Climate justice with Chinese characteristics? Expert comment NCapeling 7 November 2022

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), claims to be making sustainability a key feature of the programme.

Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has regularly unveiled a grand new strategic concept every four years or so.

Each has been deeply rooted in the Chinese political system and communicated via ambitious slogans, such as A Harmonious World, or New Types of Great Power Relations. And all have reliably generated both excitement and confusion abroad and within China.

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), is no exception. When Chinese president Xi Jinping introduced it at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2021, it made hardly any splash in the West, perhaps because China has already signalled its determination to shape international development in the post-COVID era.

But the GDI is more than just a new label for an ongoing project. One of its core political functions is to deflect some of the fierce criticism directed at its older sibling, the gigantic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has a tarnished reputation for being neither transparent nor sufficiently ‘green’.

Focus on grants and capacity-building

According to the Chinese government’s initial description of the GDI, sustainability is a key feature of the programme. Unlike the BRI, the GDI will focus less on physical infrastructure projects – such as roads, bridges, digital networks, and coal-fired power plants – and more on sustainable-development grants and capacity-building.

In his remarks about GDI in 2021, Xi placed special emphasis on advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helping developing countries manage the transition to a low-carbon economy.

On paper, then, the GDI appears a laudable initiative. While ongoing geopolitical tensions have deepened divisions between China and the US, derailing collaboration on combatting climate change, China at least is adjusting its diplomacy and aid programmes to position itself as a more attractive partner for those seeking climate security.

Since launching the GDI, it has already created the China-Pacific Island Countries Climate Action Cooperation Centre to help some of the world’s most vulnerable countries mitigate the damage from climate change.

But the GDI is still very much in line with China’s past grand initiatives. Its implementation is opaque and there is considerable flexibility in how it will deliver projects and offer grants. This approach is well understood and frequently practiced by Chinese political elites, following Deng Xiaoping’s famous reform ethos of ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’.

Xi has clearly adopted this approach in introducing the GDI. But whereas Deng was steering China’s domestic economy during a period of isolation after the Cultural Revolution, Xi needs to involve many other countries in his vision. That will not be easy now that Russia’s war in Ukraine and other recent developments have complicated many of China’s international relationships.

China’s leaders recognize the BRI was not warmly received in global development circles, owing partly to its role in increasing both climate and financial risks. In implementing the GDI, they need to rethink some basic assumptions. Although gigantic infrastructure investments drove China’s own economic miracle, the same approach is not necessarily applicable everywhere.

Nor should China’s development aid be relentlessly used to seek diplomatic endorsement from other countries. Instead, producing a clear, concrete action plan with specific regional and thematic points of focus would enhance the GDI’s clarity and credibility.

Consider Xi’s recent pledge to add $1 billion to the $3.1 billion South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund, which will be renamed the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund. If China is serious about the GDI’s green credentials, this money should go towards supporting the clean-energy transition in response to the current oil and gas price crunch.

But the GDI’s success ultimately depends on how China deploys not just financial but political capital. It needs to show it can cooperate constructively with countries in the ‘GDI Friends Group’ launched at the UN in January 2022.

For many group members, the pandemic showed that existing development assistance programs urgently need to be updated to account for their recipients’ specific interests and priorities. After years of hollow diplomatic rhetoric, there is a craving for more meaningful assistance to help countries build resilience against climate-driven natural disasters and other growing threats.

China could help meet this demand, but it also will need to manage expectations. Many in the Global South assume a grand-concept policy such as the GDI will be meticulously planned from within Xi’s cabinet and thus executed to deliver large-scale, rapid results. But the GDI will require broad coordination across a wide range of ministries, agencies, and state-owned banks.

One party but not one voice

China may be ruled by one party, but that doesn’t mean its central administration system can always speak with one voice in supporting sustainable development abroad.

Since launching the BRI in 2013, China has showered the Global South with hundreds of billions of dollars in physical infrastructure investment. With the global climate debate increasingly focusing on the need to mobilize international financing for climate mitigation and adaptation in low and middle-income countries, many will be looking to both China and the advanced economies to provide the necessary support.

The G20 will survive but needs major repair Expert comment NCapeling 15 November 2022

Russia’s attack on Ukraine is the biggest challenge to the existence of the G20 since its foundation.

The leader-level version of the G20 was founded in 2008 to coordinate the international response to the global financial crisis across advanced and major emerging economies.

At the outset it was judged a great success. The 2009 London Summit demonstrated a high degree of unity among the world’s largest economies on a comprehensive action plan to tackle the crisis.

The group’s subsequent performance has disappointed. Particularly during the pandemic and the Donald Trump presidency in the US, the group made only a limited additional contribution to policies which national governments were pursuing in any case.

Nonetheless, its members continued to see it as an essential forum without which it would be even harder to tackle a growing list of global economic challenges. This faith was partly repaid when, following the election of the Joe Biden administration in the US, agreement was reached on the $650 billion special drawing rights (SDR) general allocation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in summer 2021.

Impact of the war in Ukraine

Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine earlier this year, leading western members of the group called for Russia to be suspended from the G20 as Russia’s action ran directly against the key principles of the rules-based international system on which the G20 was founded.

Western countries also walked out of meetings of the G20 Finance Ministers’ and International Monetary and Financial Committee this spring rather than sit at the same table as Russian representatives.

This contrasted with 2014 when Russia was suspended indefinitely from the G7 for its takeover of Crimea but no action was taken against it in the G20.

However, China and India, supported by several other emerging economies declined to suspend Russia, creating a standoff which could have resulted in a rapid collapse of the G20, particularly as its informal structure means that, in contrast to the international financial institutions (IFIs), there are no legal principles or procedures to determine how to address such a situation.

