In the aftermath of the liberation from ISIS, the government of Iraq was left to count the cost of three years of brutal conflict, only the most recent phase in the ongoing cycle of conflict and stabilization that has plagued Iraq for 16 years. While reconstruction has been a focus of both the Iraqi government and international policymakers since 2003, billions of dollars in pledged funds have continually failed to reach the places they are most needed. 

At this roundtable, Ali Farhan Hamid will discuss the efforts of his provincial government to rebuild the cities and towns worst-hit by the conflict. He will provide insights into the practical and structural impediments to reconstruction efforts in both Anbar and neighbouring provinces such as Ninewah where the worst damage was sustained under ISIS but where little in the way of reconstruction has been achieved thereby leaving the door open to the potential resurgence of conflict.

The roundtable is part of the Chatham House Iraq Initiative.

The speaker will outline a number of foreign policy challenges facing transatlantic business, such as China’s increasing economic power, turmoil in the Middle East, and Russia’s recent actions in eastern Europe. He will examine how these issues can provide obstacles to cooperation and development, and restrict access to markets, and how they can be addressed. 

The event is part of our series on US and European Perspectives on Common Economic Challenges. Conducted with the support of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, this series examines some of the principal global challenges that we face today and the potentially differing perspectives from the US and across Europe. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The situation in Ukraine remains in flux and despite Europe and the US toughening sanctions on Russia, President Putin continues to increase the scope of Russia’s involvement in the conflict between the Ukrainian government and the separatists. It remains unclear how far Putin is willing to go, what his broader regional ambitions are, and what he will do if forced further into a corner by Western actions. In this time of uncertainty and instability it is therefore vital to assess how the transatlantic partners should respond to this increasingly precarious situation. 

At this all-day event, the group will discuss how US policy towards Russia is changing, what this means for Europe and, subsequently, how Europe should respond. 

Attencance at this event is by invitation only.

The event is part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will come together to discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.

During this event, Dr Constanze Stelzenmüller will discuss the findings of the Transatlantic Trends 2014 Survey. Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey measuring public opinion in the United States, Turkey, Russia, and 10 European Union member states. This year’s survey examines key issues facing the transatlantic community, such as European and US responses to the crisis in Ukraine, the state of the transatlantic relationship in the wake of the NSA scandal, the future of European integration, Russian foreign policy preferences, and views on major foreign policy issues like NATO’s future and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

The speaker will outline the importance of economic cooperation in the transatlantic relationship and consider recent developments in the global economy.

The international community is in urgent need of successful, cooperative strategies for both preventing mass atrocities before they begin and stopping those in progress. As recent crises have highlighted, effective international cooperation to save lives and preserve peace and security remains largely aspirational. Participants will discuss current thinking on mass atrocity prevention and intervention, and identify how transatlantic cooperation in this space could be more effective.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

With the Middle East in chaos and the future of many states increasingly uncertain, there is a large amount of attention as to how policy-makers in Europe and the US should respond. In particular, many in Europe are unsure of long-term US policy in light of competing American priorities, budgetary constraints and a public adverse to committing further resources abroad. In this context, it is important that European and American policy-makers understand each other’s positions.

At this all-day event, a group of experts will discuss how US policy towards the Middle East is changing, what this means for Europe and, subsequently, how Europe should respond. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The workshop is held as part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, with support for this event provided by the Delegation of Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defence and the British Embassy in Paris.

Is there a ‘crisis’ in the transatlantic relationship? Although the US and Europe are not irresistibly diverging, there are indications that governments and their populations on both sides of the Atlantic are becoming less aligned in their thinking and actions. And it is happening just when they need to become closer.

The ‘rise of the rest’, in which new emerging markets are coming to the fore, is creating a more competitive international environment. And the West is not putting on an adequate response. Unless the US and Europe want to relinquish leadership on building global norms and standards on key issues, their leaders once again need to work more collectively together.

