Independent Thinking: How can France survive its budget crisis? Audio john.pollock 17 October 2024

Sophie Pedder and Shahin Vallée join the podcast to discuss France’s contentious budget and political drama, and the potential impact on Europe and beyond.

On this episode

France is facing political turmoil. The survival of Michel Barnier’s new government rests on whether he can pass a controversial budget intended to rescue the country from its huge fiscal deficit. Bronwen Maddox is joined by Sophie Pedder, the Paris bureau chief of The Economist, Shahin Vallée, a former adviser to Emmanuel Macron and Armida van Rij, the head of our Europe Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2024

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.

The killing of Yahya Sinwar won’t change the course of the Gaza war Expert comment jon.wallace 18 October 2024

Israel has larger ambitions for Gaza beyond the Hamas leader’s death and the armed group is still asserting its influence despite its degradation.

After a year of being hunted as one of the most wanted men in the Middle East, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by Israeli forces on 17 October, in the city of Rafah in the Gaza Strip.

Hailing from Khan Younis refugee camp, Sinwar was imprisoned in Israel in 1989 for the abduction and killing of two Israeli soldiers. He was freed alongside 1,000 other prisoners during a major 2011 exchange, gradually building a notorious reputation as an intelligent and ruthless political figure.

As Hamas’ Gaza chief since 2017, Sinwar oversaw the consolidation of the movement’s authoritarian rule in the Strip and co-directed its military confrontations with Israel. He is regarded as a chief architect of Hamas’ deadly assault of 7 October, which killed 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, in southern communities.

Many world leaders and pundits were quick to embrace Sinwar’s death as an opportunity to press for a ceasefire in Gaza and secure the release of roughly 100 Israeli hostages still held by Hamas and other groups. It is too early to know the full repercussions of this development, but these hopes are largely misplaced – and reflect a reluctance to confront the larger obstacles and motivations that are preventing an end to the war.

Morale amid aimlessness

For Israelis, Sinwar’s death is undoubtedly a morale booster. It is a symbolic victory over a man deemed responsible for the 7 October massacres, and a tactical success that rids Israel of a formidable foe – one who was also an invested ally of Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Israeli politicians and generals will relish the news as another step towards restoring their reputations after their failure to prevent the 7 October attack.

Yet contrary to some wishful thinking, Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Israel’s calculus in Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose popularity has been slowly recovering in recent months, described the news as ‘the beginning of the end’ but warned that ‘the task before us is not yet complete’.

The intensification of Israel’s war with Hezbollah – including a ground invasion of Lebanon, airstrikes across the country, and the displacement of over 1 million people – has shifted Israelis’ focus away from Gaza over the past month, especially as Hezbollah rockets disrupt life in Israel’s central cities as well as the north.

During that time, the Israeli army has begun a major offensive in the northern part of the Strip, implementing what appears to be the first part of the so-called ‘General’s Plan’ – an operation to besiege and force out roughly 300,000 Palestinian civilians who remain in the area. It could also pave the way for Israel’s absorption of part of the territory. (Israel’s military has denied pursuing the plan).

As such, the Israeli government has relegated the importance of the hostages. Netanyahu is eager to divert the public’s frustration with his months-long sabotage of a deal, while the military – despite its clashes with the prime minister – is seizing the chance to redraw Israel’s geopolitical environment. Even if a deal is struck in the wake of Sinwar’s death, Israel’s bombing and carving-up of Gaza and south Lebanon will likely continue.

Dynamic but degraded

For Hamas, the killing of its fiery politburo chief – just over two months after the assassination of his predecessor Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran – is certainly a blow to its leadership and internal stability. But the Islamist movement’s dynamism has not changed. Hamas’s decision-making processes are not pegged to specific individuals, and other figures, whether in Gaza or in exile, will be rotated into senior positions.

It is unclear whether Hamas will promote a leader who shares Sinwar’s hardline orientation, or drift back to a more moderate figure similar to Haniyeh. Regardless, Hamas’s core demands in any ceasefire and hostage negotiations are unlikely to shift significantly. The movement is still seeking a permanent end to the war, and Israel is still refusing to grant it.

Hamas’s military capacity has been severely degraded by the Israeli offensive, not least by the fact that much of Gaza has been made unliveable and ungovernable. But the movement is far from destroyed. Its militants continue to fight a guerrilla war to undermine Israel’s foothold in Gaza, while trying to reassert Hamas control over public order, the war economy, and the distribution of aid.

Moreover, as the history of movements like Hamas and Hezbollah shows, the devastating nature of Israel’s campaigns and occupations are planting the seeds for further militancy among Palestinians, whether organized under Hamas or smaller, decentralized groups. The war has brutally decimated Gaza’s society, and the notion that killing figures like Sinwar will dissuade future recruits to fight Israel is fanciful.

On the Palestinian political level, Hamas and Fatah are still in talks about forming a unity agreement, though negotiations have so far remained fruitless. Even if a pact is made, Israel’s relentless targeting of Hamas personnel, the perception of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) as feckless collaborators, and Palestinians’ feeling of total abandonment raise doubts about the parties’ ability to regain popular support or legitimacy – whether to lead an interim government or the wider national movement.

The gravest threat

The killing of Sinwar is a significant marker in the Gaza war, with important ramifications for the movement he led and the conflict he seismically shaped. Israel will portray his death as validation of its aggressive military approach, and a further step in the erosion of Iran’s regional influence – an agenda the US has actively supported.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s foreign policy priorities 29 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs discusses the country’s approach to regional stability and the role of international partnerships in securing economic prosperity.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss DRC’s regional diplomatic priorities and international agency, including its ambitions around global critical mineral supply chains.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faces foreign policy tests as it manages a complex security crisis and regional tensions, alongside global economic and trade partnerships.

Entrenched conflict in eastern DRC continues to have wider regional implications. Troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployment are tackling a growing mandate as the UN’s peacekeeping mission prepares to withdraw. Tensions with Rwanda also remain high despite mediation efforts under the Luanda process.

As a major producer of critical minerals for the global energy transition, the DRC seeks to benefit from growing international demand without sacrificing value addition. New and existing frameworks with international partners will remain key to this vision, including for the development of regional infrastructure networks such as the Lobito Corridor.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss the DRC’s regional diplomacy and international agency, including the country’s positioning in global critical mineral supply chains.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must register interest in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Friday 25 October.

Sinwar’s death does not make Hamas–Fatah reconciliation more likely, whoever his successor may be Expert comment jon.wallace 22 October 2024

The killing may aid Hamas recruitment – but it will not make agreement with Fatah any easier to achieve.

Western political leaders were quick to argue that Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on 17 October presented an opportunity for a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Israeli hostages.

US President Joe Biden immediately called on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to seize the moment to negotiate, now that Israel has achieved one of its war aims.

However, that ‘moment’ has already passed. Israel’s military assault on Gaza has intensified since Sinwar was killed, leading UN Peace Process Co-ordinator Tor Wennesland to say that ‘nowhere is safe in Gaza’. It is abundantly clear Netanyahu is intent on further degrading Hamas, resetting a new ‘power balance’ and carving out a buffer zone, no matter the cost in Palestinian lives or Israeli hostages. 

But there are other implications of Sinwar’s assassination beyond the zero-sum analysis of will there or won’t there be a ceasefire.

Hamas’s ability to fight

At present, everyone has an opinion on how Sinwar’s killing will affect Hamas and its ability to resist and respond to Israel’s military. His death will have been a major blow – symbolically, operationally, and psychologically. Hamas has been downgraded and its capacity to respond compromised.

But it will recover, regenerate and retaliate in time – and Sinwar’s death will have been no surprise to Palestinians in Gaza or elsewhere. Hamas is accustomed to seeing its leaders assassinated. Since its formation in 1987, it has been ‘decapitated’ many times, only to continue with its mission to ‘liberate Palestine’.

