CARM1 is a protein arginine methyltransferase (PRMT) that acts as a coactivator in a number of transcriptional programs. CARM1 orchestrates this coactivator activity in part by depositing the H3R17me2a histone mark in the vicinity of gene promoters that it regulates. However, the gross levels of H3R17me2a in CARM1 KO mice did not significantly decrease, indicating that other PRMT(s) may compensate for this loss. We thus performed a screen of type I PRMTs, which revealed that PRMT6 can also deposit the H3R17me2a mark in vitro. CARM1 knockout mice are perinatally lethal and display a reduced fetal size, whereas PRMT6 null mice are viable, which permits the generation of double knockouts. Embryos that are null for both CARM1 and PRMT6 are noticeably smaller than CARM1 null embryos, providing in vivo evidence of redundancy. Mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs) from the double knockout embryos display an absence of the H3R17me2a mark during mitosis and increased signs of DNA damage. Moreover, using the combination of CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitors suppresses the cell proliferation of WT MEFs, suggesting a synergistic effect between CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitions. These studies provide direct evidence that PRMT6 also deposits the H3R17me2a mark and acts redundantly with CARM1.

Expert

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Expert

Visualizing the Data: The Evolution of Trade Tensions in Metals and Minerals Markets 18 January 2018 — 4:30PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 December 2017 Chatham House, London

Over the past decade, producer countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Indonesia, the DRC and, most recently, Tanzania have restricted exports of unprocessed precious metals, copper, nickel, cobalt and other minerals in an attempt to support, or create, downstream processing industries and jobs or increase revenues. These moves have invariably created tensions with trading partners. Research suggests that export restrictions are not the best way to achieve such policy objectives and can instead harm the producer country’s economy and undermine the functioning of international metals and minerals.

Drawing on OECD and Chatham House research on resource trade, the speaker will present analysis and data visualizations exploring the drivers of past export restrictions and their political and economic impacts. They will also consider how the drivers of ‘resource nationalist measures’ are changing, whether and where export restrictions might present strategic and economic risks in the current context, and the extent to which producer and consumer governments and international governance mechanisms are prepared to address them.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Moving Food up the Political Agenda 14 December 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2020 Online

How can food system transformation be woven into high level biodiversity, nutrition and climate forums in 2021?

Adverse impacts on food security are expected to worsen as global temperatures continue to rise. As well as feeling the impacts of climate change, food systems drive it in a number of ways. Not only do food systems contribute more to greenhouse gas emissions than any other parts of our lives, they are also the leading driver of biodiversity loss, the largest cause of deforestation and occupy the most land globally.

On our current trajectory, 1.5°C of warming could become a reality in the next 5-10 years. Transforming food systems to meet climate, biodiversity and food security goals is crucial. If left to continue, food alone could take us over 1.5°C this century – even with maximum efforts in the energy sector.

Unprecedented levels of action to transform food systems is required over the next decade. The coming year is described as a ‘super year’ given the numerous high-level global events taking place that cover climate, biodiversity and food security. The year ahead has also been identified as the final opportunity to bring global commitments in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

What can be achieved in the super year? How can food system transformation be woven into high level biodiversity, nutrition and climate forums during the super year? How can momentum from the super year be built upon, to ensure meaningful action is taken over the next decade?

Loss and damage: Where are we now and what happens next? 25 January 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2022 Online

This event discusses the progress of the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations. 

Loss and damage refers to harms and destruction caused by climate change impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation.

While it has gained increasing recognition in international climate change negotiations, turning the concept of loss and damage into tangible action for climate-vulnerable countries has been contentious.

Loss and damage is interwoven with issues of fairness and equity. The issue is highly disputed due to its connection with the historical responsibility of developed countries in causing climate change, as well as associated calls for compensation from developing countries.

At COP26, Scotland became the first government to pledge funds for loss and damage for countries in the Global South. However, most climate-vulnerable countries left disappointed by the failure of the Glasgow Climate Pact to secure the establishment of a dedicated loss and damage financing facility.

