ar Investing in Early Childhood Development: What is Being Spent, And What Does it Cost? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 06 Feb 2015 12:11:00 -0500 In the developing world, more than 200 million children under the age of five years are at risk of not reaching their full human potential because they suffer from the negative consequences of poverty, nutritional deficiencies and inadequate learning opportunities. Given these risks, there is a strong case for early childhood development (ECD) interventions in nutrition, health, education and social protection, which can produce long-lasting benefits throughout the life cycle. The results from the 2012 round of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)—an international, large-scale assessment that measures 15-year-olds’ performance in mathematics, reading and science literacy—demonstrate the benefits of ECD: Students in the countries that belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) who had the benefit of being enrolled for more than one year in preprimary school scored 53 points higher in mathematics (the equivalent of more than one year of schooling), compared with students who had not attended preprimary school. Although there is much evidence that ECD programs have a great impact and are less costly than educational interventions later in life, very few ECD initiatives are being scaled up in developing countries. For example, in 2010, only 15 percent of children in low-income countries—compared with 48 percent worldwide—were enrolled in preprimary education programs. Furthermore, even though the literature points to larger beneficial effects of ECD for poorer children, within developing countries, disadvantaged families are even less likely to be among those enrolled in ECD programs. For instance, in Ghana, children from wealthy families are four times more likely than children from poor households to be enrolled in preschool programs. One of the major barriers to scaling up ECD interventions is financing. In order to address financing issues, both policymakers and practitioners need a better understanding of what is currently being spent on ECD interventions, what high-quality interventions cost, and what outcomes these interventions can produce. If stakeholder groups are made more aware of the costs of ECD interventions, they may be able to support decisionmaking on investments in ECD, to better estimate gaps in financing, and to work toward securing stable funding for scaling up service provision and for quality enhancement. One of the weakest areas of ECD policy planning is in the realm of financial planning.6 Good data are scarce on ECD spending and the costs of ECD interventions that are useful for program budgeting and planning; but these data are valuable for a number of reasons, including the fact that they support analyses of what different inputs cost and thus can facilitate considering various alternative modalities for service delivery. In this paper, we focus on what data are available to gain a clearer picture of what is being spent on ECD and what it costs to deliver basic ECD interventions in developing countries. ECD interventions come in many varieties, and therefore we first define the package of ECD interventions that have been deemed essential. Then we outline a framework for better understanding ECD financing, which combines a top-down approach analyzing expenditures and a bottom-up approach analyzing the costs of delivering individual interventions. We comment on the general methodological issues stemming from these approaches and the limitations of the data that have been produced. Next, we delve into the available data and discuss the different funding sources and financing mechanisms that countries utilize to deliver ECD services and what patterns exist in spending. We provide a brief overview of how many public and private resources in both developed and developing countries are invested in young children, and in which specific subsectors. Although these data on spending illustrate the flows and help us understand how much is being allocated and by whom, the data are limited, and this top-down approach still leaves us with many unanswered questions. Therefore, we turn our attention to the actual costs of individual ECD interventions, which help us further understand what ECD spending can “buy” in different countries. We identify some trends in the actual costs of delivering these services, although there are a number of methodological issues vis-à-vis costing and the services delivered, which lead to wide variations between and within countries and make it difficult to compare programs over time. Finally, we look at a number of initiatives that are currently under way to collect better data on ECD costs and expenditures, which will be useful for countries in planning programs and identifying funding sources. These initiatives are sponsored by organizations such as UNICEF, Save the Children, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Given the gaps in the available data that we identify and the interventions currently under way, we conclude with recommendations for increasing the knowledge base in this area for use in policymaking and planning. Authors Jacques van der GaagVidya Putcha Full Article
ar Replacing the Affordable Care Act By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 08 Mar 2017 19:20:03 +0000 THE ISSUE: As Congress considers the new House Republican-backed replacement for the Affordable Care Act (ACA), they must ensure that it accomplishes a set of specific goals that are crucial for providing broad, affordable coverage to U.S. citizens. https://youtu.be/xqe4kBcyQC4 The ability to evolve has to be a key part of the ACA replacement. THE THINGS YOU… Full Article
ar Repealing the Affordable Care Act By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 08 Mar 2017 19:20:06 +0000 THE ISSUE: If Congress rejects the new House Republican-backed replacement for the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the full repeal long advocated for by many Republicans could be their next option. https://youtu.be/4wpHccHawbg A straight ACA repeal would leave an estimated 20+ million people without health coverage. THE THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW Republicans have long advocated… Full Article Uncategorized
ar How public libraries help build healthy communities By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 30 Mar 2017 15:38:45 +0000 They say you can’t judge a book by its cover. Increasingly in the United States, you also can’t judge a library’s value to its community by simply its books. Let us explain. In a previous blog post, we’ve noted the importance of “third places” in strengthening communities – meaning those places that are neither one’s… Full Article
ar Trump’s reckless Middle East policy has brought the US to the brink of war By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 06 Jan 2020 18:24:53 +0000 The U.S. drone strike that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the long-time leader of Iran’s paramilitary Quds Force of the Islamic Republican Guard Corps, comes when the United States is at a dangerous crossroads in the Middle East. Soleimani was responsible for many of Iran’s most important relationships, including with paramilitary groups in Iraq, the Lebanese militant group… Full Article
ar A foreign policy toward warlords By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 18:36:25 +0000 As the U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan winds down, examining what was a significant part of the U.S. strategy during the war—the use of warlords to fight terrorist groups — is vital for understanding how best to leverage such relationships in future wars. The use of warlords was not unique to Afghanistan: Similar policies have… Full Article
ar Webinar: Jihadism at a crossroads By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 08 May 2020 17:19:01 +0000 Although jihadist groups have gripped the world’s attention for more than 20 years, today they are no longer in the spotlight. However, ISIS, al-Qaida, and al-Shabab remain active, and new groups have emerged. The movement as a whole is evolving, as is the threat it poses. On May 29, the Center for Middle East Policy… Full Article
ar Trans-Atlantic Scorecard – April 2020 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 15:12:26 +0000 Welcome to the seventh edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative. To produce the Scorecard, we poll Brookings scholars and other experts on the present state of U.S. relations… Full Article
ar Why are US-Russia relations so challenging? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 13:03:00 +0000 The Vitals The United States’ relationship with Russia is today the worst that it has been since 1985. Moscow’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and what appears to be its continuing attempts to affect the 2020 election campaign have made Russia a toxic domestic issue in a way that it has not been… Full Article
ar Webinar: Inspired to serve – The future of public service By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 12:45:48 +0000 Americans in military, national, and public service perform a critical role in our everyday lives — defending the homeland, ensuring public safety, responding to disasters, and much more. Today, as our nation battles the coronavirus pandemic, public servants, service members, volunteers, and national service members are the unsung heroes of this crisis, working tirelessly to… Full Article
ar The coronavirus has led to more authoritarianism for Turkey By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 08 May 2020 20:00:26 +0000 Turkey is well into its second month since the first coronavirus case was diagnosed on March 10. As of May 5, the number of reported cases has reached almost 130,000, which puts Turkey among the top eight countries grappling with the deadly disease — ahead of even China and Iran. Fortunately, so far, the Turkish death… Full Article
ar Webinar: Valuing Black lives and property in America’s Black cities By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 17:07:59 +0000 The deliberate devaluation of Black-majority cities stems from a longstanding legacy of discriminatory policies. The lack of investment in Black homes, family structures, businesses, schools, and voters has had far-reaching, negative economic and social effects. White supremacy and privilege are deeply ingrained into American public policy, and remain pervasive forces that hinder meaningful investment in… Full Article
ar Making apartments more affordable starts with understanding the costs of building them By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 05 May 2020 13:12:30 +0000 During the decade between the Great Recession and the coronavirus pandemic, the U.S. experienced a historically long economic expansion. Demand for rental housing grew steadily over those years, driven by demographic trends and a strong labor market. Yet the supply of new rental housing did not keep up with demand, leading to rent increases that… Full Article
ar Big city downtowns are booming, but can their momentum outlast the coronavirus? By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 06 May 2020 04:00:21 +0000 It was only a generation ago when many Americans left downtowns for dead. From New York to Chicago to Los Angeles, residents fled urban cores in droves after World War II. While many businesses stayed, it wasn’t uncommon to find entire downtowns with little street life after 5:00 PM. Many of those former residents relocated… Full Article
ar In the age of American ‘megaregions,’ we must rethink governance across jurisdictions By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 06 May 2020 21:29:53 +0000 The coronavirus pandemic is revealing a harsh truth: Our failure to coordinate governance across local and state lines is costing lives, doing untold economic damage, and enacting disproportionate harm on marginalized individuals, households, and communities. New York Governor Andrew Cuomo explained the problem in his April 22 coronavirus briefing, when discussing plans to deploy contact… Full Article
ar The new Israeli society: From melting pot to partnership By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 10:00:00 -0500 Event Information December 10, 201510:00 AM - 11:15 AM ESTSaul/Zilkha RoomsBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036 An Alan and Jane Batkin International Leaders ForumIsraeli society is diverse, dynamic, vibrant, and challenged. Israel’s long-held social solidarity faces new pressure from growing internal fissures and from the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. In bold and candid remarks earlier this year, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin identified four “tribes” in Israeli society, representing different worldviews, and called for a new effort to find common ground among secular, national-religious and ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis, and Arab citizens of Israel. How might Israel’s diverse society coalesce in the coming years? How will the future of Israeli society affect its democracy, its relations with its neighbors and with the United States? On December 10, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted President Reuven Rivlin to discuss his vision for the future of Israeli society and the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Bruce Jones, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, gave welcoming remarks, and Tamara Cofman Wittes, senior fellow and director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, introduced President Rivlin. Following President Rivlin’s remarks, Natan Sachs, fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, engaged the president in conversation. Join the conversation on Twitter at #IsraelsFuture. Video The new Israeli society: From melting pot to partnership Audio The new Israeli society: From melting pot to partnership Transcript Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20151210_israel_rivlin_transcript Full Article
