The view from the Gulf

Neil Quilliam

There has been no coordinated response among states of the GCC, but the messages have been universal, and surprisingly each one has welcomed US efforts to restart peace talks and praised this particular US administration for doing so. But in each case, the same set of issues and concerns has been highlighted, namely the status of Jerusalem, the situation of refugees and ultimately a simple absence of a revival contiguous Palestinian state.

While much has been made of younger Gulf generation’s apparent disconnect from the emotive issues around Palestinian statehood, the state of Jerusalem and the larger refugee issue, older leaders in the Gulf continue to pay them heed. And despite a desire to coordinate with Israel on matters of security, intelligence sharing and tech, they will not advance the relationship under the terms of the so-called ‘deal of the century’.

Put simply, the deal forces Palestinians to concede ground on all matters of importance. And should the Arab Gulf states sign up to it, they will be judged harshly by history for not only selling out Palestine for $50 billion, but also footing the bill. As such, they all feel compelled to hedge and pay salutary lip-service to US efforts but know quietly they will die on the vine and that the Arab Peace Initiative is the only viable framework for advancing talks.

Even younger leaders know that the greater risk will come from signing up to the deal rather than twitter wrath of the US president.

Kuwaiti Parliament Speaker Marzouq Al-Ghanim threw a copy in the bin, emphasizing that it ‘was born dead’ and ‘should be thrown in the dustbin of history’.

While the Saudi official position towards the deal was one of qualified support, the Saudi press reported that King Salman had spoken with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who has rejected the plan, to ‘stress to him the Kingdom's steadfast position vis-à-vis the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people’. The king reportedly added: ‘The Kingdom stands alongside the Palestinian people and supports its choices and what[ever] will actualize its hopes and aspirations.’

Turki Al-Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief, described the deal’s idea of a Palestinian state as ‘a brutal conception’ and the deal itself as a ‘modern-day Frankenstein’. ‘For Palestine, it is definitely a step back,’ Al-Faisal said. ‘[The Trump administration has] given up the legitimate history and weight of the United Nations Security Council resolutions and adopted a unilateral path.’

The view from Europe

Reni Zhelyazkova

The initial EU response to President Trump’s ‘Peace to Prosperity’ plan was one of caution. An official statement soon after the announcement declared that the proposal needs to be studied and assessed but only a few days later the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, condemned the plan for being out of line with internationally agreed parameters.

Some member states like Luxembourg have expressed support for the foreign policy chief’s position. Ireland, historically a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause, and Sweden, the only country to recognize the Palestinian state after becoming an EU member, have responded negatively to the US proposal, expressing concern over mentions of Israeli annexation of Palestinian land and stating that it falls short from previous international agreements.

Other EU countries, however, have been much more guarded in their reactions. Responses from Germany and France have so far been lukewarm – on the one hand, welcoming US attempts at re-igniting peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians, and, on the other, warning that any future negotiations and agreements must be carried out in accordance with internationally established parameters and legal frameworks.

A strong voice of support for Trump’s proposal was that of Hungary, whose minister of foreign affairs and trade, Péter Szijjártó, commended White House adviser Jared Kushner on the plan during a meeting in Washington last week. Other EU countries are yet to respond publicly to the proposal but unity among all EU countries is far from certain.

The EU’s official position is that a two-state solution based on pre-1967 borders and in line with previous agreements and UN resolutions is the only viable option for lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

However, Israeli foreign policy under Netanyahu has focused on strengthening bilateral relations with countries in eastern and central Europe. Cooperation with Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and most recently Slovakia and Hungary has improved in all areas – from security and trade to tourism and cultural exchanges.

Five of these countries, namely, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria recognized the State of Palestine prior to joining the EU, but the rise of populist nationalism, concerns over migration and terrorism, and improving relations with the Trump administration in the US have contributed to an alignment in views between Israel and the right-leaning governments in southern and eastern Europe, as well as those in Italy and Austria.

Improved bilateral relations have translated into political acts of good will towards Israel with a number of EU countries expressing support for Israel in the United Nations and other international forums. Austria, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic defied official EU position and attended the US embassy opening in Jerusalem in May 2018.

In this sense, Israel’s strategy in eastern and central Europe can be seen as a deliberate effort to break up consensus within the EU, and, ideally, reverse the bloc’s position towards the Middle East conflict, but also towards Iran. 