Hamas’s portrayal of Sinwar dying in his fatigues, head wrapped in a keffiyeh and resisting until the end will persuade many young Palestinians that he died as a martyr serving the Palestinian cause. Many will be inspired to join and fortify the ranks of Hamas as a result.

The IDF’s release of drone footage showing Sinwar’s last moments will have done nothing to undermine his credibility. 

On the contrary, it will serve as a rallying call to disaffected and disenfranchised young Palestinians horrified by Israel’s bombing of civilian targets in Gaza and disaffected with Fatah’s inability to prevent Israeli settler expansion and violence in the West Bank.

Reconciliation

Some hope that if Sinwar is replaced by a more ‘moderate’ leader, his killing may smooth the path to Hamas–Fatah reconciliation – and that this could provide a foundation for a patchwork political solution when Israel and Gaza arrive at the ‘day after.’  

But the idea that a downgraded and ‘leaderless’ Hamas will be susceptible to international pressure to reconcile with Fatah is divorced from reality.  

Prospective new Hamas leaders such as Khaled al Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya are based in Qatar. 

They may be more pliable to external pressure to reconcile with Fatah in search of a political outcome, but their ability to influence events on the ground in Gaza will be limited. That was demonstrated by the Sinwar-orchestrated attacks on 7 October 2023, which took place without the blessing of the exiled leadership in Doha.

Hamas has long gone to ground in Gaza and become far more decentralized than it was before 7 October. It is now more typical of an insurgency, where Hamas cadres exercise a great degree of operational autonomy.

In other words, the disconnect between Hamas in Gaza and its political leadership in Qatar has only grown wider since this round of conflict started.

International efforts

That will undermine international efforts made by Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and others to bring about a reconciliation. Moscow and Beijing already hosted reconciliation talks in February and April early this year but made no progress in closing the chasm between the two parties. Saudi Arabia has also hosted talks.

The three Arab states, none of which have so far commented publicly on Sinwar’s killing, will likely view his death as an opportunity to bolster the political wing of Hamas – backing it with pledges of political, diplomatic and financial support.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt will have next to no influence over the succession process, but Qatar’s long-established relationship with the political wing of Hamas affords it leverage over the organization, albeit limited. They may be able to strengthen the hand of those based in Doha by promising to work harder at securing a ceasefire, guaranteeing the provision of humanitarian relief, and working towards a political solution.

How to revive Europe’s economy and unlock its potential 7 November 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Enrico Letta, former prime minister of Italy, and other experts discuss how the European Union’s economy must adapt to a challenging world.

Amid a fractured geopolitical environment, global trade volatility and hardening protectionist policies in many countries, the European economy must adapt fast. The single market is a key driver of European integration, but it was designed in a very different global economic context.

Launched in April, Enrico Letta’s Much more than a market report set out how the European Union should adapt the arrangements of the single market to ensure it delivers prosperity and economic security for EU citizens in the 21st century. The report resonates with ongoing debates over the future of European competitiveness, industrial strategy and how to respond to an apparently deglobalizing world. In this event, Letta and other experts on the European economy and integration will discuss the prospect of meaningful reform of the single market, and what the incoming Commission can do to ensure the EU unlocks the potential of its economy for all its citizens.

Key questions will include:

• What dynamics are shaping the Europe’s economic landscape?
• What opportunities are there to enhance the strength and competitiveness of the single market
• How can the EU’s leaders ensure the single market is aligned with other strategic objectives such as security and enlargement?
• What political hurdles may prevent progress on single market reform? And how can these be overcome?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

The MENA uprisings: Five years on, what role is civil society playing? 31 October 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Online

Panellists examine the protest movements’ legacies in different context and how civil society continues to work towards positive change.

Five years after nation-wide protests in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan demanded systemic changes and political reforms, the situation remains largely unchanged. In some cases, it has deteriorated. Sudan is facing a humanitarian catastrophe amidst an ongoing civil war. Lebanon is dealing with Israeli aggression amidst a severe economic crisis with little response from the caretaker government. In Iraq and Algeria, relative stability masks the reality of increased suppression of dissent. This preservation of the status quo supports the entrenched political structures that strive to uphold it.

The current absence of large-scale street protests in these countries should not be taken as an indication that populations are content with the status quo. The issues that ignited the initial uprisings remain and in many cases have worsened. Despite enormous challenges, activists continue to navigate their systems to survive and instigate change. In the face of increasing difficulties, they are raising awareness of their countries’ predicaments and are finding alternative economic solutions. Additionally they are mobilizing community support, and pushing to voice their disillusionment. All these efforts aim at actively participating in shaping decisions that determines their future.

This webinar explores:

• What has been the impact of the uprisings in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan?
• How are civil society and activists contributing to change within their communities?
• What is the current landscape for civic engagement within the politics, society and economy in these countries?
• What prospects are there for solidarity and cooperation among civil society actors across these regions and beyond?

Trust in US democracy is at stake in this election Expert comment rgold.drupal 23 October 2024

A narrow win for either side could make things worse. The rest of the world should be prepared for a disruptive transition.

With less than two weeks to election day in the United States, polls suggest the gap between Harris and Trump has narrowed even further in the swing states where the election will be decided. A fierce contest has ensued as each campaign seeks to drive voter turnout. In such a tight race, this will be decisive. But in an election that many Americans perceive as being existential for the country’s future, a narrow victory by either side will heighten the risk of a contested election.

Many Americans are pessimistic about the ability of democracy to deliver a reliable result. Two thirds of Republican voters continue to believe that the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump and for many of these, Biden’s inauguration may have demonstrated the weakness, not the strength, of US democracy. 

This environment has contributed to widespread anticipation of a contested election, as well as preparations for the possibility of a delayed result. Political disinformation and deep polarization across the country could mean that a narrow victory leads to more legal challenges and even political violence.  6 January, the anniversary of the assault on the US Capitol and the day Congress will certify the Electoral College has been designated a National Special Security Event. 

The issue of how quickly and reliably votes are certified has become an arena for argument. In the 2022 midterms, 22 county officials in key states voted to delay certification. Democrats have noted with alarm that this year, around 70 pro-Trump election ‘conspiracists’ are positioned to review the results in swing states.

Those nervous about the possibility of a narrow vote being overturned will be watching to see if Republicans maintain or increase their majority in the House of Representatives, since the newly elected House will shape who holds the gavel when a joint session of Congress returns to certify the US presidential election result. Republican control of the House could give the former president more ability to influence this vote. 

A resilient democracy

But there should be room for optimism. Democracy in America has been remarkably resilient. In 2016, Democrats swallowed their unease with Donald Trump. Despite rumours of Russian interference in the election, they accepted the election result.

Four years later, the US was far more polarized, trust in institutions had decreased, and challenges to the elections reflected this. The Trump campaign filed more than 60 lawsuits in 9 states challenging election processes and voter certification. In every single case, courts confirmed the results.  After the 6 January insurrection on the US Capitol, Congress returned to its chambers and, on the very same day, confirmed the electoral results. 

If fears of another contested election materialise, it will be the third time in recent history that the US has struggled to confirm a result. In 2000, the Supreme Court intervened to decide on a recount in Florida, effectively delivering victory to George W Bush – a memory alongside the 6 January Capitol riots contributing to America’s anxiety ahead of polling day. 

International response

The US’s partners and rivals may be ill-prepared for a contested election. 

If Trump or Harris, or both, claim victory before it is clearly settled, world leaders will need to decide how to react. Diplomatic protocol may dictate that leaders wait until the US confirms the results through official channels but there are concerns that not everyone will play by these rules. 

Where is Georgia now heading? 28 October 2024 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Online

After pivotal elections, experts discuss what the declared results and reactions mean for Georgia.

Following a year marked by protests over the controversial ‘Foreign Agents’ bill and broader concerns over democratic backsliding, Georgia faces pivotal parliamentary elections on 26 October. Regardless of the outcome, the results are expected to be contested as well as consequential.

In the wake of the election, experts will discuss the immediate and longer-term consequences.