It appears the West has now concluded (rightly) that the G20 is too important as a forum for working with China and the other major emerging economies to be allowed to disappear.

This is likely to be because there are no straightforward alternatives. The G7 is too narrow to fill the role and China is now highly unlikely to attend a future G7 Summit as a guest. The boards of the IFIs are not equipped to coordinate across institutions, which is a vital role of the G20, and the United Nations (UN) system does not offer the scope, speed, leader-level engagement, or flexibility of the G20.

Moreover, as evidenced by the chair’s summary of the third G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ meeting in July, once the group gets past the dispute over how to handle Russia, there is a worthwhile agenda of issues which can be agreed on.

As the 2022 president of the G20, Indonesia has been determined to produce a final communique for the leaders’ summit and it looks increasingly like this will be achieved, even though it was impossible to agree concluding statements for some earlier G20 ministerial meetings.

The key will be to deal with the differences over Ukraine between the West and emerging economies with a short opening paragraph reflecting both views. This would then be followed by a consensus text on all the areas where the two groups do agree.

Russia is unlikely to play a disruptive role as preserving its membership of the group will be its key objective, and it will not want to undermine support among other emerging economies by blocking issues that all agree on.

However, even with a final communique achieved, returning to a fully functioning agenda setting, coordination, and decision-making role for G20 will be very challenging, particularly while the war in Ukraine continues.

Tackling sovereign debt distress should be a top priority

There are critically important issues on which G20 action is urgently needed. Top of the list is the acute problem of sovereign debt distress. Some 60 per cent of low-income countries are now judged to be in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress.

But the existing G20 approach for tackling debt distress in low-income countries, the ‘Common Framework’, is progressing far too slowly, and there is no agreed mechanism for handling the growing list of emerging economies in debt distress.

Without tackling debt distress, it is extremely hard to see how it will be possible to generate the vast flow of private sector climate finance necessary to help the developing world progress to net zero.

And yet the G20 is one of the few forums in which a high-level approach to debt distress can be defined because China – along with the IFIs and the western-based private sector – is a key player in any solution.

Urgent repairs needed

However, there is a critical lack of trust among G20 participants which, although in part a reflection of the disagreements over handling Russia, is also about longer-term factors such as the growing geopolitical tensions between China and the US on trade and investment in high tech.

An example of how this has played out was the action China and India took at the Rome G20 Summit in 2021 in blocking Italy’s efforts to establish a new ministerial task force designed to address the threat of future pandemics – a subject which all G20 countries agree is important.

Beijing briefing: China’s wish for 2023? An end to lockdown The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

Xi Jinping will try to beef up Global South relations in 2023, but weary Chinese and the business sector need pandemic restrictions to end, says Yu Jie.

This past year in Chinese politics was capped by a highly anticipated 20th Party Congress in Beijing in October which marked the beginning of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term. Xi stacked the all-powerful Politburo with male loyalists and left the rest of the world to sift through the implications of his leadership reshuffle.

Meanwhile, Xi made headlines at the G20 summit in Indonesia, maintaining a largely positive tone with President Joe Biden and being caught on camera chiding Canada’s Justin Trudeau for leaks after their talks. So, what can we expect Xi to pull out of the hat in 2023, the Chinese Year of the Rabbit? 

In February and March, the conversations around Beijing dinner tables will focus on the composition of the new central government – the important seats within the Chinese State Council. This body must deliver Xi’s ‘security-oriented’ economic agenda as well as his much-promoted ‘Common Prosperity’ initiative.

Pundits will be paying particular attention to who is put in charge of economic planning, who the new foreign minister might be and who will govern the central bank. I will offer my reading of these tea leaves as the year unfolds.

In April and May, speculation may turn to whether China will finally open its borders to foreign visitors and those compatriots who want to be reunited with loved ones after enduring the pandemic lockdown. While some loosening of restrictions began in November 2022, China is still balancing its twin aims of containing the spread of Covid and re-engineering its economy along similar lines to Europe.

Beijing’s controversial ‘Zero-Covid’ strategy has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated rising levels of youth unemployment and tested the patience of China’s middle class, which has led to unprecedented civil disobedience. Those not employed by the state have been hit particularly hard. It is difficult to see how China’s economy can crank up again until Beijing reduces its internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

A pivot to the Global South

June and July will be prime season for Beijing’s diplomacy with the Global South. Xi recently announced that China would host the third Belt and Road Forum in 2023 – a meeting of heads of states from predominantly developing countries to discuss his flagship foreign affairs initiative. As seen in the Political Report of the 20th Party Congress, Xi has abandoned the ‘new type of great power relations’ language he previously used to describe relations with the US-led western world. 

In its place, Xi is stressing that China should develop its ties with the Global South through his Global Development and Global Security initiatives which were announced in 2021 and 2022 respectively. These aim to reshape the global governance agenda in multilateral forums and project Beijing’s influence on to the developing world.

Sport will dominate throughout August and September. While Beijing’s spending spree on football promotion might have failed to see the national side qualify for the World Cup, its table tennis team has proved invincible and continues to cheer up the nation. I will offer my own verdict on why there is such a stark contrast between the success of the two men’s teams and explain the meaning of sports in modern Chinese society.

In October and November, young graduates will begin their careers while new university students start to arrive on campus. Chinese students are constantly subjected to strenuous testing. And like their western peers, they face the inevitable pressures of finding a job, repaying the mortgage and other everyday facts of life.

The burnout of China’s Generation Z 

The term ‘involution’ – neijuan – has been adopted by China’s Generation Z to describe their feelings of burnout at the ever-increasing expectations associated with high performance. Equally, they have strong opinions about their own government as well as western liberal democracies. China’s leaders of the future will come from their ranks so it will be worthwhile spending some time trying to understand what makes them tick.

