The new geopolitics of nuclear power The World Today mhiggins.drupal 27 September 2022

States may be looking to build or restore nuclear plants, but they will need to bypass Chinese and Russian sector dominance, says Sung-Mi Kim.

Against the backdrop of a worldwide energy crisis, the global nuclear market may be seeing a renaissance with growing interest in nuclear energy.

Sceptics are being compelled to rethink the trade-off calculus of nuclear power for the first time since the 2011 Fukushima disaster, which prompted countries to postpone or phase out nuclear power. The nuclear option is again being seen as a way of boosting a nation’s energy autonomy and its ability to weather the volatility caused by unpredictable Russian gas supplies.

Adoption or expansion of nuclear energy capability will not allow a country to be free of Russian influence entirely given its dominant presence in the global nuclear sector. Rosatom, Russia’s state-controlled power corporation, and its subsidiaries, make Russia the leading exporter of nuclear power plants. Russia also supplies more than a third of the global fuel-related services, namely uranium conversion and enrichment. Notably, Russia has been capable of building these into an attractive financial package for importing countries, backed by generous state support.

Like Russia, Chinese government-owned nuclear corporations have started to make forays into export markets as part of its Belt and Road Initiative and ‘Go Out’ policy, which encourages companies to invest overseas. Both China and Russia have a strong comparative advantage in offering competitive state-backed financing schemes for nuclear products and services.

In the meantime, nuclear investment in advanced economies in the West have tended to remain stagnant. The International Energy Agency reports that of the 31 reactors built in the past five years, 27 are of Russian or Chinese design.

Given current market conditions and the technological complexity of the nuclear fuel cycle, new entrants will find it difficult to acquire energy autonomy through nuclear power. They will have to rely on foreign suppliers to build, operate and maintain their nuclear plants and supporting infrastructure. It typically takes a decade to build a nuclear plant and start generating electricity, and nuclear plant deals are built on a decades-long commitment of the parties to forge a political, technical, regulatory and scientific partnership that goes beyond purely commercial terms.

Nuclear export, therefore, is often a long-term, whole-of-the-government effort involving diplomatic skills and geopolitical calculations, and is subject to global oversight to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The US is building strategic nuclear partnerships

In response to the Russian and Chinese dominance of the civilian nuclear sector, American nuclear industries are asking the government to streamline the export-licensing process and provide them with support. The US government is also establishing strategic partnerships with nuclear-capable allies such as South Korea to win procurement contracts. South Korea has recently made a U-turn in its nuclear policy. Its new president Yoon Suk-yeol intends to revive the role of nuclear power to help meet the country’s climate targets and has vowed to export 10 nuclear power plants by 2030.

In Japan, where nuclear energy production was halted after the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, a new policy platform was launched in 2019 to enhance public-private collaboration for nuclear research and development.

Intensifying geopolitical tensions between the US and its allies on one side, and Russia and China on the other, will inevitably affect nuclear market dynamics. Domestic economic slowdowns and international sanctions will be a stress test for the export potential of Russia and China.

For instance, in May 2022, Finland eliminated Rosatom from its consortium to build a nuclear power plant, citing delays and increased uncertainties stemming from the invasion of Ukraine. In 2020, Romania cancelled its nuclear deal with China, instead securing an agreement with the US to build two more reactors for its Cernavoda plant. The decision was seen as a move to align Romania with US intentions to sideline China.

 In March 2022, when the Czech Republic officially launched a tender to build a new reactor at the Dukovany nuclear plant, Rosatom and Chinese state-controlled nuclear exporter CGN have been excluded from the tender on security grounds.

As countries try to wean themselves off price-volatile gas and decarbonize their economies to meet climate targets, new commercial opportunities are opening up for the nuclear industry. At least 15 countries are building reactors, according to the World Nuclear Association. Some, such as China, are building more than one.

More than 30 countries are considering, planning or starting a nuclear programme. There is also a growing need for replacing or extending the lives of ageing reactors. It is in this context that the commercial, geopolitical and regulatory aspects of nuclear energy will play an increasing role in the  geopolitical contest for money and influence.

Nuclear proliferation in a fragmenting world 13 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2022 Online

Where does the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stand in 2022?

With the war in Ukraine and China–US tensions rising, the threat of a nuclear arms race has never been as high since the Cold War.

Global efforts to control the appropriation and use of nuclear weapons are strained with the war in Ukraine, US–Russia and US–China tension, Iran on the nuclear threshold, instability in Pakistan and the ongoing threat from North Korea.

The Review Conference of the NPT that took place in New York this August sought to deal with the multiple nuclear threats, but new missile technology such as hypersonic glide vehicles and torpedoes are not covered by a treaty.

Russia and the US are in a development phase for a host of new technologies and delivery systems, especially after both withdrew from various arms-control treaties in the 2000s and 2010s. Now the nuclear stockpile is growing again and major superpowers are adopting confrontational geostrategic positions.

