Scandal and speculation surrounding the demise of Politburo member Bo Xilai raised questions about the stability and cohesiveness of China's political elite. However as his trial comes to an end the main political challenge is not at the elite level, but in the Communist party's ability to gain legitimacy among the wider public. 

The trial of Bo Xilai for bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power has generated a number of surprises. To start with, there has been more transparency than most observers had expected, with the court issuing transcripts at regular intervals. Plus, the court used Chinese social media to post images of the proceedings.

This level of transparency is unusual in Chinese trials. However, we should be cautious about seeing this as a precedent for the future development of judicial practice. Bo's case is rather special, both because of the senior positions he held and because of the level of speculation around the case – and Bo's fate – ever since the drama began last February when Wang Lijun, Bo's former police chief in Chongqing, fled to the US Consulate-General in Chengdu. 

Wang, who is already serving a prison sentence after being convicted of abuse of power and other offences, gave testimony at Bo's trial. The exchanges between Bo and Wang will be picked over further, with their salacious details of the arguments that apparently ensued in January 2012 when Wang told Bo that Bo's wife was suspected of murdering British businessman Neil Heywood, in Chongqing the previous November. 

It is highly likely that Bo will be found guilty. Nonetheless, the trial gave Bo the opportunity to put across his views in court. He surprised observers on the first day by retracting confessions he made during the pre-trial investigation process. It is not clear whether this was expected by the prosecutors in advance of the trial, but it contributed to the trial lasting for five days – much longer than expected. 

Result already decided

Most media coverage and comment has focused on the details of the various events, which came out in court. However the political implications lie elsewhere. 

The trial should not be seen in isolation but as the culmination of a process which began in the days after Wang's attempted defection was brought to light. The party's subsequent handling of Bo Xilai proceeded in cautious stages: first the removal from his post as Party Secretary in Chongqing in March last year, then his 'suspension' from the Politburo and Party Central Committee a month later while an investigation was carried out by the party. Only in September 2012 was Bo expelled from the Communist Party and the file handed over to state authorities for prosecution.

This train of events serves as a reminder of the context in which China's judicial system operates. Whatever the transparency of proceedings in court, or the professionalism of judges and lawyers, the party's 'leadership' of judicial work means that politically important cases are often subject to direction from the party apparatus. 

Popular, not elite, politics is at stake

The Bo case has often been presented as a story of turbulence and factional infighting at the top of the party. But in November 2012 the party delivered a clear leadership transition at the top of both party and military from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, with the government handover in March this year. With the new team firmly in place, the transparency accorded to Bo's trial demonstrates confidence among the leadership, not division. 

Political challenges lie not at the top of the party, but in the ability of the party leadership to achieve legitimacy among the wider public. The revelations in the Bo case, from last spring and up to and including the trial, have increased levels of public cynicism about the behaviour of senior officials. Posts on China's social media will provide glimpses of the wider response to the trial; popular opinion is likely to be divided – as it was when Bo was still a serving official, and has remained since his removal from office. 

Given that the party seeks to present itself as being 'responsive' to public concerns, the main political implications of the trial will be seen in the impact it has on the leadership's credibility, not in elite politics. It is that imperative, not judicial reform, which explains what we have been allowed to see of the trial. 

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It is one of the tritest statements about politics in China, one sometimes heard from the mouths of retired senior diplomats: 'all the Communist Party of China cares about is power.' Things like this make it clear that whatever the key qualities that senior diplomats in most cultures need, some capacity for deeper questioning and reflection is not amongst them. 

Functionally, of course, the statement is right. The Communist Party is focused on power, and regards a monopoly on power as its key objective. But there are many different kinds of power, and many different ways to exercise it. And for a perfect illustration of this, the fall and sentencing of Bo Xilai offers great insights. 

Destined for politics

Had there been a menu of the things that the most perfectly placed leader of the Communist Party needed in the second decade of the twenty first century to be promoted and successful, then Bo had it: sterling elite family links in a highly tribal and networked system through his father, Bo Yibo, one of the great founding immortals; excellent provincial leadership records, in both Liaoning and then Chongqing, in a system where the road to Beijing lies through China's provinces; great charisma and communicative ability, shown in the way he managed to impress visiting foreign dignitaries and in the disgruntled sounds that came from some members of the public after his fall. 

But beyond all these, Bo had something much more important, and much rarer in Chinese modern politics: a political vision which differentiated him from his colleagues. It was this, perhaps more than anything else, that meant when they had the weapons to attack, his enemies, who were numerous and highly threatened by his individualistic behaviour, could go for the kill. 