Whatever the Year of the Rabbit holds for China, billions of its people will want to have their life return to normal without the fear of having the wrong colour – yellow or red – on their Covid health QR code. Only a green code shows a person is healthy and free to move around. The Covid threat has hovered over people for three years and as borders reopen, they may be holding their breath. 

A slowing economy dimming consumer confidence and a precarious international environment make it look even harder for President Xi to pursue the agenda outlined in October 2022. As the Year of the Rabbit dawns, China doesn’t need a Mad Hatter or a March Hare, instead it urgently needs a sound path to economic recovery and a plan to reopen its borders that works for everyone. 

Beijing briefing: China bets on warmer EU relations The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

With the Sino-US Xi relationship cooling, Xi Jinping is sending a new diplomatic team to Europe – but his ties to Putin may mean slow progress, writes Yu Jie.

It has been a momentous year for Beijing. Twelve months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its relations with the West have become more strained than ever. And after President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term in office at the 20th Party Congress, the country has embarked on a chaotic exit from the Covid lockdown amid hopes the economy will rebound quickly.

Some are already asking if Beijing will set a course correction in its diplomatic priorities to spare itself some of the setbacks it incurred in 2022. But when it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. 

The Chinese leadership seeks to create a stable external environment to allow its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was adopted in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi is likely to follow it as a time-honoured recipe for diplomatic reconciliation.

China’s awkward position

Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its failure to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. Xi and his colleagues have begun to realize that cooperation with Russia comes with substantial limits to avoid undermining China’s own political priorities and longer-term economic interests.

Interestingly, pundits interpreted the omission of ‘pursuing new types of great power relations’ in the 20th Party Congress report as an acceptance by the party leadership that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is likely to remain, with little prospect of improvement in the short term.

Chinese diplomatic literature has always presented Russia as a great power, but the abandonment of such terms signals that Beijing is keen to put clear daylight between itself and Vladimir Putin, although international commentators may argue this is not enough and nothing has changed.

There has been little sign of China using its influence to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. Facing, as it feels it now does, a ‘collective West’ and not the Americans alone, Beijing has concluded there are few reasons not to move closer to Russia.

But a reset would appear necessary if China is to tackle its domestic economic woes. So far, Beijing’s main political tactic has been to reassure European countries that it is willing to use its ties with Russia to restrain Putin from entertaining the deployment of nuclear weapons. That was the message conveyed during the visit of Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, and it will be said again when both President Emmanuel Macron of France and Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, each visit later this year.

Economically, China has traditionally relied on its relationships with the European Union and the United States to support innovation and growth. So, a perceived isolation from ‘a collective West’ is not an attractive option given Xi’s hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after dropping the country’s ‘zero-covid’ policy. A precarious bilateral tie with the US has already reduced Beijing’s choice of partners and consumers. Worsening Sino-US relations and a tightening of access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted Beijing not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but to reconfigure its approach to foreign affairs.

China is making a renewed push to strengthen ties with the Global South, which does not see the war in Ukraine as black and white as the West does. Such a move is only possible because five decades of engagement with the ‘collective West’ has allowed China to emerge from poverty and become a global economic powerhouse.

A new diplomatic team

In an attempt to reset the tone of China’s relations with the EU, its largest trading partner, Xi has formed a new diplomatic team headed by Qin Gang, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is returning from his post in Washington as ambassador to the US and who has a background in European affairs. Achieving warmer relations will be easier said than done, however, as China has maintained its ‘neutrality’ at Russia’s aggression since February 2022.

Beijing briefing: China aims for tech self-reliance The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Xi Jinping’s new appointments are tasked with a technology led recovery, but they face a daunting task to restore growth, writes Yu Jie.

The three-day state visit to Moscow by President Xi Jinping in March may have eclipsed the National People’s Congress in Beijing a fortnight earlier, but as Xi seeks to establish a new global order with China at its centre, the political events in the Great Hall of People provide an important insight into the country’s longer-term economic plans.

While a new cohort of cabinet members was appointed to sit on the State Council for the next five years, much of the attention remains on China’s economic stimulus plan to enable a rapid post-Covid recovery, as well as proposals to restructure central government.

Mountainous task

Three aspects of this year’s Congress deserve deeper scrutiny: Li Qiang’s confirmation as premier to succeed Li Keqiang’s decade-long subdued tenure under Xi; the extent to which Xi’s new cabinet sheds light on China’s economic and scientific self-reliance; and the unveiling of a major restructuring of central government administration in sectors such as finance and science.

China’s new premier initially faces the mountainous task of restoring growth and market confidence. During a press conference much shorter than his predecessor would hold, Li Qiang praised China’s private business sector and repeated the words ‘China remains open to foreign business’ to address the growing anxieties among foreigners and Chinese private entrepreneurs.

Beside the daunting task of economic recovery, Li Qiang faces another big challenge. Unlike his predecessors, he has never worked as a vice premier and overseen ministries under the State Council. The test for him will be to pursue a sound economic recovery plan while coordinating numerous central government agencies. He will also need to regulate relations among provincial heads who have a tendency to argue endlessly over the distribution of public finances.

Even though Xi is secure in his third term, his involvement in shaping and implementing macro-economic policies is keenly felt. Li Qiang made explicit the State Council under his leadership will be the chief implementor of all policies approved by the president. This is a less equal working partnership with Xi than his predecessors on the State Council enjoyed in the past.

Beijing published its official plan to restructure its central government administration announcing planned cuts of 5 per cent of its civil service. The newly established Central Commission on Finance intends to deal with systemic financial risks and to coordinate the financial regulatory bodies, central bank and Ministry of Finance. This is seen to reflect the Chinese leadership’s growing concern with the poor performance of local government loans and debt as well of the volatility of the property market, all of which threaten huge uncertainty for the economy.

