The first instance of “cloud” computing came in 2006, when Amazon released its Elastic Compute Cloud, a service for consumers to lease space on virtual machines to run software. Now, the cloud enables the transfer and storage of data around the world, in an almost seamless fashion. Using cloud services are a seamless experience from the consumer perspective. This ease of use obscures significant regulation from governments on both sides of the Atlantic. The Safe Harbor Principles is a framework that ensures that personal consumer data being transferred from the EU to the US is still subject to a level of security in compliance with the EU’s stricter regulation on data protection. US companies must be certified within this framework, in order to transfer consumer data outside the EU.

A comprehensive data privacy arrangement that satisfies both sides of the Atlantic is necessary to preserve the free flow of data, and the resulting commerce, between the two regions. Speaking at the 2014 Cloud Computing Policy Conference, Cameron F. Kerry suggested that neither side of the Atlantic can afford to partition the Internet. Currently trade negotiators are assessing the viability including an update to Safe Harbor Principles as a part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

TTIP and the Future of Trade

The NSA revelations last year have only increased support for further regulation over the transfer of personal data in the cloud, especially in the European Union (EU). The revelations have also brought to light significant differences in the European and US conceptions of privacy. The ruling by the European Court of Justice on the “right to be forgotten” is a recent example of this transatlantic divide. In EU countries, citizens can now request Google to take down links from search results that lead users to potentially damaging information.

There are several disputes that negotiators must first resolve. Europeans would prefer that American regulators take a more active role in cases where US firms are violating the Safe Harbor principles. EU officials have also indicated they would like to include a mechanism to send an alert if data were improperly shared with US law enforcement officials. The expansion of the codes of conduct within the cloud would serve as a major step towards finalizing TTIP. A European Commission Analysis finds that TTIP would inject about $130 billion into the US economy. Ultimately both the EU and the US have so much to gain that both nations must find a way to resolve these thorny issues.

 

Kevin Risser contributed to this post.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

This policy brief explores the economic rationale and strategic imperative of an ambitious domestic and global trade agenda from the perspective of the United States. International trade is often viewed through the relatively narrow prism of trade-offs that might be made among domestic sectors or between trading partners, but it is important to consider also the impact that increased trade has on global growth, development and security. With that context in mind, this paper assesses the implications of the Asia-Pacific and European trade negotiations underway, including for countries that are not participating but aspire to join. It outlines some of the challenges that stand in the way of completion and ways in which they can be addressed. It examines whether the focus on "mega-regional" trade agreementscomes at the expense of broader liberalization or acts as a catalyst to develop higher standards than might otherwise be possible. It concludes with policy recommendations for action by governments, legislators and stakeholders to address concerns that have been raised and create greater domestic support.

It is fair to ask whether we should be concerned about the future of international trade policy when dire developments are threatening the security interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe. In the Middle East, significant areas of Iraq have been overrun by a toxic offshoot of Al-Qaeda, civil war in Syria rages with no end in sight, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in tatters. Nuclear negotiations with Iran have run into trouble, while Libya and Egypt face continuing instability and domestic challenges. In Asia, historic rivalries and disputes over territory have heightened tensions across the region, most acutely by China’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea towards Vietnam, Japan and the Philippines. Nuclear-armed North Korea remains isolated, reckless and unpredictable. In Africa, countries are struggling with rising terrorism, violence and corruption. In Europe, Russia continues to foment instability and destruction in eastern Ukraine. And within the European Union, lagging economic recovery and the surge in support for extremist parties have left people fearful of increasing violence against immigrants and minority groups and skeptical of further integration.

It is tempting to focus solely on these pressing problems and defer less urgent issues—such as forging new disciplines for international trade—to another day, especially when such issues pose challenges of their own. But that would be a mistake. A key motivation in building greater domestic and international consensus for advancing trade liberalization now is precisely the role that greater economic integration can play in opening up new avenues of opportunity for promoting development and increasing economic prosperity. Such initiatives can help stabilize key regions and strengthen the security of the United States and its partners.

