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EPA Awards $24,867 Grant to University of North Carolina at Charlotte for Innovative Technology Projects

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Soccer star Alex Morgan gives birth to first child

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Domino’s deliveryman says he’s forever scarred after being robbed of e-bike in Manhattan: ‘You remember something like this for the rest of your life’

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And the Winner of Sound of Music Live Is...

Filed under: , ,

Jasper180969 via Flickr
Last night's live production of The Sound of Music on NBC got more flak than Maria did for being an unsolvable problem nun. The acting was bad, the costumes St. Pauli-esque and the mountains... gasp! They were fake!


But there was one winner in last night's performance: the city of Salzburg, Austria. Home of the Von Trapps, setting of the original movie and now site of thousands of Edelweiss-blasting tour buses and gazebo-worshipping 16-going-on-17-year-olds, Salzburg enjoyed a flurry of love last night.

Continue reading And the Winner of Sound of Music Live Is...

And the Winner of Sound of Music Live Is... originally appeared on Gadling on Fri, 06 Dec 2013 14:30:00 EST. Please see our terms for use of feeds.

Permalink | Email this | Comments




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UK Charm Offensive in China

15 October 2013

Professor Kerry Brown

Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme

After a year in which there were precious few high level political visits, China is now getting two in the same week: the UK Chancellor George Osborne and the Mayor of London Boris Johnson. The irritation at David Cameron and Nick Clegg's very public meeting with the Dalai Lama last year has now been replaced by an era of warmth and mutual understanding. That, at least, is what the press releases for these visits will have us believe. 

In fact, while the ministerial freeze has been on, the UK has been doing fine – having more than double the Chinese investment of any other EU member, and increasing its exports to China. Chinese visitors to the UK brought in £300 million last year – a formidable achievement in view of the highly unwelcoming visa regime the UK currently has towards people from China (something George Osborne has promised to reform while in Beijing). 

The UK and China are always keen to assert differences, but at heart they are pragmatic nations. They are both utterly at one in seeking growth, and they see in each other compatibilities that can be benignly exploited. For the Chinese, there are decent assets in the UK in the energy and manufacturing sector that are very reasonably priced, and which exist in one of the most liberal investment regimes in the world. For the UK, China is a vast market that its companies, small and large, need to conquer. Any tactical advantage in this battle for access is good in view of the competition that is going to come from other international companies, but also players inside China that want to find their way to the hearts of Chinese consumers. The next decades look set to belong to these consumers. The long term theme of Johnson and Osborne's separate visits is getting as close as possible to these new actors in global growth. 

Overcoming hurdles

Boris Johnson and George Osborne are unlikely to be publicly explicit about the challenges that British trade interests face in China, but in private meetings they have to be raised. The first is that China is becoming a master of indirect protectionism, and the treatment being given to companies ranging from GlaxoSmithKline down to small consultancies is getting harsh. The UK has a strong interest in the success of the EU in negotiating better trade access, from the right for companies to bid for government procurement in China to the perennial problems of state subsidies for Chinese companies and intellectual property rights protection. It is important to find smart ways to leverage the newfound interest China has in deploying its capital abroad, to give UK companies better deals in China. This has to be subtle work, but the primary interests in the UK are the same as our EU partners – having a liberal, rule-based, global order where China is far more integrated. 

There are also some domestic issues. Large trade missions to China have been happening since the reign of George the Third. Lord Heseltine led a vast army of companies in the early 1990s to Beijing. Trade missions have become an unquestionable part of the whole performance of UK politicians going to China. But just how much these achieve is debatable. A decade ago, in The China Dream, Joe Studwell poured cold water on some of the noisier delegations and what real business they did. Perhaps it is time for the UK government to give more support for small and medium businesses. Many of them will have to think about a China strategy if they are not already there, and will face a tough and time consuming task in making inroads in China. Some solidarity amongst them and with the government would be a big advantage. 

This impacts on the delicate business of how the UK undertakes its business and political relations with China in the first place. China is now the world's second largest economy on some measures, and George Osborne said his visit was to change UK perceptions of the country so that British people can see it as more than just an enormous factory producing cheap goods. For that to happen there needs to be a more dynamic, inclusive operation in the UK which cultivates links with Chinese business, rather than the ancient groupings of associations and dining clubs that prevail at the moment. These are good for the egos of those already doing well in China, but are not reaching out enough to the many in the UK who might find they can work in or with China. 