As well as reorganizing the financial sector, Xi’s intention to pursue an integrated national strategy combining economic and scientific self-reliance has led to significant appointments following the Congress. As a starter, a new Central Commission for Science under the party leadership has been established. This commission will focus on providing a renewed impetus to accelerate China’s drive to achieve ‘scientific reliance’ and to ease the choke points in the economy, such as the supply chain for semiconductors.

It remains unclear who will head this new commission or who will be on it, however, as scant detail has been made public. It is seen as a direct response to the tough measures adopted by the United States designed to dent China’s ambitions of technology supremacy.

Departure from the past

New appointees to the Politburo come with substantial backgrounds in science as well as a solid track record of running state-owned enterprises. This is a departure from the past.

Instead of inserting financial specialists, Xi appointed two scientists, Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, as the vice premiers overseeing science, education and industrial policies. This signals that Xi intends to prioritize science and innovation during his third term. The appointment of technocrats to the State Council is seen as a move to strengthen innovation and prepare the Chinese economy, political system and society for potential external shocks.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives until 2024 – Japanese perceptions 24 February 2020 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Chatham House

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Japan’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Japanese perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Tokyo and was organized in partnership with the Indo-Pacific Studies Group.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Hiroki Sekine, Visiting Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House.

Read a summary and essay

Japan’s G7 leadership: Defending the liberal order amid crisis 28 February 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Online

How G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

In May 2023 Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima, where leaders of the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy come to discuss the most urgent challenges facing the world.

This year’s summit takes place against a backdrop of continued global economic and political instability from the war in Ukraine to intensifying competition between China and the West.

The speakers discuss Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s priorities at the summit and consider how G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

This event is the third of a three-part series held in partnership with Japan House London.

Watch the first event which looked at Africa-Japan relations here, and the second event, on the UK and Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia, here.

Leigh Anderson
Apr 1, 2006; 5:573-588
Research

Jesper V. Olsen
Dec 1, 2005; 4:2010-2021
Technology

The Platinum Jubilee of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II News release NCapeling 1 June 2022

The staff, associate fellows and Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House send congratulations and warmest wishes to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II on the occasion of her momentous Platinum Jubilee.

As the Patron of the institute since her accession to the throne in 1952, HM The Queen has underpinned Chatham House’s independence for seven decades and thereby strengthened the impact of our work on the critical issues facing the world.

HM The Queen lent her personal support to the establishment of the annual Chatham House Prize in 2005 and has presented the award in person on behalf of the institute’s members on three occasions.

Among her other direct engagements with Chatham House, HM The Queen has helped us engage the next generation by supporting and then attending the launch of the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs in 2014, when she met the first intake of Academy fellows.

We are enormously grateful for her continued involvement as Patron of the institute and wish her and the Royal Family a memorable Platinum Jubilee.

Independent Thinking: Rishi Sunak and the UK, John Kerry on COP27 Audio NCapeling 28 October 2022

The second episode of our new podcast examines the changes in the UK government as Rishi Sunak become prime minister and looks ahead to COP27 with John Kerry.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests discuss the arrival in Number 10 of Rishi Sunak, the UK’s youngest prime minister of modern times as well as its third of 2022, alongside analysing the Chatham House event with US Special Presidential Envoy on Climate John Kerry. 

Bronwen’s guests from Chatham House are John Kampfner, executive director of the UK in the World Initiative, Hans Kundani, associate fellow with the Europe programme, and Anna Åberg, research associate with the Environment and Society programme.

They are joined by Sir Simon Fraser, formerly of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Chatham House’s deputy chairman. 

Independent Thinking is a regular podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts to provide insight on the latest international issues.

How Beijing is closing surveillance gaps in the South China Sea The World Today iallan.drupal 15 October 2024

The discovery of a new radar system on China’s Triton Island military base shows that Beijing is rapidly developing its intelligence capacities in contested waters, write John Pollock and Damien Symon.

New satellite images reveal how the Chinese military is dramatically expanding its capabilities on Triton Island, which looks set to become a one of Beijing’s key signal intelligence bases in the South China Sea.

Once completed, the radar system would significantly increase China’s signals intercept and electronic warfare capabilities across the disputed Paracel Islands archipelago and add to a wider surveillance network spanning much of the South China Sea.

The enhanced facility on Triton is likely to offer a challenge to China’s competitors in the region and internationally.

China seized control of the Paracels from Vietnam in a 1974 naval battle, and competition for access to it waters has intensified since the recent discovery of oil and gas reserves. Chinese and Vietnamese maritime militia clashed off the coast of Triton in 2014.

In addition, American, British and Australian naval forces have for the past decade patrolled the waters to collectively challenge China’s contested ‘nine-dash-line’ claim to large stretches of the South China Sea. 

Overlapping anti-stealth network

A year after work was first identified on Triton, satellite images from Maxar have helped build a clearer picture of Beijing’s efforts to defend this strategic waterway.

The most striking development is the construction of a new radar system, known as SIAR – synthetic impulse and aperture radar – which purportedly detects stealth aircraft. The counter-stealth radar on Triton is characterized by its distinctive octagonal structure, which resembles another SIAR system built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, south of the Paracels, in 2017. A half-completed tower also sits near the SIAR radar on Triton, which is likely to be the operations centre.

Once completed, the radar on Triton will form what is believed to be a wider network of at least three overlapping counter-stealth radars built across Chinese bases in the South China Sea over the past decade, including on Hainan Island, home to several Chinese naval bases. 

The positioning of the radar on Triton, 320km south of Hainan, is telling, says J. Michael Dahm, Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies at the Mitchell Institute. 

