Aim/Purpose: This study seeks to uncover the perceived quality factors of computer-mediated communication in business planning in which communication among teammates is crucial for collaboration. Background: Computer-mediated communication has made communicating with teammates easier and more affordable than ever. What motivates people to use a particular CMC technology during business planning is a major concern in this research. Methodology: This study seeks to address the issues by applying the concept of Information Product Quality (IPQ). Based on 21 factors derived from an extensive literature review on Information Product Quality (IPQ), an experimental study was conducted to identify the factors that are perceived as most relevant. Contribution: The findings in this study will help developers find a more customer-oriented approach to developing CMC technology design, specifically useful in collaborative work, such as business planning. Findings: This study extracted the three specific quality factors to use CMC technology in business planning: informational, physical, and service. Future Research: Future research will shed more light on the generality of these findings. Future studies should be extended to other population and contextual situations in the use of CMC.

Aim/Purpose: The integration of knowledge through the transdisciplinary method with the three concepts civilization, ideology, and geopolitics (CIG) enables the analysis of international relations in a new perspective and the informing strategists of countries, organizations, analysts, clients, etc. These three concepts express the transdisciplinarity that offers a new theoretical explanation and the informing science approach. Background: The integration of knowledge using the three concepts for the analysis of international relations has found adequate explanations from 1890 until the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan. Therefore, the CIG model theoretically and practically finds support for more than a century, as argued in the paper. Methodology: The present paper uses a mixed theory based on transdisciplinary methodology and informing science. The literature was reviewed to find and build the theoretical basis and provide appropriate examples. The theory is also based on the model used by Francis Fukuyama in his books on building and dissolution of states (middle-range theory). Contribution: This paper enables the rethinking of the limitations of research on a theoretical and practical basis that is done in many scientific circles, not to eliminate others but to enrich science even more. Findings: In the paper, the main findings are the following: Integrating the three CIG concepts according to the transdisciplinary method offers a new perspective to explain international relations using the IS method; The integration of the three concepts is worthwhile after 1980, when the model of cabinet governments falls, Bismarck falls, and public opinion starts to emerge; It was after 1980 that theories of civilization and geopolitics began to emerge along with ideologies to apply in practice; These three concepts offer explanations based on a CIG zone and in the periphery of the CIG zone. In the CIG zone the security sphere is more stable and long-term, while in periphery the cooperation is temporary and not long termed; The paper shows that the Cold War period is divided into two periods; The paper also finds that CIG explains with examples the events that happened after the Cold War and until present days; The paper also shows, based on the strategies of the superpowers, how they are extending their influence based on the CIG concepts. The paper also shows new patterns of cooperation and clashes between the superpowers’ security zones, which also provide an explanatory perspective for the USA withdrawal from Afghanistan. (We do not talk in the paper about the Afghanistan issue and USA withdrawal). Recommendation for Researchers: Scientific attributes in the integration of knowledge give researchers a more open and comprehensive perspective to make more accurate and practical analyses of international relations. According to this model, other theories are enriched that use the transdisciplinary method, IS, and the CIG as a model for the integration of knowledge. Future Research: Researchers and practitioners of this CIG model can find answers such as “Why did the USA fail in Afghanistan and why was it successful in Kosovo?” as well as other questions about finding a solution for Iraq, cooperation with China, etc.

Aim/Purpose: The Covid-19 pandemic has created many adverse effects. It overloads the healthcare system, causes deaths, and angers some at anti-covid restrictions. This study examines the feasibility of using technical and technological ideas to overcome these effects. The solution is based on new knowledge about the virus, its nature, formation, and activation in the environment. Background: The rapid spread of a new coronavirus infection is taking place against the background of a lack of time required to create new treatment scenarios for the disease, development, production, and vaccine safety research. In such a situation, it became necessary to gain this time for organizing and conducting events that could reduce the burden on the healthcare system. Methodology: The science that studies the morphology, physiology, genetics, ecology, and evolution of viruses is virology. The modern development of virology is moving towards a more accurate and comprehensive description of the mechanisms of interaction of viruses with the host organism. This contributed to the emergence of genomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, and immunomics. However, in virology, there is no particular discipline that sets itself three fundamental goals: to substantiate a single concept of the emergence of viruses; to study the natural mechanisms of formation of virus molecules in the environment; to describe the natural mechanisms of activation of certain viruses in the environment that cause viral pandemics. As a result, there are many articles among the published scientific articles on viruses dealing with the mechanisms of interaction of viruses with the host organism. However, there are no articles on the natural mechanisms of formation and activation of certain viruses in the environment. In the absence of such specialized articles, we were forced to use the method of systems transdisciplinary generalization of disciplinary knowledge to achieve our article’s purpose. Generalization created new knowledge about the nature of viruses, about the mechanisms of their formation and activation in the environment and cells of biological organisms. It is logical to assume that to synchronize the state of biological objects of all functional ensembles on the planet, it is necessary to create and activate appropriate “technological tools.” We have suggested and proved that RNA viruses play the role of such tools. Piezoelectricity activates viruses. It occurs during the compression and stretching of sedimentary rocks and bases of continental plates in different territories. Contribution: The systems transdisciplinary generalization of the knowledge of scientific disciplines made it possible to edit the concept of viruses, to eliminate stereotypes that arose due to the use of unsuccessful analogies. As a result of this generalization, it was possible to prove that viruses are not intracellular parasites. The virus is a “technological tool” of the planetary organizing component. This “tool” aims to correct the genetic programs of organisms of all functional ensembles (plants, animals, people), which will maintain the state of organisms and the parameters of their metabolism in changing environmental conditions. Findings: The viruses that triggered pandemics in the 20th century and early 21st century are RNA viruses. RNA molecules play the role of “technological tools” that the planetary organizing component uses to carry out short-term and long-term adjustments and constant support of the genetic programs of biological organisms. Therefore, in such a situation, it is advisable to talk not about the fight against the virus but only about eliminating the negative manifestations of the Covid-19 pandemic: reducing the number of people in need of emergency hospitalization, eliminating cases of the acute course of the disease and deaths. It is proposed to use certain technical and technological ideas and solutions to eliminate these negative manifestations. Recommendation for Researchers: This paper recommends that researchers use new interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches. They challenge assumptions and conclusions about the nature of viruses, and the mechanisms of their formation and activation in the environment can initiate. Such new research might describe the mechanisms that form and activate viruses in the environment and the body’s cells. They also might provide practical use of this knowledge to eliminate the multiple speculations and fears that arise against the background of reports of the likely appearance of more deadly viruses and viral infections. Future Research: The results of a systems transdisciplinary generalization of disciplinary knowledge about the nature and purpose of viruses are essential for expanding the horizon of the scientific worldview. Future fundamental research on the mechanisms of objective organizing constituents, a general description given in this article, will contribute to a deeper understanding of chemical and biological evolution mechanisms in which modern humanity is involved. In due time, such an understanding will allow a new look at the existing scenarios of the world socio-economic order, explore and describe new principles of sustainable development of society.

Aim/Purpose: Parasocial relationships are today established on social media between influencers and their followers. While marketing effects are well-researched, little is known about the meaning of such relationships and the psychological mechanisms behind them. This study, therefore, explores the questions: “How do followers on Instagram interpret explicit fiction cues from influencers?” and “What does this reveal about the meaning of parasocial attachment?” Background: With a billion-dollar advertising industry and leading in influencing opinion, Instagram is a significant societal and economic player. One factor for the effective influence of consumers is the relationship between influencer and follower. Research shows that disclosing advertisements surprisingly does not harm credibility, and sometimes even leads to greater trustworthiness and, in turn, willingness to purchase. While such reverse dynamics are measurable, the mechanisms behind them remain largely unexplored. Methodology: The study follows an explorative approach with in-depth interviews, which are analyzed with Mayring’s content analysis under a reconstructive paradigm. The findings are discussed through the lens of critical psychology. Contribution: Firstly, this study contributes to the understanding of the communicative dynamics of influencer-follower communication alongside the reality-fiction-gap model, and, secondly, it contributes empirical insights through the analysis of 22 explorative interviews. Findings: The findings show (a) how followers rationalize fiction cues and justify compulsive decision-making, (b) how followers are vulnerable to influences, and (c) how parasocial attachment formation overshadows rational logic and agency. The findings are discussed with regard to mechanisms, vulnerabilities, rationalizations and cognitive bias, and the social self, as well as the ethics of influencer marketing and politics. Recommendation for Researchers: The contribution is relevant to relationship research, group dynamics and societal organizing, well-being, identity, and health perspectives, within psychology, sociology, media studies, and pedagogy to management. Future Research: Future research might seek to understand more about (a) quantifiable vulnerabilities, such as attachment styles, dispositions, and demographics, (b) usage patterns and possible factors of prevention, (c) cognitive and emotional mechanisms involved with larger samples, (d) the impact on relationships and well-being, and (e) possible conditions for the potential of parasocial attachment.

Aim/Purpose: This is an introductory paper for the developing special series on applied psychology and informing science. It takes into account the spirit of informing science to launch the first of three articles in the series on applied psychology. The paper concludes by raising questions for future investigations.