Key questions:

• These were the first fully-proportional elections in Georgia. How much difference did it make
• What will the election results, as we currently understand them, mean for Georgia’s path to European integration? How will they affect Georgia’s foreign policy priorities?
• What role should the EU play? Is Georgia a test case for the EU as an aspiring geopolitical power?
• Is the oligarchic grip likely to be tightened or loosened? What role for undue influence now?
• Has Russia done all it can for now in Georgia? Or is there more it can do?

US election rhetoric on migration undermines Washington’s soft power in Latin America Expert comment jon.wallace 23 October 2024

As US public opinion hardens, the Democratic party takes a tougher stance, and Donald Trump proposes mass deportations, Latin American leaders note a lack of long-term policy.

The US’s broken immigration system has become a central theme of the 2024 election campaign. But the discussion on immigration, undocumented immigrants, and asylum seekers – increasingly lurching into dehumanizing rhetoric – extends beyond US borders. 

As one former senior director of the National Security Council told me, ‘when the president travels or meets with heads of state from Latin America what comes up –regardless of the country – isn’t US–Cuba policy or even trade. It’s immigration’. How the US talks about and treats citizens of Latin American and the Caribbean matters to elected politicians in the region. 

The roots of the US immigration debate go deep and will not be easily resolved, even with a sweeping reform of the system. 

According to a January 2024 Pew survey, 78 per cent of Americans ‘say the large number of migrants seeking to enter the country at the Mexico border is either a crisis (45 per cent) or a major problem (32 per cent)’. Worries about the border are not limited to Republican voters: 73 per cent of Democrats feel that the issue is either a crisis or major problem. 

Despite the heated popular temperature, the numbers of undocumented immigrants encountered at the US–Mexico border has actually dropped in recent months. US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) reported 301,981 encounters with irregular border crossings in December 2023; by August 2024 this had dropped to 107,473.  

Nevertheless, illegal border crossings have increased under Biden. During his administration USCBP reported 8 million encounters along the Mexico border compared to 2.5 million under Donald Trump. 

Mexico

Any attempt to address the issue promises to affect US relations with Mexico, requiring the cooperation of newly elected president Claudia Sheinbaum. Her predecessor and founder of her Morena party, leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), proved an unexpectedly cooperative partner for the previous Trump administration and Biden White House. 

But that came at a cost, particularly for Biden. In return for AMLO’s cooperation, the US soft-pedalled criticism over his failures to disrupt narcotics trafficking and criminal networks and for his steady weakening of checks on executive power. 

Mexico’s borders with other countries are also under pressure. Mexico remains the primary sending country to the US. But political repression and insecurity in countries including Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela has pushed their citizens to travel across Mexico to the US. Economic collapse and humanitarian crises in Cuba and Venezuela have further fuelled the flight.

Rhetoric

The Kamala Harris and Trump campaigns have struck different positions on how to stem the flow of illegal immigration. But as US public opinion shifts, both parties are talking tougher. 

Harris is continuing Biden’s hardening stance, including the controversial move to bar those who cross the border illegally from applying for asylum. 

Biden’s early ‘roots’ strategy, to provide economic and security support in countries from where migrants are travelling, has fallen by the wayside. 

The Trump campaign is taking more extreme positions. The Republican presidential candidate mentions immigration in almost every campaign speech. 

He proposes to carry out the ‘largest deportation in US history’, using ICE personnel, the National Guard and local police forces to round up undocumented immigrants, including in their workplaces. 

The campaign has also pledged to end birth-right citizenship and Biden’s programme of parole for humanitarian reasons. Trump also plans to restore his first term policies including construction of the border wall. 

Trump’s proposals provide little opportunity for a broad, bipartisan consensus on immigration. Should he win in November he is likely, as he did in his first term, to attempt to push his policies via executive action, opening up challenges in federal court. 

A Harris victory would at least create space for the resurrection of the Biden administration’s 2024 immigration enforcement bill, originally supported by moderate Republican leadership in the Senate, but defeated following pressure from Trump. 

The bill would have toughened enforcement at the border – increasing funding for detention centres, asylum hearings and for local governments and border patrols. It would also permit ICE to shut down the border when crossings surpassed an average of 5,000 per day or 8,500 on a single day.

Undermining US influence

But such legislation, while promising to address domestic US perceptions of the crisis, threatens to reduce US soft power in Latin America. That would be counterproductive at a time when the US is attempting to consolidate global support in its competition with China and conflict with Russia. 

For Latin American leaders, US rhetoric on immigration rankles. The priorities of Latin American and Caribbean leaders and their voters are long term: economic growth, improved security, and climate change. These issues require investment and commitment from an engaged and reliable US partner. Sadly, Latin Americans can see such issues are not on the domestic agenda in US politics. 

To improve regional perceptions of US intentions after the election, new policy should seek to address the root causes of migration. That will require a multi-pronged, bipartisan approach that focuses attention and resources on US neighbours south of the border.  

The US’s immigration system will need to broaden paths for legal immigration to meet US labour needs, while delivering increased support for border security, and accelerated (and humane) processes for detaining and repatriating illegal border crossers and asylum claims.  

But any sustainable answer also requires addressing the multifaceted reasons driving migrants north. Any future US administration will need to risk unpopularity with some voters at home and engage with sending countries and their neighbours. 

Safeguarding Europe: how to defeat and deter Russia 10 December 2024 — 10:00AM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Chatham House

Threat assessment and practical solutions.

Nearly three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the security picture for Europe remains uncertain. Questions of European states’ own resilience and ability to counter Russia and support Ukraine have not been adequately answered by key European powers. So how can European states act proactively to support not only Ukraine but also their own security?

Key questions:

• How resilient is Europe to the challenge posed by Russia?
• What more can be done to defend EU candidate states?
• What will be the impact of the US election results?
• What deters Russia? What have we learnt from Russia’s war on Ukraine?
• Are the current approaches sufficient?

This one-day, in-person conference at Chatham House will bring together experts and policymakers from across the UK, EU and US, as well as drawing from the expertise of Russian analysts in exile. Alongside analysis of Russia’s intentions towards Europe and European strategy, there will be opportunity for in-depth conversation with experts on the geopolitical and defence tools available to European states.

This conference will be hosted in-person, with the recording of the keynote address made available on the website following the event.

Participants will be selected based on expertise. Please wait for confirmation before attending.

Corporate organisations who currently do not support the Russia-Eurasia Programme or Ukraine Forum will be subject to a fee. Your registration will be reviewed by a member of our team before it is approved.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Independent Thinking: Will debt constrain Western foreign policy? Audio john.pollock 24 October 2024

Patrick Wintour and Ranil Dissanayake join the podcast ahead of the UK Budget to discuss the high debt facing G7 economies and its impact on foreign, defence and development policies.

On this episode

Ahead of a crucial Budget by Chancellor Rachel Reeves, UK national debt is at almost 100 per cent of GDP – and it’s not alone. Many G7 economies face massive debt levels, restricting ambitions when it comes to foreign policy and global engagement. 

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Patrick Wintour, the Guardian’s diplomatic editor and Ranil Dissanayake, a senior research fellow at the Centre for Global Development. With them are Olivia O’Sullivan and David Lubin from Chatham House.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Chatham House welcomes 2024 interns News release jon.wallace 25 October 2024

An internship at Chatham House offers an invaluable learning experience through a six-month placement in one of our teams.

Chatham House is excited to welcome the 2024 cohort to the Molchanov Sustainability Internship Programme. 

Introduced in January 2021, the programme has been made possible following the gift of Pavel Molchanov, to support the next generation of leaders in sustainability. 

The internships grant practical learning opportunities at a world-famous think-tank, helping a new generation of policymakers understand how to shape policy, influence debate, and create meaningful change towards a sustainable future. 