‘SIAR radars cannot see over the curve of the Earth, which means there is a gap in China’s air surveillance coverage between Subi Reef and Hainan Island. The Triton Island site will help close that gap’, said Dahm.

The aim, he suggests, is to give China contiguous counter-stealth radar coverage of the South China Sea.

More construction underway

The satellite images reveal other building projects on Triton. One is a large pad at the end of the road network which will probably be used as a launching point for a mobile anti-ship missile battery. The building at the northeast end of the road is probably a storage building for missile transport vehicles. 

Diminishing Vietnam’s options

The development of a new counter-stealth radar system and other suspected signals intercept structures on Triton represents a notable increase in China’s intelligence capabilities in the Paracels. The Chinese Communist Party has not disclosed the purpose of the building work on Triton, but its effects on regional and global competitors are likely to be wide ranging.

For Vietnam, which is rapidly expanding its own bases in the South China Sea, the intelligence structures on Triton would significantly diminish its capacity to operate undetected in the area. Alongside existing radar on Triton which can detect sea-going vessels, Beijing now has the potential to track Vietnamese air movements and gain forewarning of Hanoi’s manoeuvres in the area, including efforts to access oil and gas deposits.

The desire to strengthen control over these resources may explain why China is fortifying Triton Island, says Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House. ‘The developments might be a warning that China is planning to mount another drilling expedition’, he suggests.

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2024

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.

In conversation with James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology and Society at Google 12 December 2024 — 11:15AM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

A conversation on AI’s global, societal and economic impacts.

2024 has been a landmark year for Artificial Intelligence (AI) development, deployment and use, with significant progress in AI-driven science, governance and cooperation. Looking ahead, AI continues to demonstrate economic promise and potential to expand on scientific breakthroughs in areas such as climate and health. This wave of innovation is occurring against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty and not all countries are fully able to participate. Heading into 2025, there are urgent questions about how best to maximise shared opportunities when it comes to AI and to advance global cooperation.

James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology & Society at Google, will unpack what 2025 will bring for AI in science, economics, global governance and international cooperation. 

Key questions include:

• What will be AI’s global societal and economic impact in 2025 and beyond? 
• What are the ways AI could help increase economic growth and economy-wide productivity? What factors must be in place for this to happen?
• How best can we maximise shared opportunities and advance global cooperation when it comes to AI? Where can public-private partnerships unlock scientific breakthroughs for societal progress, combatting shared global challenges such as climate change and global health issues?  
• What are the principles of safe, responsible AI, and how should companies remain responsive to their evolution and integrate them into technology design and implementation? 
• What is the current – and ideal – role of technology companies in emerging mechanisms for global cooperation and national governance on AI?

This event is being held in partnership with Google.

You will receive notice by 13:00 on Wednesday 11 December if you have been successful in securing an in-person place.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Assessing the trajectory of the Middle East conflict 4 November 2024 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Online

Experts examine how the conflict may develop and what we can expect from regional and international actors.

A year on, the war in Gaza has spilled beyond Israel and Palestine with escalation across the region intensifying.

Recent weeks have seen Israel deepening its military offensive on Lebanon and keeping the north of the Gaza strip under siege, while leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas have been successfully targeted by its forces. Israel also launched an unprecedented assault against Iran in response to Tehran’s missile attacks on Israeli territory earlier in October.

Against this backdrop, regional states, particularly in the Gulf, in line with their overall approach to the conflict, are prioritizing diplomacy over escalation. They maintain their neutrality on the hostility between Israel and Iran and its aligned groups from the axis of resistance.

The strength of old alliances is being tested while new alignments are uncovered that may reshape the geopolitical landscape of the region, particularly following the US presidential election.

In this webinar, experts will examine:

• What are Israel’s calculations at this stage and how have the domestic political dynamics changed over recent weeks?
• What are the impacts of the war on Iran and its aligned actors and what can we expect from Tehran and groups from the axis of resistance?
• How are the wars in Gaza and Lebanon connected and would ending one stop the other?
• What is the response from regional states, particularly in the Gulf, and what role can they play?
• What are the possible scenarios for a post-election US policy on Israel and the Middle East?

Following its snap election, Japanese politics has entered uncharted waters Expert comment LToremark 5 November 2024

Prime Minister Ishiba’s election gamble has failed. Japan now faces another period of political uncertainty, which could affect its international standing.

In Japan’s snap election on 27 October, the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito lost the overwhelming majority it had held since the 2012 general election. The ruling coalition now has 215 seats, leaving it 18 seats short of a majority. 

The largest opposition party is the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), which gained 50 seats to 148. The second largest opposition party is the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), which lost six seats to 38, and the third largest opposition party is the National Democratic Party (NDP), which gained 21 seats to 28.

But the opposition is divided and there is no real appetite to form a coalition government. This will likely result in a hung parliament, which will further destabilize Japan’s government.

The election results reveal three key things  about the state of Japanese politics and what comes next.

First, that Prime Minister Ishiba’s snap election gamble has failed. The aim was for Ishiba, a non-mainstream member of the LDP, to strengthen the party base and stabilize his administration. But with the ruling coalition losing its majority, the party base has been further weakened and the Ishiba administration is now more likely to be short-lived. LDP voters as well as the public in general  had hoped that Ishiba, as the ‘opposition within the party’, would change the LDP’s structure and government policies, eliminate the uncertainty surrounding party funding and increase transparency on how MPs use public funds to finance political activities.

However, when Ishiba became LDP leader and prime minister, he abandoned his previously more critical stance and prioritized carrying on the policies of the mainstream LDP, leaving his supporters feeling betrayed.