As the world’s established orders and system fragment, there is a possibility the nine countries with confirmed nuclear weapons could grow. Events in Ukraine highlight the need for a new, modern agreement on nuclear weapons control, needed today more than ever.

The panel of experts discuss key questions including:

• What did ‘RevCon’ in New York tell us about the adoption or update to the NPT?

• Will the war in Ukraine deter or prevent any agreement between nations or does nuclear weapons control represent an area of potential multilateral harmony?

• Are we likely to see a new arms race akin to the Cold War? Where does China fit into this race?

• How has technology changed the arms control landscape?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Nuclear stability for all put at risk by Putin's speech Explainer NCapeling 22 February 2023

Explaining the risks of Russia’s decision to suspend the New START nuclear treaty with the US, and the wider implications for international relations.

Why is New START important?

Following the collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF), New START is the only remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the US and Russia.

This means that without it there would be no limits on numbers or the type of Russian and US deployed nuclear warheads. The limits set under New START are lower than those set under its predecessor, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

It is also important for maintaining some form of strategic arms control between Russia and the US. The treaty provides the US and Russia with mechanisms for transparency and confidence-building, for instance through regular biannual data exchanges, as well as measures for verification.

What is Russia able to do next after suspending participation?

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to suspend its participation could pave the way for Russia to increase the number of deployed warheads, delivery vehicles and launchers, potentially exceeding the limits placed on numbers under the new START.

Putin stated he would resume testing of nuclear weapons if the US resumed – Russia is a full state party to the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiated in 1996, as is the UK and France. The US has signed, as has China, but neither state has yet ratified the treaty.

Other countries required to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force include Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.

Although the US is modernizing its nuclear weapons forces, there is no need – or plan – for the US to test nuclear warheads, and it is the same for the UK and France.

Concerns are now rising that Russia could point to no-fissionable yield experiments – which are allowed under the treaty and which the US and other nuclear weapons possessors conduct primarily for safety purposes – and then falsely declare those to be nuclear weapons tests, thus paving the way for a narrative to justify the resumption of nuclear testing by Russia.

Conducting a nuclear weapons test would be seen clearly as a further step on the escalation scale towards nuclear use for Russia.

While inspections of nuclear weapons sites had not resumed since COVID-19, Russia’s suspension of its participation could result in the further halting of other transparency and verification measures under New START, including the regular mutual data exchanges between the US and Russia – for example on warhead numbers, locations, and technical information on weapons systems and their sites – which are conducted through the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).

What is the difference between withdrawing from New START and ‘suspending’ participation?

In his speech, Putin announced the suspension of Russian participation in New START. While this does not mean Russia has formally withdrawn from the treaty, the suspension could enable Russia to continue preventing the US from inspecting its nuclear weapons sites and halt Russia’s participation in other obligations, such as the routine reporting and data exchanges on nuclear weapons as well as meetings of the BCC.

The decision to suspend participation rather than withdraw from the treaty means Russia retains the option to return to compliance at a later point. However, it is not yet clear under what conditions Russia would opt to return to compliance with the treaty, or whether this means the US will, in turn, suspend their own obligations.

The treaty text itself does not provide for a suspension of participation by parties to the treaty. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does address the mechanisms for suspension of participation in a treaty. Russia is a full state party to the Vienna Convention, but the US has remained a signatory without ratification since 1970.

There is a precedent of Russia suspending its membership in arms control treaties rather than withdrawing, which is when Russia suspended its participation in the original Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 2007.

The US does not recognize Russia’s suspension of its participation in the CFE treaty, but this does not make a material difference to Russian actions.

What does the suspension mean for the wider international treaty regime?

Russia’s suspension of the New START could signal the end of strategic arms control between the two countries. There is now virtually no regular scheduled arms control communication between the two countries bilaterally – this is a dangerous position to be in, especially in times of crisis.

The suspension of New START further erodes limited recourse for communication between the two countries, by suspending information exchange and meetings of the BCC under the treaty.

This is likely to have wider implications for progress on nuclear non-proliferation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as the wider international security treaty regime.

Will this increase the nuclear threat or the likelihood of nuclear use?

New START provides both the US and Russia with a degree of transparency surrounding nuclear weapons systems. Without an avenue for regular data exchange and notification, and mechanisms for verification through mutual nuclear weapons site inspections, the risk of misperception or misunderstanding could increase and fuel uncertainty which could increases the perception of threat between Russia and the US.

What are Putin’s reasons for suspending Russia’s participation?

Putin and various members of his government have been linking the future of New START to the war in Ukraine rhetorically for several months now, threatening that Russia may not be willing to negotiate a follow-on treaty for when New START expires in Feb 2026 because of US support for Ukraine.