ar Saudi Arabia’s execution of al-Nimr throws U.S. policy dilemmas into sharp relief By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 08 Jan 2016 12:05:00 -0500 What a way to start the new year. Decades of Saudi-Iranian tensions reached a new high this past week. The cycle of reactions to Riyadh’s execution of prominent Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr on January 2 is a reminder of how the Saudis, and their Iranian rivals, have viewed and used sectarianism throughout the tumultuous period since 2011. Al-Nimr was arrested in 2012 and subsequently sentenced to death for allegedly "seeking ‘foreign meddling’ in Saudi Arabia, ‘disobeying’ its rulers and taking up arms against the security forces." The arrest was meant not merely as a signal to Tehran, but at least as much to Saudi Arabia’s own Shiite minority. Shiites comprise as much as 20 percent of the Saudi population, and are concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province—and the community has regularly erupted in protests against its economic and political marginalization. In 2011, amid the Arab Spring uprisings in majority-Shiite Bahrain, Saudi Shiites also demonstrated for the release of long-held prisoners, and Saudi forces shot and killed several Shia in the streets. Riyadh’s decision to carry out the death sentence was greeted with demonstrations in Iran and attacks on Saudi diplomatic facilities. This Iranian reaction must have been calculated, as al-Nimr has been on “death row” for a very long time. In response, Saudi Arabia quickly cut ties with its longtime geopolitical foe and urged fellow Sunni governments to follow suit. So far, Bahrain and Sudan have also cut off relations, and both Qatar and the UAE have downgraded them. Governments on both sides of the Sunni-Shiite divide found a sectarian narrative useful in rallying their populations and in justifying their actions in response to the 2011 Arab uprisings. The sectarian narrative has helped the parties in this larger regional power struggle mobilize support by playing up the sectarian dimension of protests in Bahrain, the Assad regime’s crackdown in Syria, and the breakdown of inclusive politics in Iraq. Likewise, many Sunni-led countries have found sectarian rhetoric an effective way to rally Sunni citizens, intimidate their own Shiite populations, and to justify crackdowns on dissent. Governments on both sides of the Sunni-Shiite divide found a sectarian narrative useful in rallying their populations and in justifying their actions in response to the 2011 Arab uprisings. Last April, I wrote that Iran was likely to escalate its asymmetric efforts to destabilize Arab politics by exploiting the cracks within Arab societies. They have done so, and it is a form of escalation the Saudis are ill-equipped to match. Last summer, I suggested that the Sunni Arab states could defend best against this Iranian subversion by tamping down sectarian tensions and working to heal the rifts within their own societies through inclusive political and economic policies. So far, I have not seen much effort from the Arab Gulf states in that direction—instead, they have doubled down on divisive sectarianism in Yemen and elsewhere. As this escalatory spiral advances, civilians will pay the price. Some are portraying the decision to execute al-Nimr as a negative Saudi response to Iranian efforts at rapprochement over the last few weeks. I do not necessarily see it that way, because the Iranians have done as much as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to provoke and exploit tensions between the two in recent times. That notwithstanding, there is no question this execution will inflame sectarian tensions in the Gulf and Iraq, as well as present the Islamic State with new opportunities. It has been clear for some time that the U.S. focus on the threat from the so-called Islamic State is simply not matched by the Saudis, who are far more concerned about Iran and Shiite expansionism than by this violent extremist Sunni group in their neighborhood. As such, the execution and ensuing crisis brings the clash of U.S. and Saudi interests into sharp relief and has the potential to become an inflection point in regional affairs – not necessarily because of the way the Saudi and Iranian governments choose to play, but because of how others might react. For example, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi quickly and publicly condemned the execution. The execution—and the inevitable crackdown on Shiite protests in Qatif—might increase pressure on Abadi from Shiites in Iraq (and from Iran) to demonstrate sectarian preferences in his rhetoric and policy. That could prevent him from moving forward on steps Washington has been pushing to bring Iraqi Sunnis back into the political fold. This easily could threaten the anti-Islamic State campaign in Iraq, since it relies on Sunnis in Ramadi, Mosul, and elsewhere turning away from Islamic State and back toward the Iraqi state. Iraqi counterterrorism forces have taken much of Ramadi, but they cannot hold it without local Sunni support. Increased Islamic State influence in the Arabian Peninsula would certainly challenge the Saudi government and prompt a renewed securitization of domestic policy. The Islamic State worked hard to stoke sectarian tensions within the Gulf states over the past year, carrying out attacks on Shiite mosques in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The GCC leaders were not drawn in at that stage, instead expressing solidarity with their Shiite compatriots. But this time, a Sunni Gulf government is taking steps that exacerbate sectarian tensions—and that could very easily push the Islamic State to take up the issue again by attempting more such attacks. Increased Islamic State influence in the Arabian Peninsula would certainly challenge the Saudi government and prompt a renewed securitization of domestic policy. It would be an ironic outcome of a Saudi move—47 executions, mostly of Sunni extremists—that was intended to deter ISIS sympathizers. At a moment when low oil prices and a tightened financial future constrain their capacity to coopt a large, underemployed, youthful populace, this is not a recipe for stability. The possibility that ISIS will gain from this crisis illustrates the problem with governments self-interestedly wielding that sectarian narrative is that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, and it actually increases the incentive on both sides of the sectarian divide to escalate their real power competition, both directly and through proxies. Today, that narrative of sectarian conflict is far more than rhetoric in Iraq and Syria, where a true intercommunal conflict is underway. More immediately, the ripple effects of al-Nimr’s execution spotlight American policy dilemmas in the region. The escalation in sectarian conflict threatens the nascent Syrian peace process. It increases the Islamic State’s scope for action there, threatens the political dimension of the anti-Islamic State strategy in Iraq, and incentivizes Sunni extremism in the Arabian Peninsula. It pushes the Yemen war further from resolution as well, leaving al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) with room to grow and plan attacks against the American homeland. And it puts the United States into a very tight spot as it continues diplomatic dialogue with Iran in the wake of the nuclear agreement. Given this beginning, 2016 looks to be an even tougher year for the United States in the Middle East than 2015. Authors Tamara Cofman Wittes Full Article
ar The Arab Spring five years later: Toward greater inclusiveness By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 10:15:00 -0500 Event Information January 15, 201610:15 AM - 11:45 AM ESTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036 Register for the EventFive years have passed since the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia sparked revolts around the Arab world and the beginning of the Arab Spring. Despite high hopes that the Arab world was entering a new era of freedom, economic growth, and social justice, the transition turned out to be long and difficult, with the Arab world now in turmoil with revolutions, counter revolutions, wars, civil strife, and the worst refugee crisis of our times. The response to the Arab Spring and its aftermath has focused almost exclusively on political and security issues, and on the very divisive questions of national identity and political regimes. Economic and social questions have been put on the back burner. On January 15, Global Economy and Development at Brookings hosted a discussion on a new book, "The Arab Spring Five Years Later," which explores the critical economic and social issues driving the Arab Spring agenda and the real economic grievances that must be addressed in order to achieve peace, stability, and successful political transitions as well as provides an approach to addressing those grievances. Hafez Ghanem and Shinchi Yamanaka presented the key findings of the book, followed by a panel discussion. Audio The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Toward greater inclusiveness Transcript Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20160115_arab_spring_transcript Full Article
ar Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 21 Apr 2016 09:30:00 -0400 Event Information April 21, 20169:30 AM - 10:30 AM EDTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036 Register for the EventThe United States alliance with Saudi Arabia dates back to 1943, making the U.S. relationship with the Kingdom one of America's longest-standing in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is a key counterterrorism and diplomatic partner within the region, yet the alliance has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, especially in the period following the 9/11 attacks, when questions about Saudi support for extremist causes emerged. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution of the war in Yemen has added to the criticism, with many observers blaming the Kingdom for the unfolding humanitarian crisis within the Arab world's poorest state. In recent comments, President Barack Obama has been critical of Saudi policies, despite U.S. logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia’s war effort in Yemen. On April 21, the Intelligence Project and Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted U.S. Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut to discuss the U.S.-Saudi alliance with Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Cofman Wittes. Senator Murphy has urged a more rigorous approach to cooperation with Riyadh that balances U.S. counterterrorism interests, strategic imperatives, and human rights concerns, and has led efforts on Capitol Hill to debate the war in Yemen. Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. Join the conversation on Twitter at #USSaudi. Video Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership Audio Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership Transcript Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf) Event Materials 20160421_us_saudi_transcript Full Article
ar War in Syria: Next steps to mitigate the crisis By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Tue, 17 May 2016 11:00:00 -0400 Editor's note: Tamara Cofman Wittes testifies before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for a session on aggravating factors and ways to stem the violence in the Syrian conflict. Read her full written testimony below or watch the live coverage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cardin, for the invitation to appear before you today. I’d like to request that my full statement be entered into the record, and I’ll give you the highlight reel. And let me begin by emphasizing, as always, that I represent only myself before you today – the Brookings Institution does not take institutional positions on policy issues. Opportunities Lost When I last testified before this committee regarding Syria, in April 2012, I expressed my concern that American reticence to act to shape the emergent civil war and the involvement of regional powers in it risked enabling an unbridled escalation of the conflict. I suggested then that uncontrolled escalation could entrench sectarian violence, empower radicals, destabilize the neighborhood, and generate wide human suffering. While the Obama Administration has taken incremental steps over the last four years to try and shape both the battlefield and the context for diplomacy, those steps have proved too little and too late to alter the conflict’s fundamental dynamics. President Obama’s initial read of the Syrian conflict as holding only narrow implications for American interests was a signal failure to learn the lessons of the post-Cold War period, and the civil wars of the 1990s, by recognizing the risk that Syria’s civil war could spill over in ways that directly implicated U.S. interests. The experience of the 1990s clearly suggested how a neglected civil war offered easy opportunities for a violent jihadist movement—just as the Afghanistan war did for the Taliban in the mid-1990s—and how large-scale refugee flows would destabilize Syria’s neighbors, including key U.S. security partners like Jordan and Turkey. And as we now know, ISIS used the security and governance vacuums created by the Syrian civil war to consolidate a territorial and financial base that the United States has been seeking since late 2014, with limited success, to undermine. Unfortunately, the realistic policy options available to the United States have narrowed considerably since 2012, the violence is entrenched, the spillover is creating serious challenges for the neighborhood and for Europe, and the number of actors engaged directly in the Syrian conflict has proliferated. All of this means that the continuation of the Syrian civil war has direct and dire consequences today, not just for regional order, but for international security. This reality, combined with the tremendous human suffering this war generates every day, drives two clear imperatives for U.S. policy: to intensify efforts to contain the spillover and misery, and to seek an end to the conflict as soon as possible. Ending the War We must be realistic, however, about what steps will, and will not, end the Syrian conflict. Recently, some policy experts have suggested that, in the name of advancing great-power concord to end the war, the United States should relax its view that Bashar al-Assad’s departure from power is a requisite for any political settlement. This view rests on the assumption that Russia will not bend in its insistence on Assad’s remaining in place, and on the assumption that a U.S.-Russian agreement on leaving Assad in place would override the preferences of those fighting on the ground to remove him. Both of these premises, in my view, are incorrect. We must therefore understand clearly the interests and imperatives driving the major players in this conflict, and we must understand, too, that the battlefield dynamics will heavily condition the prospects of any political settlement. Ending the bloody war in Bosnia in the 1990s involved getting the major external powers with stakes in the outcome – the United States, the Europeans, and Russia – to agree on basic outlines of a settlement and impose it on the parties. But imposing it on the parties required a shift in the balance of power on the battlefield, brought about by Croat military victories and ultimately a NATO bombing campaign. Bosnia also required a large-scale, long-term United Nations presence to separate the factions and to enforce and implement the agreement. So I believe that, absent a change on the ground, diplomacy alone is unlikely to end the Syrian war – but I certainly agree with diplomatic efforts to advance a country-wide cessation of hostilities and advance a vision for a political settlement. A full-scale cease-fire could create more space for political bargaining, and in the meantime reduce human suffering and mitigate the spillover effects of the ongoing violence. Right now, however, the Assad government and its patrons in Tehran and Moscow have no interest in a sustained cease-fire, because the battleground dynamics continue to shift in their favor. They used the partial cease-fires of the past weeks to consolidate territorial gains from opposition forces and to further weaken those forces through continued air attacks. Without agreement amongst the various governments around the table as to which fighting groups constitute terrorist organizations, a ceasefire will inevitably disadvantage opposition factions as the Assad regime targets them in the name of counterterrorism. That will likewise advantage the most extreme among the rebel factions as well as jihadi groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda’s affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, who will all continue to use force to acquire and hold territory and to force their political opponents and inconvenient civilians off the field. Likewise, some suggest that the sectarian nature of the conflict, and the deep investment of regional powers in backing their preferred sides, mean that it is not possible to hasten an end to the war at all, and that it must be allowed to “burn itself out.” This policy option is infeasible for the United States, from moral, political, and security standpoints. The scale of death and destruction already, over nearly five years of war, should shame the conscience of the world. Those seeking to escape this misery deserve our succor, and those seeking to end the carnage deserve our support. And it is beyond question that Bashar al-Assad and his allies are the ones responsible for the vast majority of this death, destruction, and displacement. In political and security terms, the war’s spillover into neighboring countries and now into Europe can still get worse. Key states like Lebanon and Jordan are at risk of destabilization and/or extremist terrorism the longer the conflict goes on and the more of its consequences they must absorb. Turkey, as we know, has already suffered attacks by extremist groups. And the war has continued to be a powerful source of