Academic understanding

There is a deeper values debate that China and the UK might have. Our history means that we have shared a lot of good and bad things. The UK needs to support as many young people in learning Chinese, visiting China, and knowing about China as possible. And the good news is that relations will be helped by the quarter of a million Chinese students who have studied in the UK and had experience of life here in the last 15 years. As much outreach to this group, many of whom are back in China and developing exciting careers, is important: each one is an invaluable ambassador for life here. Decades after the visit of Osborne and Johnson has faded from memory, it will be these people that truly shape the future. 

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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Communist Party’s Plenum Will Be Important, Not Transformative, for China

8 November 2013

Professor Kerry Brown

Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme

20131108PudongChina.jpg

View of the Pudong financial district skyline from the historic Bund, Shanghai 29 October 2013. Photo by Getty Images.

Despite the hype surrounding it, the gathering of the country’s ruling elite in Beijing is likely to prize measured change over dramatic reform.

If there was a clearer idea of what makes China’s new elite leadership tick, then the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party that is about to be held in Beijing would not be such a big deal. But in a polity which privileges concealment over overt statement, it is viewed widely as the one chance for outsiders to see more clearly what the leadership aims to achieve. Expectations were raised by the October statement by one of the most staid members of the current Standing Committee of the Politburo, Yu Zhengsheng, that the plenum would presage a new era of reform.

In Chinese politics reform is a word that has a wholesome, positive air about it. But the question is where and when reform will happen and who will gain from it. The plenum is not like a party convention in the Western sense. It is not an eye-grabbing, media-dominating event that produces surprises. Comparing this year’s installment with the great Third Plenum of 1978 that heralded the repudiation of late Maoism and the embracing of the market, the non-state sector and foreign capital – all anathema before then – is misleading. The significance of the 1978 meeting was only obvious in hindsight. It took years for the scale of the radical transformation of the whole strategic direction of the Communist Party to be appreciated. That 2013 will prove a similar historic moment is unlikely, perhaps even impossible.

What is much more likely is that the highly tactical leadership now in charge will reaffirm its commitment to incremental reform. It will make some statements about the radical urbanization that China is about to undergo and say something about social welfare reform. China’s leaders will do what they have always done in plenums over the last three decades, namely set the broad parameters of politically permissible activity that provinces, ministries and other stakeholders will then need to implement.

This plenum will also have to produce something about the need to achieve greater egality and balance in the economy. It needs to answer some of the questions about how Premier Li Keqiang, in particular, intends to meet the goal of 'fast, sustainable growth' when a falling overall GDP figure looks likely. It needs to communicate to as broad a constituency as possible the arch-narrative of a world where the raw statement of growth on its own is no longer the be all and end all of government policy. It needs to say something about how the party is going to fulfill the increasingly complex aspirations of the Chinese people, aspirations that exceed purely having a materially good level of life and concern broader questions of well-being that vex the politics of all developed economies.

Observers will want to see some signs too of addressing the most sensitive issues. Yu Zhengsheng talked of economic reform. Reforming the economy is now a wholly uncontroversial mantra in China. However, it impacts on one enormously important issue that reaches beyond economics: whether wealth, prosperity and development benefit the few or are accessible to the many – in other words, good, old-fashioned questions of economic and social justice. At the heart of this lies the question of how state-owned enterprises have become vehicles of profit not just for the party state, but also for tightly knit networks of vested interests. Reforms that lap at the doors of these entities also creep into the space of powerful political players, who will resist any attempt to cut down their wealth, and who have the power to resist.

China’s new leadership is proving more confident than was expected and displays a high sense of historic mission. President Xi Jinping speaks increasingly like a politician who believes it is almost his historic destiny to sit at the centre of the leadership of a renascent 'rich, strong country'. The ultimate question for the plenum is not what outside observers make of it but what the vastly complex mixture of groups in China does. For them, a sign that the leadership is willing to take on some of the entrenched vested interests that penetrate the operations of some state-owned sectors to the core is critical.

This is likely to be couched in the language of more support for the market, which is the key channel in any attack on vested interests – through widening access to wealth and economic benefits, and support for the non-state sector and entrepreneurs. It is hard to see how deeper reform can occur without these two crucial elements. And it is through these that the attitude of China’s leadership to political and legal reforms – far more complex issues that, almost certainly, will not be addressed at the plenum but will lurk in the background − will become clearer. The leadership thinks it is too early to tackle these issues directly, but this plenum will still be part of the process for it to come up with ideas for how to transform not just China’s economy, but its polity too.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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China Looks Serious About 'Decisive' Market Reforms

20 November 2013

Dr Tim Summers

Senior Consulting Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme (based in Hong Kong)

2131120Third Plenum.jpg

Farmers harvest in the village of Gangzhong in China's eastern Zhejiang province, 19 November 2013, days after China's ruling party unveiled a list of sweeping changes including reforms to the land ownership system, loosening controls over state-owned enterprises, relaxing the controversial one-child policy, and eventually shuttering forced labour camps. Photo by Peter Parks/AFP/Getty Images.