By announcing Russia’s suspension of the treaty in his main address on the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine, Putin is sending a signal about Russia’s intent for the future.

Russia’s new hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard was already counted under New START and it is likely follow-on negotiations would have focused on some of Russia’s other hypersonic capabilities or other new nuclear systems.

Without the treaty, Russia might be less inhibited in its development of new nuclear systems.

Have both the US and Russia been compliant with the treaty until now?

Both the US and Russia have remained within the central limits of the treaty since its entry into force in 2011. Following the outbreak of COVID-19, both sides agreed to suspend in-person inspections due to restrictions on travel, and attempts to recommence in-person inspections in 2022 were unsuccessful.

In August 2022, Russia prevented US on-site inspections under New START and a November 2022 meeting of the BCC was called off by Russian officials. Russia has blamed both the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the sanctions burden on Russia as reasons for not wanting to resume inspections.

World in brief: Ukraine and nuclear proliferation to dominate G7 The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Following Russia’s ongoing intimidation, Japan will use its presidency of the G7 – and its history – to prioritize the dangers of nuclear threats, writes James Orr.

Two issues are expected to dominate the agenda as Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima from May 19-21. Central to talks will be the conflict in Ukraine, with member states eager to highlight a message of unity and resolve in the face of Russia’s continuing aggression.

Fumio Kishida, Japan’s prime minister, made an unannounced visit to Kyiv on March 21, meeting the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  This coincided with a visit to Moscow by China’s leader Xi Jinping, who described Russian president Vladimir Putin as a friend and partner.

‘Absolutely unacceptable’

Hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima is significant, too, with Kishida expected to emphasize the ‘absolutely unacceptable’ threat of nuclear proliferation. Ongoing tensions between China and Taiwan, together with recent North Korean ballistic missile tests, have heightened fears of a breakdown in security in the region.

Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin’s menacing references to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine has raised the prospect of a potentially devastating conflict with NATO. ‘Kishida’s principal goal for the presidency of the G7 is to try to draw the world away from the path of destruction that is another nuclear conflict,’ said Duncan Bartlett, a research associate at SOAS, the School of Oriental and African Studies, in London.

‘Early last year, Putin warned of terrible consequences if NATO and the West interfered in the Ukraine conflict, and that was widely seen as being a nuclear threat. North Korea is also pursuing its nuclear weapons programme, and in February an intercontinental ballistic missile went into the sea just near the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido,’ said Bartlett.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Kishida has taken a firm position on Putin, in line with his G7 peers. President Zelenskyy has addressed the Japanese parliament via video link and Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs, was invited by his Japanese counterpart to a G7 meeting held during the Munich Security Conference earlier this year.

Kishida committed $600 million in financial support to Ukraine and his government may well announce the provision of further non-lethal assistance to Zelenskyy at the summit. The country’s constitution effectively outlaws the export of deadly weapons to foreign forces. On his visit to Kyiv, Kishida promised a further $30 million to Ukraine.

‘Kishida has revised key defence documents and is pursuing a radical and controversial expansion of Japan’s defence budget and capabilities,’ said Hugo Dobson, Professor of Japan’s International Relations at the University of Sheffield.

‘He and his G7 partners have signed historic defence agreements, pledged to strengthen ties or declared the inseparability of their security in light of actual conflict in Ukraine and potential conflict in East Asia. Kishida has linked the two by emphasizing that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,’ said Dobson.

Aside from security matters, Kishida will at the summit address issues on clean energy, climate change, global health and boosting multilateral cooperation to drive post-pandemic economic recovery.

Invitation to Nagasaki

He is understood to have invited President Joe Biden to visit Nagasaki, where the second of America’s two atomic bombs is estimated to have killed 60,000 people in August 1945. No sitting US president has ever visited the city, and Kishida, who grew up in Hiroshima, may see the visit as an opportunity to boost his flagging domestic approval ratings. It may also serve as a timely reminder to Russia and others that the G7 opposes any future nuclear weapon use.

Can the world avoid a new nuclear arms race? 18 November 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

The Doomsday Clock stands at 90 seconds to midnight – the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been. As geopolitical competition intensifies, nuclear risks are resurging at an alarming rate. The collapse of key arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has removed crucial safeguards against arms races. Efforts to extend or replace existing treaties face significant hurdles in the current geopolitical climate.

Nuclear rhetoric has become more aggressive, as evidenced by Russian and North Korean nuclear threats. Several nuclear-armed states are also engaging in extensive modernization programmes of their nuclear arsenals, potentially fuelling a new arms race.

Despite these pressures, the number of nuclear possessor states has held steady so far. The ongoing Iranian efforts to build nuclear weapons is the closest attempt by a new state to acquire nuclear weapons. As the global security environment becomes more and more tense, existing nuclear possessor states increasingly rely on their nuclear weapons. This might threaten the global consensus against nuclear proliferation.

