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The battle of 'resistance' vs 'revolution' in the Middle East

The events surrounding the US assassination of Iranian Quds Force leader Major General Qassem Soleimani brought to the surface the two main ideological forces that now battle each other across the Middle East - the anti-imperial "resistance" of Iran and its Arab allies, and the freedom "revolution" of domestic protesters in the same lands. 




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What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence

Is indiscriminate loyalty what allies want? The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) case suggests that allies do not desire U.S. loyalty in all situations. Instead, they want the United States to be a reliable ally, posing no risk of abandonment or entrapment.




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After Social Distancing, a Strange Purgatory Awaits

Life right now feels very odd. And it will feel odd for months—and even years—to come.




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Joseph S. Nye: U.S. and China Need a More Cooperative Security Stance

Joseph S. Nye: U.S. and China Need a More Cooperative Security Stance




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Breaking the Ice: How France and the UK Could Reshape a Credible European Defense and Renew the Transatlantic Partnership

History is replete with irony, but rarely more poignantly than in the summer of 2016 when, on 23 June, the UK voted to leave the European Union and the next day, 24 June, the EU published its Global Strategy document asserting its ambition of “strategic autonomy.” Whither Franco-British defense cooperation in such chaotic circumstances? This paper attempts to provide the outline of an answer to that question.




anc

The battle of 'resistance' vs 'revolution' in the Middle East

The events surrounding the US assassination of Iranian Quds Force leader Major General Qassem Soleimani brought to the surface the two main ideological forces that now battle each other across the Middle East - the anti-imperial "resistance" of Iran and its Arab allies, and the freedom "revolution" of domestic protesters in the same lands. 




anc

What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence

Is indiscriminate loyalty what allies want? The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) case suggests that allies do not desire U.S. loyalty in all situations. Instead, they want the United States to be a reliable ally, posing no risk of abandonment or entrapment.




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Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




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American workers’ safety net is broken. The COVID-19 crisis is a chance to fix it.

The COVID-19 pandemic is forcing some major adjustments to many aspects of our daily lives that will likely remain long after the crisis recedes: virtual learning, telework, and fewer hugs and handshakes, just to name a few. But in addition, let’s hope the crisis also drives a permanent overhaul of the nation’s woefully inadequate worker…

       




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In the age of American ‘megaregions,’ we must rethink governance across jurisdictions

The coronavirus pandemic is revealing a harsh truth: Our failure to coordinate governance across local and state lines is costing lives, doing untold economic damage, and enacting disproportionate harm on marginalized individuals, households, and communities. New York Governor Andrew Cuomo explained the problem in his April 22 coronavirus briefing, when discussing plans to deploy contact…

       




anc

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




anc

Breaking the Ice: How France and the UK Could Reshape a Credible European Defense and Renew the Transatlantic Partnership

History is replete with irony, but rarely more poignantly than in the summer of 2016 when, on 23 June, the UK voted to leave the European Union and the next day, 24 June, the EU published its Global Strategy document asserting its ambition of “strategic autonomy.” Whither Franco-British defense cooperation in such chaotic circumstances? This paper attempts to provide the outline of an answer to that question.




anc

Joseph S. Nye: U.S. and China Need a More Cooperative Security Stance

Joseph S. Nye: U.S. and China Need a More Cooperative Security Stance




anc

Breaking the Ice: How France and the UK Could Reshape a Credible European Defense and Renew the Transatlantic Partnership

History is replete with irony, but rarely more poignantly than in the summer of 2016 when, on 23 June, the UK voted to leave the European Union and the next day, 24 June, the EU published its Global Strategy document asserting its ambition of “strategic autonomy.” Whither Franco-British defense cooperation in such chaotic circumstances? This paper attempts to provide the outline of an answer to that question.




anc

New Federal Government CIO is Key to Improving Government Performance


The appointment of new federal chief information officer Steven VanRoekel comes at a challenging time for President Barack Obama. The national economy continues to be weak. Congress plans to cut trillions from the federal budget. And in the time leading up to the 2012 election, American voters remain cynical about the ability of the government to address important policy problems in an effective manner.

In an era of deficit reduction and public cynicism, the tasks facing federal officials are to determine how to do more with less and persuade voters the government can become smarter and more effective. There are going to be fewer dollars for virtually every federal program so it is important to figure how ways to innovate and perform more efficiently.

Former CIO Vivek Kundra sought to do this through encouraging agencies to move software applications to the cloud, consolidating federal data centers, improving transparency, and improving the information technology procurement process. It is important to continue this progress even as agencies are forced to downsize their operations.

As shown in the private sector, government administrators should use technology to cut costs, improve worker productivity, and streamline operations. This is not just a matter of using technology in more innovative ways, but changing the operations and culture of the public sector. Public officials must improve its data mining activities to identify fraud and abuse in Medicare, Medicaid, the Defense Department, and other domestic programs.

New software gives managers better tools to evaluate how money is being spent and whether it is fulfilling intended goals. If it is not, programs need to be modified or eliminated. The most important weapon in Mr. VanRoekel’s arsenal may be the scalpel as he goes through the federal government’s $80 billion IT budget.

Authors

Image Source: © Hyungwon Kang / Reuters
      
 
 




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Missed Connections: Talking With Europe About Data, Privacy, and Surveillance


The United States exports digital goods worth hundreds of billions of dollars across the Atlantic each year.  And both Silicon Valley and Hollywood do big business with Europe every year.  Differences in approaches to privacy have always made this relationship unsteady but the Snowden disclosures greatly complicated the prospects of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.  In this paper Cameron Kerry examines that politics of transatlantic trade and the critical role that U.S. privacy policy plays in these conversations.

Kerry relies on his experience as the U.S.’s chief international negotiator for privacy and data regulation to provide an overview of key proposals related to privacy and data in Europe.  He addresses the possible development of a European Internet and the current regulatory regime known as Safe Harbor. Kerry argues that America and Europe have different approaches to protecting privacy both which have strengths and weaknesses.

To promote transatlantic trade the United states should:

  • Not be defensive about its protection of privacy
  • Provide clear information to the worldwide community about American law enforcement surveillance
  • Strengthen its own privacy protection
  • Focus on the importance of trade to the American and European economies

Downloads

Image Source: © Francois Lenoir / Reuters
      
 
 




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Threats to the Future of Cloud Computing: Surveillance and Transatlantic Trade


The first instance of “cloud” computing came in 2006, when Amazon released its Elastic Compute Cloud, a service for consumers to lease space on virtual machines to run software. Now, the cloud enables the transfer and storage of data around the world, in an almost seamless fashion. Using cloud services are a seamless experience from the consumer perspective. This ease of use obscures significant regulation from governments on both sides of the Atlantic. The Safe Harbor Principles is a framework that ensures that personal consumer data being transferred from the EU to the US is still subject to a level of security in compliance with the EU’s stricter regulation on data protection. US companies must be certified within this framework, in order to transfer consumer data outside the EU.

A comprehensive data privacy arrangement that satisfies both sides of the Atlantic is necessary to preserve the free flow of data, and the resulting commerce, between the two regions. Speaking at the 2014 Cloud Computing Policy Conference, Cameron F. Kerry suggested that neither side of the Atlantic can afford to partition the Internet. Currently trade negotiators are assessing the viability including an update to Safe Harbor Principles as a part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

TTIP and the Future of Trade

The NSA revelations last year have only increased support for further regulation over the transfer of personal data in the cloud, especially in the European Union (EU). The revelations have also brought to light significant differences in the European and US conceptions of privacy. The ruling by the European Court of Justice on the “right to be forgotten” is a recent example of this transatlantic divide. In EU countries, citizens can now request Google to take down links from search results that lead users to potentially damaging information.

There are several disputes that negotiators must first resolve. Europeans would prefer that American regulators take a more active role in cases where US firms are violating the Safe Harbor principles. EU officials have also indicated they would like to include a mechanism to send an alert if data were improperly shared with US law enforcement officials. The expansion of the codes of conduct within the cloud would serve as a major step towards finalizing TTIP. A European Commission Analysis finds that TTIP would inject about $130 billion into the US economy. Ultimately both the EU and the US have so much to gain that both nations must find a way to resolve these thorny issues.

 

Kevin Risser contributed to this post.

Authors

Image Source: © Fabrizio Bensch / Reuters
      
 
 




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The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution


With violent protests following the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, and calls for a new unified government amid dire comments about the stability of Egypt, the world’s attention is again on President Morsi and his country. This follows a tumultuous period last month, when Egyptians went to the polls and ratified a new constitution. The document, criticized as hurried, incomplete, and lacking in consensus is enormously contentious.

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution, nonresident fellow Mirette F. Mabrouk gives a broad overview of the new constitution, and provides context and analysis for specific sections.

Mabrouk outlines several ways in which, she argues, the document is shaky on the protection of freedoms and rights, particularly those of women, some religious minorities and minors. Mabrouk also encourages analysts to stop viewing this situation as an Islamist/ secular divide, arguing that idea is too simplistic, and lacks the context for greater understanding of Egypt’s domestic politics.

Download » (PDF)

Downloads

Image Source: © Stringer Egypt / Reuters
      
 
 




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How to increase financial support during COVID-19 by investing in worker training

It took just two weeks to exhaust one of the largest bailout packages in American history. Even the most generous financial support has limits in a recession. However, I am optimistic that a pandemic-fueled recession and mass underemployment could be an important opportunity to upskill the American workforce through loans for vocational training. Financially supporting…

       




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Life expectancy and the Republican candidates' Social Security proposals


In last Thursday’s GOP debate, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, Jeb Bush and Chris Christie managed to avoid mentioning their common proposal to “reform entitlements” by raising the Social Security retirement age from 67 to 70. That was probably a good idea. Their proposal only demonstrates their lack of understanding about the demographics of older Americans, especially the dramatic disparities in their life expectancy associated with education and race. Recent research on life expectancy indicates that their proposed change would effectively nullify Social Security for millions of Americans and sharply limit benefits for many millions more.. While many people in their 30s and 40s today can look forward to living into their 80s, the average life expectancy for the majority of Americans who do not hold a college degree hovers closer to 70, or the average life expectancy for all Americans in 1950.

