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Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Transitional Justice for the Victims of ISIS in Syria

28 April 2020

This paper aims to assist the region’s local authorities, and their key foreign backers, in understanding how transitional justice can provide alternative avenues for holding local ISIS members to account while contributing to the healing of communities.

Haid Haid

Senior Consulting Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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A fighter with the Syrian Democratic Forces monitors prisoners accused of being affiliated with ISIS, at a prison in the northeastern Syrian city of Hassakeh on 25 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.
  • The piecemeal approach to justice is deeply flawed, and raises particular concerns about due process. No precise instruments exist to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. In any event, the scale of the crimes and the number of victims – as well as severe shortages of resources and workers – make dispensation of justice extremely difficult through the traditional legal system.
  • Not all detained ISIS members receive prison sentences. Individuals who did not hold senior roles in the group’s apparatus and are not accused of ‘major’ crimes (in practice, largely defined as fighting for ISIS and murder) are being released under limited reconciliation deals with tribal leaders. But the involvement of local community leaders in those efforts is not enough to ensure positive results. Many victims are upset at seeing ISIS members walk free without even admitting their guilt publicly or apologizing for the pain they caused.
  • To overcome the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework, a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members. A combination of non-judicial mechanisms such as truth commissions, missing persons’ committees, and reparations and victim-healing programmes could play a vital role in providing ISIS victims with a sense of justice while contributing to peacebuilding and stability.
  • Ignoring the urgency of developing a long-term plan to serve justice and contribute to community healing will almost certainly allow ISIS to continue to prevent the recovery and development of northeastern Syria. This, in turn, risks undermining the stability of the country and the region at large.




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It's a man's world: carnal spectatorship and dissonant masculinities in Islamic State videos

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Manni Crone

Islamic State videos have often been associated with savage violence and beheadings. An in-depth scrutiny however reveals another striking feature: that female bodies are absent, blurred or mute. Examining a few Islamic State videos in depth, the article suggests that the invisibility of women in tandem with the ostentatious visibility of male bodies enable gendered and embodied spectators to indulge in homoerotic as well as heterosexual imaginaries. In contrast to studies on visual security and online radicalization which assert that images affect an audience, this article focuses on the interaction between video and audience and argues that spectators are not only rational and emotional but embodied and gendered as well. Islamic State videos do not only attract western foreign fighters through religious–ideological rhetoric or emotional impact but also through gendered forms of pleasure and desire that enable carnal imagination and identification. The article probes the analytical purchase of carnal aesthetics and spectatorship.




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Social media and the visibility of horrific violence

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Constance Duncombe

Images are central to social media communication. Billions of images are shared across different social media platforms every day: photos, cartoons, GIFs and short video clips are exchanged by users, facilitating or framing discourse on participatory sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. Many of these images depict events of extreme violence, which circulate uninhibited by the conventional constraints associated with traditional news media censorship. A question arises here as to how such images mobilize public and policy-making responses to atrocities. This article examines the political dynamics of violent social media images. I argue that the particular qualities of social media can play an important role in how the digital visibility of horrific violence influences policy-making as a response to such atrocities. There is an important connection between the properties of social media platforms that allow user images to reach a global audience in real time and the emotional responses that this level of circulation generates. In turn, the pressure created by events made globally visible through the circulation of violent images and the audience responses to those images puts governments in a position where they are forced to act, which has significant implications for policy-making.




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Soundscapes of war: the audio-visual performance of war by Shi'a militias in Iraq and Syria

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Helle Malmvig

This article sets out to bring sound and music to the field of visual studies in International Relations. It argues that IR largely has approached the visual field as if it was without sound; neglecting how audial landscapes frame and direct our interpretation of moving imagery. Sound and music contribute to making imagery intelligible to us, we ‘hear the pictures’ often without noticing. The audial can for instance articulate a visual absence, or blast visual signs, bring out certain emotional stages or subjects’ inner life. Audial frames steer us in distinct directions, they can mute the cries of the wounded in war, or amplify the sounds of joy of soldiers shooting in the air. To bring the audial and the visual analytically and empirically together, the article therefore proposes four key analytical themes: 1) the audial–visual frame, 2) point of view/point of audition, 3) modes of audio-visual synchronization and 4) aesthetics moods. These are applied to a study of ‘war music videos’ in Iraq and Syria made and circulated by Shi'a militias currently fighting there. Such war music videos, it is suggested, are not just artefacts of popular culture, but have become integral parts of how warfare is practiced today, and one that is shared by soldiers in the US and Europe. War music videos are performing war, just as they shape how war is known by spectators and participants alike.




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How images frame China's role in African development

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

George Karavas

Political leaders, policy-makers and academics routinely refer to development as an objective process of social change through the use of technical, value-free terms. Images of poverty and inequality are regularly presented as evidence of a world that exists ‘out there’ where development unfolds. This way of seeing reflects the value of scientific forms of knowledge but also sits in tension with the normative foundations of development that take European modernization and industrialization as the benchmark for comparison. The role images play in this process is often overlooked. This article argues that a dominant mode of visuality based on a Cartesian separation between subject and object, underpinning the ascendance of European hegemony and colonialism, aligns with the core premises of orthodox development discourse. An example of how visual representations of development matter is presented through images of Africa–China relations in western media sources. Using widely circulated images depicting China's impact on African development in western news media sources as an example of why visual politics matters for policy-making, the article examines how images play a role in legitimizing development planning by rendering associated forms of epistemological and structural violence ‘invisible to the viewer’.




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The multilevel identity politics of the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Galia Press-Barnathan and Naama Lutz

This article uses the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that took place in Tel Aviv to explore how cultural mega-events serve both as political arenas and as tools for identity construction, negotiation and contestation. These processes of identity politics are all conducted across national–subnational–international–transnational levels. The hosting of mega-events fleshes out these multiple processes in a very strong manner. We first discuss the politics of hosting mega-events in general. We then examine the identity politics associated more specifically with the Eurovision Song Contest, before examining in depth the complex forms of identity politics emerging around the competition following the 2018 Israeli victory. We suggest that it is important to study together the multiple processes—domestic, international and transnational—of identity politics that take place around the competition, as they interact with each other. Consequently, we follow the various stakeholders involved at these different levels and their interactions. We examine the internal identity negotiation process in Israel surrounding the event, the critical actors debating how to use the stage to challenge the liberal, western, ‘normal’ identity Israel hoped to project in the contest and how other stakeholders (participating states, national broadcasting agencies, participating artists) reacted to them, and finally we examine the behaviour of the institution in charge, the European Broadcasting Union, and national governments. We contribute to the study of mega-events as fields of contestation, to the understanding of the complex, multilevel nature of national identity construction, negotiation and contestation in the current era, and more broadly to the role that popular culture plays in this context.




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Violence, visuality and world politics

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

In the May 2020 issue of International Affairs, we explore the many uses of images in the conduct of global politics.

Helen Berents and Constance Duncombe

This special section brings together diverse spaces and modes of visuality through specific, sustained attention to the various types of violence depicted. In doing so, these articles draw out a concern for the visual constitution of violence in global politics, and its emotional and political consequences. Individually and collectively, the contributions highlight the ways in which policy-makers and researchers are daily confronted by violent images that influence how complex political problems are seen and consequently understood. Paying attention to the power of the visuality of violence is necessary to understand how certain kinds of policy responses to direct and indirect violence unfold.




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Ever Closer Alliance? New Developments in Russia-China Relations

Invitation Only Research Event

11 December 2019 - 9:00am to 1:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Yang Cheng, Professor of International Relations, Assistant Dean, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University
Yu Jie, Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House
Marcin Kaczmarski, Lecturer in Security Studies, University of Glasgow
Natasha Kuhrt, Lecturer, Department of War Studies, King’s College London
Bobo Lo, Non-Resident Fellow, Lowy Institute
Alexey Maslov, Professor, School of Asian Studies, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow

At face value, recent years have seen a deepening in Sino-Russian cooperation, from energy agreements, to the recent Huawei-MTS deal developing a 5G network in Russia. Ever larger-in-scale joint military exercises add to fears by some that the 'axis of convenience' is now a more genuine – and threatening – partnership.

This workshop will offer a sober assessment of the latest developments in Sino-Russian relations, shedding light on the underpinnings and practical realities of the relationship as well as on the long-term challenges of upholding cooperation.

The panel will discuss the different and potentially diverging interpretations of contemporary Sino-Russian relations as well as the implications for the rules-based international order.

This event is co-organized by the Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme and the University of Exeter and is supported by the British International Studies Association.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Political Will Was Not Enough for Justice Reform in Moldova

27 November 2019

Cristina Gherasimov

Former Academy Associate, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The pro-reform Sandu government had the will to dismantle oligarchic power structures, but was taken down by limited political experience.

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Maia Sandu in Germany in July. Photo: Getty Images.

The lack of political will to carry out rule of law reforms is frequently the reason why reforms are not fully implemented. The case of Moldova proves that in societies where strong vested interests still persist, political savviness is equally as important as political will.

Old and new political power brokers in Moldova struck a fragile pact in June to oust Vladimir Plahotniuc. Plahotniuc had built a network of corruption and patronage with the help of the Democratic Party, which he treated as a personal vehicle and which allowed him and a small economic elite circle to enrich themselves off of government institutions and state-owned enterprises, to the detriment of Moldovan citizens and the health of their political process.

Maia Sandu, co-leader of the pro-reform ACUM electoral bloc, then formed a technocratic government with a remit to implement Moldova’s lagging reform agenda. Though made up of ministers with the integrity and political will to implement difficult transformational reforms, its biggest weakness was its coalition partner – the pro-Russian Socialists’ Party and its informal leader, Igor Dodon, the president of Moldova.

Now the Socialists – threatened by how key reforms to the justice system would impact their interests – have joined forces with Plahotniuc’s former allies, the Democratic Party, to oust ACUM, exploiting the party’s lack of political savviness. 