Aim/Purpose: The aim of this paper is to examine Gen Z students located in a representative region of the United States when it comes to technology use, news and information gathering behaviors, civic engagement, and social concerns and whether differences exist based on institutional type. The purpose is to report this information so that academics can better understand the behaviors, priorities, and interests of current American students. Background: This paper investigates the mindset of Generation Z students living in the United States during a period of heightened civic unrest. Through the lens of the Theory of Generations, Uses and Gratifications Theory, and Intersectional Theory, this study aims to examine the Gen Z group and compare findings across populations. Methodology: An electronic survey was administered to students from 2019 through 2022. The survey included a combination of multiple responses, Likert scaled, dichotomous, open-ended, and ordinal questions. It was developed in the Survey Monkey system and reviewed by content and methodological experts to examine bias, vagueness, or potential semantic problems. The survey was pilot-tested in 2018 before implementation in order to explore the efficacy of the research methodology. It was then modified accordingly before widespread distribution to potential participants. The surveys were administered to students enrolled in classes taught by the authors, all of whom are educators. Participation was voluntary, optional, and anonymous. Contribution: This paper provides insight into the mindset of Generation Z students living in the United States, which is helpful to members of academia who should be informed about the current generation of students in higher education. Studying Generation Z helps us understand the future and can provide insight into the shifting needs and expectations of society. Findings: According to the findings, Gen Z are heavy users of digital technologies who use social media as their primary source for gathering news about current events as well as information for schoolwork. The majority of respondents considered themselves to be social activists. When institutional type was considered, there were notable differences with the students at the Historically Black College or University (HBCU), noting the greatest concern with a number of pressing issues, including racial justice/Black Lives Matter, women’s rights, gun violence, immigration reform, and human trafficking. Less significance across groups was found when LGBTQIA+ rights and climate change were considered. Recommendation for Researchers: As social media continues to proliferate in daily life and become a vital means of news and information gathering, additional studies such as the one presented here are needed. In other countries facing similarly turbulent times, measuring student interest, awareness, and engagement is highly informative. Future Research: Future research will explore the role that influencers have in opinion formation and the information-gathering habits of Gen Z.

Aim/Purpose: In this paper we propose a framework identifying many of the unintended consequences of information technology and posit that the increased complexity brought about by IT is a proximate cause for these negative effects. Background: Builds upon the three-world model that has been evolving within the informing science transdiscipline. Methodology: We separate complexity into three categories: experienced complexity, intrinsic complexity, and extrinsic complexity. With the complexity cycle in mind, we consider how increasing complexity of all three forms can lead to unintended consequences at the individual, task and system levels. Examples of these consequences are discussed at the individual level (e.g., deskilling, barriers to advancement), the task level (e.g., perpetuation of past practices), as well as broader consequences that may result from the need to function in an environment that is more extrinsically complex (e.g., erosion of predictable causality, shortened time horizons, inequality, tribalism). We conclude by reflecting on the implications of attempting to manage or limit increases of complexity. Contribution: Shows how many unintended consequences of IT could be attributed to growing complexity. Findings: We find that these three forms of complexity feed into one another resulting in a positive feedback loop that we term the Complexity Cycle. As examples, we analyze ChatGPT, blockchain and quantum computing, through the lens of the complexity cycle, speculating how experienced complexity can lead to greater intrinsic complexity in task performance through the incorporation of IT which, in turn, increases the extrinsic complexity of the economic/technological environment. Recommendations for Practitioners: Consider treating increasing task complexity as an externality that should be considered as new systems are developed and deployed. Recommendation for Researchers: Provides opportunities for empirical investigation of the proposed model. Impact on Society: Systemic risks of complexity are proposed along with some proposals regarding how they might be addressed. Future Research: Empirical investigation of the proposed model and the degree to which cognitive changes created by the proposed complexity cycle are necessarily problematic.

Aim/Purpose: The truism is that leadership fosters or restricts innovation behaviours in organisations, but the extent to which it does depends on the leadership style in practice. This study focuses on one of the contemporary leadership styles, knowledge-oriented leadership [KOL], which has received scant attention in research. In doing so, the contextual factors of psychological safety [PS] and employee voice [EV] were applied to determine how KOL influences are channeled to innovation at the individual level. Methodology: Data were collected from 347 academic staff in public universities in Southern Nigeria and subjected to a partial least square [PLS] analytical procedure for data treatment and hypotheses testing using the SmartPLS 3 software for variance-based structural equation modelling. Contribution: The study formed an integrated research framework that links knowledge-oriented leadership and innovation by accounting for the contextual mechanisms of psychological safety and employee voice. Findings: The PLS results demonstrated that the knowledge-oriented leadership and innovation relationship was positive and significant, and this relationship was partially mediated by two variables, namely, PS and EV. Furthermore, the two mediating variables channeled KOL’s influence on innovation in a sequence. Recommendation for Researchers: Organisations need to consider the practical application of KOL to improve innovation outcomes considerably. By this, leadership training programs should include modules, courses, or topics on KOL to engender the formation of requisite managerial skills. More so, they should consider the criterion of demonstrable KOL abilities for leadership selection and recruitment. As a personal development initiative, managers can attend leadership development programmes as well as obtain certification in knowledge management to improve their KOL abilities. This initiative should be encouraged and supported by organisations. In all, the human resource management framework should be responsive to the dynamics of the knowledge economy regarding leadership. Given that PS and EV function as mediators, organisations should actively cultivate an environment enabling interpersonal risky behaviours founded on trust, respect, and cooperation and encourage/support employees who demonstrate such behaviour accordingly. In this line, they should create and sustain a supportive environment that positively reinforces voice decisions and behaviours. Future Research: The study only determined the links between KOL, PS, EV, and innovation in public universities in Southern Nigeria. Other studies may examine the linkages in other knowledge-intensive organisations as well as expand the geographic scope to make for better generality of findings. Future studies should look at other underlying mechanisms that can affect the KOL-innovation relationship, such as psychological capital, work engagement, work commitment, etc. The role of moderators can be identified and introduced to this integrative framework to demonstrate the conditions affecting the linkages.

[Meg O’Neill] 00:08 Hello and welcome to the Berkeley Technology Law Journal podcast. My name is Meg O’Neill and I am one of the editors of the podcast. Today we are excited to share with you a conversation between Berkeley Law LLM student Franco Dellafiori, and Professor Bertrall Ross. Professor ...

The post Berkeley Technology Law Journal Podcast: Will ChatGPT Tell Me How to Vote? Democracy & AI with Professor Bertrall Ross appeared first on Berkeley Technology Law Journal.

Nan WU,Xiaocong LAI,Mei CHEN,Ying PAN, Vol.E107-D, No.11, pp.1433-1443
With the development of the Semantic Web, an increasing number of researchers are utilizing ontology technology to construct domain ontology. Since there is no unified construction standard, ontology heterogeneity occurs. The ontology matching method can fuse heterogeneous ontologies, which realizes the interoperability between knowledge and associates to more relevant semantic information. In the case of differences between ontologies, how to reduce false matching and unsuccessful matching is a critical problem to be solved. Moreover, as the number of ontologies increases, the semantic relationship between ontologies becomes increasingly complex. Nevertheless, the current methods that solely find the similarity of names between concepts are no longer sufficient. Consequently, this paper proposes an ontology matching method based on semantic association. Accurate matching pairs are discovered by existing semantic knowledge, and then the potential semantic associations between concepts are mined according to the characteristics of the contextual structure. The matching method can better carry out matching work based on reliable knowledge. In addition, this paper introduces a probabilistic logic repair method, which can detect and repair the conflict of matching results, to enhance the availability and reliability of matching results. The experimental results show that the proposed method effectively improves the quality of matching between ontologies and saves time on repairing incorrect matching pairs. Besides, compared with the existing ontology matching systems, the proposed method has better stability.
Publication Date: 2024/11/01

This study explores the hybridization of field-level logics. We define hybridized logics as rules of action, interaction, and interpretation that integrate the goals of previously incompatible logics through material forms, practices, and governance arrangements. Through an inductive study of the wind energy field in Colorado, we find that a hybridized logic emerged through a process in which organizational responses to logic incompatibility drove shifts in the relationship between logics and organizations. Compromise and framing efforts unintentionally initiated a process of logic hybridization by catalyzing proponents of the subordinate logic to contest the dominant logic and alter the balance of power in the field. Hybrid organizations then emerged to establish, legitimize, and embed a new set of inter-linked frames, practices, and arrangements that integrated previously incompatible logics. Our findings suggest that the hybridization of field-level logics is a complex process in which organizational actions and field-level conditions recursively influence each other over time.

Prior research on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has substantially advanced our understanding of how isolated acquirer- and deal-specific factors affect abnormal returns. However, investors are likely to perceive and evaluate M&As holistically—that is, as complex configurations (i.e., Gestalts) of characteristics, rather than as a list of independent factors. Yet, extant M&A literature has not addressed why and how configurations of factors elicit positive or negative reactions. In other words, overlooking the interdependent nature of factors known to influence acquisition success has limited our understanding of both M&As and investor judgment. Taking an inductive approach to addressing this important issue, this study relies on fuzzy set methodology. Our results provide compelling evidence that investor perceptions of M&A announcements are not only configurational in nature but also characterized by equifinality - or the presence of multiple paths to success - and asymmetric causality - that is, configurations that represent bad deals are not simply a mirror image of good deals, but differ fundamentally. By constructing a typology of "good" and "bad" deals as perceived by market participants, we develop a mid-range theory of M&A stock market performance. As such, this study offers novel theoretical and empirical insights to scholars, and implications for practitioners.

Exit is a critical part of the entrepreneurial process. At the same time, research indicates that founders are likely to form strong identity connections to the organizations they start. In turn, when founders exit their organizations, the process of psychological disengagement might destabilize their identities. Yet, limited research addresses how founders experience exit or how they manage their identities during this process. Through a qualitative, inductive study of founders of technology-based companies, I developed a theoretical model of founder psychological disengagement that delineates how founder work orientations relate to the disengagement paths that founders follow when leaving one organization and starting another. In elaborating theory on psychological disengagement, this study has implications for understanding the psychology of founders, how founders exit and begin again, and psychological disengagement, more broadly.

