weapon

Putin’s Remarks on Use of Nuclear Weapons Are Confusing, But Unlikely to Constitute a Shift in Nuclear Posture

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s eschatological talk of nuclear Armageddon at this year’s Valdai forum has stirred up heated debates on how well his description of Russia’s potential use of nuclear weapons matches the country’s official military doctrine. However, a close look at Putin’s Oct. 18 remarks and Russia’s 2014 military doctrine reveals that, while Putin deviated from the language in the doctrine, he did not lie on the first use issue. Nor did he seem to be hinting at a shift in Russia’s nuclear posture. More likely, he was signaling to Washington that the existing nuclear arms control treaties need to remain in place for the sake of ensuring strategic stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear dyad and avoiding an accidental war between the two countries.




weapon

The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking

In the unintuitive world of nuclear weapons strategy, it’s often difficult to identify which decisions can serve to decrease the risk of a devastating nuclear conflict and which might instead increase it. Such complexity stems from the very foundation of the field: Nuclear weapons are widely seen as bombs built never to be used. Historically, granular—even seemingly mundane—decisions about force structure, research efforts, or communicated strategy have confounded planners, sometimes causing the opposite of the intended effect.




weapon

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




weapon

The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking

In the unintuitive world of nuclear weapons strategy, it’s often difficult to identify which decisions can serve to decrease the risk of a devastating nuclear conflict and which might instead increase it. Such complexity stems from the very foundation of the field: Nuclear weapons are widely seen as bombs built never to be used. Historically, granular—even seemingly mundane—decisions about force structure, research efforts, or communicated strategy have confounded planners, sometimes causing the opposite of the intended effect.




weapon

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




weapon

The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking

In the unintuitive world of nuclear weapons strategy, it’s often difficult to identify which decisions can serve to decrease the risk of a devastating nuclear conflict and which might instead increase it. Such complexity stems from the very foundation of the field: Nuclear weapons are widely seen as bombs built never to be used. Historically, granular—even seemingly mundane—decisions about force structure, research efforts, or communicated strategy have confounded planners, sometimes causing the opposite of the intended effect.




weapon

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




weapon

The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking

In the unintuitive world of nuclear weapons strategy, it’s often difficult to identify which decisions can serve to decrease the risk of a devastating nuclear conflict and which might instead increase it. Such complexity stems from the very foundation of the field: Nuclear weapons are widely seen as bombs built never to be used. Historically, granular—even seemingly mundane—decisions about force structure, research efforts, or communicated strategy have confounded planners, sometimes causing the opposite of the intended effect.




weapon

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




weapon

The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking

In the unintuitive world of nuclear weapons strategy, it’s often difficult to identify which decisions can serve to decrease the risk of a devastating nuclear conflict and which might instead increase it. Such complexity stems from the very foundation of the field: Nuclear weapons are widely seen as bombs built never to be used. Historically, granular—even seemingly mundane—decisions about force structure, research efforts, or communicated strategy have confounded planners, sometimes causing the opposite of the intended effect.




weapon

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




weapon

The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking

In the unintuitive world of nuclear weapons strategy, it’s often difficult to identify which decisions can serve to decrease the risk of a devastating nuclear conflict and which might instead increase it. Such complexity stems from the very foundation of the field: Nuclear weapons are widely seen as bombs built never to be used. Historically, granular—even seemingly mundane—decisions about force structure, research efforts, or communicated strategy have confounded planners, sometimes causing the opposite of the intended effect.




weapon

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




weapon

The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking

In the unintuitive world of nuclear weapons strategy, it’s often difficult to identify which decisions can serve to decrease the risk of a devastating nuclear conflict and which might instead increase it. Such complexity stems from the very foundation of the field: Nuclear weapons are widely seen as bombs built never to be used. Historically, granular—even seemingly mundane—decisions about force structure, research efforts, or communicated strategy have confounded planners, sometimes causing the opposite of the intended effect.




