Event Information

Over the past few years, more than 600 Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) have formed across the country, charged with the dual goals of improving health while also reducing health care costs. Increasingly, evidence on how public and private ACOs are progressing toward these goals is beginning to emerge. Based on these results, major regulatory changes are anticipated in the months ahead that will impact accountable care programs in Medicare, as well as future uptake within the private sector.

On October 20, the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform hosted a half day forum to assess the latest evidence on accountable care, discuss strategies to overcome unique ACO challenges, and provide an overview of accountable care reforms. Sean Cavanaugh of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) provided keynote remarks on the latest Medicare ACO results and potential changes to the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Panel sessions featured leading experts in ACO research, implementation and health care policy.

 Join the conversation on Twitter using #ACOFuture or follow @BrookingsMed

Video

• The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP): Looking Ahead
• Big Issues for ACOs Going Forward
• ACO Policy Issues and Solutions on the Horizon

Audio

• The State of Accountable Care: Evidence to Date and Next Steps

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• ACO Public Event full deck FINAL
• 102014_Accountable Care_Transcript

Event Information

In its 50th year, the Medicare program currently provides health insurance coverage for more than 49 million Americans and accounts for $600 billion in federal spending. With those numbers expected to rise as the baby boomer generation ages, many policy experts consider this impending expansion a major threat to the nation’s economic future and question how it might affect the quality and value of health care for Medicare beneficiaries.

On June 5, the Center for Health Policy at Brookings and the USC Leonard D. Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics hosted a half-day forum on the future of Medicare. Instead of reflecting on historical accomplishments, the event looked ahead to 2030—a time when the youngest Baby Boomers will be Medicare-eligible—and explore the changing demographics, health care needs, medical technology costs, and financial resources available to beneficiaries. The panels focused on modernizing Medicare's infrastructure, benefit design, marketplace competition, and payment mechanisms. The event also included the release of five policy papers from featured panelists.

Please note that presentation slides from USC's Dana Goldman will not be available for download. For more information on findings from his presentation download the working paper available on this page or watch the event video.

Video

• Challenges and opportunities facing Medicare in 2030
• Eligibility, benefit design, and financial support
• Could improving choice and competition in Medicare Advantage be the future of Medicare?
• Improving provider payment in Medicare

Audio

• Strengthening Medicare for 2030

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Burtless Slides
• 20150605_medicare_2030_transcript

For over 100 years, the driving force of Ohio’s economy has been the state’s so-called Big Eight cities—Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, Akron, Dayton, Canton, and Youngstown. Today, though, the driving reality of these cities is sustained, long-term population loss. The central issue confronting these cities—and the state and surrounding metropolitan area—is not whether these cities will have different physical footprints and more green space than they do now, but how it will happen.

The state must adopt a different way of thinking and a different vision of its cities’ future—and so must the myriad local, civic, philanthropic, and business leaders who will also play a role in reshaping Ohio’s cities. The following seven basic premises should inform any vision for a smaller, stronger future and subsequent strategies for change in these places:

• These cities contain significant assets for future rebuilding
  
• These cities will not regain their peak population
  
• These cities have a surplus of housing
  
• These cities have far more vacant land than can be absorbed by redevelopment
  
• Impoverishment threatens the viability of these cities more than population loss as such
  
• Local resources are severely limited
  
• The fate of cities and their metropolitan areas are inextricably inter-connected
  

These premises have significant implications for the strategies that state and local governments should pursue to address the issues of shrinking cities.

Full Paper on Ohio's Cities » (PDF)
Paper on Shrinking Cities Across the United States »

Downloads

• Full Paper

Event Information

While the future impact of rising powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China is uncertain and the shifting political landscape in the Arab world is still playing out, the influence of these emerging nations is a central fact of geopolitics.

Already the global financial crisis, the Copenhagen climate negotiations, and the debate over Iran sanctions have illustrated the potential, the pitfalls, and above all the centrality of the relationship between American power and the influence of these rising actors and developing democracies.