At a time when the EU is managing Brexit, a complex internal agenda, including arguments over the EU budget, and with its relationship with the US strained over Iran, trade and other issues, it is unlikely that the bloc will contribute significant efforts to the Middle East Peace Process. It is even more difficult to see the EU coming up with its own proposal and even less likely that all member states will be able to agree on such an initiative given internal divisions. 

Under the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the European Joint Strategy in Support of Palestine for the period 2017-20 has focused on supporting the Palestinian Authority (PA) with institutional reform, economic development and service delivery. Progress, however, has been limited as the success of programming is dependent on Israeli policy towards the West Bank and Gaza. This has hardened under Netanyahu, who enjoys the full support of the current US administration and sees the EU as biased towards the Palestinians. 

Any plan that replaces the 2017-20 joint strategy will most likely be a continuation of the current approach which focuses on conflict management and supporting the already crumbling two-state solution by keeping the PA alive. 

Some room for cautious hope remains, as much depends on the outcome of the Israeli election on 2 March and the US presidential election in November. Changes in leadership could open up space for EU to actively support the reinvigoration of peace talks and regain its relevance as a mediator in the Middle East Peace Process.

The British vote to leave the EU is (and should be) seen as a wakeup call for political elites on both sides of the Atlantic. Under normal circumstances, the institutional support that crossed party lines for the Remain campaign should have ensured it a comfortable victory; instead, it lost by a not-insignificant 52−48 per cent margin. Similarly, Donald Trump has alienated the establishment of both American parties – while Democratic dislike is predictable, the extent of the Republican elite’s discomfort with Trump, clearly on display at the party’s convention in Cleveland this week, is extremely unusual at this point in an election campaign which is more typically a display of ‘rally around the candidate’. But as Brexit demonstrated, the conventional logic may not apply in 2016.

There are significant differences between the UK referendum and the US elections. Some of this is structural – a national referendum operates along very different lines than a US presidential election, after all, and the US electorate is much larger and more diverse than its British equivalent. Furthermore, American voters will be making a choice between individuals as well as ideas. This does not necessarily work to the advantage of either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton (both of whom have the highest unfavourability ratings for presidential candidates seen in decades), but highly individualized questions of personality and temperament will impact voter behaviour in a way that they did not for British referendum voters. Finally, who wins the US election will depend in very large part on state politics and electoral college math – as the 2000 election showed, the candidate who wins the popular vote does not necessarily end up as president.

But there is a far more important message that politicians in the US, UK and, more broadly, Europe, should take away from the Brexit result. Regardless of what happens in the US elections, elites no longer necessarily hold the preponderance of power. The disenfranchised who have historically either not had the mass or the coherence to communicate it now do - at least on occasion.

This is not an ideological split – Brexit voters came together from all parts of the political spectrum. Equally, in the US, Sanders and Trump voters are bucking the system in both the Democratic and Republican parties.

There is a significant backlash under way in both countries towards aspects of globalization, going beyond the traditional right/left divide. Allowing for some differences in specifics, the American and British political establishments have, over the past few decades, broadly eased restrictions on the free movement of capital, goods and people across national borders. There have been notable benefits associated with this approach that have mostly been distributed inclusively, but the costs have typically hit those already less advantaged and without opportunities or skills to mitigate them. Those who have been left out or left behind from these changes are discovering their own political power.

Politicians are going to have to find ways not just to appeal to these voters who feel disenfranchised by existing structures, but also address their legitimate concerns. There will of course be partisan policy solutions put forward on both sides. But inevitably the political leadership is going to have to find ways to bridge party lines to realize solutions to those social and economic inequalities. Ignoring them, as many have in the past, is increasingly a quick path to losing power.

Unless the world wants to turn back to more isolationist and protectionist times, with the slower growth and inequalities that this includes, politicians are also going to have to do a better job of explaining the benefits of globalization. And, more importantly, they will have to ensure that these benefits reach their broader population more equitably and that the costs are better mitigated. 

So the Brexit vote does not necessarily presage a Trump victory on 8 November, but it shows in stark terms that the world has fundamentally changed – the time when elites alone could call the shots is gone. Politicians, including Hillary Clinton, will need to respond proactively to the causes of the dissatisfaction rather than waiting until the next time they need the public vote.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

With Donald Trump in the White House, US trade policy will probably look very different from the past 70 years - seven decades across which successive Republican and Democratic administrations have participated in and led global trade liberalization initiatives. If the president-elect delivers on his major campaign promises on trade, the negative effects on the American economy would be severe and the United States would give up its role in shaping the global trading system.