Second, while the ruling coalition has been punished, the people of Japan still did not vote for a change of government. The opposition is divided and, despite its gains in this election, the CDP is not fully committed to take the lead and consolidate the opposition to form a coalition. The CDP also suffers from internal division. The left wing of the party would prefer a coalition with the Communist Party, while the right wing of the party does not want to form a coalition with the LDP or the Communist Party, preferring a partner such as the NDP.

Third, the NDP has become the key to future Japanese politics. By becoming the minority ruling party, the NDP is in a position to control the fate of Ishiba administration. While the CDP has no intention of cooperating with the LDP, the NDP is more willing to do so in order to implement its own policies. As the budget cannot be passed without the NDP’s cooperation, the ruling coalition will have no choice but to accept the NDP’s policy of substantial tax cuts through the expansion of tax credits. It will also likely have to accept an option for married couples to decide their family names, which requires a change of civil codes and is something it has been reluctant to do so far. 

If the NDP’s demands are rejected, a no-confidence motion will likely be submitted and passed, leaving the Ishiba cabinet with no choice but to resign or dissolve the House of Representatives (the lower house of Japan’s parliament).

But the NDP has chosen to not form a coalition with the ruling party and enter government. Why? From the NDP’s point of view, forming a coalition with the LDP, would mean getting involved in the LDP’s internal turmoil – something it wishes to avoid. In addition, elections to the House of Councillors (upper house of parliament) will be held in the summer of 2025. The NDP may have judged that it will have a better chance of implementing its policies by cooperating with the government on a case-by-case basis, rather than forming a coalition with a party that is losing public support and risk following suit.

The minority ruling system that has emerged after the election is extremely rare in Japan’s political history and is likely to make its politics even more unstable in the years ahead. The Ishiba administration will probably be able to survive until the budget is passed in March next year by cooperating with the NDP, but beyond that its prospects are unclear.

As the House of Councillors elections get closer, some in the LDP may say that they cannot fight the election with Ishiba as prime minister. If so, they may choose the option of a same-day election for the lower and the upper house. The cost of an election campaign is significant, and the LDP’s financial strength gives it an advantage in the case of a same-day election. There is also a strong possibility that the public will choose the LDP to regain stability in government. However, this election has shown that public distrust of the LDP is high, and if Ishiba continues to be pushed around by the NDP, his party’s chances of winning would be reduced.

Japanese politics has entered uncharted waters, where the patterns and customs of the past do not apply. There are now doubts both at home and abroad as to whether Ishiba, who has a weak party base, will be able to stay on and steer the government. Over the past decade, the Abe and Kishida administrations have provided Japan with political stability, which has in turn enhanced its international presence. An unstable political system, with frequent changes of government, will likely lead to a decline in Japan’s international influence.

There is also a risk that US–Japan relations  could become unstable. Although the NDP does not have a strong agenda to change the course of this relationship, Ishiba may struggle to keep the promise made by his predecessors to increase defence spending. Ishiba’s nationalist posture could also create a confrontational relationship with the United States, while his weak leadership means he may not seek to invest in strengthening the US–Japan alliance. 

Donald Trump’s win in the US presidential election could pose a further risk. Although Trump might be open to Ishiba’s demand for parity with the US, he could become irritated with Ishiba’s weak domestic position. Ishiba may not be able to make decisions – or a deal with Trump – unless the NDP agrees to it.

Trump and his growing number of European allies threaten the European project Expert comment LToremark 8 November 2024

With Trump in the White House, a key challenge for Europe will be the growing transatlantic illiberal ties which risk undermining European unity.

As the US presidential election result became clear, European leaders followed a similar formula when congratulating President-elect Trump. They offered their congratulations, mentioned previous good working relations with the US (special points for a nod to long-standing relations), and – most importantly – emphasized the need for this to continue for the benefit of the citizens of both their country and the US.

The formula was a telling sign of the political bartering most European heads of state expect with Trump back in the White House. The exception, of course, were Trump’s European allies who were simply ecstatic.

Transatlantic illiberalism

Trump’s growing number of European allies and the increase of illiberalism and populism is perhaps the most worrying development for Europe. In 2016, some of Trump’s counterparts in Europe were Angela Merkel in Germany, Emmanuel Macron in France, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, and Giuseppe Conte in Italy. Regardless of their record, they were moderates.

The picture looks very different today. Anti-war extremist parties Alternative for Germany and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance are on the rise in Germany. In France, pro-Russia Marine le Pen has been able to reduce support for Ukraine from €3 billion to €2 billion in the draft French budget. In the Netherlands, the far-right Freedom Party is the biggest coalition partner. In Italy, Prime Minister Georgia Meloni hails from a neo-fascist party. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s populist and illiberal playbook is being replicated across Europe. 

Meanwhile in Poland, moderate prime minister, Donald Tusk, is experiencing the difficulties of reversing damage done by the previous populist government.

What European populist leaders have in common is a deep-seated scepticism of the EU and a desire to erode it from within. And many of these leaders also welcome the return of Trump.

It is no coincidence that Orbán scheduled the European Political Community Summit, hosted by Hungary, to take place just days after the US election. The Trump win was an added bonus. This meant European heads of state travelled to Budapest for the summit still reeling from – or rejoicing at – the election result. 

Orbán would like to position himself as Trump’s man in Europe. He has spent the past four years building ties with the president-elect and the MAGA wing of the Republican party. Trump even namechecked Orbán – a Eurosceptic Putin-supporter – during the presidential debate.

Italy’s Meloni, meanwhile, has so far worked with EU institutions and NATO rather than against them: she has supported EU and NATO resolutions for Ukraine and demonstrated opposition to Russia. But this may have been a strategic calculation. She likely looked at her country’s balance sheet and realized she needed the European Commission’s COVID-19 recovery funds. 

But with the fund coming to an end and given her history of Euroscepticism and pro-Russian views, the transatlantic illiberal ties mean she may now feel emboldened to revise her positions. She is already deploying the illiberal playbook domestically.