The last century provides a powerful example of how expanding trade relations can help reduce global tensions and raise living standards. Following World War II, building stronger economic cooperation was a centerpiece of allied efforts to erase battle scars and embrace former enemies. In defeat, the economies of Germany, Italy and Japan faced ruin and people were on the verge of starvation. The United States led efforts to rebuild Europe and to repair Japan’s economy. A key element of the Marshall Plan, which established the foundation for unprecedented growth and the level of European integration that exists today, was to revive trade by reducing tariffs. Russia, and the eastern part of Europe that it controlled, refused to participate or receive such assistance. Decades later, as the Cold War ended, the United States and Western Europe sought to make up for lost time by providing significant technical and financial assistance to help integrate central and eastern European countries with the rest of Europe and the global economy.

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Editor's Note, Oct. 12, 2011: Congress has passed a trio of trade agreements negotiated during the George W. Bush administration and recently submitted by President Obama. The authors of this policy brief say the pacts with South Korea, Colombia and Panama will boost U.S. exports significantly, especially in the key automotive, agricultural and commercial services sectors.

Policy Brief #183

A trio of trade agreements now pending before Congress would benefit the United States both economically and strategically. Carefully developed accords with South Korea, Colombia and Panama will boost U.S. exports significantly, especially in the key automotive, agricultural and commercial services sectors.

Among the other benefits are:

• increased U.S. competitiveness
• enhancement of U.S. diplomatic and economic postures in East Asia and Latin America
• new investment opportunities
• better enforcement of labor regulation and
• improved transparency in these trading partners’ regulatory systems.

The pacts are known as Free Trade Agreements, or FTAs. The Korean agreement (KORUS) was negotiated in 2006-2007 and revised in 2010. The Colombian agreement (COL-US, sometimes known as COL-US FTA) was signed in 2006. The agreement with Panama (PFTA, sometimes known as the Panama Trade Promotion Agreement) was signed in 2007. All have the support of the Obama administration.

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	The three FTAs will substantially reduce these trading partners’ tariffs on U.S. goods, opening large markets for U.S. commerce and professional services. In combination, they will increase the size of the U.S. economy by about $15 billion. Furthermore, they will help reverse a slide in U.S. market influence in two important and increasingly affluent regions of the globe. Approval of all three agreements is in the national interest. To move forward, both Congress and the administration should take these appropriate steps: Congress should approve the trade agreements with Korea (KORUS), Colombia (COL-US) and Panama (PFTA) without additional delays.   To maximize the trade and investment benefits of KORUS, the administration should actively engage in the KORUS working groups, such as the Professional Services Working Group.   Similarly, the U.S. Trade Representative should participate in the Joint Committee’s scheduled annual meetings, in order to maintain a highlevel focus on U.S.-Korea trade, drive further trade liberalization and enable the committee to serve as a forum for broader discussions on trade in East Asia.   The Colombia-U.S. Joint Committee should include representatives of Colombia’s Trade and Labor Ministers with their US counterparts. The presence of the Labor minister should facilitate progress under the FTA through strengthened labor standards and timely implementation of all elements of the agreed-upon action plan. This Committee and specialized working groups could increase the pace of bilateral interaction and help officials identify important areas for discussion, negotiation and agreement.   Panama has ratified the Tax Information and Exchange Agreement which entered into force on April 2011. Panama and the US should strengthen bilateral communication so that collaboration in the battle against money laundering is pushed even further with greater cooperation.

Economic Effects of the Korea Agreement

The economic benefits to the United States from KORUS are especially significant, as the agreement will provide preferential market access to the world’s 11th largest—and a fast-growing—economy. In 2010, U.S.-Korea trade was worth $88 billion, comprising U.S. exports of $39 billion and imports of $49 billion, making Korea the United States’ seventh largest trading partner. According to the independent, quasi-judicial U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), exports resulting from KORUS will increase the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) by up to $12 billion. This constitutes a remarkable gain in both real and percentage terms.