Developing countries have made it clear that they will continue to push for a new financing facility in the Glasgow Dialogue, a set of international discussions on loss and damage kicking off in June.

The Environment and Society Discussion Series is hosting two events on loss and damage ahead of that date. This first event outlines the key debates and discuss what progress has been made on advancing the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations to date.

The second event focuses on solutions and possible ways forward, looking ahead to the COP27 negotiations in Egypt later in 2022, where loss and damage is expected to be a high-profile agenda item.

A deep dive into loss and damage solutions 8 February 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 January 2022 Online

This second event of our loss and damage series cuts through polarized debate by bringing together international experts to discuss innovative legal and financial approaches.

This event will focus on a deep dive into constructive solutions and progress made to address loss and damage.

Following the first event of this two-part series, ‘Loss and Damage – where are we now and what happens next’, this event focuses on a deep dive into constructive solutions and progress made to address loss and damage.

Loss and damage refers to harms and destruction caused by climate change impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation. While it has gained increasing recognition in international climate change negotiations, turning the concept of loss and damage into tangible action for climate-vulnerable countries has been contentious.

Loss and damage is interwoven with issues of fairness and equity. The issue is highly disputed due to its connection with the historical responsibility of developed countries in causing climate change, as well as associated calls for compensation from developing countries.

At COP26, Scotland became the first government to pledge funds for loss and damage for countries in the Global South. However, most climate-vulnerable countries left disappointed by the failure of the Glasgow Climate Pact to secure the establishment of a dedicated loss and damage financing facility.

Developing countries have made it clear that they will continue to push for a new financing facility in the Glasgow Dialogue, a set of international discussions on loss and damage kicking off in June. The Environment and Society Discussion Series is hosting two events on loss and damage ahead of that date.

This second event convenes a deep dive into the progress and potential on loss and damage solutions, while also examining the hurdles that are still to overcome to make loss and damage support a reality.

Climate Change and the Pacific: Impacts and Adaptation 27 November 2018 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 14 November 2018 Royal Academy of Arts

Katherine Baker, Lehel Banjai and Mariya Ptashnyk
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2711-2743.
Abstract, references and article information

Angela Robinson explains the math behind the next generation of cryptographic algorithms. Whenever you log in to a website, send an email, or make an online purchase, you're counting on your data being sent securely, without hackers being able to crack the code. Our standard cryptographic systems hinge on mathematical problems that stump present-day computers, like finding the prime factors of a very large number. But in the coming decades, powerful quantum computers are expected to be able to rapidly solve some such problems, threatening the security of our online communications. To develop new methods that can withstand even the most sophisticated quantum computer, cryptographers are using a wide range of mathematical tools, many of which were originally developed without any real-life applications in mind.

Ning Jiang, Yi-Long Luo and Shaojun Tang
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5323-5359.
Abstract, references and article information

Chris A.J. Klaassen
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 9-19.
Abstract, references and article information

Conroy Overdose's 'Life of a Star' birthday bash sizzled recently at Cool Breeze Entertainment Complex in Church Pen, St Catherine. Glamorous ladies and dapper gents gathered for a night of high fashion and revelry. The Sharper Lane venue pulsed...

Dynamic singer Tosh Alexander has been lighting up the music scene with her latest track, ' My Ting Different', a thrilling collaboration with American rapper and songwriter Lady London. The song fuses R...

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti (AP) — Haiti's main airport remained closed on Tuesday, a day after violence erupted as the country swore in its new prime minister in a politically tumultuous transition.

A father who pleaded guilty to sexually molesting his 13-year-old daughter was sentenced to several years of imprisonment in the St Catherine Circuit Court on Tuesday.

