Платформа Binance Square — блоги пользователей биржи. Блог: https://www.binance.com/ru/square/profile/AlexNFTz Задача — получить не менее 1000 подписчиков и просмотры на посты. Мы решили писать на платформу новости по активам с наиболее лояльной и активной аудиторией (активы с активной аудиторией — хорошо вышло?). На старте мы чуть нагнали публики с гивов — около 200 участников (чтобы были […]

ADNE.iNFO - создание и продвижение сообществ

Photo by freestocks The issue of rape-related pregnancies is a crucial yet often-overlooked aspect of the broader debate surrounding abortion access. As more states implement strict abortion bans, the implications for survivors of sexual violence become increasingly severe and far-reaching. When Hadley Duvall was just 12 years old, she was raped and impregnated by her stepfather. […]

The post Forced to Carry: The Reality of Rape-Related Pregnancies in a Post-Roe World appeared first on Feminist Majority Foundation.

MGK’s Tech Guy here! Some https certificates automation fell over behind the scenes, and it quietly broke for a while, so trying to browse over https would error out. I’ve nudged the automation back into place, and belatedly pointed our “is it working” checks to use https, so next time, it should make more noise.

Tomorrow, Wednesday, November 21st 2018, we will be conducting a scheduled update of our systems. You may experience a short service downtime. Maintenance time is USA EST 02:00am – 06:00am (Eastern Standard Time USA (UTC -5)). We kindly ask you to refrain from using your RSS Ground account during this time. We truly apologize for […]

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How can you identify and overcome biases that hurt you financially? NOVA teamed up with Duke University’s Center for Advanced Hindsight to design the NOVA Financial Lab, a game that breaks down the behavioral science behind financial decision-making.

No sex? No problem. At least not for Charlotte the stingray.

Ronan credits her parents and the filmmakers she worked with as a child for keeping acting fun. She stars as a woman struggling with addiction in The Outrun and as a World War II mother in Blitz.

1. PM Modi’s Rs 12,100 crore infrastructure push to transform Bihar’s railways and roadways – Here’s all you need to know  The Financial Express
2. PM Modi to visit Bihar on Wednesday, inaugurate projects worth Rs 12,100 Cr  Deccan Herald
3. PM Modi lays foundation stone for AIIMS Darbhanga, says NDA Govt committed to welfare of people  The Hindu
4. PM Modi Bihar Visit Live: Nitish Kumar removed 'jungle raj' in Bihar, says PM Modi in Darbhanga  Moneycontrol
5. Politics News Today Live Updates on November 13, 2024: ‘BJP trying to create controversy’: Karnataka Deputy CM Shivakumar on ‘Kaalia’ remark against Kumaraswamy  Mint

Financial planner Anthony Carlton says his richest clients are teachers and other unassuming professionals who have good money habits.

Dogecoin has experienced a significant surge in value since last month, with impressive price gains continuing today as it trades… Continue reading Dogecoin at the Edge of a Major Breakout – Could $2 Be Possible with Bitcoin Dominance Holding Strong?

The post Dogecoin at the Edge of a Major Breakout – Could $2 Be Possible with Bitcoin Dominance Holding Strong? appeared first on ReadWrite.

Financial Realities for Single Female Home Buyers

In conversation with Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi 14 October 2024 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

The former Speaker of the House of Representatives discusses challenges to American democracy and the importance of leadership in an election year.

As the US gears up for the 2024 Presidential election, the importance of leadership in politics has come to the fore. As the Harris and Trump campaigns move towards election day, the heightened sense of strong leadership is central to the position of both candidates.

Following her first election to the House in 1987, Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi has been central to American political leadership for over two decades. Serving as the 52nd Speaker of the House of Representative, Speaker Pelosi rose to become one of the most powerful and consequential Speakers in American political history.

Following the release of her recent book The Art of Power, Speaker Pelosi will discuss how she became a master legislator, working with numerous presidents, her political legacy in the house and her leadership during a contentious time in US politics.

Nancy Pelosi in Taiwan: What lies ahead for China and the US? Expert comment GBhardwaj 3 August 2022

Chatham House experts examine the implications for Taiwan, China and the United States of Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island.

China’s fading ties with Washington?

Dr Yu Jie

US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s, visit to Taiwan has plunged China-US relations into a new low as the reservoir of trust forged between the two sides over the last 40 years appears to be almost exhausted.

However, her move will likely not result in the full-scale crisis across the Taiwan strait that some hawkish voices in both Beijing and Washington believe. Instead, Beijing will most likely offer a combination of military posturing toward the US navy and economic sanctions on Taiwanese agricultural and manufacturing products in order to send a clear bellwether to any future potential visits by high-level Western political figures.

Neither Beijing nor Washington has declared a willingness to change the current status quo as the present impasse benefits both governments – but for different reasons. For China, the best approach is to reach a military and economic capability that prevents US engagement with Taiwan without the use of force. For the US, the strategic ambiguity under the Taiwan Relations Act remains an effective card to counter China’s growing military influence in the Indo-Pacific and keep itself relevant within the region as a security guarantor. Yet, both sides have decided to kick the issue of Taiwan’s status down the road, believing that time is ultimately on their side.

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric, China will be careful not to stumble into an accidental conflict which risks colossal damage on all fronts. Chinese President, Xi Jinping, must weigh all of the options before him as Beijing cannot afford to be perceived as unilaterally seeking to change what it agreed with the US back in 1979 when ties were re-established. If that happens, it will provoke the US political establishment to reach a unanimous agreement to change its ‘One China Policy’ and, ahead of the 20th Communist Party Congress where Xi is expected to be crowned for a historic third term, the last thing he wants is an unnecessary conflict with Taiwan.

The road to escalation?

Dr Bill Hayton

Beijing has chosen to take issue over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in a way that it did not do for other recent US Congressional visits to the island. Several high-ranking US senators visited in April and May this year yet none of these visits triggered the prospect of a cross-strait crisis. So why has Beijing chosen to turn Pelosi’s visit into a stand-off?