We study the interplay between regulatory mandates and competition on a focal firm's new resource investments. While prior literature has separately pointed to the influence of competition and regulatory policy on a focal firm's resource decisions, less is known about how the policy effect interacts with the competitive effect. Studying how regulatory mandates moderate the effect of competition on a focal firm's new resource investments, we show that resource redeployment is not simply a function of internal firm decisions but a response to external forces. We find that regulatory mandates dampen the effect of competitors' new resource investments on a focal firm's new resource investments. Distinguishing between different clean technology types, we show that this dampening effect is the stronger, the more distant the new resource is from incumbents' old resource base, and the more established the mandate is. We test our hypotheses in the context of renewable energy investments in waste-to-energy, wind, and solar in the U.S. electricity industry. Our data comprises 1542 utilities and private energy firms and their renewable investments from 1999 to 2010.

[…] Update vom 10.2.2017, Karen Blakeman’s Blog: New Creative Commons image search – back to the drawing board I’m afraid […]

This posting is for those of you who receive articles from this blog by email, and I am sure that many of you within the EU will have received similar notices from other organisations. On the 25th May the General Data Protection Regulation comes into force and as part of that we need to know … Continue reading Receiving blog postings by email – GDPR →

Tags: google openscholar tools

PTI's founding leader reiterates claims of betrayal by the establishment, state negotiations are now off the table.

Privacy: Our parents were taking liberties for granted in their analog world, liberties that are not passed down to our children in the transition to digital — such as the simple right to send an anonymous letter.

Sometimes when speaking, I ask the audience how many would be okay with sites like The Pirate Bay, even if it means that artists are losing money from their operation. (Do note that this assertion is disputed: I’m asking the question on the basis of what-if the assertion is true.) Some people raise their hands, the proportion varying with audience and venue.

The copyright industry asserts that the offline laws don’t apply on the Internet when they want to sue and prosecute people sharing knowledge and culture. They’re right, but not in the way they think. They’re right that copyright law does apply online as well. But privacy laws don’t, and they should.

In the offline world, an analog letter was given a certain level of protection. This was not intended to cover just the physical letter as such, but correspondence in general; it was just that the letter was the only form of such correspondence when these liberties were drafted.

First, the letter was anonymous. It was your prerogative entirely whether you identified yourself as sender of the letter on the outside of the envelope, on the inside of the letter (so not even the postal service knew who sent it, only the recipient), or not at all.

Further, the letter was untracked in transit. The only governments tracking people’s correspondence were those we looked down on with enormous contempt.

Third, the letter was secret. The envelope would never we broken in transit.

Fourth, the carrier was never responsible for the contents, of nothing else for the simple reason they were not allowed to examine the content in the first place. But even if they could, like with a envelopeless postcard, they were never liable for executing their courier duties — this principle, the courier immunity or messenger immunity, is a principle that dates as far back as the Roman Empire.

These principles, the liberties of correspondence, should apply to offline correspondence (the letter) just as it should to online correspondence. But it doesn’t. You don’t have the right to send anything you like to anybody you like online, because it might be a copyright infringement — even though our parents had exactly this right in their offline world.

So the copyright industry is right – sending a copied drawing in a letter is a copyright infringement, and sending a copied piece of music over the net is the same kind of copyright infringement. But offline, there are checks and balances to these laws – even though it’s a copyright infringement, nobody is allowed to open the letter in transit just to see if it violates the law, because the secrecy of private correspondence is considered more important than discovering copyright infringements. This is key. This set of checks and balances has not been carried over into the digital environment.

The only time a letter is opened and prevented is when somebody is under individual and prior suspicion of a serious crime. The words “individual” and “prior” are important here — opening letters just to see if they contain a non-serious crime in progress, like copyright infringement, is simply not permitted in the slightest.

There is no reason for the offline liberties of our parents to not be carried over into the same online liberties for our children, regardless of whether that means somebody doesn’t know how to run a business anymore.

After highlighting these points, I repeat the question whether the audience would be okay with sites like The Pirate Bay, even if it means an artist is losing income. And after making these points, basically everybody raises their hand to say they would be fine with it; they would be fine with our children having the same liberty as our parents, and the checks and balances of the offline world to also apply online.

Next in the series, we’re going to look at a related topic – public anonymous announcements and the important role the city square soapbox filled in shaping liberty.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: The liberties of our parents are not being inherited by our children – they are being lost wholesale in the transition to digital. Today, we’ll look at the importance of posting anonymous public messages.

When I was in my teens, before the Internet (yes, really), there was something called BBSes – Bulletin Board Systems. They were digital equivalents of an analog Bulletin Board, which in turn was a glorified sheet of wood intended for posting messages to the public. In a sense, they were an anonymous equivalent of today’s webforum software, but you connected from your home computer directly to the BBS over a phone line, without connecting to the Internet first.

The analog Bulletin Boards are still in existence, of course, but mostly used for concert promotions and the occasional fringe political or religious announcement.

In the early 1990s, weird laws were coming into effect worldwide as a result of lobbying from the copyright industry: the owners of bulletin board systems could be held liable for what other people posted on them. The only way to avoid liability was to take down the post within seven days. Such liability had no analog equivalent at all; it was an outright ridiculous idea that the owner of a piece of land should be held responsible for a poster put up on a tree on that land, or even that the owner of a public piece of cardboard could be sued for the posters other people had glued up on that board.

Let’s take that again: it is extremely weird from a legal standpoint that an electronic hosting provider is in any way, shape, or form liable for the contents hosted on their platform. It has no analog equivalent whatsoever.

Sure, people could put up illegal analog posters on an analog bulletin board. That would be an illegal act. When that happened, it was the problem of law enforcement, and never of the bulletin board owner. The thought is ridiculous and has no place in the digital landscape either.

The proper digital equivalent isn’t to require logging to hand over upload IPs to law enforcement, either. An analog bulletin board owner is under no obligation whatsoever to somehow identify the people using the bulletin board, or even monitor whether it’s being used at all.

The Analog Equivalent Privacy Right for an electronic post hosting provider is for an uploader to be responsible for everything they upload for the public to see, with no liability at all for the hosting provider under any circumstance, including no requirement to log upload data to help law enforcement find an uploader. Such monitoring is not a requirement in the analog world of our parents, nor is there an analog liability for anything posted, and there is no reason to have it otherwise in the digital world of our children just because somebody doesn’t know how to run a business otherwise.

As a side note, the United States would not exist had today’s hosting liability laws in place when it formed. A lot of writing was being circulated at the time arguing for breaking with the British Crown and forming an Independent Republic; from a criminal standpoint, this was inciting and abetting high treason. This writing was commonly nailed to trees and public posts, for the public to read and make up their own minds. Imagine for a moment if the landowners where such trees happened to stand had been charged with high treason for “hosting content” — the thought is as ridiculous in the analog would, as it really is in the digital too. We just need to pull the illusion aside, that the current laws on digital hosting make any kind of sense. These laws really are as ridiculous in the digital world of our children, as they would have been in the analog world of our parents.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: In the analog world of our parents, as an ordinary citizen and not under surveillance because of being a suspect of a crime, it was taken for granted that you could walk around a city without authorities tracking you at the footstep level. Our children don’t have this right anymore in their digital world.

Not even the dystopias of the 1950s — Nineteen Eighty-Four, Brave New World, Colossus, and so on, managed to dream up the horrors of this element: the fact that every citizen is now carrying a governmental tracking device. They’re not just carrying one, they even bought it themselves. Not even Brave New World could have imagined this horror.

It started out innocently, of course. It always does. With the new “portable phones” — which, at this point, meant something like “not chained to the floor” — authorities discovered that people would still call the Emergency Services number (112, 911, et cetera) from their mobile phones, but not always be capable of giving their location themselves, something that the phone network was now capable of doing. So authorities mandated that the phone networks be technically capable of always giving a subscriber’s location, just in case they would call Emergency Services. In the United States, this was known as the E911 regulation (“Enhanced 9-1-1”).

This was in 2005. Things went bad very quickly from there. Imagine that just 12 years ago, we still had the right to roam around freely without authorities being capable of tracking our every footstep – this was no more than just over a decade ago!

Before this point, governments supplied you with services so that you would be able to know your location, as had been the tradition since the naval lighthouse, but not so that they would be able to know your location. There’s a crucial difference here. And as always, the first breach was one of providing citizen services — in this case, emergency medical services — that only the most prescient dystopians would oppose.

What’s happened since?

Entire cities are using wi-fi passive tracking to track people at the individual, realtime, and sub-footstep level in the entire city center.

Train stations and airports, which used to be safe havens of anonymity in the analog world of our parents, have signs saying they employ realtime passive wi-fi and bluetooth tracking of everybody even coming close, and are connecting their tracking to personal identifying data. Correction: they have signs about it in the best case but do it regardless.

People’s location are tracked in at least three different… not ways, but categories of ways:

Active: You carry a sensor of your location (GPS sensor, Glonass receiver, cell tower triangulator, or even visual identifier through the camera). You use the sensors to find your location, at one point in time or continuously. The government takes itself the right to read the contents of your active sensors.

Passive: You take no action, but are still transmitting your location to the government continuously through a third party. In this category, we find cell tower triangulation as well as passive wi-fi and bluetooth tracking that require no action on behalf of a user’s phone other than being on.

Hybrid: The government finds your location in occasional pings through active dragnets and ongoing technical fishing expeditions. This would not only include cellphone-related techniques, but also face recognition connected to urban CCTV networks.

Privacy of location is one of the Seven Privacies, and we can calmly say that without active countermeasures, it’s been completely lost in the transition from analog to digital. Our parents had privacy of location, especially in busy places like airports and train stations. Our children don’t have privacy of location, not in general, and particularly not in places like airports and train stations that were the safest havens of our analog parents.

How do we reinstate Privacy of Location today? It was taken for granted just 12 years ago.