Reform interrupted

It was always clear the coalition would be short-lived. President Dodon and the co-ruling Socialists joined to buy themselves time, with the hope that they could restrict the most far-reaching reforms and tie the hands of ACUM ministers. In less than five months, however, the Sandu government initiated key reforms in the judicial system, aimed at dismantling Plahotniuc’s networks of patronage but also impacting the Socialists, who to a large degree also profited from the previous status quo.

The red line came over a last-minute change in the selection process of the prosecutor general proposed by Sandu on 6 November, which the Socialists claimed was unconstitutional and gave them the justification to put forward a motion of no confidence in the Sandu government. This was conveniently supported by the Democratic Party, who appeared threatened by an independent prosecutor’s office and saw an opportunity to return to power.

Thus, the political will to reform proved insufficient in the absence of a clear strategy on how to address the concerns of the old regime that they would be prosecuted and their vested interests threatened. Here, ACUM’s lack of political experience let them down. With their hands tied from the beginning in a fragile coalition with the Socialists, ACUM were unable to prevent sabotage from within state institutions and their own coalition, and could not find consensus to proceed with more radical methods to tackle corruption.

Less than two days after the Sandu government was out, a new government was sworn in on 14 November. Prime Minister Ion Chicu was an adviser to President Dodon before taking office and former minister of finance under the Plahotniuc-backed government of Pavel Filip, as part of a cabinet of ministers consisting largely of other presidential advisers and former high-level bureaucrats and ministers from the Plahotniuc era. 

The new government

A top priority for the Chicu government is to convince the international community that it is independent from President Dodon, and that its ‘technocrats’ will keep the course of reforms of the Sandu government. This is critical to preserving the financial assistance of Western partners, which the Moldovan government heavily relies on, particularly with a presidential election campaign next year, when they will likely want to create fiscal space for various giveaways to voters.

But within its first week in office, Chicu appears incapable of walking this line. Reverting to the initially proposed pre-selection process of prosecutor general signals that the post could be filled by a loyal appointee of President Dodon. Moreover, Chicu’s first visit abroad was to Russia, allegedly a major financial contributor of the Socialists’ Party. With the Socialists now holding the presidency, government, Chisinau mayoralty, and the parliament speaker’s seat, the danger of an increased Russian influence on key political decisions is very real.

A government steered by President Dodon risks bringing Moldova back to where it was before June, with a political elite mimicking reforms while misusing power for private gains. The biggest danger is that instead of continuing the reform process to bring Moldova back on its European integration path, the new government may focus on strengthening the old patronage system, this time with President Dodon at the top of the pyramid.

Lessons

This new minority government, supported by the Democrats, is a more natural one for President Dodon and therefore has more chances to survive, at least until presidential elections in autumn of 2020. Both the Socialists and the Democrats will likely seek to use this time to rebuild their own methods of capturing state resources. But with the Socialists relying on the Democrats’ votes in parliament, this is a recipe for further political instability.

Similar to Moldova, several other states across the post-Soviet space such as Ukraine and Armenia have had new political forces come to power with the political will and mandate to carry out difficult reforms to strengthen rule of law and fight systemic corruption in their countries. What they all have in common is the lack of political experience of how to create change, while old elites, used to thinking on their feet to defend their vested interests, retain their connections and economic and political influence.

Moldova is a good example of why political will needs to be backed up by clear strategy on how to deal with threatened vested interests in order for new political forces to be able to maintain themselves in power and reforms to be sustainable. When the chance comes again for fresh leaders to come to power, it is importantthey are politically prepared to use it swiftly and wisely.




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Russian Economic Policy and the Russian Economic System: Stability Versus Growth

17 December 2019

How is it possible for the directors of the Russian economy to pursue an orthodox stabilization policy with a great measure of success and yet to have achieved so little to stem the growth slowdown? This paper examines the reasons for the divergence in economic management.

Professor Philip Hanson OBE

Former Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

GettyImages-1174485152.jpg

Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina, Economic Development Minister Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Mutko, Labour and Social Safety Minister Maxim Topilin, Economy and Finance Department Head Valery Sidorenko, and Russian presidential aide Andrei Belousov (l–r) after a meeting on stimulating economic growth, at Gorki residence, Moscow, on 8 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Russia’s economic management is currently praised for its achievement of macroeconomic stability. Inflation has been brought down; the budget is in surplus; national debt is low; and the reserves are ample. At the same time, there is much criticism of the failure at present to secure more than very slow economic growth.
  • The macro-stabilization of 2014–18 was of a conventional, ‘liberal’ kind. Public spending was cut, and a budget rule was introduced that (so far) has weakened the link between increases in oil prices and increases in budgetary expenditure. The austerity campaign was harsh. Pensioners, the military, regional budgets and business all lost out, but in reality put up little resistance. The austerity drive was facilitated by the autocratic nature of the regime.
  • The growth slowdown dates from 2012, and cannot simply be blamed on falls in the oil price and sanctions. Rapid growth in 1999–2008 consisted in large part of recovery from the deep recession of the 1990s and the initial development of a services sector. These sources of growth are no longer available; investment is low; and the labour force is declining. The Western world also has a slow growth problem, but at a higher level of per capita output. In Russia, private investment and competition are inhibited by an intrusive and corrupt state. If the rule of law were in place, the economy would perform better in the long run. That would require a profound reform of formal and informal institutions.
  • The leadership wants faster growth, but has powerful incentives not to embark on systemic reform. Even the pragmatic ministers of the ‘economic bloc’ of government, who understand the problem, share this interest in maintaining the status quo. Growth is thus being sought through a highly ambitious programme, in 2018–24, of ‘national projects’, state-led and largely state-financed. This is already running into difficulties.
  • The contrast between successful stabilization and a (so far) unsuccessful growth strategy illustrates the difference between policymaking within a given system and reform of that system. Systemic reform brings with it more potential unintended consequences than do changes in policy. In the case of Russia, movement towards a rule of law could destabilize the social and political system. It is therefore unlikely to be attempted.




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Moldova in 2020 and Beyond: Challenges Ahead

Invitation Only Research Event

5 March 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Maia Sandu, President, Action and Solidarity Party; Prime Minister of Moldova (June-November 2019)
Chair: Cristina Gherasimov, Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations; Academy Associate, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
 

After a tumultuous 2019 when Moldova witnessed the end of the Plahotniuc era, the country seems bound for an equally difficult year ahead.
 
Increasing international isolation, a temporary working coalition between the Socialists and the Democrats, concentration of power and resources in the hands of President Igor Dodon, and presidential elections in autumn are among the ordeals to be discussed at this event. Ms Sandu will assess how Moldova can move beyond these challenges and return to a path for sustainable democratic reform. 

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Lukashenka’s Commitment to Belarusian Sovereignty Is Overstated

18 February 2020

Ryhor Astapenia

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Although President Lukashenka has recently shown assertiveness in relations with Russia, overall he has done very little to ensure his country’s freedom of action.

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Putin and Lukashenka play ice hockey in Sochi after a day of talks in February. Photo: Getty Images.

Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo became the highest-ranking US official to visit Belarus since Bill Clinton in 1994. After meetings with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka – who Condoleezza Rice once memorably described as ‘Europe’s last dictator’ – Pompeo said he was ‘optimistic about our strengthened relationship’. 

The EU and its member states have also changed their tune, at least a little. Previously, prosecutions of democratic activists led to sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. But his less-than-liberal manner of governance did not prevent him from visiting Austria last November or from receiving invitations to Brussels. 

Eight years ago, most EU contacts with Belarusian officials were frozen. Now, Western diplomats regularly meet with Belarusian officials again. This year, a US ambassador to Belarus will be appointed after a 12-year break.

The West is also more willing to support Belarus financially. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development invested a record-breaking $433 million in the country in 2019. The European Investment Bank only began working with the country in 2017 but already has a portfolio of $600 million.

Certain policymakers in the EU and US now, at least publicly, appear to regard Lukashenka as one of the sources of regional security and a defender of Belarusian sovereignty against Russia.

There is some truth in this. He has taken a neutral position in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, and he has consistently resisted pressure from the Kremlin to establish a military base in Belarus.

Now, amid Moscow’s demands for deeper integration in exchange for the continuation of Russian energy subsidies, Lukashenka has shown reluctance to sell his autonomy. In a token attempt to portray sovereignty Belarus even started buying oil from Norway, although this makes no economic sense.

But Lukashenka’s long-term record shows he has done little to ensure the country’s sovereignty. Lukashenka has resisted reforms that would have strengthened the economy (because they would have weakened his own position). The political system is also dependent on Russia because Lukashenka has been unwilling to build better relations with the West. Belarusians are still strongly influenced by Russian culture and media because the authorities marginalize their own national identity.

Since the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, Lukashenka’s primary goal has not been to strengthen the sovereignty of Belarus, but to preserve his absolute control over the country.

For example, when in 2018 Russia started pressing Belarus to deepen its integration in order to retain economic support, Minsk did not reject this approach outright; instead, it discussed no less than 31 ‘road maps’ for deepening integration for more than a year, hoping to receive more benefits. For Lukashenka, greater dependency on Russia is a matter of price and conditions, not principle. 

None of this is to say Belarus has illusions about Russia. It is just that Lukashenka does not take long-term steps to protect the country’s sovereignty or to strengthen relations with the West.

Belarus needs to start economic reform with the support of the International Monetary Fund, but this cannot happen without Lukashenka’s genuine commitment to transform the economy. Absence of cross-sectoral reform has led to the deterioration of the education system as well as unprecedented emigration. Few Belarusian experts are optimistic about their country’s future. Lukashenka knows all this, but does not change his system, fearing it would damage the stability of his regime.  

The West should therefore adopt a broader policy. Lukashenka is unlikely to still be president in 10–15 years, so policymakers should develop relations with the broader ruling elite, which will remain after he leaves, and try to be present in Belarus as much as possible helping it to improve public governance and develop private businesses.

The West should also support the country’s civil society and independent media, for whom Belarusian independence is a matter of principle rather than something to be bargained away.