weapon

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




weapon

The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking

In the unintuitive world of nuclear weapons strategy, it’s often difficult to identify which decisions can serve to decrease the risk of a devastating nuclear conflict and which might instead increase it. Such complexity stems from the very foundation of the field: Nuclear weapons are widely seen as bombs built never to be used. Historically, granular—even seemingly mundane—decisions about force structure, research efforts, or communicated strategy have confounded planners, sometimes causing the opposite of the intended effect.




weapon

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




weapon

The Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead: A Dangerous Weapon Based on Bad Strategic Thinking

In the unintuitive world of nuclear weapons strategy, it’s often difficult to identify which decisions can serve to decrease the risk of a devastating nuclear conflict and which might instead increase it. Such complexity stems from the very foundation of the field: Nuclear weapons are widely seen as bombs built never to be used. Historically, granular—even seemingly mundane—decisions about force structure, research efforts, or communicated strategy have confounded planners, sometimes causing the opposite of the intended effect.




weapon

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




weapon

Iran’s regional rivals aren’t likely to get nuclear weapons—here’s why

In last summer’s congressional debate over the Iran nuclear deal, one of the more hotly debated issues was whether the deal would decrease or increase the likelihood that countries in the Middle East would pursue nuclear weapons. Bob Einhorn strongly believes the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East

      
 
 




weapon

Iran’s regional rivals aren’t likely to get nuclear weapons—here’s why


In last summer’s congressional debate over the Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—one of the more hotly debated issues was whether the deal would decrease or increase the likelihood that countries in the Middle East would pursue nuclear weapons.

Supporters of the JCPOA argued that, by removing the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran, it will reduce incentives for countries of the region to acquire nuclear arms. Opponents of the deal—not just in the United States but also abroad, especially Israel—claimed that the JCPOA would increase those incentives because it would legitimize enrichment in Iran, allow Iran to ramp up its nuclear capacity when key restrictions expire after 10 and 15 years, and boost the Iranian economy and the resources Iran could devote to a weapons program.

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East (and as my colleague Richard Nephew explains in another post out today, there are things the United States and other powers can do to help reduce that prospect further). But uncertainties about the future of the JCPOA and the region will persist for quite some time—and these uncertainties could motivate regional countries to keep their nuclear options open. They may ask themselves a variety of questions in the years ahead: Will the JCPOA be sustainable over time? Will it unravel over concerns about compliance? Will it withstand challenges by opponents in Tehran and Washington? Will it survive leadership transitions in the United States and Iran? Will Iran ramp up its fissile material production capacities when key restrictions expire? Will it then break out of the JCPOA and seek to build nuclear weapons? Will Iran continue to threaten the security of its neighbors in the years ahead? And will the United States maintain a strong regional military presence and be seen by its partners as a reliable guarantor of their security?

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East.

Richard and I studied how these and other questions might affect nuclear decision-making in the Middle East. In particular, we evaluated the likelihood that key states will pursue nuclear weapons, or at least enrichment or reprocessing programs that could give them a latent nuclear weapons capability. We focused on four states often regarded as potential candidates to join the nuclear club: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey.

Saudi Arabia

Of the four, Saudi Arabia is the most highly motivated to pursue nuclear weapons. It sees Iran as an implacable foe that is intent on destabilizing its neighbors, achieving regional hegemony, and upending the Kingdom’s internal order. At the same time, the Saudis have lost much confidence in the U.S. commitment to the security of its regional partners. In part as a result, the new Saudi leadership has taken a more assertive, independent role in regional conflicts, especially in Yemen. But despite their reservations about the United States, the Saudis know they have no choice but to rely heavily on Washington for their security—and they know they would place that vital relationship in jeopardy if they pursued nuclear weapons.

The Saudis clearly have sufficient financial resources to make a run at nuclear weapons. But acquiring the necessary human and physical infrastructure to pursue an indigenous nuclear program would take many years.