α-Linked galactose is a common carbohydrate motif in nature that is processed by a variety of glycoside hydrolases from different families. Terminal Galα1–3Gal motifs are found as a defining feature of different blood group and tissue antigens, as well as the building block of the marine algal galactan λ-carrageenan. The blood group B antigen and linear α-Gal epitope can be processed by glycoside hydrolases in family GH110, whereas the presence of genes encoding GH110 enzymes in polysaccharide utilization loci from marine bacteria suggests a role in processing λ-carrageenan. However, the structure–function relationships underpinning the α-1,3-galactosidase activity within family GH110 remain unknown. Here we focus on a GH110 enzyme (PdGH110B) from the carrageenolytic marine bacterium Pseudoalteromonas distincta U2A. We showed that the enzyme was active on Galα1–3Gal but not the blood group B antigen. X-ray crystal structures in complex with galactose and unhydrolyzed Galα1–3Gal revealed the parallel β-helix fold of the enzyme and the structural basis of its inverting catalytic mechanism. Moreover, an examination of the active site reveals likely adaptations that allow accommodation of fucose in blood group B active GH110 enzymes or, in the case of PdGH110, accommodation of the sulfate groups found on λ-carrageenan. Overall, this work provides insight into the first member of a predominantly marine clade of GH110 enzymes while also illuminating the structural basis of α-1,3-galactoside processing by the family as a whole.

Systemic antibody light chains (AL) amyloidosis is characterized by deposition of amyloid fibrils derived from a particular antibody light chain. Cardiac involvement is a major risk factor for mortality. Using MAS solid-state NMR, we studied the fibril structure of a recombinant light chain fragment corresponding to the fibril protein from patient FOR005, together with fibrils formed by protein sequence variants that are derived from the closest germline (GL) sequence. Both analyzed fibril structures were seeded with ex-vivo amyloid fibrils purified from the explanted heart of this patient. We find that residues 11-42 and 69-102 adopt β-sheet conformation in patient protein fibrils. We identify arginine-49 as a key residue that forms a salt bridge to aspartate-25 in the patient protein fibril structure. In the germline sequence, this residue is replaced by a glycine. Fibrils from the GL protein and from the patient protein harboring the single point mutation R49G can be both heterologously seeded using patient ex-vivo fibrils. Seeded R49G fibrils show an increased heterogeneity in the C-terminal residues 80-102, which is reflected by the disappearance of all resonances of these residues. By contrast, residues 11-42 and 69-77, which are visible in the MAS solid-state NMR spectra, show 13Cα chemical shifts that are highly like patient fibrils. The mutation R49G thus induces a conformational heterogeneity at the C terminus in the fibril state, whereas the overall fibril topology is retained. These findings imply that patient mutations in FOR005 can stabilize the fibril structure.

Aminopeptidase N (APN, CD13) is a transmembrane ectopeptidase involved in many crucial cellular functions. Besides its role as a peptidase, APN also mediates signal transduction and is involved in the activation of matrix metalloproteinases (MMPs). MMPs function in tissue remodeling within the extracellular space and are therefore involved in many human diseases, such as fibrosis, rheumatoid arthritis, tumor angiogenesis, and metastasis, as well as viral infections. However, the exact mechanism that leads to APN-driven MMP activation is unclear. It was previously shown that extracellular 14-3-3 adapter proteins bind to APN and thereby induce the transcription of MMPs. As a first step, we sought to identify potential 14-3-3–binding sites in the APN sequence. We constructed a set of phosphorylated peptides derived from APN to probe for interactions. We identified and characterized a canonical 14-3-3–binding site (site 1) within the flexible, structurally unresolved N-terminal APN region using direct binding fluorescence polarization assays and thermodynamic analysis. In addition, we identified a secondary, noncanonical binding site (site 2), which enhances the binding affinity in combination with site 1 by many orders of magnitude. Finally, we solved crystal structures of 14-3-3σ bound to mono- and bis-phosphorylated APN-derived peptides, which revealed atomic details of the binding mode of mono- and bivalent 14-3-3 interactions. Therefore, our findings shed some light on the first steps of APN-mediated MMP activation and open the field for further investigation of this important signaling pathway.

