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Human Control Is Essential to the Responsible Use of Military Neurotechnology

8 August 2019

Yasmin Afina

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
The military importance of AI-connected brain–machine interfaces is growing. Steps must be taken to ensure human control at all times over these technologies.

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A model of a human brain is displayed at an exhibition in Lisbon, Portugal. Photo: Getty Images.

Technological progress in neurotechnology and its military use is proceeding apace. As early as the 1970s, brain-machine interfaces have been the subject of study. By 2014, the UK’s Ministry of Defence was arguing that the development of artificial devices, such as artificial limbs, is ‘likely to see refinement of control to provide… new ways to connect the able-bodied to machines and computers.’ Today, brain-machine interface technology is being investigated around the world, including in Russia, China and South Korea.

Recent developments in the private sector are producing exciting new capabilities for people with disabilities and medical conditions. In early July, Elon Musk and Neuralink presented their ‘high-bandwidth’ brain-machine interface system, with small and flexible electrode threads packaged into a small device containing custom chips and to be inserted and implanted into the user’s brain for medical purposes.

In the military realm, in 2018, the United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) put out a call for proposals to investigate the potential of nonsurgical brain-machine interfaces to allow soldiers to ‘interact regularly and intuitively with artificially intelligent, semi-autonomous and autonomous systems in a manner currently not possible with conventional interfaces’. DARPA further highlighted the need for these interfaces to be bidirectional – where information is sent both from brain to machine (neural recording) and from machine to brain (neural stimulation) – which will eventually allow machines and humans to learn from each other.

This technology may provide soldiers and commanders with a superior level of sensory sensitivity and the ability to process a greater amount of data related to their environment at a faster pace, thus enhancing situational awareness. These capabilities will support military decision-making as well as targeting processes.

Neural recording will also enable the obtention of a tremendous amount of data from operations, including visuals, real-time thought processes and emotions. These sets of data may be used for feedback and training (including for virtual wargaming and for machine learning training), as well as for investigatory purposes. Collected data will also feed into research that may help researchers understand and predict human intent from brain signals – a tremendous advantage from a military standpoint.

Legal and ethical considerations

The flip side of these advancements is the responsibilities they will impose and the risks and vulnerabilities of the technology as well as legal and ethical considerations.

The primary risk would be for users to lose control over the technology, especially in a military context; hence a fail-safe feature is critical for humans to maintain ultimate control over decision-making. Despite the potential benefits of symbiosis between humans and AI, users must have the unconditional possibility to override these technologies should they believe it is appropriate and necessary for them to do so.

This is important given the significance of human control over targeting, as well as strategic and operational decision-making. An integrated fail-safe in brain-machine interfaces may in fact allow for a greater degree of human control over critical, time-sensitive decision-making. In other words, in the event of incoming missiles alert, while the AI may suggest a specific course of action, users must be able to decide in a timely manner whether to execute it or not.

Machines can learn from coded past experiences and decisions, but humans also use gut feelings to make life and death decisions. A gut feeling is a human characteristic that is not completely transferable, as it relies on both rational and emotional traits – and is part of the ‘second-brain’ and the gut-brain axis which is currently poorly understood. It is however risky to take decisions solely on gut feelings or solely on primary brain analysis—therefore, receiving a comprehensive set of data via an AI-connected brain-machine interface may help to verify and evaluate the information in a timely manner, and complement decision-making processes. However, these connections and interactions would have to be much better understood than the current state of knowledge. 

Fail-safe features are necessary to ensure compliance with the law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. As a baseline, human control must be used to 1) define areas where technology may or may not be trusted and to what extent, and 2) ensure legal, political and ethical accountability, responsibility and explainability at all times. Legal and ethical considerations must be taken into account from as early as the design and conceptualizing stage of these technologies, and oversight must be ensured across the entirety of the manufacturing supply chain.  

The second point raises the need to further explore and clarify whether existing national, regional and international legal, political and ethical frameworks are sufficient to cover the development and use of these technologies. For instance, there is value in assessing to what extent AI-connected brain-machine interfaces will affect the assessment of the mental element in war crimes and their human rights implications.

In addition, these technologies need to be highly secure and invulnerable to cyber hacks. Neural recording and neural stimulation will be directly affecting brain processes in humans and if an adversary has the ability to connect to a human brain, steps need to be taken to ensure that memory and personality could not be damaged.

Future questions

Military applications of technological progress in neurotechnology is inevitable, and their implications cannot be ignored. There is an urgent need for policymakers to understand the fast-developing neurotechnical capabilities, develop international standards and best practices – and, if necessary, new and dedicated legal instruments – to frame the use of these technologies.

Considering the opportunities that brain-machine interfaces may present in the realms of security and defence, inclusive, multi-stakeholder discussions and negotiations leading to the development of standards must include the following considerations:

  • What degree of human control would be desirable, at what stage and by whom? To what extent could human users be trusted with their own judgment in decision-making processes?
  • How could algorithmic and human biases, the cyber security and vulnerabilities of these technologies and the quality of data be factored into these discussions?
  • How can ethical and legal considerations be incorporated into the design stage of these technologies?
  • How can it be ensured that humans cannot be harmed in the process, either inadvertently or deliberately?
  • Is there a need for a dedicated international forum to discuss the military applications of neurotechnology? How could these discussions be integrated to existing international processes related to emerging military applications of technological progress, such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems?




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PARP-1-targeted Auger emitters display high-LET cytotoxic properties in vitro but show limited therapeutic utility in solid tumor models of human neuroblastoma

The currently available therapeutic radiopharmaceutical for high-risk neuroblastoma, 131I-MIBG, is ineffective at targeting micrometastases due to the low linear energy transfer (LET) properties of high-energy beta particles. In contrast, Auger radiation has high-LET properties with nanometer ranges in tissue, efficiently causing DNA damage when emitted in close proximity to DNA. The aim of this study was to evaluate the cytotoxicity of targeted Auger therapy in pre-clinical models of high-risk neuroblastoma. Methods: Using a radiolabeled poly(ADP-ribose) polymerase (PARP) inhibitor, 125I-KX1, we delivered an Auger emitter iodine-125 to PARP-1: a chromatin-binding enzyme overexpressed in neuroblastoma. In vitro cytotoxicity of 125I-KX1 was assessed in nineteen neuroblastoma cell lines, followed by in-depth pharmacological analysis in a sensitive and resistant pair of cell lines. Immunofluorescence microscopy was used to characterize 125I-KX1-induced DNA damage. Finally, in vitro/in vivo microdosimetry was modeled from experimentally derived pharmacological variables. Results: 125I-KX1 was highly cytotoxic in vitro across a panel of neuroblastoma cell lines, directly causing double strand DNA breaks. Based on subcellular dosimetry, 125I-KX1 was approximately twice as effective compared to 131I-KX1, whereas cytoplasmic 125I-MIBG demonstrated low biological effectiveness. Despite the ability to deliver focused radiation dose to the cell nuclei, 125I-KX1 remained less effective than its alpha-emitting analog 211At-MM4, and required significantly higher activity for equivalent in vivo efficacy based on tumor microdosimetry. Conclusion: Chromatin-targeted Auger therapy is lethal to high-risk neuroblastoma cells with potential use in micrometastatic disease. This study provides the first evidence for cellular lethality from a PARP-1 targeted Auger emitter, calling for further investigation into targeted Auger therapy.




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Head-to-head comparison of 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT in patients with metastatic, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors: a prospective study

Purpose: 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 is an antagonist for somatostatin receptor used in neuroendocrine imaging. The purpose of this study is to compare 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT in patients with metastatic, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors. Methods: Patients with histologically-proven, metastatic and/or unresectable, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors were prospectively recruited in this study. They received an intravenous injection of 68Ga-DOTATATE (4.0 ± 1.3 mCi) on the first day and 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 (4.0 ± 1.4 mCi) on the second day. Whole-body PET/CT scans were performed at 40 to 60 minutes after injection on the same scanner. Physiologic uptake of normal organs, lesion numbers, and lesion uptake were compared. Results: Twenty-nine patients were prospectively enrolled in the study. The SUVmax of the spleen, renal cortex, adrenal glands, pituitary glands, stomach wall, normal liver parenchyma, small intestine, pancreas, and bone marrow were significantly lower on 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 than on 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT (P<0.001). 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 detected significantly more liver lesions (539 vs. 356, P = 0.002), but fewer bone lesions (156 vs. 374, P = 0.031, Figure 3) than 68Ga-DOTATATE. The tumor-to-background ratio of liver lesions was significantly higher on 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 (7.6 ± 5.1 vs. 3.4 ± 2.0, P<0.001). 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT showed comparable results for primary tumors and lymph node metastases based on either patient-based or lesion-based comparison. Conclusion: 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 performs better in the detection ability and TBR of liver metastases. However, 68Ga-DOTATATE outperforms 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 in the detection of bone metastases. The differential affinity of different metastatic sites provides key information for patient selection in imaging and peptide receptor radionuclide therapy.




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Differential expression of glucose transporters and hexokinases in prostate cancer with a neuroendocrine gene signature: a mechanistic perspective for FDG imaging of PSMA-suppressed tumors

Purpose: Although the incidence of de novo neuroendocrine prostate cancer (NEPC) is rare, recent data suggests that low expression of prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA) is associated with a spectrum of neuroendocrine (NE) hallmarks and androgen receptor (AR)-suppression in prostate cancer (PC). Previous clinical reports indicate that PCs with a phenotype similar to NE tumors can be more amenable to imaging by 18F-Fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) rather than PSMA-targeting radioligands. In this study, we evaluated the association between NE gene signature and FDG uptake-associated genes including glucose transporters (GLUTs) and hexokinases, with the goal of providing a genomic signature to explain the reported FDG-avidity of PSMA-suppressed tumors. Methods: Data mining approaches, cell lines and patient-derived xenograft (PDX) models were used to study the levels of 14 members of the SLC2A family (encoding GLUT proteins), 4 members of the hexokinase family (genes: HK1 to 3 and GCK) and PSMA (FOLH1 gene) following AR-inhibition and in correlation with NE hallmarks. Also, we characterize a NE-like PC (NELPC) subset among a cohort of primary and metastatic PC samples with no NE histopathology. We measured glucose uptake in a NE-induced in vitro model and a zebrafish model by non-radioactive imaging of glucose uptake using fluorescent glucose bioprobe, GB2-Cy3. Results: This work demonstrates that a NE gene signature associates with differential expression of genes encoding GLUT and hexokinase proteins. In NELPC, elevated expression of GCK (encoding glucokinase protein) and decreased expression of SLC2A12 correlated with earlier biochemical recurrence. In tumors treated with AR-inhibitors, high expression of GCK and low expression of SLC2A12 correlated with NE histopathology and PSMA gene suppression. GLUT12-suppression and amplification of glucokinase was observed in NE-induced PC cell lines and PDX models. A higher glucose uptake was confirmed in low-PSMA tumors using a GB2-Cy3 probe in a zebrafish model. Conclusion: NE gene signature in NEPC and NELPC associates with a distinct transcriptional profile of GLUTs and HKs. PSMA-suppression correlates with GLUT12-suppression and glucokinase-amplification. Alteration of FDG uptake-associated genes correlated positively with higher glucose uptake in AR and PSMA-suppressed tumors. Zebrafish xenograft tumor models are an accurate and efficient pre-clinical method for monitoring non-radioactive glucose uptake.




