It is now clear that President Putin’s ‘new model Russia’ cannot be constructively accommodated into the international system. The war in Ukraine, in part the result of the West's laissez-faire approach to Russia, demonstrates the need for a new Western strategy towards Russia.

The Russian Challenge - a major new report by six authors from the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House - argues that a new strategy must recognise that:                  

• The decline of the Russian economy, the costs of confrontation and the rise of China mean that the Putin regime is now facing the most serious challenge of its 15 years in power.  The West has neither the wish nor the means to promote regime change in Russia. But Western countries need to consider the possible consequences of a chaotic end to the Putin system.             
• A critical element in the new geo-economic competition between the West and Russia is the extent of Western support for Ukraine, whose reconstruction as an effective sovereign state, capable of standing up for itself, is crucial. This will require much greater resources than have been invested up until now.                  
• Russia has rapidly developed its armed forces and information warfare capabilities since the war in Georgia in 2008. The West must invest in defensive strategic communications and media support to counter the Kremlin’s false narratives and restore its conventional deterrent capabilities as a matter of urgency. In particular, NATO needs to demonstrate that the response to ‘ambiguous’ or ‘hybrid’ war will be robust.                  
• Sanctions are exerting economic pressure on the Russian leadership and should remain in place until Ukraine’s territorial integrity is properly restored. In particular, it is self-defeating to link the lifting of sanctions solely to implementation of the poorly crafted and inherently fragile Minsk accords.                  
• While deterrence and constraint are essential in the short term, the West must also prepare for an eventual change of leadership in Russia. There is a reasonable chance that current pressures will incline a future Russian leadership to want to re-engage with the West.

James Nixey, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, said:  

'Pursuing these goals and achieving these objectives will ensure that the West is better prepared for any further deterioration in relations with Russia. The events of the last 18 months have demonstrated conclusively that when dealing with Russia, optimism is not a strategy.'

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently being negotiated between the European Union (EU) and the United States has been sold by politicians on both sides as a strategic opportunity to shape globalization to the benefit of both parties. But a new research paper from Chatham House finds that the risks of such an ambitious project are significant – whether or not the current deadlock in negotiations can be overcome – and the UK vote for Brexit increases those risks.

The primary strategic benefit of TTIP would be to enable the United States and the EU to set the ‘rules of the road’ for international trade in the 21st century. TTIP’s backers hope that if the EU and the United States can agree on a new set of standards, the power of their combined markets will lead other countries to adopt the same rules. According to Realizing TTIP’s Strategic Potential one of the risks of agreeing such far-reaching rules is that they set the bar too high for other countries to accept. By imposing restrictive rules unilaterally on, for example, state-owned enterprises, TTIP could provoke retaliation and encourage other countries to establish alternative rules.

TTIP also has the potential to attract other countries to align themselves economically and politically with the EU and the United States due to their ‘soft-power’. But this benefit will only materialise if strategically important countries, such as Turkey, are able to join. The research finds that the demands placed on Turkey may be too high for this to be a realistic prospect in the near future. Ukraine is another strategic country that could be targeted for expansion of TTIP, but extending membership to Ukraine would be regarded by Russia as a 'serious escalation' by the West in their confrontation.

The paper argues there would be benefits to the UK, the EU and the United States if the UK were to join TTIP after the UK leaves the EU. For the UK it could provide the only real prospect of being able to influence international standards and a relatively quick means to conclude a comprehensive trade deal with the United States. For the EU and the United States, it would ensure the scale and attractiveness of TTIP is not reduced by the loss of one of the major European economies. It would also provide an immediate opportunity to establish TTIP as a plurilateral deal that is open to new members. The process would be made easier if the UK were to maintain an active role in the development of the EU position on TTIP, while the UK is still a member of the EU. This would mean that the UK would be in a position to accept the terms required to join TTIP relatively quickly upon exiting the EU. There will inevitably be sensitivities in the UK, other EU member states and the EU institutions about this, but it is in the strategic interests of all parties.

The most immediate risk for TTIP, however, is of failure. Despite 14 rounds of negotiations so far there is still disagreement over what should be included in the scope of the negotiations, including issues such as financial services regulation, which the United States is determined to exclude, and how to handle politically sensitive questions such as investor-state dispute settlement, which has become a hot-button issue in the EU. Even if an agreement is reached it must then be ratified by a sceptical US Congress, where there are challenges on both sides of the aisle, and by EU institutions and member states. The hostility to TTIP in many parts of Europe, especially in Germany, is not encouraging.

If the negotiations break down, or a deal is reached that falls short of the ambition set for it, this would send a damaging signal to the rest of the world about the ability of the EU and the United States to work together. It could also hasten the demise of their influence. For the EU, the stakes are greater now that the UK has decided to leave the EU.

The paper notes that the EU-US trade relationship is still the largest bilateral relationship in the world 'for now', but that in most sectors the lead over China is decreasing. If they miss this opportunity, the United States and the EU may not get another chance to set the standards that will govern the global trading order in the 21st century.

Report author, Gregor Irwin, said:

'TTIP negotiations are hanging in the balance. If they succeed TTIP has the potential to shape the next generation of trade rules and ensure a transatlantic vision for the international trading system prevails.  

'For now, both sides are facing off against each other in the negotiations and failing to focus enough on the strategic risks and opportunities from TTIP. If the full strategic potential from TTIP is to be realized they must pay more attention to how other countries are likely to respond.