recruitment for extremists, drawing fighters and fellow travelers from around the world. ISIS and Al Qaeda feed on the civil conflict and the chaos on the ground is what gives them room to operate. It is indeed imperative that the United States remain engaged, and intensify its engagement as needed, to secure an end to the conflict as soon as possible. Understanding the Geopolitical Context In the ongoing diplomacy over how the conflict ends and what political settlement results, there are two issues on which the parties involved in the Vienna talks demonstrate sharp disagreement, and about which the United States needs to advance clear views. The first is a disagreement over the primacy of preserving the central Syrian government, currently headed by Assad. Russia, along with some regional actors (even some opponents of Assad), believe that the most important determinant structuring a political settlement must be the preservation of the Syrian central government, even if that means preserving Bashar al Assad in office. If Assad is ousted without an agreed-upon successor in place, they argue, then Syria will become a failed state like Libya, in which ISIS will have even more space to consolidate and operate, with dire consequences for regional and international security. It is this concern over state collapse and the desire for strong central authority that keeps Russia united with Iran behind Assad. It’s understandable to desire the preservation of Syrian government institutions as a bulwark against anarchy, and to want a central government in Syria with which to work on counterterrorism and postwar reconstruction. The problem with elevating this concern to a primary objective in negotiations is its embedded assumption that any Syrian government based in Damascus will be able to exercise meaningful control over most or all of Syria’s territory after rebels and government forces stop fighting one another. That’s a faulty assumption, for several reasons. First, it is extremely unlikely that we’ll see swift or effective demobilization and disarmament of sub-state fighting factions in favor of a unified Syrian military force. If the central government remains largely in the form and structure of Assad’s government, and even more so if Assad himself remains in power, it is hard to imagine rebel groups agreeing to put down their weapons and rely on security provided by the central government. Thus, local militias will remain important providers of local order and also important players in either defeating or enabling extremist groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda. Second, effective governance from Damascus is extremely difficult to imagine, much less implement. The degree of displacement, the extent of physical destruction, and the hardening of sectarian and ethnic divisions due to five years of brutal conflict (and decades of coercive rule before that) all present steep challenges to centralized rule. Those with resources and capacity within local communities will end up being the primary providers of order at the local level – and it is local order, more than a central government, that will enable communities to resist ISIS infiltration. Thus, countries concerned with having effective governance in Syria as a bulwark against extremists need to recognize the value and importance of local governance in any post-war scenario. Finally, there is the unalterable fact that Bashar al-Assad and his allies have slaughtered perhaps as many as 400,000 of Syria’s citizens; have used chemical weapons against civilians; have imprisoned and tortured thousands and displaced millions; and, through Assad’s own horrific decisions, have broken Syria’s government, the Syrian state, and the Syrian nation to bits. Those who demand his ouster as a prerequisite for ending the war are justified in their view that Assad does not have and will not have legitimacy to govern from a majority of Syrians, that his continued rule would be divisive and destructive of Syrian unity and security, and that he should instead face justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity. As a practical matter, and because of all this, many Syrian fighting factions on the ground and their supporters, are committed to Assad’s ouster. US-Russian concurrence on setting that goal aside will not induce them to end their fight. The only way that might occur is if Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia – who are committed to Assad’s ouster – relent on their demands and agree to curtail support to rebel factions who continue to fight. This is hard to imagine in the current circumstances. In other words, while preserving the Syrian state is a laudable goal, it will not alone achieve the objectives set by those who hold it out as the primary imperative in the political negotiations over the future of Syria. I would suggest that, while the fate of Bashar al Assad is not perhaps of primary concern from the perspective of U.S. interests, the United States should be pressing Russia and others involved in the talks to relax their fixation on Syria’s central government (and who runs it) as a counterterrorism goal, and to recognize that a significant degree of decentralization and international engagement with local actors inside Syria will be necessary to preserve the peace, to carry out reconstruction, and to defeat ISIS. Likewise, the Syrian opposition and those states demanding Assad’s ouster as a precondition for peace must recognize that they have even more to gain from insisting on decentralization and local autonomy than they do from Assad’s departure from power. They might even be able to trade their current demand for Assad’s immediate departure against robust assurances for empowerment of local authority, release of detainees and internationally guaranteed transitional justice. The second major issue under contention regarding a negotiated end to the Syrian war is the role that Iran will play in post-conflict Syria. Iran’s efforts to expand its infuence – in Syria and in the region as a whole – present a concern that unites all of the United States’s partners in the region, and should be a major concern for Washington as well. The gains made by the Assad regime (with Russian and Iranian help) over the past eight months enhance the disturbing prospect of a Syrian government remaining in power in Damascus that is dependent on Iranian funding, Iranian military support, and the importation of Iranian-backed militias. While the Russians are perhaps concerned more about the Syrian state as a bulwark against extremism, Iran is deeply committed to the survival of its Alawi client and the maintenance of Syria as a channel for Iranian support to Hizballah. And while some Sunni Arab states embrace the goal of preserving Syrian territorial integrity and the central government, all are troubled at the prospect that this government would be under the thumb of Tehran. Any political settlement that institutionalizes Iran’s overwhelming role in Syria will likewise increase Iran’s ability to impact to threaten Israel’s northern border, to destabilize Lebanese and perhaps also Jordanian politics, and to interfere with ongoing efforts to assuage the anxieties of Iraqi Sunnis and bring them back into alignment with the government in Baghdad. The rising likelihood of an Iranian-dominated Syria emerging from the war has induced a change in attitude toward the Syrian conflict by America’s closest regional partner, Israel. Israeli officials took a fairly ambivalent stance toward the civil war for several years, although they were always wary of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. But today, they judge Assad’s survival as possible only through effective Iranian suzerainty, putting their most powerful enemy right on their border. Iranian domination of post-conflict Syria would also likely spell an escalation in Iranian weapons transfers to Hizballah – and Israel cannot expect to have 100% success in preventing the provision of increasingly sophisticated rocket and missile technology to Hizballah. These and other types of support from Iran through Damascus could increase Hizballah’s capacity to wage asymmetric war against Israel, at great cost to Israel’s civilian population. Israeli observers are increasingly alarmed at this scenario, and Israeli officials now state clearly that, if faced with a choice, they’d prefer to confront ISIS than Iran across the Israeli-Syrian frontier. American diplomacy in Vienna must take greater account of the destabilizing implications of an Iranian-dominated Syrian government, even a rump government that does not control all of Syrian territory. A U.S. focus on constructing a political settlement that limits Iran’s influence in postwar Syria could induce greater coherence among American partners in Vienna currently divided over the fate of Assad; and it could prevent a situation in which the United States trades the threat of ISIS in Syria for the threat of Iranian-sponsored terrorism and subversion emanating from Syria. Al Qaeda and the Syrian conflict Al Qaeda’s affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra has particularly benefited from the war’s continuation, from the weakness and partiality of the ceasefires negotiated earlier this year, and from the inability of the U.S.-Russian diplomatic process to generate any progress toward a political transition. Shrewdly, Nusra has focused on building its reputation as the most consistent, and most effective, military opponent of the Assad regime, and on its readiness to cooperate with anti-Assad factions with whom it has other, ideological and political, disagreements. The failures of diplomacy feed Nusra’s strength and win it allies amongst more nationalist rebel factions. And while it’s tempting for American efforts to focus on rallying forces to defeat ISIS, our diplomats and decision makers must beware that leaning too far back on the issue of political transition for the sake of building an anti-ISIS coalition might just end up pushing more hardline opposition elements into the arms of a different extremist movement, one with demonstrated intent and capability to attack the United States. To summarize, it’s imperative that American diplomacy to produce a political settlement of the Syrian war be firmly focused achieving two goals crucial to the interests of the United States and its regional partners: first, enabling and institutionalizing local governance as a bulwark against ISIS (more than central government institutions), and second, establishing hard limits on Iran’s role in a post-conflict Syria and on its ability to use Syria as a conduit for support to Hizballah. Managing Spillover and Restoring Stability A second major priority for US policy, in addition to this refocused diplomacy, must be stepped-up efforts to mitigate the destabilizing consequences of the Syrian war, no matter how long it goes on. And, while the United States continues to work through diplomacy and pressure to produce an end to the war, work must also begin now to prepare for the long-term and wide-scale effort needed for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. The scope of death, displacement and destruction threatens to rob Syria of the basic ingredients for social stability, regardless of what lines might be drawn at a negotiating table in Vienna. Without concerted effort to ameliorate the effects of this conflict for people on the ground, to rebuild social trust, and to nurture resilience within these battered communities against conflict and division, any peace settlement could quickly unravel the face of local security dilemmas and intercommunal tensions, as well as in light of the unaddressed scars and grievances of Assad’s brutality against the Syrian people. Meeting this challenge requires at least four lines of effort: • doing more to engage Syrians in building local governance and community resilience, especially skills and platforms for conflict resolution; • doing more to stabilize and secure frontline states, including support for integrating refugees into the economy and society; • helping more refugees create new lives far from the conflict zone, including much more resettlement in the United States; and • working diligently with regional partners to tamp down the sectarianism that both drives and is driven by the war, and that feeds extremist recruitment and violence. As we have seen, ISIS markets itself partly on the order it provides to local communities – a brutal order to be sure, but still a contrast with the chaos and insecurity of civil war. To counter ISIS effectively, we must help local communities with governance and service delivery. More can be done even now to put into place the ingredients for successful and sustainable conflict resolution for Syrians. These steps include enabling and encouraging Syrians displaced by the fighting, whether in neighboring countries or in areas of Syria not under ISIS or regime control, to engage in dialogue over, and planning for, their own communal future. Neighboring states accepting refugees have understandably sought to tamp down political discussion and debate within refugee camps, for example. But these refugee populations need to engage in dialogue to build the basis, in social trust, that will enable them to manage daily governance and resolve differences peacefully if and when they are no longer living under refugee agencies and host-government security services. These processes can also connect, over time, to negotiating efforts on a political transition in which the Syrian opposition is represented, yielding greater legitimacy and efficacy to that more formal political process. Too often, in discussing Syria, we posit a choice between working with the central government and working with unsavory non-state actors. There is an obvious additional option, already in play, that deserves greater emphasis: empowering and engaging local municipalities, local business sectors, local civil society, and other actors who exist in territory not under extremist or regime control and who have an obvious stake in the success of their own communities and their defense against coercion either from ISIS or from the Assad government. It is these local actors who will make or break the implementation of any political settlement, because they are the ones who will give it life and legitimacy. They are the ones who will help manage differences within their own communities and with their neighbors to avoid outbreaks of violence, and they are the ones who will lead the establishment of a new social compact to enable long-term stability in Syria. USAID and its implementing partners have been creative in developing programs to engage local communities and local governing institutions, and this work deserves robust, sustained support from Congress. The United States continues to lead in international support for refugee relief – but it lags woefully in refugee resettlement. Only about 1300 of the 10,000 Syrian refugees the Obama Administration promised to admit into the United States have been resettled here so far; and the United States can and should accept more. In addition, American policy efforts to address the refugee crisis must go beyond humanitarian relief and expanded resettlement. Working with European partners, the United States government can work to save lives along the transit routes for refugees fleeing the region, can support successful integration of refugees into European cities (again, working at the municipal level), and can do more to support social stabilization, livelihoods, and development for the large refugee communities in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey and for the societies hosting them. On June 14 and 15th, the Brookings Institution will convene a high-level gathering of regional, European, and American leaders to develop new responses and more robust forms of cooperation to meet this global humanitarian crisis. I look forward to reporting back to you on our results. Downloads War in Syria: Next steps to mitigate the crisis Authors Tamara Cofman Wittes Publication: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Full Article