To the United States, KORUS offers diverse economic advantages. Most strikingly, KORUS will open Korea’s service market to U.S. exports, allowing the United States to exploit its competitive advantages in financial services, education and information and communications technologies. The agreement also will lead to increased imports from Korea, which in turn will help the United States achieve greater economic specialization. The likely effects of more specialization—and of increased Korean investment in the United States—include greater U.S. efficiency, productivity, economic growth and job growth. Meanwhile, U.S. investors will gain new opportunities in the increasingly active Asia-Pacific region.

Lately, passage of KORUS has assumed enhanced importance with the impasse in the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round. No longer can the United States reasonably anticipate that Doha will lead to improved access to the Korean market. Moreover, an FTA between Korea and the European Union (EU) that took effect July 1st confers preferential access to European exporters, undermining the competitiveness of U.S. businesses in Korea. Even before the European FTA, the United States had been losing valuable ground in Korea. Between 2000 and 2010, the United States fell from first to third in the ranking of Korea’s trading partners (reversing positions with China), as U.S. products declined from 18 to only 9 percent of Korean imports. Failure to approve the agreement can be expected to lead to a further decline. These moves will strongly assist U.S. producers of electronic equipment, metals, agricultural products, autos and other consumer goods. For example, agricultural exports are expected to rise $1.8 billion per year.

On the services front, KORUS will increase U.S. businesses’ access to Korea’s $560 billion services market. Financial services providers, the insurance industry and transportation firms stand to benefit substantially. KORUS usefully builds on the link between investment and services by improving the ability of U.S. law firms to establish offices in Korea. In addition, the agreement establishes a Professional Services Working Group that will address the interests of U.S. providers of legal, accounting and engineering services, provided that U.S. representatives engage actively in the group. KORUS also requires that regulations affecting services be developed transparently and that the business community be informed of their development and have an opportunity to provide comments, which the Korean government must answer.

On the investment front, KORUS affords a chance to strengthen a bilateral investment relationship that probably is underdeveloped. In 2009, the U.S. foreign direct investment flow to Korea was $3.4 billion, while there was a net outflow of Korean foreign direct investment to the United States of $255 million. KORUS supports market access for U.S. investors with investment protection provisions, strong intellectual property protection, dispute settlement provisions, a requirement for transparently developed and implemented investment regulations and a similar requirement for open, fair and impartial judicial proceedings. All this should markedly improve the Korean investment climate for U.S. business. It will strengthen the rule of law, reducing uncertainty and the risk of investing in Korea.

On the governance side, KORUS establishes various committees to monitor implementation of the agreement. The most significant of these is the Joint Committee that is to meet annually at the level of the U.S. Trade Representative and Korea’s Trade Minister to discuss not only implementation but also ways to expand trade further. KORUS establishes committees to oversee the goods and financial services commitments, among others, and working groups that will seek to increase cooperation between U.S. and Korean agencies responsible for regulating the automotive sector and professional services. These committees and working groups, enriched through regular interaction between U.S. and Korean trade officials, should increase levels of trust and understanding of each county’s regulatory systems and help officials identify opportunities to deepen the bilateral economic relationship.

Strategic Effects of the Korea Agreement

Congressional passage of KORUS will send an important signal to all countries in the Asia-Pacific region that the United States intends to remain economically engaged with them, rather than retreat behind a wall of trade barriers, and is prepared to lead development of the rules and norms governing trade and investment in the region. KORUS will provide an important economic complement to the strong, historically rooted U.S. military alliance with Korea. It also will signal a renewed commitment by the United States in shaping Asia’s economic architecture.

The last decade has seen declining U.S. economic significance in Asia. Just as the United States has slipped from first to third in its ranking as a trading partner of Korea, similar drops are occurring with respect to Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and other Asia-Pacific economic powers. In all of Northeast and Southeast Asia, the United States has only one FTA in effect, an accord with the Republic of Singapore. Passage of KORUS now would be particularly timely, both as a sign of U.S. engagement with Asia and as a mechanism for ensuring robust growth in U.S.-Asia trade and investment.