In a new paper, Senior Fellow Bruce Jones, director of the Managing Global Order Project at Brookings, argues the greatest risk lies not in a single peer competitor but in the erosion of cooperation on issues vital to U.S. interests and a stable world order. U.S. power is indispensible for that purpose but not sufficient. No longer the CEO of Free World Inc., the United States is now the largest minority shareholder in Global Order LLC.

On March 15, the Brookings Institution and Foreign Policy magazine hosted the launch of Bruce Jones’s paper "Largest Minority Shareholder in Global Order LLC: The Changing Balance of Influence and U.S. Strategy." Panelists explored the prospects for cooperation on global finance and transnational threats; the need for new investments in global economic and energy diplomacy; and the case for new crisis management tools to help de-escalate inevitable tensions with emerging powers.

Susan Glasser, editor in chief of Foreign Policy, moderated the discussion. After the presentations, panelists took audience questions.

Video

• Relative Shift in U.S. Balance of Power
• Shifting Coalitions of Consensus
• Paradox of Power for U.S.
• U.S. Needs To Get Serious about Development and Energy

Audio

• Shifting Balance of Power: Has the U.S. Become the Largest Minority Shareholder in the Global Order?

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20110315_global_order

2015 is a pivotal year for global development; this fall is a pivotal moment. Meetings this fall will determine the global vision for sustainable development for 2030.

Three papers being released today—“Action implications focusing now on implementation of the post-2015 agenda,” “Systemic sustainability as the strategic imperative for the post-2015 agenda,” and “Political decisions and institutional innovations required for systemic transformations envisioned in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda”—set out some foundational ideas and specific proposals for political decisions and institutional innovations, which focus now on the implementation of the new global vision for 2030. This blog summarizes the key points in the three papers listed below.

Fundamentals for guiding actions, reforms and decisions

1) Managing systemic risks needs to be the foundational idea for implementing the post-2015 agenda.

The key political idea latent but not yet fully visible in the post-2015 agenda is that it is not a developing country poverty agenda for global development in the traditional North-South axis but a universal agenda based on the perception of urgent challenges that constitute systemic threats.

The term “sustainable development” by itself as the headline for the P-2015 agenda creates the danger of inheriting terminology from the past to guide the future.

2) Goal-setting and implementation must be effectively linked.

The international community learned from the previous two sets of goal-setting experiences that linking implementation to goal-setting is critical to goal achievement.  G-20 leader engagement in the post-2015 agenda and linking the success of the G-20 presidencies of Turkey (2015), China (2016), and Germany (2017) would provide global leadership for continuity of global awareness and commitment.

3) Focus on the Sustainable Development Goals must be clear.

Criticism of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as being too defuse and too detailed is ill-founded and reveals a lack of political imagination. It is a simple task to group the 17 goals into a few clusters that clearly communicate their focus on poverty, access, sustainability, partnership, growth, and institutions and their linkages to the social, economic, and environmental systemic threats that are the real and present dangers.

The Bretton Woods era is over. It was over before China initiated the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). Never has it been clearer than now that maintaining a single global system of international institutions is essential for geopolitical reasons. For the implementation of the post-2015 agenda, all the major international institutions need to commit to them.

In a joint paper with Zhang Haibing from the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS), we make five specific governance proposals for decision-makers: 

The implementation of the post-2015 agenda requires that nations internalize the SDGs by debating, adapting and adopting them in terms of their own domestic cultural, institutional, and political circumstances. It will be important for the U.N. declarations in September to urge all countries to undertake domestic decision-making processes toward this end.

2) Presidential coordination committees should be established.

To adequately address systemic risks and to implement the P-2015 agenda requires comprehensive, integrated, cross-sectoral, whole-of-government approaches.  South Korea’s experience with presidential committees composed of ministers with diverse portfolios, private sector and civil society leaders provides an example of how governments could break the “silos” and meet the holistic nature of systemic threats.

3) There needs to be a single global system of international institutions.

China’s Premier Li Keqiang stated at the World Economic Forum in early 2015 that “the world order established after World War II must be maintained, not overturned.” Together with a speech Li gave at the OECD on July 1st after signing an expanded work program agreement with the OECD and becoming a member of the OECD Development Center, clearly signals of China’s intention to cooperate within the current institutional system. The West needs to reciprocate with clear signals of respect for the increasing roles and influence of China and other emerging market economies in global affairs.