Pelosi’s visit is part of a performance in which both actors – the US and China – are playing primarily for their domestic audiences. This comes at a time when ruling circles in Beijing are preparing for the five-yearly Communist Party Congress. Amid a slowing economy and successive COVID-19 variants, Xi Jinping cannot afford to look weak as he prepares the ground for his third term of office. Meanwhile, the US, represented either by President Joe Biden or House Speaker Pelosi, cannot back down at this point without looking weak itself.

Both sides have moved military assets into strategic positions near Taiwan to demonstrate their resolve. Neither side wants confrontation yet neither wishes to be humiliated. Currently, Pelosi’s visit, amid posturing by China, will make the US appear strong, but the consequences are likely to play out over a longer period. Xi Jinping will need to appear to have recaptured the initiative between now and the congress in the autumn when the risk of an incident will be at its greatest.

Taiwan controls several isolated islands that could be pressured by Chinese forces in the event of a future crisis. The Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos lie just a few miles off the coast of the mainland and have been at the centre of previous confrontations. There are also two other points of concern. Pratas Island – known as Dongsha – sits halfway between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Itu Aba – known as Taiping – is the largest of the Spratly Islands in the centre of the South China Sea. All would be vulnerable to an attack by the People’s Liberation Army, the principal military force of China, and the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party.

A military confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan, or further south in the South China Sea, would have major impacts on regional and global trade. An estimated $300 billion worth of trade passes through the area every month. Japan and South Korea depend heavily on flows of oil and gas through the sea. Exports from Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines would also be heavily affected by disruptions to shipping, increased insurance costs and interruptions in inflows of raw materials. The impact on a world economy already suffering major disruption because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the lingering effects of COVID-19 would indeed be stark.

Is a shift in US policy on the cards?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will undoubtedly be seen as a provocation by Beijing – even if it should not be. Pelosi’s trip to the Indo-Pacific, which also includes visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan, comes at a time of growing tension between the US and China in the region.

It also comes at a time when the divide among Washington’s foreign policy elite is growing, with some arguing that it is time to abandon the country’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, where it refrains from stating how it would react were China to openly and deliberately attack Taiwan. Indeed, recent statements by President Joe Biden have raised questions about whether the US is set to make a policy change. But, since both its ‘One China Policy’ and policy of strategic ambiguity have been largely successful, it would be wise for the US to maintain them.

During her visit, Pelosi is likely to reaffirm the US’ high regard for Taiwan’s democracy and embrace the language of shared values. She has embraced Biden’s framing of international relations as a contest between democracies and autocracies. This alone will continue to exacerbate tensions. It would be a mistake, though, to signal a major policy change away from strategic ambiguity and towards strategic clarity on Taiwan’s status. Even if the US decides later to embrace a policy shift of this size, such a message should be carefully considered and communicated clearly, and not by chance.

Congress has an important role to play but President Joe Biden and his national security team should make the final decision on US policy towards Taiwan. Getting the signals right in international politics is a key part of deterrence and, especially in East Asia, deterring both China and Taiwan’s ambitions is essential. 

Increasing insecurity in the region?

Dr John Nilsson-Wright and Ben Bland

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has provoked mixed responses from US allies across Asia.

For Japanese policymakers, the Taiwan issue is connected to the wider issue of regional security. Fears that a military conflict over the island will inevitably draw Japanese self-defense forces into a shooting war with China – a development that is neither formally mandated under the terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty nor necessarily constitutionally sanctioned – explains the concerns in Tokyo.

While the Japanese government of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is increasingly worried about China’s growing military presence in the East and South China Seas, Japan’s heavy trade dependence on China and the country’s economic and security vulnerabilities make it imperative to avoid any further escalation of tensions.

Given Tokyo’s non-recognition policy towards Taiwan, Japanese ties with Taipei are handled informally by politicians of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rather than at cabinet or foreign ministry level, and in recent weeks and months there has been an increase in visits by cross party delegations from Japan.

The death of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as removed from public life a vocal advocate in support of enhanced ties between Tokyo and Taipei, but with public opinion in Japan increasingly tilting in an anti-Chinese direction, and with younger politicians favouring a more combative approach towards Beijing, there is a risk that the government will face pressure at home to toughen its language on Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence through increased military cooperation among allies, along with a graduated increase in defence spending, is the best way of limiting risk over Taiwan.

Nevertheless, privately, many officials in Tokyo are likely to have viewed the Pelosi visit as an unhelpful intervention and will be puzzled and perhaps frustrated by the apparent inability of the Biden administration to persuade the US Speaker of the House of Representatives to cancel her visit.

In South Korea, the government of President Yoon Suk-yeol, faces similar pressures to Japan, given the heavy dependence of the South Korean economy on China for trade and investment opportunities.

Pelosi’s visit to the region will strikingly not include meetings with either the president or Foreign Minister Park Jin. With Yoon on vacation and Park attending the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Cambodia, the absence of high profile engagements for Pelosi might seem to be a purely practical matter, but Seoul may also be seeking to avoid antagonizing Beijing at a time when the Chinese government is seeking to pressure South Korea not to enhance alliance coordination with the United States and Japan or to expand its commitment to the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system.

As in Japan, public opinion in South Korea is increasingly anti-Chinese, but the logic of regional economic and security uncertainty, requires the Yoon government to avoid getting trapped in a worsening stand-off with Beijing.

SVB collapse shows interest rate financial stability threat Expert comment LJefferson 15 March 2023

Governments must resist pressure to relax post-financial crisis regulation, while central banks should moderate their attack on inflation if financial stability is at risk.

The collapse of California’s Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) on 10 March has triggered a wave of volatility in global bank equity prices, raised questions about whether US bank regulation and its tech industry funding model are fit for purpose, and forced a rethink on the extent and pace of monetary policy tightening appropriate for the US and other advanced economies.