Divides in the Atlantic community

The structures put together in the first half of the 20th century by the Atlantic community (such as NATO, the UN, the WTO/GATT, the IMF and the World Bank) provided the architecture and norms by which everyone functioned – and thereby primed the international context in their favour.

However, these institutions have become increasingly dysfunctional or unfit for purpose, and are increasingly ignored (like the UN) or replaced (as China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [AIIB] is arguably attempting to do). That contextual advantage has gone. And there are many other good reasons to be concerned.

Shared values are a notable aspect of the strong and longstanding relationship between the US and Europe. But now, although the US does appear to be coming closer to Europe on some measures (Pew polling suggests America is becoming less religious and more liberal on gay rights and recreational drugs, for instance), there is clear evidence that differences of opinion are becoming more entrenched.

Policy divides between the US and Europe are commonplace, but recently the list of differences (and the degree of difference of opinion) appears to be growing. The split over joining the AIIB is the most recent of these, being a visible symptom of a larger fundamental difference of opinion on Asia. But other issues that divide include actions in Libya in 2011, Syria today, Russia, support for NATO, energy independence and what to do about climate change.

The study on elite perceptions conducted by Chatham House’s US Project in 2014 made clear how important Europeans perceived America’s traditional values to be, but also raised the concern that the US was losing sight of them (citing, for example, the lack of universal healthcare and attitudes towards the death penalty and gun laws). The visceral response of the German public to the Snowden revelations is a stark example of the divide in attitudes.

Special relationships

Anecdotally, the evidence is also not good. Over the past four years the general tone of conversations in Europe about the US has changed, due to huge uncertainty about whether the US is going to continue to play the same role it has in the past or whether it will leave Europe to face its challenges alone. Meanwhile, in the US the conversation around whether Europe will step up (particularly in security) has heightened tremendously. Four years ago, no one thought to question the transatlantic relationship. Today, on both sides, there is a lack of confidence.

The US-UK relationship has a special part in this – it has long been and still remains the centre-point of the transatlantic relationship. From a realpolitik perspective, the US sees the UK as valuable for three principal reasons: A) its role in the EU promoting common UK/US interests; B) the assets it brings to the table (particularly defence and intelligence); and C) its external perspective and its support internationally (ensuring the US is rarely alone). However, in the coming years A might go away and B is declining with falling defence spending, leaving only C. And a weak US-UK relationship could cause significant trouble for the wider US-Europe relationship.

It is all too easy to forget the importance of the transatlantic relationship. For many it is increasingly irrelevant – the emerging powers such as China and Brazil are far more interesting. And for others it is just an ever-present reality – the Atlantic allies have been so close and through so much that nothing can change it.

Neither of these is right. The transatlantic relationship is vital part of addressing global challenges and it is something that, if continued to be treated either with either contempt or ignorance, will be lost before we know it. For these reasons, the US Project is beginning new research that looks at the transatlantic relationship and asks whether there is a rift. If yes, we hope to explore what can be done to mitigate it – before it is too late.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Against the backdrop of continuing conflict in Libya, the Middle East and Ukraine and rising tensions in the South China Sea, Condoleezza Rice will discuss the importance of reenergizing NATO capabilities and ensuring a strong transatlantic alliance.

The ballot for entries to this event has now closed. Successful registrants will be sent e-tickets on Monday 26 October.

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed. The live stream will be made available at 13:30 BST on Thursday 29 October.

ASK A QUESTION: We endeavour to put questions from our online audience, as well as from those in the auditorium,  to the speaker. Questions can be submitted in advance to questions@chathamhouse.org or asked during the event on Twitter using #CHEvents.

About the John C Whitehead Lecture

The annual John C Whitehead Lecture has been a fixture of the Chatham House schedule for over a decade, honouring the many contributions Mr Whitehead made to Anglo-American relations in the public and private sectors.