4) We must move toward a single global monitoring system for development targets.

The monitoring and evaluation system that accompanies the post-2015 SDGs will be crucial to guiding the implementation of them. The U.N., the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF have all participated in joint data gathering efforts under the International Development Goals  (IDGs) in the 1990s and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the 2000s. Each of these institutions has a crucial role to play now, but they need to be brought together under one umbrella to orchestrate their contributions to a comprehensive global data system.

By engaging in the post-2015 agenda, the G-20 leaders’ summits would be strengthened by involving G-20 leaders in the people-centered post-2015 agenda. Systemically important countries would be seen as leading on systemically important issues. The G-20 finance ministers can play an appropriate role by serving as the coordinating mechanism for the global system of international institutions for the post-2015 agenda. A G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council, composed of the heads of the presidential committees for sustainable development from G20 countries, could become an effective focal point for assessing systemic sustainability.

These governance innovations could re-energize the G-20 and provide the international community with the leadership, the coordination, and the monitoring capabilities that it needs to implement the post-2015 agenda.

A clamor is rising against "short termism"—judging a company by its performance over the past quarter, rather than the past few years. BlackRock CEO Laurence Fink and Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine, for example, recently joined the Business Roundtable and others in decrying the strong pressures for short-term results exerted by daily stock traders and activist hedge funds. Critics claim that these pressures prevent executives from making long-term investments needed for sustainable corporate growth.

There are pressures on and incentives for corporate leaders to put the short term ahead of the long term, but not necessarily from activist hedge funds or stock trading. And some proposed remedies for short-termism would undermine the economic interests of shareholders.

The current attack on short termism is premised on the sharp increase in the average daily trading volume of stocks over the past few decades. The primary cause has been a relatively small group of day traders, including the notorious high-frequency traders who buy millions of shares and sell them a millisecond later. These traders care not a whit about corporate fundamentals or business plans; they are trying to exploit slight pricing anomalies that arise because of technical differences in securities markets. Thus corporate executives should not be pressured by higher daily trading volumes to avoid good long-term investment spending.

Critics of short-termism are even more alarmed about activist hedge funds that may lobby corporations to pay higher dividends, for example, or sell unprofitable divisions. They claim these funds push for a quick boost in corporate earnings in order to sell their shares for a quick profit.

The data do not support this uniformly negative view. Activist hedge funds display a broad array of strategies and time horizons. On average, they hold a company's stock for one or two years, according to various empirical studies. Yet according to a recent McKinsey study of 400 activist campaigns over the past decade, the median campaign was launched when the company was on the decline and led to higher shareholder returns relative to peers for at least three years.

To win proxy contests, activist hedge funds must persuade other shareholders to support the changes they advocate. The funds usually hold a relatively small percentage of a company's shares; the overwhelming majority are owned by institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension plans.

Activist hedge funds have won roughly half of the proxy contests they've entered, as institutional investors have carefully distinguished among long-term plans depending on a company's specific circumstances. These institutions backed activist campaigns to increase dividends at companies like Apple with huge hoards of cash. But they've also supported multi-year research programs of biotech firms like Amgen that have shown they can deliver.

To thwart the perceived threats of short-termism, critics have proposed measures that would reduce the legal rights and economic interests of all shareholders. Martin Lipton, a prominent opponent of activist hedge funds, has recommended that U.S. corporate law adopt a new norm—that corporate directors be elected to five-year terms, rather than the usual one-year term. Such long tenure, combined with existing anti-takeover defenses, would effectively insulate the leadership of chronically under-performing companies.

There is a better approach: Boards should measure and reward the efforts of corporate executives and portfolio managers by looking at the organization's performance over the past three years. At present, most firms distribute cash bonuses and stock grants on the basis of the prior year's results. This approach does encourage top executives to favor short-term results over long-term growth.

At the same time, the top executives at both public companies and asset managers should be required to retain for three to five years half of the shares they receive through stock grants and options. At present, these people can usually sell all their shares as soon as they vest or the options are exercised. This is an inducement for top executives and managers to push up the company's stock price for a few months so they can sell at a temporary high.