This session examines these competing pressures and propose strategies to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons use and proliferation. Our expert panel explores diplomatic initiatives, technical measures, and policy innovations to address these critical challenges.

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• Are we already in the middle of a global nuclear arms race?
• How can international arms control treaties be negotiated in the current geopolitical environment?
• Does a new US president change the nuclear calculus? Is the US still able to reassure allies of its ‘extended deterrence’?
• How can we reduce the risk of additional proliferation? Which states might want to acquire nuclear weapons and what can we do about it?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Hepatocyte nuclear factor-1β (HNF-1β) is a tissue-specific transcription factor that is required for normal kidney development and renal epithelial differentiation. Mutations of HNF-1β produce congenital kidney abnormalities and inherited renal tubulopathies. Here, we show that ablation of HNF-1β in mIMCD3 renal epithelial cells results in activation of β-catenin and increased expression of lymphoid enhancer–binding factor 1 (LEF1), a downstream effector in the canonical Wnt signaling pathway. Increased expression and nuclear localization of LEF1 are also observed in cystic kidneys from Hnf1b mutant mice. Expression of dominant-negative mutant HNF-1β in mIMCD3 cells produces hyperresponsiveness to exogenous Wnt ligands, which is inhibited by siRNA-mediated knockdown of Lef1. WT HNF-1β binds to two evolutionarily conserved sites located 94 and 30 kb from the mouse Lef1 promoter. Ablation of HNF-1β decreases H3K27 trimethylation repressive marks and increases β-catenin occupancy at a site 4 kb upstream to Lef1. Mechanistically, WT HNF-1β recruits the polycomb-repressive complex 2 that catalyzes H3K27 trimethylation. Deletion of the β-catenin–binding domain of LEF1 in HNF-1β–deficient cells abolishes the increase in Lef1 transcription and decreases the expression of downstream Wnt target genes. The canonical Wnt target gene, Axin2, is also a direct transcriptional target of HNF-1β through binding to negative regulatory elements in the gene promoter. These findings demonstrate that HNF-1β regulates canonical Wnt target genes through long-range effects on histone methylation at Wnt enhancers and reveal a new mode of active transcriptional repression by HNF-1β.

Nuclear Energy in a Post-Brexit Europe 11 October 2019 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Brexit will significantly change the balance within the EU in relation to nuclear energy. Apart from France and Finland, both of whose nuclear development programmes are behind schedule, the UK is the only member state in northern or western Europe currently investing in new nuclear capacity. Brexit will therefore leave the supporters of nuclear energy within the EU27 and the European Commission in a weaker position.

The speaker will argue that at a time when the energy industry needs to accelerate its shift away from fossil fuels, and when the electricity generation industry must cut its carbon emissions faster than it has ever managed to do in the past, this change is unhelpful.

The workshop will also address the need for additional interconnector capacity and the future of carbon-trading outside the EU emission trading system and how this relates to potential nuclear energy capacity.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK 23 February 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 January 2022 Online

Experts discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives on green taxonomy.

This event will address the controversial additions to the EU green finance taxonomy, including the labelling of some nuclear and gas power sources as “green”. Hear perspectives from the UK, EU and international experts.

The UK has committed to creating a green taxonomy to provide a shared understanding of which economic activities count as sustainable. It should be robust and evidence-based, taking an objective and science-based approach to assessing sustainability.

Technical Screening Criteria (TSCs) for the climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation objectives within the UK green taxonomy will be based on those in the EU Taxonomy. The Government is currently reviewing these and expects to consult on UK draft TSCs in the first quarter of 2022, ahead of legislating by the end of 2022.

In recent weeks the European Commission has proposed controversial additional TSCs for the EU taxonomy, most notably the inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in power generation, which are currently being discussed by Member States and the European Parliament.

The inclusion of controversial power sources not only risks affecting investment and deployment patterns in the net-zero transition, but may also be a threat to the authority of the taxonomy as a whole

Key questions for the UK now include whether and how to address these issues in its own taxonomy, and how to promote a science-based ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions that can lead to robust international standards.

This Environment and Society Discussion Series event brings expert voices together to discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives, and is co-organized with E3G.