Mr Whitehead was US deputy secretary of state to George Shultz and was awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal by Ronald Reagan. He was a chairman emeritus of the Brookings Institution and served as chairman of the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, the organization responsible for rebuilding and rejuvenating New York following the 2001 terrorist attacks. John C Whitehead sadly passed away in February of this year but the annual lecture at Chatham House will continue to provide a forum for prominent and distinguished speakers to address the subject of transatlantic relations.

Europe and the United States have dominated global institutions for over 70 years. However, as the emerging markets take up a greater share of the global economy it is becoming increasingly difficult for the transatlantic powers to maintain the current system. This event will examine the changes needed in order to avoid a collapse of the current system.

The workshop is held as part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, with support for this event provided by the Bertelsmann Foundation. 

Summary

• Chatham House brought together European, Asian and American policy-makers and experts over the course of a two-day scenario workshop in November 2015. The participants were asked to take part in a structured role-playing exercise imagining a potential near-future conflict between China and Japan over disputed islands.
• The findings of the workshop, and the actions of participants in the simulation, suggested significant differences between how the United States and Europe prioritize their interests in the Asia-Pacific. In particular, the perception was that the European Union and its member states consider challenges from their ‘near abroad’ as more tangible than those emanating from Asia, and that they focus on commercial opportunities in the region. In contrast, US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific is seen as emphasizing strategic and geopolitical challenges.
• In terms of military capabilities, Europeans view themselves as having few assets to bring to bear in Asia. European, American and Asian observers are largely unaware of French and British military capabilities in or near the region.
• Beyond the military, Europe’s other tools of leverage – diplomatic, development, economic and other soft-power instruments – are also ignored. Europeans are often unaware of the activities of their own governments in the region. This is equally true in reverse – Japan’s engagement vis-à-vis European interests (such as with respect to Russia or Syria) is little recognized by Europeans.
• European nations prefer to engage unilaterally with Asia on trade and multilaterally, through the EU, on security and geopolitical issues. However, no ideal forum for multilateral coordination exists (given the fact that the EU is not a member of most Asian regional organizations).
• The US’s greater engagement in Asia reflects the fact that the US, unlike its European counterparts, is a Pacific nation. But it can also be explained by greater domestic public support for such engagement. This reflects the presence of significant numbers of US troops in Asia and the relatively high proportion of ethnic Asians in the US compared with the EU.

Summary

• The United States’ transatlantic allies need to appreciate how its global leadership is changing and what this means for their interests, and respond accordingly. Notions of US decline have been overstated, but the country is not going to play the same international role in the future that it has previously.
• As the United States’ international engagement changes, Canada and Europe should increase coordination with it to prevent power vacuums from emerging. The transatlantic allies should work together to build greater links at all stages of the policy process, from perceptions of threat, prioritization, analysis, threat definition and policy formation to implementation and action.  
• As the United States’ capabilities adapt to its changed circumstances and role, so too must those of its allies. This adjustment must go far beyond military aspects to enhancing diplomatic, energy, economic, intelligence and other resources.
• In addition to the challenges around differing interests, priorities and capabilities inherent in any alliance, Europe appears to have lost its confidence. In part this is due to its growing disengagement and introspection. But Europe retains huge potential for influence if it uses its resources effectively. There is much that European states can do, individually and together, to take more control over advancing their strategic interests. Equally, by working together they can do much to nudge the United States in helpful directions to support the mutual interests of all parties.
• The conversation on reforming global institutions such as the IMF must move beyond the need for change per se towards articulating the actual shape of such changes. Europe and Canada will likely need to push the United States into accepting reform of these institutions to better reflect today’s reality and tomorrow’s challenges. Global institutions need more diversified leaderships if they are to ensure their long-term legitimacy and influence. This will be difficult to push through politically in the United States, but by working with new regional and global powers to propose reforms, Europe and Canada can help find an acceptable solution.
• The use of ad hoc coalitions does not necessarily damage the efficacy of broader consensus institutions such as NATO. In fact, flexible coalitions may often be desirable when solutions to new challenges need to be developed and agreed quickly.
• Canada and Europe should consider partnering with other actors besides the United States where necessary. This may be expedient for meeting individual objectives, and would have the secondary benefit of demonstrating to emerging powers that the West does not exclude cooperation with others out of an arbitrary loyalty to the United States.
• Europe needs to appreciate the potentially dire consequences of failing to adapt to changing US leadership and an increasingly complex world. There is a real chance that the European project could unravel in the next few years due to external and internal pressures. While many European policy-makers display an understanding of these challenges in private, in public there is little appetite for taking the decisions necessary to bring long-term stability to the continent. 