Lukashenka may be a strong leader, but the state he has built is weak.




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In a COVID-19 World, Russia Sticks to International Distancing

29 March 2020

Mathieu Boulègue

Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
While a global response is needed against the coronavirus crisis, Russia does not see it as in its interests to contribute – and in fact the Kremlin is using the crisis to further destabilise the world.

2020-03-29-Coronavirus-Russia-Moscow

Young woman wearing a face mask in front of St. Basil's Cathedral, Moscow. Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images.

Persistent internet rumours claiming the coronavirus outbreak originated from a secret American pharmaceutical company with the aim of destroying China from within were quickly discredited. Pop culture fans recognised the supposed activities of the Umbrella Corporation as being from the famous Japanese video games series Resident Evil.

However, although fake news, it can likely be attributed to Russian trolls conducting this and other similar activities online, especially when considered within the wider context of how the Russian regime is using this worldwide crisis to further destabilize the West and test its resolve.

Russian trolls never sleep

Russia’s COVID-19 related actions first and foremost take the form of a vast information warfare campaign, with media outlets simultaneously downplaying the threat of the pandemic - ‘it is less dangerous than seasonal flu’ - while stoking fear about what is happening elsewhere in Europe.

For the domestic audience in Russia, some media are reporting the pandemic marks the collapse of the Western world and liberalism altogether, calling it a form of collective punishment. Other point out how fast liberal democracies have curbed individual and entrepreneurial freedoms in order to slow down the viral outbreak, and seek to diminish the credibility of the Western response to the crisis.

Exploiting the coronavirus crisis in this way is a new low in Russia’s wider political warfare campaign to undermine global governance overall, as these activities are detrimental to people's very safety. For example, in Ukraine, it is thought a Russian-engineered disinformation operation may have caused the outburst of violence in the city of Novi Sanzhary following the arrival of evacuees from China.

In the military realm, fake news has been targeting the US-led multinational exercise DEFENDER-Europe 2020. The Russian leadership criticized the exercise as an offensive ‘anti-Russian scenario’ but then used accompanying propaganda that it could actively facilitate the spread of COVID-19 across Europe because of the arrival and movement of large numbers of troops.

The large-scale drills were planned to involve 18 participating nations and should have taken place across ten European countries from April to May 2020. But the exercise has now been scaled down – as has the Russian disinformation targeting it.

And while the world is pre-occupied with managing COVID-19, Moscow is able to grow bolder in its provocations. Recent air incursions were reported into Irish controlled airspace as well as over the North Sea. Although this practice is - unfortunately - routine as part of Russian constant military sabre-rattling, it does increase the risk of tactical errors and miscalculation.

Self-isolation, Kremlin style

Meanwhile, just when a global response is needed to fight the pandemic, Moscow’s response has been, at best, self-serving. On March 22, Russian military reportedly started sending medical equipment and supplies to Italy. While the nature and the scope of this assistance can be doubted, it still represents a charm offensive for Russia to be brought back in from the cold in Europe - since successive Italian leaderships have been accommodating to the Kremlin. And sending virologists to Italy might also be a useful learning curve for Russia’s regime.

But within Russia itself, Vladimir Putin does have to face the problem that, on top of all the projected social and healthcare costs, the coronavirus is also having negative political consequences. On March 25, the ‘popular vote’ - a mock referendum designed to rubber-stamp Putin’s recent constitutional changes - was pushed back. And the Ministry of Communications has been forced to postpone a major exercise aimed at ensuring the ‘stable and safe operation of Runet’ - namely eliminating vulnerabilities in the Russian ‘sovereign’ internet to potential external threats.

Certainly it would be naive to believe Moscow will put self-interest to one side during this pandemic. ‘International distancing’ is not new for the Kremlin, and Russia has been practising self-isolation since at least 2008 through its own actions, most notably in Georgia and Ukraine.

Its self-perception as a ‘besieged fortress’ is being reinforced by this crisis and Russia will, at the very least, likely come out of the crisis feeling vindicated in its view that internationalism is dying or already dead.

With the health systems of many countries under massive strain, and societal resilience being tested by social distancing, the Kremlin continues to probe for weaknesses, and is also carefully watching other countries’ responses to the crisis in terms of adaptation and mobilization of resources.

COVID-19 provides a major intelligence-gathering opportunity for Moscow to learn how well others can implement wartime-like planning in peacetime. In a rapidly changing world, Russia is still Russia.




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Virtual Roundtable: Russia in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Invitation Only Research Event

1 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:30pm

Event participants

Mathieu Boulegue, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Nikolai Petrov, Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Ekaterina Schulmann, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Chair: James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House

Politically speaking, Russia has been isolating itself from the West for some years now, feeding its citizens a ‘besieged fortress’ mentality. Its uniqueness, however, means its approach to - and outcome from - the COVID-19 pandemic will also be distinctive. 

This webinar will explore how Russia is adapting its internal politics and its international relations to the ‘new normal’ of today. 

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Virtual Roundtable: Russia in MENA

Invitation Only Research Event

3 April 2020 - 2:30pm to 3:30pm

Event participants

Nikolay Kozhanov, Research Associate Professor, Gulf Studies Center,  Qatar University, Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Tim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Sanam Vakil, Senior Research Fellow, Project Director, Future Dynamics of the Gulf, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

Russia’s Middle East policy is driven by a complex mixture of traditional factors (such as the ongoing confrontation with the West) and new trends. The Kremlin is keen to maintain its position as an influential external broker. However, it is not confident Russia would be able to respond effectively if forced into a reactive mode by other regional players. The Kremlin therefore seeks to retain initiative and shape the agenda according to its needs and resources. This makes prediction of Moscow’s next moves in the region a challenging, but not impossible, task.

Nikolay Kozhanov will offer remarks on the changes that have taken place in Russia’s strategy since the publication of his research paper Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods (2018), while Tim Eaton will explore Russia's increasing engagement in the Libyan conflict, and its now central role in Libya's diplomacy.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Virtual Roundtable: The Impact of COVID-19 on the Wider FSU Region

Invitation Only Research Event

21 April 2020 - 10:00am to 11:30am

Event participants

Christopher Davis, Professorial Fellow, Institute of Population Ageing, University of Oxford
Nino Evgenidze, Executive Director, EPRC
Katya Gorchinskaya, Journalist, former CEO of Hromadske.ua
Konstantin Sokulskiy, Head of Governance, UNDP, Kazakhstan
Chair: James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House

COVID-19 has put a serious strain on healthcare and economic systems around the world. This virtual roundtable will explore its impact on Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Through a comparative examination of government and society responses, this event will show how COVID-19 has laid bare the region’s broader social, economic and political challenges.

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Belarusians Left Facing COVID-19 Alone

16 April 2020

Ryhor Astapenia

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Anaïs Marin

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The way the epidemic is being mismanaged creates a risk of political destabilisation and leaves the country exposed to external influence.

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Playing accordion in front of dummy football fans in Brest, Belarus as the country's championship continues despite the COVID-19 outbreak. Photo by SERGEI GAPON/AFP via Getty Images.

Since the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, few countries have chosen to ignore social distancing recommendations. But, even among those states which have, the Belarusian official response to its epidemic remains unique.

President Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s statements that vodka, sauna and tractors are protecting Belarusians from coronavirus attracted amused attention in international media. Lukashenka also described other societies’ response to COVID-19 as ‘a massive psychosis’.

Although Lukashenka is notorious for his awkward style of public communication, the fact that Belarus is refusing to impose comprehensive confinement measures is of concern. Belarusians continue to work, play football and socialise.

Lukashenka, himself playing ice hockey in front of state cameras, claims it is the best way to stay healthy. Belarusian authorities clearly appear to be in denial – and this could have dire humanitarian consequences.

From denial to half measures

Belarus actually has one of the largest numbers of hospital beds in the world per 1,000 of the population. But in the absence of quarantine measures its health system, already crippled by corruption and embezzlement, is likely to be overwhelmed.

Patients being treated for pneumonia in hospitals have suggested medical staff are uninformed and inadequately equipped. It is claimed doctors are not reporting COVID-19 as the suspected cause of death, either through a lack of testing or for fear of reprisals.

Observers believe the real mortality rate is already well above official figures (40 deaths as of 16 April). Based on an Imperial College London model, between 15,000 and 32,000 people could die under the current mild confinement regime – and such a high death toll would hugely impact the country’s political stability. Citing personal data protection, the Ministry of Health has imposed a total news blackout; the only cluster officially acknowledged so far is the city of Vitsebsk.

Although specific Belarusian cities and some individuals started changing their approach – by extending school vacations or cancelling weddings – such measures remain half-hearted.

Clearly a major reason for such an apparently irresponsible reaction is that Belarus cannot afford a massive lockdown that would freeze its already underdeveloped economy and drive it deeper into recession. Unlike many other nations, Belarus lacks budgetary resources for a sizable stimulus package. But a delayed response might backfire on the economy.

Economic recession has been forecast to amount to at least 10% of GDP. For Lukashenka, who openly challenged conventional wisdom regarding the need for quarantine and isolation, such an economic downturn would harm his confidence rating in the eyes of Belarusian voters, mindful of the state’s mismanagement of the crisis. And it could create doubt within the ruling elite itself, with Lukashenka seeking re-election for a sixth mandate in late August.

Against this backdrop, a radicalization of the opposition-minded part of society is also to be expected, with greater reliance on social networks in the face of official secrecy and disinformation. The expected response of the regime is then likely to be pre-emptive repression. Evidence is emerging that law enforcement agencies have already stepped up judicial and paralegal harassment of dissenters, notably independent journalists and bloggers.

Russia’s initial reluctance to address the coronavirus crisis may also have influenced Belarus. Lukashenka and his administration often react to public health challenges by the Soviet rulebook, reminiscent of the Soviet authorities’ mismanagement of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

Russia has unilaterally closed its borders with Belarus and, as bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, this casts further doubt on the viability of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Pro-Russian media forecast Moscow will be unwilling to alleviate the expected socio-economic crisis, as it continues to reject Minsk’s demands regarding subsidised oil deliveries. Yet the Kremlin might use the crisis as an opportunity to resume its integrationist pressure on Belarus.