SVB was the US’s 16th largest bank with total assets of $212bn at the end of 2022 and a presence in eight countries around the world, including the UK. Since it was founded 40 years ago, it has maintained a strong focus on the technology sector, claiming recently that nearly half of all US venture-backed technology and life science companies banked with it. Partly as a consequence, some 95 per cent of its deposits came from corporates and hedge funds, far higher than the one-third typical of similarly sized banks.

What led to SVB’s collapse?

Ironically, SVB’s failure did not result from its core business model of serving a relatively high-risk and fast-growing sector, but rather from a dramatic failure in liquidity management. During the pandemic, SVB saw a very large inflow of corporate deposits. But rather than disincentivizing depositors or investing the funds attracted in assets of matching maturity, it chose to invest them in low credit risk, but long maturity bonds attracted by a small pick-up in return over shorter-term assets. 

When US interest rates began to rise rapidly in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the value of SVB’s long-term bond portfolio declined sharply. It was left facing a large capital loss of some $15bn, roughly equivalent to its total shareholder funds. The management attempted to repair SVB’s balance sheet last week by crystalizing some of the loss and raising new capital.

But when this failed, the US supervisory authorities had no choice but to step in and close the institution.  This action was quickly followed by emergency action from other regulators vis-a-vis SVB subsidiaries and offices around the world.

The US entity has formally been taken over by the FDIC and a bridge bank established. All depositors have had their funds guaranteed, going beyond the normal federal deposit insurance limit of $250,000 per customer. However, bond holders and equity holders have been wiped out. The authorities have said that any loss will be covered by the industry as a whole via the FDIC.

In the UK, the Bank of England was able to sell the ring-fenced UK subsidiary of SVB to HSBC for £1 over the weekend, so that all its depositors and other liability holders have effectively had their funds guaranteed. In contrast to previous Bank of England rescues (such as Johnson Matthey Bank in 1984, the ‘small banks’ crisis in 1991 and the global financial crisis in 2008-9) no public money has been put at risk.

Four key questions

SVB’s rapid collapse raises four central questions:

First, how was it that the bank was able to take on such a risky interest rate maturity mismatch in its US operations? Maturity transformation is standard banking industry practice, but it is usually closely monitored by regulators who place limits on the extent of interest rate maturity mismatch and require liquidity buffers to offset the risk of deposit flight and forced asset sales.

SVB’s very high concentration of corporate deposits as compared to ‘sticky’ retail deposits, means that the risk of deposit flight was unusually high and so the bank should have been more, not less, cautious in its liquidity policy. SVB was classed as a regional bank in the US which means that it did not have to meet international regulatory standards under Basle III. And in 2018, the Trump administration approved legislation removing the post-financial crisis requirement that banks with assets under $250bn submit to stress testing and relaxing liquidity buffer requirements.

But it is still hard to understand why regulators allowed SVB to commit such a classic banking error. On Monday, the Federal Reserve ordered an inquiry into what it has correctly described as a regulatory failure. This should look at the role played by all the elements of the oversight system including the auditors, KPMG.

Second, does SVB’s failure reflect a much bigger underlying risk in the US banking sector, and potentially other banking systems around the world, built up over the prolonged period of ultra-low interest rates? SVB’s collapse was followed by the failure of the $110bn Signature Bank in New York, as well as sharp falls in US regional bank stock prices – by close of play on 14 March, the S&P Regional Bank Index was down 22 per cent on a week before, with some individual bank stocks seeing much sharper falls.  

To the extent that banks have been covered by international bank regulatory requirements, the risk of a much broader problem should be limited because stress testing and other regulatory tests would have looked at precisely the scenario that has happened. Even where large market losses have been incurred, capital buffers should be sufficient to cover them. But as SVB has shown, there are some large banks that are seemingly not required to follow international rules, while the latest developments at Credit Suisse indicate that market concerns may still arise when other factors are in play.

Third, how far, in the light of the potential vulnerability in banking systems, should central banks in advanced countries moderate their efforts to squeeze out inflationary pressures? While inflation already appears to have peaked in many economies and the pace of interest rate rises was expected to slow, inflation is far from vanquished, as recent data in the US has demonstrated.

Fourth, does the failure of SVB tell us something new about the financial risks facing the high technology sector?  It was remarkable that a single (and not particularly large, by international standards) financial institution could have played such a central role in the tech sector in both the US and UK. 

Why was this the case and does it reflect special features of the tech/start-up sector (e.g. the need for substantial cash deposits to cover relatively large negative cash flows in the early years of operation, or the need for highly specialized lending expertise). If so, should governments take steps to mitigate such risks, given the outsized importance of this sector in many national economic strategies? 

Ulrich Rothbauer
Feb 1, 2008; 7:282-289
Research

W Gamble
Nov 1, 1978; 19:1068-1070
Articles

JM Dietschy
Oct 1, 1993; 34:1637-1659
Reviews

Robert W. Mahley
Jan 1, 1999; 40:1-16
Reviews

Creon Butler appointed to lead Global Economy and Finance Programme News Release sysadmin 22 October 2019

Creon Butler has been appointed to lead the Global Economy and Finance programme at Chatham House, joining the institute at the beginning of December. He will also form part of the institute’s senior leadership team.

Announcing Design Resonance in an Age of Crisis News Release sysadmin 1 June 2020

London Design Biennale and Chatham House announce Design Resonance in an Age of Crisis, which calls for action by designers around the world to create radical design solutions to critical problems across four key areas: Health, Environment, Society and Work.

Implications of post-COVID-19 Restructuring of Supply Chains for Global Investment Governance 14 July 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

As companies rethink and diversify their supply chains in order to enhance resilience, what will this mean for current and future global investment governance?