Privacy: Our analog parents had the right to meet whomever they liked, wherever they liked, and discuss whatever they liked, without the government knowing. Our digital children have lost this, just because they use more modern items.

For a lot of our digital children’s activities, there’s no such thing as privacy anymore, as they naturally take place on the net. For people born 1980 and later, it doesn’t make sense to talk of “offline” or “online” activities. What older people see as “people spending time with their phone or computer”, younger see as socializing using their phone or computer.

This is an important distinction that the older generation tends to not understand.

Perhaps this is best illustrated with an anecdote from the previous generation again: The parents of our parents complained that our parents were talking with the phone, and not to another person using the phone. What our parents saw as socializing (using an old analog landline phone), their parents in turn saw as obsession with a device. There’s nothing new under the sun.

(Note: when I say “digital children” here, I am not referring to children as in young people below majority age; I am referring to the next generation of fully capable adult professionals.)

This digital socializing, however, can be limited, it can be… permissioned. As in, requiring somebody’s permission to socialize in the way you and your friends want, or even to socialize at all. The network effects are strong and create centralizing pressure toward a few platforms where everybody hang out, and as these are private services, they get to set any terms and conditions they like for people assembling and socializing – for the billions of people assembling and socializing there.

Just as one example to illustrate this: Facebook is using American values for socializing, not universal values. Being super-against anything even slightly naked while being comparatively accepting of hate speech is not something inherently global; it is strictly American. If Facebook had been developed in France or Germany instead of the US, any and all nudity would be welcomed as art and free-body culture (Freikörperkultur) and a completely legitimate way of socializing, but the slightest genocide questioning would lead to an insta-kickban and reporting to authorities for criminal prosecution.

Therefore, just using the dominant Facebook as an example, any non-American way of socializing is effectively banned worldwide, and it’s likely that people developing and working with Facebook aren’t even aware of this. But the Freedom of Assembly hasn’t just been limited in the online sphere, but also in the classic analog offline world where our analog parents used to hang out (and still do).

Since people’s locations are tracked, as we saw in the previous post, it is possible to match locations between individuals and figure out who was talking to whom, as well as when and where this happened, even if they were only talking face to face. As I’m looking out my window from the office writing this piece, it just so happens that I’m looking at the old Stasi headquarters across from Alexanderplatz in former East Berlin. It was a little bit like Hotel California; people who checked in there tended to never leave. Stasi also tracked who was talking to whom, but required a ton of people to perform this task manually, just in order to walk behind other people and photograph whom they were talking to — and therefore, there was an economic limit to how many people could be tracked like this at any one time before the national economy couldn’t sustain more surveillance. Today, that limit is completely gone, and everybody is tracked all the time.

Do you really have Freedom of Assembly, when the fact that you’ve associated with a person — indeed, maybe just spent time in their physical proximity — can be held against you?

I’m going to illustrate this with an example. In a major leak recently, it doesn’t matter which one, a distant colleague of mine happened to celebrate a big event with a huge party in near physical proximity to where the documents were being copied at the same time, completely unaware and by sheer coincidence. Months later, this colleague was part of journalistically vetting those leaked documents and verifying their veracity, while at this time still unaware of the source and that they had held a big party very close to the origin of the documents.

The government was very aware of the physical proximity of the leak combined with this person’s journalistic access to the documents, though, and issued not one but two arrest-on-sight warrants for this distant colleague based on that coincidence. They are now living in exile outside of Sweden, and don’t expect to be able to return home anytime soon.

Privacy, including Privacy of Location, remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: “Everything you say or do can and will be used against you, at any point in the far future when the context and agreeableness of what you said or did has changed dramatically.” With the analog surveillance of our parents, everything was caught in the context of its time. The digital surveillance of our children saves everything for later use against them.

It’s a reality for our digital children so horrible, that not even Nineteen Eighty-Four managed to think of it. In the analog surveillance world, where people are put under surveillance only after they’ve been identified as suspects of a crime, everything we said and did was transient. If Winston’s telescreen missed him doing something bad, then it had missed the moment and Winston was safe.

The analog surveillance was transient for two reasons: one, it was assumed that all surveillance was people watching other people, and two, that nobody would have the capacity of instantly finding keywords in the past twenty years of somebody’s conversations. In the analog world of our parents, that would mean somebody would need to actually listen to twenty years’ worth of tape recordings, which would in turn take sixty years (as we only work 8 out of 24 hours). In the digital world of our children, surveillance agencies type a few words to get automatic transcripts of the saved-forever surveillance-of-everybody up on screen in realtime as they type the keywords – not just from one person’s conversation, but from everybody’s. (This isn’t even exaggerating; this was reality in or about 2010 with the GCHQ-NSA XKEYSCORE program.)

In the world of our analog parents, surveillance was only a thing at the specific time it was active, which was when you were under individual and concrete suspicion of a specific, already-committed, and serious crime.

In the world of our digital children, surveillance can be retroactively activated for any reason or no reason, with the net effect that everybody is under surveillance for everything they have ever done or said.

We should tell people as it has become instead; “anything you say or do can be used against you, for any reason or no reason, at any point in the future”.

The current generation has utterly failed to preserve the presumption of innocence, as it applies to surveillance, in the shift from our analog parents to our digital children.

This subtle addition – that everything is recorded for later use against you – amplifies the horrors of the previous aspects of surveillance by orders of magnitude.

Consider somebody asking you where you were on the evening of March 13, 1992. You would, at best, have a vague idea of what you did that year. (“Let’s see… I remember my military service started on March 3 of that year… and the first week was a tough boot camp in freezing winter forest… so I was probably… back at barracks after the first week, having the first military theory class of something? Or maybe that date was a Saturday or Sunday, in which case I’d be on weekend leave?” That’s about the maximum precision your memory can produce for twenty-five years past.)

However, when confronted with hard data on what you did, the people confronting you will have an utter and complete upper hand, because you simply can’t refute it. “You were in this room and said these words, according to our data transcript. These other people were also in the same room. We have to assume what you said was communicated with the intention for them to hear. What do you have to say for yourself?”

It doesn’t have to be 25 years ago. A few months back would be sufficient for most memories to be not very detailed anymore.

To illustrate further: consider that the NSA is known to store copies even of all encrypted correspondence today, on the assumption that even if it’s not breakable today, it will probably be so in the future. Consider what you’re communicating encrypted today — in text, voice, or video — can be used against you in twenty years. You probably don’t even know half of it, because the window of acceptable behavior will have shifted in ways we cannot predict, as it always does. In the 1950s, it was completely socially acceptable to drop disparaging remarks about some minorities in society, which would socially ostracize you today. Other minorities are still okay to disparage, but might not be in the future.

When you’re listening to somebody talking from fifty years ago, they were talking in the context of their time, maybe even with the best of intentions by today’s standards. Yet, we could judge them harshly for their words interpreted by today’s context — today’s completely different context.

Our digital children will face exactly this scenario, because everything they do and say can and will be used against them, at any point in the future. It should not be this way. They should have every right to enjoy Analog Equivalent Privacy Rights.

When our analog parents searched for information, that activity took place in libraries, and that was one of the most safeguarded privacies of all. When our digital children search for information, their innermost thoughts are instead harvested wholesale for marketing. How did this happen?

If you’re looking at one particular profession of the analog world that was absolutely obsessed with the privacy of its patrons, it was the librarians. Libraries were where people could search for their darkest secrets, were it literature, science, shopping, or something else. The secrecy of libraries were downright legendary.

As bomb recipes started appearing on the proto-Internet in the 1980s — on so-called BBSes — and some politicians tried to play on moral panics, many of common sense were quick to point out, that these “text files with bomb recipes” were no different than what you would find in the chemistry section of a mediocre-or-better library — and libraries were sacred. There was no moral panic to play on as soon as you pointed out that this was already available in every public library, for the public to access anonymously

So private were libraries, in fact, that librarians were in collective outrage when the FBI started asking libraries for records of who had borrowed what book – and that’s how the infamous warrant canaries were invented. Yup, by a librarian, protecting the patrons of the library. Librarians have always been the profession defending privacy rights the hardest – in the analog as well as the digital.

In the analog world of our parents, their Freedom of Information was sacramount: their innermost thirst for learning, knowledge, and understanding. In the digital world of our children, their corresponding innermost thoughts are instead harvested wholesale and sold off to market trinkets into their faces.

It’s not just what our digital children successfully studied that’s up for grabs. In the terms of our analog parents, it’s what they ever went to the library for. It’s what they ever considered going to the library for. In the world of our digital children, everything they searched for is recorded — and everything they thought of searching for but didn’t.

Think about that for a moment: something that was so sacred for our analog parents that entire classes of professions would go on strike to preserve it, is now casually used for wholesale marketing in the world of our digital children.

Combine this with the previous article about everything you do, say, and think being recorded for later use against you, and we’re going to need a major change in thinking on this very soon.

There is no reason our children should have less Freedom of Information just because they happen to live in a digital environment, as compared to the analog environment of our parents. There is no reason our digital children shouldn’t enjoy Analog Equivalent Privacy Rights.

Of course, it can be argued that the Internet search engines are private services who are free to offer whatever services they like on whatever terms they like. But there were private libraries in the analog world of our parents, too. We’ll be returning to this “it’s private so you don’t have a say” concept a little later in this series.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: Ross Ulbricht handed in his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court last week, highlighting an important Analog Equivalent Privacy Right in the process: Just because you’re using equipment that makes a third party aware of your circumstances, does that really nullify any expectation of privacy?

In most constitutions, there’s a protection of privacy of some kind. In the European Charter of Human Rights, this is specified as having the right to private and family life, home, and correspondence. In the U.S. Constitution, it’s framed slightly differently, but with the same outcome: it’s a ban for the government to invade privacy without good cause (“unreasonable search and seizure”).