To illustrate how KORUS might affect U.S. interests throughout the region, consider regulatory transparency. The KORUS transparency requirements could serve as a model for how countries can set and implement standards. They might for example, influence the unfolding Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, talks that could set the stage for a broader Asia-Pacific FTA. U.S. producers, investors and providers of commercial and professional services could only benefit from a regional trend toward greater transparency and the lifting of barriers that would ensue. Other KORUS provisions favorable to the United States could function as similar benchmarks in the development of U.S. relations with Asia-Pacific nations and organizations.

Effects of the Colombia Agreement

COL-US will also strengthen relations with a key regional ally and open a foreign market to a variety of U.S. products. Bilateral trade between Colombia and the United States was worth almost $28 billion in 2010. COL-US is expected to expand U.S. GDP by approximately $2.5 billion, which includes an increase in U.S. exports of $1.1 billion and an increase of imports from Colombia of $487 million.

COL-US offers four major advantages:

• It redresses the current imbalance in tariffs. Ninety percent of goods from Colombia now enter the United States duty-free (under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act). COL-US will eliminate 77 percent of Colombia’s tariffs immediately and the remainder over the following 10 years.
   
• It guarantees a more stable legal framework for doing business in Colombia. This should lead to bilateral investment growth, trade stimulation and job creation.
   
• It supports U.S. goals of helping Colombia reduce cocaine production by creating alternative economic opportunities for farmers.
   
• It addresses the loss of U.S. competitiveness in Colombia, in the wake of Colombian FTAs with Canada and the EU as well as Latin American sub-regional FTAs.

With respect to trade in goods, U.S. chemical, rubber and plastics producers will be key beneficiaries of COL-US, with an expected annual increase in exports in this combined sector of 23 percent, to $1.9 billion, relative to a 2007 baseline according to the ITC. The motor vehicles and parts sector is expected to see an increase of more than 40 percent. In the agriculture sector, rice exports are expected to increase from a 2007 baseline of $2 million to approximately $14 million (the corresponding increases would be 20 percent for cereal grains and 11 percent for wheat).

These and other gains will result from the gradual elimination of tariffs and from provisions that reduce non-tariff barriers as well. Among the latter, the most important changes would be increased transparency and efficiency in Colombia’s customs procedures and the removal of some sanitary and phytosanitary (or plant quarantine) restrictions. With respect to trade in services, Colombia has agreed to a number of so-called "WTO-plus" commitments that will expand U.S. firms’ access to Colombia’s $166 billion services market. For instance, the current requirement that U.S. firms hire Colombian nationals will be eliminated, and many restrictions on the financial sector will be removed.

On the investment front, the potential advantages to the United States also are substantial. In 2009, the U.S. flow of foreign direct investment into Colombia was $1.2 billion, which amounted to 32 percent of that nation’s total inflows. COL-US improves the investment climate in Colombia by providing investor protections, access to international arbitration and improved transparency in the country’s legislative and regulatory processes. These provisions will reduce investment risk and uncertainty.

COL-US presents significant improvements in the transparency of Colombia’s rule-making process, including opportunities for interested parties to have their views heard. COL-US also requires that Colombia’s judicial system conform with the rule of law for enforcing bilateral commitments, such as those relating to the protection of intellectual property. In addition to access to international arbitration for investors, COL-US includes dispute settlement mechanisms that the two governments can invoke to enforce each other’s commitments. Taken as a whole, these provisions offer an important benchmark for further developments in Colombia’s business environment. The transparency requirement alone could reduce corruption dramatically.

Labor rights have been a stumbling block to congressional approval of COL-US. The labor chapter of the agreement guarantees the enforcement of existing labor regulations, the protection of core internationally recognized labor rights, and clear access to labor tribunals or courts. In addition, in April 2011, Colombia agreed to an Action Plan strengthening labor rights and the protection of those who defend them. In the few months the plan has been in effect, Colombia has made important progress in implementation. It has reestablished a separate and fully equipped Labor Ministry to help protect labor rights and monitor employer-worker relations. It has enacted legislation authorizing criminal prosecutions of employers who undermine the right to organize or bargain collectively. It has partly eliminated a protection program backlog, involving risk assessments. And, it has hired more labor inspectors and judicial police investigators.