China’s leaders set out their intention to push forward with policy reform following the Third Plenum. The full decision released on 15 November makes clear the aim to loosen constraints on the market, and suggests a dilution of state-owned enterprise influence. A new national security committee could also lead to greater policy integration between domestic security and international affairs.

The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee took place in Beijing from 9−12 November. Initial reactions based on the communiqué released on the last day of the meeting were mixed. However, on 15 November the authorities published the detailed decision approved by the plenum, and an explanation given to the plenum by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping – in which he acknowledged major problems facing China.

These documents make the implications of the plenum much clearer. In sum, it offers a clear political signal that as China’s fifth-generation Party leadership enters its second year, it is intent on taking forward a ‘comprehensive deepening of reform’ across a wide range of issues. As an indication of the importance of this, a new high-level ‘leading small group’ will be established to coordinate and oversee this process. The decision spells out various new measures, and reiterates many which are already part of the government’s agenda.

More market in the economy

The most important material is on the economy, where the decision makes clear that the leadership envisages a ‘decisive’ role for market forces, and the establishment of ‘fair and equal’ competition in the economy. This will provide a guiding principle for policy-making over the coming years.

One of the ways of achieving this is to reorganize the functions of government. Here the decision reiterates the themes which the government has been working on since Premier Li Keqiang took over in March this year, namely reducing or removing the need for government approvals to businesses, freeing up the investment environment, and allowing businesses and the market to take the lead unless there is a strong reason for government intervention. Better governance is a wider theme of the decision, covering the judicial system and reforms to the party’s disciplinary organs which would clarify leadership and accountability in anti-corruption investigations.

SOE reform

A possible impediment to market reforms is the power of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the original communiqué gave the impression that nothing much would be done about SOEs. However, the ability of these so-called ‘vested interests’ to stymie market reforms has been weakened by the targeting of a number of senior SOE-related cadres in the party’s latest anti-corruption campaign, which began at the end of 2012.

Further, the detailed decision suggests further reforms are in the offing. Although the relevant section of the document begins by restating the leading role for state ownership, a series of subsequent policy aims could serve to dilute it, such as ensuring equality in property rights protection and competition; developing mixed (state and non-state) ownership through cross-shareholding and bringing private capital into state-led projects; shifting from managing SOEs to managing state investments in enterprises; better supervision of SOEs which operate in natural monopolies; and removing administrative monopolies.

International affairs

The decision talks about further opening of China’s economy, but the vast majority of the issues covered in the decision are domestic in nature, and announcements such as a further relaxation of birth control policies have attracted most attention. Even the points on military and defense issues relate more to internal management than external capacity.

There was, however, one announcement which could have important implications for China’s foreign policy, which will be watched carefully outside China, the establishment of a ‘national security committee’. Xi said that this was being set up in response to external pressures to protect national sovereignty, security and development. He also cited internal pressures to maintain political security and social stability. It is too early to judge what the exact remit of this body will be, but it could lead to greater policy coordination and integration between domestic security issues and international affairs, at a time when China is playing a more important role across the international spectrum.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback




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Global Attitudes: Perspectives on the US-China Power Shift

Members Event

15 July 2014 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Bruce Stokes, Director, Global Economic Attitudes project, Pew Research Center; Associate Fellow, Americas Programme, Chatham House
Roderic Wye, Associate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House
Dr Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Director, Paris Office, German Marshall Fund of the United States 
Chair: Dr Robin Niblett, Director, Chatham House 

With China’s economic power on the rise, there is a growing sense among many publics around the world that the global balance of power is shifting and that China already is, or will soon be, the world’s leading power, according to a new survey. The Pew Research Center’s latest Global Attitudes survey found that despite China’s rise in economic power, the People’s Republic is not very popular in Asia, Europe and the United States. As for the US, although the ‘Obama Bounce’ effect of more positive attitudes toward the United States is waning in Europe and China, anti-Americanism in most countries remains much lower than it was during the Bush administration, but remaining consistent in the Middle East. 