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Inflammation-based index and 68Ga-DOTATOC PET-derived uptake and volumetric parameters predict outcome in neuroendocrine tumor patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC

We performed post-hoc analyses on the utility of pre-therapeutic and early interim 68Ga-DOTA-Tyr3-octreotide (68Ga-DOTATOC) positron emission tomography (PET) tumor uptake and volumetric parameters and a recently proposed biomarker, the inflammation-based index (IBI), for peptide receptor radionuclide therapy (PRRT) in neuroendocrine tumor (NET) patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC in the setting of a prospective phase II trial. Methods: Forty-three NET patients received up to four cycles of 1.85 GBq/m²/cycle 90Y-DOTATOC with a maximal kidney biologic effective dose of 37 Gy. All patients underwent a 68Ga-DOTATOC PET/computed tomography (CT) at baseline and seven weeks after the first PRRT cycle. 68Ga-DOTATOC-avid tumor lesions were semi-automatically delineated using a customized standardized uptake value (SUV) threshold-based approach. PRRT response was assessed on CT using RECIST 1.1. Results: Median progression-free survival (PFS) and overall survival (OS) were 13.9 and 22.3 months, respectively. An SUVmean higher than 13.7 (75th percentile (P75)) was associated with better survival (hazard ratio (HR) 0.45; P = 0.024), whereas a 68Ga-DOTATOC-avid tumor volume higher than 578 ml (P75) was associated with worse OS (HR 2.18; P = 0.037). Elevated baseline IBI was associated with worse OS (HR 3.90; P = 0.001). Multivariate analysis corroborated independent associations between OS and SUVmean (P = 0.016) and IBI (P = 0.015). No significant correlations with PFS were found. A composite score based on SUVmean and IBI allowed to further stratify patients in three categories with significantly different survival. On early interim PET, a decrease in SUVmean of more than 17% (P75) was associated with worse survival (HR 2.29; P = 0.024). Conclusion: Normal baseline IBI and high 68Ga-DOTATOC tumor uptake predict better outcome in NET patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC. This can be used for treatment personalization. Interim 68Ga-DOTATOC PET does not provide information for treatment personalization.




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Quantitative 3D assessment of 68Ga-DOTATOC PET/MRI with diffusion-weighted imaging to assess imaging markers for gastroendopancreatic neuroendocrine tumors: Preliminary results

68Ga-DOTATOC-PET/MRI (68Gallium-DOTATOC-positron emission tomography/magnetic resonance imaging) combines the advantages of PET in the acquisition of metabolic-functional information with the high soft tissue contrast of MRI. Standardized uptake values (SUV) in tumors were suggested as a measure of somatostatin receptor expression. A challenge with receptor ligands is, that the distribution volume is confined to tissues with tracer-uptake, potentially limiting SUV quantification. In this study, different functional, three-dimensional (3D) SUV, apparent diffusion coefficient (ADC) parameters and arterial tumor enhancement were tested for the characterization of gastroendopancreatic neuroendocrine tumors (GEP-NET). Methods: For this single-center, cross-sectional study, 22 patients with 24 histologically confirmed GEP-NET lesions (15 men/7 women; median, 61 years, range, 43-81 years), who received hybrid 68Ga-DOTA-PET/MRI examinations at 3T between January 2017 and July 2019 met eligibility criteria. SUVs, tumor-to-background ratios (TBR), the total functional tumor volume (TFTV), ADCmean and ADCmin were measured based on volumes of interest (VOI) and examined with receiver operating characteristic analysis to determine cut-off values for differentiation between low and intermediate grade GEP-NET. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients were used to assess correlations between functional imaging parameters. Results: The ratio of PET-derived SUVmean and diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI)-derived ADCmin was introduced as a combined variable to predict tumor grade, outperforming single predictors. Based on a threshold ratio of 0.03 to be exceeded, tumors could be classified as grade 2 with a sensitivity of 86% and specificity of 100%. SUV and functional ADC values as well as arterial contrast enhancement parameters showed non-significant and mostly negligible correlations. Conclusion: As receptor density and tumor cellularity appear to be independent, potentially complementary phenomena, the combined PET/MRI ratio SUVmean/ADCmin may be used as a novel biomarker, allowing to differentiate between grade 1 and 2 GEP-NET.




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64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT for Imaging Patients with Known or Suspected Somatostatin Receptor-Positive Neuroendocrine Tumors: Results of the First US Prospective, Reader-Blinded Clinical Trial

Studies demonstrate that the investigational 64Cu-DOTATATE radiopharmaceutical may provide diagnostic and logistical benefits over available imaging agents for patients with somatostatin receptor (SSTR)-positive neuroendocrine tumors (NETs). Accordingly, we aimed to prospectively determine the lowest dose of 64Cu-DOTATATE that facilitates diagnostic quality scans and evaluated the diagnostic performance and safety in a phase III study of patients with SSTR-expressing NETs. Methods: A dose-ranging study was conducted in 12 patients divided into 3 dose groups (111 MBq [3.0 mCi], 148 MBq [4.0 mCi], and 185 MBq [5.0 mCi] ± 10%) to determine the lowest dose of 64Cu-DOTATATE that produced diagnostic quality PET/CT images. Using the 64Cu-DOTATATE dose identified in the dose-ranging study, 3 independent nuclear medicine physicians who were blinded to all clinical information read PET/CT scans from 21 healthy volunteers and 42 NET-positive patients to determine those with "Disease" and "No Disease," as well as "Localized" versus "Metastatic" status. Blinded-reader evaluations were compared to a patient-specific standard of truth (SOT), which was established by an independent oncologist who used all previously available pathology, clinical, and conventional imaging data. Diagnostic performance calculated for 64Cu-DOTATATE included sensitivity, specificity, negative predictive value, positive predictive value, and accuracy. Inter- and intra-reader reliability, as well as ability to differentiate between localized and metastatic disease, was also determined. Adverse events (AEs) were recorded from 64Cu-DOTATATE injection through 48 hours post-injection. Results: The dose-ranging study identified 148 MBq (4.0 mCi) as the optimal dose to obtain diagnostic quality PET/CT images. Following database lock, diagnostic performance from an initial majority read of the 3 independent readers showed a significant 90.9% sensitivity (P = 0.0042) and 96.6% specificity (P < 0.0001) for detecting NETs, which translated to a 100.0% sensitivity and 96.8% specificity after correcting for an initial SOT misread. Excellent inter- and intra-reader reliability, as well as ability to distinguish between localized and metastatic disease, was also noted. No AEs were related to 64Cu-DOTATATE, and no serious AEs were observed. Conclusion: 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT is a safe imaging technique that provides high-quality and accurate images at a dose of 148 MBq (4.0 mCi) for the detection of somatostatin-expressing NETs.




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Efficacy of Peptide Receptor Radionuclide Therapy for Esthesioneuroblastoma

Objectives: Esthesioneuroblastoma (ENB) is rare with limited therapeutic options when unresectable or metastatic; however, expression of somatostatin receptors qualifies it for peptide receptor radionuclide therapy (PRRT). We report outcomes of PRRT in ENB from two referral centers. Methods: Using PRRT databases at two European Neuroendocrine Tumour Society Centers of Excellence, case finding was undertaken between 2004-2018 for patients who had PRRT with recurrent/metastatic ENB deemed unsuitable for further conventional therapies. Evaluations of response using a composite reference standard and for survival were performed. Results: Of seven patients, four had partial response, two had disease stabilization and one had early progression. Possible side effects include worsening CSF-leaks. Median progression-free survival was 17 months (range, 0-30), and median overall survival was 32 months (range, 4–53). Conclusion: PRRT shows promising efficacy and moderate survival duration in unresectable locally advanced or metastatic ENB warranting larger cohort studies incorporating measures of quality of life.




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64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT and prediction of overall and progression-free survival in patients with neuroendocrine neoplasms

Overexpression of somatostatin receptors in patients with neuroendocrine neoplasms (NEN) is utilized for both diagnosis and treatment. Receptor density may reflect tumor differentiation and thus be associated with prognosis. Non-invasive visualization and quantification of somatostatin receptor density is possible by somatostatin receptor imaging (SRI) using positron emission tomography (PET). Recently, we introduced 64Cu-DOTATATE for SRI and we hypothesized that uptake of this tracer could be associated with overall (OS) and progression-free survival (PFS). Methods: We evaluated patients with NEN that had a 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT SRI performed in two prospective studies. Tracer uptake was determined as the maximal standardized uptake value (SUVmax) for each patient. Kaplan-Meier analysis with log-rank was used to determine the predictive value of 64Cu-DOTATATE SUVmax for OS and PFS. Specificity, sensitivity and accuracy was calculated for prediction of outcome at 24 months after 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT. Results: A total of 128 patients with NEN were included and followed for a median of 73 (1-112) months. During follow-up, 112 experienced disease progression and 69 patients died. The optimal cutoff for 64Cu-DOTATATE SUVmax was 43.3 for prediction of PFS with a hazard ratio of 0.56 (95% CI: 0.38-0.84) for patients with SUVmax > 43.3. However, no significant cutoff was found for prediction of OS. In multiple Cox regression adjusted for age, sex, primary tumor site and tumor grade, the SUVmax cutoff hazard ratio was 0.50 (0.32-0.77) for PFS. The accuracy was moderate for predicting PFS (57%) at 24 months after 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT. Conclusion: In this first study to report the association of 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT and outcome in patients with NEN, tumor somatostatin receptor density visualized with 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT was prognostic for PFS but not OS. However, the accuracy of prediction of PFS at 24 months after 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT SRI was moderate limiting the value on an individual patient basis.