Besides economic benefits, COL-US offers sizable strategic benefits. It would fortify relations with an important ally in the region by renewing the commitment to the joint struggle against cocaine production and trade. Under the agreement, small and medium-sized enterprises in labor-intensive Colombian industries like textiles and apparel would gain permanent access to the U.S. consumer market. With considerable investments, Colombia would be able to compete with East Asia for these higher quality jobs, swaying people away from black markets and other illicit activities.

While Congress deliberates, the clock is ticking. Colombia is also looking at other countries as potential trade and investment partners in order to build its still underdeveloped infrastructure and reduce unemployment. Complementing its FTAs with Canada, the EU, and several countries in the region, Colombia has initiated formal trade negotiations with South Korea and Turkey and is moving toward negotiations with Japan. A perhaps more telling development is China’s interest in building an inter-oceanic railroad in Colombia as an alternative to the Panama Canal: on July 11th President Juan Manuel Santos signed a bilateral investment treaty with China (and the UK) and is expected to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao in the fall.

Effects of the Panama Agreement

Although Panama’s economy is far smaller than Korea’s or even Colombia’s, the PFTA will deliver important economic and strategic benefits to the United States. Considerable gains will take place in U.S. agriculture and auto manufacturing. Moreover, the PFTA will strengthen the U.S. presence in the region, allowing for the stronger promotion of democratic institutions and market-based economies.

U.S. merchandise exports to Panama topped $2.2 billion in 2009. The PFTA’s elimination of tariffs and reduction in non-tariff barriers will cause this figure to grow. For example, rice exports are expected to increase by 145 percent, pork exports by 96 percent and beef exports by 74 percent, according to the ITC. Exports of vehicles are expected to increase by 43 percent. The PFTA also guarantees access to Panama’s $21 billion services market for U.S. firms offering portfolio management, insurance, telecommunications, computer, distribution, express delivery, energy, environmental, legal and other professional services.

Panama’s trade-to-GDP ratio in 2009 was 1.39, highlighting the preponderance of trade in Panama’s economy and the international orientation of many of its sectors. Following passage of the PFTA, Panama will eliminate more than 87 percent of tariffs on U.S. exports immediately. The remaining tariffs will be removed within 10 years for U.S. manufactured goods and 15 years for agricultural and animal products.

PFTA protections to investors—similar to protections accorded under KORUS and COL-US—are especially valuable, as Panama receives substantial investments associated with sectors that will benefit from both from the expansion of the canal and from other infrastructure projects. A fair legal framework, investor protections and a dispute settlement mechanism, all features of the PFTA, are almost certain to increase U.S. investments in Panama. Panama’s Legislature also recently approved a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with the United States and amended current laws to foster tax transparency and strengthen intellectual property rights. These are crucial steps in preventing the use of Panamanian jurisdiction as a haven for money laundering activities.

Panamanian laws and regulations prohibiting strikes or collective bargaining were a concern that initially delayed implementation of the PFTA. But, these laws have been changed, with the exception of a requirement that 40 workers (not the recommended 20) are needed to form a union; the 40-worker requirement has been kept partly because labor groups in Panama support it. The PFTA’s labor chapter protects the rights and principles outlined in the International Labor Organization’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.

Besides offering economic advantages to the United States, the PFTA is a strategic agreement. Strengthening economic links with Panama should bolster the U.S. capacity to address cocaine trafficking in the region, in light of Panama’s location as Colombia’s gateway to North America. The importance of the canal, now undergoing an expansion that will double its shipping capacity, further underscores the U.S. need to strengthen bilateral relations with Panama.

The time to act is now. Like Colombia, Panama has been negotiating with economic powerhouses other than the United States. It recently signed a trade agreement with Canada and an Association Agreement with the EU. Delaying passage of the PFTA would generate a loss of market share for a variety of sectors of the U.S. economy.

