New Strategic Partnership with the Robert Bosch Stiftung News Release jon.wallace 23 November 2020

The Robert Bosch Stiftung becomes a founding donor to Chatham House’s second century.

Design in an Age of Crisis Launches News Release jon.wallace 13 January 2021

Design open call receives 500 submissions from over 50 countries across six continents.

Deplatforming Trump puts big tech under fresh scrutiny Expert comment NCapeling 22 January 2021

The response of digital platforms to the US Capitol riots raises questions about online content governance. The EU and UK are starting to come up with answers.

The ‘deplatforming’ of Donald Trump – including Twitter’s announcement that it has permanently banned him due to ‘the risk of further incitement of violence’ after the riots in the US – shows once more not only the sheer power of online platforms but also the lack of a coherent and consistent framework for online content governance.

Taking the megaphone away from Trump during the Capitol riots seems sensible, but was it necessary or proportionate to ban him from the platform permanently? Or consistent with the treatment of other ‘strongmen’ world leaders such as Modi, Duterte and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who have overseen nationalistic violence but whose accounts remain intact?

Such complex decisions on online expression should not made unilaterally by powerful and unregulated tech actors, but instead should be subject to democratic oversight and grounded in the obligations of states and responsibilities of companies under international human rights law.

The speed and scale of digital information has left governments across the world struggling with how to tackle online harms such as hate speech, extremist content and disinformation since the emergence of mass social media 15 years ago.

The US’s hallowed approach to the First Amendment, under which speech on public issues – even hate speech – occupies the highest rank and is entitled to special protection, has contributed to a reluctance to regulate Silicon Valley’s digital platforms. But the irony is that by not regulating them, the government harmed freedom of expression by leaving complex speech decisions in the hands of private actors.

Meanwhile at the other extreme is the growing number of illiberal and authoritarian governments using a combination of vague laws, censorship, propaganda, and internet blackouts to severely restrict online freedom of expression, control the narrative and, in some cases, incite atrocities.

Regulation is on the way

The happy medium – flexible online content regulation providing clarity, predictability, transparency, and accountability – has until now been elusive. But even before the deplatforming of Trump, 2021 was set to be the year when this approach finally gained some traction, at least in Europe.

The EU’s recently-published draft Digital Services Act puts obligations on dominant social media platforms to manage ‘systemic risks’, for example through requirements for greater transparency about their content decisions, algorithms used for recommendations, and online advertising systems.

The UK will shortly publish its Online Safety Bill, which will establish a new regulatory framework for tackling online harms, including the imposition of a duty of care and codes of conduct on Big Tech, to be overseen by an independent regulator (Ofcom).

Both proposals are based on a ‘co-regulatory’ model under which the regulator sets out a framework substantiated with rules by the private sector, with the regulator performing a monitoring function to ensure the rules are complied with.

Both also draw on international human rights standards and the work of civil society in applying these standards in relation to the online public square, with the aim of increasing control for users over what they see online, requiring transparency about tech companies’ policies in a number of areas, and strengthening the accountability of platforms when they fall foul of the regulation.

The procedure for both proposals has also been inclusive, involving extensive multi-stakeholder consultations with civil society organizations and Big Tech, and the proposals will be subject to scrutiny in 2021, notably from the EU and UK parliaments.

Both proposals are at an early stage, and it remains to be seen whether they go far enough – or indeed will have a chilling effect on online platforms. But as an attempt to initiate a dialogue on globally coherent principles, they are positive first steps. They also provide food for thought for the new Joe Biden administration in the US as it turns its attention to the regulation of Big Tech.

For some time civil society – most prominently David Kaye, the former UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression and opinion – have called for content regulation to be informed by universal international human rights law standards.

The EU and UK are peculiarly well-placed to take the lead in this area because European countries have for decades been on the receiving end of judgments from the European Court of Human Rights on the appropriate limits to freedom of expression in cases brought under the European Convention on Human Rights.

In deciding these cases, the court has to balance the right to freedom of expression against the restrictions imposed – for example in the context of incitement to violence, political debate, and satire. Deciding where to draw the line on what can and cannot be expressed in a civilised society which prizes freedom of expression is inevitably a difficult exercise.

International human rights law provides a methodology that inquires whether the interference to freedom of expression was prescribed by law and pursues a legitimate aim, and also whether it was necessary in a democratic society to achieve those aims – including whether the interference was necessary and proportionate (as for example in Delfi AS v Estonia, which involved a news portal failing to take down unlawful hate speech).

To be effective, online content regulation has to bite on tech companies, which is a challenge given the internet is global but domestic law normally applies territorially. The EU’s proposals have an extraterritorial element as they apply to any online platforms providing services in the EU regardless of where the platform is headquartered.

Further, both the EU and UK want to give the regulator strong enforcement powers – it is proposed for example that Ofcom will have powers to fine platforms up to ten per cent of their turnover for breaches.

Although the proposals would not apply directly to the deplatforming of Trump which occurred in the US, the philosophy behind the EU and UK approach is likely to have an impact beyond European shores in promoting a co-regulatory model that some of the bigger tech companies have been inviting for some time, reluctant as they are to ‘play God’ on content moderation decisions without reference to any regulatory framework.

In the absence of regulation, the standards of tech platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have already evolved over time in response to pressure from civil rights groups, users, and advertisers, including updated policies on protecting civic conversation and hate speech.

Facebook has also set up an independent Oversight Board, whose members include leading human rights lawyers, to review decisions on content including – at its own request – the decision to indefinitely suspend Trump from Facebook and Instagram. Decisions on the Board’s first tranche of cases are expected imminently.

Gatekeeper status is key

Online content regulation also needs to address the role of Big Tech as the ‘digital gatekeepers’, because their monopoly power extends not just to editorial control of the news and information we consume, but also to market access.

The decision of Apple, Google, and Amazon to stop hosting right-wing social network Parler after it refused to combat calls for violence during the US Capitol riots was understandable in the circumstances, but also underlined the unilateral ability of Big Tech to decide the rules of the market.

Again, it is Europe where efforts are underway to tackle this issue: the EU’s draft Digital Market Act imposes obligations on online gatekeepers to avoid certain unfair practices, and the UK’s new Digital Markets Unit will have powers to write and enforce a new code of practice on those technology companies with ‘substantial and enduring’ market power.