U.S. Courts have long held, that if you have voluntarily given up some part of your digitally-stored privacy to a third party, then you can no longer expect to have privacy in that area. When looking at analog equivalence for privacy rights, this doctrine is atrocious, and in order to understand just how atrocious, we need to go back to the dawn of the manual telephone switchboards.

At the beginning of the telephone age, switchboards were fully manual. When you requested a telephone call, a manual switchboard operator would manually connect the wire from your telephone to the wire of the receiver’s telephone, and crank a mechanism that would make that telephone ring. The operators could hear every call if they wanted and knew who had been talking to whom and when.

Did you give up your privacy to a third party when using this manual telephone service? Yes, arguably, you did. Under the digital doctrine applied now, phonecalls would have no privacy at all, under any circumstance. But as we know, phonecalls are private. In fact, the phonecall operators were oathsworn to never utter the smallest part of what they learned on the job about people’s private dealings — so seriously was privacy considered, even by the companies running the switchboards.

Interestingly enough, this “third-party surrender of privacy” doctrine seems to have appeared the moment the last switchboard operator left their job for today’s automated phone-circuit switches. This was as late as 1983, just at the dawn of digital consumer-level technology such as the Commodore 64.

This false equivalence alone should be sufficient to scuttle the doctrine of “voluntarily” surrendering privacy to a third party in the digital world, and therefore giving up expectation of privacy: the equivalence in the analog world was the direct opposite.

But there’s more to the analog equivalent of third-party-service privacy. Somewhere in this concept is the notion that you’re voluntarily choosing to give up your privacy, as an active informed act — in particular, an act that stands out of the ordinary, since the Constitutions of the world are very clear that the ordinary default case is that you have an expectation of privacy.

In other words, since people’s everyday lives are covered by expectations of privacy, there must be something outside of the ordinary that a government can claim gives it the right to take away somebody’s privacy. And this “outside the ordinary” has been that the people in question were carrying a cellphone, and so “voluntarily” gave up their right to privacy, as the cellphone gives away their location to the network operator by contacting cellphone towers.

But carrying a cellphone is expected behavior today. It is completely within the boundaries of “ordinary”. In terms of expectations, this doesn’t differ much from wearing jeans or a jacket. This leads us to the question; in the thought experiment that yesterday’s jeans manufacturers had been able to pinpoint your location, had it been reasonable for the government to argue that you give up any expectation of privacy when you’re wearing jeans?

No. No, of course it hadn’t.

It’s not like you’re carrying a wilderness tracking device for the express purpose of rescue services to find you during a dangerous hike. In such a circumstance, it could be argued that you’re voluntarily carrying a locator device. But not when carrying something that everybody is expected to carry — indeed, something that everybody must carry in order to even function in today’s society.

When the only alternative to having your Constitutionally-guaranteed privacy is exile from modern society, a government should have a really thin case. Especially when the analog equivalent — analog phone switchboards — was never fair game in any case.

People deserve Analog Equivalent Privacy Rights.

Until a government recognizes this and voluntarily surrenders a power it has taken itself, which isn’t something people should hold their breath over, privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: Our analog parents had the ability to read news anonymously, however they wanted, wherever they wanted, and whenever they wanted. For our digital children, a government agent might as well be looking over their shoulder: the government knows what news sources they read, what articles, for how long, and in what order.

For our analog parents, reading the news was an affair the government had no part of, or indeed had any business being part of. Our analog parents bought a morning newspaper with a few coins on the street corner, brought it somewhere quiet where they had a few minutes to spare, and started reading without anybody interfering.

When our digital children read the news, the government doesn’t just know what news source they choose to read, but also what specific articles they read from that news source, in what order, and for how long. So do several commercial actors. There are at least three grave issues with this.

The first is that since the government has this data, it will attempt to use this data. More specifically, it will attempt to use the data against the individual concerned, possibly in some sort of pre-crime scheme. We know this that since all data collected by a government will eventually be used against the people concerned, with mathematical certainty.

In an attention economy, data about what we pay attention to, how much, and for how long, are absolutely crucial predictive behaviors. And in the hands of a government which makes the crucial mistake of using it to predict pre-crime, the results can be disastrous for the individual and plain wrong for the government.

Of course, the instant the government uses this data in any way imaginable, positive or negative, it will become Heisenberg Metrics — the act of using the data will shape the data itself. For example, if somebody in government decides that reading about frugality probably is an indicator of poverty, and so makes people more eligible for government handouts, then such a policy will immediately shape people’s behavior to read more about frugality. Heisenberg Metrics is when a metric can’t be measured without making it invalid in the process.

(The phenomenon is named after the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, which is traditionally confused with the Observer Effect, which states you can’t measure some things without changing them in the process. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is actually something else entirely; it states that you can’t measure precise momentum and position of a subatomic particle at the same time, and does not apply at all to Heisenberg Metrics.)

The second issue is that not only government, but also other commercial actors, will seek to act on these metrics, Heisenberg Metrics as they may be. Maybe somebody thinks that reading fanzines about motorcycle acrobatics should have an effect on your health and traffic insurance premiums?

The third issue is subtle and devious, but far more grave: the government doesn’t just know what articles you read and in what order, but as a corollary to that, knows what the last article you read was, and what you did right after reading it. In other words, it knows very precisely what piece of information leads you to stop reading and instead take a specific action. This is far more dangerous information than being aware of your general information feed patterns and preferences.

Being able to predict somebody’s actions with a high degree of certainty is a far more dangerous ability than being vaguely aware of somebody’s entertainment preferences.

Our analog parents had the privacy right of choosing their information source anonymously with nobody permitted (or able) to say what articles they read, in what order, or for what reason. It’s not unreasonable that our digital children should have the same privacy right, the analog equivalent privacy right.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: In the analog world of our parents, leaks to the press were heavily protected in both ends – both for the leaker and for the reporter receiving the leak. In the digital world of our children, this has been unceremoniously thrown out the window while discussing something unrelated entirely. Why aren’t our digital children afforded the same checks and balances?

Another area where privacy rights have not been carried over from the analog to the digital concerns journalism, an umbrella of different activities we consider to be an important set of checks-and-balances on power in society. When somebody handed over physical documents to a reporter, that was an analog action that was protected by federal and state laws, and sometimes even by constitutions. When somebody is handing over digital access to the same information to the same type of reporter, reflecting the way we work today and the way our children will work in the future, that is instead prosecutable at both ends.

Let us illustrate this with an example from the real world.

In the 2006 election in Sweden, there was an outcry of disastrous information hygiene on behalf of the ruling party at the time (yes, the same ruling party that later administered the worst governmental leak ever). A username and password circulated that gave full access to the innermost file servers of the Social Democratic party administration from anywhere. The username belonged to a Stig-Olof Friberg, who was using his nickname “sigge” as username, and the same “sigge” as password, and who accessed the innermost files over the Social Democratic office’s unencrypted, open, wireless network.

Calling this “bad opsec” doesn’t begin to describe it. Make a careful note to remember that these were, and still are, the institutions and people we rely on to make policy for good safeguarding of sensitive citizen data.

However, in the shadow of this, there was also the more important detail that some political reporters were well aware of the login credentials, such as one of Sweden’s most (in)famous political reporters Niklas Svensson, who had been using the credentials as a journalistic tool to gain insight into the ruling party’s workings.

This is where it gets interesting, because in the analog world, that reporter would have received leaks in the form of copied documents, physically handed over to him, and leaking to the press in this analog manner was (and still is) an extremely protected activity under law and indeed some constitutions — in Sweden, as this concerns, you can even go to prison for casually speculating over coffee at work who might have been behind a leak to the press. It is taken extremely seriously.

However, in this case, the reporter wasn’t leaked the documents, but was leaked a key for access to the digital documents — the ridiculously insecure credentials “sigge/sigge” — and was convicted in criminal court for electronic trespassing as a result, despite doing journalistic work with a clear analog protected equivalent.

It’s interesting to look at history to see how much critically important events would never have been uncovered, if this prosecution of digital journalism had been applied to analog journalism.

For one example, let’s take the COINTELPRO leak, when activists copied files from an FBI office to uncover a covert and highly illegal operation by law enforcement to discredit political organizations based solely on their political opinion. (This is not what law enforcement should be doing, speaking in general terms.) This leak happened when activists put up a note on the FBI office door on March 8, 1971 saying “Please do not lock this door tonight”, came back in the middle of the night when nobody was there, found the door unlocked as requested, and took (stole) about 1,000 classified files that revealed the illegal practices.

These were then mailed to various press outlets. The theft resulted in the exposure of some of the FBI’s most self-incriminating documents, including several documents detailing the FBI’s use of postal workers, switchboard operators, etc., in order to spy on black college students and various non-violent black activist groups, according to Wikipedia. And here’s the kicker in the context: while the people stealing the documents could and would have been indicted for doing so, it was unthinkable to charge the reporters receiving them with anything.

This is no longer the case.

Our digital children have lost the right to leak information to reporters in the way the world works today, an activity that was taken for granted — indeed, seen as crucially important to the balance of power — in the world of our digital parents. Our digital children who work as reporters can no longer safely receive leaks showing abuse of power. It is entirely reasonable that our digital children should have at least the same set of civil liberties in their digital world, as our parents had in their analog world.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: The anonymous cash of our analog parents is fast disappearing, and in its wake comes trackable and permissioned debit cards to our children. While convenient, it’s a wolf in sheep’s clothing.

In the last article, we looked at how our analog parents could anonymously buy a newspaper on the street corner with some coins, and read their news of choice without anybody knowing about it. This observation extends to far more than just newspapers, of course.