ar The Iran deal, one year out: What Brookings experts are saying By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 09:54:00 -0400 How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year surrounding official congressional review, offered their views. Strobe Talbott, President, Brookings Institution: At the one-year mark, it’s clear that the nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers has substantially restricted Tehran’s ability to produce the fissile material necessary to build a bomb. That’s a net positive—for the United States and the broader region. Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Senior Fellow, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program: One year after its conclusion, the JCPOA remains controversial in Tehran and Washington (as I describe in more detail here), with opponents unreconciled to the deal and determined to derail it. But opponents have had to scale back their criticism, in large part because the JCPOA, at least so far, has delivered on its principal goal—blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for an extended period of time. Moreover, Iran’s positive compliance record has not given opponents much ammunition. The IAEA found Iran in compliance in its two quarterly reports issued in 2016. But challenges to the smooth operation and even the longevity of the deal are already apparent. A real threat to the JCPOA is that Iran will blame the slow recovery of its economy on U.S. failure to conscientiously fulfill its sanctions relief commitments and, using that as a pretext, will curtail or even end its own implementation of the deal. But international banks and businesses have been reluctant to engage Iran not because they have been discouraged by the United States but because they have their own business-related reasons to be cautious. Legislation proposed in Congress could also threaten the nuclear deal. For now, the administration is in a position to block new legislation that it believes would scuttle the deal. But developments outside the JCPOA, especially Iran’s regional behavior and its crackdown on dissent at home, could weaken support for the JCPOA within the United States and give proponents of deal-killing legislation a boost. A potential wildcard for the future of the JCPOA is coming governing transitions in both Washington and Tehran. Hillary Clinton would maintain the deal but perhaps a harder line than her predecessor. Donald Trump now says he will re-negotiate rather than scrap the deal, but a better deal will not prove negotiable. With President Hassan Rouhani up for re-election next year and the health of the Supreme Leader questionable, Iran’s future policy toward the JCPOA cannot be confidently predicted. A final verdict on the JCPOA is many years away. But it is off to a promising start, as even some of its early critics now concede. Still, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth, the longevity of the deal cannot be taken for granted, and keeping it on track will require constant focus in Washington and other interested capitals. Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy program and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has fulfilled neither the worst fears of its detractors nor the most soaring ambitions of its proponents. All of the concerns that have shaped U.S. policy toward Tehran for more than a generation—terrorism, human rights abuses, weapons of mass destruction, regional destabilization—remain as relevant, and as alarming, as they have ever been. Notably, much the same is true on the Iranian side; the manifold grievances that Tehran has harbored toward Washington since the 1979 revolution continue to smolder. An important truth about the JCPOA, which has been wielded by both its defenders and its detractors in varying contexts, is that it was transactional, not transformational. As President Barack Obama repeatedly insisted, the accord addressed one specific problem, and in those narrow terms, it can be judged a relative success. The value of that relative success should not be underestimated; a nuclear-armed Iran would magnify risks in a turbulent region in a terrible way. But in the United States, in Iran, and across the Middle East, the agreement has always been viewed through a much broader lens—as a waystation toward Iranian-American rapprochement, as an instrument for addressing the vicious cycle of sectarian violence that threatens to consume the region, as a boost to the greater cause of moderation and democratization in Iran. And so the failure of the deal to catalyze greater cooperation from Iran on a range of other priorities—Syria, Yemen, Iraq, to name a few—or to jumpstart improvements in Iran’s domestic dynamics cannot be disregarded simply because it was not its original intent. For the “new normal” of regularized diplomatic contact between Washington and Tehran to yield dividends, the United States will need a serious strategy toward Tehran that transcends the JCPOA, building on the efficacy of the hard-won multilateral collaboration on the nuclear issue. Iranians, too, must begin to pivot the focus of their efforts away from endless litigation of the nuclear deal and toward a more constructive approach to addressing the deep challenges facing their country today. Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director, Intelligence Project, Foreign Policy program: As I explain more fully here, one unintended but very important consequence of the Iran nuclear deal has been to aggravate and intensify Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iran's regional goals and intentions. This fueling of Saudi fears has in turn fanned sectarian tensions in the region to unprecedented levels, and the results are likely to haunt the region for years to come. Riyadh's concerns about Iran have never been primarily focused on the nuclear danger. Rather, the key Saudi concern is that Iran seeks regional hegemony and uses terrorism and subversion to achieve it. The deal deliberately does not deal with this issue. In Saudi eyes, it actually makes the situation worse because lifting sanctions removed Iran's isolation as a rogue state and gives it more income. Washington has tried hard to reassure the Saudis, and President Obama has wisely sought to build confidence with King Salman and his young son. The Iran deal is a good one, and I've supported it from its inception. But it has had consequences that are dangerous and alarming. In the end, Riyadh and Tehran are the only players who can deescalate the situation—the Saudis show no sign of interest in that road. Norman Eisen, Visiting Fellow, Governance Studies: The biggest disappointment of the post-deal year has been the failure of Congress to pass legislation complementing the JCPOA. There is a great deal that the legislative branch could do to support the pact. Above all, it could establish criteria putting teeth into U.S. enforcement of Preamble Section III, Iran's pledge never to seek nuclear weapons. Congress could and should make clear what the ramp to seeking nuclear weapons would look like, what the triggers would be for U.S. action, and what kinds of U.S. action would be on the table. If Iran knows that, it will modulate its behavior accordingly. If it does not, it will start to act out, and we have just kicked the can down the road. That delay is of course immensely valuable—but why not extend the road indefinitely? Congress can do that, and much more (e.g. by increasing funding for JCPOA oversight by the administration and the IAEA), with appropriate legislation. Richard Nephew, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program: Over the past year, much effort has gone into ensuring that the Iran deal is fully implemented. To date, the P5+1 has—not surprisingly—gotten the better end of the bargain, with significant security benefits accruing to them and their partners in the Middle East once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified the required changes to Iran's nuclear program. Iran, for its part, has experienced a natural lag in its economic resurgence, held back by the collapse in oil prices in 2014, residual American and European sanctions, and reluctance among banks and businesses to re-engage. But, Iran's economy has stabilized and—if the deal holds for its full measure—the security benefits that the P5+1 and their partners have won may fall away while Iran's economy continues to grow. The most important challenge related to the deal for the next U.S. administration (and, presumably, the Rouhani administration in its second term) is therefore: how can it be taken forward, beyond the 10- to 15-year transition period? Iran will face internal pressure to expand its nuclear program, but it also will face pressure to refrain both externally and internally, should other countries in the region seek to create their own matching nuclear capabilities. The best next step for all sides is to negotiate a region-wide arrangement to manage nuclear programs –one that constrains all sides, though perhaps not equally. It must ensure—at a minimum—that nuclear developments in the region are predictable, understandable, and credibly civilian (something Bob Einhorn and I addressed in a recent report). The next White House will need to do the hard work of convincing countries in the region—and beyond—not to rest on the victory of the JCPOA. Rather, they must take it for what it is: another step towards a more stable and manageable region. Tamara Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: This week, Washington is awash in events and policy papers taking stock of how the Iran nuclear deal has changed the Middle East in the past year. The narratives presented this week largely track the positions that the authors, speakers, or organizations articulated on the nuclear deal when it was first concluded last summer. Those who opposed the deal have marshaled evidence of how the deal has "emboldened" Iran's destabilizing behavior, while those who supported the deal cite evidence of "moderated" politics in the Islamic Republic. That polarized views on the deal last year produce polarized assessments of the deal's impact this year should surprise no one. In fact, no matter which side of the nuclear agreement’s worth it presents, much of the analysis out this week ascribes to the nuclear deal Iranian behavior and attitudes in the region that existed before the deal's conclusion and implementation. Iran has been a revisionist state, and a state sponsor of terrorism, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry predates the revolution; Iran's backing of Houthi militias against Saudi and its allies in Yemen well predates the nuclear agreement. Most notably, the upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have given Iran wider opportunities than perhaps ever before to exploit the cracks within Arab societies—and to use cash, militias, and other tools to advance its interests and expand its influence. Iran has exploited those opportunities skillfully in the last five years and, as I wrote last summer, was likely to continue to do so regardless of diplomatic success or failure in Vienna. To argue that the nuclear deal somehow created these problems, or could solve them, is ahistorical. It is true that Iran's access to global markets might free even more cash for these endeavors, and that is a real issue worth tracking. But since severe sanctions did not prevent Iran from spending hundreds of millions of dollars to support and supply Hezbollah, or marshaling Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and militia fighters to sustain the faltering regime of Bashar Assad in Syria, it's not clear that additional cash will generate a meaningful difference in regional outcomes. Certainly, the nuclear deal's conclusion and implementation did not alter the trajectory of Iranian policy in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon to any noticeable degree—and that means that, no matter what the merits or dangers of the JCPOA, the United States must still confront and work to resolve enduring challenges to regional instability—including Iran's revisionist behavior. Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program: When the JCPOA was being debated last year, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a deal was signed. I see the events of the past 12 months as largely having borne that out. While both sides have accused the other of "cheating," the deal has so far largely held. However, as many of my colleagues have noted, the real frictions have arisen from the U.S. geostrategic response to the deal. I continue to believe that signing the JCPOA was better than any of the realistic alternatives—though I also continue to believe that a better deal was possible, had the administration handled the negotiations differently. However, the administration’s regional approach since then has been problematic—with officials condemning Riyadh and excusing Tehran in circumstances where both were culpable and ignoring some major Iranian transgressions, for instance (and with President Obama gratuitously insulting the Saudis and other U.S. allies in interviews). America's traditional Sunni Arab allies (and to some extent Turkey and Israel) feared that either the United States would use the JCPOA as an excuse to further disengage from the region or to switch sides and join the Iranian coalition. Their reading of events has been that this is precisely what has happened, and it is causing the GCC states to act more aggressively. I think our traditional allies would enthusiastically welcome a Hillary Clinton presidency. She would likely do all that she could to reassure them that she plans to be more engaged and more willing to commit American resources and energy to Middle Eastern problems. But those allies will eventually look for her to turn words into action. I cannot imagine a Hillary Clinton administration abrogating the JCPOA, imposing significant new economic sanctions on Iran, or otherwise acting in ways that it would fear could provoke Tehran to break the deal. Our allies may see that as Washington trying to remain on the fence, which will infuriate them. So there are some important strategic differences between the United States and its regional allies. The second anniversary of the JCPOA could therefore prove even more fraught for America and the Middle East than the first. Authors Strobe TalbottRobert EinhornSuzanne MaloneyBruce RiedelNorman EisenRichard NephewTamara Cofman WittesKenneth M. Pollack Full Article
ar Forging New Partnerships: Implementing Three New Initiatives in the Higher Education Act By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Full Article
ar The Impact of Increases in Pell Grant Awards on College-going among Lower Income Youth By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: SUMMARY During the 2006-2007 academic year, grants accounted for $52 billion, roughly half of the student aid received by undergraduate college students. The largest grant program—the federal Pell program—provided $13 billion in grants, primarily to lower-income students. Although grant programs provide significant support to students, their impacts have been disappointing— substantial inequalities in college-going and… Full Article
ar The future of extractive industries’ governance in Latin America and the Caribbean By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 20:15:27 +0000 Full Article
ar Caremongering in the time of coronavirus: Random acts of kindness and online enrichment By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 21:15:46 +0000 It is the middle of the night and I am cloistered in my apartment in downtown Washington, D.C. I am facing four screens, including my smartphone, a laptop, a Mac desktop and a large wall monitor. I am trying to make sense of the fast-changing data on the spread and deadliness of the virus around… Full Article