China, with which Belarus engaged in a seemingly privileged strategic partnership in the 2010s, was actually the first country to dispatch humanitarian aid to beef up Belarusian capacity to fight the virus.

But Minsk should not expect Beijing to rescue its economy and, unless it commits to more internal reforms, Belarus is not likely to receive much from the EU either. The regime has already applied to the IMF for emergency financial support, but conditions are attached and, even if successful, the funds would amount to no more than $900m.

The government’s decision to take only half measures so far is rooted in the hope COVID-19 is not as bad as foreign experts fear. But, unless the leadership acknowledges the public health crisis and mitigates its economic impact, COVID-19 will accelerate Belarus’s slide back into international self-isolation. If combined with a humanitarian crisis, this will put the Belarusian regime under considerable stress.

This crisis does risk a new ‘Chernobyl moment’ for the authorities, but the population could react more vocally this time. As volunteers self-organise to fight the epidemic, it might become more difficult for the authorities to say that it is efficient in running the country. But the bottom line is Belarus desperately needs money. Whoever steps up to support Belarus financially will also be able to heavily influence its politics.




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Virtual Roundtable: Re-integration or Dis-integration: What Does the Future Hold for Occupied Donbas?

Invitation Only Research Event

28 April 2020 - 4:00pm to 5:30pm

Event participants

Paul D’anieri, Professor of Public Policy and Political Science, University of California, Riverside
Vlad Mykhnenko, Associate Professor of Sustainable Urban Development, St Peter’s College, University of Oxford
Chair: Orysia Lutsevych, Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House

The armed conflict in Donbas has now entered its seventh year. President Zelenskyy, who came to power in May 2019, promised to end the war with Russia and bring peace to Ukraine.

Since assuming office, Zelenskyy has managed to revive the Normandy Format talks, complete military disengagement at three points along the line of contact and negotiate the release of over a hundred Ukrainians held as prisoners of war in Russia. However, ceasefire violations continue to occur frequently.

Looking at the origins of the armed conflict in Donbas and the region’s economic role in Ukraine’s economy, this event discusses the prospects for conflict resolution. Do the recent events signify an opportunity for peace? Does Zelenskyy have a viable plan for re-integrating Donbas or will the region be cut off from mainland Ukraine for the foreseeable future?

The speakers assess the strategy and track record of the Ukrainian government and its Western allies in bringing parts of the occupied Donbas under Kyiv’s control. They also review possible policy implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for the conflict.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Webinar: Russian Disinformation's Golden Moment: Challenges and Responses in the COVID-19 Era

Invitation Only Research Event

7 May 2020 - 3:00pm to 4:30pm

Event participants

Anneli Ahonen, Head, StratCom East Task Force, European External Action Service
Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Thomas Kent, Adjunct Associate Professor, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; Senior Fellow, the Jamestown Foundation
Chairs:
James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House
Glen Howard, President, The Jamestown Foundation
The COVID-19 pandemic provides the ideal environment for malign influence to thrive as it feeds on fear and a vacuum of authoritative information. What are the current challenges posed by Russian disinformation, and how should Western nations be responding?
 
In this discussion, jointly hosted by the Jamestown Foundation and the Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme, the speakers will consider what best practice looks like in safeguarding Western societies against the pernicious effects of disinformation. 
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Fighting COVID-19 the Ukrainian Way

28 April 2020

Orysia Lutsevych

Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Coronavirus has exposed vulnerabilities in Ukraine but also activated private sector and citizen engagement in delivering help. This could accelerate social change if a smart response is adopted and political reforms follow.

2020-04-28-Ukraine-COVID-Chernobyl

Girls wearing face masks at the monument to Chernobyl victims in Slavutich during a memorial ceremony amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images.

Ukrainians are accustomed to crisis. As COVID-19 spread, forest fires were raging in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, turning Kyiv into the most polluted city in the world. The fighting in Donbas continued, claiming the lives of more Ukrainian soldiers, bringing the total to more than 4,000 — and, on top of that, President Zelenskyy overhauled his government. So Ukraine is fighting three battles at the same time — war with Russia, the struggle against its own ineffective system, and now COVID-19.

Every crisis is a reality check — the coronavirus provoked and exposed the strategic vulnerabilities and deep-rooted features of Ukraine’s system of governance. Three trends have come to the fore. First, the inefficiency and paralysis of many state agencies, particularly the lack of coordination between them and the prevalence of vested interests. Second, the reliance of the country’s leaders on large financial-industrial groups (FIGs) to compensate for weak institutional capacity. Third, a strong societal and private sector mobilization to fill the gaps in the dilapidated public health system.

State agencies are rigid and ineffective. Despite the modern Prozorro digital public procurement system, and the government’s allocation of $2.5 million from the early days of the epidemic, the Ministry of Health blocked COVID-related purchases for over a month. This was a tactic by — now ex-minister — Yemets to pressure the state medical procurement agency into appointing a protégé of his as one of its deputy heads.

Lowest testing rate in Europe

Similarly, in some regions, notably Odesa, procurement stalled and orders went to politically connected businesses at higher-than-market prices. Lack of tests and laboratory equipment means Ukraine has administered only 72,000 tests within a population of 42 million to date — the lowest rate in Europe.

Doctors were given orders to ensure they only test patients in hospitals with COVID-19 symptoms and only those arriving from Asia, while ignoring the fact that millions of Ukrainian labour migrants were in Europe. Indeed, the first confirmed case was imported from Italy.

Ukrainian government and public health officials lack information to take informed decisions. There is no accurate electronic database of registered deaths and reporting is lagging behind events. Information on testing availability in the regions is missing.

Thirteen days after the first case of the virus was recorded, Zelenskyy exhorted business tycoons to come to the rescue. Taking a populist tone, Zelenskyy said ‘Ukraine has been feeding you for a long time and it is time that you helped the country’. The tycoons divided the regions among themselves to deliver relief efforts according to the location of their enterprises.

It is believed FIGs have donated around $25 million to procure testing kits, ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and disinfectants. This may sound impressive, but many of those same tycoons actually owe millions to the state, some even billions, and cause serious problems by perpetuating the current rent-seeking system, where public resources benefit those groups resulting in serious social losses.

Reliance on these groups makes Zelenskyy a hostage to their favour in any potential reform efforts. It is a dangerous solution, as these tycoons often obstruct Ukraine’s economic development.

An alternative — and more transformative — trend of public-private partnerships is emerging in some regions. Across Ukraine, hundreds of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have led efforts to deliver PPE, support the vulnerable with food supplies, and to procure ventilators for key hospitals.

They have mobilised hundreds of volunteers to deliver assistance and partnered with local non-profits. Fundraising initiatives have begun in Lviv, Odesa, Kyiv and Poltava with donations and expenditure has been posted online for transparency. Companies have repurposed to produce PPE kits and medical equipment. The efforts unfolded quickly and, in some cases, in smooth collaboration with municipal and regional authorities.

Ukraine cannot afford to ‘waste’ this crisis, which could help accelerate healthcare reform, decentralization, modernize governance, and boost citizen empowerment. But for this to happen, the country has to deploy a ‘smart response’.

Such ‘smart response’ means applying a resilience framework that nurtures the agility of the system of governance, ensures a diversity of actors in decision-making, supporting both self-regulation and better coordination. Rather than reaching out to tycoons, Zelenskyy should enter a coalition with true agents of change — SME leaders, volunteers, and mayors who have mobilized effective grassroots action. These actors demand a level playing field with accountable governance and effective state institutions.

Civic COVID-19 response hubs and local authorities should be joined in a network that spans the regions, and connected with the national agencies designing pandemic responses. For a national strategy to be effective, central headquarters should draw information from local communities and manage a ‘team of teams’ in a decentralised fashion.

Ensuring effective public service delivery without compromising integrity and keeping the risk of corruption low should also be a priority of political reform, with volunteers and the private sector ensuring civic oversight of both regional and national funding.

Civic engagement such as this can be transformative as it defies the Soviet legacy of paternalism and expands the belief among citizens that society can work for them. By assisting the relief effort, citizens are gaining valuable insights into quality of public services and participate in holding them to account.

Citizens are also developing a better understanding of the purpose of having effective armed forces, police, border guards and modern hospitals. They are coming to understand the value of taxpayer money and witnessing how corruption erodes institutions.

This survival mobilization — if properly harnessed by the state — could drive transformative change and make Ukraine more resilient, not just against present crises, but future ones too.




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Victory and Memory: WW2 Narratives in Modern Day Russia and Ukraine

Invitation Only Research Event

11 May 2020 - 4:00pm to 5:30pm
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Nina Tumarkin, Kathryn Wasserman Davis Professor of Slavic Studies; Professor of History; Director, Russian Area Studies Program, Wellesley College
Georgiy Kasianov, Head, Department of Contemporary History and Politics, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Chair: Robert Brinkley, Chairman, Steering Committee, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House
In 2020 the world commemorates the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II. The Russian government has organized a wide range of activities to mark the USSR’s victory, aiming to raise the already prominent role of the USSR to a new level. Moscow also uses its narrative about the war as a propaganda tool. Ukraine, which suffered disproportionally huge human losses and material destruction during WWII, is departing from its Soviet legacy by focusing commemorative efforts on honouring the victims of WWII rather than on glorifying victory. 
 
This event will analyze the evolution of the WWII narratives in Russia and Ukraine in recent years. The panellists will discuss the role of those narratives in shaping national discourses and their implications for the countries' respective futures.
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274

Department/project




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Virtual Roundtable: Land Reform in Ukraine: Is Zelenskyy's Government Getting it Right?