Type I and III interferons induce expression of the “myxovirus resistance proteins” MxA in human cells and its ortholog Mx1 in murine cells. Human MxA forms cytoplasmic structures, whereas murine Mx1 forms nuclear bodies. Whereas both HuMxA and MuMx1 are antiviral toward influenza A virus (FLUAV) (an orthomyxovirus), only HuMxA is considered antiviral toward vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) (a rhabdovirus). We previously reported that the cytoplasmic human GFP-MxA structures were phase-separated membraneless organelles (“biomolecular condensates”). In the present study, we investigated whether nuclear murine Mx1 structures might also represent phase-separated biomolecular condensates. The transient expression of murine GFP-Mx1 in human Huh7 hepatoma, human Mich-2H6 melanoma, and murine NIH 3T3 cells led to the appearance of Mx1 nuclear bodies. These GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies were rapidly disassembled by exposing cells to 1,6-hexanediol (5%, w/v), or to hypotonic buffer (40–50 mosm), consistent with properties of membraneless phase-separated condensates. Fluorescence recovery after photobleaching (FRAP) assays revealed that the GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies upon photobleaching showed a slow partial recovery (mobile fraction: ∼18%) suggestive of a gel-like consistency. Surprisingly, expression of GFP-MuMx1 in Huh7 cells also led to the appearance of GFP-MuMx1 in 20–30% of transfected cells in a novel cytoplasmic giantin-based intermediate filament meshwork and in cytoplasmic bodies. Remarkably, Huh7 cells with cytoplasmic murine GFP-MuMx1 filaments, but not those with only nuclear bodies, showed antiviral activity toward VSV. Thus, GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies comprised phase-separated condensates. Unexpectedly, GFP-MuMx1 in Huh7 cells also associated with cytoplasmic giantin-based intermediate filaments, and such cells showed antiviral activity toward VSV.

Stephanie E. Hood
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1720-1732
Research Articles

Lipins are eukaryotic proteins with functions in lipid synthesis and the homeostatic control of energy balance. They execute these functions by acting as phosphatidate phosphatase enzymes in the cytoplasm and by changing gene expression after translocation into the cell nucleus, in particular under fasting conditions. Here, we asked whether nuclear translocation and the enzymatic activity of Drosophila Lipin serve essential functions and how gene expression changes, under both fed and fasting conditions, when nuclear translocation is impaired. To address these questions, we created a Lipin null mutant, a mutant expressing Lipin lacking a nuclear localization signal (Lipin^NLS), and a mutant expressing enzymatically dead Lipin. Our data support the conclusion that the enzymatic but not nuclear gene regulatory activity of Lipin is essential for survival. Notably, adult Lipin^NLS flies were not only viable but also exhibited improved life expectancy. In contrast, they were highly susceptible to starvation. Both the improved life expectancy in the fed state and the decreased survival in the fasting state correlated with changes in metabolic gene expression. Moreover, increased life expectancy of fed flies was associated with a decreased metabolic rate. Interestingly, in addition to metabolic genes, genes involved in feeding behavior and the immune response were misregulated in Lipin^NLS flies. Altogether, our data suggest that the nuclear activity of Lipin influences the genomic response to nutrient availability with effects on life expectancy and starvation resistance. Thus, nutritional or therapeutic approaches that aim at lowering nuclear translocation of lipins in humans may be worth exploring.

Nuclear Disarmament and the Protection of Cultural Heritage Research paper sysadmin 6 October 2017

States possessing nuclear weapons should be called upon to consider and publish the risks posed to cultural heritage, and their mitigation strategies, in their nuclear-weapons doctrines and policies.

Summary

• Renewed risk assessments for nuclear weapons and policies are taking place around the world in light of nuclear modernization and the changing geostrategic environment that is making the use of nuclear weapons more likely. As such the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and tests have received increased attention. However, the effect on cultural heritage has so far been neglected.
• The potential for armed conflict to destroy cultural heritage has been recognized in international law since 1954. There is significant evidence on the impact of nuclear weapons on cultural heritage including the consequences of their use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the effect of nuclear-testing programmes in places of cultural significance since 1945. States that possess nuclear weapons have increased liabilities and responsibilities to protect cultural heritage and cultural rights. The need to protect cultural heritage should strengthen the case for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.
• Failure to take into account the protection of heritage in the development of nuclear weapons policies – including disarmament, non-proliferation and arms-control negotiations – significantly undermines states’ existing commitments to protecting heritage threatened by conflict.
• Risk assessments of the impact of nuclear weapons on cultural heritage and important cultural artefacts – and methods of preventing such catastrophic damage – should be part of protecting cultural heritage in every country and the subject of informed public debate. A new body of knowledge on the full range of nuclear weapons impacts would introduce a fresh perspective to inform decision-makers, international organizations and the public in thinking about nuclear weapons policies and practices.
• Risk and resilience frameworks, which provide sets of solutions for risk assessments, would allow assessments of nuclear weapons threats to heritage and highlight vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Such frameworks would provide a basis for policymakers to identify the world’s cultural heritage most at risk and help develop mitigation strategies to ensure that it is protected. In particular, states possessing nuclear weapons should be called upon to consider and publish the risks posed to cultural heritage, and their mitigation strategies, in their nuclear weapons doctrines and policies, as a contribution to transparency and confidence-building, and as a responsibility to the world’s shared heritage. International organizations, such as the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), have a role to play in bridging security perspectives with protecting cultural heritage.

A new nuclear order 7 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Rafael Mariano Grossi.