This autumn, Chatham House staff in six departments are delighted to welcome interns to their teams: 

Aisha Abdirahman will work with the Environment and Society Centre, Kendall Spence with the Africa Programme, Matthew Harris with the International Affairs journal, Noor Elgallal with the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Phoebe Hardingham with the Russia and Eurasia Programme, and Thomas Maddock with the Europe Programme.

For more information about the internships, please contact the Academy team.

In conversation with James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology and Society at Google 12 December 2024 — 11:15AM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

A conversation on AI’s global, societal and economic impacts.

2024 has been a landmark year for Artificial Intelligence (AI) development, deployment and use, with significant progress in AI-driven science, governance and cooperation. Looking ahead, AI continues to demonstrate economic promise and potential to expand on scientific breakthroughs in areas such as climate and health. This wave of innovation is occurring against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty and not all countries are fully able to participate. Heading into 2025, there are urgent questions about how best to maximise shared opportunities when it comes to AI and to advance global cooperation.

James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology & Society at Google, will unpack what 2025 will bring for AI in science, economics, global governance and international cooperation. 

Key questions include:

• What will be AI’s global societal and economic impact in 2025 and beyond? 
• What are the ways AI could help increase economic growth and economy-wide productivity? What factors must be in place for this to happen?
• How best can we maximise shared opportunities and advance global cooperation when it comes to AI? Where can public-private partnerships unlock scientific breakthroughs for societal progress, combatting shared global challenges such as climate change and global health issues?  
• What are the principles of safe, responsible AI, and how should companies remain responsive to their evolution and integrate them into technology design and implementation? 
• What is the current – and ideal – role of technology companies in emerging mechanisms for global cooperation and national governance on AI?

This event is being held in partnership with Google.

You will receive notice by 13:00 on Wednesday 11 December if you have been successful in securing an in-person place.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

As the ruling party claims victory in Georgia’s disputed election, Western condemnation is no longer enough Expert comment LToremark 29 October 2024

As tens of thousands take to the streets to protest the election results, Georgia faces a familiar crisis – with a few key differences.

As the people of Georgia went to the polls on 26 October, many were hoping not only for a democratic change of government but also for an end to one-party dominance and a return to the path of European integration. The previously weak and divided opposition had grouped itself into four major electoral centres, promising a coalition government and framing these elections as a choice between Europe and Russia. 

Ahead of the election, President Salome Zourabishvili had put forward the Georgian Charter, a blueprint for a stable and democratic transition to a new style of governance and for initiating reforms to fulfil conditions for EU accession. It was signed by all pro-European and pro-Western opposition parties. 

The official election results gave the ruling Georgian Dream party a 54 per cent majority in contrast with exit polls that gave the opposition a 10 per cent lead. President Zourabishvili and the opposition parties refuse to recognize the results, beginning a long process of contestation with allegations of fraud and street protests. As the disappointment sets in and the streets once again replace the ballot box as a conduit for democratic change, there is a sense of déja vu.

Georgia has seen this before. A party sweeps to power on the tide of popular protest, initiates reforms to meet public expectations but, by the end of its second term, it takes an authoritarian turn. As it overstays its welcome, it starts manipulating elections to cling to power. People once again take to the streets and a new party wins by a landslide only to repeat the same cycle. But with each turn, the grip the ruling elites have on power gets stronger and the methods they use become more sophisticated. State security becomes equated with regime stability, leaving no space for normal democratic contestation or expressions of dissent. 

Although what is happening in Georgia fits this familiar pattern, there are some consequential differences. 

First, these were the first fully proportional elections. Previously, a mixed system of representation meant that the incumbency always had an advantage by dominating majoritarian districts. A new electoral system had created a not unreasonable expectation that these elections, if held freely, would result in a coalition government. The hope was this could help break the vicious cycle of Georgian politics, sustained by an extreme form of majoritarianism and a winner-takes-all political culture.

The Georgian Dream party was contesting its fourth consecutive term against a backdrop of falling popularity and growing societal mobilization in opposition to its authoritarian inclinations. Despite all this, it secured – some would insist manufactured – an absolute majority in elections that international observers say were marred by serious irregularities and fell short of democratic standards. 

The second important difference is that these elections were not only about saving Georgia’s democracy but also about rescuing its European perspective. Since Georgia was granted EU candidate status in December 2023, its parliament has adopted Russian-style laws on foreign agents and combating LGBTIQ+ ‘propaganda’. 

It has also adopted a strongly Eurosceptic political discourse, pushing back on international criticism and accusing EU and US officials of interference in domestic affairs and disregard for Georgia’s sovereignty. In response, the EU has suspended accession talks with Georgia indefinitely while the US has imposed targeted sanctions on high-ranking Georgian officials and judges. 

Georgia’s democratic backsliding at home and its pivot away from the West are both simultaneous and interrelated. It was widely hoped these elections would be a course correction and return Georgia to the path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The election results, if they stick, will prevent this from happening. A Georgian Dream government will not work to fulfil conditions for EU accession, viewed as a challenge to its hold on power. 

The third and final difference is that these elections took place in the context of heightened geopolitical confrontation. The Georgian Dream ‘victory’ is a win for anti-liberal, conservative forces around the world championed, among others, by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. He was the first to congratulate Georgian Dream for its declared success and even visited Tbilisi in a show of solidarity and ideological alignment. 

The election result is also a win for Russia. It strengthens Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus, which has waned as a result of the war in Ukraine and the fall of Nagorny-Karabakh. Russian officials and propagandist were quick to congratulate Georgian Dream, wishing them success in standing up to Western pressures and offering help in case things got tough. 

From Moscow’s perspective, Georgia’s elections are part of a global hybrid war. They represent a local battle in the ongoing geopolitical contest between Russia and the West, between the rules-based global order and competitive multipolarity. 

As Georgia repeats a familiar pattern, what do the election results mean for its future? While clear predictions are difficult at this stage, it is worth bearing in mind that as the democratic resilience of the Georgian society has strengthened over time, so too has the state capacity to supress and control. 

Assessing the trajectory of the Middle East conflict 4 November 2024 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Online

Experts examine how the conflict may develop and what we can expect from regional and international actors.

A year on, the war in Gaza has spilled beyond Israel and Palestine with escalation across the region intensifying.

Recent weeks have seen Israel deepening its military offensive on Lebanon and keeping the north of the Gaza strip under siege, while leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas have been successfully targeted by its forces. Israel also launched an unprecedented assault against Iran in response to Tehran’s missile attacks on Israeli territory earlier in October.

Against this backdrop, regional states, particularly in the Gulf, in line with their overall approach to the conflict, are prioritizing diplomacy over escalation. They maintain their neutrality on the hostility between Israel and Iran and its aligned groups from the axis of resistance.

The strength of old alliances is being tested while new alignments are uncovered that may reshape the geopolitical landscape of the region, particularly following the US presidential election.

In this webinar, experts will examine:

• What are Israel’s calculations at this stage and how have the domestic political dynamics changed over recent weeks?
• What are the impacts of the war on Iran and its aligned actors and what can we expect from Tehran and groups from the axis of resistance?
• How are the wars in Gaza and Lebanon connected and would ending one stop the other?
• What is the response from regional states, particularly in the Gulf, and what role can they play?
• What are the possible scenarios for a post-election US policy on Israel and the Middle East?

Independent Thinking: Why is North Korea sending troops to Russia? Audio john.pollock 31 October 2024

Orysia Lutsevych, Edward Howell and Yossi Mekelberg discuss North Korean troops fighting with Russian forces against Ukraine, as well as the issue of military conscription.

On this episode

North Korea is sending troops to Russia, but what is Kim Jong-Un hoping to get from Vladmir Putin for this military assistance against Ukraine? The panel also discuss the role military conscription plays in Israel, South Korea and Ukraine’s defence.

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Edward Howell, the Korea Foundation fellow at Chatham House, Orysia Lutsevych, the head of our Ukraine Forum and Yossi Mekelberg, a senior consulting fellow with our Middle East and North Africa Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Harris and Trump's shared goal masks a fundamental AI policy divide Expert comment rgold.drupal 3 November 2024

Both presidential candidates will pursue US tech dominance but differ on the means to achieve it.