The Widening Inequalities in the Life Spans of Americans

This research, summarized recently in a study published in Health Affairs, found that life expectancy for various age cohorts of Americans is closely associated with both educational achievement and race. For example, the average life expectancy for college-educated American men who were age 25 in 2008, or age 33 today, is 81.7 years for whites and 78.2 years for blacks. (Table 1, below) By contrast, the projected, average life span of high-school educated males, also age 25 in 2008 or 33 today, is 73.2 years for whites and 69.3 years for blacks. Women on average live longer than men; but similar disparities based on education and race are evident. The average life expectancy of women age 25 in 2008, or 33 years old today, was 79 years for whites and 75.4 years for blacks for those with a high school diploma, and 84.7 years for whites and 81.6 years for blacks with college degrees. Most disturbing, the average life expectancy of Americans age 25 in 2008 without a high school diploma is just 68.6 years for white men, 68.2 years for black men, 74.2 years for white women, and 74.9 years for black women. Surprisingly, the researchers found that Hispanics in this age group have the longest life expectancies, even though they also have the lowest average levels of education. Since these data are anomalous and may reflect sampling problems, we will focus mainly on the life-expectancy gaps between African American and white Americans.

Tallying How Many People Are Adversely Affected

Census data on the distribution by education of people age 25 to 34 in 2010 (ages 30 to 39 in 2015) provide a good estimate of how many Americans are adversely affected by these growing differences. Overall, 56.3 percent of all Americans currently in their 30s fall are high school graduates or left school without a high school diploma, educational groups with much lower average life expectancies. (Table 2, below) More precisely, 10.1 percent or almost 4.8 million Americans in their 30s today lack a high school diploma, and 46.2 percent or 18.9 million thirty-somethings have high school diplomas and no further degrees. All told, they account for 23,702,000 Americans in their 30s; and among older Americans, the numbers and percentages are even higher.

Since race as well as education are major factors associated with differences in life expectancy, we turn next to education by race (Table 3, below). The totals differ modestly from Table 2, because Census data on education by race cover ages 30-39 in 2014, while Table 2 covers age 30-39 in 2015 (ages 25-34 in 2010).

  • Among people in their 30s today, 45.4 percent of whites or 10,613,000 Americans have a high school degree or less – and their average life expectancy is 9.4 years less than whites in their 30s with a college or associate degree.
  • Among people in their 30s todays, 64.4 percent of blacks or 3,436,000 Americans have a high school degree or less – and their life expectancy is 8.6 years less than blacks in their 30s with an B.A. or associate degree, and 11.6 years less than whites with a college or associate degree..
  • Among people in their 30s today, 75.6 percent of Hispanics or 6,243,000 Americans have a high school degree or less – and their life expectancy is 5.0 years less than Hispanics in their 30s with a college or associate degree.

As a policy matter, these data tell us that across all communities—white, black, Hispanic—improvements in secondary education to prepare everyone for higher education, and lower-cost access to higher education, can add years to the lives of millions of Americans.

Preserving Meaningful Access to Social Security Benefits

The widening inequalities in average life expectancy associated with race and education have more direct policy implications for Social Security, because the number of years that people can claim its benefits depends on their life spans. The growing inequalities in life expectancy translate directly into growing disparities in the years people can claim Social Security benefits, based on their education and race. Assuming that Americans in their 30s today retire at age 67 (the age for full benefits for this age group), they can expect to claim retirement benefits, on average, ranging from 1.2 years to 19.3 years, based on their education and race. (Table 4, below)

The most pressing issues of life expectancy and Social Security involve white males, black males, and black females without college degrees: Among Americans age 33 today, white and black men without high school diplomas and black males with high school degrees, on average, can expect to live long enough to collect benefits for less than three years. Similarly, white and black women without high school diplomas and black women with high school degrees, on average, can expect to collect benefits for less than eight years. Together, they account for 25.2 percent of whites and 64.4 percent of blacks in their 30s today. By contrast, male and female white college graduates age 33 today, on average, can expect to collect Social Security for between 14.7 and 17.7 years, respectively; and 33-year old black men and women with college degrees, on average, will claim benefits for 11.2 to 14.6 years, respectively.

These findings dictate that proposals to raise the Social Security retirement age should be rejected as a matter of basic fairness. Among this year’s presidential hopefuls, as noted earlier, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush and Chris Christie all have called for raising the retirement age to 70 years. Under this policy, black men in their 30s today without a college degree and white men now in their 30s without a high school diploma, on average, would not live long enough to collect any Social Security. The change would reduce the average number of years of Social Security for Americans in their 30s today,

  • From 1.6 years to -1.4 years for white men with no high school diploma,
  • From 1.2 years to -1.8 years for black men with no high school diploma, and
  • From 2.3 years to – 0.7 years for black, male high-school graduates.

Furthermore, among Americans in their 30s today, white and black women without a high school diploma, white male high school graduates, and black female high school graduates, would live long enough, on average, to collect Social Security for just 3.2 to 5.4 years. The GOP change reduce the average number of years of Social Security for Americans in their 30s today,

  • From 6.2 years to 3.2 years for white, male high school graduates,
  • From 7.2 years to 4.2 years for white women with no high school diploma,
  • From 7.9 years to 4.9 years for black women with no high school diploma, and
  • From 8.4 years to 5.4 years for black, female high-school graduates.

All told, proposals to raise the retirement age to 70 years old would mean, based on the average life expectancy of Americans in their 30s today, that 25.2 percent of whites in their 30s and 64.4 percent of blacks of comparable age, after working for 35 years or more, would receive Social Security benefits for 5.4 years or less.

Authors

  • Robert Shapiro
Image Source: © Jim Young / Reuters
     
 
 




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What growing life expectancy gaps mean for the promise of Social Security


     
 
 




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The rich-poor life expectancy gap


Gary Burtless, a senior fellow in Economic Studies, explains new research on the growing longevity gap between high-income and low-income Americans, especially among the aged.

“Life expectancy difference of low income workers, middle income workers, and high income workers has been increasing over time,” Burtless says. “For people born in 1920 their life expectancy was not as long typically as the life expectancy of people who were born in 1940. But those gains between those two birth years were very unequally distributed if we compare people with low mid-career earnings and people with high mid-career earnings.” Burtless also discusses retirement trends among the educated and non-educated, income inequality among different age groups, and how these trends affect early or late retirement rates.

Also stay tuned for our regular economic update with David Wessel, who also looks at the new research and offers his thoughts on what it means for Social Security.

Show Notes

Later retirement, inequality and old age, and the growing gap in longevity between rich and poor

Disparity in Life Spans of the Rich and the Poor Is Growing

Subscribe to the Brookings Cafeteria on iTunes, listen on Stitcher, and send feedback email to BCP@Brookings.edu.

Authors

Image Source: © Scott Morgan / Reuters
     
 
 




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The growing life-expectancy gap between rich and poor


Researchers have long known that the rich live longer than the poor. Evidence now suggests that the life expectancy gap is increasing, at least here the United States, which raises troubling questions about the fairness of current efforts to protect Social Security.

There's nothing particularly mysterious about the life expectancy gap. People in ill health, who are at risk of dying relatively young, face limits on the kind and amount of work they can do. By contrast, the rich can afford to live in better and safer neighborhoods, can eat more nutritious diets and can obtain access to first-rate healthcare. People who have higher incomes, moreover, tend to have more schooling, which means they may also have better information about the benefits of exercise and good diet.

Although none of the above should come as a surprise, it's still disturbing that, just as income inequality is growing, so is life-span inequality. Over the last three decades, Americans with a high perch in the income distribution have enjoyed outsized gains.

Using two large-scale surveys, my Brookings colleagues and I calculated the average mid-career earnings of each interviewed family; then we estimated the statistical relationship between respondents' age at death and their incomes when they were in their 40s. We found a startling spreading out of mortality differences between older people at the top and bottom of the income distribution.

For example, we estimated that a woman who turned 50 in 1970 and whose mid-career income placed her in the bottom one-tenth of earners had a life expectancy of about 80.4. A woman born in the same year but with income in the top tenth of earners had a life expectancy of 84.1. The gap in life expectancy was about 3½ years. For women who reached age 50 two decades later, in 1990, we found no improvement at all in the life expectancy of low earners. Among women in the top tenth of earners, however, life expectancy rose 6.4 years, from 84.1 to 90.5. In those two decades, the gap in life expectancy between women in the bottom tenth and the top tenth of earners increased from a little over 3½ years to more than 10 years.

Our findings for men were similar. The gap in life expectancy between men in the bottom tenth and top tenth of the income distribution increased from 5 years to 12 years over the same two decades.

Rising longevity inequality has important implications for reforming Social Security. Currently, the program takes in too little money to pay for all benefits promised after 2030. A common proposal to eliminate the funding shortfall is to increase the full retirement age, currently 66. Increasing the age for full benefits by one year has the effect of lowering workers' monthly checks by 6% to 7.5%, depending on the age when a worker first claims a pension.

For affluent workers, any benefit cut will be partially offset by gains in life expectancy. Additional years of life after age 65 increase the number years these workers collect pensions. Workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, however, are not living much longer, so the percentage cut in their lifetime pensions will be about the same as the percentage reduction in their monthly benefit check.

Our results and other researchers' findings suggest that low-income workers have not shared in the improvements in life expectancy that have contributed to Social Security's funding problem.

It therefore seems unfair to preserve Social Security by cutting future benefits across the board. Any reform in the program to keep it affordable should make special provision to protect the benefits of low-wage workers.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in The Los Angeles Times

Authors

Publication: The Los Angeles Times
Image Source: © Brian Snyder / Reuters
     
 
 




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Disability insurance: The Way Forward


Editor’s note: The remarks below were delivered to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget on release of their report on the SSDI Solutions Initiative

I want to thank Marc Goldwein for inviting me to join you for today’s event. We all owe thanks to Jim McCrery and Earl Pomeroy for devoting themselves to the SSDI Solutions Initiative, to the staff of CFRB who backed them up, and most of all to the scholars and practitioners who wrote the many papers that comprise this effort. This is the sort of practical, problem-solving enterprise that this town needs more of. So, to all involved in this effort, ‘hats off’ and ‘please, don’t stop now.’

The challenge of improving how public policy helps people with disabilities seemed urgent last year. Depletion of the Social Security Disability Insurance trust loomed. Fears of exploding DI benefit rolls were widespread and intense.

Congress has now taken steps that delay projected depletion until 2022. Meticulous work by Jeffrey Liebman suggests that Disability Insurance rolls have peaked and will start falling. The Technical Panel appointed by the Social Security Advisory Board, concurred in its 2015 report. With such ‘good’ news, it is all too easy to let attention drift to other seemingly more pressing items.

But trust fund depletion and growing beneficiary rolls are not the most important reasons why policymakers should be focusing on these programs.