Bruce Stokes will present these findings and the expert panel will discuss the insights it provides into an emerging superpower rivalry. In addition they will discuss how these nuances in global attitudes might increasingly shape the security and economic policies of governments around the world.

Members Events Team




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Nigeria’s Priorities for Progress: Imperatives for Stability and Inclusive Growth

Research Event

24 July 2014 - 2:30pm to 3:30pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Dr Doyin Okupe, Senior Special Assistant on Public Affairs to the President of Nigeria 

Nigeria’s prospects, with its rise to international prominence as Africa’s largest economy, are tempered by the many development and security challenges the country faces. While essential reforms in the power and agriculture sectors are underway, such efforts are balanced against the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, significant concerns around youth unemployment, and an increasingly contentious political environment in the run-up to the February 2015 elections. 

Dr Doyin Okupe, Senior Special Assistant to President Goodluck Jonathan, will discuss what steps the presidency is taking to address the country’s most urgent challenges, and how the political environment can be managed to overcome tensions that may impede progress.

Department/project

Christopher Vandome

Research Fellow, Africa Programme
+44 (0) 20 7314 3669




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Xi Jinping’s Dream: What Drives China’s Leader?

Members Event

20 April 2016 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House London, UK

Event participants

Professor Kerry Brown, Director, Lau China Institute, King's College London; Associate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Isabel Hilton OBE, Founder and Editor, Chinadialogue

Professor Brown will examine how Xi Jinping has consolidated authority since becoming head of the Communist Party in 2012 and explore what his goals are for the future of China. Is Xi trying to cement his own power or protect the interests of the party by guiding it towards a more sustainable rule?

This talk will introduce the key arguments in CEO China: The Rise of Xi Jinping, the speaker’s full-length, English language study of Xi, his background, current position and core beliefs.
 

Members Events Team




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After Five Bloody Years in Syria, Russia Is Turning Against Iran—and Assad