Policy implications for Europe of a second Trump term 

Despite some ideological similarities, Trump’s policies will not be good for his European allies. He has threatened to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports. For Italy and the Netherlands, the second and fifth largest EU exporters to the US, this would have direct negative impacts on their economies.

Increased tariffs on Chinese goods – Trump has threatened up to 60 per cent – would also have an impact on Europe’s economies. Rerouting of Chinese goods could see China dump overproduction in Europe, one of the few remaining relatively open markets, and make European products compete with cheaper Chinese goods in Europe and on the global market. 

Neither of these developments are positive for export-led European countries. In France, the EU’s fourth largest exporter to the US, Marine le Pen – previously a strong supporter of Trump – had a notably muted response to his victory due to concerns over a trade war.

Even European leaders who might have hoped for a different election outcome may seek to hedge their bets. There are two things that are clear about Trump: he is unpredictable and transactional. 

It is quite possible that some European states, in particular frontline states with genuine fears over Russia’s imperialist ambitions, will seek to buy Trump’s support through bilateral arms deals – despite their distaste for Trump’s position vis-à-vis Russia. These countries already have some of the highest defence spending in NATO, with Poland, Estonia and Latvia leading the way, so this will not irk Trump – arms deals would simply be an additional insurance premium.

Countries rushing to make bilateral deals with the US risks a similar uncoordinated race for American arms deals as during Trump’s first term. This would in turn undermine much-needed European defence industrial cooperation efforts. As the need to reduce dependencies on third countries – even for defence equipment from historically close allies – has become increasingly clear, this would be a problematic development.

The silver lining may be that it could galvanize the UK and the EU just enough to take action on UK-EU security and defence cooperation, of which the defence industrial piece is the most essential.

Europe disunited

The transatlantic link between populist, illiberal leaders should be a concern. Trump is no longer isolated in Europe, he is rapidly accumulating allies among European heads of state. These leaders agree on the perceived existential threat posed by migration, the need for so-called ‘traditional family values’ and ‘anti-wokeism’. But beyond that, they share and want to advance an illiberal view of the world, with ramifications from security and global trade to human rights – and directly threatening the European project.

In conversation with Julien Harneis, UN Assistant Secretary-General 18 November 2024 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 November 2024 Chatham House and Online

In this discussion, Julien Harneis will give critical insights into the UN’s humanitarian response in Yemen and the importance of maintaining independent humanitarian assistance.

According to the United Nations, Yemen has faced the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in the last decade, with over 20 million people in need of assistance. Years of ongoing conflict have devastated infrastructure, displaced millions, and caused widespread food insecurity and health emergencies. Access to essential services remains a daily struggle, and the escalating economic collapse has left vulnerable communities facing critical shortages in food, water, and medical supplies.

However, humanitarian actors are continually facing challenges in delivering aid to Yemen due to security threats and supply chain barriers, highlighting the urgent need for coordinated and sustainable international assistance.

UN Assistant Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, Julien Harneis, will provide an account of the humanitarian mission and evolving strategies in Yemen, the impact of regional conflicts in the delivery of aid and discuss other key questions including:

The Committee to Protect Journalists named winner of the Chatham House Prize 2018 News Release sysadmin 5 October 2018

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has been voted the winner of this year’s Chatham House Prize.

Chatham House awarded major centenary grant to establish Stavros Niarchos Foundation Wing News Release sysadmin 16 April 2019

Chatham House has been awarded a transformational £10m grant ahead of its upcoming 2020 centenary.

Renata Dwan Joins as Deputy Director and Senior Executive Officer News Release sysadmin 19 August 2020

Renata Dwan has been appointed deputy director and senior executive officer of Chatham House.

Chatham House Prize: Malawi Judges Win for Election Work News Release NCapeling 23 October 2020

Malawi’s constitutional court judges have won the 2020 Chatham House Prize in recognition of their 'courage and independence in the defence of democracy'.

Lord Hammond Joins Panel of Senior Advisers News Release NCapeling 10 December 2020

Chatham House is pleased to announce that Lord Hammond of Runnymede is joining our Panel of Senior Advisers.

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications Expert comment NCapeling 24 February 2022

Russia is violating international law in Ukraine using baseless allegations, and states’ responses should be guided accordingly.

Russia has begun a large-scale military attack on Ukraine, having first declared it recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states. It scarcely needs saying Russia is violating international law – violating the prohibition in the United Nations (UN) Charter on the use of force, violating the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, and violating the prohibition on intervention.

But Russia is using the language of the law to defend its actions. In all the recent verbiage of President Vladimir Putin, some attempts at legal arguments can be elicited – but they do not stand up to scrutiny.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with the only two Charter exceptions to this prohibition being self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council. In his speech on 23 February, Putin points to two grounds on which Russia relies on self-defence – defence in aid of the two breakaway republics and self-defence in the light of threats against Russia itself.

Donetsk, Luhansk, and collective self-defence

Putin said ‘the people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help’ and went on to seek to justify his military action under Article 51 of the Charter. But it is only in respect of states that the right of collective self-defence exists – humanitarian intervention on behalf of individuals in a state has not gained a place in international law. And it is only Russia which has recognized the statehood of the two regions.

Putin repeated on 23 February his earlier allegation that the people of the two breakaway republics are being repressed by the Ukraine government, and even that genocide is being committed against them. This baseless allegation is relevant not only to the claim of self-defence on behalf of these regions but also to Russia’s ‘recognition’ of them as separate states.

International law does not give the inhabitants of a part of a state the right to secede from that state. The aspect of self-determination which allows for independence of a ‘people’ applies to peoples in colonies and other overseas territories under the occupation of another state. The other aspect of self-determination is ‘internal’ and comprises the right to freely choose political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development within the state – as the Minsk accords sought to provide for Donetsk and Luhansk.