The primary reason is that the design and administration of disability programs can be improved with benefit to taxpayers and to people with disabilities alike. And while 2022 seems a long time off, doing the research called for in the SSDI Solutions Initiative will take all of that time and more. So, it is time to get to work, not to relax.

Before going any further, I must make a disclaimer. I was invited to talk here as chair of the Social Security Advisory Board. Everything I am going to say from now on will reflect only my personal views, not those of the other members or staff of the SSAB except where the Board has spoken as a group. The same disclaimer applies to the trustees, officers, and other staff of the Brookings Institution. Blame me, not them.

Let me start with an analogy. We economists like indices. Years ago, the late Arthur Okun came up with an index to measure how much pain the economy was inflicting on people. It was a simple index, just the sum of inflation and the unemployment rate. Okun called it the ‘misery index.’

I suggest a ‘policy misery index’—a measure of the grief that a policy problem causes us. It is the sum of a problem’s importance and difficulty. Never mind that neither ‘importance’ nor ‘difficulty’ is quantifiable. Designing and administering interventions intended to improve the lives of people with disabilities has to be at or near the top of the policy misery index.

Those who have worked on disability know what I mean. Programs for people with disabilities are hugely important and miserably hard to design and administer well. That would be true even if legislators were writing afresh on a blank legislative sheet. That they must cope with a deeply entrenched program about which analysts disagree and on which many people depend makes the problems many times more challenging.

I’m going to run through some of the reasons why designing and administering benefits for people determined to be disabled is so difficult. Some may be obvious, even banal, to the highly informed group here today. And you will doubtless think of reasons I omit.

First, the concept of disability, in the sense of a diminished capacity to work, has no clear meaning, the SSA definition of disability notwithstanding. We can define impairments. Some are so severe that work or, indeed, any other form of self-support seems impossible. But even among those with severe impairments, some people work for pay, and some don’t.

That doesn’t mean that if someone with a given impairment works, everyone with that same impairment could work if they tried hard enough. It means that physical or mental impairments incompletely identify those for whom work is not a reasonable expectation. The possibility of work depends on the availability of jobs, of services to support work effort, and of a host of personal characteristics, including functional capacities, intelligence, and grit.

That is not how the current disability determination process works. It considers the availability of jobs in the national, not the local, economy. It ignores the availability of work supports or accommodations by potential employers.

Whatever eligibility criteria one may establish for benefits, some people who really can’t work, or can’t earn enough to support themselves, will be denied benefits. And some will be awarded benefits who could work.

Good program design helps keep those numbers down. Good administration helps at least as much as, and maybe more than, program design. But there is no way to reduce the number of improper awards and improper denials to zero.

Second, the causes of disability are many and varied. Again, this observation is obvious, almost banal. Genetic inheritance, accidents and injuries, wear and tear from hard physical labor, and normal aging all create different needs for assistance.

These facts mean that people deemed unable to work have different needs. They constitute distinct interest groups, each seeking support, but not necessarily of the same kind. These groups sometimes compete with each other for always-limited resources. And that competition means that the politics of disability benefits are, shall we say, interesting.

Third, the design of programs to help people deemed unable to work is important and difficult. Moral hazard is endemic. Providing needed support and services is an act of compassion and decency. The goal is to provide such support and services while preserving incentives to work and to controlling costs borne by taxpayers.

But preserving work incentives is only part of the challenge. The capacity to work is continuous, not binary. Training and a wide and diverse range of services can help people perform activities of daily living and work.

Because resources are scarce, policy makers and administrators have to sort out who should get those services. Should it be those who are neediest? Those who are most likely to recover full capacities? Triage is inescapable. It is technically difficult. And it is always ethically fraught.

Designing disability benefit programs is hard. But administering them well is just as important and at least as difficult.

These statements may also be obvious to those who here today. But recent legislation and administrative appropriations raise doubts about whether they are obvious to or accepted by some members of Congress.

Let’s start with program design. We can all agree, I think, that incentives matter. If benefits ceased at the first dollar earned, few who come on the rolls would ever try to work.

So, Congress, for many years, has allowed beneficiaries to earn any amount for a brief period and small amounts indefinitely without losing eligibility. Under current law, there is a benefit cliff. If—after a trial work period—beneficiaries earn even $1 more than what is called substantial gainful activity, $1,130 in 2016, their benefit checks stop. They retain eligibility for health coverage for a while even after they leave the rolls. And for an extended period they may regain cash and health benefits without delay if their earnings decline.

Members of Congress have long been interested in whether a more gradual phase-out of benefits as earnings rise might encourage work. Various aspects of the current Disability Insurance program reflect Congress’s desire to encourage work.

The so-called Benefit Offset National Demonstration—or BOND—was designed to test the impact on labor supply by DI beneficiaries of one formula—replacing the “cliff” with a gradual reduction in benefits: $1 of benefit last for each $2 of earnings above the Substantial Gainful Activity level.

Alas, there were problems with that demonstration. It tested only one offset scenario – one starting point and one rate. So, there could be no way of knowing whether a 2-for-1 offset was the best way to encourage work.

And then there was the uncomfortable fact that, at the time of the last evaluation, out of 79,440 study participants only 21 experienced the offset. So there was no way of telling much of anything, other than that few people had worked enough to experience the offset.

Nor was the cause of non-response obvious. It is not clear how many demonstration participants even understood what was on offer.

Unsurprisingly, members of Congress interested in promoting work among DI recipients asked SSA to revisit the issue. The 2015 DI legislation mandates a new demonstration, christened the Promoting Opportunity Demonstration, or POD. POD uses the same 2 for 1 offset rate that BOND did, but the offset starts at an earnings level at or below earnings of $810 a month in 2016—which is well below the earnings at which the BOND phase-out began.

Unfortunately, as Kathleen Romig has pointed out in an excellent paper for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, this demonstration is unlikely to yield useful results. Only a very few atypical DI beneficiaries are likely to find it in their interest to participate in the demonstration, fewer even than in the BOND. That is because the POD offset begins at lower earnings than the BOND offset did. In addition, participants in POD sacrifice the right under current law that permits people receiving disability benefits to earn any amount for 9 months of working without losing any benefits.

Furthermore, the 2015 law stipulated that no Disability Insurance beneficiary could be required to participate in the demonstration or, having agreed to participate, forced to remain in the demonstration. Thus, few people are likely to respond to the POD or to remain in it.

There is a small group to whom POD will be very attractive—those few DI recipients who retain a lot of earning capacity. The POD will allow them to retain DI coverage until their earnings are quite high. For example, a person receiving a $2,000 monthly benefit—well above the average, to be sure, but well below the maximum—would remain eligible for some benefits until his or her annual earnings exceeded $57,700. I don’t know about you, but I doubt that Congress would favorably consider permanent law of this sort.

Not only would those participating be a thin and quite unrepresentative sample of DI beneficiaries in general, or even of those with some earning capacity, but selection bias resulting from the opportunity to opt out at any time would destroy the external validity of any statistical results.

Let me be clear. My comments on POD, the demonstration mandated in the 2015 legislation, are not meant to denigrate the need for, or the importance of, research on how to encourage work by DI recipients, especially those for whom financial independence is plausible. On the contrary, as I said at the outset, research is desperately needed on this issue, as well as many others. It is not yet too late to authorize a research design with a better chance of producing useful results.

But it will be too late soon. Fielding demonstrations takes time:

  • to solicit bids from contractors,
  • for contractors to formulate bids,
  • for government boards to select the best one,
  • for contractors to enroll participants,
  • for contractors to administer the demonstration,
  • and for analysts to process the data generated by the demonstrations.

That process will take all the time available between now and 2021 or 2022 when the DI trust fund will again demand attention. It will take a good deal more time than that to address the formidable and intriguing research agenda of SSDI Solutions Initiative.

I should like to conclude with plugs for two initiatives to which the Social Security Advisory Board has been giving some attention.

It takes too long for disability insurance applicants to have their cases decided. Perhaps the whole determination process should be redesigned. One of the CFRB papers proposes just that. But until that happens, it is vital to shorten the unconscionable delays separating initial denials and reconsideration from hearings before administrative law judges to which applicants are legally entitled. Procedural reforms in the hearing process might help. More ALJs surely will.

The 2015 budget act requires the Office of Personnel Management to take steps that will help increase the number of ALJs hired. I believe that the new director, Beth Colbert, is committed to reforms. But it is very hard to change legal interpretations that have hampered hiring for years and the sluggish bureaucratic culture that fostered them.

So, the jury is out on whether OPM can deliver. In a recent op-ed in Politico, Lanhee Chen, a Republican member of the SSAB, and I jointly endorsed urged Congress to be ready, if OPM fails to deliver on more and better lists of ALJ candidates and streamlined procedures for their appointment, to move the ALJ examination authority to another federal organization, such as the Administrative Conference of the United States.

Lastly, there is a facet of income support policy that we on the SSAB all agree merits much more attention than it has received. Just last month, the SSAB released a paper entitled Representative Payees: A Call to Action. More than eight million beneficiaries have been deemed incapable of managing $77 billion in benefits that the Social Security Administration provided them in 2014.

We believe that serious concern is warranted about all aspects of the representative payee program—how this infringement of personal autonomy is found to be necessary, how payees are selected, and how payee performance is monitored.

Management of representative payees is a particular challenge for the Social Security Administration. Its primary job is to pay cash benefits in the right amount to the right person at the right time. SSA does that job at rock-bottom costs and with remarkable accuracy. It is handing rapidly rising workloads with budgets that have barely risen. SSA is neither designed nor staffed to provide social services. Yet determining the need for, selecting, and monitoring representative payees is a social service function.

As the Baby Boom ages, the number of people needing help in administering cash benefits from the Social Security Administration—and from other agencies such as the Veterans Administration—will grow. So will the number needing help in making informed choices under Medicare and Medicaid.

The SSAB is determined to look into this challenge and to make constructive suggestions. We are just beginning and invite others to join in studying what I have called “the most important problem the public has never heard of.”

Living with disabilities today is markedly different from what it was in 1956 when the Disability Insurance program began. Yet, the DI program has changed little. Beneficiaries and taxpayers are pay heavily the failure of public policy to apply what has been learned over the past six decades about health, disability, function, and work.

I hope that SSA and Congress will use well the time until it next must legislate on Disability Insurance. The DI rolls are stabilizing. The economy has grown steadily since the Great Recession. Congress has reinstated demonstration authority. With adequate funding for research and testing, the SSA can rebuild its research capability. Along with the external research community, it can identify what works and help Congress improve the DI program for beneficiaries and taxpayers alike. The SSDI Solutions Initiative is a fine roadmap.