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Prognostic Value of 18F-FDG PET/CT in a Large Cohort of 495 Patients with Advanced Metastatic Neuroendocrine Neoplasms (NEN) Treated with Peptide Receptor Radionuclide Therapy (PRRT)

The objective of this retrospective study was to determine the role of 18F-FDG PET/CT in a large cohort of 495 patients with metastatic neuroendocrine neoplasms (NENs) who were treated with peptide receptor radionuclide therapy (PRRT) with a long-term follow-up. Methods: The 495 patients were treated with 177Lu- and/or 90Y- DOTATOC/DOTATATE PRRT between 2/2002 and 7/2018. All subjects received both 68Ga-DOTATOC/TATE/NOC and 18F-FDG PET/CT prior to treatment and were followed 3-189 months. Kaplan-Meier analysis, log-rank test (Mantel-Cox), and Cox regression analysis were performed for overall survival (OS) and progression-free survival (PFS). Results: 199 patients (40.2%) presented with pancreatic NEN, 49 with CUP (cancer of unknown primary), 139 with midgut NEN, whereas the primary tumor was present in the rectum in 20, in the lung in 38, in the stomach in 8 and other locations in 42 patients. FDG-PET/CT was positive in 382 (77.2%) patients and 113 (22.8%) were FDG-negative before PRRT, while 100% were 68Ga-DOTATOC/TATE/NOC positive. For all patients, the median PFS and OS, defined from start of PRRT, were 19.6 mo and 58.7 mo, respectively. Positive FDG predicted shorter PFS (18.5 mo vs 24.1 mo; P = 0.0015) and OS (53.2 mo vs 83.1 mo; P < 0.001) than negative FDG. Amongst the pancreatic NEN, the median OS was 52.8 mo in FDG positive and 114.3 mo in FDG negative subjects (P = 0.0006). For all patients with positive 18F-FDG uptake, and a ratio of the highest SUVmax on 68Ga-SSTR PET to the most 18F-FDG-avid tumor lesions >2, the median OS was 53.0 mo, compared to 43.4 mo in those patients with a ratio <2 (P = 0.030). For patients with no 18F-FDG uptake (complete "mismatch" imaging pattern), the median OS was 108.3 mo vs 76.9 mo for SUVmax >15.0 and ≤15.0 on 68Ga-SSTR PET/CT, respectively. Conclusion: The presence of positive lesions on 18F-FDG PET is an independent prognostic factor in patients with NEN treated with PRRT. Metabolic imaging with 18F-FDG PET/CT compliments the molecular imaging aspect of 68Ga-SSTR PET/CT for the prognosis of survival after PRRT. High SSTR expression combined with negative 18F-FDG PET/CT imaging is associated with the most favorable long-term prognosis.




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Neuroendocrine Differentiation and Response toPSMA-Targeted Radioligand Therapy in Advanced Metastatic Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer: a Single-Center Retrospective Study

Introduction: Neuroendocrine differentiation is associated with treatment failure and poor outcome in metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer (mCRPC). We investigated the effect of circulating neuroendocrine biomarkers on the efficacy of PSMA-targeted radioligand therapy (RLT). Methods: Neuroendocrine biomarker profiles (progastrin-releasing peptide, neuron-specific enolase, and chromogranin-A) were analyzed in 50 patients commencing 177Lu-PSMA-617 RLT. The primary endpoint was PSA response in relation to baseline neuroendocrine marker profiles. Additional endpoints included progression-free survival. Tumor uptake on post-therapeutic scans, a known predictive marker for response, was used as control-variable. Results: Neuroendocrine biomarker profiles were abnormal in the majority of patients. Neuroendocrine biomarker levels did not predict treatment failure or early progression (P ≥ 0.13). By contrast, intense PSMA-ligand uptake in metastases predicted both treatment response (P = 0.0030) and reduced risk of early progression (P = 0.0111). Conclusion: Neuroendocrine marker profiles do not predict adverse outcome of RLT. By contrast, high ligand uptake was confirmed to be crucial for achieving tumor-response.




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Integrity of neurocognitive networks in dementing disorders as measured with simultaneous PET/fMRI

Background: Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have reported altered integrity of large-scale neurocognitive networks (NCNs) in dementing disorders. However, findings on specificity of these alterations in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) are still very limited. Recently, NCNs have been successfully captured using positron emission tomography (PET) with F18-fluordesoxyglucose (FDG). Methods: Network integrity was measured in 72 individuals (38 male) with mild AD, bvFTD, and healthy controls using a simultaneous resting state fMRI and FDG-PET. Indices of network integrity were calculated for each subject, network, and imaging modality. Results: In either modality, independent component analysis revealed four major NCNs: anterior default mode network (DMN), posterior DMN, salience network, and right central executive network (CEN). In fMRI data, integrity of posterior DMN was found to be significantly reduced in both patient groups relative to controls. In the AD group anterior DMN and CEN appeared to be additionally affected. In PET data, only integrity of posterior DMN in patients with AD was reduced, while three remaining networks appeared to be affected only in patients with bvFTD. In a logistic regression analysis, integrity of anterior DMN as measured with PET alone accurately differentiated between the patient groups. A correlation between indices of two imaging modalities was overall low. Conclusion: FMRI and FDG-PET capture partly different aspects of network integrity. A higher disease specificity of NCNs as derived from PET data supports metabolic connectivity imaging as a promising diagnostic tool.




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Confirmation of 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT (ioflupane) quantification methods in dementia with Lewy body and other neurodegenerative disorders

Rationale: To conduct a retrospective study comparing three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative methods in patients with neurodegenerative syndromes as referenced to neuropathological findings. Methods: 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT and neuropathological findings among patients with neurodegenerative syndromes from the Mayo Alzheimer's Disease Research Center and Mayo Clinic Study of Aging were examined. Three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative assessment Methods: MIMneuro (MIM Software Inc.), DaTQUANT (GE Healthcare), and manual region of interest (ROI) creation on an Advantage Workstation (GE Healthcare) were compared to neuropathological findings describing the presence or absence of Lewy body disease (LBD). Striatum to background ratios (SBRs) generated by DaTQUANT were compared to the calculated SBRs of the manual method and MIMneuro. The left and right SBRs for caudate, putamen and striatum were evaluated with the manual method. For DaTQUANT and MIMneuro the left, right, total and average SBRs and z-scores for whole striatum, caudate, putamen, anterior putamen, and posterior putamen were calculated. Results: The cohort included 24 patients [20 (83%) male, aged 75.4 +/- 10.0 at death]. The antemortem clinical diagnoses were Alzheimer’s disease dementia (ADem, N = 6), probable dementia with Lewy bodies (pDLB, N = 12), mixed ADem/pDLB (N = 1), Parkinson’s disease with mild cognitive impairment (N = 2), corticobasal syndrome (N = 1), idiopathic rapid eye movement sleep behavior disorder (iRBD) (N = 1) and behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (N = 1). Seventeen (71%) had LBD pathology. All three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative methods had area under the receiver operating characteristics (AUROC) values above 0.93 and up to 1.000 (p<0.001) and showed excellent discrimination between LBD and non-LBD patients in each region assessed, p<.001. There was no significant difference between the accuracy of the regions in discriminating the two groups, with good discrimination for both caudate and putamen. Conclusion: All three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative methods showed excellent discrimination between LBD and non-LBD patients in each region assessed, using both SBRs and z-scores.




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Central and Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa: The Potential of Investment Partnerships for Mutual Benefit

31 October 2019

Trade between Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa has increased significantly in the last decade and a half. There is a strong case to be made for greater economic re-engagement, especially in terms of investment, that has the potential to support inclusive growth in both regions.

Damir Kurtagic

Former Academy Robert Bosch Fellow, Africa Programme

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Recycled containerboard warehouse, Mondi Group, Poland. Photo: Mondi Group.

Summary

  • There are growing economic links between the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa in terms of both trade and investment. However, while trade has picked up significantly from pre-EU accession levels, investment has not increased to the same extent.
  • Contrary to common assumption, investment flows are not solely from Central and Eastern Europe to sub-Saharan Africa. In reality, the largest investment flow between the two blocs occurs in the opposite direction – from South Africa into Central and Eastern Europe.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa can benefit from a greater commercial relationship focused on attracting sustainable investment from Central and Eastern Europe. For this to happen, commercial strategies towards Central and Eastern European countries need to be put in place before strategy can be reinforced by greater diplomatic and informational support.
  • For many sub-Saharan African governments, there is no overall targeted approach to attracting Central and Eastern European investors. A notable exception is South Africa, where departments have been established at provincial government level to specifically target investment from Central and Eastern Europe.
  • Sub-Saharan African governments expect Central and Eastern European private-sector investment to result not only in job creation, but also to bring spillover benefits such as the transfer of skills and knowledge to domestic industries.
  • Each sub-Saharan African country, in accordance with its individual circumstances, will need to adopt a discrete mix of administrative reform (particularly aimed at cutting red tape), as well as infrastructural and other policies that improve the business environment and generate investor confidence.
  • Much of the private sector in Central and Eastern Europe is somewhat hesitant to invest in sub-Saharan Africa on a greater scale. Many companies are most comfortable operating within their domestic environment; when they invest abroad, it tends to be in the ‘neighbourhood’ with which they are already familiar. Perceptions of risk are often compounded by popular misperceptions and generalizations about sub-Saharan Africa.
  • Central and Eastern European countries stand to gain from a deeper investment relationship. While greater engagement with sub-Saharan Africa has already been pursued by some countries, most of them focus on trade. Institutional support to companies from Central and Eastern Europe (both public and private) has evolved to a degree, but is still not comprehensive. Information for companies interested in investing is either lacking or not shared in an efficient way. And the greatest challenge is ensuring top-level political engagement.
  • EU membership offers clear opportunities for Central and Eastern European countries to invest sustainably and responsibly in sub-Saharan Africa. Not only is financial support forthcoming, through innovative EU financial instruments, but the availability of information relevant to business and the EU’s extensive diplomatic presence in Africa should help to alleviate some of the concerns of Central and Eastern European investors.




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Can the New European Commission Deliver on Its Promises to Africa?

4 December 2019

Fergus Kell

Projects Assistant, Africa Programme

Damir Kurtagic

Former Academy Robert Bosch Fellow, Africa Programme
Familiar promises of equal partnership must be backed by bolder action, including an expanded budget, internal reform and a rethink of its approach to trade negotiations.

2019-12-03-Urpilainen.jpg

Jutta Urpilainen, new EU commissioner for international partnerships, at the European Parliament in Brussels in October. Photo: Getty Images.

The new European Commission, headed by Ursula von der Leyen, assumed office on 1 December, and there are early signs that Africa will begin near the top of their foreign policy priorities. Policy towards Africa under the new EU administration is yet to be fully defined, but its contours are already visible in the selection of commissioners and assignment of portfolios.  