There remain some differences between the US presidential candidates’ positions on the governance of artificial intelligence and other emerging technology, notably around competition. 

But under either future administration, US decision-making looks set to be heavily influenced by growing securitization, the aims of the US technology industry and broader competition with China. 

‘Safe’ AI development 

Vice President Kamala Harris attended the inaugural Global AI Safety summit in the UK in 2023, where she announced President Joe Biden’s Executive Order on AI. This significant move by the federal government sought to define national and cyber security guidelines for AI developers and outline privacy and transparency guarantees. It also committed the federal government to a review of the National Security implications of this emerging technology, which was published last week.

In her remarks at the summit, Harris was clear that her definitions of safety extended beyond catastrophic risk mitigation to societal and personal harm. She noted the corrosive effects of some algorithmic decision-making and disinformation on democracy, appealing for AI that is developed ‘in the service of the public interest’.

A number of initiatives developed during the Biden administration have attempted to steer emerging technology as it takes root in society. This includes the establishment of the US AI Safety Institute, various schemes on global AI governance and investment in Public AI projects like the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR).

The US public is largely supportive: polling by the AI Policy Institute (AIPI) points to a majority preference for safety standards governing the US effort to lead in AI, rather than pedal-to-the-metal development. Investment in public options on AI and the infrastructure required to develop and sustain it is a bold direction that the incoming administration should consider expanding.

Biden’s Executive Order on AI has come under fire by the Trump campaign. At a rally in Iowa, Trump explained that he would cancel the order ‘on day one’, echoing a Republican platform that described it as imposing ‘Radical Leftwing ideas’ . 

Trump does, however, have his own track record in technology policy. During his first presidency, his administration passed an Executive Order on AI, stressing that ‘continued American leadership in Artificial Intelligence is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national security of the United States’. The tools and institutions announced as part of the order – including AI research investment, national AI research institutes and AI regulatory guidance including on federal use of AI – echo those of the current administration. 

Four years is a long time in AI, however. As the power of this technology is revealed, talk of safety may give way to talk of security. While the candidates may disagree on the role of the federal government in setting standards, there will be close alignment on the central need for US supremacy in national security. Neither administration seems likely to erect barriers to securitization of AI should it emerge as a critical strategic asset.

AI regulation at home 

American industry will remain the pivotal force shaping the US AI ecosystem, particularly as America jostles for position as the maker of the global rules governing AI. A notable aspect of Biden’s AI Executive Order was where it staked responsibility. Reports by AI and Cloud companies on the safety of their tools and infrastructure are sent to the Department of Commerce.

Under Secretary Gina Raimondo, whose star continues to rise, the department has become significantly more engaged with technology companies. In the absence of any other legal authority, AI governance has therefore sat under the purview of a secretary who herself has noted that they are ‘not a regulator’. 

The trend of industry leaders driving the government agenda on AI is replicated in other departments. There was an outcry over the composition of the new Department of Homeland Security advisory panel, the Artificial Intelligence and Security Board, with civil society groups concerned about the preponderance of industry voices: the 22-member panel includes the CEOs of OpenAI, Anthropic, NVIDIA, IBM, AWS, Adobe, Microsoft and Alphabet.

Under a Harris presidency, these trends seem likely to continue. Plus with deadlock in Congress probable, establishing new legal authorities for emerging technology will be difficult. That will likely mean emerging tech governance remains heavily influenced by the Department for Commerce. 

Like Harris, Trump has his allies in industry. While the Biden administration has courted the CEOs of AI companies who have historically spoken out in favour of regulation, Trump’s allies tend towards a more deregulatory agenda. 

Silicon Valley billionaires Elon Musk and Marc Andreessen have backed Trump’s plans to minimize AI regulation, lauding his support for ‘little tech’. They have also backed reported plans for so-called ‘Manhattan Projects’ to develop military technology, stewarded by ‘industry-led’ agencies. Trump’s aversion to strong regulatory institutions may mean an end to Biden’s anti-trust efforts, benefitting the biggest voices in the room, though his VP pick may disagree. JD Vance has somewhat surprisingly come out strongly in defence of the current chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, and her anti-trust efforts targeting US big tech.

Regardless, business interests will likely shape either a Harris or Trump administration’s approach as the US grapples with balancing the ambitions of its industry with an increasingly protectionist stance towards its biggest import market, China.

Competition abroad

China looms large in the imaginations of both campaigns. 

The US has signalled to its allies that American AI standards should replace Chinese standards. Export controls on semiconductors were expanded in September this year, with key voices in the industry – notably the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea – describing the restrictions as ‘economically motivated’ despite nominally being tied to national security by the US. 

The UK needs to address growth and debt problems if it is to match resources to ambitions on international priorities Expert comment LJefferson 5 November 2024

The budget marks the lowest amount in decades the country has spent on development, and it is struggling to fund other international priorities too.

The UK’s Chancellor Rachel Reeves unveiled her much-anticipated budget last week, the first of the new Labour government. Labour is in a difficult place. There are numerous calls on the public purse and public services are not performing well. Meanwhile, public debt remains close to 100 per cent of GDP, and there has been a long run of sluggish growth.
 
Reeves argues with some justification that the previous government left her a challenging inheritance – gaps in this year’s spending plans, and persistent debt questions left unresolved. More importantly, there are longer-term concerns about the sustainability of UK public spending – the country’s Office for Budget Responsibility has warned public debt could triple by the 2070s due to an ageing population, the climate crisis, and security risks. The focus has understandably been on kitchen table questions about tax rises and funding public services.
 
But this picture also has longstanding implications for international policy – on whether the UK can afford to invest in its foreign policy. The Chancellor did announce an increase of £2.9bn for defence. But the question of whether the UK can get on a sustainable path to spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence is still being worked through in the ongoing Strategic Review, and remains challenging despite increasingly urgent warnings from parliamentary committees about the UK’s defence readiness.

The budget also marks one of the lowest amounts in recent years the UK will spend on development overseas, despite setting an ambition to reset relations with the Global South and recover the UK’s role as a leader in international development.
  
The UK needs to either match resources to ambition, spend much more efficiently, or, in the case of the aid budget, it could seek to focus on priorities that are less dependent on spending. But even this will still require consistent resources, alongside significant diplomatic attention, intellectual leadership, and focus.

Longer-term, the UK may need to consider larger questions: addressing broader problems with its lack of growth and productivity will be critical to fund an expansive international role.

With this budget, UK aid spent overseas is at a historic low

In 2020 the UK government cut its goal for spending on international development to 0.5 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), ending a longstanding policy of spending 0.7 per cent. Labour have echoed this, promising to only return to previous levels when fiscal circumstances allow.
 
But this masks a bigger issue. Since 2022, significant amounts of the UK’s aid budget have been spent on accommodation for asylum seekers in the UK. This is within the rules governing aid, but reduces the amount spent on reducing poverty overseas. In 2023 this spending was 28 per cent of the £15.4bn aid budget. In 2016, it was 3.2 per cent. 

Previous Chancellor Jeremy Hunt quietly allowed a top-up of aid spending over the last two fiscal years to offset how much is being spent at home on asylum seeker accommodation. That provided an additional £2.5 billion for 2022–23 and 2023–24.

But Rachel Reeves declined to provide extra funding this time, meaning the amount being spent overseas is likely the lowest its been since 2007 – an effective cut – under a Labour government.

The Minister for Development, Anneliese Dodds, speaking at Chatham House last month, said the government is working on clearing the backlog of asylum claims, which should free up more to spend overseas.

But beyond this there has been little clarity on plans to address the issue. And costs for asylum seeker accommodation have increased significantly – the UK appears to spend much more than comparator countries per head, according to the Center for Global Development, raising questions about how this spending is managed.