Conclusion

All three FTAs encourage trade by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. All the agreements provide access to large services markets, foster transparency and offer significant strategic advantages to the United States. Congress should approve each of them now.

The authors would like to thank Juan Pablo Candela for his assistance with this project.

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In a new paper, William Galston and Elaine Kamarck argue that the laws and rules that shape corporate and investor behavior today must be changed. They argue that Wall Street today is trapped in an incentive system that results in delivering quarterly profits and earnings at the expense of long-term investment.

As Galston and Kamarck see it, there’s nothing wrong with paying investors handsome returns, and a vibrant stock market is something to strive for. But when the very few can move stock prices in the short term and simultaneously reap handsome rewards for themselves, not their companies, and when this cycle becomes standard operating procedure, crowding out investments that boost productivity and wage increases that boost consumption, the long-term consequences for the economy are debilitating.

Galston and Kamarck argue that a set of incentives has evolved that favors short-term gains over long-term growth. These damaging incentives include:

• The proliferation of stock buybacks and dividends
• The increase in non-cash compensation
• The fixation on quarterly earnings
• The rise of activist Investors

These micro-incentives are so powerful that once they became pervasive in the private sector, they have broad effects, Galston and Kamarck write. Taken together, they have contributed significantly to economy-wide problems such as: (1) Rising inequality, (2) A shrinking middle class, (3) An increasing wedge between productivity & compensation, (4) Less business investment, and (5) Excessive financialization of the U.S. economy.

So what should be done? Galston and Kamarck propose reining in both share repurchases and the use of stock awards and options to compensate managers as well as refocusing corporate reporting on the long term. To this end, these scholars recommend the following policy steps:

• Repeal SEC Rule 10-B-18 and the 25% exemption
• Improve corporate disclosure practices
• Strengthen sustainability standards in 10-K reporting
• Toughen executive compensation rules
• Reform the taxation of executive compensation

Galston and Kamarck state that the American economy would work better if public corporations behaved more like private and family-held firms—if they made long-term investments, retained and trained their workers, grew organically, and offered reasonable but not excessive compensation to their top managers, based on long-term performance rather than quarterly earnings. To make these significant changes happen, the incentives that shape the decisions of CEOs and board of directors must be restructured. Reining in stock buybacks, reducing short-term equity gains from compensation packages, and shifting managers’ focus toward long-term objectives, Galston and Kamarck argue, will help address the most significant challenges facing America’s workers and corporations.  

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Forty years after its initial publication, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff remains an influential work from one of the most important macroeconomists over the last century, Arthur M. Okun (1928-1980). Okun’s theory on market economies reminds readers of an engaging dual theme: the market needs a place, and the market needs to be kept in its place. Articulated in a way that remains relevant even during today’s discussions on broadening gaps in income inequality, Okun emphasized that institutions in a capitalist democracy prod us to get ahead of our neighbors economically after telling us to stay in line socially.

On May 4, The Brookings Institution Press re-released Okun’s classic work with a new foreword from Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers, in addition to “Further Thoughts on Equality and Efficiency,” a paper published by Okun in 1977. The event included opening remarks from Brookings Senior Fellow George Perry, with a keynote address from Larry Summers. Following these remarks, David Wessel moderated a panel discussion with former Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers Greg Mankiw, Economic Studies’ Melissa Kearney and Justin Wolfers, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth's Heather Boushey regarding the history and impact of Okun’s work.

Download a copy of Lawrence Summers' opening remarks.

Ted Gayer, Vice President and Director of Economic Studies and Joseph Pechman Senior Fellow, reads Lawrence Summers's opening remarks.

David Wessel (right), Director of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, moderates a panel discussion with N. Gregory Mankiw, Melissa Kearney, and Heather Boushey.

Janet Yellen, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, listens to the discussion from the audience. To Yellen's right is former Congressional Budget Office director, Doug Elmendorf.