What are the risks of negative effects on inclusivity and transparency? Does this shift create an opportunity to advance good governance of cross-border investment practices?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Innovating Governance: Examples from the Digital Arena 25 February 2020 TO 26 February 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Chatham House

The Inclusive Governance Initiative is launched with this roundtable on digital governance.

The Inclusive Governance Initiative, a centenary project which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world, is launched with this roundtable on digital governance.

The event brings together a diverse and multidisciplinary group of leading experts to consider where and how early initiatives around governance of the digital sphere have succeeded – or not – and how they are evolving today.

The conversation will include the debate between multilateral and multi-stakeholder approaches, the opportunities and challenges of collective non-binding commitments, and converting civil society collaboration into policy contribution.

A seat at the table – why inclusivity matters in global governance 10 May 2021 — 1:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 April 2021 Online

Exploring the changing dynamics of global cooperation and the role inclusivity can play in building collaborative action.

Please click on the below link to confirm your participation and receive your individual joining details from Zoom for this event. You will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which contains the option to add the event to your calendar if you so wish.

The scale of today’s global challenges demand collaborative and coordinated action. But deepening geopolitical competition is threatening multilateralism while growing inequality and social tensions continue to undermine public confidence in the ability of international institutions to deliver.

Into this challenging environment, add the complexity and sheer pace of many global challenges such as the climate crisis and the proliferation of new technologies – issues that cannot be addressed effectively by governments alone.

• How do global institutions and mechanisms need to adapt to address the demands for a fairer distribution of power between states and to engage the diverse set of actors essential today for effective solutions?
• What can be learnt from existing initiatives that bring together governments, civil society, private sector, cities, next generation leaders and other stakeholders?
• And what are the political obstacles to greater inclusivity?

This event supports the launch of a synthesis paper from Chatham House’s Inclusive Governance Initiative.

Can global technology governance anticipate the future? Expert comment NCapeling 27 April 2021

Trying to govern disruption is perilous as complex technology is increasingly embedded in societies and omnipresent in economic, social, and political activity.

Technology governance is beset by the challenges of how regulation can keep pace with rapid digital transformation, how governments can regulate in a context of deep knowledge asymmetry, and how policymakers can address the transnational nature of technology.

Keeping pace with, much less understanding, the implications of digital platforms and artificial intelligence for societies is increasingly challenging as technology becomes more sophisticated and yet more ubiquitous.

To overcome these obstacles, there is an urgent need to move towards a more anticipatory and inclusive model of technology governance. There are some signs of this in recent proposals by the European Union (EU) and the UK on the regulation of online harms.

Regulation failing to keep up

The speed of the digital revolution, further accelerated by the pandemic, has largely outstripped policymakers’ ability to provide appropriate frameworks to regulate and direct technology transformations.

Governments around the world face a ‘pacing problem’, a phenomenon described by Gary Marchant in 2011 as ‘the growing gap between the pace of science and technology and the lagging responsiveness of legal and ethical oversight that society relies on to govern emerging technologies’.

This ever-growing rift, Marchant argues, has been exacerbated by the increasing public appetite for and adoption of new technologies, as well as political inertia. As a result, legislation on emerging technologies risks being ineffective or out-of-date by the time it is implemented.

Effective regulation requires a thorough understanding of both the underlying technology design, processes and business model, and how current or new policy tools can be used to promote principles of good governance.

Artificial intelligence, for example, is penetrating all sectors of society and spanning multiple regulatory regimes without any regard for jurisdictional boundaries. As technology is increasingly developed and applied by the private sector rather than the state, officials often lack the technical expertise to adequately comprehend and act on emerging issues. This increases the risk of superficial regulation which fails to address the underlying structural causes of societal harms.

The significant lack of knowledge from those who aim to regulate compared to those who design, develop and market technology is prevalent in most technology-related domains, including powerful online platforms and providers such as Facebook, Twitter, Google and YouTube.

For example, the ability for governments and researchers to access the algorithms used in the business model of social media companies to promote online content – harmful or otherwise – remains opaque so, to a crucial extent, the regulator is operating in the dark.

The transnational nature of technology also poses additional problems for effective governance. Digital technologies intensify the gathering, harvesting, and transfer of data across borders, challenging administrative boundaries both domestically and internationally.

While there have been some efforts at the international level to coordinate approaches to the regulation of – for example – artificial intelligence (AI) and online content governance, more work is needed to promote global regulatory alignment, including on cross-border data flows and antitrust.

Reactive national legislative approaches are often based on targeted interventions in specific policy areas, and so risk failing to address the scale, complexity, and transnational nature of socio-technological challenges. Greater attention needs to be placed on how regulatory functions and policy tools should evolve to effectively govern technology, requiring a shift from a reactionary and rigid framework to a more anticipatory and adaptive model of governance.

Holistic and systemic versus mechanistic and linear

Some recent proposals for technology governance may offer potential solutions. The EU publication of a series of interlinked regulatory proposals – the Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act and European Democracy Action Plan – integrates several novel and anticipatory features.

The EU package recognizes that the solutions to online harms such as disinformation, hate speech, and extremism lie in a holistic approach which draws on a range of disciplines, such as international human rights law, competition law, e-commerce, and behavioural science.

It consists of a combination of light touch regulation – such as codes of conduct – and hard law requirements such as transparency obligations. Codes of conduct provide flexibility as to how requirements are achieved by digital platforms, and can be updated and tweaked relatively easily enabling regulations to keep pace as technology evolves.

As with the EU Digital Services Act, the UK’s recent proposals for an online safety bill are innovative in adopting a ‘systems-based’ approach which broadly focuses on the procedures and policies of technology companies rather than the substance of online content.

This means the proposals can be adapted to different types of content, and differentiated according to the size and reach of the technology company concerned. This ‘co-regulatory’ model recognizes the evolving nature of digital ecosystems and the ongoing responsibilities of the companies concerned. The forthcoming UK draft legislation will also be complemented by a ‘Safety by Design’ framework, which is forward-looking in focusing on responsible product design.