But there is no need to panic. Trump will likely leave behind the rhetoric of the campaign trail once he sits in the Oval Office. Trump will probably moderate his proposals, because a faction of the Republican-dominated Congress continues to support free trade. He might also be reined in by his team, though that depends on who best catches the ear of the president: individuals such as Vice-President-elect Mike Pence, who has supported free-trade agreements in the past, or trade-skeptical advisors such as Dan DiMicco, who now heads the transition team for the Office of the United States Trade Representative. 

So what does the Trump presidency actually mean for trade?

Trump won’t likely follow through on his most extreme plans, such as leaving the World Trade Organization. But he will lead a more protectionist United States that focuses on its trade deficits – with particular attention being paid to China and Mexico. Trump will probably impose tariffs on imports from those countries; however, duties will be lower than the mooted 45 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively. With regards to China, Trump will probably bring trade cases against Beijing’s subsidy arrangements and look into alleged currency manipulation (even though most economists accept that the renminbi is no longer undervalued).

Given the prominence of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the campaign trail, Trump will have to address the deal with Canada and Mexico. Whether that means renegotiating or pulling out remains to be seen. One thing is certain: Trump will not move forward with mega-regional trade accords such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Those would-be pacts are a lost opportunity, but this is not the end of the trade world. Trump will focus instead on striking trade deals with individual countries. One such potential bilateral trade deal could be a US–UK agreement, which Trump and his advisers, despite the prognostications of the current president, see at the front of the queue.  

Opportunity to rethink the trade framework

The fact that Trump is not necessarily against free trade per se bears hope. And there is another silver lining in the dark cloud hanging over trade. Trump has pointed to some valid concerns about the current trading system. His victory can be an opportunity to address these shortcomings. 

NAFTA does need an update. The agreement entered into force in 1994 - before the internet took off. Thus, provisions to include standards to protect digital freedoms could modernize NAFTA and expand its scope to cover 21st century economic issues. In addition, labour rights and environmental protections were not included in NAFTA but were incorporated into side agreements with weak, unenforceable provisions. By better addressing labour and environmental issues, NAFTA could be significantly upgraded.

Trump will aim to tackle unfair competition and look to enforce existing trade deals more vigilantly. This is another important and legitimate issue, and could be tackled in conjunction with European allies. The European Commission has recently proposed redesigning and updating its trade defence instruments because non-market economy practices and state intervention by some WTO countries - for example, China’s overcapacity in the steel sector - have hurt domestic industries. Without action by major players such as the United States or the European Union, China would have no incentive to reform its distortionary policies. Trust in the rules-based trading system requires that existing trade agreements are properly and fairly enforced.

Trump’s win highlights the need for better compensation for those who have felt the adverse effects of trade. His victory was partly fuelled by tapping into economic anxieties and appealing to voters who feel left behind by globalization. Better mechanisms to cushion the blows to the losers of globalization are indeed required. In the United States, Trade Adjustment Assistance has been insufficiently funded and is ineffective. More needs to be done to replace the wages of workers whose jobs have been lost due to trade and to provide them with skills training for re-employment. This reconsideration of assistance for those who are hurt by free trade could provide a foundation for the future. Once the current wave of anti-trade sentiment subsides, new trade agreements can be struck that don’t leave so many citizens feeling left behind. 

Instead of worrying about how Trump might blow up the underpinnings of the global trading system, this is an opportunity to rethink what a new trade framework might look like.

This piece was published in collaboration with Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Events over the past 18 months, in particular with the UK’s decision to leave the European Union and the election of Donald Trump, have elevated concerns among many Europeans and Americans over the health of the transatlantic relationship. With the EU looking inward and President Trump’s rejection of a number of historically common US-European interests, such as NATO, the JCPOA on Iran, and the Paris Agreement, the continuation of close transatlantic collaboration is in question.

Xenia Wickett will discuss the future of the transatlantic relationship. Is there a clear structural divergence between the US and the UK or is the partnership merely going through a temporary hiccup? She will explore the importance of recent events as well as structural, long-term factors that affect the US and Europe similarly. And what actions, if any, can be taken to mitigate differences and best manage the current situation of uncertainty?

Please note, this event is online only. Members will be able to watch the webinar from a computer or other internet-ready device and do not need to come to Chatham House to attend.