Invitation Only Research Event

14 May 2020 - 12:00pm to 1:30pm
Add to Calendar
Ihor Petrashko, Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Ukraine
Andriy Dykun, Chair, Ukrainian Agricultural Council
Vadim Tolpeco, Ukrlandfarming Plc
Chair: Orysia Lutsevych, Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House
Ukraine is known as the ‘breadbasket of Europe’ thanks to its grain exports. On 31 March 2020, the Ukrainian parliament passed a landmark law ending a 19-year ban on the sale of privately owned agricultural land. Due to come into force in July 2021, the law applies to 41.5 million hectares of farmland and economists predict substantial economic gains from this liberalization.
 
This event will discuss the impact of the law on Ukraine’s agricultural sector and food security. How can the government best implement this reform and ensure that small and medium-sized agricultural companies increase their productivity? What does this change mean for Ukraine’s capacity to export grain? Can the country’s food supply withstand crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic? What role could foreign direct investors play in boosting production?
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Erratum: FTY720/fingolimod decreases hepatic steatosis and expression of fatty acid synthase in diet-induced nonalcoholic fatty liver disease in mice [Errata]




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Metallopeptidase Stp1 activates the transcription factor Sre1 in the carotenogenic yeast Xanthophyllomyces dendrorhous [Research Articles]

Xanthophyllomyces dendrorhous is a basidiomycete yeast known as a natural producer of astaxanthin, a carotenoid of commercial interest because of its antioxidant properties. Recent studies indicated that X. dendrorhous has a functional SREBP pathway involved in the regulation of isoprenoid compound biosynthesis, which includes ergosterol and carotenoids. SREBP is a major regulator of sterol metabolism and homeostasis in mammals; characterization in fungi also provides information about its role in the hypoxia adaptation response and virulence. SREBP protease processing is required to activate SREBP pathway functions in fungi. Here, we identified and described the STP1 gene, which encodes a metallopeptidase of the M50 family involved in the proteolytic activation of the transcription factor Sre1 of the SREBP pathway, in X. dendrorhous. We assessed STP1 function in stp1 strains derived from the wild-type and a mutant of ergosterol biosynthesis that overproduces carotenoids and sterols. Bioinformatic analysis of the deduced protein predicted the presence of characteristic features identified in homologs from mammals and fungi. The stp1 mutation decreased yeast growth in the presence of azole drugs and reduced transcript levels of Sre1-dependent genes. This mutation also negatively affected the carotenoid- and sterol-overproducing phenotype. Western blot analysis demonstrated that Sre1 was activated in the yeast ergosterol biosynthesis mutant and that the stp1 mutation introduced in this strain prevented Sre1 proteolytic activation. Overall, our results demonstrate that STP1 encodes a metallopeptidase involved in proteolytic activation of Sre1 in X. dendrorhous, contributing to our understanding of fungal SREBP pathways.




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Endocytosis of very low-density lipoproteins: an unexpected mechanism for lipid acquisition by breast cancer cells [Research Articles]

We previously described the expression of CD36 and LPL by breast cancer (BC) cells and tissues and the growth-promoting effect of VLDL observed only in the presence of LPL. We now report a model in which LPL is bound to a heparan sulfate proteoglycan motif on the BC cell surface and acts in concert with the VLDL receptor to internalize VLDLs via receptor-mediated endocytosis. We also demonstrate that gene-expression programs for lipid synthesis versus uptake respond robustly to triglyceride-rich lipoprotein availability. The literature emphasizes de novo FA synthesis and exogenous free FA uptake using CD36 as paramount mechanisms for lipid acquisition by cancer cells. We find that the uptake of intact lipoproteins is also an important mechanism for lipid acquisition and that the relative reliance on lipid synthesis versus uptake varies among BC cell lines and in response to VLDL availability. This metabolic plasticity has important implications for the development of therapies aimed at the lipid dependence of many types of cancer, in that the inhibition of FA synthesis may elicit compensatory upregulation of lipid uptake. Moreover, the mechanism that we have elucidated provides a direct connection between dietary fat and tumor biology.­.




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A nematode sterol C4{alpha}-methyltransferase catalyzes a new methylation reaction responsible for sterol diversity [Research Articles]

Primitive sterol evolution plays an important role in fossil record interpretation and offers potential therapeutic avenues for human disease resulting from nematode infections. Recognizing that C4-methyl stenol products [8(14)-lophenol] can be synthesized in bacteria while C4-methyl stanol products (dinosterol) can be synthesized in dinoflagellates and preserved as sterane biomarkers in ancient sedimentary rock is key to eukaryotic sterol evolution. In this regard, nematodes have been proposed to convert dietary cholesterol to 8(14)-lophenol by a secondary metabolism pathway that could involve sterol C4 methylation analogous to the C2 methylation of hopanoids (radicle-type mechanism) or C24 methylation of sterols (carbocation-type mechanism). Here, we characterized dichotomous cholesterol metabolic pathways in Caenorhabditis elegans that generate 3-oxo sterol intermediates in separate paths to lophanol (4-methyl stanol) and 8(14)-lophenol (4-methyl stenol). We uncovered alternate C3-sterol oxidation and 7 desaturation steps that regulate sterol flux from which branching metabolite networks arise, while lophanol/8(14)-lophenol formation is shown to be dependent on a sterol C4α-methyltransferse (4-SMT) that requires 3-oxo sterol substrates and catalyzes a newly discovered 3-keto-enol tautomerism mechanism linked to S-adenosyl-l-methionine-dependent methylation. Alignment-specific substrate-binding domains similarly conserved in 4-SMT and 24-SMT enzymes, despite minimal amino acid sequence identity, suggests divergence from a common, primordial ancestor in the evolution of methyl sterols. The combination of these results provides evolutionary leads to sterol diversity and points to cryptic C4-methyl steroidogenic pathways of targeted convergence that mediate lineage-specific adaptations.­­




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Lipid droplet-associated kinase STK25 regulates peroxisomal activity and metabolic stress response in steatotic liver [Research Articles]

Nonalcoholic fatty liver disease (NAFLD) and nonalcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) are emerging as leading causes of liver disease worldwide and have been recognized as one of the major unmet medical needs of the 21st century. Our recent translational studies in mouse models, human cell lines, and well-characterized patient cohorts have identified serine/threonine kinase (STK)25 as a protein that coats intrahepatocellular lipid droplets (LDs) and critically regulates liver lipid homeostasis and progression of NAFLD/NASH. Here, we studied the mechanism-of-action of STK25 in steatotic liver by relative quantification of the hepatic LD-associated phosphoproteome from high-fat diet-fed Stk25 knockout mice compared with their wild-type littermates. We observed a total of 131 proteins and 60 phosphoproteins that were differentially represented in STK25-deficient livers. Most notably, a number of proteins involved in peroxisomal function, ubiquitination-mediated proteolysis, and antioxidant defense were coordinately regulated in Stk25–/– versus wild-type livers. We confirmed attenuated peroxisomal biogenesis and protection against oxidative and ER stress in STK25-deficient human liver cells, demonstrating the hepatocyte-autonomous manner of STK25’s action. In summary, our results suggest that regulation of peroxisomal function and metabolic stress response may be important molecular mechanisms by which STK25 controls the development and progression of NAFLD/NASH.




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Macrophage polarization is linked to Ca2+-independent phospholipase A2{beta}-derived lipids and cross-cell signaling in mice [Research Articles]

Phospholipases A2 (PLA2s) catalyze hydrolysis of the sn-2 substituent from glycerophospholipids to yield a free fatty acid (i.e., arachidonic acid), which can be metabolized to pro- or anti-inflammatory eicosanoids. Macrophages modulate inflammatory responses and are affected by Ca2+-independent phospholipase A2 (PLA2)β (iPLA2β). Here, we assessed the link between iPLA2β-derived lipids (iDLs) and macrophage polarization. Macrophages from WT and KO (iPLA2β–/–) mice were classically M1 pro-inflammatory phenotype activated or alternatively M2 anti-inflammatory phenotype activated, and eicosanoid production was determined by ultra-performance LC ESI-MS/MS. As a genotypic control, we performed similar analyses on macrophages from RIP.iPLA2β.Tg mice with selective iPLA2β overexpression in β-cells. Compared with WT, generation of select pro-inflammatory prostaglandins (PGs) was lower in iPLA2β–/–, and that of a specialized pro-resolving lipid mediator (SPM), resolvin D2, was higher; both changes are consistent with the M2 phenotype. Conversely, macrophages from RIP.iPLA2β.Tg mice exhibited an opposite landscape, one associated with the M1 phenotype: namely, increased production of pro-inflammatory eicosanoids (6-keto PGF1α, PGE2, leukotriene B4) and decreased ability to generate resolvin D2. These changes were not linked with secretory PLA2 or cytosolic PLA2α or with leakage of the transgene. Thus, we report previously unidentified links between select iPLA2β-derived eicosanoids, an SPM, and macrophage polarization. Importantly, our findings reveal for the first time that β-cell iPLA2β-derived signaling can predispose macrophage responses. These findings suggest that iDLs play critical roles in macrophage polarization, and we posit that they could be targeted therapeutically to counter inflammation-based disorders.




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Novel GPR120 agonist TUG891 modulates fat taste perception and preference and activates tongue-brain-gut axis in mice [Research Articles]

GPR120 is implicated as a lipid receptor in the oro-sensory detection of dietary fatty acids. However, the effects of GPR120 activation on dietary fat intake or obesity are not clearly understood. We investigated to determine whether the binding of TUG891, a novel GPR120 agonist, to lingual GPR120 modulates fat preference in mice. We explored the effects of TUG891 on obesity-related hormones and conducted behavioral choice tests on mice to better understand the physiologic relevance of the action of TUG891. In cultured mouse and human taste bud cells (TBCs), TUG891 induced a rapid increase in Ca2+ by acting on GPR120. A long-chain dietary fatty acid, linoleic acid (LA), also recruited Ca2+ via GPR120 in human and mouse TBCs. Both TUG891 and LA induced ERK1/2 phosphorylation and enhanced in vitro release of glucagon-like peptide-1 from cultured human and mouse TBCs. In situ application of TUG891 onto the tongue of anesthetized mice triggered the secretion of pancreatobiliary juice, probably via the tongue-brain-gut axis. Furthermore, lingual application of TUG891 altered circulating concentrations of cholecystokinin and adipokines, associated with decreased circulating LDL, in conscious mice. In behavioral tests, mice exhibited a spontaneous preference for solutions containing either TUG891 or LA instead of a control. However, addition of TUG891 to a solution containing LA significantly curtailed fatty acid preference. Our study demonstrates that TUG891 binds to lingual GPR120 receptors, activates the tongue-brain-gut axis, and modulates fat preference. These findings may support the development of new fat taste analogs that can change the approach to obesity prevention and treatment.