ar What Brookings experts are saying about Netanyahu's address to Congress By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 12:02:00 -0500 This week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke at a joint meeting of Congress. His address sparked an intense debate among U.S. and Israeli lawmakers over the protocol issues raised by the invitation to speak, which came from the Republican speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives without consultation with the Obama White House, as well as the substance of the address — a broadside against Obama’s Iran policy — and its timing during the final days of a closely contested Israeli election. Brookings scholars weighed in on the debate, through blog posts, op-eds and the media. These include: Fellow Natan Sachs explained why Netanyahu’s speech was so controversial. "Israelis, by and large, don't like it when their prime minister quarrels with the United States," Sachs told Vox. "For most voters, especially in the core base on the right and I think center right, here's Bibi doing something that opposition leaders cannot do: speak the way he does with his English and this reception from Americans.” Also read Sachs' blog post on the electoral implications of the speech as well as his Haaretz op-ed with recommendations for Israeli and American strategy toward the Iran nuclear talks. Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy (CMEP) at Brookings, appeared on Charlie Rose following the speech, and said, “I think the speech was very effective, as a speech, particularly at the end when Netanyahu was really playing to his domestic audience and political base more than anyone…I think that’s probably the video clip the Likud will be playing in ads as the campaign winds down.” Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami looked at poll results examined U.S. public opinion related to Netanyahu’s speech. "Among Democrats, those holding favorable views of the Israeli prime minister declined from 25 percent in November to 16 percent in February, and among Independents from 21 percent to 14 percent. Correspondingly, unfavorable views increased from 22 to 26 percent among Democrats, and from 14 to 21 percent among Independents," he wrote in Foreign Policy. A New York Times editorial examining Netanyahu's speech discussed American public opinion on the Iran nuclear deal, and cited Telhami’s poll results “show[ing] that a clear majority of Americans — including 61 percent of Republicans and 66 percent of Democrats — favor an agreement.” Telhami also organized and moderated the annual Sadat Forum earlier this week, featuring a discussion on the Iranian nuclear issue and the Netanyahu speech with Brookings Distinguished Fellow Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Jessica Matthews, and CMEP Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney. According to Ambassador Martin Indyk, who has served as director of the Foreign Policy program and was just named Brookings Executive Vice President, Netanyahu remained against any agreement. “He was pretty clear about his opposition to the deal,” Indyk told Foreign Policy. “I believe he wants to sink it, not modify it.” Prior to the speech, Robert Einhorn, senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Intelligence and Security and the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Initiative, wrote an op-ed published in the International New York Times discussing Netanyahu’s angle on the Iran talks. After Netanyahu’s speech, Einhorn appeared on Christiane Amanpour and argued that the deal was “not an ideal deal, but it’s a good deal, and one that’s better than any realistic alternative.” Einhorn, who formerly participated in the negotiations with Iran as a senior State Department official, was quoted in coverage of the speech published in the Washington Post and Politico, among others. In an op-ed on U.S. News and World Report, Maloney argued that when it comes to a deal with Iran, “The ever-present illusion of a more perfect deal is not worth risking an imperfect, but minimally sufficient, bargain.” With the prospect of a nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 looking increasingly likely and with the caveat that, “as always, Iran’s future behavior is hard to predict because its motives going into the nuclear negotiations are unclear and its decision-making is always opaque,” Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack examined the possible scenarios and offered his thoughts on whether a nuclear deal would likely make Iran more or less aggressive — or neither. Bruce Riedel, senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, wrote about Netanyahu’s address in contrast to Saudi Arabia’s diplomacy. “As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu plays center stage at the Congress this week to slam the Iran deal-in-the-making, the Saudis are playing a more subtle game,” Riedel wrote. “Iran is priority number one. It's more than just the nuclear issue.” The pot was also quoted in a Bloomberg News analysis of Gulf reaction to the state of play on Iran. Last week, William Galston, who holds Brookings' Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies, wrote about the implications of Netanyahu’s speech, warning that “[t]he last thing he should want is a negative reception in the United States that fuels Israeli swing voters’ doubts about his capacity to manage Israel’s most important relationship.” And in his Washington Post column last week, Senior Fellow Robert Kagan argued that “there is no doubt that the precedent being set is a bad one” and regretted that “bringing a foreign leader before Congress to challenge a U.S. president’s policies…will be just another weapon in our bitter partisan struggle.” And finally, for anyone wanting to see what our scholars were tweeting during Netanyahu’s speech, and reaction afterward, here’s a round-up. Authors Stephanie Dahle Image Source: © Joshua Roberts / Reuters Full Article
ar Brookings hosts U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker for a conversation on economic opportunities and the liberal international order By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 02 Jun 2016 13:30:00 -0400 Event Information June 2, 20161:30 PM - 2:00 PM EDTFalk AuditoriumBrookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036 A conversation with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny PritzkerOn Thursday, June 2, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker joined Senior Fellow Robert Kagan for a conversation on the economic dimensions of the liberal world order, including the critical economic opportunities on the global horizon and the role America’s private sector can play in helping shape modern commerce. They also discussed the importance of trade agreements to strengthening U.S. global competiveness. Suzanne Nora Johnson, vice chair of the Brookings Board of Trustees, moderated. Video Economic opportunities and the liberal international order Full Article
ar The Private Sector and Sustainable Development: Market-Based Solutions for Addressing Global Challenges By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: The private sector is an important player in sustainable global development. Corporations are finding that they can help encourage economic growth and development in the poorest of countries. Most importantly, the private sector can tackle development differently by taking a market-based approach. The private sector is providing new ideas in the fight to end global… Full Article
ar 2020 and beyond: Maintaining the bipartisan narrative on US global development By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 04 Sep 2019 16:17:57 +0000 It is timely to look at the dynamics that will drive the next period of U.S. politics and policymaking and how they will affect U.S. foreign assistance and development programs. Over the past 15 years, a strong bipartisan consensus—especially in the U.S. Congress—has emerged to advance and support U.S. leadership on global development as a… Full Article
ar Did Zelenskiy give in to Moscow? It’s too early to tell By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 09 Oct 2019 16:50:59 +0000 For more than five years, Russia has used its military and proxy forces to wage a low-intensity but still very real war in eastern Ukraine. Newly-elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy would like to end that conflict. On October 1, he announced an agreement based on the “Steinmeier Formula” to advance a settlement. Angry crowds took… Full Article
ar Hal Sonnenfeldt, hard-nosed realism, and U.S.-Russian arms control By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 17 Oct 2019 21:14:52 +0000 Serving as a senior member on the National Security Council at the Nixon White House from 1969-1974, Hal Sonnenfeldt was Henry Kissinger’s primary advisor on the Soviet Union and Europe. After Sonnenfeldt’s passing, Kissinger told the New York Times that Sonnenfeldt was “my closest associate” on U.S.-Soviet relations and “at my right hand on all… Full Article
ar Trans-Atlantic Scorecard – October 2019 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 14:38:07 +0000 Welcome to the fifth edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative. To produce the Scorecard, we poll Brookings scholars and other experts on the present state of U.S. relations… Full Article
ar Five months into Ukrainian President Zelenskiy’s term, there are reasons for optimism and caution By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 04 Nov 2019 20:47:05 +0000 How do Ukrainians assess the performance and prospects of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, now five months in office, as he tackles the country’s two largest challenges: resolving the war with Russia and implementing economic and anti-corruption reforms? In two words: cautious optimism. Many retain the optimism they felt when Zelenskiy swept into office this spring, elected… Full Article
ar How to end the war in Ukraine: What an American-led peace plan should look like By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 21:19:04 +0000 Full Article
ar Why care about Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 05 Dec 2019 18:36:43 +0000 Since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, the United States has provided Ukraine with $3 billion in reform and military assistance and $3 billion in loan guarantees. U.S. troops in western Ukraine train their Ukrainian colleagues. Washington, in concert with the European Union, has taken steps to isolate Moscow politically and imposed a series of economic… Full Article
ar Controversy in Paris Makes Regionalism Newsworthy By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 26 Feb 2010 11:42:00 -0500 If you live in a city or suburb, chances are your regional government has tried to get your attention. Did you notice? Many of the issues your regional government is grappling with are actually important to you: the quality of the air you breathe, the quality of public transportation, the availability of green open space, and more.As important as these issues are, I can almost guarantee that planners from your region have had to work extra hard to convince the press -- not to mention the citizens that live and work there -- to pay attention. The problem is, regional planning is about as exciting to the public as televised bowling and the press don’t seem to find the topic as newsworthy as it should be. And then there is Paris. In one year, approximately a hundred articles and editorials on Grand Paris, a new regional effort, were printed in the city’s main paper, Le Monde. Grand Paris has also been covered by UK newspapers, such as the Telegraph and The Guardian, and by US newspapers, such as The New York Times and The Christian Science Monitor. In my interviews with Parisian architects, economists, and sociologists, they tell me that it’s not only the press that is paying attention. Ordinary citizens on the streets and cafes are talking about Grand Paris and Paris as a region. So what happened? Turns out, President Sarkozy created a political and media frenzy this past year when he announced his intention to design a new Paris that incorporates the suburbs. Looking at his effort from a socio-economic perspective, Sarkozy should be lauded for his effort to reconnect the isolated suburbs to the economic heart of Paris. The 2005 riots by African immigrants in some of these suburbs gave the world a real peek into some of the inequities found here. His push has been to look past local political boundaries and acknowledge the new Paris that is emerging -- one that is both larger in geography and socio-economically more diverse. In 2007, the metropolitan area produced more than a quarter of France’s GDP, with a Gross Metropolitan Product of $731.3 billion. Yet, his national government cites that Paris is underdeveloped in important sectors, and that the region’s economic growth has been slowing over the past two decades. Sarkozy also saw this as an opportunity to redefine the region in a post-Kyoto era, where sustainable development is no longer an afterthought. Sarkozy retained 10 architectural teams with heavy hitters, such as Richard Rodgers, and asked them to “think big” on how to physically redefine the Paris region. In response, they offered lofty ideas for new economic centers, new high density housing hubs, and even a Paris covered with green roofs. For a moment, one could even argue that these teams breathed a new life of possibility for Paris. But politics is local—even when the French President is involved. As it turns out, Paris already has a plan for their region; one that was formally approved by the local jurisdictions and leaders and is now simply waiting for sign off by Sarkozy’s government. This plan addresses many of the issues Sarkozy argues that the region lacks, such as the need to address the 20 years of underinvestment in public infrastructure. It also turns out that Grand Paris flies directly in the face of the regional coalition building effort under way. An important number of leaders that comprise the region’s 1,231 jurisdictions are already forging a common agenda on cross cutting issues such as transportation and economic development. These are just two of the several missteps that have made the idea turn sour. So what seems to have started as a visionary act to physically remake the region has turned into a story on jurisdictional entanglements and hurt egos -- and the press ate it up. Interestingly, this controversy and all the press it generated has actually been an important win for regionalism in the end. Authors Julie Wagner Publication: The Avenue, The New Republic Image Source: © Charles Platiau / Reuters Full Article
ar A Study Tour of Barcelona and the Catalonia Region in Spain: Strategies for Metropolitan Economic Reinvention By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 22 Jun 2011 00:00:00 -0400 In partnership with the ESADE Business School and the City of Barcelona, the Metropolitan Policy Program planned and participated in three intensive days of learning in Barcelona in June 2011. The focus of the session was to look at examples of strategies Barcelona, Spain and its greater metropolitan region is embracing to rebuild and re-invent their economies. The goal is to share innovative ideas with U.S. metros engaged in similar initiatives as they face the challenge of moving to a new economic growth model.This paper features brief synopses of the tours and meetings held with the City of Barcelona and the Catalonia Region on their economic development strategies. Specific strategies include: Barcelona Activa » Barcelona Activa, a local development agency wholly owned by the City of Barcelona, has spent over the last 20 years developing what appears to be the strongest entrepreneurial development program in Europe. Barcelona Economic Triangle » (PDF) The Barcelona Economic Triangle was designed to stitch together three separate economic cluster initiatives across the metropolitan area. Through the BET, the myriad of public and private actors jointly developed a common brand and strategy for attracting foreign investment. 22@Barcelona » (PDF) One node of the Barcelona Economic Triangle. To remake an outmoded industrial area in the heart of the city into a hot-bed of innovation-driven sectors, the City of Barcelona designed a purpose-driven urban renovation strategy. Changing area zoning from industrial to services and increasing allowable density essentially rewired the area. Parc de l’Alba » One node of the Barcelona Economic Triangle. Located seven miles north of Barcelona, 840 acres of predominantly public-owned land, the Parc de l’Alba was designed to address three perplexing challenges: sprawling land use, specialization , and social segregation. Click on any image below for a larger version Barcelona Activa The 22@Barcelona revitalization area The Parc de l'Alba revitalization area Downloads Download the Full Paper Authors Bruce KatzJulie Wagner Full Article