While there are reasonable concerns about corporate short-termism, their remedies should be narrowly tailored. Most of these concerns can be addressed by adopting longer periods for executive compensation. But we should not overreact to day traders or hedge funds by dramatically reducing the legitimate rights and financial interests of all shareholders.

Editor's note: This blog piece is based on findings from the new book Governance in an Age of Abundance: Experiences from the Extractive Industries in Latin America and the Caribbean, which will be launched at a Brookings public event later today. A Spanish version of this post is available on the Inter-American Development Bank's website. 

The myth of Sisyphus represents in Greek mythology a metaphor for pointless and interminable efforts. Sisyphus was condemned by Zeus to push a huge boulder up a steep hill. Every time he was close to reaching the top, the boulder was made to roll back down the hill and to the starting point, so that Sisyphus had to start all over again, in perpetuity.    

This metaphor may sound familiar to countries rich in natural resources. In many of these countries, citizens have hoped for generations that the revenue derived from extractive industries (oil, gas and mining) would translate into concrete benefits. Instead, rents from extractive industries have frequently been misused, either through wasteful state spending or public and private corruption. In many countries, heavy dependence on revenues from extractive industries has produced economic and political distortions. Also, revenues are all too often centralized at the national level, leaving local communities to wonder about the benefits of hosting extractive industries.

Overcoming the ‘Resource Curse’

The good news is that there are countries that have found a way to overcome the so-called "resource curse." In Norway, for example, the revenue deriving from the extractive industries supports a majority of government investment in education and health, as well as the pension system. While many resource-rich states can make the same claim, what makes Norway unusual is that it has been able to do so while minimizing corruption, mitigating economic distortions and ensuring efficiency in government spending at the same time.  

How did Norway do it? A look at the Natural Resources Governance Index (NRGI), developed by the Natural Resource Governance Institute, provides a possible explanation: by strengthening governance in the extractive sector. This implies establishing a robust legal and regulatory framework, agile mechanisms to promote transparency and disseminate information, effective safeguards and rigorous controls, and an overall institutional environment that is business-friendly and conducive to greater accountability in the public sector. And this is not a phenomenon unique to Norway, but it is replicated in other countries with large extractive sectors, such as Australia, Botswana and Canada.

Extractive Industries in Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin American and the Caribbean are at a crucial juncture in their effort to strengthen governance in the management of natural resources. On the one hand the above-mentioned NRGI, which measures the quality of extractives governance in 58 resource-rich countries, shows that among the eleven world leaders in quality of extractives governance, more than half are countries from the region (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Peru). This is especially good news if one considers that Latin America and the Caribbean is the main source of metals at a global level, and that it holds the second largest oil reserves in the world. Latin America and the Caribbean are also remarkable because many countries have managed to develop large extractive sectors while at the same time avoiding the secessionist conflicts over extractives that plague resource-rich countries in other regions of the world.

On the other hand, Latin America still has to resolve some important issues. Overall, the region still falls short on rule of law and corruption measures in comparison to OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. Social conflicts related to the exploitation of natural resources remain a sensitive issue in the region, especially when extractive industries operate in territories where indigenous communities have a significant interest and presence. Citizen demands regarding the control and mitigation of environmental impacts by governments and corporations are increasing, especially in terms of land use and conservation of water resources and forests. And many Latin Americans are increasingly demanding good governance and transparency in state spending.

Transparency is Key to Improving Governance

The recent IDB book Governance in an Age of Abundance: Experiences from the Extractive Industries in Latin America and the Caribbean (IDB, 2014), edited by Juan Cruz Vieyra and Malaika Masson, analyzes these challenges, particularly in light of recent initiatives to strengthen transparency in the governance of natural resources in the region.

The book focuses on two main themes. The first is on how best to improve governance in the extractives sector, especially in a way that promotes inclusive growth and takes into account the concerns of citizens. The key to this is governance mechanisms that include checks and balances to ensure that the needs of local communities are taken into account. The second theme of the book is a focus on evaluating concrete governance proposals, which include improved legislation, licensing arrangements, contracting procedures, and fiscal regimes. Underlying these two themes is a strong argument in favor of strengthened government capacity to produce, use, and disseminate accurate and timely information about the extractive sector.