As tensions escalate in the Middle East, US President Donald Trump has threatened to strike targets in Iran should they seek to retaliate over the killing of Qassem Soleimani. According to the president’s tweet, these sites includes those that are ‘important to Iran and Iranian culture’.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper was quick on Monday to rule out any such action and acknowledged that the US would ‘follow the laws of armed conflict’. But Trump has not since commented further on the matter.

Any move to target Iranian cultural heritage could constitute a breach of the international laws protecting cultural property. Attacks on cultural sites are deemed unlawful under two United Nations conventions; the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property during Armed Conflict, and the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.

These have established deliberate attacks on cultural heritage (when not militarily necessary) as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in recognition of the irreparable damage that the loss of cultural heritage can have locally, regionally and globally.

These conventions were established in the aftermath of the Second World War, in reaction to the legacy of the massive destruction of cultural property that took place, including the intense bombing of cities, and systematic plunder of artworks across Europe. The conventions recognize that damage to the cultural property of any people means ‘damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind’. The intention of these is to establish a new norm whereby protecting culture and history – that includes cultural and historical property – is as important as safeguarding people.

Such historical sites are important not simply as a matter of buildings and statues, but rather for their symbolic significance in a people’s history and identity. Destroying cultural artefacts is a direct attack on the identity of the population that values them, erasing their memories and historical legacy. Following the heavy bombing of Dresden during the Second World War, one resident summed up the psychological impact of such destruction in observing that ‘you expect people to die, but you don’t expect the buildings to die’.

Targeting sites of cultural significance isn’t just an act of intimidation during conflict. It can also have a lasting effect far beyond the cessation of violence, hampering post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction, where ruins or the absence of previously significant cultural monuments act as a lasting physical reminder of hostilities.

For example, during the Bosnian War in the 1990s, the Old Bridge in Mostar represented a symbol of centuries of shared cultural heritage and peaceful co-existence between the Serbian and Croat communities. The bridge’s destruction in 1993 at the height of the civil war and the temporary cable bridge which took its place acted as a lasting reminder of the bitter hostilities, prompting its reconstruction a decade later as a mark of the reunification of the ethnically divided town.

More recently, the destruction of cultural property has been a feature of terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban’s demolition of the 1,700-year-old Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001, eliciting international condemnation. Similarly, in Iraq in 2014 following ISIS’s seizure of the city of Mosul, the terrorist group set about systematically destroying a number of cultural sites, including the Great Mosque of al-Nuri with its leaning minaret, which had stood since 1172. And in Syria, the ancient city of Palmyra was destroyed by ISIS in 2015, who attacked its archaeological sites with bulldozers and explosives.

Such violations go beyond destruction: they include the looting of archaeological sites and trafficking of cultural objects, which are used to finance terrorist activities, which are also prohibited under the 1954 Hague Convention.

As a war crime, the destruction of cultural property has been successfully prosecuted in the International Criminal Court, which sentenced Ahmad Al-Faqi Al-Mahdi to nine years in jail in 2016 for his part in the destruction of the Timbuktu mausoleums in Mali. Mahdi led members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to destroy mausoleums and monuments of cultural and religious importance in Timbuktu, irreversibly erasing what the chief prosecutor described as ‘the embodiment of Malian history captured in tangible form from an era long gone’.

Targeting cultural property is prohibited under customary international humanitarian law, not only by the Hague Convention. But the Convention sets out detailed regulations for protection of such property, and it has taken some states a lot of time to provide for these.

Although the UK was an original signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention, it did not ratify it until 2017, introducing into law the Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017, and setting up the Cultural Protection Fund to safeguard heritage of international importance threatened by conflict in countries across the Middle East and North Africa.

Ostensibly, the UK’s delay in ratifying the convention lay in concerns over the definition of key terms and adequate criminal sanctions, which were addressed in the Second Protocol in 1999. However, changing social attitudes towards the plunder of antiquities, and an alarming increase in the use of cultural destruction as a weapon of war by extremist groups to eliminate cultures that do not align with their own ideology, eventually compelled the UK to act.

In the US, it is notoriously difficult to get the necessary majority for the approval of any treaty in the Senate; for the Hague Convention, approval was achieved in 2008, following which the US ratified the Convention in 2009.

Destroying the buildings and monuments which form the common heritage of humanity is to wipe out the physical record of who we are. People are people within a place, and they draw meaning about who they are from their surroundings. Religious buildings, historical sites, works of art, monuments and historic artefacts all tell the story of who we are and how we got here. We have a responsibility to protect them.

