j Boris Johnson Gets a Hong Kong Reality Check By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 07:46:19 +0000 Source Bloomberg URL https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-05-29/hong-kong-boris-johnson-ge... Release date 29 May 2020 Expert Dr Yu Jie In the news type Op-ed Hide date on homepage Full Article
j The Gonchar–Chudnovskies conjecture and a functional analogue of the Thue–Siegel–Roth theorem By www.ams.org Published On :: Tue, 01 Oct 2024 14:21 EDT A. I. Aptekarev and M. L. Yattselev Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 251-268. Abstract, references and article information Full Article
j Prioritizing equity and justice in climate action By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Thu, 10 Jun 2021 13:45:31 +0000 Prioritizing equity and justice in climate action 30 June 2021 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online London Climate Action Week event: Why understanding equity and justice is essential to the ability to meaningfully inform climate politics. Citizen-led climate activism is demonstrating the need to think about climate change ‘not just as a problem for science to solve’ but also as a problem of equity, human rights and justice. The disproportionate impacts of climate change on the poor and the marginalized across the world means that understanding equity and justice is essential for the ability to meaningfully inform climate politics. Excluding these issues risks ignoring, or intentionally omitting, the consequences of policies, tools and frameworks on those who are most likely to face the severe costs of any climate action or inaction. In a pivotal year for climate decision-making, this event explores the necessity of equity and justice in climate action and how the world can move the political conversation to one that is more inclusive. The speakers explore how communities themselves articulate the justice dimensions of climate change and how fairness can create a greener future for current and future generations. This event is being hosted as a part of Strengthening Climate Diplomacy, a series of events from Chatham House during London Climate Action Week 2021. Full Article
j Effective homology and periods of complex projective hypersurfaces By www.ams.org Published On :: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 15:01 EDT Pierre Lairez, Eric Pichon-Pharabod and Pierre Vanhove Math. Comp. 93 (), 2985-3025. Abstract, references and article information Full Article
j Deformation of Artinian Algebras and Jordan Type By www.ams.org Published On :: Fri, 30 Aug 2024 09:28 EDT Anthony Iarrobino, Pedro Macias Marques, Maria Evelina Rossi and Jean Vallès, editors. American Mathematical Society, 2024, CONM, volume 805, approx. 252 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4704-7356-3 (print), 978-1-4704-7665-6 (online). This volume contains the proceedings of the AMS-EMS-SMF Special Session on Deformations of Artinian Algebras and Jordan Type, held July 18–22,... Full Article
j On Jacobians of geometrically reduced curves and their Néron models By www.ams.org Published On :: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 16:22 EDT Otto Overkamp Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5863-5903. Abstract, references and article information Full Article
j Surface counterexamples to the Eisenbud-Goto conjecture By www.ams.org Published On :: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 16:22 EDT Jong In Han and Sijong Kwak Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5561-5581. Abstract, references and article information Full Article
j JOEPIE ON HIS WAY TO SAFE PETER FROM THE BAD BIRD || JOEPIE OP WEG OM PETER TE REDDEN VAN DE BOZE VOGEL By www.flickr.com Published On :: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 12:24:19 -0800 Anne-Miek Bibbe posted a photo: JOEPIE: I'm almost there! I wish Uncle Jeroen was here, I'm a little, really just a little bit afraid of the dark. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- JOEPIE: Ik ben bijna bij Peter! Ik wou dat oom Jeroen hier was, ik ben een beetje, echt maar een héél klein beetje bang in het donker. Full Article
j Borel conjecture for the Marczewski ideal By www.ams.org Published On :: Tue, 05 Nov 2024 15:05 EST Jörg Brendle and Wolfgang Wohofsky Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5395-5410. Abstract, references and article information Full Article
j Brylinski-Radon transformation and generic projections By www.ams.org Published On :: Tue, 05 Nov 2024 15:05 EST Yongqiang Liu, Laurentiu Maxim and Botong Wang Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5279-5288. Abstract, references and article information Full Article
j AMS Day Member Celebration is Dec 2 - Join today! By www.ams.org Published On :: Fri, 01 Nov 2024 00:00:00 EST Full Article
j If You Think Blocking People Over Political Views Is Petty, Just Wait Until You See The Other Reasons People Shared By www.yahoo.com Published On :: 2024-11-11T20:07:53Z Full Article
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j COMAC says Air China is the first customer for C929 widebody jet By finance.yahoo.com Published On :: 2024-11-12T04:03:58Z Full Article
j John Bolton Sums Up What Trump Really Wants In 1 Damning Word By www.yahoo.com Published On :: 2024-11-13T04:31:44Z Full Article
j Sarah Palin, NY Times have explored settlement, as judge sets defamation retrial By www.yahoo.com Published On :: 2024-11-12T17:07:41Z Full Article
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j Vietnam Airlines to request bids for 50 narrowbody jets next year By finance.yahoo.com Published On :: 2024-11-13T05:54:37Z Full Article
j Cali P enjoys buzz with ‘Secret Hater’ By jamaica-star.com Published On :: Mon, 11 Nov 2024 05:01:03 -0500 Switzerland-based reggae and dancehall recording artiste Cali P has expressed gratitude to the public for supporting his music, following the release of his latest single ' Secret Hater'. The song, which was produced jointly by himself and Suku... Full Article
j DJ Specs gives up university to juggle music By jamaica-star.com Published On :: Mon, 11 Nov 2024 05:01:06 -0500 In 2020, when Anthony Parker, known to his fans as DJ Specs, decided to trade his textbooks for turntables, he didn't just pivot his career -- he pivoted his entire life. At just 25 years old, this Kingston-born DJ has already carved out a space... Full Article
j Jah Kettle wraps up successful tour By jamaica-star.com Published On :: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 05:00:55 -0500 Reggae artiste Jah Kettle says he was pleased with his recently concluded Canada tour and is now excited to release a new single, titled Nothing Gonna Take Your Love Away, done with fellow reggae act Ras Penco. "The fans were riveting and showed... Full Article
j Making the dead look better - Jamaican morticians get advanced skills in embalming and cosmetics By jamaica-star.com Published On :: Mon, 11 Nov 2024 05:01:27 -0500 For many Jamaicans, the deceased are more than just loved ones who have passed on; they are cherished family members who deserve to look as presentable as they did in life. In a culture where the appearance of the deceased is paramount, morticians... Full Article
j Ganja use playing role in motor vehicle crashes By jamaica-star.com Published On :: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 05:01:02 -0500 A growing number of motor vehicle crashes across Jamaica has been attributed to drivers operating the vehicles under the influence of marijuana, according to Health Minister Dr Christopher Tufton. "The data is clear, we are seeing more people... Full Article
j Manchester man charged with smoking ganja in public By jamaica-star.com Published On :: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 10:09:40 -0500 Twenty-eight-year-old labourer Michael Ennis, of Manning's Hill district in Manchester, has been charged with smoking ganja in a public place following an incident in May Pen, Clarendon on Monday. Full Article