Modern China is blighted by a great contradiction. It is in one moment both rich and poor. This has been widely acknowledged, both inside and outside the country. Its status as a rich poor country creates great challenges for policy makers and politicians. It is one they have been addressing through creating more access to public goods, more empowerment policies through investment in education and poverty relief, and more focus on addressing the urban and rural divide. Bo's prescription however was a uniquely popularist one. His social housing campaign in Chongqing was the most sustained effort to allow citizens in a city in China to have a realistic shot at being homeowners. He looked precariously close to threatening some immense areas of vested interest in the construction sector, and his anti-mafia campaign, while brutal and controversial, had an element that appealed to a popularist sense of social justice. At least this time, many thought, a government leader was taking on people who were dabbling in their own form of violence rather than picking on migrants and rural protestors. 

Bo made policy attack on inequality part of his persona in Chongqing, and in effect turned the tables on those who had lobbied for him to be sent there in 2007 as a means to sideline him. He made national and international headlines, and, it should be remembered, secured vociferous support from visiting national leaders, amongst them a highly enthusiastic Xi Jinping who went to Chongqing in 2010 and gave the city a ringing endorsement – and, by association, Bo's style of leadership. 

For all the court drama and dark intrigue on show in Jinan in August, the criminal charges that were brought against Bo cannot deflect from the power issues above. Power in China is not the uniform, never-changing monolithic entity or quality that diplomats lazily refer to – but something like a form of energy, or a currency, which can mutate, change, and dissipate in ways which are often hard, and sometimes even impossible, to understand. 

Downfall

The final image of Bo is of a man allowed a voice one final time to defend himself on the narrow criminal charges. It was also of someone who knew that on the bigger political issues he had been brought down by, there was no point in trying to speak out. His political death sentence had been delivered during this fall from grace the year before. Someone weaned, nurtured, and trained to exercise power had what they most desired and felt suited for taken away when it was just within their reach. Since then, there was little else to do but tidy up. And that, in Jinan, is precisely what happened. 

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After a year in which there were precious few high level political visits, China is now getting two in the same week: the UK Chancellor George Osborne and the Mayor of London Boris Johnson. The irritation at David Cameron and Nick Clegg's very public meeting with the Dalai Lama last year has now been replaced by an era of warmth and mutual understanding. That, at least, is what the press releases for these visits will have us believe. 

In fact, while the ministerial freeze has been on, the UK has been doing fine – having more than double the Chinese investment of any other EU member, and increasing its exports to China. Chinese visitors to the UK brought in £300 million last year – a formidable achievement in view of the highly unwelcoming visa regime the UK currently has towards people from China (something George Osborne has promised to reform while in Beijing). 

The UK and China are always keen to assert differences, but at heart they are pragmatic nations. They are both utterly at one in seeking growth, and they see in each other compatibilities that can be benignly exploited. For the Chinese, there are decent assets in the UK in the energy and manufacturing sector that are very reasonably priced, and which exist in one of the most liberal investment regimes in the world. For the UK, China is a vast market that its companies, small and large, need to conquer. Any tactical advantage in this battle for access is good in view of the competition that is going to come from other international companies, but also players inside China that want to find their way to the hearts of Chinese consumers. The next decades look set to belong to these consumers. The long term theme of Johnson and Osborne's separate visits is getting as close as possible to these new actors in global growth. 

Overcoming hurdles

Boris Johnson and George Osborne are unlikely to be publicly explicit about the challenges that British trade interests face in China, but in private meetings they have to be raised. The first is that China is becoming a master of indirect protectionism, and the treatment being given to companies ranging from GlaxoSmithKline down to small consultancies is getting harsh. The UK has a strong interest in the success of the EU in negotiating better trade access, from the right for companies to bid for government procurement in China to the perennial problems of state subsidies for Chinese companies and intellectual property rights protection. It is important to find smart ways to leverage the newfound interest China has in deploying its capital abroad, to give UK companies better deals in China. This has to be subtle work, but the primary interests in the UK are the same as our EU partners – having a liberal, rule-based, global order where China is far more integrated. 

There are also some domestic issues. Large trade missions to China have been happening since the reign of George the Third. Lord Heseltine led a vast army of companies in the early 1990s to Beijing. Trade missions have become an unquestionable part of the whole performance of UK politicians going to China. But just how much these achieve is debatable. A decade ago, in The China Dream, Joe Studwell poured cold water on some of the noisier delegations and what real business they did. Perhaps it is time for the UK government to give more support for small and medium businesses. Many of them will have to think about a China strategy if they are not already there, and will face a tough and time consuming task in making inroads in China. Some solidarity amongst them and with the government would be a big advantage. 

This impacts on the delicate business of how the UK undertakes its business and political relations with China in the first place. China is now the world's second largest economy on some measures, and George Osborne said his visit was to change UK perceptions of the country so that British people can see it as more than just an enormous factory producing cheap goods. For that to happen there needs to be a more dynamic, inclusive operation in the UK which cultivates links with Chinese business, rather than the ancient groupings of associations and dining clubs that prevail at the moment. These are good for the egos of those already doing well in China, but are not reaching out enough to the many in the UK who might find they can work in or with China. 