The vote to impeach Donald Trump holds almost no surprises - on both the abuse of power and obstruction of congress articles, the votes were split entirely on party lines with nearly all the majority-led House Democrats but not a single Republican voting to impeach Trump.

However, this ‘pre-ordained’ outcome of the House impeachment inquiry does serve to highlight that the US is in the midst of a hyper-partisan political moment. Policy gridlock has led to two government shutdowns during Donald Trump’s presidency, with one further budgetary fight narrowly avoided.

With a few notable exceptions (such as USMCA), policy areas that lend themselves to bipartisanship - including infrastructure and drug pricing - have seen very little progress under divided congressional chambers. Party identification can now be overlaid with the cable news channel one watches or the newspaper one reads.

Impeachment now moves to the Senate for a trial, requiring a two-thirds majority of the Republican-led senate (or 67 senators) for a conviction. Given the congressional partisanship we are seeing, the baseline scenario continues to be that the senate will not vote to convict Trump and remove him from office - despite much being made of how many senators are likely to vote for a Senate conviction.

Why public opinion could be crucial

There is another story to keep a close eye on. The number to track is 47.2 – the current polling average of public support for Trump’s impeachment. Polling averages from the end of September 2019 (before the hearings began, but after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced a formal inquiry) had 49.4% supporting impeachment versus 47.2% this week.

Here’s why this number matters. If those pushing for impeachment and removal are unable to drive popular support across a critical threshold level, then those against impeachment and removal are not going to abandon the president and vote for a senate conviction. With Trump consistently polling in the low 40s on job approval, but in the high 80s/low 90s within the Republican party, this means Republican congress members concerned about re-election are extremely hesitant to distance themselves from him without a clear mandate from the domestic public. 

A tale of the two most recent presidents to face impeachment underscores this point. Gallup polling claimed 58% of adults supported impeaching and removing President Richard Nixon from office in August 1974, whereas only 35% of the public supported impeaching President Bill Clinton in December 1998, the month he was impeached.

Given the respective outcomes of those two impeachments, it suggests public support for impeachment and removal needs to increase well beyond the current 47.2%, to avoid the foregone conclusion of acquittal in the Senate (even if there are signs of the tide moving in the opposite direction with those against impeachment overtaking support for the first time in December).   

What does this mean for Democrats?

In the short term, if the Democrats want to make inroads into the hearts and minds of those across the partisan gulf, it will be critical to secure senate testimony from those in Trump’s inner circle at the time of the Ukrainian affair.

After Trump ordered individuals with first-hand knowledge of the administration’s efforts vis-à-vis Ukraine not to testify, House investigators were unable to call many witnesses with direct evidence (which in fact left the House testimony exposed to Republican claims of hearsay). With Trump impeached, more of the public is likely to tune in to the senate proceedings, and direct evidence by inner circle administration officials required to testify presents an opportunity to move public opinion.

House speaker Nancy Pelosi recognizes how crucial the procedures and participants for the senate trial will be, and has said she could delay sending the articles of impeachment to the senate as leverage for a 'fair trial'.

Democrats also have to consider how an impeachment inquiry that - at least from this vantage point - does not end in a conviction of the president plays out for the 2020 election campaign, especially if this also likely means that public opinion - and certainly Republican-party views - of Trump have not shifted.

There has been a renaissance in the study of how the backgrounds of individual leaders affect foreign policy outcomes. Donald Trump's presidency highlights the limits of this approach. Trump's psychology is so unique, and so akin to that of a small child, that studying his background alone is insufficient to explain his decision-making. The evidence for this characterization of Trump's leadership comes not from his political opponents, but his allies, staffers and subordinates. Trump's lack of impulse control, short attention span and frequent temper tantrums have all undercut his effectiveness as president as compared to his predecessors. Nonetheless, the 45th president helps to clarify ongoing debates in American politics about the relative strength of the presidency as an institution. In particular, the powers of the presidency have become so enhanced that even comparatively weak and inexperienced leaders can execute dramatic policy shifts. The formal checks on presidential power, from the legislative, judicial and executive branches have all eroded. Similarly, the informal checks on the presidency had also degraded before Trump's inauguration. This article uses Trump's presidency—and his severe limitations as a decision-maker—to highlight the ways in which even a weak leader can affect change by holding a powerful office.