The recent structural elucidation of ex vivo Drosophila Orb2 fibrils revealed a novel amyloid formed by interdigitated Gln and His residue side chains belonging to the prion-like domain. However, atomic-level details on the conformational transitions associated with memory consolidation remain unknown. Here, we have characterized the nascent conformation and dynamics of the prion-like domain (PLD) of Orb2A using a nonconventional liquid-state NMR spectroscopy strategy based on 13C detection to afford an essentially complete set of 13Cα, 13Cβ, 1Hα, and backbone 13CO and 15N assignments. At pH 4, where His residues are protonated, the PLD is disordered and flexible, except for a partially populated α-helix spanning residues 55–60, and binds RNA oligos, but not divalent cations. At pH 7, in contrast, His residues are predominantly neutral, and the Q/H segments adopt minor populations of helical structure, show decreased mobility and start to self-associate. At pH 7, the His residues do not bind RNA or Ca2+, but do bind Zn2+, which promotes further association. These findings represent a remarkable case of structural plasticity, based on which an updated model for Orb2A functional amyloidogenesis is suggested.

14 September 2020

Viral infection is one environmental factor that may contribute to the initiation of pancreatic β-cell destruction during the development of autoimmune diabetes. Picornaviruses, such as encephalomyocarditis virus (EMCV), induce a pro-inflammatory response in islets leading to local production of cytokines, such as IL-1, by resident islet leukocytes. Furthermore, IL-1 is known to stimulate β-cell expression of iNOS and production of the free radical nitric oxide. The purpose of this study was to determine whether nitric oxide contributes to the β-cell response to viral infection. We show that nitric oxide protects β-cells against virally mediated lysis by limiting EMCV replication. This protection requires low micromolar, or iNOS-derived, levels of nitric oxide. At these concentrations nitric oxide inhibits the Krebs enzyme aconitase and complex IV of the electron transport chain. Like nitric oxide, pharmacological inhibition of mitochondrial oxidative metabolism attenuates EMCV-mediated β-cell lysis by inhibiting viral replication. These findings provide novel evidence that cytokine signaling in β-cells functions to limit viral replication and subsequent β-cell lysis by attenuating mitochondrial oxidative metabolism in a nitric oxide–dependent manner.

In addition to their well-known role in the control of cellular proliferation and cancer, cell cycle regulators are increasingly identified as important metabolic modulators. Several GWAS have identified SNPs near CDKN2A, the locus encoding for p16INK4a (p16), associated with elevated risk for cardiovascular diseases and type-2 diabetes development, two pathologies associated with impaired hepatic lipid metabolism. Although p16 was recently shown to control hepatic glucose homeostasis, it is unknown whether p16 also controls hepatic lipid metabolism. Using a combination of in vivo and in vitro approaches, we found that p16 modulates fasting-induced hepatic fatty acid oxidation (FAO) and lipid droplet accumulation. In primary hepatocytes, p16-deficiency was associated with elevated expression of genes involved in fatty acid catabolism. These transcriptional changes led to increased FAO and were associated with enhanced activation of PPARα through a mechanism requiring the catalytic AMPKα2 subunit and SIRT1, two known activators of PPARα. By contrast, p16 overexpression was associated with triglyceride accumulation and increased lipid droplet numbers in vitro, and decreased ketogenesis and hepatic mitochondrial activity in vivo. Finally, gene expression analysis of liver samples from obese patients revealed a negative correlation between CDKN2A expression and PPARA and its target genes. Our findings demonstrate that p16 represses hepatic lipid catabolism during fasting and may thus participate in the preservation of metabolic flexibility.

Cancer cachexia is characterized by reductions in peripheral lean muscle mass. Prior studies have primarily focused on increased protein breakdown as the driver of cancer-associated muscle wasting. Therapeutic interventions targeting catabolic pathways have, however, largely failed to preserve muscle mass in cachexia, suggesting that other mechanisms might be involved. In pursuit of novel pathways, we used untargeted metabolomics to search for metabolite signatures that may be linked with muscle atrophy. We injected 7-week–old C57/BL6 mice with LLC1 tumor cells or vehicle. After 21 days, tumor-bearing mice exhibited reduced body and muscle mass and impaired grip strength compared with controls, which was accompanied by lower synthesis rates of mixed muscle protein and the myofibrillar and sarcoplasmic muscle fractions. Reductions in protein synthesis were accompanied by mitochondrial enlargement and reduced coupling efficiency in tumor-bearing mice. To generate mechanistic insights into impaired protein synthesis, we performed untargeted metabolomic analyses of plasma and muscle and found increased concentrations of two methylarginines, asymmetric dimethylarginine (ADMA) and NG-monomethyl-l-arginine, in tumor-bearing mice compared with control mice. Compared with healthy controls, human cancer patients were also found to have higher levels of ADMA in the skeletal muscle. Treatment of C2C12 myotubes with ADMA impaired protein synthesis and reduced mitochondrial protein quality. These results suggest that increased levels of ADMA and mitochondrial changes may contribute to impaired muscle protein synthesis in cancer cachexia and could point to novel therapeutic targets by which to mitigate cancer cachexia.