In the US, Biden’s team will be following these developments with interest, given the growing bipartisan support for strengthening US antitrust rules and reviving antitrust enforcement. The EU’s recently published proposals for an EU-US tech agenda include a transatlantic dialogue on the responsibility of tech platforms and strengthened cooperation between antitrust authorities on digital markets.

Ultimately a consistent – and global – approach to online content is needed instead of fragmented approaches by different companies and governments. It is also important the framework is flexible so that it is capable of applying not only to major democracies but also to countries where too often sweeping state regulation has been used as a pretext to curtail online expression online.

The pursuit of a pluralistic framework tailored to different political and cultural contexts is challenging, and international human rights law cannot provide all the answers but, as a universal framework, it is a good place to start. The raft of regulatory measures from the EU and UK means that, regardless of whether Trump regains his online megaphone, 2021 is set to be a year of reckoning for Big Tech.

Rebuilding trust is central to the UN’s future Expert comment NCapeling 25 March 2021

António Guterres is under scrutiny as he prepares to report on the future of the United Nations, with a renewed focus on trust, resilience and prevention.

The United Nations Secretary-General’s inbox is full as his organization celebrates its 75th anniversary. Trust must be rebuilt amid increased geo-political rivalry, North-South divisions, and sceptical citizens left behind by globalization. The international community has manifestly underinvested in institutional resilience and prevention. Better partnerships are needed with the private sector, and innovative forms of cross-regional cooperation fostered.

There are positive signs UN member states want things to change. They unanimously agreed a Political Declaration last September strongly reaffirming multilateralism, and they gave António Guterres one year to present a roadmap on how to respond, ‘building back better’ in the face of climate change and COVID-19.

A key challenge is to steer mandates and resources towards prevention. The World Bank-WHO Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, which eerily predicted the pandemic in its inaugural report in September 2019, reminds us successful prevention rests not on warning alone, but on aligned incentives for early action.

Geopolitical tensions persist

China has invested significantly in the multilateral system over the last decade, both in formal organizations such as the UN and the African Union, and in fostering a set of China-centred ‘mini-lateral’ fora such as the SCO, BRICS and BRI. It has also deepened its ties with Russia in the UN Security Council. Western countries both begrudgingly admire and deeply distrust China’s nimbleness in advancing its interests and values in this way but are divided on how to respond.

The Biden administration has recommitted itself to multilateral processes but US bilateral relations are likely to remain the main foreign policy driver. The UK has sought to convert the G7 into an enlarged summit-level meeting for democracies but Europe is divided over the wisdom of formalizing a group which may increase divisions with China, and some major democracies – India for example – have divergent approaches on issues such as trade protection.

An increase in cross-regional informal caucusing within the UN system to advance norms and progress around specific common objectives is likely. Guterres can encourage smaller powers to become ‘bridge builders’ sitting in the middle of a ‘Venn diagram’ of such new member state constellations at the UN.

Guterres can also build on the recent Abraham Accords to encourage cross-regional cultural, political and security relationships on the back of trade and investment, and map practical opportunities for strategic cooperation between China and the West in health and food security, climate and biodiversity, and global macroeconomic management, while fostering new normative frameworks to manage strategic competition in artificial intelligence (AI), big data, cyber resilience, gene-editing, and automation.

North-South mistrust

Realizing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate objectives rests in part in mobilizing the expertise and resources of sub-state actors such as business and city and regional authorities. However, developing countries remain wary of granting the UN Secretary-General a greater role in fostering partnerships with the private sector and mobilizing private finance, out of fear this may overshadow the global North’s promises to provide aid and create fairer trade and debt conditions.

In addition, African governments are expressing growing frustration at their continued lack of ‘agency’ in UN decision-making, the reneging of promises on climate financing by the global North, and the slow rollout of the COVAX facility to developing countries.

Progress may lie in two areas. First, developing country leadership of initiatives – such as the Friends Group on SDG financing established by the Jamaican and Canadian ambassadors to the UN – can help build trust and allay concerns, which is vital to incentivise transformative investment by sovereign wealth, pension, and insurance funds in pro-poor low carbon infrastructure in developing countries.

The second area is curating multi-stakeholder initiatives outside the UN framework and then linking them back to the organization once they have proven to be beneficial to both developed and developing countries. Successful initiatives such as the Vaccine Alliance can be a model of how to do this while not detracting from state obligations.

Scepticism among citizens

Trust in governance also needs rebuilding at the level of the individual citizen. Mobilized by populist movements and ‘fake news’ online, individuals left behind by the uneven economic benefits of globalization view governments and international organizations as unaccountable and lacking their interests at heart.

Guterres has called for a new ‘social contract’ between governments and their citizens, and for ‘Multilateralism 2.0’ to demonstrate a practical ‘hard interest’ as well as a ‘values’ case for why international cooperation inclusively benefits individuals as well as states. And technological innovation can also help citizens hold governments to account. As the first Secretary-General with a science and engineering background, Guterres has championed how technology enhances UN delivery of its objectives.

The pairing of artificial intelligence (AI) with satellites and drones for geospatial insight has been pioneered by both the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to help communities preserve ecosystems and agricultural productivity. The resultant data, accessible on smart phones and computers, enables civil society to measure governments’ promises against real-time progress, through monitoring greenhouse gas emissions from power stations.

Alongside trust and accountability, fostering inclusiveness is likely to be central to Guterres’ report as he navigates how the UN can legitimize multi-stakeholder partnerships, enhance transparency, and bring coherence to diverse ‘mini-lateral’ initiatives.

These themes are explored further in the forthcoming synthesis paper ‘Reflections on building more inclusive global governance: Ten insights into emerging practice’

Facebook's power under scrutiny as Trump ban upheld Expert comment NCapeling 6 May 2021

Keeping Donald Trump’s Facebook ban in place shows the vast power social media platforms hold, raising questions of whether that power is appropriately used.

Kate Jones

From a human rights perspective, the Oversight Board’s decision is a strong one, and not at all surprising. The board decided Facebook was right to suspend the former president’s access to post content on Facebook and Instagram, but not indefinitely.

It found Donald Trump’s posts violated Facebook’s community standards because they amounted to praise or support of people engaged in violence and that, applying a human rights assessment, Facebook’s suspension of Trump was a necessary and proportionate restriction of his right to freedom of expression.

However the board also found Trump’s indefinite suspension was neither in conformity with a clear Facebook procedure nor consistent with its commitment to respect human rights. Its decision requires Facebook to make a new decision on the future of Donald Trump’s account, grounded in its rules.