j Biochemical transformation of bacterial lipopolysaccharides by acyloxyacyl hydrolase reduces host injury and promotes recovery [Enzymology] By www.jbc.org Published On :: 2020-12-18T00:06:18-08:00 Animals can sense the presence of microbes in their tissues and mobilize their own defenses by recognizing and responding to conserved microbial structures (often called microbe-associated molecular patterns (MAMPs)). Successful host defenses may kill the invaders, yet the host animal may fail to restore homeostasis if the stimulatory microbial structures are not silenced. Although mice have many mechanisms for limiting their responses to lipopolysaccharide (LPS), a major Gram-negative bacterial MAMP, a highly conserved host lipase is required to extinguish LPS sensing in tissues and restore homeostasis. We review recent progress in understanding how this enzyme, acyloxyacyl hydrolase (AOAH), transforms LPS from stimulus to inhibitor, reduces tissue injury and death from infection, prevents prolonged post-infection immunosuppression, and keeps stimulatory LPS from entering the bloodstream. We also discuss how AOAH may increase sensitivity to pulmonary allergens. Better appreciation of how host enzymes modify LPS and other MAMPs may help prevent tissue injury and hasten recovery from infection. Full Article
j Structural and biochemical characteristics of two Staphylococcus epidermidis RNase J paralogs RNase J1 and RNase J2 [Protein Structure and Folding] By www.jbc.org Published On :: 2020-12-04T00:06:06-08:00 RNase J enzymes are metallohydrolases that are involved in RNA maturation and RNA recycling, govern gene expression in bacteria, and catalyze both exonuclease and endonuclease activity. The catalytic activity of RNase J is regulated by multiple mechanisms which include oligomerization, conformational changes to aid substrate recognition, and the metal cofactor at the active site. However, little is known of how RNase J paralogs differ in expression and activity. Here we describe structural and biochemical features of two Staphylococcus epidermidis RNase J paralogs, RNase J1 and RNase J2. RNase J1 is a homodimer with exonuclease activity aided by two metal cofactors at the active site. RNase J2, on the other hand, has endonuclease activity and one metal ion at the active site and is predominantly a monomer. We note that the expression levels of these enzymes vary across Staphylococcal strains. Together, these observations suggest that multiple interacting RNase J paralogs could provide a strategy for functional improvisation utilizing differences in intracellular concentration, quaternary structure, and distinct active site architecture despite overall structural similarity. Full Article
j COVID-19: The Hidden Majority in India's Migration Crisis By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 12:58:13 +0000 13 July 2020 Dr Champa Patel Director, Asia-Pacific Programme @patel_champa While the social and economic costs of coronavirus lockdowns, travel bans and social distancing initially focused on international migrants, there has been increasing attention paid to the plight of internal migrants. 2020-07-13-India-Farming-Migration Migrant workers plant paddy in a field at Jhandi village in Patiala, India. Photo by Bharat Bhushan/Hindustan Times via Getty Images. The World Bank estimates that the magnitude of internal migration is about two‐and‐a‐half times that of international migration. Within India, an estimated 40 million internal migrant workers, largely in the informal economy, were severely impacted by the government’s COVID-19 lockdown.With transportation systems initially shut down, many had no recourse to travel options back to homes and villages, resulting in harrowing journeys home. Those who were able to make it home found, in some instances, villages refusing entry because of fears of transmission.The shocking images of migrants forced to walk in desperation showed the enormity of the crisis as well as some of the challenges posed by an extended lockdown in India where so many people live hand to mouth and cannot afford not to work.Migrant workers and the informal economyThe complete failure of the government to anticipate the needs of this group, and the subsequent distress caused, has made visible a large workforce who experience precarity of work and often live hand to mouth.One key challenge is the lack of robust data on the scale of internal migration. While estimates abound, there is no proper data collection system in place to accurately record temporary, seasonal and circular migration patterns. However, it is estimated that more than 90% of working people in India are engaged in the informal economy, with states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar accounting for more than 80% of workers in this sector.A recent government labour force survey estimated that more than 71% of people with a regular salary working in non-agricultural industries had no written job contract. Nearly half of workers are not eligible for social security benefits.Daily-wage workers are particularly vulnerable, with limited or no access to social security and most living in poverty. Living hand to mouth, their loss of livelihoods has led to a lack of money to pay rents or pay for food. Women are impacted whether because of their gender, responsibilities as caregivers, or as members of disadvantaged castes and communities.COVID-19 has massively impacted this group of workers. Stranded Workers Action Network found that 50% of workers had rations left for less than one day; 74% had less than half their daily wages remaining to survive for the rest of the lockdown period; and 89% had not been paid by their employers at all during the lockdown.According to Supreme Court proceedings, relief camps are housing some 660,000 workers; some 2.2 million people also rely on emergency food supplies. Job losses, and home and food insecurity have left this group highly vulnerable.In March 2020, in response to COVID-19, the Indian government instituted the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Package (PMGKB), a $22.6 billion relief package. The World Bank announced $1 billion funding to accelerate social protection support, in part through the PMGKB.This support would work alongside pre-existing initiatives such as the Public Distribution System (PDS), which covers 800 million people, and Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT). This cash injection could help address one of the key challenges facing India’s piecemeal and uneven social protection programmes – inadequate funding. India’s spending on public social protection excluding health is just 1.3% of the GDP.However, there are still other challenges to overcome. One is how to ensure coordination and coverage within, and across, differing states. The second is how to transition multiple schemes into one integrated system that can be accessed anywhere within the country, particularly important when many workers are on the move. There is an urgent need for a comprehensive system, which is adaptive and flexible to needs and provides adequate social and income support.Another coverage issue relates to the use of direct cash transfers (DCTs) to support people impacted by the loss of livelihoods, where funds are deposited within bank accounts. Such measures fail to consider the significant numbers of people who do not have access to banks and will not be able to access this support.Wider impact on livelihoods and remittancesThere is a risk, with extended lockdown and risks of further waves of infection, that labour shortages could negatively impact the economy. There is a wider need to support re-entry back into the workforce and support livelihoods. National Survey Sample data shows that between 2007 and 2008, internal remittances amounted to US$10 billion. These domestic transfers financed over 30% of all household consumption in remittance-receiving households.But future migration for work is likely to be severely impacted. As restrictions begin to ease, employers and businesses cannot necessarily rely on cheap available labour. Having faced destitution and hardship, many may wish to stay closer to families and local support networks.As Irudaya Rajan notes in The New Humanitarian, it is likely ‘there will be a reduction in long-distance migration in India after this’, as many migrants will be wary of being stranded again. This would be hugely detrimental to stimulating the economy as reverse migration could push down wages and subsequently demand.Another issue