GAZIANTEP, Turkey—After five years fighting to preserve Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Russia now appears inclined to dispose of its infamous client. Assad’s persistent brutality and corruption, and his inability to establish even the semblance of a functioning state, has grown to be a burden Moscow would prefer not to bear.And then there’s the problem of Iran. Assad, members of his family, and his Alawite clansmen enjoy close, perhaps unbreakable, bonds to the regime in Tehran and to Iranian-backed militias in Syria. All of which undermines Moscow’s primary mission there: to rehabilitate the Assad regime as a symbol of stability capable of attracting hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign investment for reconstruction, which Russian firms would then be poised to receive. As long as Assad’s relatives continue to function as a mafia and give free rein to Iranian troops using Syria as base of operations to threaten Israel and plan attacks against U.S. troops in Iraq, those countries likely to foot the bill for Syrian reconstruction—the nations of Europe and the Gulf—are unlikely to come up with the cash. Amid Escalating Syrian Carnage, Turkey Shoots Down Assad’s PlanesThis has not gone unnoticed by the United States.“Assad has done nothing to help the Russians sell this regime,”James Jeffrey, the U.S. special envoy for the Coalition to Defeat ISIS, told reporters in a State Department briefing on Thursday. “You find Assad has nothing but thugs around him, and they don't sell well either in the Arab world or in Europe. We have heard repeatedly from Russians we take as credible that they understand how bad Assad is.” The Syrian president’s “refusal to make any compromises” in order to secure diplomatic recognition and acceptance for his regime has jeopardized “hundreds of billions of dollars in reconstruction assistance” for Syria, according to Jeffrey. Yet the Trump administration is unlikely to exploit this growing rift. “Getting Russia out of Syria,” Jeffrey said, “has never been our goal. Russia has been there for 30 years. It has a long-term relationship with Syria. We don’t think it has been healthy for the region. We don’t think it really is even healthy for Russia. But that’s not our policy.”  MEDIA FRENZYJeffrey’s statements come just one week after Russian state media unleashed a slew of reports and editorials targeting Assad, portraying the beleaguered president as hopelessly corrupt and unfit to govern, and suggesting the time had come to replace him with a new leader.The first batch of articles was published by the Russia’s Federal News Agency (FNA), an outlet owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch and chairman of several companies implicated in the 2016 U.S. elections scandal. Appearing over the course of a mere three hours on April 17, they would shake Syria to its core. The first of the three articles in question highlighted a corruption scheme carried out by the regime in summer 2019 in which the Syrian prime minister purportedly lied to citizens about oil and gas scarcities in order to justify the occurrence of long power outages while selling Syrian electricity to businessmen in Lebanon. The second piece cited an opinion poll claiming only 32 percent of Syrians would vote for Assad in the country’s upcoming 2021 presidential election. The third and final article, entitled, “Corruption is Worse than Terrorism,” chastized President Assad for personally failing to combat corruption, prevalent at all levels of the state.  That these were published by Prigozhin’s news agency was the kind of signal it would be hard for Assad to miss. Prigozhin, who first built his fortune as a caterer, is sometimes known as “Putin’s chef.” But of particular relevance to Syria is his role as chairman of the Wagner Group, whose mercenaries have fought alongside Assad regime forces since October 2015 and helped the latter take back control of key revenue generating infrastructure such as the al-Sha’ir gas field in Homs province.Deputy Assistant Secretary Christopher Robin told the same State Department briefing Thursday, “Wagner is often misleadingly referred to as a Russian private military company, but in fact it’s an instrument of the Russian government which the Kremlin uses as a low-cost and low-risk instrument to advance its goals.”The article on corruption would also point out, suggestively, that the Assads are not the only powerful family in Syria, “there are also the Makhloufs.”Rami Makhlouf, who is in fact Bashar al-Assad’s first cousin, is Syria’s wealthiest man, and also, it would seem, Russia’s man. Certainly he has strong ties to the Kremlin and for years has been one of the most vocal critics of Iran’s presence in Syria. In July 2018, the al-Watan newspaper, one Syria’s most prominent pro-regime mouthpieces and owned by Rami Makhlouf since 2006, published a then unprecedented public rebuke to Iran, accusing it of sponsoring Islamist fanaticism throughout the Middle East alongside Turkey and Qatar, the main backers of Syria’s opposition. (Rami Makhlouf’s father Muhammad and brother Hafiz meanwhile are alleged by some to be living in Russia.) The April 17 articles published by Prigozhin’s FNA preceded the release of a wave of other articles and items in the media over the next 12 days that would further drive home the point that Moscow was considering options other than Assad to rule Syria. TASS, Russia’s largest state-run news agency, wrote in one editorial that, “Russia suspects that Assad is not only unable to lead the country anymore, but also that the head of the Syrian regime is dragging Moscow towards the Afghani scenario.” This is like evoking the Vietnam War for an American audience, a reference to the Kremlin’s botched campaign through the 1980s that helped bankrupt the Soviet Union and finally break it apart.Amid this coverage, TASS would also take swipes at Iran, claiming that the Islamic Republic has “no interest in achieving stability in the region, because it considers it a battlefield with Washington”.On April 30, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), a think tank established by Moscow’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, released a scathing report saying Russia was in talks with other parties to the Syrian conflict to draw up plans for a political resolution that did not include Bashar al-Assad as president. The report highlighted purported Russian efforts to compel the Syrian regime to commit to ceasefires with both American-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) opposition, while beginning steps to form a new unity government that would include representatives from both. That day, Rami Makhlouf, whose assets were frozen five months earlier as part of a tax dispute, uploaded a video onto his personal Facebook page accusing the Assad regime of corruption. In a state known for carrying out the full-scale slaughter of those who test its authority, Makhlouf’s videos, coming on the heels of the unprecedented Russian attacks in the media, sent shockwaves throughout the country.  