Academic understanding

There is a deeper values debate that China and the UK might have. Our history means that we have shared a lot of good and bad things. The UK needs to support as many young people in learning Chinese, visiting China, and knowing about China as possible. And the good news is that relations will be helped by the quarter of a million Chinese students who have studied in the UK and had experience of life here in the last 15 years. As much outreach to this group, many of whom are back in China and developing exciting careers, is important: each one is an invaluable ambassador for life here. Decades after the visit of Osborne and Johnson has faded from memory, it will be these people that truly shape the future. 

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One year after a transition at the top of China's Communist Party, a major party gathering − the third plenum − was held on 9-12 November, with Chinese officials preparing a 'comprehensive plan for reform' in the context of apparently slowing growth in China as well as social and environmental challenges.

The speaker will comment on the outcomes of the plenum and the debates which led up to it, and examine likely policy changes and their impact on developments in China.

Despite the hype surrounding it, the gathering of the country’s ruling elite in Beijing is likely to prize measured change over dramatic reform.

If there was a clearer idea of what makes China’s new elite leadership tick, then the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party that is about to be held in Beijing would not be such a big deal. But in a polity which privileges concealment over overt statement, it is viewed widely as the one chance for outsiders to see more clearly what the leadership aims to achieve. Expectations were raised by the October statement by one of the most staid members of the current Standing Committee of the Politburo, Yu Zhengsheng, that the plenum would presage a new era of reform.

In Chinese politics reform is a word that has a wholesome, positive air about it. But the question is where and when reform will happen and who will gain from it. The plenum is not like a party convention in the Western sense. It is not an eye-grabbing, media-dominating event that produces surprises. Comparing this year’s installment with the great Third Plenum of 1978 that heralded the repudiation of late Maoism and the embracing of the market, the non-state sector and foreign capital – all anathema before then – is misleading. The significance of the 1978 meeting was only obvious in hindsight. It took years for the scale of the radical transformation of the whole strategic direction of the Communist Party to be appreciated. That 2013 will prove a similar historic moment is unlikely, perhaps even impossible.

What is much more likely is that the highly tactical leadership now in charge will reaffirm its commitment to incremental reform. It will make some statements about the radical urbanization that China is about to undergo and say something about social welfare reform. China’s leaders will do what they have always done in plenums over the last three decades, namely set the broad parameters of politically permissible activity that provinces, ministries and other stakeholders will then need to implement.

This plenum will also have to produce something about the need to achieve greater egality and balance in the economy. It needs to answer some of the questions about how Premier Li Keqiang, in particular, intends to meet the goal of 'fast, sustainable growth' when a falling overall GDP figure looks likely. It needs to communicate to as broad a constituency as possible the arch-narrative of a world where the raw statement of growth on its own is no longer the be all and end all of government policy. It needs to say something about how the party is going to fulfill the increasingly complex aspirations of the Chinese people, aspirations that exceed purely having a materially good level of life and concern broader questions of well-being that vex the politics of all developed economies.

Observers will want to see some signs too of addressing the most sensitive issues. Yu Zhengsheng talked of economic reform. Reforming the economy is now a wholly uncontroversial mantra in China. However, it impacts on one enormously important issue that reaches beyond economics: whether wealth, prosperity and development benefit the few or are accessible to the many – in other words, good, old-fashioned questions of economic and social justice. At the heart of this lies the question of how state-owned enterprises have become vehicles of profit not just for the party state, but also for tightly knit networks of vested interests. Reforms that lap at the doors of these entities also creep into the space of powerful political players, who will resist any attempt to cut down their wealth, and who have the power to resist.

China’s new leadership is proving more confident than was expected and displays a high sense of historic mission. President Xi Jinping speaks increasingly like a politician who believes it is almost his historic destiny to sit at the centre of the leadership of a renascent 'rich, strong country'. The ultimate question for the plenum is not what outside observers make of it but what the vastly complex mixture of groups in China does. For them, a sign that the leadership is willing to take on some of the entrenched vested interests that penetrate the operations of some state-owned sectors to the core is critical.

This is likely to be couched in the language of more support for the market, which is the key channel in any attack on vested interests – through widening access to wealth and economic benefits, and support for the non-state sector and entrepreneurs. It is hard to see how deeper reform can occur without these two crucial elements. And it is through these that the attitude of China’s leadership to political and legal reforms – far more complex issues that, almost certainly, will not be addressed at the plenum but will lurk in the background − will become clearer. The leadership thinks it is too early to tackle these issues directly, but this plenum will still be part of the process for it to come up with ideas for how to transform not just China’s economy, but its polity too.