may be returning migrant workers, who have been working overseas, over half of whom work in the Gulf. It is unclear if, or when, migrants will be able to return to work, with the World Bank estimating that remittances from this group could fall by about 23%.However, what is striking has been India’s support for this group - the Vande Bharat Mission has deployed flights and naval ships to help return migrant workers, especially vulnerable groups - in marked contrast to the lack of preparation and care for internal migrants.One factor for this may be the volume of remittances these migrant workers bring to the Indian economy, but it overlooks the contribution of internal remittances, on which there is far less robust data.But the current challenges can also be an opportunity. The scale of the migrant crisis has made visible an often-overlooked population of workers. With political will, and investment at federal and state levels, this could be an opportunity to transform livelihoods.As thoughts will turn to how to stimulate economies and get people back to work, it is imperative that those in authority turn their minds to how to create a more just society, that invests in healthcare, and has a social protection system that supports the most vulnerable in society.Migrants are not just objects of charity that need support. Internal migrants are key income generators that play a vital role in Indian society and should never be overlooked again.This article was originally published in Routed Magazine. Full Article
j New Fighting Brings Three-year Armenian-Azerbaijani Truce to an End By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 22:17:03 +0000 16 July 2020 Laurence Broers Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @LaurenceBroers Deadly clashes at the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan have followed renewed disappointment in the peace process, and cast a new shadow over its future. 2020-07-16-Armenia-Shrapnel-Conflict A man shows a piece of shrapnel after attacks carried out by the Armenian army at Dondar Kuscu village near Tovuz, Azerbaijan. Photo by Aziz Karimov/Getty Images. Although the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is focused on the Line of Contact around Nagorny Karabakh, a new - and significant - outbreak of violence has happened some 300 kilometres away on high ground along the de jure Armenia-Azerbaijan border.Although not a first, violence in this area has generally been contained by the proximity of major transport and infrastructure arteries, and of civilian populations on both sides of the border. Plus, unlike in Nagorny Karabakh, the extended deterrents conferred by Armenia’s membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and bilateral agreements with Russia are also – theoretically at least – in force.Despite this, battlespaces opened rapidly, with bombardment of civilian homes, drone strikes and cyberattacks on government and other sites being widely reported by both sides. At the time of writing, combined reported casualties were already at least 16, the highest for a single incident since April 2016’s ‘four-day war’.Most are known to be Azerbaijani combatants, including the highest-ranking Azerbaijani serviceman to be killed in action since the 1990s – the respected Major General Polad Hashimov. And, although rumoured to be removed soon anyway following a campaign of negative briefing, Azerbaijani foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov was publicly blamed in the immediate aftermath for ‘meaningless’ diplomacy and dismissed. He was replaced by education minister Jeyhun Bayramov.Origins of the clashesHow the fighting began remains unclear. The escalation did not appear to result from a coordinated offensive operation of the kind that led to the four-day war, nor are there obvious strategic goals for either side in terms of the international border. There does appear to have been an element of surprise as an Azerbaijani vehicle unexpectedly encountered a new Armenian post, triggering deadly artillery exchanges.Unclear boundaries in highland terrain may have played a role. Although referred to as the international border, the de jure boundary between Armenia and Azerbaijan - previously an inconsequential internal administrative boundary in the Soviet Union - is not clearly demarcated in many areas and does not coincide with lines of actual control.Here, as in Nakhichevan - Azerbaijan’s exclave bordering Armenia and Iran - Armenian and Azerbaijani forces have been engaged in long-term, incremental competition for tactical advantage by claiming higher ground in ‘no man’s lands’. But in remote and cartographically ambiguous areas, the precise location of borders - and even place-names - are unclear, and rival forces can unexpectedly meet their adversaries.Although clear strategic objectives appear absent, what might then have been a lesser incident escalated purposefully into a crisis – suggesting a political rationale.A missed opportunity for a negotiations resetBoth Armenia and Azerbaijan began 2020 with unfinished consolidations of domestic power - whether bottom-up in the case of Armenia’s ‘Velvet Revolution’, or top-down in the case of Azerbaijan elite renewal. COVID-19 then added further challenges, with the government of Armenia facing significant domestic criticism for its handling of the pandemic, while numerous opposition activists in Azerbaijan were arrested, and the country’s economic vulnerability to external shocks was highlighted.But throughout this, the frontlines did remain calm - as they generally have since the three-year period from 2014-2017 which witnessed regular skirmishes, use of heavy weaponry and four days of intensive combat in April 2016. In January 2019, the OSCE Minsk Group made the often-cited announcement that the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan had agreed on the necessity of ‘preparing their populations for peace’.Although the quietest year on the frontline since the 1990s then followed, neither side invested seriously in a peace strategy. After a reasonable start and moves towards humanitarian cooperation, relations between President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually visibly soured.Several moves, such as the go-ahead for new infrastructure in the occupied territories and Pashinyan’s attendance at de facto leader Arayik Harutyunyan’s inauguration in Nagorny Karabakh, were received in Azerbaijan as evidence of Armenian insincerity towards the peace process.More inflammatory rhetoric then resumed, leading the OSCE Minsk Group to call for calm at the end of June. As recently as July 7, President Aliyev expressed public criticism of the peace process and emphasised the validity of Azerbaijan’s right to use force.Each new round of Armenian-Azerbaijani fighting serves as an audit of the various restraining factors preventing a larger war. A Russian-Euro-Atlantic-Iranian consensus on proactively containing any new Armenian-Azerbaijani war appears to still hold, although senior-level attention from US secretary of state Mike Pompeo trailed that of his counterparts.Russia acted quickly to offer mediation, reflecting the reality that any large-scale Armenia-Azerbaijan war would test Russia’s extended deterrence guarantees to Armenia. As in April 2016, Turkey has been vigorous in its support of Azerbaijan, raising concerns in Armenia and drawing oblique warnings from Russia. On the other hand, the CSTO - much to Armenian chagrin - dithered, initially calling then postponing a meeting citing the need for more time to study the situation.Unprecedented spontaneous demonstrations in Baku called for war with Armenia, broke into the Azerbaijani parliament and, in some cases, articulated anti-government slogans. In the absence of reliable polling, such protests cannot be taken as evidence of a popular consensus in favour of war.But they do underline the importance of the conflict as the one issue in Azerbaijan where open protest is accepted as legitimate and cannot easily be dispersed. As losses over the past week are counted, the dismissal of the foreign minister may not be sufficient to quell public anger.Prospects are now real of a return to the dynamics in 2014-15: recursive low-level violence aimed at influencing the diplomatic calendar and public opinion while remaining below the deterrence threshold for triggering active external involvement. Full Article
