on increasing infectious disease risks has only become more evident with the coronavirus pandemic.

With climate change, and environmental change more generally, disrupting ecologies, and people interacting with wildlife in new ways, it creates the conditions for new diseases to emerge: a better understanding of the health dimensions of environmental change will be critical to managing pandemic risks in future. 

Our event will examine the relationship between environmental change and disease, how these linkages have manifested in historical outbreaks and in the coronavirus pandemic, and the role of environmental policies in minimizing the risk of future emerging diseases.  What can be done to ensure equitable action? What can we learn from our responses to previous pandemics? And will the growing recognition of the diverse risks arising from climate change motivate more climate action?

This event will launch the Energy, Environment and Resources (EER) Programme’s Environment and Society Discussion Series. This series aims to provide a platform to promote interdisciplinary knowledge sharing and policy dialogue to mitigate and adapt to the impacts that climate change, biodiversity loss and natural resource depletion are having on people and communities globally, and on geopolitics, security and international development.

Sign up to find out about more events in this series here. 

Forecasting forum 2021 28 January 2021 — 12:30PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 January 2021 Online

Speakers explore the dynamics that will likely affect fossil fuel demand, energy investments and markets in the year ahead.

The Forecasting Forum 2021 presents the latest thinking from the Energy, Environment and Resources Programme’s senior research team and colleagues on the dynamics that will likely affect fossil fuel demand, energy investments and markets in the year ahead.

Focus is given to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the first 100 days of the new Biden administration in the US, and the run-up to COP26. The extraordinary developments over the last year have demonstrated the need consider and discuss a wide range of possible futures and the factors that affect them to help improve system resilience and increase stability, whilst achieving sustainability.

For the first time, this annual event was run online and consisted of a panel discussion on what the year ahead might hold.

Cities as climate leaders: Progress and ambition 1 December 2021 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 November 2021 Online

This panel discusses the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally.

Cities are critical to tackling the pressing environmental challenges of our time. While they now account for an estimated 75 per cent of global CO2 emissions, cities also offer a unique opportunity for devolved leadership on climate action. At the recent COP26, some significant progress was made in elevating cities’ position on climate action with a flurry of announcements and commitments.

For example, more than 1,000 cities are now committed to the Cities Race to Zero and C40’s Clean Construction Declaration saw multiple cities committing to at least halving emissions from initial construction of buildings by 2030. A raft of financing commitments were also made to improve urban resilience in the face of climate change.

This builds on existing momentum before COP26. Over 50 world cities are now on track to meet Paris Agreement and the Marrakech Partnership is further enabling collaboration between governments and cities within the UNFCCC processes.

Therefore, how we design, build, govern and use our urban places will be a key factor for decarbonization and climate change adaptation.

On the back of COP26, this panel brings together leaders from across urban development sectors to discuss the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally. 

Forecasting forum 2022 2 February 2022 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2022 Online

The Environment and Society Programme’s senior research team will discuss the emerging geopolitical trends that may impact energy markets and investments in 2022.

The Forecasting Forum 2022 presents the latest thinking from the Environment and Society Programme’s senior research team on the dynamics that will likely affect fossil fuel demand, energy investments and markets in the year ahead.

The event will discuss a wide range of emerging geopolitical trends that may impact energy markets and investments in 2022, including continuing uncertainty around COVID-19, fuel price changes, US political direction and progress of President Biden’s climate agenda, and growing shareholder activism within some of the largest energy companies. Moreover, the implications of pledges made at COP26 will start to materialize, ahead of a new climate scenarios report by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the COP27 summit in Egypt. In this respect, the panel will assess whether 2022 could prove to be a decisive year for the energy transition. 

Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK 23 February 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 January 2022 Online

Experts discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives on green taxonomy.

This event will address the controversial additions to the EU green finance taxonomy, including the labelling of some nuclear and gas power sources as “green”. Hear perspectives from the UK, EU and international experts.

The UK has committed to creating a green taxonomy to provide a shared understanding of which economic activities count as sustainable. It should be robust and evidence-based, taking an objective and science-based approach to assessing sustainability.

Technical Screening Criteria (TSCs) for the climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation objectives within the UK green taxonomy will be based on those in the EU Taxonomy. The Government is currently reviewing these and expects to consult on UK draft TSCs in the first quarter of 2022, ahead of legislating by the end of 2022.

In recent weeks the European Commission has proposed controversial additional TSCs for the EU taxonomy, most notably the inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in power generation, which are currently being discussed by Member States and the European Parliament.

The inclusion of controversial power sources not only risks affecting investment and deployment patterns in the net-zero transition, but may also be a threat to the authority of the taxonomy as a whole

Key questions for the UK now include whether and how to address these issues in its own taxonomy, and how to promote a science-based ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions that can lead to robust international standards.

This Environment and Society Discussion Series event brings expert voices together to discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives, and is co-organized with E3G.

China Paves Its Way in New Areas of International Law Expert comment sysadmin 31 March 2017

China is looking to increase its capacity and influence in international legal matters – and it is particularly in frontier areas of the law that China is likely to take a proactive stance.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi called China a staunch defender and builder of the international rule of law in his speech to the UN General Assembly in October 2014. He promised that as China grew stronger, it would make a greater contribution to the maintenance and promotion of international rule of law, and would work with other countries to build a fairer and more reasonable international political and economic order.

For many in China, that time has now come: there is a sense that China deserves a much stronger and more respected voice in discussions surrounding the future of the international system. The recent speeches of Xi Jinping in Davos and Geneva in January 2017 suggest that China is now seizing the initiative and fighting for a voice and influence commensurate with its status and power as the number two economy in the world.