This ability of our parents – the ability to conduct decentralized, secure transactions anonymously – has been all but lost in a landscape that keeps pushing card payments for convenience. The convenience of not paying upfront, with credit cards; the convenience of always paying an exact amount, with debit cards; the convenience of not needing to carry and find exact amounts with every purchase. Some could even argue that having every transaction listed on a bank statement is a convenience of accounting.

But with accounting comes tracking. With tracking comes predictability and unwanted accountability.

It’s been said that a VISA executive can predict a divorce one year ahead of the parties involved, based on changes in purchase patterns. Infamously, a Target store was targeting a high school-aged woman with maternity advertising, which at first made her father furious: but as things turned out, the young woman was indeed pregnant. Target knew, and her own father didn’t.

This is because when we’re no longer using anonymous cash, every single purchase is tracked and recorded with the express intent on using it against us — whether for influencing us to make a choice to deplete our resources (“buy more”) or for punishing us for buying something we shouldn’t have, in a wide variety of conceivable ways.

China is taking the concept one step further, as has been written here before, and in what must have been the inspiration for a Black Mirror episode, is weighting its citizens’ Obedience Scores based on whether they buy useful or lavish items — useful in the views of the regime, of course.

It’s not just the fact that transactions of our digital children are logged for later use against them, in ways our analog parents could never conceive of.

It’s also that the transactions of our digital children are permissioned. When our digital children buy a bottle of water with a debit card, a transaction clears somewhere in the background. But that also means that somebody can decide to have the transaction not clear; somebody has the right to arbitrarily decide what people get to buy and not buy, if this trend continues for our digital children. That is a horrifying thought.

Our parents were using decentralized, censorship resistant, anonymous transactions in using plain cash. There is no reason our digital children should have anything less. It’s a matter of liberty and self-determination.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: In the last article, we focused on how people are tracked today when using credit cards instead of cash. But few pay attention to the fact that we’re tracked when using cash today, too.

Few people pay attention to the little sign on the revolving door on Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, Netherlands. It says that wi-fi and bluetooth tracking of every single individual is taking place in the airport.

What sets Schiphol Airport apart isn’t that they track individual people’s movements to the sub-footstep level in a commercial area. (It’s for commercial purposes, not security purposes.) No, what sets Schiphol apart is that they bother to tell people about it. (The Netherlands tend to take privacy seriously, as does Germany, and for the same reason.)

Locator beacons are practically a standard in bigger commercial areas now. They ping your phone using wi-fi and bluetooth, and using signal strength triangulation, a grid of locator beacons is able to show how every single individual is moving in realtime at the sub-footstep level. This is used to “optimize marketing” — in other words, find ways to trick people’s brains to spend resources they otherwise wouldn’t have. Our own loss of privacy is being turned against us, as it always is.

Where do people stop for a while, what catches their attention, what doesn’t catch their attention, what’s a roadblock for more sales?

These are legitimate questions. However, taking away people’s privacy in order to answer those questions is not a legitimate method to answer them.

This kind of mass individual tracking has even been deployed at city levels, which happened in complete silence until the Privacy Oversight Board of a remote government sounded the alarms. The city of Västerås got the green light to continue tracking once some formal criteria were met.

Yes, this kind of people tracking is documented to have been already rolled out citywide in at least one small city in a remote part of the world (Västerås, Sweden). With the government’s Privacy Oversight Board having shrugged and said “fine, whatever”, don’t expect this to stay in the small town of Västerås. Correction, wrong tense: don’t expect it to have stayed in just Västerås, where it was greenlit three years ago.

Our analog parents had the ability to walk around untracked in the city and street of their choice, without it being used or held against them. It’s not unreasonable that our digital children should have the same ability.

There’s one other way to buy things with cash which avoids this kind of tracking, and that’s paying cash-on-delivery when ordering something online or over the phone to your door — in which case your purchase is also logged and recorded, just in another type of system.

This isn’t only used against the ordinary citizen for marketing purposes, of course. It’s used against the ordinary citizen for every conceivable purpose. But we’ll be returning to that in a later article in the series.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: We’ve seen how our digital children’s privacy is violated in everything they buy with cash or credit, in a way our analog parents would have balked at. But even worse: our digital children’s privacy is also violated by tracking what they don’t buy — either actively decline or just plain walk away from.

Amazon just opened its first “Amazon Go” store, where you just pick things into a bag and leave, without ever going through a checkout process. As part of the introduction of this concept, Amazon points out that you can pick something off the shelves, at which point it’ll register in your purchase — and change your mind and put it back, at which point you’ll be registered and logged as having not purchased the item.

Sure, you’re not paying for something you changed your mind about, which is the point of the video presentation. But it’s not just about the deduction from your total amount to pay: Amazon also knows you considered buying it and eventually didn’t, and will be using that data.

Our digital children are tracked this way on a daily basis, if not an hourly basis. Our analog parents never were.

When we’re shopping for anything online, there are even simple plugins for the most common merchant solutions with the business terms “funnel analysis” — where in the so-called “purchase funnel” our digital children choose to leave the process of purchasing something — or “cart abandonment analysis”.

We can’t even simply walk away from something anymore without it being recorded, logged, and cataloged for later use against us.

But so-called “cart abandonment” is only one part of the bigger issue of tracking what we’re interested in in the age of our digital children, but didn’t buy. There is no shortage of people today who would swear they were just discussing a very specific type of product with their phone present (say, “black leather skirts”) and all of a sudden, advertising for that very specific type of product would pop up all over Facebook and/or Amazon ads. Is this really due to some company listening for keywords through the phone? Maybe, maybe not. All we know since Snowden is that if it’s technically possible to invade privacy, it is already happening.

(We have to assume here these people still need to learn how to install a simple adblocker. But still.)

At the worst ad-dense places, like (but not limited to) airports, there are eyeball trackers to find out which ads you look at. They don’t yet change to match your interests, as per Minority Report, but that’s already present on your phone and on your desktop, and so wouldn’t be foreign to see in public soon, either.

In the world of our analog parents, we weren’t registered and tracked when we bought something.

In the world of our digital children, we’re registered and tracked even when we don’t buy something.

Privacy: Our analog parents’ dating preferences were considered a most private of matters. For our digital children, their dating preferences is a wholesale harvesting opportunity for marketing purposes. How did this terrifying shift come to be?

I believe the first big harvester of dating preferences was the innocent-looking site hotornot.com 18 years ago, a site that more seemed like the after-hours side work of a frustrated highschooler than a clever marketing ploy. It simply allowed people to rate their subjective perceived attractiveness of a photograph, and to upload photographs for such rating. (The two founders of this alleged highschool side project netted $10 million each for it when the site was sold.)

Then the scene exploded, with both user-funded and advertising-funded dating sites, all of which cataloged people’s dating preferences to the smallest detail.

Large-scale pornography sites, like PornHub, also started cataloging people’s porn preferences, and contiously make interesting infographics about geographical differences in preferences. (The link is safe for work, it’s data and maps in the form of a news story on Inverse, not on Pornhub directly.) It’s particularly interesting, as Pornhub is able to break down preferences quite specifically by age, location, gender, income brackets, and so on.

Do you know anyone who told Pornhub any of that data? No, I don’t either. And still, they are able to pinpoint who likes what with quite some precision, precision that comes from somewhere.

And then, of course, we have the social networks (which may or may not be responsible for that tracking, by the way).

It’s been reported that Facebook can tell if you’re gay or not with as little as three likes. Three. And they don’t have to be related to dating preferences or lifestyle preferences — they can be any random selections that just map up well with bigger patterns.

This is bad enough in itself, on the basis that it’s private data. At a very minimum, our digital childrens’ preferences should be their own, just like their favorite ice cream.

But a dating preferences are not just a preference like choosing your flavor of ice cream, is it? It should be, but it isn’t at this moment in time. It could also be something you’re born with. Something that people even get killed for if they’re born with the wrong preference.

It is still illegal to be born homosexual in 73 out of 192 countries, and out of these 73, eleven prescribe the death penalty for being born this way. A mere 23 out of 192 countries have full marriage equality.

Further, although the policy direction is quite one-way toward more tolerance, acceptance, and inclusion at this point in time, that doesn’t mean the policy trend can’t reverse for a number of reasons, most of them very bad. People who felt comfortable in expressing themselves can again become persecuted.

Genocide is almost always based on public data collected with benevolent intent.

This is why privacy is the last line of defense, not the first. And this last line of defense, which held fast for our analog parents, has been breached for our digital children. That matter isn’t taken nearly seriously enough.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: At worst, our analog parents could be prevented from meeting each other. Our digital children are prevented from talking about particular subjects, once the conversation is already happening. This is a horrifying development.

When our digital children are posting a link to The Pirate Bay somewhere on Facebook, a small window sometimes pops up saying “you have posted a link with potentially harmful content. Please refrain from posting such links.”

Yes, even in private conversations. Especially in private conversations.

This may seem like a small thing, but it is downright egregious. Our digital children are not prevented from having a conversation, per se, but are monitored for bad topics that the regime doesn’t like being discussed, and are prevented from discussing those topics. This is far worse than preventing certain people from just meeting.

The analog equivalent would be if our parents were holding an analog phone conversation, and a menacing third voice popped into the conversation with a slow voice speaking just softly enough to be perceived as threatening: “You have mentioned a prohibited subject. Please refrain from discussing prohibited subjects in the future.”

Our parents would have been horrified if this happened — and rightly so!

But in the digital world of our children, the same phenomenon is instead cheered on by the same people who would abhor it if it happened in their world, to themselves.

In this case, of course, it is any and all links to The Pirate Bay that are considered forbidden topics, under the assumption — assumption! — that they lead to manufacturing of copies that would be found in breach of the copyright monopoly in a court of law.