Development is not just about money – but money is important

The UK debate about development has often focused on the 0.7 per cent figure, which can distract from larger questions about what development policy is intended to achieve. As many experts have argued, development aid is about more than spending, and the wider, complex process by which the UK contributes to broad-based growth and stability for poorer countries is not about hitting a specific number.
 
There are things the UK can do that aren’t about spending more directly. This might include focusing on priorities like reforming multilateral development banks so they provide more low-cost public finance, and more flexible and agile loans to poorer countries – a priority echoed by Dodds. It might also incorporate focusing more broadly on helping developing countries attract more investment to bolster growth. 

There is also the issue of developing country debt, much of which is held by the private sector. Dodds previously said, when she was shadow chancellor, she might consider changing the law to address this issue. However,  she declined to recommit to this when questioned at Chatham House. 

None of this can be done unilaterally – on debt, for example, the UK has spearheaded some creative policies. Its UK Export Finance body developed climate-resilient debt clauses – agreements that countries can pause debt repayments in the event of a climate shock – but the UK holds limited amounts of developing country debt. Impact will only come by galvanizing and coordinating others to adopt similar approaches.

Following its snap election, Japanese politics has entered uncharted waters Expert comment LToremark 5 November 2024

Prime Minister Ishiba’s election gamble has failed. Japan now faces another period of political uncertainty, which could affect its international standing.

In Japan’s snap election on 27 October, the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito lost the overwhelming majority it had held since the 2012 general election. The ruling coalition now has 215 seats, leaving it 18 seats short of a majority. 

The largest opposition party is the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), which gained 50 seats to 148. The second largest opposition party is the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), which lost six seats to 38, and the third largest opposition party is the National Democratic Party (NDP), which gained 21 seats to 28.

But the opposition is divided and there is no real appetite to form a coalition government. This will likely result in a hung parliament, which will further destabilize Japan’s government.

The election results reveal three key things  about the state of Japanese politics and what comes next.

First, that Prime Minister Ishiba’s snap election gamble has failed. The aim was for Ishiba, a non-mainstream member of the LDP, to strengthen the party base and stabilize his administration. But with the ruling coalition losing its majority, the party base has been further weakened and the Ishiba administration is now more likely to be short-lived. LDP voters as well as the public in general  had hoped that Ishiba, as the ‘opposition within the party’, would change the LDP’s structure and government policies, eliminate the uncertainty surrounding party funding and increase transparency on how MPs use public funds to finance political activities.

However, when Ishiba became LDP leader and prime minister, he abandoned his previously more critical stance and prioritized carrying on the policies of the mainstream LDP, leaving his supporters feeling betrayed.

Second, while the ruling coalition has been punished, the people of Japan still did not vote for a change of government. The opposition is divided and, despite its gains in this election, the CDP is not fully committed to take the lead and consolidate the opposition to form a coalition. The CDP also suffers from internal division. The left wing of the party would prefer a coalition with the Communist Party, while the right wing of the party does not want to form a coalition with the LDP or the Communist Party, preferring a partner such as the NDP.

Third, the NDP has become the key to future Japanese politics. By becoming the minority ruling party, the NDP is in a position to control the fate of Ishiba administration. While the CDP has no intention of cooperating with the LDP, the NDP is more willing to do so in order to implement its own policies. As the budget cannot be passed without the NDP’s cooperation, the ruling coalition will have no choice but to accept the NDP’s policy of substantial tax cuts through the expansion of tax credits. It will also likely have to accept an option for married couples to decide their family names, which requires a change of civil codes and is something it has been reluctant to do so far. 

If the NDP’s demands are rejected, a no-confidence motion will likely be submitted and passed, leaving the Ishiba cabinet with no choice but to resign or dissolve the House of Representatives (the lower house of Japan’s parliament).

But the NDP has chosen to not form a coalition with the ruling party and enter government. Why? From the NDP’s point of view, forming a coalition with the LDP, would mean getting involved in the LDP’s internal turmoil – something it wishes to avoid. In addition, elections to the House of Councillors (upper house of parliament) will be held in the summer of 2025. The NDP may have judged that it will have a better chance of implementing its policies by cooperating with the government on a case-by-case basis, rather than forming a coalition with a party that is losing public support and risk following suit.

The minority ruling system that has emerged after the election is extremely rare in Japan’s political history and is likely to make its politics even more unstable in the years ahead. The Ishiba administration will probably be able to survive until the budget is passed in March next year by cooperating with the NDP, but beyond that its prospects are unclear.

As the House of Councillors elections get closer, some in the LDP may say that they cannot fight the election with Ishiba as prime minister. If so, they may choose the option of a same-day election for the lower and the upper house. The cost of an election campaign is significant, and the LDP’s financial strength gives it an advantage in the case of a same-day election. There is also a strong possibility that the public will choose the LDP to regain stability in government. However, this election has shown that public distrust of the LDP is high, and if Ishiba continues to be pushed around by the NDP, his party’s chances of winning would be reduced.

Japanese politics has entered uncharted waters, where the patterns and customs of the past do not apply. There are now doubts both at home and abroad as to whether Ishiba, who has a weak party base, will be able to stay on and steer the government. Over the past decade, the Abe and Kishida administrations have provided Japan with political stability, which has in turn enhanced its international presence. An unstable political system, with frequent changes of government, will likely lead to a decline in Japan’s international influence.

There is also a risk that US–Japan relations  could become unstable. Although the NDP does not have a strong agenda to change the course of this relationship, Ishiba may struggle to keep the promise made by his predecessors to increase defence spending. Ishiba’s nationalist posture could also create a confrontational relationship with the United States, while his weak leadership means he may not seek to invest in strengthening the US–Japan alliance. 

Donald Trump’s win in the US presidential election could pose a further risk. Although Trump might be open to Ishiba’s demand for parity with the US, he could become irritated with Ishiba’s weak domestic position. Ishiba may not be able to make decisions – or a deal with Trump – unless the NDP agrees to it.

Is there an end to the Central Bank of Libya crisis? 14 November 2024 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2024 Online

Experts discuss implications for Libya’s economic governance.

In August this year, the Libyan Presidency Council moved to replace Libya’s longtime central bank governor, Sadiq al-Kabir. Kabir had been in position since September 2011, and in the period following the administrative division of Libya, he rose to prominence as one of the most influential figures on the Libyan political scene.

In the absence of a functioning relationship between executive and legislature, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) took on many of the competencies of the ministry of finance and became an arbiter of which payments were made and when. In October, following UN-led and parallel back-channel negotiations, a new governor was selected and the CBL board of directors reconstituted.

In this webinar, experts will examine:

• What challenges will the new CBL leadership face?
• Can we expect significant changes for Libya’s economic governance?
• What are the implications for the balance of power between Libya’s rival power centres?

This webinar is organized in partnership with the North Africa Initiative (NAI) at the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) of the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

Addressing illegal gold mining: International policy priorities 18 November 2024 — 11:30AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2024 Chatham House and Online

Held in partnership with the World Gold Council, this panel of experts examines the global Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) landscape and propose policy priorities essential for fostering sector formalization.

In this panel discussion, held in partnership with the World Gold Council, experts will examine the global Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) landscape and propose policy priorities essential for fostering sector formalization.

An estimated twenty million people worldwide are involved in the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) sector, which now accounts for around 20 percent of global gold output. However, 85 percent of this production occurs outside formal legal frameworks. While many in ASGM operate within informal economies or seek pathways to formalization, a significant portion is also vulnerable to criminal exploitation, involving organized crime and armed groups.

In Ethiopia, the sector’s informality is tied to the nation’s volatile security dynamics, with illicit gold mining proliferating as non-state actors compete for control in conflict-prone regions such as Tigray. Additionally, gold is increasingly trafficked through transnational illicit networks in the Sahel and Sudan fuelling instability. South America is also impacted, for example in Peru where the government’s response to illegal ASGM initially saw success in 2019 but has faced sustainability challenges, and environmental impact.