There is a somewhat controversial theory in international law that would give a right of secession from a state if the people in question were subject to extreme abuse of human rights and systematic oppression. This is the theory of remedial secession, which some countries, such as Switzerland, used in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – an independence still not recognized by Russia.

But the theory has no support from the international courts and, even if it did, Russia itself has stated previously that a right of remedial secession is ‘limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question’ (see Russia’s submissions to the ICJ in the Kosovo case, para 88).

The facts do not substantiate Russia’s claims anyway. The law is as stated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General on 21 February – that Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions is a ‘violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ There are no ‘states’ which can request the use of military force.

Is Ukraine a threat against Russia?

Putin refers to the ‘further expansion of the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, the military development of the territories of Ukraine’ as creating an ‘anti-Russia’ comprising a ‘real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty’.

Article 51 allows for self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This has been interpreted by many states to include defence against the threat of an imminent attack – for example, there is no requirement to wait until a nuclear strike has begun. But under no interpretation of ‘imminence’ can the situation in Ukraine constitute a threat to Russia. There have been no threats of force against Russia from Ukraine nor from NATO member states. There is nothing to support a legal justification for Russia’s military attack against Ukraine.

The myth of Ukraine never having had ‘real statehood’ also does not give any legal justification for Russian aggression. The UN is based on the ‘principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter). Ukraine retained its membership in the UN at the dissolution of the USSR, having been one of the founding members of the UN as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

What are the legal consequences of Russia’s actions?

Within the UN, it is the Security Council which has the mandate to uphold international peace and security, and act when there is a threat to the peace. But there will be no help from there with Russia’s status as a permanent member holding a veto.

The UN General Assembly may act instead. Since 2014 it has adopted a series of resolutions (the latest on 9 December 2021) requiring Russia to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Crimea. But the General Assembly does not have the powers of the Security Council, and cannot mandate peacekeepers or the use of force.

In due course there may be the need for a UN Human Rights Commission of Inquiry to be launched if there are breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law, and human rights cases may be brought against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. But international institutions do not have the necessary powers to stop what is going on right now.

International law gives the right to Ukraine, being attacked, to call for support from other states. And as well as imposing sanctions, states may wish to consider cyber countermeasures. Some of the recent cyber activity against Ukraine has been attributed by the US, UK, and Australia to the Russian Main Intelligence Unit (GRU).

The ICC response to Russia’s war gives hope for justice Expert comment NCapeling 19 March 2023

The ICC’s arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova show the commission of international crimes is not without consequences.

Warrants of arrest for Russian president Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, commissioner for children’s rights in the president’s office, have been issued because the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has reasonable grounds to believe they have committed war crimes.

Following an independent investigation and evidence-gathering by the ICC prosecutor Karim Khan in his first new case since taking office, the pair are accused of committing two different war crimes – the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia, and the unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

The focus on those two war crimes is likely due to clear evidence that deportation and forcible transfer of thousands of Ukrainian children have occurred, as the Russian government was overt about its policy of taking Ukrainian children to Russia and placing them in camps or putting them up for adoption by Russian families.

Furthermore, in line with the Office of the Prosecutor’s policy on children, crimes against children are prioritized given their particularly vulnerable status.

Jurisdiction and enforcement

The ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed fully in Russia by Russian nationals, as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute which created the ICC.

However, it does have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Ukraine irrespective of who committed them, pursuant to two declarations lodged by Ukraine in 2014 accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over its territory from November 2013.

Although a prosecution has been initiated, it is ultimately for the judges of the ICC to decide on the accused’s fate. But the chances of Putin getting arrested or tried for these offences are slim.

The ICC lacks enforcement or police powers and depends on state cooperation to execute arrest warrants. Also, because it cannot try individuals in their absence, a trial or conviction cannot occur without Putin and Lvova-Belova being in custody.

But by issuing and unsealing these arrest warrants, the ICC is relying on the symbolic function of international criminal law – it is publicly naming and shaming Putin and Lvova-Belova for the commission of serious atrocities, and it is sending a message to other leaders and the international community that such actions are not without consequence.

The arrest warrants also give victims some form of vindication or recognition for their suffering and hope for justice in the future. And making the warrants public enables the ICC to reclaim itself as a key avenue for ensuring accountability for international crimes, following a wave of criticism and disenchantment about its work in Africa and delays in advancing its investigation on Afghanistan.

International courts gearing into action

This ICC case is the latest in a series of ongoing cases related to Russia’s war in Ukraine before different international courts and tribunals. Others include at least four cases before the European Court of Human Rights for events that occurred before Russia was excluded from the Council of Europe, such as the MH17 flight case and the annexation of Crimea.

Two cases have also been brought by Ukraine against Russia before the International Court of Justice – in 2017 and 2022 – with hearings scheduled for June. An unprecedented number of states parties have sought to intervene in one or more of these cases.

Each case must be considered on its own merits and the decisions cannot be prejudged. But they showcase an important feature of the global legal system and its judicial architecture that cannot be underestimated – the ability to quickly swing into action in response to violations of international law. In this case, the response was prompted by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in breach of the United Nations Charter and fundamental principles of international law.

A starting point for a bigger case

The ICC prosecutor already has a broader investigation into other international crimes committed in Ukraine since 21 November 2013. So this is likely to be just the starting point of a much bigger case against Putin and other senior Russian officials for international crimes committed in the context of the war in Ukraine and within the ICC’s jurisdiction.

These potentially include other war crimes such as the indiscriminate or disproportionate targeting of civilians, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

Expert

Expert

Expert

Expert