Given the Kingdom’s difficulty in developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, speculation has turned to the possibility that it would receive support from a foreign power, usually Pakistan, which received generous financial support from Saudi Arabia in acquiring its own nuclear arsenal. But while rumors abound about a Pakistani commitment to help Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons, the truth is hard to pin down. If such a Saudi-Pakistani agreement was ever reached, it was probably a vague, unwritten assurance long ago between a Pakistani leader and Saudi king, without operational details or the circumstances in which it would be activated. In any event, the Saudis would find it hard to rely on such an assurance today, when Pakistanis are trying to put the legacy of A.Q. Khan behind them and join the international nonproliferation mainstream. 

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE believes Iran poses a severe threat to regional security and has become more aggressive since the completion of the JCPOA. And like the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor. But also like the Saudis, the Emiratis are reluctant to put their vital security ties to the United States in jeopardy.

[L]ike the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor.

Moreover, the Emiratis are heavily invested in their ambitious nuclear energy program—with efforts currently underway, with the help of a South Korean-led consortium, to construct four nuclear power reactors—and they know this project would be dead in the water if they opted for nuclear weapons.

The Emiratis have also been a leading regional supporter of nonproliferation. In their bilateral agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with the United States, they formally renounced the acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities (the so-called “gold standard”), effectively precluding the pursuit of nuclear weapons. After the JCPOA permitted Iran to retain its enrichment program, the UAE, faced with criticism domestically and from some Arab governments for having given up its nuclear “rights,” said it may reconsider its formal renunciation of enrichment. But subsequently, Emirati officials have made clear that their nuclear energy plans have not changed and that they have no intention to pursue enrichment or reprocessing.

Egypt

Egypt is on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear aspirants—in part because of its former role as leader of the Arab world and its flirtation with nuclear weapons in the Gamal Abdel Nasser years. But while Egypt and Iran have often been regional rivals, Egypt does not view Iran as a direct military threat. Instead, Egypt’s main concerns include extremist activities in the Sinai, the fragmentation of Iraq and Syria, disarray in Libya—and the adverse impact of these developments on Egypt’s internal security. The Egyptians recognize that none of these threats can be addressed by the possession of nuclear weapons.

Although Russia is committed to work with Egypt on its first nuclear power reactor, Cairo’s nuclear energy plans have experienced many false starts before, and there is little reason to believe the outcome will be different this time around, especially given the severe economic challenges the Egyptian government currently faces. Moreover, although Egypt trained a substantial number of nuclear scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, its human nuclear infrastructure atrophied when ambitious nuclear energy plans never materialized.

Turkey

Because of its emergence in the last decade as a rising power, its large and growing scientific and industrial basis, and its ambition to be an influential regional player, Turkey is also on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear-armed states. But Turkey has maintained reasonably good relations with Tehran, even during the height of the sanctions campaign against Iran. Although the two countries have taken opposing sides in the Syria civil war, Turkey, like Egypt, does not regard Iran as a direct military threat. Indeed, Ankara sees instability and terrorism emanating from the Syrian conflict as its main security concerns—and nuclear weapons are not viewed as relevant to dealing with those concerns.

Current tensions with Russia over Turkey’s November 2015 shoot-down of a Russian fighter jet are another source of concern in Ankara. But the best means of addressing that concern is to rely on the security guarantee Turkey enjoys as a member of NATO. While Turkish confidence in NATO has waxed and waned in recent decades, most Turks, especially in the military, believe they can count on NATO in a crisis, and they would be reluctant to put their relationship with NATO at risk by pursuing nuclear weapons.

Former nuclear aspirants

For the sake of completeness, our study also looked at regional countries that once actively pursued nuclear weapons but were forced to abandon their programs: Iraq, Libya, and Syria. But we concluded that, given the civil strife tearing those countries apart, none of them was in a position to pursue a sustained, disciplined nuclear weapons effort.