j UK Should Focus on Better Defining Objectives in the Sahel By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 11:19:46 +0000 22 July 2020 Dr Alex Vines OBE Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme The Sahel is one of Africa’s poorest and most fragile regions witnessing an escalation in jihadist activity and illegal migration, writes Alex Vines. GettyImages-1204470166.jpg Pictured is a Nigerian refugee living in the Awaradi settlement that houses some 9,000 displaced people fleeing violence from Boko Haram. Image: Getty Images. The UK has been redeploying diplomatic, defence and development capabilities towards the Sahel since 2018 – a strategic pivot intended to deliver development impact, address long term security threats to UK interests and support alliances with international partners.The Sahel is one of Africa’s poorest and most fragile regions and has witnessed an escalation in jihadist activity, illegal migration and trafficking since a security crisis erupted in Mali in 2012.The crisis spread to Niger and Burkina Faso and may now spill over into Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. With Nigeria also facing insurgency in the Lake Chad basin, all major regional security and economic anchors in the region are under threat including key UK partners. Reviewing the Sahel pivotThis pivot has already resulted in the expanding of UK embassies in Senegal, Mauritania and Mali and public commitments to opening new ones in Chad and Niger.Back in London, there has also been a large uplift of staff including the setting up of a cross-Whitehall Joint Sahel Department in late 2018 and plans for more UK civil servants to have placements with the French government on the Sahel.Yet in light of looming economic shocks from Brexit and Covid-19, there has been a lively debate in Whitehall on whether this is stretching UK resources too thin in an area of Africa that does not have close ties with the UK.UK ministers are this week reviewing the Sahel pivot and will decide if it continues or grinds to a standstill including whether full embassies are opened in Niger and Chad.This debate is not new. The UK has opened and closed its diplomatic missions in the Sahel in fits and starts since the early 1960s. More recently, MI6 pushed the re-opening of the embassy in Bamako in 2010 foreseeing Mali’s fragility before the current crisis started.Partnering with the FrenchBut though the Sahel is likely to dominate the Africa peace and security agenda for decades to come, the UK’s serious engagement in the region is not just about strategic foresight.It also fulfils two other objectives: of partnership with two key bilateral allies, particularly France, and authority and leverage in multilateral fora such as the United Nations, African Union and the EU.Partnering with the French in the Sahel has become even more important due to Brexit and the need to reinforce relationships with key European partners.In 2012, David Cameron concluded that the rapid French response to stop a jihadist advance on the Malian capital Bamako was 'in our interests' and authorized the deployment of 330 UK military personnel, two cargo aircraft and a surveillance plane.In July 2018, the UK announced further support to French led Opération Barkhane sending three Royal Air Force Chinook helicopters – supported by almost 100 personnel – which remain in theatre to this day.UN commitmentDemonstrating the UK’s commitment to UN peacekeeping has also resulted in the deployment of 250 troops to join a UN peacekeeping mission to Mali later this year.Based in Gao, these troops will form a long-range reconnaissance capability providing threat awareness, contributing to the protection of civilians and helping to prevent conflict from spilling over to neighbouring states.This represents one of the biggest British peacekeeping deployments since Bosnia and it will be the most dangerous mission for British forces since Afghanistan.The UK is also one of the largest humanitarian donors to the region and has contributed over £500 million in bilateral development and humanitarian assistance since 2015.With COVID-19 now an additional challenge in the Sahel, a significant part of the UK’s £764 million contribution to the global COVID-19 effort will be channelled to the region.New embassies are 'global Britain' strategy pillarsKeeping an eye on the impact of these initiatives requires a meaningful UK diplomatic network on the ground.New embassies in the Sahel cost a fraction of maintaining three Chinook helicopters in the region providing the government real time insight in the post-Brexit absence of a regular supply of country analysis from the European External Action Service and support for the UK’s international relationships.It also underlines the UK’s commitment to UN peacekeeping and standing as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in light of regular discussions of the Sahel.The tripartite ministerial review of the Sahel pivot by the secretaries of state for foreign affairs, international development and defence that is underway should not penny pinch by reversing the opening of small embassies in Niger and Chad nor threaten the overall strategic focus on the Sahel – most recently welcomed by the House of Lord’s Select Committee on International Relations and Defence in its July report on UK Africa policy.Instead, UK ministers should focus on better defining what the UK’s specific objectives are in the Sahel and particularly what the UK plans to do about Burkina Faso whose rapidly deteriorating security threatens to over-spill into key UK partner Ghana.This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph. Full Article
j Is the Juba Peace Agreement a Turning Point for Sudan? By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 13:34:19 +0000 14 September 2020 Dame Rosalind Marsden Associate Fellow, Africa Programme @MarsdenRosalind Sudan is looking towards a brighter future after the initialling of the Juba peace agreement on August 31, an important first step towards bringing peace to the conflict zones and laying the foundation for democratic transition and economic reform throughout the country. 2020-09-14-Sudan-Peace-Deal-Juba Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, Lt General Abdel Fattah al Burhan (left), South Sudan President Salva Kiir (centre) and the Sudanese Prime Minister Dr Abdalla Hamdok (right) greet people gathering during the initialling of the Sudan peace deal with the rebel groups in Juba, South Sudan. Photo by AKUOT CHOL/AFP via Getty Images. Although there is a long road ahead to achieve sustainable peace and formidable challenges remain, the hope is Sudan can turn the page on decades of war that has left hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced, particularly in Darfur and the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile).The peace agreement, between Sudan’s transitional government and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a broad alliance of armed and other movements, and Minni Minawi’s Sudan Liberation Movement, is not yet comprehensive as it did not include two other important armed movements.Expected to be formally signed in early October, the deal has been hailed as a ’historic achievement’ by the UN secretary-general, and the international community also commended the government of South Sudan for its positive role as mediator and urged hold-out groups to join the peace process. Much does depend on delivering on the agreement, and the experience of implementing past peace accords in Sudan has been dismal, particularly when it comes to bringing tangible benefits to people on the ground.What potentially makes the Juba agreement different is that Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government aspires to deliver peace, justice and democracy in line with the goals of the revolution; that the agreement was negotiated between the Sudanese themselves, with a light touch from the South Sudanese mediation and low-key logistical and technical support from the international community; and that much of the negotiations were conducted between former comrades, in