Although rumours of a dedicated commissioner for Africa were unfounded, the appointment of Jutta Urpilainen to the new role of commissioner for international partnerships – replacing the former post of development commissioner – is a strong signal of ongoing change in EU development thinking, away from bilateral aid towards trade and investment, including by the private sector. 

This may have significant consequences for the EU’s relationship with Africa. In her mission letter to Urpilainen in September, von der Leyen listed the first objective as a new ‘comprehensive strategy for Africa’. Urpilainen, Finland’s finance minister before being posted to Ethiopia as special representative on mediation, has also described her appointment as an opportunity to move on from traditional measures of aid delivery. 

Ambition or incoherence? 

However, this ambition may be at odds with other EU priorities and practices, notably managing migration and institutions and instruments for governing EU–Africa relations that remain rooted in a ‘traditional’ model of North–South development cooperation rather than equitable partnership.

Another newly created post will see Margaritis Schinas assume the role of vice-president for promoting the European way of life – formerly ‘protecting our European way of life’ before a backlash saw it changed – a reminder that migration will remain high on the EU’s foreign policy agenda. The new high representative for foreign and security policy and chief EU diplomat, Josep Borrell, has highlighted the need for bilateral partnership with countries of origin and transit, mainly in Africa. 

Negotiations also continue to stall on a replacement to the Cotonou Agreement, the 20-year partnership framework between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states, which now looks certain to be extended for at least 12 months beyond its expiry in February 2020.

Ambiguities in the EU’s negotiating approach have certainly contributed to the delay: having pushed initially for a separate regional pillar for Africa that would be opened to the North African countries (who are not ACP members) and include a loosely defined role for the African Union, this would later be abandoned in favour of a dual-track process on separate new agreements with the AU and ACP respectively.

The EU also continues to pursue controversial economic partnership agreements under the aegis of Cotonou, despite their increasing appearance of incompatibility with the pathbreaking African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – one of the clearest expressions to date of African agency.

The EU has so far attempted to gloss over this incoherence, claiming that EPAs can somehow act as the ‘building blocks’ for Africa-wide economic integration. But tensions are appearing between EU departments and within the commission, with the European External Action Service inclined to prioritize a more strategic continental relationship with the AU, while the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development remains committed to the ACP as the conduit for financial support and aid delivery.

And it is unlikely to get away with such incoherence for much longer. Change is now urgent, as numerous countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue to attract the strategic and commercial interests of the EU’s competitors: from established players such as China and potentially in future the UK, which is intent on remodelling its Africa ties post-Brexit, to emerging actors such as Turkey or Russia, which held its first Africa summit in October. 

The need for delivery

If the EU is serious about its rhetoric on equal partnership, it must therefore move beyond convoluted hybrid proposals. Delivering on the Juncker administration’s proposal to increase funding for external action by 30 per cent for 2021–27 would mark an important first step, particularly as this involves streamlining that would see the European Development Fund – the financial instrument for EU-ACP relations – incorporated into the main EU budget.

The new commission should therefore continue to exert pressure on the European Council and European Parliament to adopt this proposal, as negotiations on this financial framework have been repeatedly subject to delay and may not be resolved before the end of the year. 

Beyond this, proactive support for the AfCFTA and for structural transformation more broadly must be prioritized ahead of vague promises for a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as held out by Juncker in his final State of the Union address in 2018. 

The significance of internal EU reforms for Africa should also not be discounted. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, for instance, has placed the African sector at a particular disadvantage and has made it harder to compete even in domestic markets, let alone in the distant EU export markets. EU efforts to stimulate inflows of private investments into the African agricultural sector, abolish import tariffs and offer technical support for African producers to satisfy EU health and safety regulations will be of little use if they are undermined by heavy subsidies across Europe.

Ultimately, changes to job titles alone will be insufficient. The new commission’s rhetoric, while ambitious, differs little from that of the previous decade – Africa has heard the promise of a ‘partnership of equals’ and of ‘shared ownership’ since before the advent of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy in 2007. Now is the time for truly bold steps to implement this vision.




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Central & Eastern Europe and Africa Engagement: Labour Mobility and Policy in East Africa

Research Event

15 January 2020 - 10:00am to 12:30pm

Nairobi, Kenya

Strengthened links between the states of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are emerging marked by growth in diplomatic representation, trade and economic ties and supporting networks.

Against this backdrop, labour migration within and from the CEE and East Africa sub-regions are a key policy area with significant potential for shared learning and cooperation. For both regions, migration trends in recent years have evolved as a result of a diverse range of interactions among public, private and civil society actors and at local, national, regional and international levels. Unpacking such interactions and their political and geographical specificities is essential to effective engagement and cooperation within and between the regions on issues of labour migration and their management.

This roundtable brainstorming workshop will provide a platform for stakeholders based in East Africa to discuss the way in which different actors and agencies in the region influence and shape labour migration processes and policy responses.

This event is supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Fergus Kell

Projects Assistant, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3671




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A peroxisome deficiency-induced reductive cytosol state up-regulates the brain-derived neurotrophic factor pathway [Metabolism]

The peroxisome is a subcellular organelle that functions in essential metabolic pathways, including biosynthesis of plasmalogens, fatty acid β-oxidation of very-long-chain fatty acids, and degradation of hydrogen peroxide. Peroxisome biogenesis disorders (PBDs) manifest as severe dysfunction in multiple organs, including the central nervous system (CNS), but the pathogenic mechanisms in PBDs are largely unknown. Because CNS integrity is coordinately established and maintained by neural cell interactions, we here investigated whether cell-cell communication is impaired and responsible for the neurological defects associated with PBDs. Results from a noncontact co-culture system consisting of primary hippocampal neurons with glial cells revealed that a peroxisome-deficient astrocytic cell line secretes increased levels of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), resulting in axonal branching of the neurons. Of note, the BDNF expression in astrocytes was not affected by defects in plasmalogen biosynthesis and peroxisomal fatty acid β-oxidation in the astrocytes. Instead, we found that cytosolic reductive states caused by a mislocalized catalase in the peroxisome-deficient cells induce the elevation in BDNF secretion. Our results suggest that peroxisome deficiency dysregulates neuronal axogenesis by causing a cytosolic reductive state in astrocytes. We conclude that astrocytic peroxisomes regulate BDNF expression and thereby support neuronal integrity and function.




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Webinar: European Democracy in the Last 100 Years: Economic Crises and Political Upheaval

Members Event Webinar

6 May 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Pepijn Bergsen, Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Dr Sheri Berman, Professor of Political Science, Barnard College

Chair: Hans Kundnani, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

 

In the last 100 years, global economic crises from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the 2008 financial crash have contributed to significant political changes in Europe, often leading to a rise in popularity for extremist parties and politics. As Europe contends with a perceived crisis of democracy - now compounded by the varied responses to the coronavirus outbreak - how should we understand the relationship between externally-driven economic crises, political upheaval and democracy?

The panellists will consider the parallels between the political responses to some of the greatest economic crises Europe has experienced in the last century. Given that economic crises often transcend borders, why does political disruption vary between democracies? What can history tell us about the potential political impact of the unfolding COVID-19-related economic crisis? And will the unprecedented financial interventions by governments across Europe fundamentally change the expectations citizens have of the role government should play in their lives?

This event is based on a recent article in The World Today by Hans Kundnani and Pepijn Bergsen who are both researchers in Chatham House's Europe Programme. 'Crawling from the Wreckage' is the first in a series of articles that look at key themes in European political discourse from the last century. You can read the article here

This event is open to Chatham House Members. Not a member? Find out more.




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Coronavirus and the Future of Democracy in Europe

31 March 2020

Hans Kundnani

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme
The pandemic raises difficult questions about whether liberal democracies can adequately protect their citizens.

2020-03-31-Police-Poland

Police officers wearing protective face masks patrol during coronavirus lockdown enforcement in Wroclaw, Poland. Photo by Bartek Sadowski/Bloomberg via Getty Images.

It is less than a month since we published our research paper on the future of democracy in Europe. But it feels like we now live in a different world. The coronavirus has already killed thousands of people in Europe, led to an unprecedented economic crisis and transformed daily life – and in the process raised difficult new questions about democracy.

The essence of our argument in the paper was that democracy in Europe should be deepened. But now there is a much more basic question about whether democracies can protect their citizens from the pandemic.

There has already been much discussion about whether authoritarian states will emerge stronger from this crisis than democracies. In particular, although the virus originated in China and the government initially seemed to struggle to deal with it, it was able to largely contain the outbreak in Hubei and deploy vast resources from the rest of the country to deal with it.

Come through the worst

China may have come through the worst of the health crisis – though a second wave of infections as restrictions are lifted is possible – and there have already been three times as many deaths in Italy, and twice as many in Spain, as in China (although there is increasing doubt about the accuracy of China’s figures).

However, it is not only authoritarian states that seem so far to have coped relatively well with the virus. In fact, some East Asian democracies appear to have done even better than China. At the time of writing South Korea, with a population of 51.5 million, has had only 144 death rates so far. Taiwan, with a population of nearly 24 million, has had only two deaths.

So rather than thinking in terms of the relative performance of authoritarian states and democracies, perhaps instead we should be asking what we in Europe can learn from East Asian democracies.

It is not yet clear why East Asian democracies were able to respond so effectively, especially as they did not all follow exactly the same approach. Whereas some quickly imposed restrictions on travel (for example, Taiwan suspended flights from China and then prohibited the entry of people from China and other affected countries) and quarantines, others used extensive testing and contact tracing, often making use of personal data collected from citizens.

Whatever the exact strategy they used, though, they did all act quickly and decisively – and the collective memory of the SARS outbreak in 2003 and other recent epidemics seems to have played a role in this. For example, following the SARS outbreak, Taiwan created a central epidemic command center. Europe, meanwhile, was hardly affected by SARS – and we seem to have assumed the coronavirus would be the same (although that does not quite explain why we were still so slow to react in February even after it was clear that the virus had spread to Italy).

However, while the relative success of East Asian democracies may have something to do with this recent experience of epidemics, it may also have something to do with the kind of democracies they are. It may be a simple matter of competence – the bureaucracy in Taiwan and South Korea may function better, and in particular in a more coordinated way, than in many European countries.

But it may also be more than that. In particular, it could be that East Asian democracies have a kind of 'authoritarian residue' that has helped in the initial response to this crisis. South Korea and Taiwan are certainly vibrant democracies – but they are also relatively new democracies compared to many in Europe. As a result, citizens may have a different relationship with the state and be more willing to accept sudden restrictions of freedoms, in particular on movement, and the use of personal data – at least in a crisis.