Authors

Publication: Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget
Image Source: © Max Whittaker / Reuters
      
 
 




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The European Union and India: Strategic Partners on Multilateralism and Global Governance

By Aditya Srinivasan & Nidhi Varma On 7th November 2019, Brookings India in collaboration with the European Union Delegation to India organised a panel discussion titled ‘The European Union and India: Strategic Partners on Multilateralism and Global Governance’. The keynote address was given by  Christian Leffler, Deputy Secretary-General for Economic and Global Issues, European External…

       




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A conversation with Somali Finance Minister Abdirahman Duale Beileh on economic adjustment in fragile African states

Fragile and conflict-affected states in Africa currently account for about one-third of those living in extreme poverty worldwide. These states struggle with tradeoffs between development and stabilization, the need for economic stimulus and debt sustainability, and global financial stewardship and transparency. Addressing fragility requires innovative approaches, the strengthening of public and private sector capacity, and…

       




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Why Pope Francis is visiting Myanmar

      
 
 




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Leveling the playing field between inherited income and income from work through an inheritance tax

The Problem The core objectives of tax policymaking should be to raise revenue in an efficient and equitable manner. Current taxation of estates and gifts (and nontaxation of inheritances) fails to meet these goals, perpetuating high levels of economic inequality and impeding intergenerational mobility. The current system also provides an intense incentive to delay realization of capital gains…

       




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What is a financial transaction tax?

The Vitals Democratic presidential candidates are proposing using a financial transaction tax (FTT), a tax on buying and selling a stock, bond, or other financial contract like options and derivatives. Taxing stock trading is not new. In fact, America already has an FTT, albeit extremely small: currently set at roughly 2 cents per $1,000 traded.…

       




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Examining the financing and delivery of long-term care in the US


Editor's note: On March 1, Alice Rivlin testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health on the financing and delivery of long-term care in the US

Chairman Pitts, Ranking Member Green: I am happy to be back before this Subcommittee, which is never afraid to take on complex issues of great importance to millions of Americans. I have worked on long-term services and supports (LTSS) for a long time and have recently had the privilege of co-chairing the Long-Term Care Initiative at the Bipartisan Policy Center (along with former Senators Bill Frist and Tom Daschle and former Governor and Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson). Our February 2016 report, Initial Recommendations to Improve the Financing of Long-Term Care, appended to my testimony, outlines a set of doable, practical changes in both public and private programs that could improve the availability and affordability of long-term services and supports.

I don’t need to remind this committee that Americans are living longer, and many of us will need help with the ordinary activities of daily living and suffer cognitive impairments that make it dangerous for us to cope alone. The number of people needing LTSS is rising and expected to double in the next 35 years or so.

Responsibility for LTSS is shared among seniors and people with disabilities themselves, family, friends, and volunteer care-givers; communities, state, and federal government. This shared-responsibility system is severely stressed, and will become increasingly unable to cope as the numbers needing care increase. Growing burdens fall on families, often daughters and daughters-in-law, who must manage daily conflicts between earning a living, caring for children, and meeting the needs of elderly or disabled relatives. Growth in Medicaid, the largest payer of long-term services and supports at about $123 billion per year, stresses state and federal budgets as spending for older Americans and individuals with disabilities competes with budgets for education and other investments in young people.

Many efforts to find a comprehensive solution to long-term care financing have failed—evidenced by passage and subsequent repeal of the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act and failure of the federal Long-term Care Commission to reach consensus on financing recommendations. Recently, however, a growing consensus has emerged around a set of incremental steps, which, if taken together could greatly improve the availability and affordability of long-term services and supports to America’s most vulnerable populations and take some of the burden off families and Medicaid in a fiscally responsible way. In recent weeks, The Bipartisan Policy Center and The Long-term Care Collaborative have offered similar sets of recommendations, as has LeadingAge, a key provider association.

While policymakers failed to agree on big legislative solutions, amazing progress has been made at the community level in finding new ways of keeping older Americans and people with disabilities out of institutions and in the community where they are happier and less isolated and can be served more effectively and cheaper. There has been an explosion of assisted living facilities, continuing care communities, senior villages, senior centers, senior daycare, and use of home health aides of various sorts. Growth in home and community-based services (HCBS) has been rapid, while the population served by traditional nursing homes has been virtually flat. Medicaid, with the support of both parties in Congress, has moved to increase the availability of home and community-based services.

The group working on the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Long-Term Care Initiative addressed the question: Is there a set of practical policies that could command bipartisan support that would improve the care of older Americans with disabilities, take significant pressure off families and Medicaid, and not break the bank? We came up with four proposals.

Make private long-term care insurance more affordable and available. Long term care ought to be an insurable risk. If more people bought Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) in their earning years, there would be less pressure on their savings and family resources and Medicaid when they became disabled. But both demand and supply of LTCI are weak and falling. Potential customers are reluctant to buy because it is costly and the need seems remote and hard to think about. Carriers find it difficult to price a product that will be used far in the future and fear losing money if customers live and use services for a long time. Many insurance companies have stopped offering LTCI.

Our report recommends developing a new type of private insurance product: “retirement long-term care insurance,” which would cover long-term care for a limited period (2-4 years) after a substantial deductible or waiting period and would have coinsurance. The insurance would provide inflation protection, which helps to ensure benefits keep pace with the rising costs of care, and a non-forfeiture benefit, which allows lapsed policyholders to access a limited benefit. Employers would be encouraged to offer such policies as a default option as part of a retirement plan. These policies, if offered through employers and public and private insurance exchanges, could cut premiums in half according estimates done by Milliman, LLC, for the Bipartisan Policy Center and other organizations. Penalty-free withdrawals would be allowed from retirement plans, such as 401(k) plans and IRAs, beginning at age 45, exclusively for the purchase of retirement LTCI.

Design a federal long-term care insurance option for those with catastrophic costs. Part of the reluctance of carriers to offer LTCI relates to the difficulty of predicting costs far in the future and the fact that a few policy holders may have extremely high costs for a very long time. A public program, covering truly catastrophic long-term care spending, could overcome this reluctance and reduce the cost of private LTCI. Catastrophic insurance, combined with retirement LTCI from the private market, could substantially relieve families and Medicaid. The cost of this program should be fully offset so as not to add to the deficit.

Streamline Medicaid home and community-based care options to encourage more effective care in lower-cost settings. While Congress has been proactive in encouraging state Medicaid programs to shift care settings from institutions to home and community-based care, states continue to face a daunting federal waiver process and multiple state options. Securing waivers requires complex negotiations between states and the federal government, and each of the existing state options have disincentives. Home and community-based options should be simplified into a single streamlined state plan amendment process.

Ensure that working people with disabilities in need of long-term services and supports do not lose access to their long-term services and supports as earnings increase. Individuals with modest employment incomes risk losing access to services that permit them to remain on the job. Existing Medicaid “buy-in” programs are often costly. Building on the “Achieving a Better Life Experience,” or “ABLE” Act, states could be given the option to offer a lower-cost, Medicaid buy-in for long-term services and supports designed to “wrap around” private health insurance or Medicare. Under this option, working individuals with disabilities would pay an income-related, sliding-scale premium.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts on this issue. It is one of America’s big challenges, but it’s an even bigger opportunity for a constructive bipartisan policy process. I look forward to continued dialogue and will keep you apprised of forthcoming recommendations by BPC’s Long-Term Care Initiative in 2016 and 2017.

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Authors

Publication: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce
Image Source: Kevin Lamarque
      




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Militias (and militancy) in Nigeria’s north-east: Not going away

Introduction Since 2009, an insurgency calling itself The People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad (Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad in Arabic) has caused devastating insecurity, impoverishment, displacement, and other suffering in Nigeria’s poor and arid North- East Zone.1 The group is better known to the world as Boko Haram, and although…

       




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Post-Brexit: What happens in France?

A recent Pew Research Center study found that 61 percent of French people hold an unfavorable view of the EU. In that same report, 60 percent of those who responded said they wished that the government of France would focus on the country’s own problems, rather than “helping” other countries. Philippe LeCorre takes a look at the implications of the Brexit vote and the rise of right-wing sentiments in France.

      
 
 




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Exit, voice, and loyalty: Lessons from Brexit for global governance

Uma Lele looks at a variety of works on the political economy to explain the shifts in global governance that led to Brexit.

      
 
 




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Webinar: Health insurance auto-enrollment

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, 30 million Americans were uninsured, but half of this population is eligible for insurance coverage through Medicaid or for financial assistance to buy coverage on the health insurance marketplace. Auto-enrollment is a method by which individuals are placed automatically into the health insurance coverage they are qualified for, and it has…

       




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Youth and Civil Society Action on Sustainable Development Goals: New Multi-Stakeholder Framework Advanced at UN Asia-Pacific Hosted Forum


In late October at the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP) headquarters in Bangkok, a multi-stakeholder coalition was launched to promote the role of youth and civil society in advancing post-2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The youth initiatives, fostering regional integration and youth service impact in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and counterpart regions of Northeast and South Asia, will be furthered through a new Asia-Pacific Peace Service Alliance. The alliance is comprised of youth leaders, foundations, civil society entities, multilateral partners and U.N. agencies. Together, their initiatives illustrate the potential of youth and multi-stakeholder coalitions to scale impacts to meet SDG development targets through youth service and social media campaigns, and partnerships with multilateral agencies, nongovernmental organizations, corporations and research institutes.

The “Asia-Pacific Forum on Youth Volunteerism to Promote Participation in Development and Peace” at UN ESCAP featured a new joint partnership of the U.S. Peace Corps and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) as well as USAID support for the ASEAN Youth Volunteering Program. With key leadership from ASEAN youth entitles, sponsor FK Norway, Youth Corps Singapore and Peace Corps’ innovative program in Thailand, the forum also furthered President Obama’s goal of Americans serving “side by side” with other nations’ volunteers. The multi-stakeholder Asia-Pacific alliance will be powered by creative youth action and a broad array of private and public partners from Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, Korea, China, Mongolia, Japan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, the U.S. and other nations.

During the event, Dr. Shamshad Akhtar, ESCAP executive secretary, pointed out that “tapping youth potential is critical to shape our shared destiny, as they are a source of new ideas, talent and inspiration. For ESCAP and the United Nations, a dynamic youth agenda is vital to ensure the success of post-2015 sustainable development.”

Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, former ASEAN secretary-general, called for a new Asia-wide multilateralism engaging youth and civil society.  In his remarks, he drew from his experience in mobilizing Asian relief and recovery efforts after Cyclone Nargis devastated the delta region of Myanmar in May 2008. Surin, honorary Alliance chairman and this year’s recipient of the Harris Wofford Global Citizenship Award, also noted the necessity of a “spiritual evolution” to a common sense of well-being to redress the “present course of possible extinction” caused by global conflicts and climate challenges. He summoned Asia-Pacific youth, representing 60 percent of the world’s young population, to “be the change you want to see” and to “commit our youth to a useful cause for humanity.”

The potential for similar upscaled service efforts in Africa, weaving regional integration and youth volunteering impact, has been assessed in Brookings research and policy recommendations being implemented in the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Recommendations, many of which COMESA and ASEAN are undertaking, include enabling youth entrepreneurship and service contributions to livelihoods in regional economic integration schemes, and commissioning third-party support for impact evidence research.

A good example of successful voluntary service contributions from which regional economic communities like ASEAN can learn a lot is the current Omnimed pilot research intervention in Uganda. In eastern Ugandan villages, 1,200 village health workers supported by volunteer medical doctors, Uganda’s Health Ministry, Peace Corps volunteers and Global Peace Women are addressing lifesaving maternal and child health outcomes furthering UNICEF’s campaign on “integrated health” addressing malaria, diarrheal disease and indoor cooking pollution. The effort has included construction of 15 secure water sources and 1,200 clean cook stoves along with randomized controlled trials.

Last week, the young leaders from more than 40 nations produced a “Bangkok Statement” outlining their policy guidance and practical steps to guide volunteering work plans for the new Asia-Pacific alliance. Youth service initiatives undertaken in “collective impact” clusters will focus on the environment (including clean water and solar villages), health service, entrepreneurship, youth roles in disaster preparedness and positive peace. The forum was co-convened by ESCAP, UNESCO, the Global Peace Foundation and the Global Young Leaders Academy.

      
 
 




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Multi-stakeholder alliance demonstrates the power of volunteers to meet 2030 Goals


Volunteerism remains a powerful tool for good around the world. Young people, in particular, are motivated by the prospect of creating real and lasting change, as well as gaining valuable learning experiences that come with volunteering. This energy and optimism among youth can be harnessed and mobilized to help meet challenges facing our world today and accomplish such targets as the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

On June 14, young leaders and development agents from leading non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations, corporations, universities, the Peace Corps, and United Nations Volunteers came together at the Brookings Institution to answer the question on how to achieve impacts on the SDGs through international service.

This was also the 10th anniversary gathering of the Building Bridges Coalition—a multi-stakeholder consortium of development volunteers— and included the announcement of a new Service Year Alliance partnership with the coalition to step up international volunteers and village-based volunteering capacity around the world.

Brookings Senior Fellow Homi Kharas, who served as the lead author supporting the high-level panel advising the U.N. secretary-general on the post-2015 development agenda, noted the imperative of engaging community volunteers to scale up effective initiatives, build political awareness, and generate “partnerships with citizens at every level” to achieve the 2030 goals.  

Kharas’ call was echoed in reports on effective grassroots initiatives, including Omnimed’s mobilization of 1,200 village health workers in Uganda’s Mukono district, a dramatic reduction of malaria through Peace Corps efforts with Senegal village volunteers, and Seed Global Health’s partnership to scale up medical doctors and nurses to address critical health professional shortages in the developing world. 

U.N. Youth Envoy Ahmad Alhendawi of Jordan energized young leaders from Atlas Corps, Global Citizen Year, America Solidaria, International Young Leaders Academy, and universities, citing U.N. Security Council Resolution 2250 on youth, peace, and security as “a turning point when it comes to the way we engage with young people globally… to recognize their role for who they are, as peacebuilders, not troublemakers… and equal partners on the ground.”

Service Year Alliance Chair General Stanley McChrystal, former Joint Special Operations commander, acclaimed, “The big idea… of a culture where the expectation [and] habit of service has provided young people an opportunity to do a year of funded, full-time service.” 

Civic Enterprises President John Bridgeland and Brookings Senior Fellow E.J. Dionne, Jr. led a panel with Seed Global Health’s Vanessa Kerry and Atlas Corps’ Scott Beale on policy ideas for the next administration, including offering Global Service Fellowships in United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs to grow health service corps, student service year loan forgiveness, and technical support through State Department volunteer exchanges. Former Senator Harris Wofford, Building Bridge Coalition’s senior advisor and a founding Peace Corps architect, shared how the coalition’s new “service quantum leap” furthers the original idea announced by President John F. Kennedy, which called for the Peace Corps and the mobilization of one million global volunteers through NGOs, faith-based groups, and universities.

The multi-stakeholder volunteering model was showcased by Richard Dictus, executive coordinator of U.N. Volunteers; Peace Corps Director Carrie Hessler-Radelet; USAID Counselor Susan Reischle; and Diane Melley, IBM vice president for Global Citizenship. Melley highlighted IBM’s 280,000 skills-based employee volunteers who are building community capacity in 130 countries along with Impact 2030—a consortium of 60 companies collaborating with the U.N.—that is “integrating service into overall citizenship activities” while furthering the SDGs.

The faith and millennial leaders who contributed to the coalition’s action plan included Jim Lindsay of Catholic Volunteer Network; Service Year’s Yasmeen Shaheen-McConnell; C. Eduardo Vargas of USAID’s Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives; and moderator David Eisner of Repair the World, a former CEO of the Corporation for National and Community Service. Jesuit Volunteer Corps President Tim Shriver, grandson of the Peace Corps’ founding director, addressed working sessions on engaging faith-based volunteers, which, according to research, account for an estimated 44 percent of nearly one million U.S. global volunteers

The key role of colleges and universities in the coalition’s action plan—including  linking service year with student learning, impact research, and gap year service—was  outlined by Dean Alan Solomont of Tisch College at Tufts University; Marlboro College President Kevin Quigley; and U.N. Volunteers researcher Ben Lough of University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign.

These panel discussion directed us towards the final goal of the event, which was a multi-stakeholder action campaign calling for ongoing collaboration and policy support to enhance the collective impact of international service in achieving the 2030 goals.

This resolution, which remains a working document, highlighted five major priorities:

  1. Engage service abroad programs to more effectively address the 2030 SDGs by mobilizing 10,000 additional service year and short-term volunteers annually and partnerships that leverage local capacity and volunteers in host communities.
  2. Promote a new generation of global leaders through global service fellowships promoting service and study abroad.
  3. Expand cross-sectorial participation and partnerships.
  4. Engage more volunteers of all ages in service abroad.
  5. Study and foster best practices across international service programs, measure community impact, and ensure the highest quality of volunteer safety, well-being, and confidence.

Participants agreed that it’s through these types of efforts that volunteer service could become a common strategy throughout the world for meeting pressing challenges. Moreover, the cooperation of individuals and organizations will be vital in laying a foundation on which governments and civil society can build a more prosperous, healthy, and peaceful world.

      
 
 




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Financial well-being: Measuring financial perceptions and experiences in low- and moderate-income households

Thirty-nine percent of U.S. adults reported lacking sufficient liquidity to cover even a modest $400 emergency without borrowing or selling an asset, and 60 percent reported experiencing a financial shock (e.g., loss of income or car repair) in the prior year. While facing precarious financial situations may leave households unable to manage essential expenses and…

       




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How to increase financial support during COVID-19 by investing in worker training

It took just two weeks to exhaust one of the largest bailout packages in American history. Even the most generous financial support has limits in a recession. However, I am optimistic that a pandemic-fueled recession and mass underemployment could be an important opportunity to upskill the American workforce through loans for vocational training. Financially supporting…

       




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The Origins of the Financial Crisis

SUMMARY

The financial crisis that has been wreaking havoc in markets in the U.S. and across the world since August 2007 had its origins in an asset price bubble that interacted with new kinds of financial innovations that masked risk; with companies that failed to follow their own risk management procedures; and with regulators and supervisors that failed to restrain excessive risk taking.

A bubble formed in the housing markets as home prices across the country increased each year from the mid 1990s to 2006, moving out of line with fundamentals like household income. Like traditional asset price bubbles, expectations of future price increases developed and were a significant factor in inflating house prices. As individuals witnessed rising prices in their neighborhood and across the country, they began to expect those prices to continue to rise, even in the late years of the bubble when it had nearly peaked.

The rapid rise of lending to subprime borrowers helped inflate the housing price bubble. Before 2000, subprime lending was virtually non-existent, but thereafter it took off exponentially. The sustained rise in house prices, along with new financial innovations, suddenly made subprime borrowers — previously shut out of the mortgage markets — attractive customers for mortgage lenders. Lenders devised innovative Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) — with low "teaser rates," no down-payments, and some even allowing the borrower to postpone some of the interest due each month and add it to the principal of the loan — which were predicated on the expectation that home prices would continue to rise.

But innovation in mortgage design alone would not have enabled so many subprime borrowers to access credit without other innovations in the so-called process of "securitizing" mortgages — or the pooling of mortgages into packages and then selling securities backed by those packages to investors who receive pro rata payments of principal and interest by the borrowers. The two main government-sponsored enterprises devoted to mortgage lending, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, developed this financing technique in the 1970s, adding their guarantees to these "mortgage-backed securities" (MBS) to ensure their marketability. For roughly three decades, Fannie and Freddie confined their guarantees to "prime" borrowers who took out "conforming" loans, or loans with a principal below a certain dollar threshold and to borrowers with a credit score above a certain limit. Along the way, the private sector developed MBS backed by non-conforming loans that had other means of "credit enhancement," but this market stayed relatively small until the late 1990s. In this fashion, Wall Street investors effectively financed homebuyers on Main Street. Banks, thrifts, and a new industry of mortgage brokers originated the loans but did not keep them, which was the "old" way of financing home ownership.

Over the past decade, private sector commercial and investment banks developed new ways of securitizing subprime mortgages: by packaging them into "Collateralized Debt Obligations" (sometimes with other asset-backed securities), and then dividing the cash flows into different "tranches" to appeal to different classes of investors with different tolerances for risk. By ordering the rights to the cash flows, the developers of CDOs (and subsequently other securities built on this model), were able to convince the credit rating agencies to assign their highest ratings to the securities in the highest tranche, or risk class. In some cases, so-called "monoline" bond insurers (which had previously concentrated on insuring municipal bonds) sold protection insurance to CDO investors that would pay off in the event that loans went into default. In other cases, especially more recently, insurance companies, investment banks and other parties did the near equivalent by selling "credit default swaps" (CDS), which were similar to monocline insurance in principle but different in risk, as CDS sellers put up very little capital to back their transactions.