marked contrast to the confrontational atmosphere that prevailed during the Bashir era.As Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok put it: ’This is a Sudanese peace, made with our own hands and by our own efforts’ and: ’This is not a paper agreement, but is a living organism that needs care, attention and political will from all of us’.Achievements of the agreementThe result of almost one year’s hard work in Juba, the agreement is comprehensive in scope and addresses the fundamental issues of Sudan’s crises in Darfur, the Two Areas and other marginalized regions, albeit in a mixture of regional and national protocols. It goes a long way to realizing the vision of a democratic ‘New Sudan’ based on respect for the diversity of the Sudanese people and equal citizenship without religious, ethnic, cultural or gender discrimination.There is a focus on the concerns of historically marginalized populations in Sudan’s conflict zones and disadvantaged areas, and it addresses root causes of conflict, such as issues of identity, marginalization, the relationship between religion and state, governance, resource-sharing, land issues, social justice, and equality at the national level.The deal also looks to resolve the consequences of conflict, such as humanitarian relief, the safe and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their original lands and compensation, eviction of illegal settlers and the development and reconstruction of the conflict-affected areas. It provides for significant devolution of power and resources to the regions, including autonomy for the Two Areas and restoration of a single Darfur region. On transitional justice, the government has committed to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and ensure Bashir and others subject to arrest warrants will ‘appear before’ the ICC.This deal will change the face of the transitional government by bringing marginalized forces to the centre of the political process. The transitional period will extend to 2023, with the armed movements having three seats in the (currently 11-member) Sovereign Council and 25% of seats in the Cabinet and soon-to-be-formed Legislative Assembly.The power-sharing provisions have been criticized as disproportionate to the size of the movements’ political constituencies and military presence inside Sudan. But the movements argue significant representation in the government is necessary to support implementation and that their arrival in Khartoum will help to strengthen the transition to democracy.Establishing a single, national professional army, reflective of the diversity of Sudan and with a new military doctrine opens the way for much-needed comprehensive security sector reform. During the transition, this will include the creation of a 12,000 strong joint force between government security forces and the armed movements to help protect civilians in Darfur. Importantly, mechanisms allowing for civilian input on security reforms are also established.The deal also guarantees religious freedom and the separation of religion from politics. This ensures religion will not be exploited by state institutions as it was during the Bashir-era, provides for the constitution to be based on equal citizenship, and for the establishment of a National Commission for Religious Freedom to protect the rights of Christians and other minorities. In the Two Areas, the autonomous government will have special legislative powers to pass laws based on the secular 1973 Constitution.Increasing inclusivityKey to achieving inclusive and sustainable peace is ensuring popular ownership and finding ways to engage civil society stakeholders and marginalized communities such as nomads in dialogue, reconciliation and social peace initiatives. The negotiations were mainly a top-down elitist process. Although the UN brought IDPs, tribal leaders and women’s groups to Juba for short periods, there was limited participation by civil society. However, the agreement provides for a wider range of stakeholders to feed into a comprehensive peace through reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms, follow-on conferences and an inclusive National Constitutional Conference.Achieving a comprehensive peace will also mean bringing other armed movements on board, particularly those led by Abdel Aziz Al Hilu and Abdel Wahid Al Nur, both of whom hold significant territory, forces and support (in the Two Areas and Darfur respectively). Negotiations in Juba with Abdel Aziz had stalled over his demands for a secular state or, failing that, the right to self-determination, but he has now reached a preliminary agreement with Prime Minister Hamdok on a way forward.Other challenges of implementing peaceTurning the peace agreement into reality on the ground will face many other challenges given the fragility of a civilian-military transitional government, distrust, and competition between the signatory movements and some political parties, as well as increasing insecurity in many parts of the country caused by armed militias, inter-tribal violence, the proliferation of weapons, and sabotage by elements of the former regime. There is also likely to be resistance from groups such as illegal settlers who see their interests being threatened.With its economy in meltdown because of economic mismanagement by the Bashir regime, COVID-19, and unprecedented floods, finding resources to implement the peace deal is far beyond the means of Sudan’s cash-strapped government. Implementation therefore requires sustained and generous support from its regional and international partners, including the country’s urgent removal from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list, which is preventing debt relief, access to concessionary loans and large-scale foreign investment. With donor budgets under heavy pressure, raising money will be hard, but by continuing to support a nascent democracy in a strategically important but unstable region, Sudan’s allies will be safeguarding their long-term interests.If properly implemented, the Juba peace agreement is a major first step towards creating a ‘New Sudan’ based on peace, equal citizenship and social justice. Key tests of whether Sudan can finally turn the page are whether the signatory movements and other revolutionary forces can unite to deliver the dividends of peace for the victims of Sudan’s conflicts, and embrace inclusion rather than tribalism and narrow political affiliation; whether the remaining armed movements are ready to start serious negotiations for a comprehensive peace; and whether Sudan now receives the support and attention it deserves from the international community. Surely Sudan has already come too far for this historic opportunity to be lost. Full Article
j The bacterial cell division protein fragment EFtsN binds to and activates the major peptidoglycan synthase PBP1b [Metabolism] By www.jbc.org Published On :: 2020-12-25T00:06:31-08:00 Peptidoglycan (PG) is an essential constituent of the bacterial cell wall. During cell division, the machinery responsible for PG synthesis localizes mid-cell, at the septum, under the control of a multiprotein complex called the divisome. In Escherichia coli, septal PG synthesis and cell constriction rely on the accumulation of FtsN at the division site. Interestingly, a short sequence of FtsN (Leu75–Gln93, known as EFtsN) was shown to be essential and sufficient for its functioning in vivo, but what exactly this sequence is doing remained unknown. Here, we show that EFtsN binds specifically to the major PG synthase PBP1b and is sufficient to stimulate its biosynthetic glycosyltransferase (GTase) activity. We also report the crystal structure of PBP1b in complex with EFtsN, which demonstrates that EFtsN binds at the junction between the GTase and UB2H domains of PBP1b. Interestingly, mutations to two residues (R141A/R397A) within the EFtsN-binding pocket reduced the activation of PBP1b by FtsN but not by the lipoprotein LpoB. This mutant was unable to rescue the ΔponB-ponAts strain, which lacks PBP1b and has a thermosensitive PBP1a, at nonpermissive temperature and induced a mild cell-chaining phenotype and cell lysis. Altogether, the results show that EFtsN interacts with PBP1b and that this interaction plays a role in the activation of its GTase activity by FtsN, which may contribute to the overall septal PG synthesis and regulation during cell division. Full Article
j Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for urban energy solutions and job creation By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 18 May 2022 10:37:13 +0000 Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for urban energy solutions and job creation 9 June 2022 — 7:30AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 May 2022 Nairobi and online This event explores the major openings and potential impediments to the development of a just transition policy in Africa. Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should also align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities. In particular, the need for decent and fair job creation and the establishment of sufficient, resilient and sustainable power supply, accessible to all, and efficient energy use. Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. Ahead of the ‘African COP27’ set to take place in Egypt in November 2022, there is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers in their green financing demands and national implementation plans. Sustainable urban energy solutions represent a critical zone of opportunity for the development of new and more reliable green finance pathways. Africa’s rapidly expanding cities present a significant economic opportunity and source of growth. However, urban centres are also where income and energy inequalities are at their starkest. The acceleration of sustainable energy generation and use could have a transformative impact on SMEs and livelihoods across value chains. At this event, participants will discuss the major openings and potential impediments to the development of a credible ‘just transition’ policy in Africa towards net zero goals, with a particular focus on establishing and enhancing links between green financing innovation, employment creation, sustainable power supply and generation, and sustainable energy usage and consumption in an urban environment. This event is held in partnership with the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA). It is part of a series on Towards Just Transition: Connecting Green Financing and Sustainable Job Creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator. This event will be held in English and French with simultaneous interpretation. [English] Agenda- Towards Just Transition in Africa (PDF) [French] Agenda - Towards Just Transition in Africa (PDF) Full Article
j Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for nature-based solutions and rural resilience By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 10:52:13 +0000 Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for nature-based solutions and rural resilience 21 July 2022 — 9:30AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 June 2022 Libreville and online This hybrid event in Libreville explores just transition policy and green financing for nature-based solutions, with a particular focus on the integration of job creation priorities in conservation and rural resilience. Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities – in particular, the need for decent and fair job creation, as well as resilient and sustainable land, environment, and ecosystem management policies. Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. Ahead of the ‘African COP27’ set to take place in Egypt in November 2022, there is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers, in their green financing demands and national implementation plans. Preservation of biodiversity and nature is not only critical in the global fight against climate change but is also vital for conservation-based economic development. Natural capital stocks, such as terrestrial and marine ecosystems and biodiversity, produce benefits that support societal and individual well-being and economic prosperity, such as clean air, fresh water, regulation of water flows and pollination of crops – while also acting as important carbon sinks. Financing environmental protection must go beyond compensation and contribute to creating fair social and economic conditions for incentivizing conservation. At this hybrid event in Libreville, participants will discuss green financing for nature-based solutions, particularly the integration of plans for job creation in conservation and rural resilience within just transition planning. This event is part of a series on Towards Just Transition: Connecting Green Financing and Sustainable Job Creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator. This event will be held in French and English with simultaneous interpretation. This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page. Green financing for nature-based solutions and rural resilience - English agenda (PDF) Green financing for nature-based solutions and rural resilience - French agenda (PDF) Full Article
j Towards just transition in Africa: Continental coordination on green financing and job creation By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Thu, 08 Sep 2022 14:07:13 +0000 Towards just transition in Africa: Continental coordination on green financing and job creation 6 October 2022 — 7:00AM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 September 2022 Addis Ababa and online At this hybrid conference in Addis Ababa, speakers take stock of preparations ahead of the ‘African COP27’ in November and discuss the key priorities for streamlining continental cooperation on policy approaches to just transition. At this hybrid conference in Addis Ababa, speakers will take stock of policy efforts and preparations ahead of the ‘African COP27’ in November and discuss the key priorities for streamlining continental cooperation on policy approaches to just transition. Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities – in particular, the need for decent and fair job creation, as well as resilient and sustainable land, environment and ecosystem management policies. They must also be cognizant of African nations’ urgent requirements for sustainable and accessible energy to underpin economic development. Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. It also requires clarity and cooperation to unlock investment in both renewable and transitional energy. African countries face collective climate and employment-related challenges. However, policymaking often remains regionally siloed according to differing political, energy sector and ecological realities. There is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers, in their green financing demands and national implementation plans. At this hybrid conference in Addis Ababa, speakers will take stock of policy efforts and preparations ahead of the ‘African COP27’ in November and discuss the key priorities for streamlining continental cooperation on policy approaches to just transition, job creation and green financing. This event is the third in a series on Towards just transition: Connecting green financing and sustainable job creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator. Agenda: Towards a just transition in Africa (English) (PDF) Agenda: Towards a just transition in Africa (French) (PDF) Full Article
j Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 15:52:14 +0000 Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism 23 November 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2022 Online This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025. The eighth edition of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in Tunisia from 27–28 August 2022, marked the second time that Japan’s now-triennial summit was hosted in an African country, after TICAD 6 was held in Kenya in 2016. The summit was attended by 48 representatives of African countries and at least 20 heads of state and government and included a pledge by the Japanese government to commit $30 billion in public and private finance to Africa over the next three years. In reaffirming the three pillars of TICAD 8 – revolving around the economy, societal resilience, and peace and stability – the newly adopted Tunis Declaration (28 August 2022) also outlined some of the key projects underpinning Japan’s pledge, including a $4 billion fund for a Green Growth Initiative with Africa (GGA). 2023 will mark 30 years since the inception of TICAD in 1993 and ten years since the African Union (AU)’s adoption of its flagship Agenda 2063, on which the Tunis Declaration placed distinct emphasis. This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025, exploring wider developments in summitry, Africa-Asia relations, and modes of multilateralism. Questions explored include: How has international summitry evolved over the past three decades since the inception of TICAD in 1993, which represented the first periodic high-level summit engagement with Africa by a ‘non-traditional’ partner? Looking ahead to TICAD 9 in 2025, what are the priorities for enforcing the stated tenets of TICAD – ‘African ownership, international partnership, inclusivity and openness’ – in cooperation efforts? What lessons can be drawn from TICAD’s co-partnership approach (with the African Union Commission and others) – particularly given increasing calls for AU membership of the G20 and Prime Minister Kishida’s pledge at TICAD 8 to support a permanent African UNSC seat during its non-permanent membership in 2023–24? Beyond membership, what are the priorities for furthering agency? How are Africa-Asia relations evolving and diverging? How are Japan and other Asian countries perceived by different African countries? This event is the third in the Chatham House – Japan House London webinar series (2022-2023). The series is held in partnership with Japan House London. You can watch previous webinars from the series here. Full Article
j Towards just transition in Africa By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Fri, 23 Dec 2022 08:59:21 +0000 Towards just transition in Africa Interview Video NCapeling 23 December 2022 Highlighting key interventions from African policymakers, business leaders, researchers, and civil society voices on green financing and implementation plans. African countries face collective climate and employment-related challenges. However, policymaking often remains regionally siloed according to differing political, energy sector, and ecological realities. There is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses, and financiers, in their green financing demands and national implementation plans. This video highlights key interventions from policymakers, business leaders, researchers, and civil society voices at a series of events hosted by the Chatham House Africa programme in Nairobi, Libreville, and Addis Ababa in the lead-up to COP27. The events series, Towards just transition: Connecting green financing and sustainable job creation in Africa, was supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator and the United Nations Development Programme. Full Article
j Africa Aware: Towards just transition in Africa By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 01 Mar 2023 16:47:47 +0000 Africa Aware: Towards just transition in Africa Audio NCapeling 1 March 2023 African countries face collective climate and job creation-related challenges, yet policymaking often remains regionally siloed. This podcast reflects on the key policy messages from the Africa programme’s series on Towards just transition: Connecting green financing and sustainable job creation in Africa. African countries face collective climate and job creation-related challenges. Yet policymaking often remains regionally siloed according to differing political, energy sector and ecological realities. This output is part of a stream of work supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Full Article
j A critical juncture for Sudan’s democratic transition By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 14:36:40 +0000 A critical juncture for Sudan’s democratic transition Expert comment LJefferson 28 March 2023 International pressure is essential to reach an agreement that establishes a credible civilian government. The signing of the Framework Agreement (FA) on 5 December 2022 between Sudan’s military leaders and its leading pro-democracy parties is a major step to reversing the damage done by the disastrous military coup in October 2021. The FA removes any formal role for the military in Sudan’s politics. A civilian head of state and prime minister will select the cabinet and chair the Defence and Security Council. The armed forces will be prohibited from non-military business activities and security sector reform will lead to a unified, professional and non-partisan national army. Elections are due to take place at the end of a two-year transitional period. Signatories included General Abdel Fatah Al Burhan, chair of the Sovereign Council and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), his deputy and Commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and more than 40 civilian entities, including the Forces of Freedom and Change- Central Council (FFC-CC), a few other political parties, former armed movements, civil society organizations and professional associations. However, the agreement has faced criticism from the street for not being sufficiently radical, has been overshadowed at times by heightened tension between the two military leaders, and has seen sabotage attempts by supporters of the Bashir regime. Building consensus on the Framework Agreement The agreement meets most of the demands of the anti-coup camp, at least on paper. Yet doubts persist as to whether the military are genuine about handing over power, particularly among the neighbourhood-based resistance committees – the heart of the youth-led mobilization that forced the military to recognize the failure of their power grab. Peaceful protests against the coup have seen 125 killed and over 8,000 injured by government security forces. Many want to see Burhan and Hemedti held accountable. Doubts persist as to whether the military are genuine about handing over power, particularly among the neighbourhood-based resistance committees. Recognizing the need to expand popular support, FFC-CC leaders have been reaching out to other pro-democracy forces to build a united civilian front. They report increased buy-in from some resistance committees in the last few months, recognizing that street protests alone were not sufficient to overthrow the coup, and that engagement with the military is necessary to find a way out of the impasse. The FA offers the only currently available path to embedding civilian politics in Sudan and has received active diplomatic support from UNITAMS, AU and IGAD (who form the Tripartite Mechanism), the Troika of the US, UK and Norway, alongside the EU, as well as Saudi Arabia and the UAE (who are members of ‘the Quad’ with the US and UK). Broader public participation has also been developed through a series of conferences, facilitated by the Tripartite Mechanism, on five contentious issues – dismantling the old regime, the Juba Peace Agreement, Eastern Sudan, Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform. Recommendations will be incorporated in a final political agreement. In a significant breakthrough, both sides have agreed to draft the final agreement and transitional constitution, with the aim of forming a civilian government by 11 April. The political process has been overshadowed by increasingly visible tension between Burhan and Hemedti, seen in parallel foreign visits, conflicting public statements, and a heavy military presence in Khartoum. But concerns that SAF and the RSF were heading towards confrontation appear to have been assuaged thanks to international pressure and preliminary agreements reached between military and civilian signatories of the FA on security sector reform and integration. In a significant breakthrough, both sides have now agreed to draft the final agreement and transitional constitution, with the aim of forming a civilian government by 11 April. Potential spoilers and interests from Sudan’s regions Progress has been made, but significant challenges remain, notably from supporters of the former Bashir regime in ‘the deep state’ and from Sudan’s historically marginalized peripheries. Old regime elements have been intensifying social media campaigns to derail the agreement and drive a wedge between the SAF and RSF, and have been accused of deliberately inciting instability in