The book identifies transparency as a key tool to improve the quality of governance in the extractive sector. This is not an easy task, because effective governance of this sector requires states to manage across a complex set of policy domains. Transparency is part of the solution to this problem by making data available to a wider set of stakeholders. This allows for improved coordination inside of government and helps civil society and the private sector to make informed contributions to public policy and hold governments accountable. For example, Colombia, through its Maparegalías initiative, is putting all the information about how money from extractive industry royalties are being spent, community by community, with everything placed online on an interactive map for easy access. But to make the most out of transparency, states need to address shortfalls in human capacity to use newly available data effectively in the public sector. This is particularly true at the sub-national level in many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Ultimately, as transparency improves and governments use data to operate more effectively and efficiently, citizen trust and confidence in the ability of the public sector to manage the wealth produced by extractive industries will improve. 

The findings of the book point towards two key challenges for governments related to designing and implementing transparency initiatives:

1. Governments need to make data more easily available and more accessible to stakeholders. This includes addressing the quality and timeliness of information. It also means improving the ease of use of data, both in terms of the formatting of data and navigability of the platforms that present it.
2. Governments need to be creative about soliciting feedback from stakeholders in the extractive sector. It is not enough to merely present data to the public. Governments should actively seek out input from citizens. This will ultimately mean investing in public and private capacity to analyze available data so that stakeholders can make informed contributions to governance.

These recommendations present the best way for governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to emerge from the paradoxical Sisyphean trap that resource abundance has all too often posed.

The authors are grateful to Pablo Bachelet, Juan Cruz Vieyra, Francesco De Simone and Martin Walter for their comments. 

Event Information

During the past decade, an abundance of wealth in minerals and hydrocarbons in Latin America and the Caribbean has translated into substantial revenues and macroeconomic growth. However, operations in the extractive sector have also led to significant challenges, such as corruption, negative social outcomes and environmental impacts.

On November 4, the Latin America Initiative and Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), hosted a discussion on governance and institutional capacity in the extractive sector in Latin America and the Caribbean, drawing on findings from the publication Transparent Governance in an Age of Abundance: Experiences from the Extractive Industries in Latin America and the Caribbean, published by the IDB. Edited by Malaika Masson and Juan Cruz Vieyra, the book presents transparency as a central element to bolster governance quality and state legitimacy in the context of an increasingly demanding citizenry.

 Join the conversation on Twitter using #LatAmResources

Audio

• Transparent Governance in Latin America’s Extractive Industries

Publicly traded companies in the U.S. provide their shareholders with a voice on who runs the company.  But corporate governance is not like a political democracy where voters usually choose between two candidates.   The company's slate of directors is typically the only one presented to its shareholders who have a limited choice - vote for the company's slate or withhold their votes. 

Recently, however, the director election process has begun to become more democratic. This is happening gradually on an individual company basis under Delaware law, and not by a federal rule applicable to all publicly traded companies. 

In the United States, the traditional rule is that a company's current board nominates its slate of directors for the next annual election.  Then the company foots the bill to prepare and solicit proxies for this slate from all the company's shareholders, typically mailing them ballots.

Although shareholders may nominate their own candidate to be a director, they must bear the entire expense of preparing and distributing proxy materials to all the company's shareholders.  For large publicly traded companies, this expense is so high that it effectively prevents most shareholders from making director nominations (unless someone is waging a proxy fight for control).

In an effort to help even the playing field, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2010 adopted the "proxy access" rule, which would have allowed certain shareholders to nominate less than a majority of a company's directors.  Then these shareholder nominees would have to be included in the company's proxy materials along with its slate of proposed directors.  However, the SEC rule was struck down by the DC Court of Appeals on procedural grounds. 

While the SEC has not proposed a revised proxy access rule, Delaware law now permits companies chartered in that state to adopt a bylaw authorizing shareholder nominations (the charters of most large American companies are registered in Delaware because of its favorable corporate laws).  Thus, Delaware law now provides a mechanism for a large company to allow proxy access under conditions acceptable to that company and its shareholders.