These new innovations enabled Wall Street to do for subprime mortgages what it had already done for conforming mortgages, and they facilitated the boom in subprime lending that occurred after 2000. By channeling funds of institutional investors to support the origination of subprime mortgages, many households previously unable to qualify for mortgage credit became eligible for loans. This new group of eligible borrowers increased housing demand and helped inflate home prices.

These new financial innovations thrived in an environment of easy monetary policy by the Federal Reserve and poor regulatory oversight. With interest rates so low and with regulators turning a blind eye, financial institutions borrowed more and more money (i.e. increased their leverage) to finance their purchases of mortgage-related securities. Banks created off-balance sheet affiliated entities such as Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) to purchase mortgage-related assets that were not subject to regulatory capital requirements Financial institutions also turned to short-term "collateralized borrowing" like repurchase agreements, so much so that by 2006 investment banks were on average rolling over a quarter of their balance sheet every night. During the years of rising asset prices, this short-term debt could be rolled over like clockwork. This tenuous situation shut down once panic hit in 2007, however, as sudden uncertainty over asset prices caused lenders to abruptly refuse to rollover their debts, and over-leveraged banks found themselves exposed to falling asset prices with very little capital.

While ex post we can certainly say that the system-wide increase in borrowed money was irresponsible and bound for catastrophe, it is not shocking that consumers, would-be homeowners, and profit-maximizing banks will borrow more money when asset prices are rising; indeed, it is quite intuitive. What is especially shocking, though, is how institutions along each link of the securitization chain failed so grossly to perform adequate risk assessment on the mortgage-related assets they held and traded. From the mortgage originator, to the loan servicer, to the mortgage-backed security issuer, to the CDO issuer, to the CDS protection seller, to the credit rating agencies, and to the holders of all those securities, at no point did any institution stop the party or question the little-understood computer risk models, or the blatantly unsustainable deterioration of the loan terms of the underlying mortgages.

A key point in understanding this system-wide failure of risk assessment is that each link of the securitization chain is plagued by asymmetric information – that is, one party has better information than the other. In such cases, one side is usually careful in doing business with the other and makes every effort to accurately assess the risk of the other side with the information it is given. However, this sort of due diligence that is to be expected from markets with asymmetric information was essentially absent in recent years of mortgage securitization. Computer models took the place of human judgment, as originators did not adequately assess the risk of borrowers, mortgage services did not adequately assess the risk of the terms of mortgage loans they serviced, MBS issuers did not adequately assess the risk of the securities they sold, and so on.

The lack of due diligence on all fronts was partly due to the incentives in the securitization model itself. With the ability to immediately pass off the risk of an asset to someone else, institutions had little financial incentive to worry about the actual risk of the assets in question. But what about the MBS, CDO, and CDS holders who did ultimately hold the risk? The buyers of these instruments had every incentive to understand the risk of the underlying assets. What explains their failure to do so?

One part of the reason is that these investors — like everyone else — were caught up in a bubble mentality that enveloped the entire system. Others saw the large profits from subprime-mortgage related assets and wanted to get in on the action. In addition, the sheer complexity and opacity of the securitized financial system meant that many people simply did not have the information or capacity to make their own judgment on the securities they held, instead relying on rating agencies and complex but flawed computer models. In other words, poor incentives, the bubble in home prices, and lack of transparency erased the frictions inherent in markets with asymmetric information (and since the crisis hit in 2007, the extreme opposite has been the case, with asymmetric information problems having effectively frozen credit markets). In the pages that follow, we tell this story more fully.

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Authors

      
 
 




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Fixing Finance: A Roadmap for Reform

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Obama Administration has announced that fixing the nation’s financial system is one of its highest initial priorities and will shortly release a plan to do that. In this essay, we attempt to provide our own version of a roadmap for reform.

We believe that the central challenge confronting policy makers now is to establish a new regulatory framework that will do a far better job preventing financial abuses and their consequences without chilling innovation and prudent risk-taking that are essential for growth in any economy.

To accomplish that end will require a major restructuring and strengthening of the two pillars upon which an efficient and safe financial system must rest: market discipline and sound regulation. It would be a mistake, in our view, to conclude that because both these pillars failed to prevent the current crisis that either one should be jettisoned. Neither pillar alone can do the job. There is no alternative, we need both pillars, but both need to work much better in the future.

The United States has a history of enacting major legislation and adopting new rules in response to crises, and this time will be no exception. The critical challenge is to ensure that reforms remedy the flaws in the current framework; that they are sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing circumstances and to head off future, avoidable crises, and, all the while, that they do not amount to overkill, by chilling the innovation and prudent risk-taking on which continued economic growth very much depends. These objectives will most likely be met if policymakers have a suitable roadmap for guiding their reforms. We suggest the following:

  1. Multiple measures should be adopted to improve transparency and increase the incentive for prudent behavior throughout the mortgage process.

     

  2. A special set of prudential rules should govern the regulation of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), or those whose failure could have systemic consequences, and thus trigger federal rescues.

     

  3. A prudential regulator should require all SIFIs to fund some portion of their assets with long-term, subordinated debt. Such debt might also be convertible to equity in the event the institution’s capital-to-asset ratio falls below a certain level.

     

  4. Regulators should encourage the formation of clearinghouses for derivatives contracts, starting with credit default swaps, and empower an overseer.

     

  5. Financial reforms should be written broadly enough, and with enough discretion for regulators, so that policy makers can better anticipate future financial crises, however they might arise.

     

  6. The financial regulatory agencies should be reorganized, so that they have jurisdiction by function or objective (solvency and consumer protection) rather than by type of charter of the regulated financial institution.

     

  7. In the short to intermediate run, the housing GSEs — Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System — should be regulated as public utility “SIFIs” (after recapitalization with public funds) or directly operated as government agencies.

     

  8. While U.S. financial policy makers must support international cooperation on financial regulation they should not wait for international agreement before taking necessary steps to improve our own system.
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Regulating Insurance After the Crisis

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite a long-standing policy debate, insurance remains the only major financial industry not to be regulated at the federal level, a tradition dating from the 19th century. However, recent financial turmoil has fundamentally changed the terms of this important discussion.

Many contend that as opposed to as many 51 separate regulators, a single federal insurance regulator would: allow insurers to pass substantial savings on to their consumers; preempt market distorting state regulation of rates; attract the expert talent needed to supervise the increasingly complex industry products; improve competition between insurers and non-insurance financial institutions for insurance-like products; better position insurers to compete globally and; make national policy with respect to insurer solvency.
 
However, state insurance regulators and some smaller insurers and insurance agents favor the current system, arguing that: they alone have the interest, expertise, and accessibility to consumers to handle best consumer complaints; insurance rates must be subject to oversight if not outright control to protect consumers; and state regulators have moved aggressively in recent years to improve their solvency regulation.

After weighing these arguments, I conclude in this essay that insurers and agents operating in multiple states should have the option to operate under a more streamlined regulatory system, and in particular to choose between being chartered and thus regulated by individual state regulators, or by a new federal insurance regulator. Congress has considered but not yet enacted legislation establishing this “optional federal charter” system, analogous (although not identical) to the regulatory system that has long governed the U.S. banking industry.

Further, the recent financial crisis and associated bailout of AIG make it is clear that, in addition to the optional federal charter, the government should require federal solvency and consumer protection regulation of the largest insurers that are deemed to be “systemically important financial institutions.” Clearly, if the federal government is potentially needed as a source of debt or equity funds for certain insurers, there is a strong case for having the federal authorities actively oversee the financial safety and soundness of at least those firms that may benefit from federal, and thus national taxpayer, assistance.

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The U.S. Financial and Economic Crisis: Where Does It Stand and Where Do We Go From Here?

INTRODUCTION

The Obama administration needs to focus on executing its existing financial rescue plans, keep the TARP focused on the banking sector, and create a contingency plan should the banking system destabilize again.

Crystal balls are dangerous, especially when it comes to economic predictions, which is why it is important for the administration to chart a path forward. Public policy must remain focused on the very real possibility that the apparent easing in the economy’s decline may be followed by little or no growth for several quarters and there could possibly be another negative turn. One of the risks is that the United States is very connected to the rest of the world, most of which is in severe recession. The global economy could be a significant drag on U.S. growth.

Cautious optimism should be the order of the day. We fear that the recent reactions of the financial markets and of some analysts carry too much of the optimism without recognizing enough of the uncertainty. There remains a lot of uncertainty and policymakers should not rest on their laurels or turn to other policies, even if they look more exciting. It is vital to follow through on the current financial rescue plans and to have well-conceived contingency plans in case there is another dip down.

We propose three recommendations for the financial rescue plans:

  • Focus on execution of existing programs. The Administration has created programs to deal with each of the key elements necessary to solve the financial crisis. All of them have significant steps remaining and some of them have not even started yet, such as the programs to deal with toxic assets. As has been demonstrated multiple times now since October 2008, these are complex programs that require a great deal of attention. It is time to execute rather than to create still more efforts.
  • Resist the temptation to allocate money from the TARP to other uses—it is essential to maintain a reserve of Congressionally-authorized funds in case they are needed for the banks. It would be difficult to overemphasize the remaining uncertainties about bank solvency as they navigate what will remain a rough year or more. The banks could easily need another $300 billion of equity capital and might need still more. It is essential that the administration have the ammunition readily available.
  • Third, make sure there is a contingency plan to deal with a major setback for the banking system. The plan needs broad support within the administration and among regulators and, ideally, from key congressional leaders. We probably won’t need it, but there is too high a chance that we will require it for us to remain without one. The country cannot afford even the appearance of the ad hoc and changing nature of the responses that were evident last fall.
We also give the administration a thumbs-up for their bank recapitalization as well as the TALF program, while they are much more skeptical of the Treasury’s approaches to toxic assets. The authors also believe it is time to focus on the truly mind-blowing budget deficits given the danger that markets will not be able to absorb the amount of government borrowing needed without triggering a rise in U.S. interest rates and perhaps an unstable decline in the value of the dollar, nor do they believe there should be a another fiscal stimulus except under extreme circumstances.

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How to ensure Africa has the financial resources to address COVID-19

As countries around the world fall into a recession due to the coronavirus, what effects will this economic downturn have on Africa? Brahima S. Coulibaly joins David Dollar to explain the economic strain from falling commodity prices, remittances, and tourism, and also the consequences of a recent G-20 decision to temporarily suspend debt service payments…

       




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Figures of the week: The costs of financing Africa’s response to COVID-19

Last month’s edition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s biannual Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, which discusses economic developments and prospects for the region, pays special attention to the financial channels through which COVID-19 has—and will—impact the economic growth of the region. Notably, the authors of the report reduced their GDP growth estimates from…

       




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Transparency and governance in US foreign policy

The recent impeachment inquiry examined whether the president abused his office in dealing with a foreign power, and posed new challenges for a Congress seeking to exert oversight over the executive branch. This new level of tension between the branches adds to the list of divergences between the executive branch and Congress about the power…

       




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How is Pakistan balancing religion and politics in its response to the coronavirus?