While opinions on this result will differ, the increased call for clear and accessible rules and respect for human rights in their implementation that the Oversight Board brings to Facebook’s operations is welcome.

But the Oversight Board’s powers are limited to content moderation – Facebook declined to answer the board’s questions about amplification of Trump’s posts through the platform’s design decisions and algorithms. This limitation on the board’s role should be lifted. It is in content amplification, not just content moderation, that Facebook should face scrutiny and accountability for the sake of the human rights of its users.

Fundamentally, human rights is not a veneer which can mask or legitimize underlying power dynamics or public policy – those still fall to be assessed for themselves.

The Trump/Facebook saga does highlight the vast power Facebook and other major social media platforms have over political discussion and persuasion. Through granting or denying, or through amplifying or quietening the voices of political figures, Facebook has the power to shape politics, electorates, and democratic processes. Improving content moderation through the Oversight Board, although important, does little to constrain that power.

Facebook itself, unlike a government, has no accountability to the general public, and the Oversight Board must not distract us from the need for a full conversation about the extent to which Facebook’s power is appropriately held and properly wielded.

Emily Taylor

This decision marks a coming of age for Facebook’s content moderation process. For years, decisions to take down content or ban users have been opaque, conducted by a human workforce that Facebook and other platforms have been hesitant to acknowledge. The platforms have also been worried that being seen to exercise an editorial function might put at risk the legal protections which prevent the platforms being held responsible for user-generated content.

When the Oversight Board was first posited, observers questioned whether a body funded by Facebook could properly exercise a legitimate appeals function. Now there is a reasoned decision which partly supports the decision to de-platform a serving president, but also takes issue with the indefinite nature of the ban.

Facebook specifically asked the Oversight Board to consider specific challenges involved when the person involved is a political leader. The board concluded that Trump’s ‘status as head of state with a high position of trust not only imbued his words with greater force and credibility but also created risks that his followers would understand they could act with impunity’. The storming of the US Capitol and role President Trump played in stirring up the violence underlined that political leaders’ words can motivate others to take harmful actions.

Just as the events of January 6 remain shocking, it remains shocking that private platforms have exercised the power to curb the speech of a US president. It also remains shocking that the platforms sat back and took no action over the previous four years, but waited until the final days of the transition.

The board’s decision is an evolution in private-sector content moderation, with a diverse board giving a reasoned opinion on a Facebook decision. But to fully comply with the principles of open justice, board decisions should include more detail on the individuals who have made the decision – at present, it appears all members of the board review the decision but it is not clear which individuals were involved in its drafting, or that they were clear from conflicts. If the process is to gain respect as a truly independent oversight on the platform’s decisions, greater transparency over the identity of decision-makers will be needed.

Mark Zuckerberg expressed concern about Facebook becoming an arbiter of truth or free speech and, overall, the difficulty of having private companies managing the application of fundamental rights on their platforms has not been solved. Just because companies have the financial resources to do it, does not mean they necessarily should.

Yet no other international governance or arbitration system has emerged to handle the complexities of platform power over speech. In the context of that vacuum, the Oversight Board’s decision is a welcome step.

Undercurrents: The Oversight Board's Trump decision, and Merkel's legacy Audio bhorton.drupal 25 June 2021

Was Facebook right to suspend Trump? And how will Merkel be remembered?

In the wake of the storming of Capitol Hill on 6 January 2021, social media platforms took steps to remove former President Donald Trump from their websites for infringing community standards. This step was welcomed by many, but also raised serious questions about the power of social media companies to limit free speech and censor elected officials. The suspension of President Trump from Facebook was referred to the Oversight Board, an independent body of experts set up to scrutinise the platform’s content moderation decisions.  

In this episode, Ben speaks to Thomas Hughes and Kate Jones about the outcome of the Oversight Board’s inquiry into the Trump suspension, and the wider implications for content moderation on social media.  

Then Lara is joined by Hans Kundnani to assess the political outlook in Germany and reflect on the legacy of outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel.  

Counter-terrorism measures and sanctions: How to avoid negative consequences for humanitarian action? 9 September 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 July 2021 Online

Exploring current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

Counter-terrorism measures  address broad forms of support to terrorist acts. Their expansion, internationally and domestically, has given rise to new points of friction with international humanitarian law. Unless the measures include adequate safeguards, they  can impede humanitarian action. Country-specific sanctions imposed for other objectives, such as ending conflicts or protecting civilians, raise similar challenges for humanitarian action. 

These problems are not new, but solutions at international and national level remain elusive. 

At this panel event, which marks the launch of a new Chatham House research paper, panellists explore current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

• What are the current dynamics and developments at Security Council level?  
• What are the opportunities now that the UK is developing its independent sanctions strategy? 
• What challenges do counter-terrorism requirements in funding agreements for humanitarian action  pose? 
• What is necessary to make progress?

How can the investor community address the ‘S’ in ESG? – the role of social purpose values 16 November 2021 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2021 Online

This webinar highlights the crucial relationship between an open civic space and a profitable business environment.

2020 was a tipping point for investors to think and act more responsibly, galvanized by catalysts like the killing of George Floyd and the pandemic. There is increasing investor support for social and environmental causes. Younger investors are placing increasing emphasis on values and social issues in their investment decisions.

The ‘S’ in the Environment Social and Governance (ESG) agenda is clearly gaining traction, but how far does it extend to civil and political liberties i.e. the right of citizens, NGOs and journalists to speak freely, assemble and associate which are increasingly shrinking around the world?

While there is increasing focus on human rights issues such as modern slavery and supply chains, civil society space issues often fall between the cracks when investors consider ESG.

This webinar also explores opportunities and challenges that arise for the investor community in terms of factoring civic space issues into their political risk and ESG analysis.

• To what extent are civic space issues being factored into ESG social purpose values, especially by younger investors?
• What is the best methodology for assessing these issues in order to ensure a common and coherent set of global standards in this area?
• And how can investors mitigate the risks of their activities to civic space in practice?

Protecting universal human rights: Imagine a better world Explainer Video NCapeling 19 November 2021

Short animation examining why protecting and defending human rights ensures an equitable response to humanitarian crises and addresses economic inequality.

Human rights are not policies that can be overturned, they are not granted by governments. They belong to everyone as human beings.