On February 6 of this year, General Electric led the way by adopting a bylaw allowing shareholders to nominate a few directors if these shareholders held at least 3 percent of the company's voting shares for at least three years.  Given the size and prominence of General Electric, it is a signal event – many companies should follow suit.

More broadly, this 3+3 approach of General Electric is being advocated by officials at New York City's

pension plan (NYCers), which holds over $160 billion in assets.   NYCers has submitted "advisory" shareholder resolutions to 75 public companies in which it holds shares.   While these resolutions are not binding on the company, they carry significant weight if approved by a substantial majority of voting shareholders.

In response, Whole Foods has proposed to allow director nominations by shareholders owning at least 9 percent of their shares for at least 5 years.   After a series of complex legal moves, the SEC has declined to permit Whole Foods to exclude the 3+3 proposal because the company is making a different proposal on the same subject.

The SEC's non-decision, together with General Electric's dramatic move, reopens the debate on the pros and cons of proxy access.  Here are some of the key arguments and counterarguments.

• Company officials worry that proxy access will lead to special interest groups hijacking boards for their own purposes.   But shareholder advocates say that the hijacking scenario is unlikely because of the 3 percent ownership threshold and the need to garner over 50 percent of shareholder votes for their nominees.
• Company officials believe that shareholders would be confused if there were more than one set of directors nominated in the same proxy materials. But shareholder advocates can show how proxy materials can be easily understood by clearly separating company and shareholder nominees.
• Shareholder advocates believe that proxy access is likely to increase constructive engagement between company directors and their large institutional shareholders. But company officials are concerned that proxy access will disrupt the election process and lead to dissension among directors.
• Shareholder advocates point out that in countries like Australia and United Kingdom that do have proxy access, it is used sparingly by large shareholders. But company officials emphasize that the U.S. is a much more adversarial society, with more aggressive tactics by activist hedge funds and others.

We cannot resolve these arguments and counterarguments on proxy access in the abstract.

Instead, though actions of companies like General Electric and shareholders like the New York City pension plan, we will be able to examine the actual effects of various methods and conditions for shareholders to nominate directors.  Let’s see what happens on the ground.

In our latest 21st Century Capitalism initiative paper, "What must corporate directors do? Maximizing shareholder value versus creating value through team production," author Margaret M. Blair explores how the share value maximization norm (or the “short-termism” malady) came to dominate, why it is wrong, and why the “team production” approach provides a better basis for governing corporations over the long term.

Blair reviews the legal and economic theories behind the share-value maximization norm, and then lays out a theory of corporate law building on the economics of team production. Blair demonstrates how the team production theory recognizes that creating wealth for society as a whole requires recognizing the importance of all of the participants in a corporate enterprise, and making sure that all share in the expanding pie so that they continue to collaborate to create wealth.

Arguing that the corporate form itself helps solve the team production problem, Blair details five features which distinguish corporations from other organizational forms:

1. Legal personality
2. Limited liability
3. Transferable shares
4. Management under a Board of Directors
5. Indefinite existence

Blair concludes that these five characteristics are all problematic from a principal-agent point of view where shareholders are principals. However, the team production theory makes sense out of these arrangements. This theory provides a rationale for the role of corporate directors consistent with the role that boards of directors historically understood themselves to play: balancing competing interests so the whole organization stays productive.

Downloads

• Download the paper

Event Information

In July 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a far-reaching and still-controversial piece of legislation that was intended to reduce the odds of a repeat of the worst financial crisis in generations.  Five years later, is it working as hoped? Did it go too far—or not far enough? Are there parts that should be revisited? What remains on the U.S. and global financial-stability to-do list? 

On July 8, the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy hosted a conversation with Treasury Secretary Jack Lew to address those and other questions about financial stability and the economy.

 Follow the conversation at @BrookingsEcon or #DoddFrank

Video

• Dodd-Frank at 5: A conversation with Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew
• Secretary Jack Lew on Dodd Frank
• Secretary Jack Lew on the $10 bill
• Secretary Jack Lew on Greece
• Secretary Jack Lew on China

Audio

• Dodd-Frank at 5: A conversation with Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150708_dodd_frank_lew_transcript