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Worming our way toward multiple evolutionary origins of convergent sterol pathways [Commentary]




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Separation of postprandial lipoproteins: improved purification of chylomicrons using an ApoB100 immunoaffinity method [Methods]

Elevated levels of triglyceride-rich lipoproteins (TRLs), both fasting and postprandial, are associated with increased risk for atherosclerosis. However, guidelines for treatment are defined solely by fasting lipid levels, even though postprandial lipids may be more informative. In the postprandial state, circulating lipids consist of dietary fat transported from the intestine in chylomicrons (CMs; containing ApoB48) and fat transported from the liver in VLDL (containing ApoB100). Research into the roles of endogenous versus dietary fat has been hindered because of the difficulty in separating these particles by ultracentrifugation. CM fractions have considerable contamination from VLDL (purity, 10%). To separate CMs from VLDL, we produced polyclonal antibodies against ApoB100 and generated immunoaffinity columns. TRLs isolated by ultracentrifugation of plasma were applied to these columns, and highly purified CMs were collected (purity, 90–94%). Overall eight healthy unmedicated adult volunteers (BMI, 27.2 ± 1.4 kg/m2; fasting triacylglycerol, 102.6 ± 19.5 mg/dl) participated in a feeding study, which contained an oral stable-isotope tracer (1-13C acetate). We then used this technique on plasma samples freshly collected during an 8 h human feeding study from a subset of four subjects. We analyzed fractionated lipoproteins by Western blot, isolated and derivatized triacylglycerols, and calculated fractional de novo lipogenesis. The results demonstrated effective separation of postprandial lipoproteins and substantially improved purity compared with ultracentrifugation protocols, using the immunoaffinity method. This method can be used to better delineate the role of dietary sugar and fat on postprandial lipids in cardiovascular risk and explore the potential role of CM remnants in atherosclerosis.




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Nonsynonymous SNPs in LPA homologous to plasminogen deficiency mutants represent novel null apo(a) alleles [Patient-Oriented and Epidemiological Research]

Plasma lipoprotein (a) [Lp(a)] levels are largely determined by variation in the LPA gene, which codes for apo(a). Genome-wide association studies (GWASs) have identified nonsynonymous variants in LPA that associate with low Lp(a) levels, although their effect on apo(a) function is unknown. We investigated two such variants, R990Q and R1771C, which were present in four null Lp(a) individuals, for structural and functional effects. Sequence alignments showed the R990 and R1771 residues to be highly conserved and homologous to each other and to residues associated with plasminogen deficiency. Structural modeling showed both residues to make several polar contacts with neighboring residues that would be ablated on substitution. Recombinant expression of the WT and R1771C apo(a) in liver and kidney cells showed an abundance of an immature form for both apo(a) proteins. A mature form of apo(a) was only seen with the WT protein. Imaging of the recombinant apo(a) proteins in conjunction with markers of the secretory pathway indicated a poor transit of R1771C into the Golgi. Furthermore, the R1771C mutant displayed a glycosylation pattern consistent with ER, but not Golgi, glycosylation. We conclude that R1771 and the equivalent R990 residue facilitate correct folding of the apo(a) kringle structure and mutations at these positions prevent the proper folding required for full maturation and secretion. To our knowledge, this is the first example of nonsynonymous variants in LPA being causative of a null Lp(a) phenotype.




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The citrus flavonoid nobiletin confers protection from metabolic dysregulation in high-fat-fed mice independent of AMPK [Research Articles]

Obesity, dyslipidemia, and insulin resistance, the increasingly common metabolic syndrome, are risk factors for CVD and type 2 diabetes that warrant novel therapeutic interventions. The flavonoid nobiletin displays potent lipid-lowering and insulin-sensitizing properties in mice with metabolic dysfunction. However, the mechanisms by which nobiletin mediates metabolic protection are not clearly established. The central role of AMP-activated protein kinase (AMPK) as an energy sensor suggests that AMPK is a target of nobiletin. We tested the hypothesis that metabolic protection by nobiletin required phosphorylation of AMPK and acetyl-CoA carboxylase (ACC) in mouse hepatocytes, in mice deficient in hepatic AMPK (Ampkβ1–/–), in mice incapable of inhibitory phosphorylation of ACC (AccDKI), and in mice with adipocyte-specific AMPK deficiency (iβ1β2AKO). We fed mice a high-fat/high-cholesterol diet with or without nobiletin. Nobiletin increased phosphorylation of AMPK and ACC in primary mouse hepatocytes, which was associated with increased FA oxidation and attenuated FA synthesis. Despite loss of ACC phosphorylation in Ampkβ1–/– hepatocytes, nobiletin suppressed FA synthesis and enhanced FA oxidation. Acute injection of nobiletin into mice did not increase phosphorylation of either AMPK or ACC in liver. In mice fed a high-fat diet, nobiletin robustly prevented obesity, hepatic steatosis, dyslipidemia, and insulin resistance, and it improved energy expenditure in Ampkβ1–/–, AccDKI, and iβ1β2AKO mice to the same extent as in WT controls. Thus, the beneficial metabolic effects of nobiletin in vivo are conferred independently of hepatic or adipocyte AMPK activation. These studies further underscore the therapeutic potential of nobiletin and begin to clarify possible mechanisms.




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Alirocumab, evinacumab, and atorvastatin triple therapy regresses plaque lesions and improves lesion composition in mice [Research Articles]

Atherosclerosis-related CVD causes nearly 20 million deaths annually. Most patients are treated after plaques develop, so therapies must regress existing lesions. Current therapies reduce plaque volume, but targeting all apoB-containing lipoproteins with intensive combinations that include alirocumab or evinacumab, monoclonal antibodies against cholesterol-regulating proprotein convertase subtilisin/kexin type 9 and angiopoietin-like protein 3, may provide more benefit. We investigated the effect of such lipid-lowering interventions on atherosclerosis in APOE*3-Leiden.CETP mice, a well-established model for hyperlipidemia. Mice were fed a Western-type diet for 13 weeks and thereafter matched into a baseline group (euthanized at 13 weeks) and five groups that received diet alone (control) or with treatment [atorvastatin; atorvastatin and alirocumab; atorvastatin and evinacumab; or atorvastatin, alirocumab, and evinacumab (triple therapy)] for 25 weeks. We measured effects on cholesterol levels, plaque composition and morphology, monocyte adherence, and macrophage proliferation. All interventions reduced plasma total cholesterol (37% with atorvastatin to 80% with triple treatment; all P < 0.001). Triple treatment decreased non-HDL-C to 1.0 mmol/l (91% difference from control; P < 0.001). Atorvastatin reduced atherosclerosis progression by 28% versus control (P < 0.001); double treatment completely blocked progression and diminished lesion severity. Triple treatment regressed lesion size versus baseline in the thoracic aorta by 50% and the aortic root by 36% (both P < 0.05 vs. baseline), decreased macrophage accumulation through reduced proliferation, and abated lesion severity. Thus, high-intensive cholesterol-lowering triple treatment targeting all apoB-containing lipoproteins regresses atherosclerotic lesion area and improves lesion composition in mice, making it a promising potential approach for treating atherosclerosis.




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Role of pyruvate kinase M2 in oxidized LDL-induced macrophage foam cell formation and inflammation [Research Articles]

Pyruvate kinase M2 (PKM2) links metabolic and inflammatory dysfunction in atherosclerotic coronary artery disease; however, its role in oxidized LDL (Ox-LDL)-induced macrophage foam cell formation and inflammation is unknown and therefore was studied. In recombinant mouse granulocyte-macrophage colony-stimulating factor-differentiated murine bone marrow-derived macrophages, early (1–6 h) Ox-LDL treatment induced PKM2 tyrosine 105 phosphorylation and promotes its nuclear localization. PKM2 regulates aerobic glycolysis and inflammation because PKM2 shRNA or Shikonin abrogated Ox-LDL-induced hypoxia-inducible factor-1α target genes lactate dehydrogenase, glucose transporter member 1, interleukin 1β (IL-1β) mRNA expression, lactate, and secretory IL-1β production. PKM2 inhibition significantly increased Ox-LDL-induced ABCA1 and ABCG1 protein expression and NBD-cholesterol efflux to apoA1 and HDL. PKM2 shRNA significantly inhibited Ox-LDL-induced CD36, FASN protein expression, DiI-Ox-LDL binding and uptake, and cellular total cholesterol, free cholesterol, and cholesteryl ester content. Therefore, PKM2 regulates lipid uptake and efflux. DASA-58, a PKM2 activator, downregulated LXR-α, ABCA1, and ABCG1, and augmented FASN and CD36 protein expression. Peritoneal macrophages showed similar results. Ox-LDL induced PKM2- SREBP-1 interaction and FASN expression in a PKM2-dependent manner. Therefore, this study suggests a role for PKM2 in Ox-LDL-induced aerobic glycolysis, inflammation, and macrophage foam cell formation.