Bottom line

Our study found that the Iran nuclear deal has significantly reduced incentives for countries of the Middle East to reconsider their nuclear options. At least for the foreseeable future, none of them is likely to pursue nuclear weapons or even latent nuclear weapons capabilities—or to succeed if they do. 

Editors’ Note: Bob Einhorn and Richard Nephew spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

Authors

     
 
 




weapon

The weak case for the long-range stand-off weapon


The Pentagon is embarking on a modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces that will cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Much of it makes sense, as key elements of the strategic triad age out and require replacement. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States should maintain a robust triad. However, the long-range stand-off weapon (LRSO), a new nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile, does not make sense.

The U.S. strategic triad consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. This mix gives the Pentagon the ability to hold at risk things that a potential adversary values. The inherent ability to destroy those things provides the basis for deterrence.

ICBMs can hold at risk targets 6,000 miles away. As they are based on mobile ballistic missile submarines, SLBMs can reach targets anywhere on earth. The same is true for weapons carried by the B-2 and B-52 and, in the future, the B-21. With aerial refueling, U.S. strategic bombers have global reach.

So the question arises: What unique target set could the LRSO hold at risk that cannot be threatened by ICBMs, SLBMs, or gravity bombs delivered by stealthy strategic bombers? At a recent panel discussion on the LRSO, the best answer to this question was “certain things”—but the proponent could not articulate what those “things” were. That explains much of the questioning about the LRSO. No one seems able to offer a plausible explanation for what the LRSO could do that other strategic nuclear systems cannot.

The weapon’s justification often seems to boil down to: The Pentagon is replacing other strategic systems because they are old, so it should replace the old nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as well. Does that logic hold?

The Air Force developed nuclear-armed ALCMs in the 1970s because the B-52 presented a big target on radar screens. Concern grew that the B-52 could not penetrate Soviet air defenses. A B-52 armed with ALCMs could launch its missiles from well beyond the reach of those air defenses.

Today, however, the Air Force has the stealthy B-2 bomber. It is in the process of procuring 80 to 100 B-21 bombers, which reportedly will incorporate stealth and advanced electronic warfare capabilities. The Department of Energy is already well along in the program to modernize the B61 nuclear gravity bomb. The modernized bomb will be highly accurate and have a variable yield. B-2 and B-21 bombers that can penetrate advanced air defenses and deliver B61 bombs against targets make the LRSO redundant.

Some suggest the LRSO hedges against a compromise of the B-21’s stealth. If that argument has merit, Congress ought to reexamine the wisdom of spending $60 to $80 billion—or perhaps $100 billion—on the bomber. Converted KC-46s (military refueling variants of the Boeing 767) with LRSOs would offer a far cheaper option. The Pentagon, however, seems to believe the B-21 will be capable of defeating advanced air defenses.

That being so, the case for the LRSO is weak. It will cost taxpayers $20 to $30 billion. True, that is a relatively small cost compared to what the Pentagon will pay to replace the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines or build the B-21. But it is not chump change.

Some LRSO proponents cite the relatively “small” cost to argue that the defense budget can afford it. Current Pentagon officials, however, say they have no idea how to pay for everything they want for strategic modernization. Given the rising cost of mandatory spending such as social security and Medicare, and the pressure to hold down the deficit, the budget problem will not become easier in the 2020s, when the “bow-wave” of strategic modernization spending arrives. The Air Force will likely find itself having to choose between B-21s, KC-46 tankers, F-35 fighters, and the LRSO. It also wants to buy a new ICBM then. It is hard to see how all of that will be affordable.

Funding the LRSO now contributes to a budget time-bomb that the current administration and Congress will leave to their successors. The LRSO seems a redundant weapon without a mission. Shelving the program would defuse part of that time-bomb.