 

Video

• 40 years later- The relevance of Okun’s "Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff"

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• 40 years later- The relevance of Okun’s "Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff"

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150504_okun_equality_efficiency_transcript
• 050415 Summers Okun Speech

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

International development debates of the last four decades have ascribed ever greater importance to intellectual property rights (IPRs). There has also been a significant effort on the part of the U.S. to encourage its trade partners to introduce and enforce patent law modeled after American intellectual property law. Aside from a discussion on the impact of patents on innovation, there are some important consequences of international harmonization regarding the obduracy of the terms of trade agreements.

The position of the State Department on patents when negotiating trade agreements has consistently been one of defending stronger patent protection. However, the high-tech sector is under reorganization, and the most innovative industries today have strong disagreements about the value of patents for innovation. This situation begs the question as to why the national posture on patent law is so consistent in favor of industries such as pharmaceuticals or biotech to the detriment of software developers and Internet-based companies.

The State Department defends this posture, arguing that the U.S. has a comparative advantage in sectors dependent on patent protection. Therefore, to promote exports, our national trade policy should place incentives for partners to come in line with national patent law. This posture will become problematic when America’s competitive advantage shifts to sectors that find patents to be a hindrance to innovation, because too much effort will have already been invested in twisting the arm of our trade partners. It will be hard to undo those chapters in trade agreements particularly after our trade partners have taken pains in passing laws aligned to American law.

Related to the previous concern, the policy inertia effect and inflexibility applies to domestic policy as much as it does to trade agreements. When other nations adopt policy regimes following the American model, advocates of stronger patent protection will use international adoption as an argument in favor of keeping the domestic policy status quo. The pressure we place on our trade partners to strengthen patent protection (via trade agreements and other mechanisms like the Special 301 Report) will be forgotten. Advocates will present those trade partners as having adopted the enlightened laws of the U.S., and ask why American lawmakers would wish to change law that inspires international emulation. Innovation scholar Timothy Simcoe has correctly suggested that harmonization creates inflexibility in domestic policy. Indeed, in a not-too-distant future the rapid transformation of the economy, new big market players, and emerging business models may give policymakers the feeling that we are stuck in a patent policy rut whose usefulness has expired.

In addition, there are indirect economic effects from projecting national patent law onto trade agreements. If we assume that a club of economies (such as OECD) generate most of the innovation worldwide while the rest of countries simply adopt new technologies, the innovation club would have control over the global supply of high value-added goods and services and be able to preserve a terms-of-trade advantage. In this scenario, stronger patent protection may be in the interest of the innovation club to the extent that their competitive advantage remains in industries dependent of patent protection. But should the world economic order change and the innovation club become specialized in digital services while the rest of the world takes on larger segments of manufactures, the advantage may shift outside the innovation club. This is not a far-fetched scenario. Emerging economies have increased their service economy in addition to their manufacturing capacity; overall they are better integrated in global supply chains. What is more, these emerging economies are growing consumption markets that will become increasingly more relevant globally as they continue to grow faster than rich economies.

What is more, the innovation club will not likely retain a monopoly on global innovation for too long. Within emerging economies, another club of economies is placing great investments in developing innovative capacity. In particular, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa (and possibly Russia) have strengthened their innovation systems by expanding public investments in R&D and introducing institutional reforms to foster entrepreneurship. The innovation of this second club may, in a world of harmonized patent law, increase their competitive advantage by securing monopolistic control of key high-tech markets. As industries less reliant on patents flourish and the digital economy transforms US markets, an inflexibly patent policy regime may actually be detrimental to American terms of trade.

I should stress that these kind of political and economic effects of America’s posture on IPRs in trade policy are not merely speculative. Just as manufactures displaced the once dominant agricultural sector, and services in turn took over as the largest sector of the economy, we can fully expect that the digital economy—with its preference for limited use of patents—will become not only more economic relevant, but also more politically influential. The tensions observed in international trade and especially the aforementioned considerations merit revisiting the rationale for America’s posture on intellectual property policy in trade negotiations.

Elsie Bjarnason contributed to this post.