• Chatham House brought together 32 participants over a two-day period in February 2016 to discuss the US and European responses to a simulated scenario in which alleged actions by Iran threaten the sustainability of the nuclear deal. This was the second of four scenario roundtables (the first involved a conflict between China and Japan).
• Despite the inherent challenges in the initial scenario the transatlantic partners in the simulation were able to retain a strong joint position in their negotiations with Iran throughout the scenario. The principal factor enabling the US and Europe to maintain their joint negotiating position was the framework of conditions provided by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which mandated specific actions, responses and timelines if events threatened the agreement. When in doubt, all parties in the simulation reverted to the agreed framework.
• The Europeans in the simulation seemed to view any indirect consequences of the nuclear deal as mostly positive whereas the Americans largely saw the externalities as negative. Equally, the scenario showed Iran as having different approaches towards the US and Europe respectively: willing to engage with the latter, while keeping the former in the cold.
• The greatest tensions occurred between EU member states, mainly in relation to differences over process rather than policy. Domestic factors in the US and Europe could, in the future, make maintaining a joint position towards Iran increasingly hard. In particular, potential stumbling blocks include immigration and social policies in response to the migration crisis in Europe; and, in the US, the significant political polarization around the E3/EU+3 deal.

Summary

• Chatham House brought together 22 participants over a two-day period in May 2016 to discuss US and European responses to a potential conflict between Turkey and Russia. This was the third of four scenario roundtables (the first two involved a conflict between China and Japan and a potential breakdown in the Iran nuclear deal, respectively).
• The scenario was designed and the roundtable took place before a number of crucial subsequent developments, including the partial restoration of Turkish/Russian relations, the British vote to leave the European Union (EU), and the attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This paper should be read and understood in that context.
• In our simulation, the United States and Europe worked closely together, with cooperation particularly in evidence between the US and Germany. While the US was slightly more willing than Europe to threaten sanctions against Russia, transatlantic unity was not seriously threatened by a Turkey/Russia conflict.
• Western states were wary of bringing NATO into the picture for fear that this would be perceived as militarizing an already tense situation. The EU was also sidelined in favour of more ad hoc negotiating strategies.
• Russia was effective in using international law to defend its position, even as it took steadily more aggressive action in Syria. Neither the West nor Turkey deployed an effective countermeasure to this tactic.

Economic populism is on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have made protectionist arguments and appealed to voters who feel left behind by globalization. In Europe, left-wing groups like Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain as well as far-right groups like France’s Front National, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the UK Independence Party are capitalizing on the anti-globalization mood.

Manifestations of the current anti-trade and anti-globalization movements include opposition to trade initiatives like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as populist calls for an end to the austerity measures and economic reforms that were introduced in the wake of the euro crisis. There have been questions regarding whether capitalism can respond to the rise in inequality seen in many Western states. Many populists also share a distrust of those they perceive as elite policy-makers and a desire to reclaim national sovereignty from international institutions. Thus, the rise of populism could have far-reaching consequences for trade and economic policy-making and the existing trade and broader economic architectures.