In that sense, the pandemic may be a challenge not to democracy as such but to liberal democracy in particular – in other words, a system of popular sovereignty together with guaranteed basic rights, such as including freedom of association and expression and checks and balances on executive power. There may now be difficult trade-offs to be made between those basic rights and security – and, after the experience of coronavirus, many citizens may choose security.

This brings us back to the issues we discussed in our research paper. Even before the coronavirus hit, there was already much discussion of a crisis of liberal democracy. In particular, there has been a debate about whether liberalism and democracy, which had long been assumed to go together, were becoming decoupled.

In particular, ‘illiberal democracies’ seemed to be emerging in many places including Europe (although, as we discuss in the paper, some analysts argue that the term is incoherent). This model of ‘illiberal democracy’ – in other words, one in which elections continue to be held but some individual rights are curtailed – may emerge stronger from this new crisis.

It is striking that Singapore – also seen as responding successfully to coronavirus – was seen as a paradigmatic ‘illiberal democracy’ long before Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán embraced the idea. In particular, there is little real opposition to the People’s Action Party, which has been in power since 1959.

Since this new crisis began, Orbán has gone further in suspending rights in Hungary. On March 11, he declared a state of emergency – as many other European countries have also done. But he has now gone further by passing legislation that allows him to govern by decree indefinitely and make it illegal to spread misinformation that undermines the government’s response to the pandemic. Clearly, this is a further decisive step in the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Hungary.

So far, though, much of the discussion, particularly in the foreign policy world, has focused mainly on how to change popular perceptions that liberal democracies are failing in this crisis. For example, High Representative Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign minister, wrote last week of a 'battle of narratives'.

But this misses the point. It is not a matter of spinning the European model, but of taking seriously the substantial questions raised by the coronavirus about the ability of liberal democracies to adequately protect their citizens.




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Dysregulation of Exosome Cargo by Mutant Tau Expressed in Human-Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell (iPSC) Neurons Revealed by Proteomics Analyses [Research]

Accumulation and propagation of hyperphosphorylated tau (p-tau) is a common neuropathological hallmark associated with neurodegeneration of Alzheimer's disease (AD), frontotemporal dementia and parkinsonism linked to chromosome 17 (FTDP-17), and related tauopathies. Extracellular vesicles, specifically exosomes, have recently been demonstrated to participate in mediating tau propagation in brain. Exosomes produced by human induced pluripotent stem cell (iPSC)-derived neurons expressing mutant Tau (mTau), containing the P301L and V337M Tau mutations of FTDP-17, possess the ability to propagate p-tau pathology after injection into mouse brain.  To gain an understanding of the mTau exosome cargo involved in tau pathogenesis, these pathogenic exosomes were analyzed by proteomics and bioinformatics. The data showed that mTau expression dysregulates the exosome proteome to result in (1) proteins uniquely present only in mTau, and not control exosomes, (2) the absence of proteins in mTau exosomes, uniquely present in control exosomes, and (3) shared proteins which were significantly up-regulated or down-regulated in mTau compared to control exosomes. Notably, mTau exosomes (not control exosomes) contain ANP32A (also known as I1PP2A), an endogenous inhibitor of the PP2A phosphatase which regulates the phosphorylation state of p-tau.  Several of the mTau exosome-specific proteins have been shown to participate in AD mechanisms involving lysosomes, inflammation, secretases, and related processes.  Furthermore, the mTau exosomes lacked a substantial portion of proteins present in control exosomes involved in pathways of localization, vesicle transport, and protein binding functions. The shared proteins present in both mTau and control exosomes represented exosome functions of vesicle-mediated transport, exocytosis, and secretion processes. These data illustrate mTau as a dynamic regulator of the biogenesis of exosomes to result in acquisition, deletion, and up- or down-regulation of protein cargo to result in pathogenic mTau exosomes capable of in vivo propagation of p-tau neuropathology in mouse brain. 




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Europe and the Mediterranean: Eyeing Other Shores

1 July 2008 , Number 3

Ahead of the French holiday rush for relaxation in warm waters, President Nicolas Sarkozy has flung himself into the Mediterranean policy pool. Not content with existing arrangements, plans and processes for dealing with those on the other shore, the President has built his very own scheme, now adopted by the European Union. But the tides have not been altogether kind.

Claire Spencer

Head, Middle East Programme, Chatham House




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United States Presidency and Europe: Over to You, Europe

1 November 2008 , Number 1

The race is on to ensure that relations between the United States and its European allies are set on the right track from the outset of Barack Obama’s presidency. Although they may not like it, the main responsibility for ensuring that the transatlantic relationship does not stumble into a series of disappointed expectations in its first critical year lies more in European capitals than in Washington.

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House




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Europe: Fifty Years On - Essay Competition

1 January 2007 ,

An ageing population in Europe makes the opinion of young people about their continent’s future even more important. Leading international figures, including the President of the United Nations General Assembly, have been expressing concern over the limited role of young people in shaping policy. With this in mind, The World Today and the National Association for Gifted and Talented Youth have given students the opportunity to share their vision through a competition on Europe: The Next Fifty Years. The three finalists have been invited to an International Economics Programme workshop at Chatham House next month.




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Towards a Low-Carbon Future: China and the European Union

1 October 2007 , Number 7

Chinese goods seem to flood western markets: computers, light bulbs, sweaters, T-shirts and bras. The instinct is to try to protect home producers. A better plan would be to work with Beijing on producing products for the next industrial revolution – the creation of a low-carbon economy. But that would take real vision and political courage.

Bernice Lee OBE

Research Director; Executive Director, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy

Nick Mabey

Founding director and Chief Executive, E3G




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The multilevel identity politics of the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Galia Press-Barnathan and Naama Lutz

This article uses the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that took place in Tel Aviv to explore how cultural mega-events serve both as political arenas and as tools for identity construction, negotiation and contestation. These processes of identity politics are all conducted across national–subnational–international–transnational levels. The hosting of mega-events fleshes out these multiple processes in a very strong manner. We first discuss the politics of hosting mega-events in general. We then examine the identity politics associated more specifically with the Eurovision Song Contest, before examining in depth the complex forms of identity politics emerging around the competition following the 2018 Israeli victory. We suggest that it is important to study together the multiple processes—domestic, international and transnational—of identity politics that take place around the competition, as they interact with each other. Consequently, we follow the various stakeholders involved at these different levels and their interactions. We examine the internal identity negotiation process in Israel surrounding the event, the critical actors debating how to use the stage to challenge the liberal, western, ‘normal’ identity Israel hoped to project in the contest and how other stakeholders (participating states, national broadcasting agencies, participating artists) reacted to them, and finally we examine the behaviour of the institution in charge, the European Broadcasting Union, and national governments. We contribute to the study of mega-events as fields of contestation, to the understanding of the complex, multilevel nature of national identity construction, negotiation and contestation in the current era, and more broadly to the role that popular culture plays in this context.




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Lipid rafts in glial cells: role in neuroinflammation and pain processing [Thematic Reviews]

Activation of microglia and astrocytes secondary to inflammatory processes contributes to the development and perpetuation of pain with a neuropathic phenotype. This pain state presents as a chronic debilitating condition and affects a large population of patients with conditions like rheumatoid arthritis and diabetes, or after surgery, trauma, or chemotherapy. Here, we review the regulation of lipid rafts in glial cells and the role they play as a key component of neuroinflammatory sensitization of central pain signaling pathways. In this context, we introduce the concept of an inflammaraft (i-raft), enlarged lipid rafts harboring activated receptors and adaptor molecules and serving as an organizing platform to initiate inflammatory signaling and the cellular response. Characteristics of the inflammaraft include increased relative abundance of lipid rafts in inflammatory cells, increased content of cholesterol per raft, and increased levels of inflammatory receptors, such as toll-like receptor (TLR)4, adaptor molecules, ion channels, and enzymes in lipid rafts. This inflammaraft motif serves an important role in the membrane assembly of protein complexes, for example, TLR4 dimerization. Operating within this framework, we demonstrate the involvement of inflammatory receptors, redox molecules, and ion channels in the inflammaraft formation and the regulation of cholesterol and sphingolipid metabolism in the inflammaraft maintenance and disruption. Strategies for targeting inflammarafts, without affecting the integrity of lipid rafts in noninflammatory cells, may lead to developing novel therapies for neuropathic pain states and other neuroinflammatory conditions.




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Lipid rafts and neurodegeneration: structural and functional roles in physiologic aging and neurodegenerative diseases [Thematic Reviews]

Lipid rafts are small, dynamic membrane areas characterized by the clustering of selected membrane lipids as the result of the spontaneous separation of glycolipids, sphingolipids, and cholesterol in a liquid-ordered phase. The exact dynamics underlying phase separation of membrane lipids in the complex biological membranes are still not fully understood. Nevertheless, alterations in the membrane lipid composition affect the lateral organization of molecules belonging to lipid rafts. Neural lipid rafts are found in brain cells, including neurons, astrocytes, and microglia, and are characterized by a high enrichment of specific lipids depending on the cell type. These lipid rafts seem to organize and determine the function of multiprotein complexes involved in several aspects of signal transduction, thus regulating the homeostasis of the brain. The progressive decline of brain performance along with physiological aging is at least in part associated with alterations in the composition and structure of neural lipid rafts. In addition, neurodegenerative conditions, such as lysosomal storage disorders, multiple sclerosis, and Parkinson’s, Huntington’s, and Alzheimer’s diseases, are frequently characterized by dysregulated lipid metabolism, which in turn affects the structure of lipid rafts. Several events underlying the pathogenesis of these diseases appear to depend on the altered composition of lipid rafts. Thus, the structure and function of lipid rafts play a central role in the pathogenesis of many common neurodegenerative diseases.




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Does general anesthesia affect neurodevelopment in infants and children?




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Amylin/Calcitonin Receptor-Mediated Signaling in POMC Neurons Influences Energy Balance and Locomotor Activity in Chow-Fed Male Mice

Amylin, a pancreatic hormone and neuropeptide, acts principally in the hindbrain to decrease food intake and has been recently shown to act as a neurotrophic factor to control the development of AP->NTS and ARC->PVN axonal fiber outgrowth. Amylin is also able to activate ERK signaling specifically in POMC neurons independently of leptin. To investigate the physiological role of amylin signaling in POMC neurons, the core component of the amylin receptor, calcitonin receptor (CTR) was depleted from POMC neurons using an inducible mouse model. The loss of CTR in POMC neurons leads to increased body weight gain, increased adiposity, and glucose intolerance in male knockout mice, characterized by decreased energy expenditure (EE) and decreased expression of uncoupling protein 1 (UCP1) in brown adipose tissue (BAT). Furthermore, a decreased spontaneous locomotor activity and absent thermogenic reaction to the application of the amylin receptor agonist were observed in male and female mice. Together, these results show a significant physiological impact of amylin/calcitonin signaling in CTR-POMC neurons on energy metabolism and demonstrate the need for sex-specific approaches in obesity research and potentially treatment.