ar Innovation Districts Appear in Cities as disparate as Montreal and London By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:33:00 -0500 For years, corporate campuses like Silicon Valley were known for innovation. Located in suburban corridors that were only accessible by car, these places put little emphasis on creating communities where people work, live and go out. But now, as the economy emerges from the recession, a shift is occurring where innovation is taking place. Districts of innovation can be found in urban centres as disparate as Montreal, Seoul, Singapore, Medellin, Barcelona, and London. They are popping up in the downtowns and midtowns of cities like Atlanta, Cambridge, Philadelphia, and St. Louis. These are places where advanced research universities, medical complexes, and clusters of tech and creative firms are attracting businesses and residents. Other innovation districts can be found in Boston, Brooklyn, San Francisco, and Seattle, where older industrial areas are being re-imagined and remade, leveraging their enviable location near waterfronts and city centres and along transit lines. Innovative companies and talented workers are flocking to these areas in abundance. Even traditional science parks like Research Triangle Park in Raleigh-Durham are scrambling to urbanise to keep pace with their workers' preference for walkable communities and their companies' desire to be near other firms. In these districts, leading anchor institutions and start-ups are clustering and connecting with one another. They are coming together with spin-off companies, incubators, and accelerators in the relentless pursuit of new discoveries for the market. These areas are small and accessible, growing talent, fostering open collaboration, and offering housing and office space as well as modern urban amenities. They are both competitive places and "cool" spaces. The growth of innovation districts is being driven by private and civic actors like universities, philanthropies, business associations and business improvement districts. Yet local governments play an important role in accelerating the growth of districts and maximising their potential . Three roles stand out: 1) Mayors are leading efforts to designate districts Barcelona's former mayor Joan Clos set his eyes on transforming his city into a "city of knowledge". Through extensive, focused public planning and investment, Clos designed an innovation district from the debris of a 494-acre industrial area, which was scarred and separated from the rest of the city by railroad tracks. His vision included burying these tracks, increasing access via a new public tram, designing walkable streets, and creating new public spaces and housing. Today, the area is a 21st-century urban community with 4,500 firms, thousands of new housing units, and clusters of universities, technology centres, and incubators. Across the Atlantic in Boston, former mayor Tom Menino declared the South Boston waterfront an innovation district in 2010. Menino persuaded innovators like MassChallenge to move to the district and exacted important concessions from developers (including land for innovation-oriented retail, shared labs and other spaces, and micro-housing) to help realise the district's vision. 2) Changing land-use laws to build spaces with a mix of facilities Barcelona and Research Triangle Park, for example, developed bold master plans encouraging the "mixing" of large and small firms, research facilities, housing, restaurants, and retail and outlining where to create open spaces for networking. Cambridge, Massachusetts, by contrast, has allowed incremental moves from rigid, antiquated rules to encourage similar outcomes in Kendall Square . 3) Supporting scarce public resources with large private and civic investments In New York , former mayor Michael Bloomberg deployed $100m in municipal capital to prepare the infrastructure necessary to lure Cornell and Technion universities to Roosevelt Island. In other cities, including St Louis and Seattle, local resources are financing infrastructure improvements to buttress and accelerate private growth. Given that many innovation districts are adjacent to low-income neighbourhoods, cities like Philadelphia are considering smart use of school investments to prepare disadvantaged youth for good jobs in the Stem (science, technology, engineering, and math) economy. As this decade unfolds, we should expect more cities to use their powers in the service of this new model of innovative, inclusive, and resilient growth. This opinion originally appeared in The Guardian Authors Bruce KatzJulie Wagner Full Article
ar One year after: Observations on the rise of innovation districts By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 24 Jun 2015 00:00:00 -0400 In the year since we released “The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New Geography of Innovation in America,” Brookings has visited or interacted with dozens of leaders in burgeoning innovation districts in the United States and Europe. In so doing, we’ve sharpened our knowledge of what’s happening on the ground and gained some important insights into how cities and metros are embracing this new paradigm of economy-shaping, place-making, and network-building. Innovation districts capture the remarkable spatial pattern underway in the innovation economy—the heightened clustering of anchor institutions, companies, and start-ups in small geographic areas of central cities across the United States, Europe, and other global-trading regions. The rise of innovation districts has been situated against the familiar backdrop of suburban corporate campuses and science parks. Accessible only by car, these spatially isolated corridors place little emphasis on the quality of life or on integrating work, housing, and recreation. By contrast, in our report we found the rise of urban innovation hubs to be the organic result of profound economic and demographic forces that are altering how we live and work. The growing application of “open innovation”—where companies work with other firms, inventors, and researchers to generate new ideas and bring them to market—has revalued proximity, density, and other attributes of cities. At the same time, the growing preference of young talented workers to congregate in vibrant neighborhoods that offer choices in housing, transportation, and amenities has made urban and urbanizing areas increasingly attractive. We also found that innovation districts uniformly contain a mix of economic, physical, and networking assets. Economic assets are the firms, institutions, and organizations that drive, cultivate, or support an innovation-rich environment. Physical assets are the public and privately owned spaces—buildings, open spaces, streets, and other infrastructure—designed and organized to stimulate new and higher levels of connectivity, collaboration, and innovation. Lastly, networking assets are the relationships between actors—such as between individuals, firms, and institutions—that have the potential to generate, sharpen, and/or accelerate the advancement of ideas. These assets, taken together, create an innovation ecosystem—the synergistic relationship between people, firms, and place that facilitates idea generation and advances commercialization. One year later, innovation districts continue to rise. What have we learned about how they are evolving? First, the model of innovation districts has been embraced, co-opted, and (in some cases) misappropriated, further reinforcing the need for grounding this work in empirically based evidence. A simple Google search will reveal the extent to which the language of “innovation districts” (or “innovation quarters,“ “innovation neighborhoods,” or “innovation corridors”) has rapidly permeated the field of urban and metropolitan economic development and place-making. In some places, this labeling is being accurately used by globally recognized research institutions (e.g., Carnegie Mellon in Pittsburgh, Drexel University in Philadelphia) that are both experiencing extraordinary growth near their campuses as well as designing intentional efforts to build on their distinctive assets. In communities as diverse as Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis in the United States and Manchester and Sheffield in England, local leaders are conducting deep empirical analysis to understand their competitive advantages and existing weaknesses within their innovation ecosystem. They are exploring what it means to encourage greater collaboration and cooperation across their institutions, firms, and entrepreneurs. And they are exploring ways to better create “place” so as to increase overall vitality, facilitate innovation, and spur the growth of new businesses and jobs. In other places, the nomenclature reflects an aspiration—and is spurring more deliberate efforts by local stakeholders to grow distinctive innovation ecosystems. In cities like Albuquerque, N.M., Chattanooga, Tenn., Chicago, Ill., Durham, N.C., and San Diego, Calif., local leaders are using the innovation district paradigm as a platform to measure their current conditions, develop strategies for addressing gaps and challenges, and build coalitions of stakeholders that can together help realize a unified vision for innovative growth. Some of these budding districts represent typologies not outlined in our report but that are ripe for future research, including “start-up” enclaves in or near downtowns of cities that lack a major anchor as well as “public markets” that blend locally produced food products and crafts with maker spaces, digital design, and other innovations in the creative arts. There is one unfortunate trend in the rising use of the "innovation district" lexicon. In a number of cities, local stakeholders have applied the label to a project or area that lacks the minimum threshold of innovation-oriented firms, start-ups, institutions, or clusters needed to create an innovation ecosystem. This appears to result either from the chase to jump on the latest economic development bandwagon, the desire to drive up demand and real estate prices, or sometimes a true lack of understanding of what an innovation district actually is. The motivation for real estate developers to adopt the moniker seems clear: to achieve a price premium for their commercial, residential, and retail rents. Yet these sites are typically a collection of service-sector activities with little focus on the innovation economy. The lesson: labeling something innovative does not make it so. From all these observations, it is clear that the field needs a routinized way to measure the starting assets of innovation districts—both to separate true districts from “in name only” ones as well as to give individual communities a platform for developing targeted strategies going forward. This means both running the numbers—conducting a quantitative audit—and undertaking a more qualitative assessment of strengths and weaknesses. Irrespective of their phase of development, innovation districts must evaluate the extent to which they have a critical mass of economic, physical, and networking assets to collectively generate the vitality that these districts demand. They need to evaluate the competitive advantages they have in certain economic sectors and learn how to cultivate them. And they need to ensure that they have the connectivity, diversity, and quality of place necessary to create a unique and vibrant environment in which innovation can thrive. To facilitate this process, we are working in close collaboration with Mass Economics and the Project for Public Spaces to develop an audit template and tool. Over the next year, we intend to sharpen this tool in a subset of innovation districts across the country and then encourage others to employ it in their own established or burgeoning districts. Second, the core economic assets of innovation districts are not fixed; in fact, many innovation districts are being created or enhanced by the relocation of major anchor facilities as institutions strive to achieve the highest return on investment. The conventional notion of an “anchor” institution is that it is solidly weighted in a particular place. Yet over the past decade a substantial number of innovative companies and advanced educational and research institutions have moved key facilities and units as a means of generating greater innovation output. Examples of new locations include the University of California-San Francisco’s biotechnology campus in Mission Bay (2003); the University of Washington’s medical research hub in Seattle’s South Lake Union (2005); Brown University’s medical school in downtown Providence, R.I. (2011); Duke’s Clinical Research Institute in downtown Durham (2013); Carnegie Mellon University’s Integrative Media Program in the Brooklyn Navy Yard (2013); and, most famously, the new Cornell Tech campus on Roosevelt Island in New York City (2015). These “first mover” relocations show how corporate and university leaders are departing from the tradition of building new facilities within their existing footprint and are willing to seek out new areas (and even new cities) to retain, or achieve, competitive advantage in their respective clusters and fields. As Cornell Professor Ronald Ehrenberg said about his school’s isolated Ithaca, N.Y. campus, “It is very, very difficult for us to do the kind of development through tech transfer that a place like Stanford or Berkeley can do in San Francisco or Harvard or MIT can do in Boston.” Our strong sense in talking with leaders around the country is that we are still at the early stage of corporate and university relocations given the extent to which urban areas have been revalued. The physical relocation of key innovation assets has now become a critical competitiveness strategy for companies, universities, and even states. In some cases, the “unanchoring of anchors” is also compelling local leaders to rethink the traditional borders and boundaries of the innovation economy. In Philadelphia, for example, University City has always been recognized as a settled innovation hub, given the co-location of such anchor institutions as Drexel University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University City Science Center, and others. The recent decision of Comcast to consolidate its corporate presence in the downtown area and build its major new Innovation and Technology Center less than 10 blocks from 30th Street Station and the Drexel Campus is convincing some leaders to “stretch” Philadelphia’s University City district to incorporate this new corporate giant. Third, almost all innovation districts have significant work ahead to understand the rising value of “place” in the innovation ecosystem and leverage or reconfigure their physical assets to create dense and dynamic communities. While our paper dissected various types of physical assets to help practitioners understand their individual roles and value, the more important message to convey now is the imperative to combine and activate physical assets in ways that create vibrant “places.” The Project for Public Spaces aptly describes place as “…environments in which people have invested meaning over time. A place has its own history—a unique cultural and social identity that is defined by the way it is used and the people who use it.”1 Our review of innovation districts, including those cited in our paper, reveals that many have not yet maximized the potential for creating lively communities in which their residents and workers feel invested, reducing the potential innovation output of these communities. When designed and programmed