For more than half a century, the global nuclear non-proliferation framework has supported international security and facilitated the expansion of the many peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. 

What is happening today in Ukraine, Iran and North Korea, not only challenges the way we deal with the existential threat of nuclear weapons, but also the impact it could have on addressing another existential threat – climate change.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the biggest test to global resolve both in avoiding nuclear conflict and in ensuring the safety of one of the biggest nuclear power programmes in Europe.

Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency discusses key questions on global nuclear cooperation including:

• The impact of the war in Ukraine and issues with Iran and North Korea on countries’ risk assessment with regards to nuclear non-proliferation.

• What the IAEA’s on-the-ground presence and the director general’s missions to Ukraine, particularly the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, tells us about what is necessary – now and in the long term – to ensure the safety and security of nuclear material under all circumstances.

• The role of ensuring nuclear energy can play its vital part in mitigating climate change now and in the future.

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Bispecific antibodies (bsAbs) are engineered to target 2 different epitopes simultaneously. About 75% of the 16 clinically approved bsAbs have entered the clinic internationally since 2022. Hence, research on biomedical imaging of various radiolabeled bsAb scaffolds may serve to improve patient selection for bsAb therapy. Here, we provide a comprehensive overview of recent advances in radiolabeled bsAbs for imaging via PET or SPECT. We compare direct targeting and pretargeting approaches in preclinical and clinical studies in oncologic research. Furthermore, we show preclinical applications of imaging bsAbs in neurodegenerative diseases. Finally, we offer perspectives on the future directions of imaging bsAbs based on their challenges and opportunities.

Earlier this month, the United States and the Republic of Korea reached an agreement on greater cooperation on civil nuclear energy projects, the U.S. Department of Energy said this week.

NEW YORK, Nov. 1, 2024 — NANO Nuclear Energy Inc. has announced the October 29, 2024 closing of the sale of an additional 317,646 shares of its common stock at […]

The post NANO Nuclear Energy Raises Over $40M from Recent Underwritten Follow-On Offering appeared first on HPCwire.

Prithviraj Rajebhosale
Oct 23, 2024; 44:e0063242024-e0063242024
Cellular

Neuronal cytotoxic edema is implicated in neuronal injury and death, yet mitigating brain edema with osmotic and surgical interventions yields poor clinical outcomes. Importantly, neuronal swelling and its downstream consequences during early brain development remain poorly investigated, and new treatment approaches are needed. We explored Ca²⁺-dependent downstream effects after neuronal cytotoxic edema caused by diverse injuries in mice of both sexes using multiphoton Ca²⁺ imaging in vivo [Postnatal Day (P)12–17] and in acute brain slices (P8–12). After different excitotoxic insults, cytosolic GCaMP6s translocated into the nucleus after a few minutes in a subpopulation of neurons, persisting for hours. We used an automated morphology-detection algorithm to detect neuronal soma and quantified the nuclear translocation of GCaMP6s as the nuclear to cytosolic intensity (N/C ratio). Elevated neuronal N/C ratios occurred concurrently with persistent elevation in Ca²⁺ loads and could also occur independently from neuronal swelling. Electron microscopy revealed that the nuclear translocation was associated with the increased nuclear pore size. The nuclear accumulation of GCaMP6s in neurons led to neocortical circuit dysfunction, mitochondrial pathology, and increased cell death. Inhibiting calpains, a family of Ca²⁺-activated proteases, prevented elevated N/C ratios and neuronal swelling. In summary, in the developing brain, we identified a calpain-dependent alteration of nuclear transport in a subpopulation of neurons after disease-relevant insults leading to long-term circuit dysfunction and cell death. The nuclear translocation of GCaMP6 and other cytosolic proteins after acute excitotoxicity can be an early biomarker of brain injury in the developing brain.

Neuregulin1 (Nrg1) signaling is critical for neuronal development and function from fate specification to synaptic plasticity. Type III Nrg1 is a synaptic protein which engages in bidirectional signaling with its receptor ErbB4. Forward signaling engages ErbB4 phosphorylation, whereas back signaling engages two known mechanisms: (1) local axonal PI3K-AKT signaling and (2) cleavage by -secretase resulting in cytosolic release of the intracellular domain (ICD), which can traffic to the nucleus (Bao et al., 2003; Hancock et al., 2008). To dissect the contribution of these alternate signaling strategies to neuronal development, we generated a transgenic mouse with a missense mutation (V₃₂₁L) in the Nrg1 transmembrane domain that disrupts nuclear back signaling with minimal effects on forward signaling or local back signaling and was previously found to be associated with psychosis (Walss-Bass et al., 2006). We combined RNA sequencing, retroviral fate mapping of neural stem cells, behavioral analyses, and various network analyses of transcriptomic data to investigate the effect of disrupting Nrg1 nuclear back signaling in the dentate gyrus (DG) of male and female mice. The V₃₂₁L mutation impairs nuclear translocation of the Nrg1 ICD and alters gene expression in the DG. V₃₂₁L mice show reduced stem cell proliferation, altered cell cycle dynamics, fate specification defects, and dendritic dysmorphogenesis. Orthologs of known schizophrenia (SCZ)-susceptibility genes were dysregulated in the V₃₂₁L DG. These genes coordinated a larger network with other dysregulated genes. Weighted gene correlation network analysis and protein interaction network analyses revealed striking similarity between DG transcriptomes of V₃₂₁L mouse and humans with SCZ.