As Ramadan begins, Pakistan has loosened social distancing restrictions on gatherings in mosques, allowing communal prayers to go forward during the holy month. David Rubenstein Fellow Madiha Afzal explains how Prime Minister Imran Khan's political compromise with the religious right and cash assistance programs for the poor help burnish his populist image, while leaving it…

       




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Webinar: How federal job vacancies hinder the government’s response to COVID-19

Vacant positions and high turnover across the federal bureaucracy have been a perpetual problem since President Trump was sworn into office. Upper-level Trump administration officials (“the A Team”) have experienced a turnover rate of 85 percent — much higher than any other administration in the past 40 years. The struggle to recruit and retain qualified…

       




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WATCH: South African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan on the country’s challenges, potential, and resilience


At a time of decelerating regional growth in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa—one of the continent’s leading economies—is facing the brunt of concurrent external and domestic growth shocks. During a Brookings event on April 14, 2016 moderated by Africa Growth Initiative Director Amadou Sy, South African minister of finance, the Honorable Pravin Gordhan, provided cause for encouragement, as he highlighted strategies that South Africa is implementing to reverse slowing growth trends, boost social cohesion, and springboard inclusive, sustainable development.

Throughout the event, Minister Gordhan emphasized that South Africa is refocusing its efforts on implementing homegrown policies to mitigate the effects of global and domestic shocks: “Our approach is not to keep pointing outside our borders and say, ‘That’s where the problem is.’ We've got our own challenges and difficulties, and potential and opportunities. And it's important to focus on those, and rally South Africans behind that set of initiatives so that we could go wherever we can in terms improving the situation.”

He began by explaining the major growth problems facing South Africa, including first-level structural challenges—consistent electricity supply and labor relations—as well as deeper structural challenges, for instance, reforming the oligopolistic sectors of its economy. To address these issues, he expanded on what collaborative, multi-stakeholder efforts would be necessary. Watch:

Pravin Gordhan notes the major growth challenges in South Africa

Contending with infrastructure needs—particularly energy and logistical, but also social, such as water and sanitation, health care, and educational facilities—will play a significant role in overcoming these aforementioned challenges. Minister Gordhan explained how the government aims to fill existing infrastructure gaps through innovative financing mechanisms. Watch:

Pravin Gordhan on addressing South Africa’s infrastructure gaps

Later in the event, Sy pressed Minister Gordhan on plans for implementation for the country’s ambitious goals. As an example, Minister Gordhan underlined “Operation Phakisa,” a results-driven approach to fast-track the implementation of initiatives to achieve development objectives. The government intends to use this methodology to address a number of social priorities, including unlocking the potential of South Africa’s coastlines and oceans. Watch:

Pravin Gordhan on implementation of South Africa's development objectives

Urbanization in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is widespread and increasing, creating a demand for governments to both maintain their infrastructure as well as harness their energy and human capacity. Cities, especially those in South Africa’s Gauteng Province (Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Ekurhuleni), will continue to be crucial engines of economic development if municipal governance systems effectively manage the region’s expected rapid urbanization in the years to come. Minister Gordhan discusses some of the lessons learned from the Gauteng city region. Watch:

Pravin Gordhan on the vital role of cities in economic development in South Africa

In sum, referring to the confluence of adverse global conditions and internal problems currently affecting South Africa, Minister Gordhan stated, “Whenever you are in the middle of a storm it looks like the worst thing possible—but storms don’t last forever.” He did not doubt the ability of the South African people to weather and emerge stronger from the storm, offering: “Ultimately South Africans are hopeful, are optimistic and resilient.”

You can watch the full event here

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  • Amy Copley
      
 
 




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Multi-stakeholder alliance demonstrates the power of volunteers to meet 2030 Goals


Volunteerism remains a powerful tool for good around the world. Young people, in particular, are motivated by the prospect of creating real and lasting change, as well as gaining valuable learning experiences that come with volunteering. This energy and optimism among youth can be harnessed and mobilized to help meet challenges facing our world today and accomplish such targets as the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

On June 14, young leaders and development agents from leading non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations, corporations, universities, the Peace Corps, and United Nations Volunteers came together at the Brookings Institution to answer the question on how to achieve impacts on the SDGs through international service.

This was also the 10th anniversary gathering of the Building Bridges Coalition—a multi-stakeholder consortium of development volunteers— and included the announcement of a new Service Year Alliance partnership with the coalition to step up international volunteers and village-based volunteering capacity around the world.

Brookings Senior Fellow Homi Kharas, who served as the lead author supporting the high-level panel advising the U.N. secretary-general on the post-2015 development agenda, noted the imperative of engaging community volunteers to scale up effective initiatives, build political awareness, and generate “partnerships with citizens at every level” to achieve the 2030 goals.  

Kharas’ call was echoed in reports on effective grassroots initiatives, including Omnimed’s mobilization of 1,200 village health workers in Uganda’s Mukono district, a dramatic reduction of malaria through Peace Corps efforts with Senegal village volunteers, and Seed Global Health’s partnership to scale up medical doctors and nurses to address critical health professional shortages in the developing world. 

U.N. Youth Envoy Ahmad Alhendawi of Jordan energized young leaders from Atlas Corps, Global Citizen Year, America Solidaria, International Young Leaders Academy, and universities, citing U.N. Security Council Resolution 2250 on youth, peace, and security as “a turning point when it comes to the way we engage with young people globally… to recognize their role for who they are, as peacebuilders, not troublemakers… and equal partners on the ground.”

Service Year Alliance Chair General Stanley McChrystal, former Joint Special Operations commander, acclaimed, “The big idea… of a culture where the expectation [and] habit of service has provided young people an opportunity to do a year of funded, full-time service.” 

Civic Enterprises President John Bridgeland and Brookings Senior Fellow E.J. Dionne, Jr. led a panel with Seed Global Health’s Vanessa Kerry and Atlas Corps’ Scott Beale on policy ideas for the next administration, including offering Global Service Fellowships in United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs to grow health service corps, student service year loan forgiveness, and technical support through State Department volunteer exchanges. Former Senator Harris Wofford, Building Bridge Coalition’s senior advisor and a founding Peace Corps architect, shared how the coalition’s new “service quantum leap” furthers the original idea announced by President John F. Kennedy, which called for the Peace Corps and the mobilization of one million global volunteers through NGOs, faith-based groups, and universities.

The multi-stakeholder volunteering model was showcased by Richard Dictus, executive coordinator of U.N. Volunteers; Peace Corps Director Carrie Hessler-Radelet; USAID Counselor Susan Reischle; and Diane Melley, IBM vice president for Global Citizenship. Melley highlighted IBM’s 280,000 skills-based employee volunteers who are building community capacity in 130 countries along with Impact 2030—a consortium of 60 companies collaborating with the U.N.—that is “integrating service into overall citizenship activities” while furthering the SDGs.

The faith and millennial leaders who contributed to the coalition’s action plan included Jim Lindsay of Catholic Volunteer Network; Service Year’s Yasmeen Shaheen-McConnell; C. Eduardo Vargas of USAID’s Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives; and moderator David Eisner of Repair the World, a former CEO of the Corporation for National and Community Service. Jesuit Volunteer Corps President Tim Shriver, grandson of the Peace Corps’ founding director, addressed working sessions on engaging faith-based volunteers, which, according to research, account for an estimated 44 percent of nearly one million U.S. global volunteers

The key role of colleges and universities in the coalition’s action plan—including  linking service year with student learning, impact research, and gap year service—was  outlined by Dean Alan Solomont of Tisch College at Tufts University; Marlboro College President Kevin Quigley; and U.N. Volunteers researcher Ben Lough of University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign.

These panel discussion directed us towards the final goal of the event, which was a multi-stakeholder action campaign calling for ongoing collaboration and policy support to enhance the collective impact of international service in achieving the 2030 goals.

This resolution, which remains a working document, highlighted five major priorities:

  1. Engage service abroad programs to more effectively address the 2030 SDGs by mobilizing 10,000 additional service year and short-term volunteers annually and partnerships that leverage local capacity and volunteers in host communities.
  2. Promote a new generation of global leaders through global service fellowships promoting service and study abroad.
  3. Expand cross-sectorial participation and partnerships.
  4. Engage more volunteers of all ages in service abroad.
  5. Study and foster best practices across international service programs, measure community impact, and ensure the highest quality of volunteer safety, well-being, and confidence.

Participants agreed that it’s through these types of efforts that volunteer service could become a common strategy throughout the world for meeting pressing challenges. Moreover, the cooperation of individuals and organizations will be vital in laying a foundation on which governments and civil society can build a more prosperous, healthy, and peaceful world.

      
 
 




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How to make Africa meet sustainable development ends: A special glance at cross-border energy solutions


Cliquez ici pour lire la version complète de ce blog en français »

2016: The turning point

Policymakers and development practitioners now face a new set of challenges in the aftermath of the global consensus triumvirate Addis Agenda—2030 Agenda—Paris Agreement: [1] implementation, follow-up, and review. Development policy professionals must tackle these while at the same time including the three pillars of sustainable development—social development, economic growth, and environmental protection—and the above three global consensus’ cross-sectoral natures—all while working in a context where policy planning is still performed in silos. They also must incorporate the universality of these new agreements in the light of different national circumstances—different national realities, capacities, needs, levels of development, and national policies and priorities. And then they have to significantly scale up resource allocation and means of implementation (including financing, capacity building, and technology transfer) to make a difference and enhance novel multi-stakeholder partnerships to contain the surge of global flows of all kinds (such as migration, terrorism, diseases, taxation, extreme weather, and digital revolution) in a resolutely interconnected world. Quite an ambitious task!

Given the above complexities, new national and global arrangements are being made to honor the commitments put forth to answer these unprecedented challenges. Several African governments have already started establishing inter-ministerial committees and task forces to ensure alignment between the global goals and existing national planning processes, aspirations, and priorities.

With the international community, Africa is preparing for the first High-Level Political Forum since the 2030 Agenda adoption in July 2016 on the theme “Ensuring that no one is left behind.” In order to inform the 2030 Agenda’s implementation leadership, guidance, and recommendations, six African countries [2] of 22 U.N. Member States, volunteered to present national reviews on their work to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a unique opportunity to provide an uncompromising reality check and highlight levers to exploit and limits to overcome for impact.