THE ROYAL FAMILYWhile the Makhlouf clan clearly has thrown its lot in with Russia, key members of Bashar al-Assad’s immediate family and others with ties to Qardaha in Syria’s largely Alawite Latakia province, are among the most prominent Iranian-backed militia leaders in Syria. It’s an alliance that traces back to his father Hafez al-Assad, who was born in Qardaha, and who forged ties with the Iranian revolution almost from its beginning more than 40 years ago. The Iranians responded by offering religious legitimacy to the Alawite sect, which is regarded as heretical by Sunnis and indeed by many Shi’a.These Qardaha militia leaders have regularly engaged in armed clashes against Russian backed units. They are among the most egregious violators and abusers of power, overseeing wide networks of corruption similar to those lamented in the Russian media. And foremost among them is Bashar’s younger brother, Maher al-Assad. Since April 2018, Maher al-Assad has commanded the Syrian Army’s 4th Armored Division, one of country’s oldest, best equipped and overwhelmingly Alawite brigades. After the 2011 outbreak of the Syrian revolution, when the loyalty of much of the army was in doubt, it became a refuge for numerous Alawite-Shi’a dominated pro-regime militias.Currently, the 4th Armored Division’s members control many smuggling operations throughout the country, in cities from Albu Kamel on Syria’s eastern border with Iraq to Latakia on the Syrian coast, where the port was leased to Iran on October 1 last year. It has since become one of the biggest export hubs for drugs headed to markets in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Examples abound: On July 5, 2019, Greek coast guard and drug enforcement officials announced the biggest drug bust in history, seizing 5.25 tons (33 million pills) of Captagon amphetamines worth $660m hidden in shipping containers loaded at the Latakia port in Syria. That followed a long string of such seizures made by Greek authorities. More recently, in late April, customs officials in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt also announced the seizure of similar quantities of drugs in containers traced back to Latakia. Local reports have accused a range of actors including Maher al-Assad’s 4th Division, Hizbollah, Rami Makhlouf, and others of profiting from the massive drug exports emanating from the port. In January 2019 the 4th Armored Division launched attacks on the Russian-backed Tiger Forces unit in an attempt to wrest control of smuggling routes between regime- and opposition-held territory in Idlib province. The clashes led to the death of 70 fighters. These and other skirmishes prompted Russia to back a major campaign to arrest 4th Division and other Iranian-backed units throughout the country beginning in April 2019, which succeeded in rounding up numerous mid-ranking Iranian-backed officers. Among those targeted in the campaign was Bashar Talal al-Assad, a cousin to the president (similar name, different people) who was wanted on drug and weapons trafficking charges. Unlike others who were detained in the roundup, Bashar Talal al-Assad and his ‘Areen Brigade managed to fight off Russian-backed forces that sought to arrest him in Qardaha. He then pledged to attack Russia’s Hmeimim military base, located 17 miles east of Latakia city, in the event the regime sought to arrest him again.For Russia, the threat of such attacks on its military infrastructure is a real concern. The Hmeimim base—from which Moscow has directed its entire military campaign in Syria—had already been subject to a series of attacks from January to October 2018 by other Iranian-backed militias in the area. The threat posed by both Iran’s acquisition of the Latakia port and its support for local Assad family proxies in Syria’s coastal region is exacerbated by the fact that Tehran has also begun making progress toward completing construction of its Shalamcha railroad, which, via stops in Basra, Baghdad, Albu Kamel and Damascus, will give Tehran direct access to the Syrian and Lebanese coasts. If Iran succeeds in integrating the Latakia port with the Shalamcha rail line, this will cut off Hmeimim from Russian forces in central and southern Syria and enable Tehran to quickly deliver weapons to proxy forces in Latakia that are already engaged in clashes against Russian-backed groups. WORLDWIDE CONSENSUSMoscow’s inability to control Iranian backed Syrian militiamen engaged in widespread crime, corruption, and assaults on Russian forces has infuriated the Kremlin. But Russia is not the only major player on the ground with scores to settle against Iran, and the Russian military leadership in Syria has ignored if not largely encouraged Israeli strikes on Iranian troops throughout the country.It may not be coincidental that the Israeli attacks have increased in pace and scope since April, following the flurry of Russian media articles attacking Assad and his regime. “We have moved from blocking Iran’s entrenchment in Syria to forcing it out of there, and we will not stop,” Israel’s new defense minister, Naftali Bennett, declared on April 28. Without Russia, Iran has found itself the odd man out in Syria, the single party still seeking to push for war at a time when most other international players have been struck with fatigue and simply seek to put Syria’s pieces back together. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, the last patron of Syria’s battered FSA opposition, has himself made peace with Moscow, effectively agreeing last March to cede control of wide swaths of rebel held territory after a particularly bloody Russian led campaign against the last FSA holdout in Idlib province that ended in victory for regime forces. Ironically, Erdoğan’s long-held desire to overthrow Syria’s president may still come to fruition, albeit not as he expected, as Assad’s ouster may come at the hands of Russia itself, and not the revolution. Read more at The Daily Beast.Get our top stories in your inbox every day. Sign up now!Daily Beast Membership: Beast Inside goes deeper on the stories that matter to you. Learn more.