When I first saw the Facebook window above telling me to not discuss forbidden subjects, I was trying to distribute political material I had created myself, and used The Pirate Bay to distribute. It happens to be a very efficient way to distribute large files, which is exactly why it is being used by a lot of people for that purpose (gee, who would have thought?), including people like myself who wanted to distribute large collections of political material.

There are private communications channels, but far too few use them, and the politicians at large (yes, this includes our analog parents) are still cheering on this development, because “terrorism” and other bogeymen.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: In the analog world of our parents, it was absolutely unthinkable that the government would demand to know every footstep you took, every phonecall you made, and every message you wrote, just as a routine matter. For our digital children, government officials keep insisting on this as though it were perfectly reasonable, because terrorism, and also, our digital children may be listening to music together or watching TV together, which is illegal in the way they like to do it, because of mail-order legislation from Hollywood. To make things even worse, the surveillance is retroactive — it is logged, recorded, and kept until somebody wants all of it.

About ten years ago, a colleague of mine moved from Europe to China. He noted that among many differences, the postal service was much more tightly controlled — as in, every letter sent was written by hand onto a line in a log book, kept by the postmaster at each post office. Letter from, to whom, and the date.

At the time, three things struck me: one, how natural this was to the Chinese population, not really knowing anything else; two, how horrified and denouncing our analog parents would have been at this concept; three, and despite that, that this is exactly what our lawmaker analog parents are doing to all our digital children right now.

Or trying to do, anyway; the courts are fighting back hard.

Yes, I’m talking about Telecommunications Data Retention.

There is a saying, which mirrors the Chinese feeling of normality about this quite well: “The bullshit this generation puts up with as a temporary nuisance from deranged politicians will seem perfectly ordinary to the next generation.”

Every piece of surveillance so far in this series is amplified by several orders of magnitude by the notion that it you’re not only being watched, but that everything you do is recorded for later use against you.

This is a concept so bad, not even Nineteen-Eighty Four got it: If Winston’s telescreen missed him doing something that the regime didn’t want him to do, Winston would have been safe, because there was no recording happening; only surveillance in the moment.

If Winston Smith had had today’s surveillance regime, with recording and data retention, the regime could and would have gone back and re-examined every earlier piece of action for what they might have missed.

This horror is reality now, and it applies to every piece in this series. Our digital children aren’t just without privacy in the moment, they’re retroactively without privacy in the past, too.

(Well, this horror is a reality that comes and goes, as legislators and courts are in a tug of war. In the European Union, Data Retention was mandated in 2005 by the European Parliament, was un-mandated in 2014 by the European Court of Justice, and prohibited in 2016 by the same Court. Other jurisdictions are playing out similar games; a UK court just dealt a blow to the Data Retention there, for example.)

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: For our analog parents, a diary or a personal letter could rarely be touched by authorities, not even by law enforcement searching for evidence of a crime. Objects such as these had protection over and above the constitutional privacy safeguards. For our digital children, however, the equivalent diaries and letters aren’t even considered worthy of basic constitutional privacy.

In most jurisdictions, there is a constitutional right to privacy. Law enforcement in such countries can’t just walk in and read somebody’s mail, wiretap their phonecalls, or track their IP addresses. They need a prior court order to do so, which in turn is based on a concrete suspicion of a serious crime: the general case is that you have a right to privacy, and violations of this rule are the exception, not the norm.

However, there’s usually a layer of protection over and above this: even if and when law enforcement gets permission from a judge to violate somebody’s privacy in the form of a search warrant of their home, there are certain things that may not be touched unless specific and additional permissions are granted by the same type of judge. This class of items includes the most private of the personal: private letters, diaries, and so on.

Of course, this is only true in the analog world of our parents. Even though the letter of the law is the same, this protection doesn’t apply at all to the digital world of our children, to their diaries and letters.

Because the modern diary is kept on a computer. If not on a desktop computer, then certainly on a mobile handheld one — what we’d call a “phone” for historical reasons, but what’s really a handheld computer.

And a computer is a work tool in the analog world of our parents. There are loads of precedent cases that establish any form of electronic device as a work tool, dating back well into the analog world, and law enforcement is falling back on all of them with vigor, even now that our digital devices are holding our diaries, personal letters, and other items far more private than an analog diary was ever capable of.

That’s right: whereas your parents’ diaries were extremely protected under the law of the land, your children’s diaries — no less private to them, than those of your parents were to your parents — are as protected from search and seizure as an ordinary steel wrench in a random workshop.

So the question is how we got from point A to point B here? Why are the Police, who know that they can’t touch an analog diary during a house search, instantly grabbing mobile phones which serve the same purpose for our children?

“Because they can”, is the short answer. “Also because nobody put their foot down” for advanced points on the civics course. It’s because some people saw short term political points in being “tough on crime” and completely erasing hard-won rights in the process.

Encrypt everything.

Privacy: Our parents, at least in the Western world, had a right to hold private conversations face-to-face, whether out in public or in the sanctity of their home. This is all but gone for our digital children.

Not long ago, it was the thing of horror books and movies that there would actually be widespread surveillance of what you said inside your own home. Our analog parents literally had this as scary stories worthy of Halloween, mixing the horror with the utter disbelief.

“There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being surveilled at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual device was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they listened to everybody all the time. But at any rate they could listen to you whenever they wanted to. You had to live — did live, from habit that became instinct — in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard.” — from Nineteen Eighty-Four

In the West, we prided ourselves on not being the East — the Communist East, specifically — who regarded their own citizens as suspects: suspects who needed to be cleansed of bad thoughts and bad conversations, to the degree that ordinary homes were wiretapped for ordinary conversations.

There were microphones under every café table and in every residence. And even if there weren’t in the literal sense, just there and then, they could still be anywhere, so you had to live — did live, from habit that became instinct — in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard.

“Please speak loudly and clearly into the flower pot.” — a common not-joke about the Communist societies during the Cold War

Disregard phonecalls and other remote conversations for now, since we already know them to be wiretapped across most common platforms. Let’s look at conversations in a private home.

We now have Google Echo and Amazon Alexa. And while they might have intended to keep your conversations to themselves, out of the reach of authorities, Amazon has already handed over living room recordings to authorities. In this case, permission became a moot point because the suspect gave permission. In the next case, permission might not be there, and it might happen anyway.

Mobile phones are already listening, all the time. We know because when we say “Ok Google” to an Android phone, it wakes up and listens more intensely. This, at a very minimum, means it’s always listening for the words “Ok Google”. IPhones have a similar mechanism listening for “Hey Siri”. While nominally possible to turn off, it’s one of those things you can never be sure of. And we carry these governmental surveillance microphones with us everywhere we go.

If the Snowden documents showed us anything in the general sense, it was that if a certain form of surveillance is technically possible, it is already happening.

And even if Google and Apple aren’t already listening, the German police got the green light to break into phones and plant Bundestrojaner, the flower-pot equivalent of hidden microphones, anyway. You would think that Germany of all countries has in recent memory what a bad idea this is. It could — maybe even should — be assumed that the police forces of other countries have and are already using similar tools.

For our analog parents, the concept of a private conversations was as self-evident as oxygen in the air. Our digital children may never know what one feels like.

And so we live today — from what started as a habit that has already become instinct — in the assumption that every sound we make is overheard by authorities.

Privacy: The dystopic stories of the 1950s said the government would install cameras in our homes, with the government listening in and watching us at all times. Those stories were all wrong, for we installed the cameras ourselves.

In the analog world of our parents, it was taken for completely granted that the government would not be watching us in our own homes. It’s so important an idea, it’s written into the very constitutions of states pretty much all around the world.

And yet, for our digital children, this rule, this bedrock, this principle is simply… ignored. Just because they their technology is digital, and not the analog technology of our parents.

There are many examples of how this has taken place, despite being utterly verboten. Perhaps the most high-profile one is the OPTIC NERVE program of the British surveillance agency GCHQ, which wiretapped video chats without the people concerned knowing about it.

Yes, this means the government was indeed looking into people’s living rooms remotely. Yes, this means they sometimes saw people in the nude. Quite a lot of “sometimes”, even.

According to summaries in The Guardian, over ten percent of the viewed conversations may have been sexually explicit, and 7.1% contained undesirable nudity.

Taste that term. Speak it out loud, to hear for yourself just how oppressive it really is. “Undesirable nudity”. The way you are described by the government, in a file about you, when looking into your private home without your permission.

When the government writes you down as having “undesirable nudity” in your own home.

There are many other examples, such as the state schools that activate school-issued webcams, or even the US government outright admitting it’ll all your home devices against you.

It’s too hard not to think of the 1984 quote here:

The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it, moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live — did live, from habit that became instinct — in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized. — From Nineteen Eighty-Four

And of course, this has already happened. The so-called “Smart TVs” from LG, Vizio, Samsung, Sony, and surely others have been found to do just this — spy on its owners. It’s arguable that the data collected only was collected by the TV manufacturer. It’s equally arguable by the police officers knocking on that manufacturer’s door that they don’t have the right to keep such data to themselves, but that the government wants in on the action, too.

There’s absolutely no reason our digital children shouldn’t enjoy the Analog Equivalent Rights of having their own home to their very selves, a right our analog parents took for granted.

Europe: Slack has updated its Terms of Service to let your manager read your private conversations in private channels. Our analog parents would have been shocked and horrified at the very idea that their bosses would open packages and read personal messages that were addressed to them. For our digital children, it’s another shrugworthy part of everyday life.

The analog plain old telephone system, sometimes abbreviated POTS, is a good template for how things should be even in the digital world. This is something that lawmakers got mostly right in the old analog world.

When somebody is on a phonecall — an old-fashioned, analog phonecall — we know that the conversation is private by default. It doesn’t matter who owns the phone. It is the person using the phone, right this very minute, that has all the rights to its communication capabilities, right this very minute.