But there is an interesting divide in the areas in which China chooses to assert itself. In traditional areas of international law – such as the law of the sea and international human rights law – China continues to harbour reservations about the fairness of the existing international order. Its misgivings are fuelled by a perception that it did not play a significant part in the creation of the post-Second World War international order, and that those rules operate mainly in the interests of Western powers.

There is also a sense that traditional areas of international law do not offer a level playing field for China, since Western states have far more experience at operating in those. We know from Chinese experts that in the South China Sea case, one background issue that played into China’s refusal to engage in litigation with the Philippines and other interested states (which were represented by leading Western international lawyers) was a lack of experience before international courts and tribunals.

Contrast this with newer areas of international law– such as the regimes governing cyber, space, climate change and deep sea mining issues. In these areas, the rules are still in the process of being developed and tested, and the influence of the existing powers is not so firmly established or accepted, so there is more opportunity for China’s voice to be heard and heeded.

On climate change, China has become a champion of the Paris Agreement, which it worked hard with the Obama administration to secure. China is also active in some of the processes related to cyber rule-making, both as a member of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on cyber issues and through bilateral dialogues with a number of states. China has taken a keen interest in the regime applicable to the mining of the international seabed, making submissions to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea about the procedure for settling disputes. In international economic law, another relatively new area, China has been assiduously cultivating expertise, and is a major player in the negotiation of the ‘mega regional’ trade deal, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

In time, the development of China’s much heralded Belt and Road Initiative may provide an opportunity for China to be further involved in international norm-setting, through the creation of a system of economic and political interaction that is built and run more along Chinese determined lines. The emergence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may offer an early indicator of China’s attempts to shape global governance, although in this context China has so far scrupulously observed international standards and has made no open attempt to challenge them.

So far, China’s practical input to international norm-setting has been limited. While China is prone to making wide-ranging statements of principle, it finds it more challenging to engage in the nitty gritty of specific rule making. But as is clear from its membership of the WTO, China can adapt quickly. While initially it was a reluctant adherent to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, China is now adept at making active and effective use of its rules to promote China’s interests, including launching a legal challenge regarding the contested issue of its non-market economy status. Overall, there is strong leadership backing for a more activist approach to its engagement with the international legal system.

China sees international law as an important instrument in the “toolbox” of international diplomacy. It will increasingly be seeking to leverage international law to promote its own interests, particularly in newer areas, as it seeks to strengthen its wider soft power and influence.

Combatting Human Trafficking: The Situation in East Asia 16 September 2019 — 10:30AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 August 2019 Taipei, Taiwan

In 2017, there were an estimated 40.3 million victims of modern slavery worldwide. The prevalence for individuals to fall victim to forced labour practices is highest in the Asia-Pacific region where four out of every 1,000 people have been found to be victims of forced labour and labour trafficking. Many of these victims end up in the more developed economies of East Asia as destination countries of labour trafficking. Such cases are, however, often under-reported and under-detected, largely owing to a lack of a coherent response to trafficking across the sub-region.

At this roundtable, organized in partnership with the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and the University of Portsmouth, participants will discuss emerging anti-trafficking practices from a regional perspective including legal and policy frameworks and the role of business and recruitment agencies.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Asia-Pacific

Research explores geopolitics, population and migration, technology and its impact, conflict, and promoting sustainable development.

Covering the region from Afghanistan to Australia, the region is a major centre of geostrategic interest, with factories in the Far East and South East Asia exporting manufactured products, while importing energy and raw materials, and half of the world’s maritime trade passing through the Indonesian Straits of Sunda, Lombok and Malacca.

The competition to establish control and supremacy over these trade routes has seen major regional powers such as China, Japan and India try to expand their presence in the south China Sea and the Indian Ocean - in the face of a massive US military presence in the area to contain Chinese expansion.

Territorial disputes also loom large on land. In addition to the dispute between North and South Korea, the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea cause regional tension, as does a growing Australia-Japan defence relationship. 

Key issues covered include China’s influence in the region and globally, the UK and Japan’s relationship in a changing world, and the economic relationship between the EU and China over the coming decade.

Webinar: On the Front Line: The Impact of COVID-19 on Asia's Migrant Workers 21 May 2020 — 2:00PM TO 2:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 May 2020

Asia’s army of migrant workers are on the frontline in confronting the health and economic effects of COVID-19. Lacking formal safety nets, health care access, and facing social dislocation, hundreds of millions across the region are bearing the brunt of the coronavirus lockdown. Asian governments have scrambled to come up with an effective health and humanitarian response, exposing public apathy and significant shortcomings in public policy.

Is better regional coordination necessary to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 on migrant labourers? Is the private sector in Asia part of the problem or part of the solution?

In this webinar, the speakers will discuss the likely implications of lasting economic damage on the livelihoods of Asia’s migrant workers, as well as responses and measures to effectively mitigate the impact.

Gurmeet K. Bakshi, Jyoti Garg and Gabriela Olteanu
Math. Comp. 93 (), 3027-3058.
Abstract, references and article information

Thomas O. Gallouët, Andrea Natale and Gabriele Todeschi
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2769-2810.
Abstract, references and article information

Dr. Abiy Tasissa of Tufts University, discusses the mathematics he and colleagues used to study particle collider data, including optimal transport and optimization. Collider physics often result in distributions referred to as jets. Dr. Tasissa and his team used "Earth Mover's Distance" and other mathematical tools to study the shape of jets. "It is interesting for me to see how mathematics can be applied to study these fundamental problems answering fundamental equations in physics, not only at the level of formulating new ideas, which is, in this particular case, a notion of distance, but also how the importance of designing fast optimization algorithms to be able to actually compute these distances," says Dr. Tasissa.