For the most part, states are meeting their commitments to defend and protect universal human rights. But increasingly some governments are beginning to shy away from their obligations, and some are even actively seeking to subvert human rights.

And the regional and international bodies created and charged with defending these rights are being challenged by the rise of new powers and political movements.

Chatham House is built on big ideas. Help us imagine a better world.

Our researchers develop positive solutions to global challenges, working with governments, charities, businesses and society to build a better future.

SNF CoLab is our project supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) to share our ideas in experimental, collaborative ways – and to learn about designing a better future.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG appointed Honorary Queen’s Counsel News release jon.wallace 14 January 2022

Founder of the International Law Programme at Chatham House recognized for her major contribution to the law of England and Wales.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG, distinguished fellow of Chatham House’s International Law Programme, has been awarded the title of Honorary Queen’s Counsel (QC Honoris Causa), recognizing her major contribution to the law of England and Wales, outside practice in the courts. The Lord Chancellor will preside over an appointment ceremony at Westminster Hall on 21 March 2022.

Elizabeth founded the International Law Programme at Chatham House and is an academic expert member of Doughty Street Chambers. She was a legal adviser in the United Kingdom diplomatic service between 1974 and 2003. Between 1994 and 1997 she was the Legal Adviser to the United Kingdom mission to the United Nations in New York. She also took part in the negotiations for the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

Throughout her career, Elizabeth has worked to strengthen the role of international law in reducing global tensions, addressing cross-border challenges and promoting individual liberty, including through influential publications at the Institute such as The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence. 

Robin Niblett CMG, Director and Chief Executive of Chatham House said:

‘We are delighted by this award which recognizes Elizabeth’s outstanding contribution to the field of international law, both in government and – on a continuing basis – through the International Law Programme at Chatham House.’

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications Expert comment NCapeling 24 February 2022

Russia is violating international law in Ukraine using baseless allegations, and states’ responses should be guided accordingly.

Russia has begun a large-scale military attack on Ukraine, having first declared it recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states. It scarcely needs saying Russia is violating international law – violating the prohibition in the United Nations (UN) Charter on the use of force, violating the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, and violating the prohibition on intervention.

But Russia is using the language of the law to defend its actions. In all the recent verbiage of President Vladimir Putin, some attempts at legal arguments can be elicited – but they do not stand up to scrutiny.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with the only two Charter exceptions to this prohibition being self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council. In his speech on 23 February, Putin points to two grounds on which Russia relies on self-defence – defence in aid of the two breakaway republics and self-defence in the light of threats against Russia itself.

Donetsk, Luhansk, and collective self-defence

Putin said ‘the people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help’ and went on to seek to justify his military action under Article 51 of the Charter. But it is only in respect of states that the right of collective self-defence exists – humanitarian intervention on behalf of individuals in a state has not gained a place in international law. And it is only Russia which has recognized the statehood of the two regions.

Putin repeated on 23 February his earlier allegation that the people of the two breakaway republics are being repressed by the Ukraine government, and even that genocide is being committed against them. This baseless allegation is relevant not only to the claim of self-defence on behalf of these regions but also to Russia’s ‘recognition’ of them as separate states.

International law does not give the inhabitants of a part of a state the right to secede from that state. The aspect of self-determination which allows for independence of a ‘people’ applies to peoples in colonies and other overseas territories under the occupation of another state. The other aspect of self-determination is ‘internal’ and comprises the right to freely choose political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development within the state – as the Minsk accords sought to provide for Donetsk and Luhansk.

There is a somewhat controversial theory in international law that would give a right of secession from a state if the people in question were subject to extreme abuse of human rights and systematic oppression. This is the theory of remedial secession, which some countries, such as Switzerland, used in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – an independence still not recognized by Russia.

But the theory has no support from the international courts and, even if it did, Russia itself has stated previously that a right of remedial secession is ‘limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question’ (see Russia’s submissions to the ICJ in the Kosovo case, para 88).

The facts do not substantiate Russia’s claims anyway. The law is as stated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General on 21 February – that Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions is a ‘violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ There are no ‘states’ which can request the use of military force.

Is Ukraine a threat against Russia?

Putin refers to the ‘further expansion of the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, the military development of the territories of Ukraine’ as creating an ‘anti-Russia’ comprising a ‘real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty’.

Article 51 allows for self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This has been interpreted by many states to include defence against the threat of an imminent attack – for example, there is no requirement to wait until a nuclear strike has begun. But under no interpretation of ‘imminence’ can the situation in Ukraine constitute a threat to Russia. There have been no threats of force against Russia from Ukraine nor from NATO member states. There is nothing to support a legal justification for Russia’s military attack against Ukraine.

The myth of Ukraine never having had ‘real statehood’ also does not give any legal justification for Russian aggression. The UN is based on the ‘principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter). Ukraine retained its membership in the UN at the dissolution of the USSR, having been one of the founding members of the UN as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

What are the legal consequences of Russia’s actions?

Within the UN, it is the Security Council which has the mandate to uphold international peace and security, and act when there is a threat to the peace. But there will be no help from there with Russia’s status as a permanent member holding a veto.

The UN General Assembly may act instead. Since 2014 it has adopted a series of resolutions (the latest on 9 December 2021) requiring Russia to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Crimea. But the General Assembly does not have the powers of the Security Council, and cannot mandate peacekeepers or the use of force.

In due course there may be the need for a UN Human Rights Commission of Inquiry to be launched if there are breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law, and human rights cases may be brought against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. But international institutions do not have the necessary powers to stop what is going on right now.

International law gives the right to Ukraine, being attacked, to call for support from other states. And as well as imposing sanctions, states may wish to consider cyber countermeasures. Some of the recent cyber activity against Ukraine has been attributed by the US, UK, and Australia to the Russian Main Intelligence Unit (GRU).

Cyberspace governance at the United Nations 18 January 2023 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 November 2022 Online

How can member states achieve lasting, adaptable, and meaningful success in cyberspace governance at the United Nations?

Now in its second iteration, the Open-ended Working Group on Information and Communications Technologies (OEWG) has been a space for United Nations member states to discuss the use, regulation and governance of cyberspace since 2019.

The progress of this forum in shaping cyberspace and its governance is evidenced by two consensus reports including a framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and, more recently, plans for a Programme of Action. 
 
However, the true impact of these UN processes in limiting the threats of ICTs to international peace and security is contingent upon operationalizing the consensus at the international level and reflecting it in national policies and practices.