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Structures of the MHC-I molecule BF2*1501 disclose the preferred presentation of an H5N1 virus-derived epitope [Protein Structure and Folding]

Lethal infections by strains of the highly-pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 pose serious threats to both the poultry industry and public health worldwide. A lack of confirmed HPAIV epitopes recognized by cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTLs) has hindered the utilization of CD8+ T-cell–mediated immunity and has precluded the development of effectively diversified epitope-based vaccination approaches. In particular, an HPAIV H5N1 CTL-recognized epitope based on the peptide MHC-I–β2m (pMHC-I) complex has not yet been designed. Here, screening a collection of selected peptides of several HPAIV strains against a specific pathogen-free pMHC-I (pBF2*1501), we identified a highly-conserved HPAIV H5N1 CTL epitope, named HPAIV–PA123–130. We determined the structure of the BF2*1501–PA123–130 complex at 2.1 Å resolution to elucidate the molecular mechanisms of a preferential presentation of the highly-conserved PA123–130 epitope in the chicken B15 lineage. Conformational characteristics of the PA123–130 epitope with a protruding Tyr-7 residue indicated that this epitope has great potential to be recognized by specific TCRs. Moreover, significantly increased numbers of CD8+ T cells specific for the HPAIV–PA123–130 epitope in peptide-immunized chickens indicated that a repertoire of CD8+ T cells can specifically respond to this epitope. We anticipate that the identification and structural characterization of the PA123–130 epitope reported here could enable further studies of CTL immunity against HPAIV H5N1. Such studies may aid in the development of vaccine development strategies using well-conserved internal viral antigens in chickens.




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Structural insight into the recognition of pathogen-derived phosphoglycolipids by C-type lectin receptor DCAR [Protein Structure and Folding]

The C-type lectin receptors (CLRs) form a family of pattern recognition receptors that recognize numerous pathogens, such as bacteria and fungi, and trigger innate immune responses. The extracellular carbohydrate-recognition domain (CRD) of CLRs forms a globular structure that can coordinate a Ca2+ ion, allowing receptor interactions with sugar-containing ligands. Although well-conserved, the CRD fold can also display differences that directly affect the specificity of the receptors for their ligands. Here, we report crystal structures at 1.8–2.3 Å resolutions of the CRD of murine dendritic cell-immunoactivating receptor (DCAR, or Clec4b1), the CLR that binds phosphoglycolipids such as acylated phosphatidyl-myo-inositol mannosides (AcPIMs) of mycobacteria. Using mutagenesis analysis, we identified critical residues, Ala136 and Gln198, on the surface surrounding the ligand-binding site of DCAR, as well as an atypical Ca2+-binding motif (Glu-Pro-Ser/EPS168–170). By chemically synthesizing a water-soluble ligand analog, inositol-monophosphate dimannose (IPM2), we confirmed the direct interaction of DCAR with the polar moiety of AcPIMs by biolayer interferometry and co-crystallization approaches. We also observed a hydrophobic groove extending from the ligand-binding site that is in a suitable position to interact with the lipid portion of whole AcPIMs. These results suggest that the hydroxyl group-binding ability and hydrophobic groove of DCAR mediate its specific binding to pathogen-derived phosphoglycolipids such as mycobacterial AcPIMs.




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NF-{kappa}B mediates lipopolysaccharide-induced alternative pre-mRNA splicing of MyD88 in mouse macrophages [Signal Transduction]

Although a robust inflammatory response is needed to combat infection, this response must ultimately be terminated to prevent chronic inflammation. One mechanism that terminates inflammatory signaling is the production of alternative mRNA splice forms in the Toll-like receptor (TLR) signaling pathway. Whereas most genes in the TLR pathway encode positive mediators of inflammatory signaling, several, including that encoding the MyD88 signaling adaptor, also produce alternative spliced mRNA isoforms that encode dominant-negative inhibitors of the response. Production of these negatively acting alternatively spliced isoforms is induced by stimulation with the TLR4 agonist lipopolysaccharide (LPS); thus, this alternative pre-mRNA splicing represents a negative feedback loop that terminates TLR signaling and prevents chronic inflammation. In the current study, we investigated the mechanisms regulating the LPS-induced alternative pre-mRNA splicing of the MyD88 transcript in murine macrophages. We found that 1) the induction of the alternatively spliced MyD88 form is due to alternative pre-mRNA splicing and not caused by another RNA regulatory mechanism, 2) MyD88 splicing is regulated by both the MyD88- and TRIF-dependent arms of the TLR signaling pathway, 3) MyD88 splicing is regulated by the NF-κB transcription factor, and 4) NF-κB likely regulates MyD88 alternative pre-mRNA splicing per se rather than regulating splicing indirectly by altering MyD88 transcription. We conclude that alternative splicing of MyD88 may provide a sensitive mechanism that ensures robust termination of inflammation for tissue repair and restoration of normal tissue homeostasis once an infection is controlled.