       

       

It certainly seems that way, judging by recent developments. Capital increases for the World Bank, for the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), for the African Development Bank (AsDB), and for the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) are nowhere in sight, despite their constrained lending capacities. Replenishments of their soft-loan windows have been anemic. They face divisive debates about what role emerging economies should play in their governance and how their leaders should be selected. Competitors are nipping at their heels, with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) only the most recent example. News of drastic financial restructuring of the AsDB and of protracted reorganization in the World Bank add to the questions about where the traditional Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are headed.

So let’s unpack what are the key challenges – and the main opportunities – that the traditional MDBs face. Based on the discussion at a recent roundtable of MDB representatives organized by International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in Rome, I see seven principal challenges:

• Progress in reducing extreme poverty and the in graduation of many low-income countries to middle-income status has reduced the rationale for aid and the apparent need for MDBs.
• The rapid growth of development finance channels means increasing competition in a crowded field of financial actors (private and non-governmental financial flows, new development finance institutions and vertical funds, and non-traditional donors).
• Traditional donors face increasing domestic pressure to channel aid resources through their bilateral aid organizations, and they show a growing preference to earmark their funding, rather than support general core financing for MDBs. 
• MDBs face a dramatic growth of competing knowledge providers (international and national consulting firms, universities and think tanks).
• Inflexible governance structures limit the attractiveness of MDBs to their borrowers and to new donors. With traditional donors unwilling to give up control over vote, voice, leadership selection and lending practices, borrowers see the MDBs as unresponsive, risk averse, burdensome and costly. Emerging economy donors find MDBs unable or unwilling to absorb increased contributions with associated shifts in votes, voice and control. And since non-governmental actors cannot participate in the MDB governance structures, they do not contribute to MDB funding.
• The revival of Cold War/East-West confrontation risks politicizing the institutions’ lending practices – the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) stopped lending to Russia in the wake of the sanctions imposed by the West – and reinforces incentives for setting up new institutions.
• Most MDBs find it difficult to engage directly with the private and social enterprise sectors. Due to constraints in their statutes, policies and staff capacity MDBs have not been able to provide much direct financing for private investments.

But there are also opportunities that the MDBs can capitalize on:

• Despite the challenges that MDBs face in borrowing and donor countries, overall they remain trusted partners, due to a unique combination of strengths: their traditional political neutrality, freedom from special interests and corruption, technical professionalism, long-term development perspective and hands-on program design and finance engagement. Overdue reform of MDB governance and processes and effective resistance to political pressures can increase the trust all members put in them.
• As we face increased risks of geo-political fragmentation, regionalization, and confrontation, the world will need the truly multilateral MDBs more rather than less, since they offer globally inclusive forums and instruments to help address pressing global and regional issues.
• Despite remarkable progress, poverty reduction remains a huge task. Elimination of extreme poverty ($1.25pd) by 2030 is a valid goal; but its achievement will not eliminate poverty. The billions of people living below $5pd are poor. Poverty reduction will remain a valid goal for MDBs long beyond 2030.
• The Post-2015 and climate change agendas provide a window of opportunity for MDBs to demonstrate their continued, and indeed enhanced, relevance to the global sustainable development agenda in low-income and middle-income countries. The huge role of European Investment Bank in the European Union is one demonstration of the important role MDBs can play even for the advanced countries.
• The MDBs’ unique package of services provides better value than the services offered by many competitors. Their combination of strong project preparation, supervision and finance, their attention to indebtedness constraints and sustainability requirements, their focus on policy and institutional capacity and their ability to forge multi-stakeholder partnerships provide strong and effective support. MDBs provide a steady compass in helping shift countries’ national priorities from short-term expediency to sound long-term policies and programs for sustained impact at scale.
• MDBs have shown that they play a key role in responding to economic crises, natural disasters and conflict, as demonstrated for example by their response to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008/9.
• MDBs can increase the leverage of their financial resources, as demonstrated by the recent restructuring of the AsDB, and broaden their engagement with the private sector, building on the successful experience of the International Finance Corporation and EBRD.

In sum, the creation of many copycat development banks demonstrates the remarkable strength and durability of the basic MDB model. As long as the traditional MDBs squarely face the challenges and opportunities, there’s plenty of life left in their old bones.