Authors

      
 
 




weapon

Iran’s regional rivals aren’t likely to get nuclear weapons—here’s why

In last summer’s congressional debate over the Iran nuclear deal, one of the more hotly debated issues was whether the deal would decrease or increase the likelihood that countries in the Middle East would pursue nuclear weapons. Bob Einhorn strongly believes the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East

      
 
 




weapon

The weak case for the long-range stand-off weapon

The Pentagon is embarking on a modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces that will cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Much of it makes sense, as key elements of the strategic triad age out and require replacement. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States should maintain a robust triad. However, the long-range stand-off weapon (LRSO), a new nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile, does not make sense.

       
 
 




weapon

Islamic State and weapons of mass destruction: A future nightmare?

      
 
 




weapon

Managing risk: Nuclear weapons in the new geopolitics

Director's summarySince the end of the Cold War, more attention has been given to nuclear non-proliferation issues at large than to traditional issues of deterrence, strategic stability, and arms control. Given the state of current events and the re-emergence of great power competition, we are now starting to see a rebalance, with a renewed focus on questions…

       




weapon

Wing-it Wednesday: My family's simple weapon against food waste

It's become a very tasty ritual.




weapon

Guns to Drums: An Orchestra Made of Old Weapons

The sound of gunshots has been transformed into the sound of music in Mexico's Ciudad Juárez, where artist Pedro Reyes turned 6,700 confiscated weapons into a complete orchestra of fully playable musical instruments.




weapon

Why the caulking gun (and the thermal imager) are the best weapons in the war against energy waste

Take a thermographic tour of my house to see why.




weapon

Kerry Washington Joins The Allstate Foundation to Spotlight Finances As A "Weapon of Choice" Used by Domestic Violence Abusers - Kerry Washington PSA

Kerry Washington PSA




weapon

WHO Adviser on Meat Plants: If We're at War, the Weapons We Need Are Tests and PPE, Not Pork

As President Trump invokes the Defense Production Act to bar local governments from closing meatpacking plants around the United States, we get response from a longtime adviser to the World Health Organization. "When Congress passed that act, it certainly did not have in mind that the president has the power or the right to put workers' lives and health at risk," says Lawrence Gostin, professor of global health law at Georgetown University and director of the World Health Organization Center on National and Global Health Law. Gostin also discusses why he joined 40 leading center directors in a declaration this week that urges Trump and Congress to restore and increase WHO funding.




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Mumbai: BJP man held for selling weapons at Dombivli shop

A large haul of weapons, including 170 guns, swords, machetes and knives, was found at the shop of a local BJP functionary in Dombivli, the police said on Wednesday. Dhananjay Kulkarni, deputy chief of BJP's Dombivli city unit in Thane district, from whose store the seizure was made, has been arrested, police said. The 170 weapons were found during a raid conducted by the Kalyan Crime Branch at Kulkarni's fashion accessories store in Tilak Nagar on Monday night, the police said. The cops added that he was arrested on Tuesday morning.

A local BJP leader said Kulkarni was the vice-president of the party's Dombivli unit. "Following a tip-off, the raid was conducted at Tapasya House of Fashion, which sells fashion accessories and cosmetics," a police officer said. "The weapons for sale included eight air guns, 10 swords, 38 press button knives, 25 choppers, nine kukris, nine guptis (bladed weapon concealed in a wooden case), five knives, three axes and a sickle," he added. "The seized weapons are collectively worth R1.86 lakh. The outlet has been operating for the past seven months," the officer said.

"Kulkarni had procured the arms from Crawford Market, and Punjab and Rajasthan," he added. The accused was on Tuesday produced before a local court, which remanded him in judicial custody, police said. The NCP has demanded an explanation from Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis over the arms seizure. State NCP President Jayant Patil said the incident revealed the manner in which the BJP wanted to rule."What kind of riots do the BJP want to incite by using these weapons?" he said.

170
No. of weapons recovered from the shop

Rs 1.86 lakh
Total worth of the weapons

Also Read: Bal Thackeray plotted to kill Sonu Nigam, says Nilesh Rane; Sena MP rubbishes claim

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Call of Duty: Modern Warfare and Warzone Update Fixes Exploits and Rebalances Weapons

Infinity Ward is rolling out a new update for Call of Duty: Modern Warfare and Warzone.