The technology, enabled by thorium atoms, could keep time more accurately than atomic clocks and enable new discoveries about gravity, gravitational waves and dark matter

The grassroots organization, Nihon Hidankyo, was lauded for "demonstrating through witness testimony that nuclear weapons must never be used again"

Stefano Terlizzi joined the Ken and Mary Alice Lindquist Department of Nuclear Engineering as the John and Jean M. Brennan Clean Energy Early Career Professor on July 22. In this Q&A, Terlizzi talks about his research background and interests, why he chose Penn State and more.

This week SA Money Report tries to understand eThekwini's surprising plan for nuclear power, and whether the ANC's RET faction has a hand in things.

India has ambitious plans to set up nuclear reactors across the country, especially in states where thermal power plants have either completed its life, or where access to coal is a challenge.

India has ambitious plans to set up nuclear reactors across the country, especially in states where thermal power plants have either completed its life, or where access to coal is a challenge.

NASA’s Power to Explore Challenge calls on U.S. students to submit ideas for moon missions powered by radioisotope systems. The contest encourages kindergarten through Year 12 students to envision a mission, detail objectives, and apply their unique “power” to achieve mission success. Entries are due by January 31, 2025, and grand prize winners will tour NASA’s Glenn Research Center, gaining insight into the technology and science of space exploration.

[Namibian] Russian company Rosatom and South African AllWeld Nuclear and Industrial are joining forces to promote the sustainable development of nuclear energy in Africa.

BAKU, Azerbaijan — The head of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog said Tuesday he's hopeful that meetings this week with Iranian officials, including the country's new president, can lead to a breakthrough in monitoring the country's nuclear program, a longstanding issue that has gained new urgency as Israel has twice struck Iran amid rising tensions in the Middle East. Rafael Mariano Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, will travel to Iran on Wednesday to meet for the first time with President Masoud Pezeshkian, who was elected in July. Grossi said he hopes to build on positive discussions he had with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during the U.N. General Assembly in September. "We have a problem that we need to solve," Grossi said in an interview at the U.N. climate conference in Azerbaijan. "That is this gap, this lack of confidence, which we should not allow to grow into a self-fulfilling prophecy of using nuclear facilities as targets." He added: "There has been a bit of a dire straits dynamic with Iran that we want to go beyond." Iran is rapidly advancing its atomic program while increasing stockpiles of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels, all in defiance of international demands, according to the IAEA. Iran says its program is for energy purposes, not to build weapons. Grossi's visit comes as Israel and Iran have traded missile attacks in recent months after more than a year of war in Gaza, which is governed by Hamas, a group supported by Iran. Grossi noted that international law prohibits the attack of nuclear facilities and "it's obvious that is something that can have radiological consequences." The Biden administration said last month that it had won assurances from Israel that it would not attack nuclear or oil sites. A 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers put limits on Iran's nuclear program, which the West fears could be used to make nuclear weapons. The deal included the lifting of economic sanctions on Iran. But that deal collapsed after Donald Trump's administration in 2018 pulled the United States from it. That led Iran to abandon all limits put on its program and enrich uranium to up to 60% purity. When asked if the IAEA feared Iran may be developing a bomb, Grossi said he didn't "have any information that would sustain that." He added that inspectors' job was not to "judge intentions," but rather verify that what Iran says about its nuclear program was true. Trump's reelection last week raises questions about whether and how the incoming administration and Iran may engage. Grossi said he had worked with the first Trump administration, which he said engaged in "seamless, professional work," and looked forward to looking with Trump's second administration. "Circumstances have changed in that the problem has grown bigger than it was," said Grossi. "The problem of not finding a solution."

Solar power is now priced competitively with traditional forms of energy, which makes new nuclear power plants financially unviable.

North Korea conducted its fourth hydrogen bomb test last week, and reactions from around the world have ranged from outrage and alarm to dismissiveness.