well, a district’s public spaces—whether within buildings or outside of them—facilitate open innovation by offering numerous opportunities to meet, network, and brainstorm. Strong places entice residents and workers to remain in the area off hours, extending the opportunities for collaboration. Strong places create a culturally and educationally enriched environment that strengthens human interaction, knowledge, and motivation. While some university-led districts have made some improvements over the years, districts anchored by medical campuses have significant work ahead. These spaces were designed as isolated fortresses that valued parking over walking (ironic given their health mission), with little or no attention paid to amenities, cultural activities, retail, or housing. Significantly, some medical campuses are often located in close proximity to downtowns, as part of universities, or near organic entrepreneurial communities (e.g., the proximity of Oklahoma City’s Health District to Automobile Alley). This raises the potential for smart (and related) place-making activities in a nearby area and reinforces the need to rethink traditional geographies and artificial boundaries when considering interventions. Fourth, the rapid growth and impact of national intermediaries (what we call innovation cultivators) shows real promise in helping innovation districts grow and steward their networking assets and stimulating new innovation opportunities. The past year has seen substantial growth in multicity intermediaries along with scores of locally grown accelerators and incubators. It appears more than ever that intermediaries are increasingly the catalyst to growing innovation and entrepreneurial energy within local districts and across start-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises, and, even to some extent, large companies and research institutions. They are designed to think and act horizontally, encouraging people and firms to interact and work together in ways and at a scale previously unseen. A growing and increasingly important role for intermediaries is helping innovation districts evolve from the traditional “research and development” model to a “search and development” one, where crucial answers to their innovation questions and technological challenges are discovered by finding and collaborating with other firms. Some districts immediately recognized this potential and have gone to great lengths to grow, lure, and fund the development of multiple intermediaries across their districts. The Cortex Innovation Community in St. Louis has, in a short period, clustered new buildings owned and/or supported by a number of well-respected intermediaries. These development and programmatic moves are effectively creating a new focal point for Cortex innovation activities. The new Cambridge Innovation Center, which offers space for start-ups combined with access to venture capital firms, professional services, and a plug-and-play physical environment, is already at 85 percent occupancy. A newly constructed Tech Shop—a do-it-yourself “maker space” equipped with industrial tools, machinery, and technology to support entrepreneurs—is under construction nearby. The near complete renovation of the Center for Emerging Technologies, which provides training, specialized facilities, and technical support, adds yet another layer of support for entrepreneurs and start-ups. Adding more to this mix is a soon-to-be-constructed space for tech-commercial activities combined with new housing, which will exponentially increase the number of people in a very small radius.2 As one can imagine, this clustering was deeply intentional and viewed as a way to stimulate new relationships, new networks, and the cross-fertilization of ideas; Cortex refers to this deliberate process as “innovation engineering.” We anticipate more innovation districts to follow suit, pursuing, if not cultivating, such intermediaries in their own innovation ecosystems. Finally, the rise of innovation districts takes place in a national and urban political environment that demands inclusive growth and equitable outcomes. The past year has seen the elevation of income inequality and social mobility as issues of national and urban significance. With the federal government mired in partisan gridlock, cities have become the vanguard of efforts to raise the minimum wage, expand affordable housing, and extend pre-K education, among other initiatives. These efforts come at a time when the civil unrest in Baltimore and Ferguson has refocused national attention on neighborhoods of high poverty. Because of their location in the cores of central cities, many established and emerging innovation districts are located several blocks away from distressed communities. This proximity creates an enormous opportunity to show the positive impact that innovative growth can have on inclusive outcomes. Innovation districts create employment opportunities that can be filled by local residents and procurement and construction opportunities that can be fulfilled by local vendors and contractors. The districts generate tax revenues that can be used to fund neighborhood services and neighborhood regeneration. And they offer the potential to link the ample expertise and talent in anchor educational institutions with the needs of neighborhood schools and children. Recognizing these benefits, local leaders are demonstrating a genuine commitment to growing more inclusive districts. In our work, we’ve seen several early models that could be built on and replicated. In the Barcelona 22@ district, for example, leaders are trying to quantify the growth in service jobs accessible to local and regional residents while, at the same time, connecting those residents to training that increases their skills in more innovation-oriented sectors. Last year, Drexel University opened a new “urban extension center” that offers career-building workshops, legal clinics, and other services to residents of the adjacent Mantua Promise Zone. The Evergreen Cooperative in Cleveland’s University Circle district has been working for several years to leverage local purchasing power to create business ownership and employment opportunities for low-income residents. And in Baltimore, the University of Maryland partnered with surrounding neighborhood organizations, residents, and institutions to develop a detailed new plan for building what the Baltimore Southwest Partnership envisions as a “diverse, cohesive community of choice built on mutual respect and shared responsibility.” These examples represent concrete initiatives to ensure that nearby neighborhoods and their residents connect to and benefit from new growth opportunities in innovation districts and beyond. Scaling such efforts will be critical in the years to come, as the success of these districts will be defined in large part by their broader city and regional impacts. As Brookings works this year to help unleash more innovation districts across the U.S. and Europe, we will continue to hone our observations and knowledge about trends, challenges, and strategies. We will compile and publish what we have learned for anchor leaders, policymakers, scholars, and practitioners, focusing on many of the issues—accelerating commercialization to improving inclusion—noted above. We will do this work in close collaboration with proven organizations like Mass Economics and Project for Public Spaces. We look forward to contributing to this rapidly changing space via empirical and on-the-ground research, strategy and policy development, convenings, and network building. Stay tuned. Read The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New Geography of Innovation in America 1. Project for Public Spaces, “Placemaking and Place-Led Development: A New Paradigm for Cities of the Future, available at http://www.pps.org/reference/placemaking-and-place-led-development-a-new-paradigm-for-cities-of-the-future/ (June 15, 2015). 2. Email exchange with Dennis Lower, President and CEO, Cortex Innovation Community, May 8, 2015. Authors Bruce KatzJennifer S. VeyJulie Wagner Image Source: © Charles Mostoller / Reuters Full Article
ar U.K. innovation districts and Brexit: Keep calm and carry on By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Wed, 29 Jun 2016 15:00:00 -0400 The tide of uncertainty that has swept the United Kingdom after its vote to leave the European Union has spared few—including its emerging class of innovation districts. These hubs of innovation—where anchor institutions, such as universities and R&D laden companies cluster and connect with startups, incubators, and a host of public spaces, coffee shops, retail and housing—are now asking themselves important questions that will affect their future. Will the U.K. broker a deal to continue free trade with Europe? Will access to talent across Europe be curtailed? Will the devalued pound keep U.K. advanced manufacturers competitive for the medium to long term? Will European Union legal frameworks be replaced with a regulatory platform that continues to support advanced sectors? What will happen to EU funding on science and innovation, such as Horizon 2020? Of course, innovation districts are no stranger to uncertainty, if not chaos. These districts thrive on random mixing, on smashing different kinds of disciplines and people together to generate new ideas and new products for the market. In this close-knit, highly networked ecosystem, chaos breeds creativity. At the same time, the backbone of districts is a clear regulatory and legal framework with rules on intellectual property, investment, and funding streams. The twinning of chaos and certainty is what makes these places simply superb spaces to incubate new technology, aggregate talent, and experiment in linking placemaking with innovation. Yet from the distinctive innovation districts in London to those emerging in the middle of England, such as in Sheffield and Manchester, to those rising in Scotland, such as in Glasgow, this moment of uncertainty could be not only painful—it could be downright dangerous. In the face of such uncertain times, the temptation will be to sit back and wait for the cards to fall. But this tempered, conservative approach is ironically the more risky tactic. We recommend another path. Now is the time for the institutions and firms that are driving innovation districts to strengthen their competitive position and expand their reach. Now is the time to try new forms of collaboration between universities, large companies, and local enterprises. Now is the time to test more democratic modes of innovation with maker spaces, fab labs, and shared infrastructure and equipment. Now is the time to forge new partnerships with other innovation districts in the United States and Europe to share promising strategies around commercialization, networking, and financing. Now is the time to apply new energy to creative placemaking, including strengthening the innovation–place nexus around key nodes and applying quick interventions around traffic calming, bike lanes, and pop-up gathering spaces. U.S. cities and innovation districts have demonstrated that progress can persist even when higher levels of government are adrift. U.K. cities and districts can do the same. Authors Julie WagnerBruce Katz Full Article
ar Economic inclusion can help prevent violent extremism in the Arab world By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: News reports that “more likely than not” a bomb brought down the Russian plane over Egypt’s Sinai, together with the claim by a Daesh (the Arabic acronym for ISIS) affiliate that it was behind that attack, is yet another reminder of the dangers of violent extremism. People of many different nationalities have been victims of… Full Article Uncategorized
ar The Arab Spring Five Years Later By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: The dilemma felt by Arab youth was captured in Tunisia by the self-immolation in 2010 of Mohamed Bouazizi, who was frustrated by restrictions on his small street-vending business. His death became the catalyst that seemed to light up revolts throughout the Middle East. The frustration had been building for some time: large segments of society… Full Article
ar The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Vol 2 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Volume 1 of The Arab Spring Five Years Later is based on extensive research conducted by scholars from a variety of backgrounds, including many associated with the Japan International Cooperation Agency. Now the original research papers are gathered in volume 2 and are available for readers who wish to go even further in understanding the… Full Article
ar The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Vol. 1 & Vol. 2 By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 18:10:44 +0000 This two-volume set explores in-depth the economic origins and repercussions of the Arab Spring revolts. Volume 1 of The Arab Spring Five Years Later is based on extensive research conducted by scholars from a variety of backgrounds, including many associated with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The original research papers are gathered in volume… Full Article
ar The Arab Spring five years later: Toward greater inclusiveness By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Five years have passed since the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia sparked revolts around the Arab world and the beginning of the Arab Spring. Despite high hopes that the Arab world was entering a new era of freedom, economic growth, and social justice, the transition turned out to be long and difficult, with the… Full Article
ar In November jobs report, real earnings and payrolls improve but labor force participation remains weak By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 04 Dec 2015 12:50:00 -0500 November's U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) employment report showed continued improvement in the job market, with employers adding 211,000 workers to their payrolls and hourly pay edging up compared with its level a year ago. The pace of job growth was similar to that over the past year and somewhat slower than the pace in 2014. For the 69th consecutive month, private-sector payrolls increased. Since the economic recovery began in the third quarter of 2009, all the nation’s employment gains have occurred as a result of expansion in private-sector payrolls. Government employment has shrunk by more than half a million workers, or about 2.5 percent. In the past twelve months, however, public payrolls edged up by 93,000. The good news on employment gains in November was sweetened by revised estimates of job gains in the previous two months. Revisions added 8,000 to estimated job growth in September and 27,000 to job gains in October. The BLS now estimates that payrolls increased 298,000 in October, a big rebound compared with the more modest gains in August and September, when payrolls grew an average of about 150,000 a month. Average hourly pay in November was 2.3 percent higher than its level 12 months earlier. This is a slightly faster rate of improvement compared with the gains we saw between 2010 and 2014. A tighter job market may mean that employers are now facing modestly higher pressure to boost employee compensation. The exceptionally low level of consumer price inflation means that the slow rate of nominal wage growth translates into a healthy rate of real wage improvement. The latest BLS numbers show that real weekly and hourly earnings in October were 2.4 percent above their levels one year earlier. Not only have employers added more than 2.6 million workers to their payrolls over the past year, the purchasing power of workers' earnings have been boosted by the slightly faster pace of wage gain and falling prices for oil and other commodities. The BLS household survey also shows robust job gains last month. Employment rose 244,000 in November, following a jump of 320,000 in October. More than 270,000 adults entered the labor force in November, so the number of unemployed increased slightly, leaving the unemployment rate unchanged at 5.0 percent. In view of the low level of the jobless rate, the median duration of unemployment spells remains surprisingly long, 10.8 weeks. Between 1967 and the onset of the Great Recession, the median duration of unemployment was 10.8 weeks or higher in just seven months. Since the middle of the Great Recession, the median duration of unemployment has been 10.8 weeks or longer for 82 consecutive months. The reason, of course, is that many of the unemployed have been looking for work for a long time. More than one-quarter of the unemployed—slightly more than two million job seekers—have been jobless for at least 6 months. That number has been dropping for more than five years, but remains high relative to our experience before the Great Recession. If there is bad news in the latest employment report, it's the sluggish response of labor force participation to a brighter job picture. The participation rate of Americans 16 and older edged up 0.1 point in November but still remains 3.5 percentage points below its level before the Great Recession. About half the decline can be explained by an aging adult population, but a sizeable part of the decline remains unexplained. The participation rate of men and women between 25 and 54 years old is now 80.8 percent, exactly the same level it was a year ago but 2.2 points lower than it was before the Great Recession. Despite the fact that real wages are higher and job finding is now easier than was the case earlier in the recovery, the prime-age labor force participation rate remains stuck well below its level before the recession. How strong must the recovery be before prime-age adults are induced to come back into the work force? Even though the recovery is now 6 and a half years old, we still do not know. Authors Gary Burtless Image Source: © Fred Greaves / Reuters Full Article