Environmental factors, such as viral infection, are proposed to play a role in the initiation of autoimmune diabetes. In response to encephalomyocarditis virus (EMCV) infection, resident islet macrophages release the pro-inflammatory cytokine IL-1β, to levels that are sufficient to stimulate inducible nitric oxide synthase (iNOS) expression and production of micromolar levels of the free radical nitric oxide in neighboring β-cells. We have recently shown that nitric oxide inhibits EMCV replication and EMCV-mediated β-cell lysis and that this protection is associated with an inhibition of mitochondrial oxidative metabolism. Here we show that the protective actions of nitric oxide against EMCV infection are selective for β-cells and associated with the metabolic coupling of glycolysis and mitochondrial oxidation that is necessary for insulin secretion. Inhibitors of mitochondrial respiration attenuate EMCV replication in β-cells, and this inhibition is associated with a decrease in ATP levels. In mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs), inhibition of mitochondrial metabolism does not modify EMCV replication or decrease ATP levels. Like most cell types, MEFs have the capacity to uncouple the glycolytic utilization of glucose from mitochondrial respiration, allowing for the maintenance of ATP levels under conditions of impaired mitochondrial respiration. It is only when MEFs are forced to use mitochondrial oxidative metabolism for ATP generation that mitochondrial inhibitors attenuate viral replication. In a β-cell selective manner, these findings indicate that nitric oxide targets the same metabolic pathways necessary for glucose stimulated insulin secretion for protection from viral lysis.

Africa Aware: Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan Audio bhorton.drupal 9 April 2022

This episode of Africa Aware examines the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ahmed Soliman provides an overview of the Africa Programme’s work on cross-border conflict as part of the XCEPT project.

First, we speak to Kholood Khair on the steady deterioration in relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Then Abel Abate Demissie discusses how recent political developments in Ethiopia and Sudan have impacted relations between the two countries.

This podcast was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) project, funded by UK Aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.

It is also part of a series of outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.

Towards democracy in Sudan: Reflections on the transitional period 20 September 2022 — 2:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 August 2022 Online

In this webinar, panellists discuss the key outcomes of the evaluation workshop and reflect on how the experience of the transition to date should inform the realization of Sudan’s democratic aspirations going forward.

The military coup on 25 October 2021 halted Sudan’s transition to democracy and prospects for sustainable peace. Since then, members of the former regime have regained political influence, with many reinstated to senior positions.

The coup has provoked a strong reaction from the country’s pro-democracy movement and youth-led resistance committees who have led continuous peaceful protests demanding civilian democratic transition, despite a brutal crackdown by state security forces.

Those supportive of the coup have blamed the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a wide coalition of pro-democracy political and civilian groups, for the mistakes of the transitional government.

However, the country’s political, security and economic situation has sharply deteriorated since the military’s action, and the progress achieved by the transitional government has been reversed, leading to an accelerating economic crisis, increased food insecurity and political instability.

The FFC, which played a key role in appointing the transitional government, has acknowledged its errors. In July 2022, it held a workshop in Khartoum, which was broadcast on social media, to evaluate its performance and identify lessons learned, in discussion with civil society actors and activists.

In this webinar, leading pro-democracy movement figures and independent experts discuss the key outcomes of the evaluation workshop and reflect on how the experience of the transition to date should inform the realization of Sudan’s democratic aspirations going forward.