By tackling the complexity and unpredictability of technology governance through holistic and systemic approaches rather than mechanistic and linear ones, the UK and EU proposals represent an important pivot from reactive to anticipatory digital governance.

Both sets of proposals were also the result of extensive multistakeholder engagement, including between policy officials and technology actors. This engagement broke down silos within the technical and policy/legal communities and helped bridge the knowledge gap between dominant technology companies and policymakers, facilitating a more agile, inclusive, and pragmatic regulatory approach.

Coherence rather than fragmentation

Anticipatory governance also recognizes the need for new coalitions to promote regulatory coherence rather than fragmentation at the international level. The EU has been pushing for greater transatlantic engagement on regulation of the digital space, and the UK – as chair of the G7 presidency in 2021 – aims to work with democratic allies to forge a coherent response to online harms.

Meanwhile the OECD’s AI Policy Observatory enables member states to share best practice on the regulation of AI, and an increasing number of states such as France, Norway, and the UK are using ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to test and build AI or personal data systems that meet privacy standards.

Not all states currently have the organizational capacity and institutional depth to design and deliver regulatory schemes of this nature, as well as the resource-intensive consultation processes which often accompany them.

So, as an increasing number of states ponder how to ‘futureproof’ their regulation of tomorrow’s technology – whether 6G, quantum computing or biotechnology – there is a need for capacity building in governments both on the theory of anticipatory governance and on how it can be applied in practice to global technology regulation.

Digital governance must not marginalize smaller states Expert comment LToremark 19 May 2021

For effective and inclusive digital governance, multi-stakeholderism must raise its game.

Last month, the G7 announced it is to work towards a trusted, values-driven digital ecosystem. While this is commendable, the G7 must recognize that key international digital governance decisions should involve all states whose populations will be affected. Not doing so is to deny the legitimate interests of those populations and may cause a lack of trust in international digital governance that embeds longer-term instability.

While a multi-stakeholder approach to digital governance is important, it must be structured in a way that allows for meaningful representation of states’ interests and ensures their representatives have the opportunity and capacity to take part. As the internet becomes fundamental to life in every country of the world, international digital governance is increasingly important to all governments and excluding some states’ perspectives may engender wider risks to international security and governance.

The ‘glitter ball’ of digital governance

International digital governance is playing catch-up with the digital sphere it needs to govern. Its starting point is a ‘glitter ball’ of governance initiatives: a large number of complex facets with overlapping impacts – and an almost impenetrable core. Governance initiatives (see infographic) include governance of the internet itself and its uses, international cybersecurity, international human rights, data management, as well as the impact of digital developments in areas such as armed conflict, trade and health.

Many of the bodies involved – such as the Internet Governance Forum, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and technical standards bodies – include a wide range of stakeholders, yet there is no one accessible, central body. Furthermore, certain key issues, such as the role and responsibilities of tech platforms, are barely touched upon by international governance mechanisms. There is also currently only a limited role for traditional UN multilateral decision-making, a process which builds in a role for smaller states.

The sheer number of forums involved, each with a different set of working methods and rules on participation, makes it difficult to fully grasp what digital governance looks like as a whole. The UN secretary-general’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation recognized the complexity of digital cooperation arrangements and the barriers to inclusion facing small and developing countries as well as under-represented groups. In response, the June 2020 UN Roadmap on Digital Cooperation accepts the need to streamline digital governance while ensuring marginalized voices are heard.

The UN is considering potential models for future governance, each of which would – reassuringly – involve multi-stakeholder participation, dedicated funds to boost participation, consolidation of discussions currently split between different forums and a minor coordinating role for the UN.  

Building in roles for smaller states

As the UN designs new digital governance architecture, it is particularly important to build in roles for small and medium states. Core constituencies affected by decisions should be at the centre and governments – as guardians of public interest – should have a key say in the decision-making process. The distrust generated by built-in power imbalances needs to be addressed, as does the dominance of voices from the Global North in bodies such as ICANN.   

There has been some progress made to increase participation. For example, the Freedom Online Coalition includes a number of developing countries and the 2020 Internet Governance Forum included input from 175 states.

However, participation is not only a matter of having a seat at the table. As discussed at the March 2021 UN Open-ended Working Group on ICTs in the context of international security, capacity-building is vital. The group’s conclusions include the suggested development of a global cyber capacity-building agenda with information sharing and norms guidance under the auspices of the UN. Representatives of small and medium states need a roadmap to understand in which forums they can defend and pursue their interests, and the financial help to do so if necessary.

Managing multi-stakeholder participation

A multi-stakeholder approach has been fundamental to digital governance from the start and has played a vital role in helping to secure the openness and universality of the internet. This approach is rightly seen as essential to effective governance because it introduces diverse expertise, allows the interests of all impacted sectors to be taken into account and helps ensure decisions are accepted by those affected.

However, as identified in a Chatham House report on inclusive global governance, multi-stakeholderism needs to raise its game. One of its downsides is that in the cacophony some important voices may not be heard because they lack resource or capacity to speak up. There is a perennial risk of debate and decision-making being captured by the wealthiest companies or the most powerful states. At present, small and medium states are under-represented in multi-stakeholder forums and it is important that those managing such forums seek to identify and include previously excluded voices.

Multi-stakeholderism should not come at the expense of efficiency. While it does not have to mean huge, inefficient meetings or endless discussion, it should also not mean that smaller, less well-funded voices are not heard. Instead, such processes should enable representation of appropriate interest groups, complemented by wider meetings (such as regional meetings, or sector-specific meetings) as needed. While inclusivity and transparency are key, synergies between regional and global forums can work well –  for example, some countries have adopted national versions of the Internet Governance Forum –  and so too can hybrid models such as the Freedom Online Coalition, which meets both as government members and for regular multi-stakeholder dialogue.