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Central {alpha}-Klotho Suppresses NPY/AgRP Neuron Activity and Regulates Metabolism in Mice

α-Klotho is a circulating factor with well-documented anti-aging properties; however, the central role of α-klotho in metabolism remains largely unexplored. The current study investigated the potential role of central α-klotho to modulate NPY/AgRP neurons, energy balance, and glucose homeostasis. Intracerebroventricular (ICV) administration of α-klotho suppressed food intake, improved glucose profiles, and reduced body weight in mouse models of Type I and II diabetes. Furthermore, central α-klotho inhibition via an anti-α-klotho antibody impaired glucose tolerance. Ex vivo patch clamp electrophysiology and immunohistochemical analysis revealed that α-klotho suppresses NPY/AgRP neuron activity, at least in part, by enhancing mIPSC’s. Experiments in hypothalamic GT1-7 cells observed α-klotho induces phosphorylation of AKTser473, ERKthr202/tyr204, and FOXO1ser256, as well as blunts AgRP gene transcription. Mechanistically, fibroblast growth factor 1 (FGFR1) inhibition abolished the downstream signaling of α-klotho, negated its ability to modulate NPY/AgRP neurons, and blunted its therapeutic effects. PI3 kinase inhibition also abolished α-klotho’s ability to suppress food intake and improve glucose clearance. These results indicate a prominent role of hypothalamic α-klotho/FGFR1/PI3K signaling in the modulation of NPY/AgRP neuron activity and maintenance of energy homeostasis, thus providing new insight into the pathophysiology of metabolic disease.




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S-Palmitoylation of the sodium channel Nav1.6 regulates its activity and neuronal excitability [Cell Biology]

S-Palmitoylation is a reversible post-translational lipid modification that dynamically regulates protein functions. Voltage-gated sodium channels are subjected to S-palmitoylation and exhibit altered functions in different S-palmitoylation states. Our aim was to investigate whether and how S-palmitoylation regulates Nav1.6 channel function and to identify S-palmitoylation sites that can potentially be pharmacologically targeted. Acyl-biotin exchange assay showed that Nav1.6 is modified by S-palmitoylation in the mouse brain and in a Nav1.6 stable HEK 293 cell line. Using whole-cell voltage clamp, we discovered that enhancing S-palmitoylation with palmitic acid increases Nav1.6 current, whereas blocking S-palmitoylation with 2-bromopalmitate reduces Nav1.6 current and shifts the steady-state inactivation in the hyperpolarizing direction. Three S-palmitoylation sites (Cys1169, Cys1170, and Cys1978) were identified. These sites differentially modulate distinct Nav1.6 properties. Interestingly, Cys1978 is exclusive to Nav1.6 among all Nav isoforms and is evolutionally conserved in Nav1.6 among most species. Cys1978 S-palmitoylation regulates current amplitude uniquely in Nav1.6. Furthermore, we showed that eliminating S-palmitoylation at specific sites alters Nav1.6-mediated excitability in dorsal root ganglion neurons. Therefore, our study reveals S-palmitoylation as a potential isoform-specific mechanism to modulate Nav activity and neuronal excitability in physiological and diseased conditions.




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Certain ortho-hydroxylated brominated ethers are promiscuous kinase inhibitors that impair neuronal signaling and neurodevelopmental processes [Cell Biology]

The developing nervous system is remarkably sensitive to environmental signals, including disruptive toxins, such as polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs). PBDEs are an environmentally pervasive class of brominated flame retardants whose neurodevelopmental toxicity mechanisms remain largely unclear. Using dissociated cortical neurons from embryonic Rattus norvegicus, we found here that chronic exposure to 6-OH–BDE-47, one of the most prevalent hydroxylated PBDE metabolites, suppresses both spontaneous and evoked neuronal electrical activity. On the basis of our previous work on mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAPK)/extracellular signal-related kinase (ERK) (MEK) biology and our observation that 6-OH–BDE-47 is structurally similar to kinase inhibitors, we hypothesized that certain hydroxylated PBDEs mediate neurotoxicity, at least in part, by impairing the MEK–ERK axis of MAPK signal transduction. We tested this hypothesis on three experimental platforms: 1) in silico, where modeling ligand–protein docking suggested that 6-OH–BDE-47 is a promiscuous ATP-competitive kinase inhibitor; 2) in vitro in dissociated neurons, where 6-OH–BDE-47 and another specific hydroxylated BDE metabolite similarly impaired phosphorylation of MEK/ERK1/2 and activity-induced transcription of a neuronal immediate early gene; and 3) in vivo in Drosophila melanogaster, where developmental exposures to 6-OH–BDE-47 and a MAPK inhibitor resulted in offspring displaying similarly increased frequency of mushroom-body β–lobe midline crossing, a metric of axonal guidance. Taken together, our results support that certain ortho-hydroxylated PBDE metabolites are promiscuous kinase inhibitors and can cause disruptions of critical neurodevelopmental processes, including neuronal electrical activity, pre-synaptic functions, MEK–ERK signaling, and axonal guidance.




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A kinesin adapter directly mediates dendritic mRNA localization during neural development in mice [Neurobiology]

Motor protein-based active transport is essential for mRNA localization and local translation in animal cells, yet how mRNA granules interact with motor proteins remains poorly understood. Using an unbiased yeast two–hybrid screen for interactions between murine RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) and motor proteins, here we identified protein interaction with APP tail-1 (PAT1) as a potential direct adapter between zipcode-binding protein 1 (ZBP1, a β-actin RBP) and the kinesin-I motor complex. The amino acid sequence of mouse PAT1 is similar to that of the kinesin light chain (KLC), and we found that PAT1 binds to KLC directly. Studying PAT1 in mouse primary hippocampal neuronal cultures from both sexes and using structured illumination microscopic imaging of these neurons, we observed that brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) enhances co-localization of dendritic ZBP1 and PAT1 within granules that also contain kinesin-I. PAT1 is essential for BDNF-stimulated neuronal growth cone development and dendritic protrusion formation, and we noted that ZBP1 and PAT1 co-locate along with β-actin mRNA in actively transported granules in living neurons. Acute disruption of the PAT1–ZBP1 interaction in neurons with PAT1 siRNA or a dominant-negative ZBP1 construct diminished localization of β-actin mRNA but not of Ca2+/calmodulin-dependent protein kinase IIα (CaMKIIα) mRNA in dendrites. The aberrant β-actin mRNA localization resulted in abnormal dendritic protrusions and growth cone dynamics. These results suggest a critical role for PAT1 in BDNF-induced β-actin mRNA transport during postnatal development and reveal a new molecular mechanism for mRNA localization in vertebrates.




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Risk Factors for Diabetic Peripheral Neuropathy and Cardiovascular Autonomic Neuropathy in the Diabetes Control and Complications Trial/Epidemiology of Diabetes Interventions and Complications (DCCT/EDIC) Study

Barbara H. Braffett
May 1, 2020; 69:1000-1010
Complications




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Muscle Weakness: A Progressive Late Complication in Diabetic Distal Symmetric Polyneuropathy

Christer S. Andreassen
Mar 1, 2006; 55:806-812
Complications




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Trade, Technology and National Security: Will Europe Be Trapped Between the US and China?

Invitation Only Research Event

2 March 2020 - 8:00am to 9:15am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Sir Simon Fraser, Managing Partner of Flint Global; Deputy Chairman, Chatham House
Chair: Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, Senior Research Fellow, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House

The US and China have entered into an increasingly confrontational relationship over trade and technology. This may force Europe to make difficult choices between the two economic superpowers – or perform a balancing act. Although the recent US-China phase-1 trade deal has eased the relationship for now, the trade and technology tensions are a structural issue and are likely to persist.

The debate over Huawei’s participation in 5G networks is an example of how the UK and other countries may face competing priorities in economic, security and foreign policy. Can Europe avoid a binary choice between the US and China? Is it possible for the EU to position itself as a third global power in trade, technology and standard-setting? What strategies should Europeans adopt to keep the US and China engaged in the rules-based international order and what does the future hold for trade multilateralism?

Sir Simon Fraser will join us for a discussion on Europe’s future role between the US and China. Sir Simon is Managing Partner of Flint Global and Deputy Chairman of Chatham House. He previously served as Permanent Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Head of the UK Diplomatic Service from 2010 to 2015. Prior to that he was Permanent Secretary at the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. He has also served as Director General for Europe in the FCO and Chief of Staff to European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

US and Americas Programme




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Virtual Roundtable: US and European Responses to Coronavirus

Invitation Only Research Event

20 March 2020 - 1:00pm to 1:45pm

Event participants

Anne Applebaum, Staff Writer, The Atlantic; Pulitzer-Prize Winning Historian
Amy Pope, Partner, Schillings; Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, US National Security Council, 2015 - 17
Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House

This event is part of the Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US, Americas and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.  Participants should not come to Chatham House for these events.

Department/project

US and Americas Programme




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Covid-19: UK death toll overtakes Italy’s to become worst in Europe




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Is Europe Ready for Another Ash Shock?

24 May 2011

Bernice Lee OBE

Research Director; Executive Director, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy


The eruption of another Icelandic volcano this week, ejecting ash plume into the atmosphere, reminds us afresh of Europe's vulnerability to 'low probability, high impact' events. Will Europe respond better this time? A forthcoming Chatham House Report shows that in such crises our governments and global businesses are in a better place to cope for a week - but no longer. This is because the full consequences of worst case scenarios are rarely factored in.

The ash cloud in 2010 is estimated to have cost the EU around $ 5-10 billion - the airlines bore about $ 1.7 billion in lost revenues and the tourism industry was hit hard. The greatest impact felt by many organisations was in human resources - the absence of stranded employees and dislocated management structures - but some companies fared better than others having learnt lessons from 9/11, SARS and other shocks to aviation. Businesses responding to a Chatham House survey on the impact of the ash cloud said that if the ash event last year had persisted just a few more days there would have been far more serious consequences.

This is not surprising given our dependence on long supply chains and the just-in-time business model. Since the earthquake and tsunami in March, for example, Japanese national infrastructure has been struggling to cope with fraying supply-chains and significantly slowed production. Carmakers and mobile phone manufacturers across the world were forced to halt or slow production as inventories of essential products - electronic components, car parts and fine chemicals - were quickly run down. Major cities for production, trade and travel are often badly affected by any international shocks, irrespective of the source, rendering the apparent resilience of having multiple suppliers meaningless.