ASGM growth is driven by the rising value of gold, youth unemployment, weak law enforcement, climate impacts, and conflict. While formalization offers significant economic potential, robust international cooperation and industry commitment is required to address the human toll, environmental impact and support sustainable practices.

In this panel discussion, experts will focus on addressing the expansion of illicit control and exploitation within ASGM, highlighting the pathways for governments and large-scale mining companies to drive meaningful change.

This event is hosted in partnership with the World Gold Council. There will be a reception with light refreshments hosted at Chatham House following the event.

This event will be livestreamed via the Africa Programme Facebook page.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

America chooses a new role in the world Expert comment jon.wallace 6 November 2024

Donald Trump’s election victory will bring immediate costs for US allies, says Bronwen Maddox, and will remake the map of American partnership.

As a second Trump presidency became a certainty, countries around the world were racing to forge relationships with him and calculate the likely impacts – which could come within weeks of his inauguration. 

One Japanese official spoke for the mood in many capitals in saying ‘we have learned to respond to new American presidents as we would to a Christmas present – you open it, and whatever is inside, you say “That is exactly what I wanted!”’

In the case of Trump, that sentiment is most straightforward in Moscow, where President Vladimir Putin’s supporters were exultant. In Europe, especially the UK, and among the US’s Indo-Pacific allies, the calculation is more complicated. They are trying to work out their response based on remarks Trump has made, knowing that unpredictability and inconsistency were the hallmarks of his first presidency and may be of his second. 

Tariffs

The most immediate global impact is likely to come through the tariffs which Trump has vowed to impose on goods from China – and other countries too. Tariffs will not decouple the US and Chinese economies but could sharply check trade in electric vehicles and other imports. 

They could also undermine global economic growth: economists have warned – with no apparent effect on the Trump campaign – of the inflationary effect tariffs will have and the consequent upwards pressure on interest rates and the dollar.

A similar effect would apply to European countries. This will depend on the tariffs chosen and whether a Trump administration seeks actively to discourage Europe’s still relatively open economy from trade with China. 

Given that many European governments are struggling to get economic growth at all, this would be a significant new blow. 

Ukraine

In his victory speech Trump repeated a point of which he is immensely proud: that in his terms, there were ‘no new wars’ during his first administration.

He also said that while he wanted strong US armed forces, he preferred not to use them. He has publicly made much of his desire to end conflicts in Ukraine and in the Middle East and has boasted of his ability to strike ‘deals’ to that end. 

The key question is if and how Trump will push for a cessation of fighting in Ukraine. If he seeks to freeze the conflict along the current frontline, there will be little to protect Ukraine – or Europe – from further Russian aggression in the future unless the US pledges to block that. The US could offer Kyiv explicit security guarantees, although NATO membership remains a distant prospect.

A direct security pledge from Washington is more realistic, but it remains to be seen whether that would be sufficient to convince Ukraine to stop fighting. Ukrainian leadership and people regard the war as existential and any surrender of territory to Russian control, even if it were not formalized, may yet prove an impossible barrier in negotiations.

Nor is it obvious how Trump could secure an agreement with Putin worth the name. He has prided himself on his relationship with the Russian leader, and Russian disinformation campaigns appeared to weigh in on his side. But Russia has broken agreements before. 

It would be a more plausible deal if backed by China – but that would require Trump to deal with a regime he appears to regard as the US’s primary threat. 

Middle East

Trump could make the conflict in the region much worse – or just possibly, open a route to stability. He has consistently sided with Israel, but his relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been mixed. 

There is no doubt that Netanyahu hoped for a Trump victory. Were Trump to clearly side with the prime minister and those in his cabinet who have no intention of granting a state to the Palestinians, it would represent an inflammatory step. 

Elements of Israeli society would see this as the opportunity to annex the West Bank and seek control or partial reoccupation of Gaza, hoping to give Palestinians every incentive to leave those areas for neighbouring countries. Netanyahu may also be encouraged to strike further at Iran.

On the other hand, Trump appears to mean what he says about shutting down conflicts, even if only out of concern for US interests. Netanyahu may come under pressure to stop bombing southern Lebanon and to reach some deal in Gaza with Hamas, including the release of the hostages. 

A more hopeful route lies in Trump’s pride in the Abraham Accords, a signature achievement of his first term that normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco. 

The great prize still dangling in front of Israel is the possibility of normalization with Saudi Arabia. That would allow Trump to claim he had brought peace to the Middle East. But that will remain impossible for Riyadh without Israeli commitment to a Palestinian state. 

The UK

There are no grounds to believe this will be an easy relationship for the UK to manage.

Sir Keir Starmer was quick to congratulate Trump, pointedly including the phrase ‘special relationship’ and referring to cooperation on technology and security. But his new UK government, which has prioritized growth, will be acutely aware of the tariff threat. 

Foreign Secretary David Lammy has put in the air miles getting to know the Republicans around Trump, but his comments denouncing the president elect before Labour’s own election victory may well sour the mood. So too will reports of Labour supporters organizing to support Democrat campaigning.  

Chancellor Rachel Reeves is expected to visit China early in the new year. She will have to decide by then the UK’s position on whether to import cheap Chinese solar panels and electric vehicles. Trump’s victory will not make this decision easier.

Climate

Trump and Harris offered starkly different environmental visions. Trump’s commitment to pursue cheap US oil and gas is fashioned with voters at home in mind, and will remove the US further from global climate talks. 

The election shows that Trumpism is here to stay Expert comment rgold.drupal 7 November 2024

World leaders must engage with the new president’s view of America’s priorities and accept that the US has changed.

In a landslide victory, former President Donald Trump has been elected to be the 47th president of the United States. This election was laden with the expectation that a dead heat would lead to delay, legal challenge, extremism, and possible violence. It has instead passed quickly, decisively, and peacefully.  More than 67 million Americans who voted for Kamala Harris have demonstrated restraint and accepted the result. By this measure, democracy in the United States has prevailed. 

Across Asia and Latin America, leaders have been preparing for a second Trump term. They are pragmatic and resolute in their belief that they can work with the once and 

also future US president. In Europe, leaders have been less certain. They have oscillated between two approaches. The first, of ‘Trump-proofing’ – an instinct if not a strategy  that builds on the quest for strategic autonomy, championed by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. The second, a calculation by some, not least the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, that they can present themselves as top-tier partners to the US in a new approach to transatlantic security. 

Trumpism is not an aberration

For eight years, world leaders and foreign policy experts have been debating whether President Trump was the cause of a radical change in the US, or merely a symptom of powerful trends in the American body politic: rising inequality, a loss of manufacturing jobs – a demographic defined by white male non-college-educated voters who feel left behind – a deeply engrained anti-elitism, and a society in desperate need of a new kind of political leadership. 

In Trump’s first term, many leaders acted on the basis that he was an aberration, not a symptom. That meant that foreign leaders assumed his policies might disappear with his future electoral defeat, and short-term strategies designed to ‘work around’ Trump were a good bet. 

The next US president would return to a familiar agenda (free trade, market access, strong alliances, a commitment to climate action, extended nuclear deterrence and deepening transatlantic ties) and so America’s friends could wait this out. Indeed, civil servants frequently pointed to the strength of bilateral working relations, despite an often disruptive high-level political style. 

President Joe Biden’s commitment to multilateralism, the transatlantic partnership and Ukraine seemed to confirm the view that Trump’s policies were an anomaly and that America had reverted to normal. Gradually, though, Biden’s policies began to chip away at this assumption. He continued Trump’s tariffs, executed a reckless and unilateral exit from Afghanistan with little consultation, and pushed through a transformative but also protectionist climate investment bill in the Inflation Reduction Act. 

Fast forward to this election result. A stunning – many would say shocking – victory must put to rest any assumption that Trump is an aberration. It may have started that way, but today it appears there is no going back. The world is now confronted with a president that has had time to sharpen and hone his instincts, to prioritise loyalty in appointing a close circle of advisers, and to lay the foundation for his Vice President JD Vance to carry forward his vision once his second term ends. 