The user has all the usage rights. The owner has no right to intercept or interfere with the communications usage, just based on the property right alone.

Put another way: just because you own a piece of communications equipment, that doesn’t give you any kind of automatic right to listen to private conversations that happen to come across this equipment.

Regrettably, this only applies to the telephone network. Moreover, only the analog part of the telephone network. If anything is even remotely digital, the owner can basically intercept anything they like, for any reason they like.

This particularly extends to the workplace. It can be argued that you have no expectation of privacy for what you do on your employer’s equipment; this is precisely forgetting that such privacy was paramount for the POTS, less than two decades ago, regardless of who owned the equipment.

Some employers even install wildcard digital certificates on their workplace computers with the specific purpose of negating any end-to-end security between the employee’s computer and the outside world, effectively performing a so-called “man-in-the-middle attack”. In a whitewashed term, this practice is called HTTPS Interception instead of “man-in-the-middle attack” when it’s performed by your employer instead of another adversary.

Since we’re looking at difference between analog and digital, and how privacy rights have vanished in the transition to digital, it’s worth looking at the code of law for the oldest of analog correspondences: the analog letter, and whether your boss could open and read it just because it was addressed to you at your workplace.

Analog law differs somewhat between different countries on this issue, but in general, even if your manager or workplace were allowed to open your mail (which is the case in the United States but not in Britain), they are typically never allowed to read it (even in the United States).

In contrast, with electronic mail, your managers don’t just read your entire e-mail, but typically has hired an entire department to read it for them. In Europe, this went as far as the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that it’s totally fine for an employer to read the most private of correspondence, as long as the employer informs of this fact (thereby negating the default expectation of privacy).

Of course, this principle about somewhat-old-fashioned e-mail applies to any and all electronic communications now, such as Slack.

So for our digital children, the concept of “mail is private and yours, no matter if you receive it at the workplace” appears to have been irrevocably lost. This was a concept our analog parents took so for granted, they didn’t see any need to fight for it.

Today, privacy remains your own responsibility.

Privacy: In a series of posts on this blog, we have shown how practically everything our parents took for granted with regards to privacy has been completely eliminated for our children, just because they use digital tools instead of analog, and the people interpreting the laws are saying that privacy only applies to the old, analog environment of our parents.

Once you agree with the observation that privacy seems to simply not apply for our children, merely for living in a digitally-powered environment instead of our parents’ analog-powered one, surprise turns to shock turns to anger, and it’s easy to want to assign blame to someone for essentially erasing five generations’ fight for civil liberties while people were looking the other way.

So whose fault is it, then?

It’s more than one actor at work here, but part of the blame must be assigned to the illusion that that nothing has changed, just because our digital children can use old-fashioned and obsolete technology to obtain the rights they should always have by law and constitution, regardless of which method they use to talk to friends and exercise their privacy rights.

We’ve all heard these excuses.

“You still have privacy of correspondence, just use the old analog letter”. As if the Internet generation would. You might as well tell our analog parents that they would need to send a wired telegram to enjoy some basic rights.

“You can still use a library freely.” Well, only an analog one, not a digital one like The Pirate Bay, which differs from an analog library only in efficiency, and not in anything else.

“You can still discuss anything you like.” Yes, but only in the analog streets and squares, not in the digital streets and squares.

“You can still date someone without the government knowing your dating preferences.” Only if I prefer to date like our parents did, in the unsafe analog world, as opposed to the safe digital environment where predators vanish at the click of a “block” button, an option our analog parents didn’t have in shady bars.

The laws aren’t different for the analog and the digital. The law doesn’t make a difference between analog and digital. But no law is above the people who interpret it in the courts, and the way people interpret those laws means the privacy rights always apply to the analog world, but never to the digital world.

It’s not rocket science to demand the same laws to apply offline and online. This includes copyright law, as well as the fact that privacy of correspondence takes precedence over copyright law (in other words, you’re not allowed to open and examine private correspondence for infringements in the analog world, not without prior and individual warrants — our law books are full of these checks and balances; they should apply in the digital too, but don’t today).

Going back to blame, that’s one actor right there: the copyright industry. They have successfully argued that their monopoly laws should apply online just as it does offline, and in doing so, has completely ignored all the checks and balances that apply to the copyright monopoly laws in the analog world. And since copying movies and music has now moved into the same communications channels as we use for private correspondence, the copyright monopoly as such has become fundamentally incompatible with private correspondence at the conceptual level.

The copyright industry has been aware of this conflict and has been continuously pushing for eroded and eliminated privacy to prop up their crumbling and obsolete monopolies, such as pushing for the hated (and now court-axed) Data Retention Directive in Europe. They would use this federal law (or European equivalent thereof) to literally get more powers than the Police themselves in pursuing individual people who were simply sharing music and movies, sharing in the way everybody does.

There are two other major factors at work. The second factor is marketing. The reason we’re tracked at the sub-footstep level in airports and other busy commercial centers is simply to sell us more crap we don’t need. This comes at the expense of privacy that our analog parents took for granted. Don’t even get started on Facebook and Google.

Last but not least are the surveillance hawks — the politicians who want to look “Tough on Crime”, or “Tough on Terrorism”, or whatever the word of choice is this week. These were the ones who pushed the Data Retention Directive into law. The copyright industry were the ones who basically wrote it for them.

These three factors have working together, and they’ve been very busy.

It’s going to be a long uphill battle to win back the liberties that were slowly won by our ancestors over about six generations, and which have been all but abolished in a decade.

Our children are right to demand Analog Equivalent Privacy Rights — the civil liberties our parents not just enjoyed, but took for granted.

I fear the failure to pass on the civil liberties from our parents to our children is going to be seen as the greatest failure of this particular current generation, regardless of all the good we also accomplish. Surveillance societies can be erected in just ten years, but can take centuries to roll back.

Privacy remains your own responsibility today. We all need to take it back merely by exercising our privacy rights, with whatever tools are at our disposal.

Image from the movie “Nineteen-Eighty Four”; used under fair use for political commentary.

Cologne - BMX CGN BMX Contest 2016 - Miguel Smajlji & Robin Kachfi & Kevin Nikulski & Oliver Frömter

We send our new trainee Oliver Frömter (@oliverfroemter18 ) and our team riders Miguel Smajlji (@smilesridesbikes), Robin Kachfi (robinkachfibmx) and Kevin Nikulski (@kevin_nikulski) to the famous BMX Contest in Cologne which is called that time #bmxcologne! So that video is about the trip to cologne, as well some impression of the #bmxcologne and flat tyre of oli's car!

Follow our youtube account on: https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/kunstformbmxshop

Robin Kachfi was with his homies on spot safari in Heidelberg, Germany. Check his whole adventure right here!

Enjoy the video, your kunstform BMX Shop Team!



Video: Robin Kachfi



subscribe to our youtube channel: https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/kunstformbmxshop

Our bros Robin Kachfi, Felix Prangenberg, Markus Schwital, Miguel Smajli, Felix Donat, Kevin Nikulski killed it at this years BMX Cologne contest. Watch the whole video now on our Youtube Channel.

Enjoy the video, your kunstform BMX Shop Team!



Video: Michael Lorenz



subscribe to our youtube channel: https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/kunstformbmxshop

Robin Kachfi uploaded a new webisode on his Youtube Channel. This time our Bro Robin went with his homies to Barcelona, where the boys produced a lot of footage. Check out the first part right now!

Enjoy the video, your kunstform BMX Shop Team!



Video: Robin Kachfi

Related links:

• all Products of kunstform
• all products of Radio Bikes
• kunstform YouTube Channel

Robin Kachfi uploaded the second part of his Barcelona Vlog on his Youtube Channel. This time Robin and his homies rode through the Barcelona City until the sun goes down, to check some other BMX Street Spots. Check their second part right now!

Enjoy the video, your kunstform BMX Shop Team!



Video: Robin Kachfi

Related links:

• all Products of kunstform
• all products of Radio Bikes
• kunstform YouTube Channel

Robin Kachfi uploaded the second part of his Barcelona Vlog on his Youtube Channel. In addition to a few street spots in Badalona, the boys checked out the top of Barcelona, as well.

Enjoy the video, your kunstform BMX Shop Team!



Video: Robin Kachfi

Related links:

• all Products of kunstform
• all products of Radio Bikes
• kunstform YouTube Channel

Our Bro Robin Kachfi has teamed up with Nik Pfeiffer to head to Berlin for the Highway to Hill contest. As you know, a long journey should be enjoyed, so the guys went off a little earlier to be able to search for spots. Apparently, the good is close, so the guys have decided to shred the DIY Parks within the Mellowpark. The video rounds up with a lot fails, so we are quite sure you cannot resist!

Enjoy the video, your kunstform BMX Shop Team!


Video: Robin Kachfi

Related links:

• all Products of kunstform
• all products of Radio Bikes
• Robin's YouTube Channel

Our Bro Robin Kachfi was also part of the 20Inch Trophy BMX Contest in Innsbruck. In his Vlog you will learn more about the get-together of our kunstform BMX Team and accompany Robin through the day. You will learn more about the accommodation of our bros, be close to the bros at various BMX Street Sessions and get to know the Skatehalle Innsbruck.

Enjoy the video, your kunstform BMX Shop Team!


Video: Robin Kachfi

Related links:

• all Products of kunstform
• Robin's YouTube Channel

The bro Justin Rudd has opted for 2 days to Cologne in order to meet with the guys from Fracture to ride various BMX Street Sessions. Felix Prangenberg was also on site and has captured not only Justins new hairstyle, but also the whole action for you on video.

Have fun with the video, your kunstform BMX Shop Team!

Video: Felix Prangenberg

Related links:

• all products of kunstform