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weapon

Italy Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Italy decreased to 611 USD Million in 2018 from 802 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Italy averaged 476.13 USD Million from 1950 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 1715 USD Million in 1981 and a record low of 1 USD Million in 1953. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




weapon

Australia Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Australia decreased to 38 USD Million in 2018 from 98 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Australia averaged 50.54 USD Million from 1952 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 158 USD Million in 1990 and a record low of 2 USD Million in 1961. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




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New Zealand Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in New Zealand increased to 6 USD Million in 2018 from 4 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in New Zealand averaged 8.05 USD Million from 1967 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 75 USD Million in 2012 and a record low of 1 USD Million in 1968. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




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South Africa Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in South Africa increased to 149 USD Million in 2018 from 103 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in South Africa averaged 51.06 USD Million from 1959 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 235 USD Million in 2010 and a record low of 1 USD Million in 1973. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




weapon

Canada Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Canada increased to 84 USD Million in 2018 from 64 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Canada averaged 184.13 USD Million from 1950 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 473 USD Million in 1958 and a record low of 38 USD Million in 1950. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




weapon

Brazil Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Brazil increased to 111 USD Million in 2018 from 47 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Brazil averaged 80.34 USD Million from 1960 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 267 USD Million in 1984 and a record low of 1 USD Million in 2005. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




weapon

China Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in China decreased to 1040 USD Million in 2018 from 1227 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in China averaged 849.91 USD Million from 1954 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 2605 USD Million in 1987 and a record low of 3 USD Million in 1954. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




weapon

India Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in India decreased to 46 USD Million in 2018 from 56 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in India averaged 13.85 USD Million from 1959 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 56 USD Million in 2017 and a record low of 0 USD Million in 1987. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




weapon

Indonesia Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Indonesia decreased to 15 USD Million in 2018 from 94 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Indonesia averaged 21.90 USD Million from 1963 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 94 USD Million in 2017 and a record low of 1 USD Million in 2008. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




weapon

Israel Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Israel decreased to 707 USD Million in 2018 from 1254 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Israel averaged 295.85 USD Million from 1954 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 1441 USD Million in 2016 and a record low of 4 USD Million in 1957. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




weapon

South Korea Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in South Korea increased to 1083 USD Million in 2018 from 751 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in South Korea averaged 172.56 USD Million from 1972 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 1083 USD Million in 2018 and a record low of 7 USD Million in 1994. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




weapon

United Kingdom Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in the United Kingdom decreased to 741 USD Million in 2018 from 1235 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in the United Kingdom averaged 2049.07 USD Million from 1950 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 5966 USD Million in 1956 and a record low of 741 USD Million in 2018. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




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France Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in France decreased to 1768 USD Million in 2018 from 2302 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in France averaged 1776.16 USD Million from 1950 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 4021 USD Million in 1985 and a record low of 8 USD Million in 1950. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




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Germany Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Germany decreased to 1277 USD Million in 2018 from 1980 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Germany averaged 1314.27 USD Million from 1953 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 3311 USD Million in 2007 and a record low of 12 USD Million in 1961. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




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Switzerland Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Switzerland increased to 243 USD Million in 2018 from 184 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Switzerland averaged 284.78 USD Million from 1959 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 530 USD Million in 1962 and a record low of 18 USD Million in 1970. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




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Sweden Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Sweden increased to 134 USD Million in 2018 from 84 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Sweden averaged 218.13 USD Million from 1950 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 898 USD Million in 2001 and a record low of 13 USD Million in 1963. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.




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Turkey Weapons Sales

Weapons Sales in Turkey increased to 364 USD Million in 2018 from 245 USD Million in 2017. Weapons Sales in Turkey averaged 96.52 USD Million from 1980 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 364 USD Million in 2018 and a record low of 3 USD Million in 1995. Weapons Sales are presented as a Trend-Indicator Value based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons such as aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and others. The indicator aims to represent the transfer value of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.