A multi-stakeholder approach should also not lose sight of the key role of states – and where mandated, sub-state entities – in making public policy decisions.

An important role for the UN

For 75 years, the UN has acted as a bulwark of international security and shared values, and a promoter of economic and social development. If misused, technology has the potential to undermine this bulwark, to facilitate conflict, erode rights and undermine development. The UN must encourage the harnessing of technology for society’s benefit, while leading a collective effort to guard against the risks through the retention and growth of a universal, open internet – particularly in the face of growing digital authoritarianism exacerbated by COVID-19.

The UN can also help protect against a commercial culture that threatens to trample fundamental freedoms of privacy and autonomy in its pursuit of wealth and to widen economic and social gulfs by leaving large swathes of the world behind. If the UN is to play this role effectively – and for the benefit of all its members ­– it requires the active participation of all states, large and small.

Influence of soft law grows in international governance Expert comment NCapeling 17 June 2021

Soft law is increasingly being used by policymakers to enable greater cooperation and inclusivity, and its role is here to stay in creating effective regimes.

As the UK government’s recent Integrated Review points out, international law-making in a fragmented international order is becoming increasingly difficult.

Geopolitical tensions, and the length of time required to agree multilateral treaties – typically decades – make it challenging to reach binding agreements in complex and fast-evolving policy areas such as climate change and technology governance.

As a result, the regulation of international behaviour through soft law – meaning non-binding instruments such as principles, codes of conduct or declarations – is starting to assume greater significance. And states increasingly find soft law-making attractive because there are relatively fewer decision costs involved.

Soft law also lays the ground for the possibility of transforming into hard law if, over time, its principles become widely accepted and it is evident states are treating them as legal obligations. And the emergence of a hybrid of both soft and hard law components in treaties has started to develop in recent years, such as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

Opening access to global governance

A major attraction of soft law-making is that it provides for non-traditional, non-state actors to take part in the process of global governance. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, corporate sector, and individuals are more easily drawn into soft law-making compared to treaties, to which only states can be party.

This holds out the promise for greater inclusiveness in global rulemaking and governance, but soft law processes also pose many challenges. Soft law provides an avenue for states to avoid legal obligations on important subjects and developing rules in such an informal manner can lead to fragmentation and a lack of coherence in the international system.

As noted in dialogues held under Chatham House’s Inclusive Governance Initiative, some areas of international interaction require hard law, such as economic competition, certain international security issues, and aspects of the global commons. In these areas, soft law is just not appropriate or enough.

Soft law measures such as codes of conduct may be useful in rapidly developing areas such as technology, as they are more flexible and adaptable than hard law. And they may be particularly effective if used in conjunction with binding regulation, and subject to monitoring and enforcement by a regulator, as in recent proposals by the European Union (EU) for a Digital Services Act.

The Chatham House Inclusive Governance Initiative report highlights that the proliferation of soft law does not necessarily have to compete with the existing system of hard law, so long as soft law solutions do not conflict with, or undermine, hard law such as existing treaty provisions.

Case study: Business and human rights

The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) are an interesting example of both the promise of soft law-making, and its challenges. Officially adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2011, the UNGPs set out the global standard of what is expected of companies as regards human rights due diligence (HRDD) to prevent and address business-related human rights harms.

The sections on HRDD in the UNGPs have been constructed as a non-binding ‘social’ standard of conduct, though with the expectation that this would eventually be reinforced through a “smart mix” of both soft law and hard law initiatives. Arguments in favour of the predominantly soft law approach at the time – subsequently borne out in practice – were that this would encourage a higher level of participation, by states and businesses in particular, and better foster creativity and innovation in a still-developing field.

The UNGPs recognize and reinforce the importance of meaningful and inclusive stakeholder engagement for both the credibility and legitimacy of processes, and for the quality of substantive outcomes. The Ruggie process which led to the UNGPs, drew extensively from a wide range of stakeholder engagement processes covering many different jurisdictions and all UN regional groupings. The importance of deep and inclusive stakeholder engagement is also recognized in the mandate of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights.

The annual UN Forum on Business and Human Rights is one of the largest and most vibrant multi-stakeholder events in the UN calendar. Now in its tenth year, the forum provides an opportunity for an annual review by stakeholders – government, business and civil society – of past achievements in implementing the UNGPs and knowledge sharing on ways to address more persistent, underlying challenges.

Its relatively informal approach to agenda setting has, year on year, enabled an increasingly diverse array of stakeholder-organized sessions, supporting a ‘bottom up’ approach which raises awareness of under-reported issues and undervalued solutions.

In addition, while the UNGPs provide the substantive framework for discussion, flexible governance arrangements allow for rapid reorientation to respond to present and emerging crises, such as COVID-19 pandemic and climate change.

However, the sluggish responses of many companies, coupled with revulsion at reports of serious abuses in the value chains of many well-known brands, have prompted some governments to seek ways of translating some aspects of HRDD methodologies into binding legal standards. France passed a Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law in 2017 and Germany adopted a new law on supply chain due diligence in June 2021 which is to enter into effect on 1 January 2023. The European Commission is also working up proposals for an EU-wide regime to be unveiled in mid-2021.

Soft law versus hard law

At the international level, there are signs of divergence between those states which see value in persevering with the soft law route towards better regulation and corporate standards, and those which want to move as rapidly as possible to a hard law framework for business and human rights, enshrined in treaty, to improve domestic-level regulation and access to effective remedies.

Those supporting the hard law route – largely less industrialized states – received a boost in 2016 when the UN Human Rights Council mandated an Intergovernmental Working Group to explore options for a new treaty on business and human rights.

This initiative, known as the ‘treaty process’, has completed six rounds of negotiations. Despite the necessarily greater formality, these treaty negotiation sessions continue to emphasize the importance of stakeholder consultation. NGOs with ECOSOC status are invited to contribute views on the framing and content of draft treaty provisions immediately following the interventions by states, intergovernmental organizations and national human rights institutions, in that order.