Pervasive challenges continue to hamper operationalization efforts, including differences in national capacities and capabilities, and divergences in national perspectives regarding the application of international law to cyberspace.

So, how can member states overcome these challenges and set this vital forum up for lasting, adaptable and meaningful success? What role does ‘multi-stakeholderism’ play in realizing responsible state behaviour in cyberspace?

With a dual focus on cyber capacity building and international law, this event considers how these two elements interact and intersect, how discussions on them could progress in the UN space and outside it and how the two contribute to a safer and more secure cyberspace for all. 
 
This event is organized jointly by the International Security and International Law Programmes at Chatham House to launch Phase 2 of the project ‘Cyberspace4All: Towards an inclusive approach to cyber governance’ which is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

Humanitarian exceptions: A turning point in UN sanctions Expert comment LJefferson 20 December 2022

The UN Security Council has adopted a cross-cutting exception for humanitarian action in UN sanctions. What does it cover? What must happen next?

The UN Security Council has removed an obstacle to humanitarian work. On 9 December 2022, it adopted a resolution establishing a cross-cutting exception to existing – and future – UN financial sanctions for funds or assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. In a coup for multilateralism, the council has been able to act, even when the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused paralysis in other areas.

Resolution 2664 – introduced by Ireland and the US, co-sponsored by 53 states, and adopted by 14 votes in favour, with India abstaining – is the culmination of a decade of engagement between humanitarian organizations and states to find ways of avoiding the adverse impact of sanctions on the most vulnerable: people relying on humanitarian action for survival.

A reminder of the problem

Whilst sanctions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for civilian populations, aid agencies have argued for years that they do just this. UN financial sanctions prohibit making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to designated persons or entities. Without adequate safeguards, incidental payments made during humanitarian operations, or relief consignments that are diverted and end up in the hands of such persons or entities can violate this prohibition.

Exceptions in Afghanistan and Haiti sanctions pave the way

Humanitarian actors have been decrying and documenting the impact of sanctions on their operations for years. Ensuring that sanctions did not hinder the COVID-19 response was a turning point in states’ willingness to address the issue.

Movement at Security Council level was gradual, starting off with demands in the renewals of certain country-specific sanctions that measures taken by member states to give effect to them comply with international law. The return to power of the Taliban called for a more radical approach.

In December 2021, the Council adopted a broad exception to the Afghanistan financial sanctions, covering the provision, payment and processing of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian action and for activities to meet basic human needs. A similar exception was adopted – almost unnoticed – in October 2022 in the newly-established Haiti sanctions.

These developments, coupled with the determination of elected Council member Ireland to find solutions, paved the way for the adoption of SCR 2664.

The scope of the humanitarian exception

SCR 2664 introduces a clear and broad exception that addresses the key challenges financial sanctions pose to humanitarian action. The exception expressly refers to the different ways in which funds or assets are allowed to reach designated persons or entities: by the provision of goods or payment of funds by humanitarian actors themselves; by the processing of funds by financial institutions; and by the provision of goods and services by other commercial actors whose services are necessary for humanitarian action such as insurers and freight companies.

The exception is broad in terms of the excluded activities: the provision of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. The UN Somalia sanctions – the first, and for a decade the only, regime to include an express exception – exclude funds necessary for ‘humanitarian assistance’.

SCR 2615 on Afghanistan added the expression ‘activities to meet basic human needs’.  These go beyond humanitarian assistance, and have been interpreted as including activities necessary to sustain essential social services such as health and education, preserve essential community systems, and promote livelihoods and social cohesion.  These are essentially development programmes.  ‘Activities that support basic needs’ should be understood in a similar manner in SCR 2664.

SCR 2664 is not, however, a ‘blanket’ exception.  It only applies to financial sanctions.  These are not the only type of restriction in UN sanctions that can hinder humanitarian action. For example, organizations that send commodities into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must still go through the notoriously slow procedure of authorization by the sanctions committee.  Similarly, authorizations are still required for import of demining materials that fall within the scope of arms embargoes.

Opportunities for further engagement and additional safeguards

Recognizing that additional challenges remain, SCR 2664 requests the UN Secretary-General to draft a report on unintended adverse humanitarian consequences of all types of restrictions in UN sanctions. He is asked to include recommendations for minimizing and such unintended consequences, including by the adoption of additional cross-cutting exceptions.

Humanitarian organizations have played a pivotal role in advancing the agenda. SCR 2664 is the result of their relentless engagement with the Security Council. It is not the end of the road. Other restrictions raise problems, and the Council has left the door open to finding ways of addressing them.

Humanitarian actors should seize this opportunity to provide information, identifying the problematic types of restrictions and their consequences on their operations as specifically as possible.

What happens next?

It is UN member states that implement UN sanctions. For SCR 2664 to be truly effective, it is imperative that states give effect to it in domestic law and practice. In doing so, they must not narrow the scope of the exception.

Recent experience in Afghanistan has shown that even in situations when significant safeguards exist, key actors may be unaware of them or unclear as to their precise scope. Financial institutions in particular are fast to de-risk when sanctions are imposed, and remain wary of conducting transactions that they perceive as high-risk even though exceptions permit this.

OFAC – the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the US Treasury – has issued extensive guidance on the Afghanistan sanctions in the form of frequently asked questions.  These have played an extremely important role in ensuring full advantage is taken of the exceptions.

States should follow this example, and adopt guidance to raise awareness of the exception in SCR 2664 and to clarify its scope.

A valuable precedent for autonomous sanctions

SCR 2664 only applies to sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council. It does not extend to autonomous sanctions adopted by states or relevant international organizations such as the EU.

Reactive oxygen species (ROS) are an unavoidable host environmental cue for intracellular pathogens such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Mycobacterium bovis; however, the signaling pathway in mycobacteria for sensing and responding to environmental stress remains largely unclear. Here, we characterize a novel CmtR-Zur-ESX3-Zn2+ regulatory pathway in M. bovis that aids mycobacterial survival under oxidative stress. We demonstrate that CmtR functions as a novel redox sensor and that its expression can be significantly induced under H2O2 stress. CmtR can physically interact with the negative regulator Zur and de-represses the expression of the esx-3 operon, which leads to Zn2+ accumulation and promotion of reactive oxygen species detoxication in mycobacterial cells. Zn2+ can also act as an effector molecule of the CmtR regulator, using which the latter can de-repress its own expression for further inducing bacterial antioxidant adaptation. Consistently, CmtR can induce the expression of EsxH, a component of esx-3 operon involved in Zn2+ transportation that has been reported earlier, and inhibit phagosome maturation in macrophages. Lastly, CmtR significantly contributes to bacterial survival in macrophages and in the lungs of infected mice. Our findings reveal the existence of an antioxidant regulatory pathway in mycobacteria and provide novel information on stress-triggered gene regulation and its association with host–pathogen interaction.