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China’s leaders set out their intention to push forward with policy reform following the Third Plenum. The full decision released on 15 November makes clear the aim to loosen constraints on the market, and suggests a dilution of state-owned enterprise influence. A new national security committee could also lead to greater policy integration between domestic security and international affairs.

The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee took place in Beijing from 9−12 November. Initial reactions based on the communiqué released on the last day of the meeting were mixed. However, on 15 November the authorities published the detailed decision approved by the plenum, and an explanation given to the plenum by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping – in which he acknowledged major problems facing China.

These documents make the implications of the plenum much clearer. In sum, it offers a clear political signal that as China’s fifth-generation Party leadership enters its second year, it is intent on taking forward a ‘comprehensive deepening of reform’ across a wide range of issues. As an indication of the importance of this, a new high-level ‘leading small group’ will be established to coordinate and oversee this process. The decision spells out various new measures, and reiterates many which are already part of the government’s agenda.

More market in the economy

The most important material is on the economy, where the decision makes clear that the leadership envisages a ‘decisive’ role for market forces, and the establishment of ‘fair and equal’ competition in the economy. This will provide a guiding principle for policy-making over the coming years.

One of the ways of achieving this is to reorganize the functions of government. Here the decision reiterates the themes which the government has been working on since Premier Li Keqiang took over in March this year, namely reducing or removing the need for government approvals to businesses, freeing up the investment environment, and allowing businesses and the market to take the lead unless there is a strong reason for government intervention. Better governance is a wider theme of the decision, covering the judicial system and reforms to the party’s disciplinary organs which would clarify leadership and accountability in anti-corruption investigations.

SOE reform

A possible impediment to market reforms is the power of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the original communiqué gave the impression that nothing much would be done about SOEs. However, the ability of these so-called ‘vested interests’ to stymie market reforms has been weakened by the targeting of a number of senior SOE-related cadres in the party’s latest anti-corruption campaign, which began at the end of 2012.

Further, the detailed decision suggests further reforms are in the offing. Although the relevant section of the document begins by restating the leading role for state ownership, a series of subsequent policy aims could serve to dilute it, such as ensuring equality in property rights protection and competition; developing mixed (state and non-state) ownership through cross-shareholding and bringing private capital into state-led projects; shifting from managing SOEs to managing state investments in enterprises; better supervision of SOEs which operate in natural monopolies; and removing administrative monopolies.

International affairs

The decision talks about further opening of China’s economy, but the vast majority of the issues covered in the decision are domestic in nature, and announcements such as a further relaxation of birth control policies have attracted most attention. Even the points on military and defense issues relate more to internal management than external capacity.

There was, however, one announcement which could have important implications for China’s foreign policy, which will be watched carefully outside China, the establishment of a ‘national security committee’. Xi said that this was being set up in response to external pressures to protect national sovereignty, security and development. He also cited internal pressures to maintain political security and social stability. It is too early to judge what the exact remit of this body will be, but it could lead to greater policy coordination and integration between domestic security issues and international affairs, at a time when China is playing a more important role across the international spectrum.

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Moisés Naím will share his insights into the changing nature of power in the 21st century. He will articulate what he considers to be the shift and dispersal of power between traditionally dominant actors (such as large, stable governments, corporations and armies), and newly ascendant ‘micropowers’ (such as the Tea Party, WikiLeaks, and Somali pirates). 

Crucially, however, he will argue power today is decaying. He will suggest power is easier to acquire, but harder to use, and easier to lose. Coupled with this, the drive for power makes emerging actors across many fields of endeavour vulnerable, leading to chaos, confusion and paralysis. 

There will be a reception after the event.

This is an Under 35s Forum event.

Following the Third Plenum of the Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee in November 2013, the panel will offer their thoughts on whether the economic, political and social reforms announced, such as the relaxation of the one child policy and establishment of a national security council, signal a new era for China’s domestic and foreign policies. The speakers will consider how significant these reforms will be in comparison to those announced in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping following the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee.

Rapid economic growth and more widespread political stability have catalyzed increased international engagement with Africa in the past decade, as African states develop more significant roles in the global economy and political cooperation in geopolitics. Accompanying this is a shift in British engagement with African states from one with a development aid emphasis to one focused on trade and political cooperation.

HE Professor Kwaku Danso-Boafo will reflect on his time in London, developments in UK-Africa relations, the role of diplomatic engagements in informing and strengthening bilateral relations and the prospects for intergovernmental cooperation on African and global issues.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Dr Naím will discuss the changing nature of power in the 21st century and will argue power today is decaying. He will suggest that while power is easier to acquire, it is harder to use, and easier to lose. In addition to this, the drive for power makes emerging actors across many different fields of endeavour vulnerable, leading to chaos, confusion and paralysis. The conversation will take place under the Chatham House Rule. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.