The key question is whether this dynamism and inclusivity can be preserved as the transition is made from soft law to more binding approaches. Translating soft law standards into binding regimes inevitably means making hard choices, and different stakeholder groups have different views as to where legal lines should be drawn, how key concepts should be defined, and where the balance between legal certainty and flexibility should be struck.

The negotiations needed to strike an effective balance between competing objectives and needs can be challenging and time-consuming, as experiences with the treaty process have shown. But stakeholder demand for inclusive processes to help shape the law remains strong. Stakeholder groups clearly want a say in how the new EU-wide regime for ‘mandatory human rights due diligence’ will work in practice. A recent online ‘stakeholder survey’ garnered more than 400,000 responses.

Ultimately, the most effective domestic regimes are likely to be a mix of hard law standards supported by more flexible standards and guidance. Civil society organizations and trade unions will continue to have a multi-faceted role to play. Not only are they vital sources of expertise on human rights challenges connected to business activities, at home and abroad, they can also act as private enforcers of standards and advocates for affected people and communities.

How can governance be more inclusive? Explainer Video NCapeling 28 June 2021

Short animation exploring how global governance can be reshaped to meet the challenges of today’s world.

The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the urgent need for change in the structures and mechanisms of international cooperation.

This animation supports the release of a major synthesis paper as part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which was launched in 2020 to mark Chatham House’s centenary.

Read the synthesis paper Reflections on building more inclusive global governance.

Cyberspace governance at the United Nations 18 January 2023 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 November 2022 Online

How can member states achieve lasting, adaptable, and meaningful success in cyberspace governance at the United Nations?

Now in its second iteration, the Open-ended Working Group on Information and Communications Technologies (OEWG) has been a space for United Nations member states to discuss the use, regulation and governance of cyberspace since 2019.

The progress of this forum in shaping cyberspace and its governance is evidenced by two consensus reports including a framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and, more recently, plans for a Programme of Action. 
 
However, the true impact of these UN processes in limiting the threats of ICTs to international peace and security is contingent upon operationalizing the consensus at the international level and reflecting it in national policies and practices.

Pervasive challenges continue to hamper operationalization efforts, including differences in national capacities and capabilities, and divergences in national perspectives regarding the application of international law to cyberspace.

So, how can member states overcome these challenges and set this vital forum up for lasting, adaptable and meaningful success? What role does ‘multi-stakeholderism’ play in realizing responsible state behaviour in cyberspace?

With a dual focus on cyber capacity building and international law, this event considers how these two elements interact and intersect, how discussions on them could progress in the UN space and outside it and how the two contribute to a safer and more secure cyberspace for all. 
 
This event is organized jointly by the International Security and International Law Programmes at Chatham House to launch Phase 2 of the project ‘Cyberspace4All: Towards an inclusive approach to cyber governance’ which is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

Expert

A. P. Starovoitov and N. V. Ryabchenko
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 15-31.
Abstract, references and article information

Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK 23 February 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 January 2022 Online

Experts discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives on green taxonomy.

This event will address the controversial additions to the EU green finance taxonomy, including the labelling of some nuclear and gas power sources as “green”. Hear perspectives from the UK, EU and international experts.

The UK has committed to creating a green taxonomy to provide a shared understanding of which economic activities count as sustainable. It should be robust and evidence-based, taking an objective and science-based approach to assessing sustainability.

Technical Screening Criteria (TSCs) for the climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation objectives within the UK green taxonomy will be based on those in the EU Taxonomy. The Government is currently reviewing these and expects to consult on UK draft TSCs in the first quarter of 2022, ahead of legislating by the end of 2022.

In recent weeks the European Commission has proposed controversial additional TSCs for the EU taxonomy, most notably the inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in power generation, which are currently being discussed by Member States and the European Parliament.

The inclusion of controversial power sources not only risks affecting investment and deployment patterns in the net-zero transition, but may also be a threat to the authority of the taxonomy as a whole

Key questions for the UK now include whether and how to address these issues in its own taxonomy, and how to promote a science-based ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions that can lead to robust international standards.

This Environment and Society Discussion Series event brings expert voices together to discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives, and is co-organized with E3G.

Climate finance and conflict dynamics on the road to COP27 21 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2022 Online

Stakeholders discuss the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity in climate finance and action.

With climate change, fragility and conflict challenges worsening, the role of international climate finance is more urgent than ever.

From the implementation of climate finance and who it reaches to the rush for renewable energy, the inclusion of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity principles often remain absent from climate finance discussions and planning.

With COP27 around the corner and for the occasion of International Peace Day, stakeholders ranging from government representatives to climate activists discuss their perspectives on the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity as part of climate finance and action.

This event was organized in partnership with International Alert.

α-Linked galactose is a common carbohydrate motif in nature that is processed by a variety of glycoside hydrolases from different families. Terminal Galα1–3Gal motifs are found as a defining feature of different blood group and tissue antigens, as well as the building block of the marine algal galactan λ-carrageenan. The blood group B antigen and linear α-Gal epitope can be processed by glycoside hydrolases in family GH110, whereas the presence of genes encoding GH110 enzymes in polysaccharide utilization loci from marine bacteria suggests a role in processing λ-carrageenan. However, the structure–function relationships underpinning the α-1,3-galactosidase activity within family GH110 remain unknown. Here we focus on a GH110 enzyme (PdGH110B) from the carrageenolytic marine bacterium Pseudoalteromonas distincta U2A. We showed that the enzyme was active on Galα1–3Gal but not the blood group B antigen. X-ray crystal structures in complex with galactose and unhydrolyzed Galα1–3Gal revealed the parallel β-helix fold of the enzyme and the structural basis of its inverting catalytic mechanism. Moreover, an examination of the active site reveals likely adaptations that allow accommodation of fucose in blood group B active GH110 enzymes or, in the case of PdGH110, accommodation of the sulfate groups found on λ-carrageenan. Overall, this work provides insight into the first member of a predominantly marine clade of GH110 enzymes while also illuminating the structural basis of α-1,3-galactoside processing by the family as a whole.