The US and the Americas Programme at Chatham House and the German Marshall Fund of the United States in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung will convene an expert roundtable to provide insight and analysis geared towards examining key drivers behind the rise of economic populism, its implications for the international economic system, and possible ways to mitigate the effects of populism in the economic arena.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

The Chatham House Rule

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

As US and European governments grapple with the challenges of reinforcing their economic relationships, traditional negotiations over tax and trade policy may soon be overwhelmed by a far thornier issue: the regulation of data storage, protection and analysis. As traditional global trade in goods and services has levelled off, cross-border data flows continue to expand rapidly.

Christopher Smart will outline the economic promise of data analytics to drive dramatic productivity gains, particularly for industry and financial services. He will explore contrasting political debates in the United States and Europe over personal privacy and national security and analyse how these have influenced many of the assumptions that drive the regulation of data flows. 

This event is open to coporate members only.

This event will be preceded by an informal, welcome reception from 12:15.

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule. 

The transatlantic partnership has provided the backbone to the liberal international order ever since the end of the Second World War. The tumultuous political events of 2016 denote a brutal rupture from the dominant global position of the transatlantic partnership and threaten to undermine the partnership itself. Only by understanding that the current problems facing the transatlantic relationship have deep structural roots will it be possible to find ways to prevent further erosion, sustain the benefits of the existing partnership and build opportunities for transatlantic cooperation in the future. 

Ahead of the publication of his new paper, Robin Niblett, will join us to share his thoughts on the challenges, opportunities and potential strategies towards securing the future of the transatlantic relationship. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Summary

• As the US government and European governments once again grapple with the challenges of reinforcing and expanding the transatlantic economic relationship, traditional negotiations over trade or tax policy may soon be upstaged by a far thornier and more important issue: how to regulate the storage, protection and analysis of data.
• Growth in the traditional global trade in goods and services has levelled off, but cross-border data flows continue to expand rapidly and the challenges of developing policies that protect privacy, security and innovation are already tremendous. For example, data analytics are driving dramatic productivity gains in industry, particularly for large and complex installations whose safety and efficiency will increasingly depend on flows of data across jurisdictions. Meanwhile, ‘fintech’ (financial technology) start-ups and large banks alike are testing new modes of accumulating, analysing and deploying customer data to provide less expensive services and manage the risk profile of their businesses.
• While the US debate on the use of data has often been framed around the trade-off between national security and personal privacy, Europeans often face an even more complex set of concerns that include worries that their digital and technology firms lag behind dominant US competitors. The political and regulatory uncertainty helps neither side, and leaves transatlantic companies struggling to comply with uncertain and conflicting rules in different jurisdictions.
• A global consensus on data regulation is currently well out of reach, but given the expanding importance of data in so many areas, basic agreement on regulatory principles is crucial between the US and the EU. This paper proposes a ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’, which could help shape a common understanding. While it would hardly resolve all concerns – or indeed contradictions – around the prevailing traditions on both sides of the Atlantic, it could provide the basis for better cooperation and establish a framework to protect the promise of the digital age amid an unpredictable and emotional debate.

While trade and tax remain at the heart of the difficult economic conversations between Europe and the US, a new issue has emerged as a potential source of even greater friction: data.

Growth in the traditional global trade in goods and services has levelled off, but cross-border data flows continue to expand rapidly and the challenges of developing policies that protect privacy, security and innovation are already tremendous. For example, data analytics are driving dramatic productivity gains in industry, particularly for large and complex installations whose safety and efficiency will increasingly depend on flows of those data across jurisdictions. Meanwhile, ‘fintech’ (financial technology) start-ups and large banks alike are testing new modes of accumulating, analysing and deploying customer data to provide less expensive services and manage the risk profile of their businesses.

The rules that govern the collection, transmission and storage of data are perhaps one of the more surprising controversies in the transatlantic relationship. Similar liberal democracies with similar geostrategic interests might be expected to approach the handling of personal, corporate and government data in more or less the same way. And yet the US and its key European partners have struck different balances in the trade-offs between national security and citizens’ rights, between freedom of expression and personal privacy, and between free enterprise and market regulation.