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Kruppel-like factor 3 (KLF3) suppresses NF-{kappa}B-driven inflammation in mice [Immunology]

Bacterial products such as lipopolysaccharides (or endotoxin) cause systemic inflammation, resulting in a substantial global health burden. The onset, progression, and resolution of the inflammatory response to endotoxin are usually tightly controlled to avoid chronic inflammation. Members of the NF-κB family of transcription factors are key drivers of inflammation that activate sets of genes in response to inflammatory signals. Such responses are typically short-lived and can be suppressed by proteins that act post-translationally, such as the SOCS (suppressor of cytokine signaling) family. Less is known about direct transcriptional regulation of these responses, however. Here, using a combination of in vitro approaches and in vivo animal models, we show that endotoxin treatment induced expression of the well-characterized transcriptional repressor Krüppel-like factor 3 (KLF3), which, in turn, directly repressed the expression of the NF-κB family member RELA/p65. We also observed that KLF3-deficient mice were hypersensitive to endotoxin and exhibited elevated levels of circulating Ly6C+ monocytes and macrophage-derived inflammatory cytokines. These findings reveal that KLF3 is a fundamental suppressor that operates as a feedback inhibitor of RELA/p65 and may be important in facilitating the resolution of inflammation.




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ADAM10 and ADAM17 proteases mediate proinflammatory cytokine-induced and constitutive cleavage of endomucin from the endothelial surface [Membrane Biology]

Contact between inflammatory cells and endothelial cells (ECs) is a crucial step in vascular inflammation. Recently, we demonstrated that the cell-surface level of endomucin (EMCN), a heavily O-glycosylated single-transmembrane sialomucin, interferes with the interactions between inflammatory cells and ECs. We have also shown that, in response to an inflammatory stimulus, EMCN is cleared from the cell surface by an unknown mechanism. In this study, using adenovirus-mediated overexpression of a tagged EMCN in human umbilical vein ECs, we found that treatment with tumor necrosis factor α (TNF-α) or the strong oxidant pervanadate leads to loss of cell-surface EMCN and increases the levels of the C-terminal fragment of EMCN 3- to 4-fold. Furthermore, treatment with the broad-spectrum matrix metalloproteinase inhibitor batimastat (BB94) or inhibition of ADAM metallopeptidase domain 10 (ADAM10) and ADAM17 with two small-molecule inhibitors, GW280264X and GI254023X, or with siRNA significantly reduced basal and TNFα-induced cell-surface EMCN cleavage. Release of the C-terminal fragment of EMCN by TNF-α treatment was blocked by chemical inhibition of ADAM10 alone or in combination with ADAM17. These results indicate that cell-surface EMCN undergoes constitutive cleavage and that TNF-α treatment dramatically increases this cleavage, which is mediated predominantly by ADAM10 and ADAM17. As endothelial cell-surface EMCN attenuates leukocyte–EC interactions during inflammation, we propose that EMCN is a potential therapeutic target to manage vascular inflammation.




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Re: David Oliver: Is abuse towards doctors in government roles unfair?




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Re: Covid-19: how to use your time when clinical placements are postponed - Wellbeing perspective




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Rising drug prices drive US manufacturers’ revenues, analysis finds




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Australian neuroscientist given two year suspended sentence for falsifying Parkinson's research




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“Impressive results” in stem cell treatment for multiple sclerosis




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Pay-to-Go Schemes and Other Noncoercive Return Programs: Is Scale Possible?

Noncoercive, pay-to-go, voluntary, assisted voluntary, and nonforced returns generally can offer paid travel and/or other financial incentive to encourage unauthorized immigrants to cooperate with immigration officials and leave host countries. A look at three key rationales for governments to choose pay-to-go and other returns.




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Migration and Development: Policy Perspectives from the United States

The report examines U.S. immigration and international development policies, which have unique objectives and respond to distinct political and administrative constraints, and points out that international development has never been a U.S. immigration policy objective; nonetheless, it is an unintended consequence.




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The Role of Immigration in Fostering Competitiveness in the United States

While aspects of the U.S. immigration system facilitate newcomers’ contributions to economic growth and competitiveness, others undermine them. Reforms are needed to enhance the job-creating power of U.S. employers and strengthen the system’s ability to select effectively from the large pool of foreign workers.




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The Role of Civil Society in EU Migration Policy: Perspectives on the European Union's Engagement in its Neighborhood

Civil society provides a crucial link between governments and the communities they represent—infusing policy processes with grassroots knowledge to which governments may not otherwise have access. Looking at the European Union’s efforts to engage with civil society in its “neighborhood,” this report examines the benefits, challenges, and mechanisms to building dialogue and cooperation on migration and development.