Broad-specificity glycoside hydrolases (GHs) contribute to plant biomass hydrolysis by degrading a diverse range of polysaccharides, making them useful catalysts for renewable energy and biocommodity production. Discovery of new GHs with improved kinetic parameters or more tolerant substrate-binding sites could increase the efficiency of renewable bioenergy production even further. GH5 has over 50 subfamilies exhibiting selectivities for reaction with β-(1,4)–linked oligo- and polysaccharides. Among these, subfamily 4 (GH5_4) contains numerous broad-selectivity endoglucanases that hydrolyze cellulose, xyloglucan, and mixed-linkage glucans. We previously surveyed the whole subfamily and found over 100 new broad-specificity endoglucanases, although the structural origins of broad specificity remained unclear. A mechanistic understanding of GH5_4 substrate specificity would help inform the best protein design strategies and the most appropriate industrial application of broad-specificity endoglucanases. Here we report structures of 10 new GH5_4 enzymes from cellulolytic microbes and characterize their substrate selectivity using normalized reducing sugar assays and MS. We found that GH5_4 enzymes have the highest catalytic efficiency for hydrolysis of xyloglucan, glucomannan, and soluble β-glucans, with opportunistic secondary reactions on cellulose, mannan, and xylan. The positions of key aromatic residues determine the overall reaction rate and breadth of substrate tolerance, and they contribute to differences in oligosaccharide cleavage patterns. Our new composite model identifies several critical structural features that confer broad specificity and may be readily engineered into existing industrial enzymes. We demonstrate that GH5_4 endoglucanases can have broad specificity without sacrificing high activity, making them a valuable addition to the biomass deconstruction toolset.

Replication protein A (RPA) is a eukaryotic ssDNA-binding protein and contains three subunits: RPA70, RPA32, and RPA14. Phosphorylation of the N-terminal region of the RPA32 subunit plays an essential role in DNA metabolism in processes such as replication and damage response. Phosphorylated RPA32 (pRPA32) binds to RPA70 and possibly regulates the transient RPA70-Bloom syndrome helicase (BLM) interaction to inhibit DNA resection. However, the structural details and determinants of the phosphorylated RPA32–RPA70 interaction are still unknown. In this study, we provide molecular details of the interaction between RPA70 and a mimic of phosphorylated RPA32 (pmRPA32) using fluorescence polarization and NMR analysis. We show that the N-terminal domain of RPA70 (RPA70N) specifically participates in pmRPA32 binding, whereas the unphosphorylated RPA32 does not bind to RPA70N. Our NMR data revealed that RPA70N binds pmRPA32 using a basic cleft region. We also show that at least 6 negatively charged residues of pmRPA32 are required for RPA70N binding. By introducing alanine mutations into hydrophobic positions of pmRPA32, we found potential points of contact between RPA70N and the N-terminal half of pmRPA32. We used this information to guide docking simulations that suggest the orientation of pmRPA32 in complex with RPA70N. Our study demonstrates detailed features of the domain-domain interaction between RPA70 and RPA32 upon phosphorylation. This result provides insight into how phosphorylation tunes transient bindings between RPA and its partners in DNA resection.

Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for urban energy solutions and job creation 9 June 2022 — 7:30AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 May 2022 Nairobi and online

This event explores the major openings and potential impediments to the development of a just transition policy in Africa.

Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should also align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities. In particular, the need for decent and fair job creation and the establishment of sufficient, resilient and sustainable power supply, accessible to all, and efficient energy use.

Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. Ahead of the ‘African COP27’ set to take place in Egypt in November 2022, there is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers in their green financing demands and national implementation plans.

Sustainable urban energy solutions represent a critical zone of opportunity for the development of new and more reliable green finance pathways. Africa’s rapidly expanding cities present a significant economic opportunity and source of growth. However, urban centres are also where income and energy inequalities are at their starkest. The acceleration of sustainable energy generation and use could have a transformative impact on SMEs and livelihoods across value chains.

At this event, participants will discuss the major openings and potential impediments to the development of a credible ‘just transition’ policy in Africa towards net zero goals, with a particular focus on establishing and enhancing links between green financing innovation, employment creation, sustainable power supply and generation, and sustainable energy usage and consumption in an urban environment.

This event is held in partnership with the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA). It is part of a series on Towards Just Transition: Connecting Green Financing and Sustainable Job Creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator.

This event will be held in English and French with simultaneous interpretation.

Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for nature-based solutions and rural resilience 21 July 2022 — 9:30AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 June 2022 Libreville and online

This hybrid event in Libreville explores just transition policy and green financing for nature-based solutions, with a particular focus on the integration of job creation priorities in conservation and rural resilience.

Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities – in particular, the need for decent and fair job creation, as well as resilient and sustainable land, environment, and ecosystem management policies.

Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. Ahead of the ‘African COP27’ set to take place in Egypt in November 2022, there is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers, in their green financing demands and national implementation plans.

Preservation of biodiversity and nature is not only critical in the global fight against climate change but is also vital for conservation-based economic development. Natural capital stocks, such as terrestrial and marine ecosystems and biodiversity, produce benefits that support societal and individual well-being and economic prosperity, such as clean air, fresh water, regulation of water flows and pollination of crops – while also acting as important carbon sinks. Financing environmental protection must go beyond compensation and contribute to creating fair social and economic conditions for incentivizing conservation.

At this hybrid event in Libreville, participants will discuss green financing for nature-based solutions, particularly the integration of plans for job creation in conservation and rural resilience within just transition planning.

This event is part of a series on Towards Just Transition: Connecting Green Financing and Sustainable Job Creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator.

This event will be held in French and English with simultaneous interpretation.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.