A major scenario planning exercise conducted by Eurocontrol, five weeks ago suggests that the EU might be better prepared for an ash cloud disruption than a year ago. A key test for Europe now lies in whether member states will succeed in working together better in coordinating responses to ash threat and building public confidence in science-based risk management and planning.

Policy-makers face again the challenge of communicating a complex problem to a frustrated public. The ash cloud last year demonstrated the complication of crisis management in the media-saturated world, where opinion can be swayed by the most audible, the most active or the most politically powerful voices rather than the best informed or the most legitimate. There are important lessons here on the advantages and potential pitfalls of engaging stakeholders and the public via social and online media.

Our forthcoming report also shows a bias in the traditional media towards industry voices rather than those of the scientific community and policy-makers. During the crisis last year, there was scant public defence of the precautionary principles or safety, merely airlines duelling through the airwaves to step up pressure to remove the flight ban. First off the gate, Ryanair had already started its public relations battle last night. This time around, let's hope that traditional media will give greater airplay to voices beyond industry commentators, including scientists and experts. In-depth explanations of the science and technology involved in an event can help people assess the levels of uncertainty and risk involved in a situation, and what it means for them.




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Europe’s Energy Union: Foreign Policy Implications for Energy Security, Climate and Competitiveness

31 March 2016

By addressing structural divisions between member states, the Energy Union could have a beneficial effect on the EU’s capacity to conduct a unified and effective foreign policy, write Thomas Raines and Shane Tomlinson.

Thomas Raines

Director, Europe Programme

Shane Tomlinson

Former Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources, Chatham House

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True colour satellite image of Europe at night. Photo via Getty Images.

Summary

  • Plans for an EU-wide Energy Union are taking shape, following the European Commission’s adoption in February 2015 of a ‘Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’. The strategy underlines the EU’s ambition to attain ‘secure, sustainable, competitive, affordable energy for every European’.
  • The initiative seeks to transform energy markets and energy/climate policy across the EU. Its goals include cross-border coordination and integration in energy security, supply, market operations, regulation, energy efficiency, low-carbon development, and research and innovation.
  • There is an important foreign policy aspect to the Energy Union, given the imperative of managing security and supply risks in Europe’s neighbourhood and further afield. By addressing structural divisions between member states, the Energy Union could have a marked beneficial effect on the EU’s capacity to conduct a unified and effective foreign policy.
  • Development of the Energy Union presents abundant challenges, however. Policy and legislative changes will need to be coordinated across 28 countries. Variations in EU member states’ attitudes to security and energy policy may lead to differences in, or clashes between, priorities. The wider context is also complicated. Interrelated challenges rooted in broader policy issues include the partial transition to low-carbon energy, and concerns over competitiveness relative to other major economies.
  • The current EU approach to energy security and infrastructure focuses on natural gas. This ‘gas first’ approach risks crowding out other responses to the energy security challenge. It could result in the creation of ‘stranded assets’, if the future gas demand on which investments are predicated does not match projections. A narrow focus on new gas infrastructure could also impede development of other dimensions of the Energy Union.
  • The markets for coal, oil, gas and renewables are changing significantly. The shale oil and gas ‘revolution’ in the United States has altered the economics of hydrocarbon fuels, and the plunge in oil prices since mid-2014 is causing energy businesses in the EU to reassess investment plans.
  • The EU is rapidly expanding the use of renewable energy. Dramatically falling prices for renewables will challenge traditional energy utility business models. How the Energy Union enables market access for new business models will be key to determining future energy trajectories.




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Germany offers hope to other Euro leagues

Germany’s decision that football can return this month provided encouragement for players and teams across Europe yesterday that the shutdown caused by the coronavirus pandemic could soon be coming to an end. With COVID-19 infections declining,...




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Europe's impending syrup tsunami

Europe's common agricultural policy (CAP) on sugar is due to change, and Emilie Aguirre, from the UKCRC Centre for Diet and Activity Research at the University of Cambridge, argues that an influx of cheap high fructose corn syrup (HFCS, isoglucose) into the European market will have a negative effect on on the health of the continent. Read the...




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Inflammatory Cytokines and the Risk to Develop Type 2 Diabetes: Results of the Prospective Population-Based European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition (EPIC)-Potsdam Study

Joachim Spranger
Mar 1, 2003; 52:812-817
Pathophysiology




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Exosomes Derived From Schwann Cells Ameliorate Peripheral Neuropathy in Type 2 Diabetic Mice

Schwann cell–derived exosomes communicate with dorsal root ganglia (DRG) neurons. The current study investigated the therapeutic effect of exosomes derived from healthy Schwann cells (SC-Exos) on diabetic peripheral neuropathy (DPN). We found that intravenous administration of SC-Exos to type 2 diabetic db/db mice with peripheral neuropathy remarkably ameliorated DPN by improving sciatic nerve conduction velocity and increasing thermal and mechanical sensitivity. These functional improvements were associated with the augmentation of epidermal nerve fibers and remyelination of sciatic nerves. Quantitative RT-PCR and Western blot analysis of sciatic nerve tissues showed that SC-Exo treatment reversed diabetes-reduced mature form of miRNA (miR)-21, -27a, and -146a and diabetes-increased semaphorin 6A (SEMA6A); Ras homolog gene family, member A (RhoA); phosphatase and tensin homolog (PTEN); and nuclear factor-B (NF-B). In vitro data showed that SC-Exos promoted neurite outgrowth of diabetic DRG neurons and migration of Schwann cells challenged by high glucose. Collectively, these novel data provide evidence that SC-Exos have a therapeutic effect on DPN in mice and suggest that SC-Exo modulation of miRs contributes to this therapy.




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Understanding Diabetic Neuropathy--From Subclinical Nerve Lesions to Severe Nerve Fiber Deficits: A Cross-Sectional Study in Patients With Type 2 Diabetes and Healthy Control Subjects

Studies on magnetic resonance neurography (MRN) in diabetic polyneuropathy (DPN) have found proximal sciatic nerve lesions. The aim of this study was to evaluate the functional relevance of sciatic nerve lesions in DPN, with the expectation of correlations with the impairment of large-fiber function. Sixty-one patients with type 2 diabetes (48 with and 13 without DPN) and 12 control subjects were enrolled and underwent MRN, quantitative sensory testing, and electrophysiological examinations. There were differences in mechanical detection (Aβ fibers) and mechanical pain (A fibers) but not in thermal pain and thermal detection clusters (C fibers) among the groups. Lesion load correlated with lower Aα-, Aβ-, and A-fiber but not with C-fiber function in all participants. Patients with lower function showed a higher load of nerve lesions than patients with elevated function or no measurable deficit despite apparent DPN. Longer diabetes duration was associated with higher lesion load in patients with DPN, suggesting that nerve lesions in DPN may accumulate over time and become clinically relevant once a critical amount of nerve fascicles is affected. Moreover, MRN is an objective method for determining lower function mainly in medium and large fibers in DPN.




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n-3 Fatty Acid and Its Metabolite 18-HEPE Ameliorate Retinal Neuronal Cell Dysfunction by Enhancing Mu&#x0308;ller BDNF in Diabetic Retinopathy

Diabetic retinopathy (DR) is a widespread vision-threatening disease, and neuroretinal abnormality should be considered as an important problem. Brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) has recently been considered as a possible treatment to prevent DR-induced neuroretinal damage, but how BDNF is upregulated in DR remains unclear. We found an increase in hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) in the vitreous of patients with DR. We confirmed that human retinal endothelial cells secreted H2O2 by high glucose, and H2O2 reduced cell viability of MIO-M1, Müller glia cell line, PC12D, and the neuronal cell line and lowered BDNF expression in MIO-M1, whereas BDNF administration recovered PC12D cell viability. Streptozocin-induced diabetic rats showed reduced BDNF, which is mainly expressed in the Müller glia cell. Oral intake of eicosapentaenoic acid ethyl ester (EPA-E) ameliorated BDNF reduction and oscillatory potentials (OPs) in electroretinography (ERG) in DR. Mass spectrometry revealed an increase in several EPA metabolites in the eyes of EPA-E–fed rats. In particular, an EPA metabolite, 18-hydroxyeicosapentaenoic acid (18-HEPE), induced BDNF upregulation in Müller glia cells and recovery of OPs in ERG. Our results indicated diabetes-induced oxidative stress attenuates neuroretinal function, but oral EPA-E intake prevents retinal neurodegeneration via BDNF in Müller glia cells by increasing 18-HEPE in the early stages of DR.




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Troponin T Parallels Structural Nerve Damage in Type 2 Diabetes: A Cross-sectional Study Using Magnetic Resonance Neurography

Clinical studies have suggested that changes in peripheral nerve microcirculation may contribute to nerve damage in diabetic polyneuropathy (DN). High-sensitivity troponin T (hsTNT) assays have been recently shown to provide predictive values for both cardiac and peripheral microangiopathy in type 2 diabetes (T2D). This study investigated the association of sciatic nerve structural damage in 3 Tesla (3T) magnetic resonance neurography (MRN) with hsTNT and N-terminal pro-brain natriuretic peptide serum levels in patients with T2D. MRN at 3T was performed in 51 patients with T2D (23 without DN, 28 with DN) and 10 control subjects without diabetes. The sciatic nerve’s fractional anisotropy (FA), a marker of structural nerve integrity, was correlated with clinical, electrophysiological, and serological data. In patients with T2D, hsTNT showed a negative correlation with the sciatic nerve’s FA (r = –0.52, P < 0.001), with a closer correlation in DN patients (r = –0.66, P < 0.001). hsTNT further correlated positively with the neuropathy disability score (r = 0.39, P = 0.005). Negative correlations were found with sural nerve conduction velocities (NCVs) (r = –0.65, P < 0.001) and tibial NCVs (r = –0.44, P = 0.002) and amplitudes (r = –0.53, P < 0.001). This study is the first to show that hsTNT is a potential indicator for structural nerve damage in T2D. Our results indirectly support the hypothesis that microangiopathy contributes to structural nerve damage in T2D.