'The UK’s decision to leave to leave the EU should sharpen the incentives that both sides have to conclude a deal. It is in everyone’s interest to ensure that the UK is able to join TTIP once the UK leaves the EU.

'Further opening up TTIP to include Turkey could create an alternative anchor for its economic and political relationship with the EU, short of EU membership. It could transform Turkey’s relationship with the EU, just as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has transformed Mexico’s relationship with the US.'

The COVID-19 pandemic has struck the Sahel and West Africa at a time when the region is already under severe pressure from violent insecurity and the effects of climate change on its land, food and water resources.

By the end of April, there had been 9,513 confirmed coronavirus cases across the 17 countries of the region, and some 231 deaths, with the highest overall numbers recorded in Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Niger and Burkina Faso. Low testing rates mean than these numbers give only a partial picture.

The Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) forecast in early April that almost 17 million people in the Sahel and West Africa (7.1 million in Nigeria alone) will need food and nutritional assistance during the coming lean season in June–August, more than double the number in an average year. The combined impact of violent insecurity and COVID-19 could put more than 50 million other people across the region at risk of food and nutrition crisis.

Rippling across the region

The effects of the collapse in global commodity prices, currency depreciations, rising costs of consumer goods and disruptions to supply chains are rippling across the region. And for major oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Chad and Cameroon, the wipe-out of foreign currency earnings will hammer government revenues just as the cost of food and other critical imports goes up. It is likely that the number of people who suffer the direct health impact of the coronavirus will be far outstripped by the number for whom there will be harsh social and economic costs.

In recent years, valuable protocols and capacities have been put in place by governments in West and Central Africa in response to Ebola and other infectious disease outbreaks.

But inadequate healthcare funding and infrastructure across this region compound the challenge of responding to the spread of the COVID-19 infection – which is testing the resources of even the world’s best-funded public health systems.

Over many years, however, the region has steadily built up structures to tackle humanitarian and development challenges, particularly as regards food security. It has an established system for assessing the risk of food crisis annually and coordinating emergency support to vulnerable communities. Each country monitors climate and weather patterns, transhumance, market systems and agricultural statistics, and terrorist disruption of agricultural productivity, from local community to national and regional level.

The system is coordinated and quality-controlled, using common technical data standards, by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), a regional intergovernmental body established in 1973 in response to a devastating drought. Collective risk assessments allow emergency support to be mobilized through the RPCA.

For almost three months already, countries in Sahelian West Africa have been working with the World Health Organization to prepare national COVID-19 response strategies and strengthen health controls at their borders. Almost all governments have also opted for domestic curfews, and variations of lockdown and market restrictions.

Senegal has been a leader in rapidly developing Africa’s diagnostic capacity, and plans are under way to speed up production of test kits. Niger was swift to develop a national response strategy, to which donors have pledged €194.5 million. While the IMF has agreed emergency financial assistance to help countries address the urgent balance-of-payments, health and social programme needs linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, signing off $3.4 billion for Nigeria, $442 million for Senegal and $130 million for Mauritania.

Steps are also now being taken towards the formulation of a more joined-up regional approach. Notably, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari has been chosen by an extraordinary session of the Economic Community of West African States to coordinate the regional response to COVID-19. As Africa’s biggest economy and home to its largest population, Nigeria is a critical hub for transnational flows of goods and people. Its controversial August 2019 land border closure, in a bid to address smuggling, has already painfully disrupted regional agri-food trade and value chains. The active engagement of the Buhari administration will thus be crucial to the success of a multifaceted regional response.

One of the first tough questions the region’s governments must collectively address is how long to maintain the border shutdowns that were imposed as an initial measure to curb the spread of the virus. Closed borders are detrimental to food security, and disruptive to supply chains and the livelihoods of micro, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs that rely on cross-border trade. The impact of prolonged closures will be all the more profound in a region where welfare systems are largely non-existent or, at best, highly precarious.

Nigeria, in particular, with more than 95 million people already living in extreme poverty, might do well to explore measures to avoid putting food further beyond the reach of people who are seeing their purchasing power evaporate.

In taking further actions to control the spread of the coronavirus, the region’s governments will need to show faith in the system that they have painstakingly developed to monitor and respond to the annual risk of food crisis across the Sahel. This system, and the critical data it offers, will be vital to informing interventions to strengthen the four components of food security – availability, access, stability and utilization – in the context of COVID-19, and for charting a post-pandemic path of recovery.

Above all, careful steps will need to be put in place to ensure that preventing the spread of the coronavirus does not come at the cost of even greater food insecurity for the people of the Sahel and West Africa. The region’s governments must prioritize the flow of food across borders and renew their commitment to strategic coordination and alignment.

From the perception of the imminence of threats at the political level to the seizing of initiative through proper timing at the tactical level, temporality is directly related to war and warfare. Yet, despite some analyses of the importance of time at the political/grand strategic level (usually by scholars) and at the tactical level (usually by military professionals) there is surprisingly little discussion of the impact of time on the preparation and the conduct of warfare. This article introduces the concept of ‘wartime paradigm’ as a heuristic device to understand the relationship between the perception of time and the conduct of warfare, and argues that after the Cold War, a specific ‘wartime paradigm’ combining an optimization for speed and an understanding of war as risk management has guided western warfare, from force structure to the conduct of actual operations. It shows how the changing character of warfare directly challenges this wartime paradigm and why, if western forces want to prevail in future conflicts, the establishment of a new wartime paradigm guiding technological improvements and operational concepts is critical.