the peripheries to undermine the democratic transition. The Popular Defence Forces, established by the National Islamic Front in the 1990s, have been reactivated under different names in several parts of the country and there are reports of mobilization and recruitment of armed militias in Darfur. The recent public appearance of Ali Karti, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Movement, who has close relations with Islamists in SAF, has also caused renewed concern. Two Darfuri armed movement leaders who signed the October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and are members of the current military-led government, have not signed the FA, allegedly due to concerns about their representation in the next government. Despite intensive efforts to bring them on board, there is continuing disagreement over the inclusion of other members of ‘the Democratic Bloc’, a political alliance backed by Sudan’s influential neighbour Egypt, which is reportedly angry at being excluded from the Quad. The FFC-CC say that the door is open for the two Darfuri leaders and some other political parties, but they will not allow the agreement to be ‘diluted’ with political forces who intend to torpedo the transition, including by imposing a weak prime minister. Supporters of the pro-democracy movement outside Khartoum, particularly the resistance committees, recognize the organic link between peace and democracy. Both Burhan and Hemedti have courted support from the regions. Burhan used the 2020 SAF takeover of Al Fashaga in the contested eastern border region with Ethiopia to boost his national standing and secure backing from local tribal leaders; while Hemedti has sought to position himself as a champion of the peripheries, particularly in his Darfur heartlands, while simultaneously advancing his business interests. Competition between them in building domestic powerbases, as well as alliances with neighbouring states, risks reigniting tensions, particularly given deep grievances and contrasting ambitions between and among Sudan’s diverse regional leaders and communities. Full Article
j Humana and 18F-FDG PET/CT: Another Sequel to the Injustice of Being Judged by the Errors of Others By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-11-13T12:38:57-08:00 Full Article
j The Annual Journal Impact Factor Saga By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2021-07-08T14:20:31-07:00 Full Article
j Oncologist, Business Leader, and Investor Arie S. Belldegrun Discusses a Career in Innovative Medical Entrepreneurship: A Conversation with Ken Herrmann and Johannes Czernin By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2024-10-30T08:04:15-07:00 Full Article
j Global Proteome and Phosphoproteome Characterization of Sepsis-induced Kidney Injury By www.mcponline.org Published On :: 2020-12-01 Yi-Han LinDec 1, 2020; 19:2030-2046Research Full Article
j Multi-sample mass spectrometry-based approach for discovering injury markers in chronic kidney disease By www.mcponline.org Published On :: 2020-12-20 Ji Eun KimDec 20, 2020; 0:RA120.002159v1-mcp.RA120.002159Research Full Article
j Quantitative proteomics reveal neuron projection development genes ARF4, KIF5B and RAB8A associated with Hirschsprung disease By www.mcponline.org Published On :: 2020-11-17 Qin ZhangNov 17, 2020; 0:RA120.002325v1-mcp.RA120.002325Research Full Article
j A Gs-RhoGEF interaction: An old G protein finds a new job [Cell Biology] By www.jbc.org Published On :: 2020-12-11T00:06:20-08:00 The heterotrimeric G proteins are known to have a variety of downstream effectors, but Gs was long thought to be specifically coupled to adenylyl cyclases. A new study indicates that activated Gs can also directly interact with a guanine nucleotide exchange factor for Rho family small GTPases, PDZ-RhoGEF. This novel interaction mediates activation of the small G protein Cdc42 by Gs-coupled GPCRs, inducing cytoskeletal rearrangements and formation of filopodia-like structures. Furthermore, overexpression of a minimal PDZ-RhoGEF fragment can down-regulate cAMP signaling, suggesting that this effector competes with canonical signaling. This first demonstration that the Gαs subfamily regulates activity of Rho GTPases extends our understanding of Gαs activity and establishes RhoGEF coupling as a universal Gα function. Full Article
j Therapeutic targeting of pancreatic cancer stem cells by dexamethasone modulation of the MKP-1-JNK axis [Cell Biology] By www.jbc.org Published On :: 2020-12-25T00:06:31-08:00 Postoperative recurrence from microscopic residual disease must be prevented to cure intractable cancers, including pancreatic cancer. Key to this goal is the elimination of cancer stem cells (CSCs) endowed with tumor-initiating capacity and drug resistance. However, current therapeutic strategies capable of accomplishing this are insufficient. Using in vitro models of CSCs and in vivo models of tumor initiation in which CSCs give rise to xenograft tumors, we show that dexamethasone induces expression of MKP-1, a MAPK phosphatase, via glucocorticoid receptor activation, thereby inactivating JNK, which is required for self-renewal and tumor initiation by pancreatic CSCs as well as for their expression of survivin, an anti-apoptotic protein implicated in multidrug resistance. We also demonstrate that systemic administration of clinically relevant doses of dexamethasone together with gemcitabine prevents tumor formation by CSCs in a pancreatic cancer xenograft model. Our study thus provides preclinical evidence for the efficacy of dexamethasone as an adjuvant therapy to prevent postoperative recurrence in patients with pancreatic cancer. Full Article
j Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 66095: The message "ERROR: Could not move and link one or more files to..." occurs while running a job-flow instance By Published On :: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 15:33:44 EST In SAS Infrastructure for Risk Management, the message "ERROR: Could not move and link one or more files to..." occurs while running a job-flow instance if an orphaned folder exists in the persistent area. Full Article IRMOFR+SAS+Infrastructure+for+Risk+Manag
j An ankle that just didn’t look right By www.bmj.com Published On :: Thursday, November 10, 2016 - 13:25 Full Article
j Global Proteome and Phosphoproteome Characterization of Sepsis-induced Kidney Injury [Research] By www.mcponline.org Published On :: 2020-12-01T00:05:33-08:00 Sepsis-induced acute kidney injury (S-AKI) is the most common complication in hospitalized and critically ill patients, highlighted by a rapid decline of kidney function occurring a few hours or days after sepsis onset. Systemic inflammation elicited by microbial infections is believed to lead to kidney damage under immunocompromised conditions. However, although AKI has been recognized as a disease with long-term sequelae, partly because of the associated higher risk of chronic kidney disease (CKD), the understanding of kidney pathophysiology at the molecular level and the global view of dynamic regulations in situ after S-AKI, including the transition to CKD, remains limited. Existing studies of S-AKI mainly focus on deriving sepsis biomarkers from body fluids. In the present study, we constructed a mid-severity septic murine model using cecal ligation and puncture (CLP), and examined the temporal changes to the kidney proteome and phosphoproteome at day 2 and day 7 after CLP surgery, corresponding to S-AKI and the transition to CKD, respectively, by employing an ultrafast and economical filter-based sample processing method combined with the label-free quantitation approach. Collectively, we identified 2,119 proteins and 2950 phosphosites through multi-proteomics analyses. Among them, we identified an array of highly promising candidate marker proteins indicative of disease onset and progression accompanied by immunoblot validations, and further denoted the pathways that are specifically responsive to S-AKI and its transition to CKD, which include regulation of cell metabolism regulation, oxidative stress, and energy consumption in the diseased kidneys. Our data can serve as an enriched resource for the identification of mechanisms and biomarkers for sepsis-induced kidney diseases. Full Article