The warnings from the United Nations and from anti-nuclear activists are increasingly ominous: the world is closer to a nuclear war—by design or by accident—more than ever before. The current conflicts—and the intense war of words—between nuclear and non-nuclear states—Russia vs. Ukraine, Israel vs. Palestine and North Korea vs. South Korea—are adding fuel to a […]

In recent years, the rhetoric, strategy and practice of nuclear deterrence has grown riskier, more urgent, more dangerous, less stable, and increasingly in the hands of deficient leaders and policymakers. Playing Nuclear Games The ten States that have manufactured and test detonated nuclear weapons since 1945, each have received and/or provided assistance to other States […]

The United Nations Secretary General António Guterres congratulated grassroots Japanese organization Nihon Hidankyo on being awarded the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize. “The atomic bomb survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, also known as the hibakusha, are selfless, soul-bearing witnesses of the horrific human cost of nuclear weapons,” he said in a statement. “While their numbers grow smaller each […]

Satellite images show China working on nuclear reactor for new warship

India’s federal power minister on Tuesday asked the states that are away from coal resources to consider setting up nuclear-based power plants, besides identifying and listing the power utilities to meet investments to support growing power demand.

The Indian government in its federal budget this year had proposed to partner with private players to develop small nuclear reactors to increase the amount of electricity from sources that do not produce carbon dioxide emissions.

States should consider setting up nuclear power plants at the sites where coal-based thermal power plants have completed their life, Manohar Lal, the country’s power minister, told states as per a government statement.

India’s stringent nuclear compensation laws have hampered talks with foreign power plant builders such as General Electric GE.N and Westinghouse.

The country, which currently has about 8 gigawatts of nuclear capacity, aims to increase it to 20 GW by 2032.

The minister also asked the states to identify and list their power utilities in the country’s stock exchange to meet increasing investment demand in the power sector as well as improve the transmission system to add more renewable capacity.

India has pledged to achieve a net zero carbon emission target by 2070 and has a target of 500 GW of renewable energy by 2030.

Two important barriers to a stable, powerful fusion reaction have been leapt by an experiment in a small tokamak reactor, but we don’t yet know if the technique will work in larger devices

Concern over the risks of enabling nuclear weapons development is usually focused on nuclear fission reactors, but the potential harm from more advanced fusion reactors has been underappreciated

Two types of fusion reactor called tokamaks and stellarators both have drawbacks – but a new design combining parts from both could offer the best of both worlds

These stunning photographs are all shortlisted for the Sony World Photography Awards 2024

The diagnostic work-up of patients with fever of unknown origin (FUO) begins with a thorough history and physical examination, complete blood count with differential, chest x-ray, urinalysis and culture, electrolyte panel, liver enzymes, erythrocyte sedimentation rate, and C-reactive protein level. Additional imaging procedures, including nuclear medicine tests, are generally used as second-line procedures, with ¹⁸F-FDG PET and PET/CT assuming increasingly important roles in the diagnostic work-up. The Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging, the Infectious Diseases Society of America, and the American College of Nuclear Medicine convened an autonomous expert work group to comprehensively review the published literature for nuclear imaging in adults and children with FUO and establish appropriate use criteria (AUC). This process was performed in accordance with the Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, which requires that all referring physicians consult AUC by using a clinical decision support mechanism before ordering advanced diagnostic imaging services. The complete findings and discussions of the work group were published on January 8, 2023, and are available at https://www.snmmi.org/ClinicalPractice/content.aspx?ItemNumber=15666. The AUC in the final document are intended to assist referring health care providers in appropriate use of nuclear medicine imaging procedures in patients with FUO. The work group noted limitations in the current literature on nuclear medicine imaging for FUO, with the need for well-designed prospective multicenter investigations. Consensus findings from published data and expert opinions were used to create recommendations in common clinical scenarios for adults and children. Included in the complete document is a discussion of inflammation of unknown origin (IUO), a recently described entity. In view of the fact that the criteria for FUO and IUO are similar (except for fever > 38.3°C [100.9°F]) and that the most common etiologies of these 2 entities are similar, it is the expert opinion of the work group that the recommendations for nuclear medicine imaging of FUO are also applicable to IUO. These recommendations are included in the full guidance document. This summary reviews rationale, methodology, and main findings and refers the reader to the complete AUC document.

The first ever full-scale demonstration of a nuclear reactor designed to passively cool itself in an emergency was a success, showing that it should be possible to build nuclear plants without the risk of dangerous meltdown

A new design for a nuclear battery that generates electricity from the radioactive decay of americium is unprecedentedly efficient

Imagine a world without Facebook. For just half an hour. A group of AI leaders get together but don’t seem to invite Elon Musk. Amazon takes data centres nuclear. A new competitor for ChatGPT and Google. And public trust in AI is declining.  All this and more on the “just breath, Facebook will be back” […]

Scientists in New Mexico conducted several experiments and learned that asteroids can be deflected from Earth using explosions of nuclear warheads above the space rock's surface.

The California-based Middlebury Institute of International Studies published research this week that showed China has constructed a prototype nuclear reactor that could fit aboard a large surface vessel - a sign that China is making progress toward building a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

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