This event is part of a Chatham House Africa programme project on supporting Sudan’s civilian-led democratic transition.

Sudan’s gold boom: Connections to conflict and transnational impacts 7 December 2022 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 November 2022 Online

At this event, experts will discuss Sudan’s gold sector, its connections to conflict, and transnational impacts. 

At this webinar panellists will discuss Sudan’s gold sector, its connections to conflict, and transnational impacts.

Sudan is one of the largest gold producers on the continent, with the industry constituting Sudan’s foremost source of hard currency since the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and resulting loss of oilfields.

The gold rush that has ensued has had important implications for domestic and transnational conflict dynamics. Military actors and armed groups have sought control of gold-producing areas in the peripheries and to capitalize on the flow of labour migrants, against a wider backdrop of conflict partly stemming from contestation for control between central and local actors.

International interests are prominent, including increased Russian involvement in the sector, while gold smuggling has also interlaced with mercenary activity in neighbouring CAR, Chad and Libya.
 
At this event, panellists will discuss Sudan’s gold trade, its connections to conflict, and transnational impacts, including the international politics of Sudan’s gold extraction and role of armed groups. It will also explore the environmental and socio-economic dimensions of gold in Sudan’s border areas. 
 
This roundtable is an output of the Cross-Border Conflict: Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK Aid from the UK government.
 

A critical juncture for Sudan’s democratic transition Expert comment LJefferson 28 March 2023

International pressure is essential to reach an agreement that establishes a credible civilian government.

The signing of the Framework Agreement (FA) on 5 December 2022 between Sudan’s military leaders and its leading pro-democracy parties is a major step to reversing the damage done by the disastrous military coup in October 2021.

The FA removes any formal role for the military in Sudan’s politics. A civilian head of state and prime minister will select the cabinet and chair the Defence and Security Council. The armed forces will be prohibited from non-military business activities and security sector reform will lead to a unified, professional and non-partisan national army. Elections are due to take place at the end of a two-year transitional period. 

Signatories included General Abdel Fatah Al Burhan, chair of the Sovereign Council and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), his deputy and Commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and more than 40 civilian entities, including the Forces of Freedom and Change- Central Council (FFC-CC), a few other political parties, former armed movements, civil society organizations and professional associations. However, the agreement has faced criticism from the street for not being sufficiently radical, has been overshadowed at times by heightened tension between the two military leaders, and has seen sabotage attempts by supporters of the Bashir regime.

Building consensus on the Framework Agreement

The agreement meets most of the demands of the anti-coup camp, at least on paper. Yet doubts persist as to whether the military are genuine about handing over power, particularly among the neighbourhood-based resistance committees – the heart of the youth-led mobilization that forced the military to recognize the failure of their power grab. Peaceful protests against the coup have seen 125 killed and over 8,000 injured by government security forces. Many want to see Burhan and Hemedti held accountable.

Recognizing the need to expand popular support, FFC-CC leaders have been reaching out to other pro-democracy forces to build a united civilian front. They report increased buy-in from some resistance committees in the last few months, recognizing that street protests alone were not sufficient to overthrow the coup, and that engagement with the military is necessary to find a way out of the impasse.

The FA offers the only currently available path to embedding civilian politics in Sudan and has received active diplomatic support from UNITAMS, AU and IGAD (who form the Tripartite Mechanism), the Troika of the US, UK and Norway, alongside the EU, as well as Saudi Arabia and the UAE (who are members of ‘the Quad’ with the US and UK).

Broader public participation has also been developed through a series of conferences, facilitated by the Tripartite Mechanism, on five contentious issues – dismantling the old regime, the Juba Peace Agreement, Eastern Sudan, Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform. Recommendations will be incorporated in a final political agreement. 

The political process has been overshadowed by increasingly visible tension between Burhan and Hemedti, seen in parallel foreign visits, conflicting public statements, and a heavy military presence in Khartoum. But concerns that SAF and the RSF were heading towards confrontation appear to have been assuaged thanks to international pressure and preliminary agreements reached between military and civilian signatories of the FA on security sector reform and integration. In a significant breakthrough, both sides have now agreed to draft the final agreement and transitional constitution, with the aim of forming a civilian government by 11 April.  