While the US debate on the use of data has often been framed around the trade-off between national security and personal privacy, Europeans often face an even more complex set of concerns that include worries that their digital and technology firms lag behind dominant US competitors. The political and regulatory uncertainty helps neither side, and leaves transatlantic companies struggling to comply with uncertain and conflicting rules in different jurisdictions.

This makes more determined efforts by US and European policymakers to agree basic principles that will guide the usage and protection of personal and commercial data all the more important. While common regulations or even greater alignment among regulators seem out of reach, a ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’ would provide a set of principles for more specific rules amid political landscapes and technological developments that are evolving rapidly. It could also provide the basis for firms, whether in manufacturing or financial services or health care, to draft their own voluntary standards on how they protect data even as they develop new algorithms that improve productivity, safety and customer satisfaction.

Embarrassing leaks, careful denials and endless lawsuits will continue to shape the awkward efforts of policymakers to find common ground around issues like cyberespionage, defence of common networks and the sharing of personal data with law enforcement. Cyberattacks with the aim of disrupting government operations or influencing election campaigns will add still further pressures. These will all serve as a noisy backdrop to a related but separate debate over how commercial firms should exploit the opportunities of global networks and ‘big data’ analytics while protecting national interests and privacy.

Yet, setting common guidelines for commercial data transmission and storage remains crucial both to protect the goods and services that already depend on sophisticated data-gathering and analysis, and to support the next generation of productivity gains and business opportunities.

Global firms yearn for clarity and predictability as they organize themselves to make the most of the data revolution. Neither is likely to become a reality soon. The EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation will take effect in 2018, but its implementation will inevitably be coloured by the fact that American firms currently dominate the information technology business. Last year’s ‘Privacy Shield’ agreement between the US and the EU renews the permission for firms with transatlantic business interests to transfer data, subject to compliance with basic standards of protection, but the agreement remains vulnerable to European court challenges. Britain’s decision to leave the EU adds a further complication, as it establishes its own set of data protection rules that may not easily align with either European or US requirements. Meanwhile, the World Trade Organization continues to debate new rules for digital trade, even as markets like China, Russia and Brazil make up their own.

If this ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’ were adopted bilaterally, say as part of the annual reviews of the US–EU Privacy Shield agreement, it could form the basis for broader cooperation on these issues, helping to drive progress in the G7 and G20 and ultimately perhaps in trade agreements under the WTO. It would hardly secure complete alignment on these questions, but it could help establish the framework for a debate that all too often lurches to extremes and risks damaging a fundamental alliance for global stability – along with a fundamental driver of 21st-century economic progress.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

The US and the EU face many of the same challenges today: they must maintain economic growth in the face of global competition, harness and manage rapid technological change and respond to diverse security threats. Yet a transatlantic alliance that has endured since the end of the Second World War now appears increasingly divided over how to respond.  

The 2016 Brexit referendum and the US presidential election resulted in victories for populist campaigns that questioned the core values and institutions of this alliance. More recent elections in Europe have bolstered centrist candidates, and helped to rejuvenate the EU. But on questions of trade, security, climate change and relations with Russia, Europe’s leaders have frequently been at odds with the Trump administration. On these and other critical issues, an opportunity and impetus has arisen for the EU to assume a global leadership role that many feel the US is abandoning.

Are the EU and the US on divergent paths? How are changing geopolitical and economic realities transforming the transatlantic alliance? And how committed is this alliance to defending the global institutions and rules it created? Chatham House and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs will convene policy experts, journalists and practitioners for a half-day event to chart these trends and consider their implications.

Please note, this event will take place in Chicago between 2.30pm and 7pm Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).

Chatham House members will be able to follow a livestream of the event here on the day.

This event is being co-hosted with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.