CARM1 is a protein arginine methyltransferase (PRMT) that acts as a coactivator in a number of transcriptional programs. CARM1 orchestrates this coactivator activity in part by depositing the H3R17me2a histone mark in the vicinity of gene promoters that it regulates. However, the gross levels of H3R17me2a in CARM1 KO mice did not significantly decrease, indicating that other PRMT(s) may compensate for this loss. We thus performed a screen of type I PRMTs, which revealed that PRMT6 can also deposit the H3R17me2a mark in vitro. CARM1 knockout mice are perinatally lethal and display a reduced fetal size, whereas PRMT6 null mice are viable, which permits the generation of double knockouts. Embryos that are null for both CARM1 and PRMT6 are noticeably smaller than CARM1 null embryos, providing in vivo evidence of redundancy. Mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs) from the double knockout embryos display an absence of the H3R17me2a mark during mitosis and increased signs of DNA damage. Moreover, using the combination of CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitors suppresses the cell proliferation of WT MEFs, suggesting a synergistic effect between CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitions. These studies provide direct evidence that PRMT6 also deposits the H3R17me2a mark and acts redundantly with CARM1.

Stop codon read-through (SCR) is a process of continuation of translation beyond a stop codon. This phenomenon, which occurs only in certain mRNAs under specific conditions, leads to a longer isoform with properties different from that of the canonical isoform. MTCH2, which encodes a mitochondrial protein that regulates mitochondrial metabolism, was selected as a potential read-through candidate based on evolutionary conservation observed in the proximal region of its 3' UTR. Here, we demonstrate translational read-through across two evolutionarily conserved, in-frame stop codons of MTCH2 using luminescence- and fluorescence-based assays, and by analyzing ribosome-profiling and mass spectrometry (MS) data. This phenomenon generates two isoforms, MTCH2x and MTCH2xx (single- and double-SCR products, respectively), in addition to the canonical isoform MTCH2, from the same mRNA. Our experiments revealed that a cis-acting 12-nucleotide sequence in the proximal 3' UTR of MTCH2 is the necessary signal for SCR. Functional characterization showed that MTCH2 and MTCH2x were localized to mitochondria with a long t1/2 (>36 h). However, MTCH2xx was found predominantly in the cytoplasm. This mislocalization and its unique C terminus led to increased degradation, as shown by greatly reduced t1/2 (<1 h). MTCH2 read-through–deficient cells, generated using CRISPR-Cas9, showed increased MTCH2 expression and, consistent with this, decreased mitochondrial membrane potential. Thus, double-SCR of MTCH2 regulates its own expression levels contributing toward the maintenance of normal mitochondrial membrane potential.

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Phospholipase Cε (PLCε) is activated downstream of G protein–coupled receptors and receptor tyrosine kinases through direct interactions with small GTPases, including Rap1A and Ras. Although Ras has been reported to allosterically activate the lipase, it is not known whether Rap1A has the same ability or what its molecular mechanism might be. Rap1A activates PLCε in response to the stimulation of β-adrenergic receptors, translocating the complex to the perinuclear membrane. Because the C-terminal Ras association (RA2) domain of PLCε was proposed to the primary binding site for Rap1A, we first confirmed using purified proteins that the RA2 domain is indeed essential for activation by Rap1A. However, we also showed that the PLCε pleckstrin homology (PH) domain and first two EF hands (EF1/2) are required for Rap1A activation and identified hydrophobic residues on the surface of the RA2 domain that are also necessary. Small-angle X-ray scattering showed that Rap1A binding induces and stabilizes discrete conformational states in PLCε variants that can be activated by the GTPase. These data, together with the recent structure of a catalytically active fragment of PLCε, provide the first evidence that Rap1A, and by extension Ras, allosterically activate the lipase by promoting and stabilizing interactions between the RA2 domain and the PLCε core.

RecQ family helicases are highly conserved from bacteria to humans and have essential roles in maintaining genome stability. Mutations in three human RecQ helicases cause severe diseases with the main features of premature aging and cancer predisposition. Most RecQ helicases shared a conserved domain arrangement which comprises a helicase core, an RecQ C-terminal domain, and an auxiliary element helicase and RNaseD C-terminal (HRDC) domain, the functions of which are poorly understood. In this study, we systematically characterized the roles of the HRDC domain in E. coli RecQ in various DNA transactions by single-molecule FRET. We found that RecQ repetitively unwinds the 3'-partial duplex and fork DNA with a moderate processivity and periodically patrols on the ssDNA in the 5'-partial duplex by translocation. The HRDC domain significantly suppresses RecQ activities in the above transactions. In sharp contrast, the HRDC domain is essential for the deep and long-time unfolding of the G4 DNA structure by RecQ. Based on the observations that the HRDC domain dynamically switches between RecA core- and ssDNA-binding modes after RecQ association with DNA, we proposed a model to explain the modulation mechanism of the HRDC domain. Our findings not only provide new insights into the activities of RecQ on different substrates but also highlight the novel functions of the HRDC domain in DNA metabolisms.

Centrioles are key eukaryotic organelles that are responsible for the formation of cilia and flagella, and for organizing the microtubule network and the mitotic spindle in animals. Centriole assembly requires oligomerization of the essential protein spindle assembly abnormal 6 (SAS-6), which forms a structural scaffold templating the organization of further organelle components. A dimerization interaction between SAS-6 N-terminal “head” domains was previously shown to be essential for protein oligomerization in vitro and for function in centriole assembly. Here, we developed a pharmacophore model allowing us to assemble a library of low-molecular-weight ligands predicted to bind the SAS-6 head domain and inhibit protein oligomerization. We demonstrate using NMR spectroscopy that a ligand from this family binds at the head domain dimerization site of algae, nematode, and human SAS-6 variants, but also that another ligand specifically recognizes human SAS-6. Atomistic molecular dynamics simulations starting from SAS-6 head domain crystallographic structures, including that of the human head domain which we now resolve, suggest that ligand specificity derives from favorable Van der Waals interactions with a hydrophobic cavity at the dimerization site.