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Hepatic PLIN5 signals via SIRT1 to promote autophagy and prevent inflammation during fasting [Research Articles]

Lipid droplets (LDs) are energy-storage organelles that are coated with hundreds of proteins, including members of the perilipin (PLIN) family. PLIN5 is highly expressed in oxidative tissues, including the liver, and is thought to play a key role in uncoupling LD accumulation from lipotoxicity; however, the mechanisms behind this action are incompletely defined. We investigated the role of hepatic PLIN5 in inflammation and lipotoxicity in a murine model under both fasting and refeeding conditions and in hepatocyte cultures. PLIN5 ablation with antisense oligonucleotides triggered a pro-inflammatory response in livers from mice only under fasting conditions. Similarly, PLIN5 mitigated lipopolysaccharide- or palmitic acid-induced inflammatory responses in hepatocytes. During fasting, PLIN5 was also required for the induction of autophagy, which contributed to its anti-inflammatory effects. The ability of PLIN5 to promote autophagy and prevent inflammation were dependent upon signaling through sirtuin 1 (SIRT1), which is known to be activated in response to nuclear PLIN5 under fasting conditions. Taken together, these data show that PLIN5 signals via SIRT1 to promote autophagy and prevent FA-induced inflammation as a means to maintain hepatocyte homeostasis during periods of fasting and FA mobilization.




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A human-like bile acid pool induced by deletion of hepatic Cyp2c70 modulates effects of FXR activation in mice [Research Articles]

Bile acids (BAs) facilitate intestinal absorption of lipid-soluble nutrients and modulate various metabolic pathways through the farnesoid X receptor (FXR) and Takeda G-protein-coupled receptor 5. These receptors are targets for therapy in cholestatic and metabolic diseases. However, dissimilarities in BA metabolism between humans and mice complicate translation of preclinical data. Cytochrome P450 family 2 subfamily c polypeptide 70 (CYP2C70) was recently proposed to catalyze the formation of rodent-specific muricholic acids (MCAs). With CRISPR/Cas9-mediated somatic genome editing, we generated an acute hepatic Cyp2c70 knockout mouse model (Cyp2c70ako) to clarify the role of CYP2C70 in BA metabolism in vivo and evaluate whether its activity modulates effects of pharmacologic FXR activation on cholesterol homeostasis. In Cyp2c70ako mice, chenodeoxycholic acid (CDCA) increased at the expense of βMCA, resulting in a more hydrophobic human-like BA pool. Tracer studies demonstrated that, in vivo, CYP2C70 catalyzes the formation of βMCA primarily by sequential 6β-hydroxylation and C7-epimerization of CDCA, generating αMCA as an intermediate metabolite. Physiologically, the humanized BA composition in Cyp2c70ako mice blunted the stimulation of fecal cholesterol disposal in response to FXR activation compared with WT mice, predominantly due to reduced stimulation of transintestinal cholesterol excretion. Thus, deletion of hepatic Cyp2c70 in adult mice translates into a human-like BA pool composition and impacts the response to pharmacologic FXR activation. This Cyp2c70ako mouse model may be a useful tool for future studies of BA signaling and metabolism that informs human disease development and treatment.




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Tissue-specific analysis of lipid species in Drosophila during overnutrition by UHPLC-MS/MS and MALDI-MSI [Research Articles]

Diets high in calories can be used to model metabolic diseases, including obesity and its associated comorbidities, in animals. Drosophila melanogaster fed high-sugar diets (HSDs) exhibit complications of human obesity including hyperglycemia, hyperlipidemia, insulin resistance, cardiomyopathy, increased susceptibility to infection, and reduced longevity. We hypothesize that lipid storage in the high-sugar-fed fly’s fat body (FB) reaches a maximum capacity, resulting in the accumulation of toxic lipids in other tissues or lipotoxicity. We took two approaches to characterize tissue-specific lipotoxicity. Ultra-HPLC-MS/MS and MALDI-MS imaging enabled spatial and temporal localization of lipid species in the FB, heart, and hemolymph. Substituent chain length was diet dependent, with fewer odd chain esterified FAs on HSDs in all sample types. By contrast, dietary effects on double bond content differed among organs, consistent with a model where some substituent pools are shared and others are spatially restricted. Both di- and triglycerides increased on HSDs in all sample types, similar to observations in obese humans. Interestingly, there were dramatic effects of sugar feeding on lipid ethers, which have not been previously associated with lipotoxicity. Taken together, we have identified candidate endocrine mechanisms and molecular targets that may be involved in metabolic disease and lipotoxicity.




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ANGPTL3, PCSK9, and statin therapy drive remarkable reductions in hyperlipidemia and atherosclerosis in a mouse model [Commentary]




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Erratum: Unequivocal evidence for endogenous geranylgeranoic acid biosynthesized from mevalonate in mammalian cells [Errata]




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Development of a sensitive and quantitative method for the identification of two major furan fatty acids in human plasma [Methods]

This article focuses on the establishment of an accurate and sensitive quantitation method for the analysis of furan fatty acids. In particular, the sensitivity of GC/MS and UPLC/ESI/MS/MS was compared for the identification and quantification of furan fatty acids. Different methylation methods were tested with respect to GC/MS analysis. Special attention needs to be paid to the methylation of furan fatty acids, as acidic catalysts might lead to the degradation of the furan ring. GC/MS analysis in full-scan mode demonstrated that the limit of quantitation was 10 μM. UPLC/ESI/MS/MS in multiple reaction monitoring mode displayed a higher detection sensitivity than GC/MS. Moreover, the identification of furan fatty acids with charge-reversal derivatization was tested in the positive mode with two widely used pyridinium salts. Significant oxidation was unexpectedly observed using N-(4-aminomethylphenyl) pyridinium as a derivatization agent. The formed 3-acyl-oxymethyl-1-methylpyridinium iodide derivatized by 2-bromo-1-methylpyridinium iodide and 3-carbinol-1-methylpyridinium iodide improved the sensitivity more than 2,000-fold compared with nonderivatization in the negative mode by UPLC/ESI/MS/MS. This charge-reversal derivatization enabled the targeted quantitation of furan fatty acids in human plasma. Thus, it is anticipated that this protocol could greatly contribute to the clarification of pathological mechanisms related to furan fatty acids and their metabolites.




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A novel NanoBiT-based assay monitors the interaction between lipoprotein lipase and GPIHBP1 in real time [Methods]

The hydrolysis of triglycerides in triglyceride-rich lipoproteins by LPL is critical for the delivery of triglyceride-derived fatty acids to tissues, including heart, skeletal muscle, and adipose tissues. Physiologically active LPL is normally bound to the endothelial cell protein glycosylphosphatidylinositol-anchored high-density lipoprotein binding protein 1 (GPIHBP1), which transports LPL across endothelial cells, anchors LPL to the vascular wall, and stabilizes LPL activity. Disruption of LPL-GPIHBP1 binding significantly alters triglyceride metabolism and lipid partitioning. In this study, we modified the NanoLuc® Binary Technology split-luciferase system to develop a novel assay that monitors the binding of LPL to GPIHBP1 on endothelial cells in real time. We validated the specificity and sensitivity of the assay using endothelial lipase and a mutant version of LPL and found that this assay reliably and specifically detected the interaction between LPL and GPIHBP1. We then interrogated various endogenous and exogenous inhibitors of LPL-mediated lipolysis for their ability to disrupt the binding of LPL to GPIHBP1. We found that angiopoietin-like (ANGPTL)4 and ANGPTL3-ANGPTL8 complexes disrupted the interactions of LPL and GPIHBP1, whereas the exogenous LPL blockers we tested (tyloxapol, poloxamer-407, and tetrahydrolipstatin) did not. We also found that chylomicrons could dissociate LPL from GPIHBP1 and found evidence that this dissociation was mediated in part by the fatty acids produced by lipolysis. These results demonstrate the ability of this assay to monitor LPL-GPIHBP1 binding and to probe how various agents influence this important complex.




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Heritability of 596 lipid species and genetic correlation with cardiovascular traits in the Busselton Family Heart Study [Patient-Oriented and Epidemiological Research]

CVD is the leading cause of death worldwide, and genetic investigations into the human lipidome may provide insight into CVD risk. The aim of this study was to estimate the heritability of circulating lipid species and their genetic correlation with CVD traits. Targeted lipidomic profiling was performed on 4,492 participants from the Busselton Family Heart Study to quantify the major fatty acids of 596 lipid species from 33 classes. We estimated narrow-sense heritabilities of lipid species/classes and their genetic correlations with eight CVD traits: BMI, HDL-C, LDL-C, triglycerides, total cholesterol, waist-hip ratio, systolic blood pressure, and diastolic blood pressure. We report heritabilities and genetic correlations of new lipid species/subclasses, including acylcarnitine (AC), ubiquinone, sulfatide, and oxidized cholesteryl esters. Over 99% of lipid species were significantly heritable (h2: 0.06–0.50) and all lipid classes were significantly heritable (h2: 0.14–0.50). The monohexosylceramide and AC classes had the highest median heritabilities (h2 = 0.43). The largest genetic correlation was between clinical triglycerides and total diacylglycerol (rg = 0.88). We observed novel positive genetic correlations between clinical triglycerides and phosphatidylglycerol species (rg: 0.64–0.82), and HDL-C and alkenylphosphatidylcholine species (rg: 0.45–0.74). Overall, 51% of the 4,768 lipid species-CVD trait genetic correlations were statistically significant after correction for multiple comparisons. This is the largest lipidomic study to address the heritability of lipids and their genetic correlation with CVD traits. Future work includes identifying putative causal genetic variants for lipid species and CVD using genome-wide SNP and whole-genome sequencing data.




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Hexacosenoyl-CoA is the most abundant very long-chain acyl-CoA in ATP binding cassette transporter D1-deficient cells [Patient-Oriented and Epidemiological Research]

X-linked adrenoleukodystrophy (X-ALD) is an inherited disorder caused by deleterious mutations in the ABCD1 gene. The ABCD1 protein transports very long-chain FAs (VLCFAs) from the cytosol into the peroxisome where the VLCFAs are degraded through β-oxidation. ABCD1 dysfunction leads to VLCFA accumulation in individuals with X-ALD. FAs are activated by esterification to CoA before metabolic utilization. However, the intracellular pools and metabolic profiles of individual acyl-CoA esters have not been fully analyzed. In this study, we profiled the acyl-CoA species in fibroblasts from X-ALD patients and in ABCD1-deficient HeLa cells. We found that hexacosenoyl (26:1)-CoA, but not hexacosanoyl (26:0)-CoA, was the most abundantly concentrated among the VLCFA-CoA species in these cells. We also show that 26:1-CoA is mainly synthesized from oleoyl-CoA, and the metabolic turnover rate of 26:1-CoA was almost identical to that of oleoyl-CoA in both WT and ABCD1-deficient HeLa cells. The findings of our study provide precise quantitative and metabolic information of each acyl-CoA species in living cells. Our results suggest that VLCFA is endogenously synthesized as VLCFA-CoA through a FA elongation pathway and is then efficiently converted to other metabolites, such as phospholipids, in the absence of ABCD1.