Paralleling Africa’s groundwork, the United Nations’ efforts for coordination have been numerous. They include an inter-agency task force to prepare for the follow-up forum to Financing For Development timed with the Global Infrastructure Forum that will consult on infrastructure investment, a crucial point for the continent; an appointed 10-representative group to support the Technology Facilitation Mechanism that facilitates the development, transfer and dissemination of technologies for the SDGs, another very important item for Africa; and an independent team of advisors to counsel on the longer-term positioning of the U.N. development system in the context of the 2030 Agenda, commonly called “U.N. fit for purpose,” among many other endeavors.

These overwhelming bureaucratic duties alone will put a meaningful burden on Africa’s limited capacity. Thus, it is in the interest of the continent to pool its assets by taking advantage of its robust regional networks in order to mitigate this obstacle in a coherent and coordinated manner, and by building on the convergence between the newly adopted texts and Agenda 2063, the African Union’s 50-year transformation blueprint, with the help of pan-African institutions.

Regionalization in Africa: The gearwheel to the next developmental phase

Besides national and global, there is a third level of consideration: the regional one. Indeed, the three major agreements in 2015 emphasized support to projects and cooperation frameworks that foster regional and subregional integration, particularly in Africa. [3] Indeed, common and coherent industrial policies for regional value chains developed by strengthened regional institutions and sustained by a strong-willed transformational leadership are gaining traction towards Africa’s insertion into the global economy.

Africa has long made regional economic integration within its main “building blocs,” the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), a core strategy for development. The continent is definitely engaged in this path: Last summer, three RECs, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), launched the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) that covers 26 countries, over 600 million people, and $1 trillion GDP. The tripartite arrangement paves the way towards Africa’s own mega-regional one, the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), and the realization of one broad African Economic Community. If regionalization allows free movement of people, capital, goods, and services, the resulting increased intra-African connectivity will boost trade within Africa, promote growth, create jobs, and attract investments. Ultimately, it should ignite industrialization, innovation, and competitiveness. To that end, pan-African institutions, capitalizing on the recent positive continental performances, are redoubling their efforts to build an enabling environment for policy and regulation harmonization and economies of scale.

Infrastructure and regionalization

Importantly, infrastructure, without which no connectivity is possible, is undeniably the enabling bedrock to all future regionalization plans. Together with market integration and industrial development, infrastructure development is one of the three pillars of the TFTA strategy. Similarly, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Agency, the technical body of the African Union (AU) mandated with planning and coordinating the implementation of continental priorities and regional programs, adopted regional integration as a strategic approach to infrastructure. In fact, in June 2014, the NEPAD Agency organized the Dakar Financing Summit for Infrastructure, culminating with the adoption of the Dakar Agenda for Action that lays down options for investment mobilization towards infrastructure development projects, starting with 16 key bankable projects stemming from the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). These “NEPAD mega-projects to transform Africa” are, notably, all regional in scope.

See the full map of NEPAD’s 16 mega-projects to transform Africa here »

Supplementing NEPAD and TFTA, the Continental Business Network was formed to promote public-private dialogue with regard to regional infrastructure investment. The Africa50 Infrastructure Fund was constituted as a new delivery platform commercially managed to narrow the massive infrastructure finance gap in Africa evaluated at $50 billion per annum.

The development of homegrown proposals and institutional advances observed lately demonstrate Africa’s assertive engagement towards accelerating infrastructure development, thereby regionalization. At the last AU Summit, the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee approved the institutionalization of an annual PIDA Week hosted at the African Development Bank (AfDB) to follow up on the progresses made.

The momentum of Africa’s regional energy projects

The energy partnerships listed below illustrate the possible gain from adopting trans-boundary approaches for implementation and follow-up: the Africa Power Vision (APV) undertaken with Power Africa; the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) model accompanying the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) Africa Hub efforts; and the Africa GreenCo solution that is to bank on PIDA.

  • Africa Power Vision: African ministers of power and finance gathered at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos in 2014 decided to create the APV. The vision provides a strategic template harnessing resources to fast-track access to modern energy for African households, businesses, and industries. It draws up a shortlist of African-driven regional priority energy projects mostly extracted from the PIDA Priority Action Program, which is the PIDA short-term pipeline to be completed by 2020. The game changer Inga III hydropower project, the iconic DESERTEC Sahara solar project, and the gigantic North-South Interconnection Transmission Line covering almost the entire TFTA are among the 13 selected projects. The APV concept note and implementation plan entitled “From vision to action” developed by the NEPAD Agency, in collaboration with U.S. government-led Power Africa initiative, was endorsed at the January 2015 AU Summit. The package elaborates on responses to counter bottlenecks to achieve quantifiable targets, the “acceleration methodology” based on NEPAD Project Prioritization Considerations Tool (PPCT), risk mitigation, and power projects’ financing. Innovative design was thought to avoid duplication, save resources, improve coordination and foster transformative action with the setting up of dual-hatted Power Africa – APV Transaction Advisors, who supervise investment schemes up to financial closure where and when there is an overlap of energy projects or common interest. Overall, the APV partnership permits a mutualization of expertise while at the same time, since it is based on PIDA, promoting regional economic integration for electrification.
  • ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency: U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the Sustainable Energy for All initiative worldwide as early as 2011 with the triple objective of ensuring universal access to modern energy services, doubling the rate of improvement of energy efficiency, and doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 2030. Since its inception, SE4ALL prompted a lot of enthusiasm on the continent, and is now counting 44 opt-in African countries. As a result, the SE4ALL Africa Hub was the first regional hub to be launched in 2013. Hosted at the AfDB in partnership with the AU Commission, NEPAD Agency, and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), its role is to facilitate the implementation of SE4ALL on the continent. The SE4ALL Africa Hub 3rd Annual Workshop held in Abidjan last February showed the potential of this “creative coalition” (Yumkella, 2014) to deliver on areas spanning from national plans of action, regionally concerted approaches in line with the continental vision, to SDG7 on energy, to climate Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) made for the Paris Agreement. Above all, the workshop displayed the hub’s ability to efficiently kick-start the harmonization of processes for impact among countries. Forasmuch as all ECOWAS Member States opted-in to SE4ALL, the West African ministers mandated their regional energy center, ECREEE, to coordinate the implementation of the SE4ALL Action Agendas (AAs), which are documents outlining country actions required to achieve sustainable energy objectives, and from then Investment Prospectuses (IPs), the documents presenting the AAs investment requirements. As a result, the ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy (EREP) and the Energy Efficiency Policy (EEEP) were formulated and adopted; and a regional monitoring framework to feed into a Global Tracking Framework, the SE4ALL measuring and reporting system, is now being conceived. The successful ECREEE model, bridging national inventory and global players, is about to be duplicated in two other African regions, EAC and SADC, with the support of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
  • Africa GreenCo: Lastly, initiatives like Africa GreenCo are incubating. This promising vehicle, currently funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, envisions itself as an independently managed power trader and broker to move energy where needed. Indeed, Africa GreenCo aims to capitalize on PIDA power projects: In its capacity as intermediary creditworthy off taker, it plans to eventually utilize their regional character as a value addition to risk guarantee. To date, Africa GreenCo is refining the legal, regulatory, technical, and financial aspects of its future structure and forging links with key stakeholders in the sector (member states, multilateral development banks, African regional utilities for generation and interconnection called Power Pools) ahead of the completion of its feasibility study in June 2016.

Leapfrog and paradigm shift ahead: Towards transnationalism

The above-mentioned partnerships are encouraging trends towards more symbiotic multi-stakeholders cooperation. As they relate to home-crafted initiatives, it is imperative that we do not drift away from a continental vision. Not only do Africa-grown plans have higher chance of success than the one-size-fits-all imported solutions, but consistent and combined efforts in the same direction reinforce confidence, emulation, and attract supportive attention. It implies that the fulfillment of intergovernmental agreements requires first and foremost their adaptation to local realities in a domestication process that is respectful of the policy space. Mainstreaming adjustments can be later conducted according to evidence-based and data-driven experiments. Between these global engagements and national procedures, the regional dimension is the indispensable link: Enabling countries to bypass the artificiality of borders inherited from colonial times and offering concrete options to eradicate poverty in a united-we-stand fashion. Regional integration is therefore a prelude to sustainable development operationalization within Africa and a key step towards its active partaking in the global arena. Regionalization can also trigger international relations shift provided that it encompasses fair multilateralism and sustainable management of global knowledge. Indeed, the resulting openness and the complexity encountered are useful parameters to enrich the conception of relevant local answers.

These success stories show the great potential for new experiments and synergies. To me, they inspire the promise of a better world. The one I like to imagine is characterized by mutually beneficial ecosystems for the people and the planet. It encourages win-win reverse linkages, or in other words, more positive spillovers of developing economies on industrial countries. It is a place where, for example, an African region could draw lessons from the Greek crisis and the other way around: China could learn from Africa’s Maputo Development Corridor for its Silk Road Economic Belt. Twin institutes performing joint research among regional knowledge hubs would flourish. Innovative Fab Labs would be entitled to strive after spatial adventure with e-waste material recycled into 3D printers. In that world, innovative collaborations in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) would be favored and involve not only women but also the diaspora in order to develop environmentally sound technical progress. Commensurate efforts, persistent willingness, indigenous ingenuity, and unbridled creativity place this brighter future within our reach.

Beyond the recognition of the African voice throughout the intergovernmental processes, Africa should now consolidate its gains by firmly maintaining its position and safeguarding its winnings throughout the preliminary phase. The continent should urgently set singular tactics with the greatest potential in terms of inclusiveness and creation of productive capacity. While doing so, African development actors should initiate a “learning by doing” virtuous cycle to create an endogenous development narrative cognizant of adaptable best practices as well as failures. Yet the only approach capable of generating both structural transformation and informative change that are in line with continentally own and led long-term strategies is … regional integration.


[1] Respectively resulting from the intergovernmental negotiations on the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD3), the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and the U.N. Convention on Climate Change (COP21).

[2] Egypt, Madagascar, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Uganda

[3] As stated in the Addis Agenda for example: “We urge the international community, including international financial institutions and multilateral and regional development banks, to increase its support to projects and cooperation frameworks that foster regional and subregional integration, with special attention to Africa, and that enhance the participation and integration of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, particularly from developing countries, into global value chains and markets.”

Authors

  • Sarah Lawan