RNA-protein interfaces control key replication events during the HIV-1 life cycle. The viral trans-activator of transcription (Tat) protein uses an archetypal arginine-rich motif (ARM) to recruit the host positive transcription elongation factor b (pTEFb) complex onto the viral trans-activation response (TAR) RNA, leading to activation of HIV transcription. Efforts to block this interaction have stimulated production of biologics designed to disrupt this essential RNA-protein interface. Here, we present four co-crystal structures of lab-evolved TAR-binding proteins (TBPs) in complex with HIV-1 TAR. Our results reveal that high-affinity binding requires a distinct sequence and spacing of arginines within a specific β2-β3 hairpin loop that arose during selection. Although loops with as many as five arginines were analyzed, only three arginines could bind simultaneously with major-groove guanines. Amino acids that promote backbone interactions within the β2-β3 loop were also observed to be important for high-affinity interactions. Based on structural and affinity analyses, we designed two cyclic peptide mimics of the TAR-binding β2-β3 loop sequences present in two high-affinity TBPs (KD values of 4.2 ± 0.3 and 3.0 ± 0.3 nm). Our efforts yielded low-molecular weight compounds that bind TAR with low micromolar affinity (KD values ranging from 3.6 to 22 μm). Significantly, one cyclic compound within this series blocked binding of the Tat-ARM peptide to TAR in solution assays, whereas its linear counterpart did not. Overall, this work provides insight into protein-mediated TAR recognition and lays the ground for the development of cyclic peptide inhibitors of a vital HIV-1 RNA-protein interaction.

E. A. Rakhmanov and S. P. Suetin
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 269-290.
Abstract, references and article information

A. I. Aptekarev and M. L. Yattselev
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 251-268.
Abstract, references and article information

A. Kh. Khachatryan, Kh. A. Khachatryan and A. Zh. Narimanyan
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 183-200.
Abstract, references and article information

M. A. Stepanova
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 1-13.
Abstract, references and article information

Minerals and Metals for a Low-Carbon Future: Implications for Developing Countries 30 October 2017 — 5:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 October 2017 Chatham House, London

This roundtable will explore two sides of minerals and metals for a low-carbon future - the growing demand for metals required for low-carbon technology and the technological and policy innovations that will be required to manage the carbon footprint of the mining sector and its wider energy and industrial linkages. Based around a presentation and scenarios developed by the World Bank, this roundtable discussion will assess which strategic metals will likely rise in demand in order to deliver a low-carbon future, before exploring the possible implications for resource-rich developing countries. In particular, what does a growing demand of minerals for a clean energy future mean for governments and industry, and how might developing countries benefit from this trend? What impact might growth of the mining sector have on a sustainable and climate-smart development? Can renewable energy and other clean tech innovations in the mining industry help reduce the carbon footprint of the sector and related industries, and under what circumstances? And how fit-for-purpose are current donor approaches to the mining sector in an increasingly carbon-constrained world?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Fossil Fuels Expert Roundtable: Forecasting Forum 2018 12 February 2018 — 2:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 December 2017 Chatham House, London

This forum will present the latest thinking from senior researchers on the dynamics that will affect fossil fuels investment and markets in the year ahead. The first session will assess the various factors keeping oil and gas prices from bouncing back and will consider conditions and political developments that could influence markets in the year ahead. The second session will assess the future of the power sector and what this means for the fossil fuels industry.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Fossil Fuels Expert Roundtable: How Solar is Shaping the Energy Transition 1 June 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 22 May 2018 Chatham House, London

As global temperatures rise and extreme weather events multiply, doubts over the reality and imminence of climate change have dissipated. Despite this, there is a clear lack of urgency by governments to the approaching crisis. At this event, Prem Shankar Jha will set out what he believes are the three main causes for this inaction.

Furthermore, he will argue that catastrophic climate change is imminent, but even if it weren’t, the risk is too great to ignore. Only a complete shift from fossil fuels by 2070 at the latest would provide reasonable certainty of avoiding irreversible consequences. This transition is not only possible but the technologies to enable it were harnessed four to nine decades ago – and all of them draw their primary energy from the sun. These technologies are already capable of delivering electricity, transport fuels, and petrochemicals at prices that are competitive with the current delivered cost of electricity in the US and Western Europe. So what is holding up the energy shift?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Mining, Minerals and Metals Expert Roundtable: Forest-Smart Mining Report Launch 10 May 2019 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The EU’s Un-Common Agricultural Policy 21 October 2019 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 27 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

What's next for environmental peacebuilding? Lessons learned and opportunities from conflict-affected states 17 February 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2021 Online

 This event explores lessons and opportunities from conflict-affected states.

In the field of peacebuilding, scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of environmental restoration, afforestation and infrastructural renewal for creating the sustainable livelihoods necessary for successful peacebuilding efforts.

Featuring academics writing for International Affairs on environmental peacebuilding in Colombia, Yemen and the Sahel, this webinar discusses the policy implications of the turn to environmental peacebuilding.

This event is part of the Chatham House’s Environment and Society Discussion Series in which the Energy Environment and Resources Programme brings together leading academics and policymakers to discuss key issues in environmental policy.

In particular, this event focuses on the role of environmental peacebuilding in creating sustainable livelihoods. From the impact the destruction of infrastructure can have on poverty as a driver of conflict, to the role environmental peacebuilding can play in bringing communities together by creating sustainable shared spaces of employment, the importance of the environmental livelihood creation is difficult to overstate.

Panellists focus on how policymakers can best encourage inclusive and sustainable livelihood creation and on addressing the key challenges such approaches face in the context of environmental peacebuilding efforts.

An Attack on the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Principle in Hong Kong Expert comment sysadmin 11 January 2016

The disappearance of publisher Lee Bo may mark the beginning of the end of Beijing’s commitment to uphold the framework that provides the territory with a high degree of autonomy.

The disappearance of a publisher in Hong Kong, Lee Bo, who owns a well-known bookshop that sells books critical of Chinese leaders, is a landmark event and potentially a historical turning point for Hong Kong. It is not clear if this happened at the behest of the senior Chinese leadership. But if those responsible for the disappearing of Lee are not punished, it will be clear that their acts are condoned by the authorities.