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TSPO Versus P2X7 as a Target for Neuroinflammation: An In Vitro and In Vivo Study

Neuroinflammation is important in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). The P2X7 receptor (P2X7R) is a promising target for neuroinflammation. The objective of this study was to compare 18F-DPA714, a second-generation translocator protein tracer, with 11C-JNJ717, a novel P2X7R tracer, in vitro and in vivo in ALS. Methods: For the in vitro portion of the study, autoradiography with 18F-DPA714 and 11C-JNJ717 was performed on human ALS brain sections in comparison to immunofluorescence with Iba1 and GFAP. For the in vivo portion, 3 male patients with early-stage ALS (59.3 ± 7.2 y old) and 6 healthy volunteers (48.2 ± 16.5 y old, 2 men and 4 women) underwent dynamic PET/MR scanning with 18F-DPA714 and 11C-JNJ717. Volume-of-distribution images were calculated using Logan plots and analyzed on a volume-of-interest basis. Results: Autoradiography showed no difference in 11C-JNJ717 binding but did show increased 18F-DPA714 binding in the motor cortex correlating with Iba1 expression (glial cells). Similar findings were observed in vivo, with a 13% increase in 18F-DPA714 binding in the motor cortex. Conclusion: In symptomatic ALS patients, 18F-DPA714 showed increased signal whereas 11C-JNJ717 was not elevated.




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Can the New European Commission Deliver on Its Promises to Africa?

4 December 2019

Fergus Kell

Projects Assistant, Africa Programme

Damir Kurtagic

Former Academy Robert Bosch Fellow, Africa Programme
Familiar promises of equal partnership must be backed by bolder action, including an expanded budget, internal reform and a rethink of its approach to trade negotiations.

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Jutta Urpilainen, new EU commissioner for international partnerships, at the European Parliament in Brussels in October. Photo: Getty Images.

The new European Commission, headed by Ursula von der Leyen, assumed office on 1 December, and there are early signs that Africa will begin near the top of their foreign policy priorities. Policy towards Africa under the new EU administration is yet to be fully defined, but its contours are already visible in the selection of commissioners and assignment of portfolios.  

Although rumours of a dedicated commissioner for Africa were unfounded, the appointment of Jutta Urpilainen to the new role of commissioner for international partnerships – replacing the former post of development commissioner – is a strong signal of ongoing change in EU development thinking, away from bilateral aid towards trade and investment, including by the private sector. 

This may have significant consequences for the EU’s relationship with Africa. In her mission letter to Urpilainen in September, von der Leyen listed the first objective as a new ‘comprehensive strategy for Africa’. Urpilainen, Finland’s finance minister before being posted to Ethiopia as special representative on mediation, has also described her appointment as an opportunity to move on from traditional measures of aid delivery. 

Ambition or incoherence? 

However, this ambition may be at odds with other EU priorities and practices, notably managing migration and institutions and instruments for governing EU–Africa relations that remain rooted in a ‘traditional’ model of North–South development cooperation rather than equitable partnership.

Another newly created post will see Margaritis Schinas assume the role of vice-president for promoting the European way of life – formerly ‘protecting our European way of life’ before a backlash saw it changed – a reminder that migration will remain high on the EU’s foreign policy agenda. The new high representative for foreign and security policy and chief EU diplomat, Josep Borrell, has highlighted the need for bilateral partnership with countries of origin and transit, mainly in Africa. 

Negotiations also continue to stall on a replacement to the Cotonou Agreement, the 20-year partnership framework between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states, which now looks certain to be extended for at least 12 months beyond its expiry in February 2020.

Ambiguities in the EU’s negotiating approach have certainly contributed to the delay: having pushed initially for a separate regional pillar for Africa that would be opened to the North African countries (who are not ACP members) and include a loosely defined role for the African Union, this would later be abandoned in favour of a dual-track process on separate new agreements with the AU and ACP respectively.

The EU also continues to pursue controversial economic partnership agreements under the aegis of Cotonou, despite their increasing appearance of incompatibility with the pathbreaking African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – one of the clearest expressions to date of African agency.

The EU has so far attempted to gloss over this incoherence, claiming that EPAs can somehow act as the ‘building blocks’ for Africa-wide economic integration. But tensions are appearing between EU departments and within the commission, with the European External Action Service inclined to prioritize a more strategic continental relationship with the AU, while the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development remains committed to the ACP as the conduit for financial support and aid delivery.

And it is unlikely to get away with such incoherence for much longer. Change is now urgent, as numerous countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue to attract the strategic and commercial interests of the EU’s competitors: from established players such as China and potentially in future the UK, which is intent on remodelling its Africa ties post-Brexit, to emerging actors such as Turkey or Russia, which held its first Africa summit in October. 

The need for delivery

If the EU is serious about its rhetoric on equal partnership, it must therefore move beyond convoluted hybrid proposals. Delivering on the Juncker administration’s proposal to increase funding for external action by 30 per cent for 2021–27 would mark an important first step, particularly as this involves streamlining that would see the European Development Fund – the financial instrument for EU-ACP relations – incorporated into the main EU budget.

The new commission should therefore continue to exert pressure on the European Council and European Parliament to adopt this proposal, as negotiations on this financial framework have been repeatedly subject to delay and may not be resolved before the end of the year. 

Beyond this, proactive support for the AfCFTA and for structural transformation more broadly must be prioritized ahead of vague promises for a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as held out by Juncker in his final State of the Union address in 2018. 

The significance of internal EU reforms for Africa should also not be discounted. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, for instance, has placed the African sector at a particular disadvantage and has made it harder to compete even in domestic markets, let alone in the distant EU export markets. EU efforts to stimulate inflows of private investments into the African agricultural sector, abolish import tariffs and offer technical support for African producers to satisfy EU health and safety regulations will be of little use if they are undermined by heavy subsidies across Europe.

Ultimately, changes to job titles alone will be insufficient. The new commission’s rhetoric, while ambitious, differs little from that of the previous decade – Africa has heard the promise of a ‘partnership of equals’ and of ‘shared ownership’ since before the advent of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy in 2007. Now is the time for truly bold steps to implement this vision.




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Britain Must Balance a Transatlantic Heart With a European Head

19 December 2019

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
Returning from an EU-rooted foreign and economic policy to one which is more international in outlook will be difficult, take time, and be more costly than the new UK government currently envisages.

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Boris Johnson chairs the first cabinet meeting after winning a majority of 80 seats in the 2019 UK general election. Photo by Matt Dunham – WPA Pool/Getty Images.

The convincing general election win for the Conservative Party and Boris Johnson opens a new chapter in British history. On 31 January 2020, Britain will withdraw from the EU and return to its historical position as a separate European power.

Recognising the strategic significance of this change, the Queen’s speech opening the new parliament stated that 'the government will undertake the deepest review of Britain's security, defence, and foreign policy since the end of the Cold War'. But in what context?

Prime Minister Boris Johnson and other Brexit supporters have yearned for Britain to return to its exceptional trajectory. In their view, Britain can once again become a trading nation - more global in outlook and ambition than its European neighbours, freed from the shackles of an ageing and fractured European continent and its deadening regulatory hand.

This imagery makes good copy. But the 21st century does not offer Britain the same opportunities as did the 18th, 19th or early 20th centuries. This is a different world, and Britain’s position in it needs to be crafted with a sharp eye to what is possible.

Geopolitics undergoing wrenching change

This is not declinism. The UK remains an economically strong and politically influential country by relative global standards – it is currently the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world, and the second largest donor of official development assistance. It has ubiquitous cultural brands from fashion and music to the royal family, and an eminent diplomatic and security position at the heart of all of the world’s major international institutions and alliances, from NATO and the UN security council to the IMF, G7, G20 and Commonwealth. 

But Britain leaves the EU just as the geopolitical landscape is undergoing wrenching change. The United States has turned inwards, closer to its own historic norm, and is undermining the international institutions which it created alongside Britain in the 1940s. China’s international influence is on the rise alongside its vast and still growing economy, challenging traditional norms of individual freedom and public transparency.

Russia is navigating the cracks and crevices of the fracturing rules-based international order with ruthless efficiency. Sensing the change in the wind, many governments are now back-tracking on their post-Cold War transitions to more open and democratic societies.

The implications of this new context have yet to be fully internalised by those who look forward to Britain’s future outside the EU. Britain will be negotiating new trade deals in an increasingly transactional, fragmented and protectionist international economic environment. It will be trying to sell its world-class services into markets where national control over finance, law, technology and media is increasingly prized.

Making new diplomatic inroads will be no easier. The government will face strong internal and external criticism if it lends security assistance to states that are simultaneously clamping down on their citizens’ rights. With the number of military personnel in decline and investment in new equipment stretched across multiple expensive platforms, the UK could struggle to project meaningful defence cooperation to new security partners in Asia at the same time as upholding its NATO commitments and its deployments in conflict zones around the world.

Britain also opens its new global chapter at a time when it is changing domestically. There is no over-riding reason for a missionary British foreign policy – neither the economic returns or image of national glory that drove Empire, nor the existential defence of its land, interests and freedom that drove it during the Cold War.

Stretching liberal interventionism to Iraq, as Tony Blair did when he was prime minister, and to Libya as David Cameron did in 2011, has injected a deep dose of popular scepticism to the idea that Britain - with or without allies - can or should help make the world in its own image.

This more defensive mindset – epitomised by parliament’s refusal to use military force to punish President Bashar al Assad’s regime for using chemical weapons against its citizens in 2013 – will not abate soon. Especially when the new government’s political bandwidth will be stretched by fiendishly complex trade-offs between its financial promises to support domestic renewal, the imperatives of striking and implementing a new free trade agreement with the EU, and the economic consequences of leaving the single market.

All this points to the fact that the most important step for Britain at the beginning of this new national chapter will be to establish an effective partnership with the EU and its member states. They face the same international risks as Britain and have as much to gain from the preservation of rules-based international behaviour. Recognising the continued interdependence between Britain and the EU will offer both sides greater leverage in a more competitive and hostile world.

A new transatlantic relationship

Once it has agreed its new relationship with the EU, Britain can turn to crafting its new relationship with the mighty United States. US-UK economic interdependence and close security ties should help discipline the bilateral economic relationship. The more difficult challenge will be for the UK to avoid falling into fissures between the US and the EU over how to manage bilateral relations with China and Russia, particularly if President Trump wins a second term.

Britain will have to get used to this difficult balancing act between its transatlantic heart and European head after Brexit. This makes it all the more important for the UK to develop new diplomatic and commercial initiatives with countries that are also struggling to cope with the current uncertain, transactional international environment.

Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand can grow as bilateral economic partners and as allies in international institutions, such as the G7, OECD and WTO. They may even open a door to British engagement in regional trade arrangements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP), which do not require the same political commitments as EU membership.

Turning from an EU-rooted foreign and economic policy to one that is once again more international in outlook will be difficult, take time and be more costly than the government currently envisages. The irony is that for this to be successful requires sustained political investment by the Johnson government to build a strong relationship with the EU that it is focused on leaving.