Potential spoilers and interests from Sudan’s regions

Progress has been made, but significant challenges remain, notably from supporters of the former Bashir regime in ‘the deep state’ and from Sudan’s historically marginalized peripheries. Old regime elements have been intensifying social media campaigns to derail the agreement and drive a wedge between the SAF and RSF, and have been accused of deliberately inciting instability in the peripheries to undermine the democratic transition. 

The Popular Defence Forces, established by the National Islamic Front in the 1990s, have been reactivated under different names in several parts of the country and there are reports of mobilization and recruitment of armed militias in Darfur. The recent public appearance of Ali Karti, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Movement, who has close relations with Islamists in SAF, has also caused renewed concern.

Two Darfuri armed movement leaders who signed the October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and are members of the current military-led government, have not signed the FA, allegedly due to concerns about their representation in the next government.

Despite intensive efforts to bring them on board, there is continuing disagreement over the inclusion of other members of ‘the Democratic Bloc’, a political alliance backed by Sudan’s influential neighbour Egypt, which is reportedly angry at being excluded from the Quad. The FFC-CC say that the door is open for the two Darfuri leaders and some other political parties, but they will not allow the agreement to be ‘diluted’ with political forces who intend to torpedo the transition, including by imposing a weak prime minister.

Both Burhan and Hemedti have courted support from the regions. Burhan used the 2020 SAF takeover of Al Fashaga in the contested eastern border region with Ethiopia to boost his national standing and secure backing from local tribal leaders; while Hemedti has sought to position himself as a champion of the peripheries, particularly in his Darfur heartlands, while simultaneously advancing his business interests.

Competition between them in building domestic powerbases, as well as alliances with neighbouring states, risks reigniting tensions, particularly given deep grievances and contrasting ambitions between and among Sudan’s diverse regional leaders and communities.

Fighting over ‘white gold’: Sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan Expert comment LJefferson 3 April 2023

The supply chain of a seemingly innocuous cash crop – sesame – has intersected with transnational conflict dynamics, exacerbating tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Late 2020 saw the beginning of the devastating war in Tigray and the occupation of a disputed region on the Ethiopia–Sudan border – Al Fashaga – by the Sudanese army. These shocks disrupted settled patterns of land ownership and control in both Ethiopia’s volatile north and Sudan’s borderlands, historically the heart of the sesame and oilseed production that is economically vital to both countries.

These seemingly harmless cash crops are now embedded in local, subnational and national political contestations in both countries. Sesame value chains are being reshaped, with power and profits being used to entrench the grip of political and armed actors who are reinforcing new patterns of land control and driving informal and illicit trade – impacting the coping mechanisms of local communities and threatening to fuel further conflict.

Regional rivalries drive contestation over the Ethiopia supply chain

Internal borders between most of Ethiopia’s regions are marked by boundary disputes, which often degenerate into violent conflict. The most important is between the Tigray and Amhara regions. Since the war began in 2020, the Amhara region has annexed vast areas of western and southern Tigray, which the Amhara region claims were taken from them by Tigray 30 years ago, after the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated ethnic coalition came to power.

Ethiopia’s exports of spices, oilseeds and pulses brought in over half a billion dollars in 2021, roughly a quarter of the country’s total export revenues and second only to coffee. The sector has been rocked by the war in the north, which accounted for much of Ethiopia’s sesame production, with an estimated 500,000 hectares of sesame fields taken out of cultivation during the 2021 growing season. Conflict has exacerbated a steady decline in formal revenues from sesame exports, dropping over $115 million from 2016 to 2021.

Alongside falling production, the previously integrated value chain has been disrupted and decentralized by political fragmentation and land competition between Amharas and Tigrayans. Before the war, the agricultural sector in Western Tigray/Welkait was dominated by Tigrayan business interests, through the TPLF’s regional endowment fund EFFORT, a business conglomerate including subsidiaries such as Guna Trading House, and Hiwot Agricultural Mechanization.