This is deeply worrying as it gravely undermines the ‘one country, two systems’ framework, which provides Hong Kong with high degree of autonomy from Beijing. Under the Sino-British Agreement of 1984 and Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which govern relations between Hong Kong and China, the rights of Hong Kong citizens are meant to be protected within the territory. Mainland Chinese authorities do not have the legal power to arrest or detain an individual in, or remove anyone from, Hong Kong.

The Chinese know the limit of their legal authority in Hong Kong. Hence, Lee was quietly disappeared, rather than openly arrested. But that it happened at all may mark the beginning of the end of Beijing’s commitment to uphold the ‘one country, two systems’ framework – a relationship that requires Beijing to tolerate, if not respect, the judicial integrity and the way of life in Hong Kong.

Do we know for sure that Lee was ‘disappeared’ by China’s security apparatus? Before he disappeared, Lee said in an interview that he knew he had been watched and that his emails were accessed by Chinese agents, and that he would not travel to the mainland as a result. And we know that Lee’s travel documents are all in his home; yet he is now supposedly in China ‘assisting the authorities in an investigation’ into something unspecified. This explanation comes from a fax sent to Lee’s wife, probably intended by the Chinese authorities to put an end to speculation. But why would Chinese authorities work with Lee, a British citizen who carries no travel documents and would thus have broken the law by entering China? The circumstantial evidence is strong enough to show that whether he was taken by Chinese officers or someone else, his removal from Hong Kong to China must have received official endorsement.

Should the rest of the world be concerned about this? Hong Kong is a major financial center that services the world economy, and it can do so largely because it enjoys judicial independence and the high degree of autonomy under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. It is also a shining example of how the rights and scope of development for individuals can be respected in a Chinese community. Should the ‘one country, two systems’ framework be undermined, Hong Kong as we know it will be no more.

Beijing’s quick response in requiring Lee to fax his family may come across as ham-fisted and callous, but it also demonstrates that it had not expected the strong backlash to Lee’s disappearance. A strong and well-articulated international response that brings the matter to Xi’s attention may persuade him that it is in China’s best interest to put a stop to this process of undermining the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. Given Hong Kong’s importance to the global economy, this should be a priority for the international community.

This article was originally published in the Diplomat.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Twenty Years After Hong Kong Handover, Does ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Still Work? Expert comment sysadmin 28 June 2017

This unique constitutional framework can endure – if Hong Kong society can reconcile its different visions of the future.

Twenty years after the handover of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty, the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement – the main aim of which was to guarantee the continuity of Hong Kong’s open society and way of life – can be said to have worked well. Street protests remain a regular feature of Hong Kong’s political culture. Freedom of information and expression are alive and well. Hong Kong retains its ‘capitalist way of life’, its legal system based on common law and independent judiciary, and its status as an international financial centre. As a result the city remains one of the most open economies across Asia, with robust institutions and transparency which are hard to find anywhere else in the region.

Yet the 79-day ‘occupy’ protests of autumn 2014 showed that something is not quite right in the city of Hong Kong.

The protests themselves had a number of causes. Partly they reflected socioeconomic concerns, especially the rise in income inequality and lack of affordable housing. These might have been dealt with to some extent by better governance over the years, but they are also a feature of many societies in the current phase of globalization – a case, perhaps, of too much ‘capitalist way of life’.

Politically, the desire expressed by many in 2014 was for a form of ‘genuine universal suffrage’ for the selection of Hong Kong’s chief executive which went beyond a provision of Hong Kong’s mini constitution, the Basic Law, that candidates should be put forward by a ‘nominating committee’. It was on this point that the possibility of constitutional reform foundered in 2015, leaving Hong Kong no further ahead in its ‘gradual progress’ towards democracy.

But this episode also brought to the surface the tension between different visions for Hong Kong’s future. In particular, many in Hong Kong are still uncomfortable with the ‘one country’ part of the deal, rejected by some (especially young people) in the ways that they conceptualize Hong Kong identity – according to one recent survey, as little as 3.1% of Hong Kong youths identify themselves as ‘Chinese’. These issues are likely to constrain political development for some time to come.

At their sharpest, some of these visions are for some form of self-determination, or even independence, for Hong Kong. This is not just anathema to the national authorities in Beijing, but contradicts a basic tenet of Hong Kong’s handover in 1997, the return to Chinese sovereignty. This is not just something on which Beijing will never compromise, but will seek to challenge.

It is this which explains the sense in Hong Kong that the central government has been looking to become politically more involved since 2014. But the challenge of influencing Hong Kong society is great, and other than strengthening relations with the establishment camp, Beijing has not been able to tighten its grip. If anything, the centre of gravity of Hong Kong politics has continued to drift away from Beijing, not towards it.

How this will play out remains to be seen. Some amelioration of social tensions could help. But the fundamental divergence in visions of Hong Kong’s future will not be resolved so easily.

Looking forward therefore, the key to the continued success of ‘one country, two systems’ lies in Hong Kong society. If mainstream acceptance of the compromises involved can return, then this unique constitutional framework can still work for years to come.

Is Myanmar Running Out of Time? 17 February 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Just a few years ago the West was celebrating what appeared to be the conclusion of a quarter-century long contest between Myanmar’s democrats and a military dictatorship. Today, the country stands charged with genocide at the International Court of Justice, with Aung San Suu Kyi leading the defence. Is Myanmar a democratic transition gone awry? Or something else entirely?

The speaker will argue that Myanmar is not the simple morality tale often portrayed. It has instead become the stage for some of the world’s most pressing challenges such as climate change, explosive inequality and rising populism, the impact of social media; and the rise of China as the next global superpower.

In this context, are 20th century democratic institutions and free-market reforms the correct remedy for a country plagued by the legacies of colonialism, decades of civil war, tyranny and a predatory economic system? The speaker will offer a prognosis for Myanmar’s future, assessing the question of whether it will become Asia’s next failed state.

This event will be held off the record.

Gurmeet K. Bakshi, Jyoti Garg and Gabriela Olteanu
Math. Comp. 93 (), 3027-3058.
Abstract, references and article information

Martin Ehler and Karlheinz Gröchenig
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2885-2919.
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Haiyong Wang
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2861-2884.
Abstract, references and article information

Ran Gu and Bing Gao
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2837-2860.
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Zhaohui Fu, Tao Tang and Jiang Yang
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2745-2767.
Abstract, references and article information