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HDL inhibits endoplasmic reticulum stress-induced apoptosis of pancreatic {beta}-cells in vitro by activation of Smoothened [Research Articles]

Loss of pancreatic β-cell mass and function as a result of sustained ER stress is a core step in the pathogenesis of diabetes mellitus type 2. The complex control of β-cells and insulin production involves hedgehog (Hh) signaling pathways as well as cholesterol-mediated effects. In fact, data from studies in humans and animal models suggest that HDL protects against the development of diabetes through inhibition of ER stress and β-cell apoptosis. We investigated the mechanism by which HDL inhibits ER stress and apoptosis induced by thapsigargin, a sarco/ER Ca2+-ATPase inhibitor, in β-cells of a rat insulinoma cell line, INS1e. We further explored effects on the Hh signaling receptor Smoothened (SMO) with pharmacologic agonists and inhibitors. Interference with sterol synthesis or efflux enhanced β-cell apoptosis and abrogated the anti-apoptotic activity of HDL. During ER stress, HDL facilitated the efflux of specific oxysterols, including 24-hydroxycholesterol (OHC). Supplementation of reconstituted HDL with 24-OHC enhanced and, in cells lacking ABCG1 or the 24-OHC synthesizing enzyme CYP46A1, restored the protective activity of HDL. Inhibition of SMO countered the beneficial effects of HDL and also LDL, and SMO agonists decreased β-cell apoptosis in the absence of ABCG1 or CYP46A1. The translocation of the SMO-activated transcription factor glioma-associated oncogene GLI-1 was inhibited by ER stress but restored by both HDL and 24-OHC. In conclusion, the protective effect of HDL to counter ER stress and β-cell death involves the transport, generation, and mobilization of oxysterols for activation of the Hh signaling receptor SMO




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Alcohol effects on hepatic lipid metabolism [Reviews]

Alcoholic liver disease (ALD) is the most prevalent type of chronic liver disease with significant morbidity and mortality worldwide. ALD begins with simple hepatic steatosis and progresses to alcoholic steatohepatitis, fibrosis, and cirrhosis. The severity of hepatic steatosis is highly associated with the development of later stages of ALD. This review explores the disturbances of alcohol-induced hepatic lipid metabolism through altered hepatic lipid uptake, de novo lipid synthesis, fatty acid oxidation, hepatic lipid export, and lipid droplet formation and catabolism. In addition, we review emerging data on the contributions of genetics and bioactive lipid metabolism in alcohol-induced hepatic lipid accumulation.




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SSO and other putative inhibitors of FA transport across membranes by CD36 disrupt intracellular metabolism, but do not affect FA translocation [Research Articles]

Membrane-bound proteins have been proposed to mediate the transport of long-chain FA (LCFA) transport through the plasma membrane (PM). These proposals are based largely on reports that PM transport of LCFAs can be blocked by a number of enzymes and purported inhibitors of LCFA transport. Here, using the ratiometric pH indicator (2',7'-bis-(2-carboxyethyl)-5-(and-6-)-carboxyfluorescein and acrylodated intestinal FA-binding protein-based dual fluorescence assays, we investigated the effects of nine inhibitors of the putative FA transporter protein CD36 on the binding and transmembrane movement of LCFAs. We particularly focused on sulfosuccinimidyl oleate (SSO), reported to be a competitive inhibitor of CD36-mediated LCFA transport. Using these assays in adipocytes and inhibitor-treated protein-free lipid vesicles, we demonstrate that rapid LCFA transport across model and biological membranes remains unchanged in the presence of these purported inhibitors. We have previously shown in live cells that CD36 does not accelerate the transport of unesterified LCFAs across the PM. Our present experiments indicated disruption of LCFA metabolism inside the cell within minutes upon treatment with many of the "inhibitors" previously assumed to inhibit LCFA transport across the PM. Furthermore, using confocal microscopy and a specific anti-SSO antibody, we found that numerous intracellular and PM-bound proteins are SSO-modified in addition to CD36. Our results support the hypothesis that LCFAs diffuse rapidly across biological membranes and do not require an active protein transporter for their transmembrane movement.




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Hepatic monoamine oxidase B is involved in endogenous geranylgeranoic acid synthesis in mammalian liver cells [Research Articles]

Geranylgeranoic acid (GGA) originally was identified in some animals and has been developed as an agent for preventing second primary hepatoma. We previously have also identified GGA as an acyclic diterpenoid in some medicinal herbs. Recently, we reported that in human hepatoma-derived HuH-7 cells, GGA is metabolically labeled from 13C-mevalonate. Several cell-free experiments have demonstrated that GGA is synthesized through geranylgeranial by oxygen-dependent oxidation of geranylgeraniol (GGOH), but the exact biochemical events giving rise to GGA in hepatoma cells remain unclear. Monoamine oxidase B (MOAB) has been suggested to be involved in GGOH oxidation. Here, using two human hepatoma cell lines, we investigated whether MAOB contributes to GGA biosynthesis. Using either HuH-7 cell lysates or recombinant human MAOB, we found that: 1) the MAO inhibitor tranylcypromine dose-dependently downregulates endogenous GGA levels in HuH-7 cells; and 2) siRNA-mediated MAOB silencing reduces intracellular GGA levels in HuH-7 and Hep3B cells. Unexpectedly, however, CRISPR/Cas9-generated MAOB-KO human hepatoma Hep3B cells had GGA levels similar to those in MAOB-WT cells. A sensitivity of GGA levels to siRNA-mediated MAOB downregulation was recovered when the MAOB-KO cells were transfected with a MAOB-expression plasmid, suggesting that MAOB is the enzyme primarily responsible for GGOH oxidation and that some other latent metabolic pathways may maintain endogenous GGA levels in the MAOB-KO hepatoma cells. Along with the previous findings, these results provide critical insights into the biological roles of human MAOB and provide evidence that hepatic MAOB is involved in endogenous GGA biosynthesis via GGOH oxidation.




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A novel GPER antagonist protects against the formation of estrogen-induced cholesterol gallstones in female mice [Research Articles]

Many clinical studies and epidemiological investigations have clearly demonstrated that women are twice as likely to develop cholesterol gallstones as men, and oral contraceptives and other estrogen therapies dramatically increase that risk. Further, animal studies have revealed that estrogen promotes cholesterol gallstone formation through the estrogen receptor (ER) α, but not ERβ, pathway. More importantly, some genetic and pathophysiological studies have found that G protein-coupled estrogen receptor (GPER) 1 is a new gallstone gene, Lith18, on chromosome 5 in mice and produces additional lithogenic actions, working independently of ERα, to markedly increase cholelithogenesis in female mice. Based on computational modeling of GPER, a novel series of GPER-selective antagonists were designed, synthesized, and subsequently assessed for their therapeutic effects via calcium mobilization, cAMP, and ERα and ERβ fluorescence polarization binding assays. From this series of compounds, one new compound, 2-cyclohexyl-4-isopropyl-N-(4-methoxybenzyl)aniline (CIMBA), exhibits superior antagonism and selectivity exclusively for GPER. Furthermore, CIMBA reduces the formation of 17β-estradiol-induced gallstones in a dose-dependent manner in ovariectomized mice fed a lithogenic diet for 8 weeks. At 32 μg/day/kg CIMBA, no gallstones are found, even in ovariectomized ERα (–/–) mice treated with 6 μg/day 17β-estradiol and fed the lithogenic diet for 8 weeks. In conclusion, CIMBA treatment protects against the formation of estrogen-induced cholesterol gallstones by inhibiting the GPER signaling pathway in female mice. CIMBA may thus be a new agent for effectively treating cholesterol gallstone disease in women.­




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Nanodomains can persist at physiologic temperature in plasma membrane vesicles and be modulated by altering cell lipids [Research Articles]

The formation and properties of liquid-ordered (Lo) lipid domains (rafts) in the plasma membrane are still poorly understood. This limits our ability to manipulate ordered lipid domain-dependent biological functions. Giant plasma membrane vesicles (GPMVs) undergo large-scale phase separations into coexisting Lo and liquid-disordered lipid domains. However, large-scale phase separation in GPMVs detected by light microscopy is observed only at low temperatures. Comparing Förster resonance energy transfer-detected versus light microscopy-detected domain formation, we found that nanodomains, domains of nanometer size, persist at temperatures up to 20°C higher than large-scale phases, up to physiologic temperature. The persistence of nanodomains at higher temperatures is consistent with previously reported theoretical calculations. To investigate the sensitivity of nanodomains to lipid composition, GPMVs were prepared from mammalian cells in which sterol, phospholipid, or sphingolipid composition in the plasma membrane outer leaflet had been altered by cyclodextrin-catalyzed lipid exchange. Lipid substitutions that stabilize or destabilize ordered domain formation in artificial lipid vesicles had a similar effect on the thermal stability of nanodomains and large-scale phase separation in GPMVs, with nanodomains persisting at higher temperatures than large-scale phases for a wide range of lipid compositions. This indicates that it is likely that plasma membrane nanodomains can form under physiologic conditions more readily than large-scale phase separation. We also conclude that membrane lipid substitutions carried out in intact cells are able to modulate the propensity of plasma membranes to form ordered domains. This implies lipid substitutions can be used to alter biological processes dependent upon ordered domains.