ar Job market news just keeps getting better By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 13:21:00 -0500 Employers continued to boost payrolls in 2015, capping six straight years of job gains. It was the third year in a row in which employment gains topped 210,000 a month. In the 12 months ending in November, public and private payrolls increased 220,000 a month, or about 1.9 percent over the year. Virtually all the growth in payrolls was in the private sector, which added 212,000 jobs a month. The public sector added modestly to its payrolls last year, but the number of government employees remains more than one million (4.4 percent) below the peak level attained in 2010. Nearly all major industries except mining contributed to job gains in the past 12 months, though gains in manufacturing were weaker than in any year since the expansion began in 2010. Payrolls in the mining industry tumbled more than 10 percent, hurt by a steep fall in oil and gas prices and the decline in exploration for new energy reserves. The construction industry continued to add to payrolls last year at about the same pace as in the previous two years, although the level of employment is still about 1.2 million (15 percent) below the peak level achieved in 2006. Based on the age composition of the U.S. population, between 65,000-80,000 new jobs are needed every month to keep the unemployment rate from rising. Since late 2010, monthly payroll gains have comfortably exceeded this threshold. As a result, the jobless rate has declined steadily. In the 12 months through November 2015, the unemployment rate dropped another 0.8 percentage point, falling to 5.0 percent. The jobless rate is now within a half percentage point of its level immediately before the Great Recession. Since reaching a peak in the autumn of 2009, the unemployment rate has been cut in half. We’ve also seen improvement in other indicators of job market distress in the past year. The number of Americans who want full-time jobs but have been forced to take part-time positions fell more than 11 percent in the 12 months through November 2015. About 9 million workers who wanted a full-time job were employed part-time in the middle of 2010. That number has fallen to about 6 million in recent months. Similarly, the number of Americans in long spells of unemployment continues to shrink. Workers reporting they were unemployed 6 months or longer fell to 2.05 million in November, representing a considerable improvement since 2010. In that year, more than 6 million jobless workers reported they had been looking for work for at least a half a year. The most welcome news for Americans who hold jobs is that inflation-adjusted wage levels improved last year. Real average hourly earnings increased 1.8 percent between November 2014 and November 2015, and real weekly earnings climbed 1.6 percent. These gains represent a considerable improvement compared with earlier years in the recovery, when real wage gains were negligible. Nonetheless, nominal wage gains in 2015 were only slightly faster than they were in earlier years of the recovery. The reason for the startling turnaround in real wage growth is that consumer prices increased very little over the past year. In the 12 months ending in November, the CPI edged up just 0.5 percent, almost a full percentage point more slowly than the average rate of consumer inflation in the previous three years. The slowdown was driven by lower prices for energy and other key commodities. (The “core” consumer inflation rate, which strips out the effects of price changes in energy and food, was 2.0 percent last year, a bit higher than the rate in the previous year.) Back when politicians and voters cared more about inflation than they currently do, Brookings economist Arthur Okun proposed an economic indicator called the “misery index” to summarize the dual hardships of inflation and unemployment. To measure economic misery Okun suggested adding the current unemployment rate and a measure of consumer price inflation. In Chart 1 below I have added the civilian unemployment rate and the trailing 12-month percentage change in the CPI. In the 11 months of 2012 through November, the misery index averaged just 5.4, its lowest level since the 1950s and well below its average levels in the 1990s (8.8) and in the period from 2000 to 2007 (7.8). When inflation is benign and has remained subdued for a long time, Americans may forget the pain they feel when price increases are frequent and large. Okun’s misery index fell to an exceptionally low level in 2015, even if a small majority of Americans continues to believe the economy is getting worse. The good news in 2015 is that unemployment continued to fall and real wages began to rise. The less welcome news is that key measures of labor force participation failed to improve. For example, the labor force participation rate of Americans between 25 and 54 was the same in November 2015 as it was in November 2014. More worryingly, it was 2.1 percentage points below its level in November 2007, just before the Great Recession. So far we have seen no rebound in participation among people in prime working ages, despite abundant signs that it’s easier to land a job. Low participation is the main explanation for depressed employment rates among prime-age Americans. Participation rates are not only low in comparison to levels seen before the Great Recession, they are also now below those in other rich countries. Charts 2 and 3 compare employment-to-population rates among 25-54 year-olds in seven OECD member countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The charts show employment rates separately for men and women in two different years, 2000 and 2014. The countries are ranked, from left to right, by their employment rates in 2014. In 2000 the U.S. had the second highest male employment rate (Chart 2) and the second highest female employment rate (Chart 3) of the seven countries listed. By 2014, the U.S. had the lowest male and female employment rates among the countries compared. Although several nations saw declines in their prime-age male employment rate, only the U.S. also experienced a decline in its prime-age female employment rate. The other six countries all saw increases in female employment. The main reason for the drop in prime-age U.S. employment was the decline in prime-age participation. An enduring puzzle of the current recovery is the failure of participation rates to rebound, even in the face of steady improvement in the job market. Authors Gary Burtless Full Article
ar U.S. job market goes from strength to strength as global stock markets tremble By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 08 Jan 2016 12:06:00 -0500 The latest BLS employment report showed remarkable strength in the U.S. job market even as global financial markets were trembling. Employers added 292,000 to their payrolls in December. Upward revisions in previous BLS estimates also boosted gains in October and November. In the last quarter of 2015, payrolls increased at a rate of 284,000 per month, a remarkable performance in the face of rising uncertainty about prospects for the world economy. U.S. employers added a total of 2.65 million jobs in 2015, the second best calendar-year gain of the current recovery. (Gains were stronger in 2014 but smaller in earlier years of the recovery.) As usual, private employers accounted for an overwhelming share of the job gains. Ninety-seven percent of the gains in the fourth quarter and 96 percent of the gains last year occurred as a result of employment gains in the private sector. Whatever the uncertainty of the world economic outlook, U.S. employers have enough confidence in their own prospects to keep adding to their payrolls at a healthy clip. Public employment remains about 375,000 (1.7 percent) lower than it was at the onset of the Great Depression. Though government payrolls are now growing, in percentage terms they have been rising much more slowly that private payrolls. Sizeable job gains were recorded in construction, transportation, motion pictures, professional and business services, leisure and hospitality industries, and health care. Gains were modest or negligible in manufacturing and retail trade. Payrolls fell for the twelfth consecutive month in mining, primarily as a result of continued weakness in world energy prices. Average hourly pay in private firms edged down 1 cent in December, but the nominal wage was 2.5 percent higher than its level 12 months earlier. This is a somewhat faster rate of improvement compared with the gains workers saw between 2010 and 2014. In terms of purchasing power, U.S. workers are clearly enjoying faster pay gains as a result of lower inflation. The 12-month change in real hourly earnings through November was 1.8 percent, the fastest rate of improvement in the current recovery. The BLS household survey also contained a big helping of good news. The unemployment rate remained unchanged, at 5.0 percent, but that was the result of sizeable employment gains combined with a notable influx into the active labor force. The number of survey respondents who said they were employed jumped 485,000, and the number saying they held a job or were actively looking rose 466,000. Over the past 12 months the labor force has increased only 1.69 million, but the number of household survey respondents who say they hold a job has increased 2.49 million. Contrary to predictions that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act would push employers to put workers on part-time schedules, an overwhelming share of job growth has been in full-time positions. The number of survey respondents who said they held full-time jobs increased 504,000 in December. It has increased 2.6 million over the past year. The gray cloud in the latest jobs report is the continued weakness in the prime-age labor force participation rate. The participation rate of men and women between 25 and 54 years old is now 80.9 percent, exactly the same as its level a year ago but more than 2 percentage points below its level before the Great Recession. Most labor economists anticipate that easier job finding and rising real hourly pay will bring more potential workers back into the workforce. Among Americans in their prime working years, however, that resurgence in participation is hard to see. Authors Gary Burtless Image Source: GARY HERSHORN Full Article
ar Job gains slow in January, but signs of a rebound in labor force participation By webfeeds.brookings.edu Published On :: Fri, 05 Feb 2016 11:29:00 -0500 The pace of employment gains slowed in January from the torrid pace of the previous three months. The latest BLS jobs report shows that employers added 151,000 to their payrolls in January, well below monthly gains in October through December. In that quarter payrolls climbed almost 280,000 a month. For two reasons, the deceleration in employment gains was not a complete surprise. First, the rapid growth payrolls in the last quarter did not seem consistent with other indicators of growth in the quarter. Preliminary GDP estimates suggest that output growth slowed sharply in the fourth quarter compared with the previous two. Second, I see few indicators suggesting the pace of economic growth has picked up so far this year. It’s worth noting that employment gains in January were far faster than needed to keep the unemployment rate from increasing. In fact, if payrolls continue to grow at January’s pace throughout the year, we should expect the unemployment rate to continue falling. As usual in the current expansion, private employers accounted for all of January’s employment gains. Government payrolls shrank slightly. The number of public employees is about the same as it was last July. Over the same period, private employers added about 213,000 workers a month to their payrolls. In January employment gains slowed in construction and in business and professional industries. Payrolls shrank in mining. Since mining payrolls reached a peak in September 2014, they have fallen 16 percent. Manufacturing payrolls rose slightly in January, but payroll gains have been very slow over the past year. Employment in the temporary help industry contracted in January. The industry has seen no net change in payrolls since October. Average hourly pay in private companies edged up in January. The average nominal wage was 2.5 percent higher than its level 12 months earlier. This is a faster rate of improvement compared with what we saw earlier in the recovery, when annual pay gains averaged about 2.0 percent a year. The modest acceleration in nominal pay gains has occurred against the backdrop of slowing consumer price inflation. The combination has given workers real wage gains approaching 2.0 percent over the past year. The BLS household survey showed a small drop in unemployment. The jobless rate fell to 4.9 percent, just 0.3 points above its average level in 2007, the last year before the Great Recession. The drop in unemployment was the result of a rise in the number of survey respondents who were employed. The labor force participation rate increased in January, and it has increased 0.3 points since October. This rebound in labor force participation is modest compared with the drop that occurred between 2008 and 2015. From 2007 to January 2016 the adult participation rate fell 3.4 percentage points. Roughly half the drop is traceable to population aging, but the other half is due to factors related to the deep slump or to long-term factors that have affected Americans’ willingness to enter or remain in the workforce. If we assume all of the drop was due to factors that have temporarily discouraged jobless adults from seeking work, then we can recalculate the unemployment rate to reflect the rate we would see if all of these discouraged workers were reclassified as unemployed. That calculation suggests the current unemployment rate would be about 7.4 percent rather than 4.9 percent. It is of course unlikely all the adults who’ve dropped out the labor force would stream back in if job finding got easier and real wages continued to rise. It is encouraging to see, however, that participation is now climbing after a long period of decline. Over the past four months, the labor force participation rate of 25-54 year-olds increased 0.5 percentage points. Authors Gary Burtless Image Source: © Lee Celano / Reuters Full Article