First moves

What will Trump do first? Several things are in store: A sharp immigration policy including deportations is likely to be top of Team Trump’s agenda in its first 100 days. This may prove to be inflationary – deporting millions of undocumented migrants would shrink the labour supply – but that is unlikely to restrain Trump in the short-term. A 2.0 version of his so-called ‘Muslim ban’ could also feature. And immigrants will continue to take a hit rhetorically, labelled as outsiders and as criminals. 

The punishment for noncompliance could also be harsh. If Mexico does not demonstrate its willingness to cooperate, retaliation might take the form of tariffs, or a tough review or even renegotiation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2026. 

The return to tariffs as the front line of trade policy  is virtually certain. Trump has telegraphed this for months. China can expect far harsher tariffs. What is more difficult to discern is whether these will be a bargaining tool with conditions attached, or a ratcheting up towards a new level of protectionism. 

For Asia, there is grave uncertainty. No one can be sure what Trump’s strategy will be towards Taiwan. Investment in the latticework of mutually-reinforcing partnerships across the region may take a back seat. But how Trump will manage North Korea’s nuclear threat is unclear. So too is the question of whether under his watch, US nuclear deterrence will continue to provide enough assurance to prevent South Korea and Japan from developing their own nuclear weapons. 

Still, it is Europe that is likely to face the sharpest edge of Trump’s second term. Tariffs in search of reciprocal market access and reducing America’s trade deficit with Europe are more likely than not. But it will be the existential and enduring shift in America’s commitment to Europe and its security that will hit hardest. 

Independent Thinking: What does Donald Trump’s re-election mean for the world? Audio john.pollock 8 November 2024

Edward Luce, Leslie Vinjamuri and Gerald Seib join the podcast this week to discuss Donald Trump’s victory over Kamala Harris in the US presidential election.

On this episode

Donald Trump has decisively defeated Kamala Harris in the US presidential election. What does his return to the White House mean for America and the world? 

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Edward Luce, the FT’s North America editor, Gerald Seib, the former Washington bureau chief of The Wall Street Journal and Leslie Vinjamuri, the head of our US and Americas programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Members' question time: What has COP29 achieved? 25 November 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 November 2024 Online

Join us and ask our senior research fellow, Ruth Townend anything about the outcome from COP29. Submit your questions in advance.

As COP29 prepares to conclude in Baku, Azerbaijan, this year’s conference has taken place against a backdrop of ever worsening climate impacts and escalating financial needs for developing countries. Being hosted by Azerbaijan has been significant, a country whose economy is heavily reliant on fossil fuels. As delegates and officials prepare to leave, the urgency for global climate action intensifies.

Join us as Ruth Townend, our Senior Research Fellow for the Environment and Society Centre to provide the latest insight and analysis from COP. She will give an overview of the key developments from Baku, new global commitments that have been agreed and how this sets up COP 30 in Brazil in 2025.

Submit your questions to Ruth Townend in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.

Trump and his growing number of European allies threaten the European project Expert comment LToremark 8 November 2024

With Trump in the White House, a key challenge for Europe will be the growing transatlantic illiberal ties which risk undermining European unity.

As the US presidential election result became clear, European leaders followed a similar formula when congratulating President-elect Trump. They offered their congratulations, mentioned previous good working relations with the US (special points for a nod to long-standing relations), and – most importantly – emphasized the need for this to continue for the benefit of the citizens of both their country and the US.

The formula was a telling sign of the political bartering most European heads of state expect with Trump back in the White House. The exception, of course, were Trump’s European allies who were simply ecstatic.

Transatlantic illiberalism

Trump’s growing number of European allies and the increase of illiberalism and populism is perhaps the most worrying development for Europe. In 2016, some of Trump’s counterparts in Europe were Angela Merkel in Germany, Emmanuel Macron in France, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, and Giuseppe Conte in Italy. Regardless of their record, they were moderates.

The picture looks very different today. Anti-war extremist parties Alternative for Germany and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance are on the rise in Germany. In France, pro-Russia Marine le Pen has been able to reduce support for Ukraine from €3 billion to €2 billion in the draft French budget. In the Netherlands, the far-right Freedom Party is the biggest coalition partner. In Italy, Prime Minister Georgia Meloni hails from a neo-fascist party. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s populist and illiberal playbook is being replicated across Europe. 

Meanwhile in Poland, moderate prime minister, Donald Tusk, is experiencing the difficulties of reversing damage done by the previous populist government.

What European populist leaders have in common is a deep-seated scepticism of the EU and a desire to erode it from within. And many of these leaders also welcome the return of Trump.

It is no coincidence that Orbán scheduled the European Political Community Summit, hosted by Hungary, to take place just days after the US election. The Trump win was an added bonus. This meant European heads of state travelled to Budapest for the summit still reeling from – or rejoicing at – the election result. 

Orbán would like to position himself as Trump’s man in Europe. He has spent the past four years building ties with the president-elect and the MAGA wing of the Republican party. Trump even namechecked Orbán – a Eurosceptic Putin-supporter – during the presidential debate.

Italy’s Meloni, meanwhile, has so far worked with EU institutions and NATO rather than against them: she has supported EU and NATO resolutions for Ukraine and demonstrated opposition to Russia. But this may have been a strategic calculation. She likely looked at her country’s balance sheet and realized she needed the European Commission’s COVID-19 recovery funds. 

But with the fund coming to an end and given her history of Euroscepticism and pro-Russian views, the transatlantic illiberal ties mean she may now feel emboldened to revise her positions. She is already deploying the illiberal playbook domestically.

Policy implications for Europe of a second Trump term 

Despite some ideological similarities, Trump’s policies will not be good for his European allies. He has threatened to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports. For Italy and the Netherlands, the second and fifth largest EU exporters to the US, this would have direct negative impacts on their economies.

Increased tariffs on Chinese goods – Trump has threatened up to 60 per cent – would also have an impact on Europe’s economies. Rerouting of Chinese goods could see China dump overproduction in Europe, one of the few remaining relatively open markets, and make European products compete with cheaper Chinese goods in Europe and on the global market. 

Neither of these developments are positive for export-led European countries. In France, the EU’s fourth largest exporter to the US, Marine le Pen – previously a strong supporter of Trump – had a notably muted response to his victory due to concerns over a trade war.

Even European leaders who might have hoped for a different election outcome may seek to hedge their bets. There are two things that are clear about Trump: he is unpredictable and transactional. 

It is quite possible that some European states, in particular frontline states with genuine fears over Russia’s imperialist ambitions, will seek to buy Trump’s support through bilateral arms deals – despite their distaste for Trump’s position vis-à-vis Russia. These countries already have some of the highest defence spending in NATO, with Poland, Estonia and Latvia leading the way, so this will not irk Trump – arms deals would simply be an additional insurance premium.

Countries rushing to make bilateral deals with the US risks a similar uncoordinated race for American arms deals as during Trump’s first term. This would in turn undermine much-needed European defence industrial cooperation efforts. As the need to reduce dependencies on third countries – even for defence equipment from historically close allies – has become increasingly clear, this would be a problematic development.

The silver lining may be that it could galvanize the UK and the EU just enough to take action on UK-EU security and defence cooperation, of which the defence industrial piece is the most essential.

Europe disunited

The transatlantic link between populist, illiberal leaders should be a concern. Trump is no longer isolated in Europe, he is rapidly accumulating allies among European heads of state. These leaders agree on the perceived existential threat posed by migration, the need for so-called ‘traditional family values’ and ‘anti-wokeism’. But beyond that, they share and want to advance an illiberal view of the world, with ramifications from security and global trade to human rights – and directly threatening the European project.

In conversation with Julien Harneis, UN Assistant Secretary-General 18 November 2024 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 November 2024 Chatham House and Online

In this discussion, Julien Harneis will give critical insights into the UN’s humanitarian response in Yemen and the importance of maintaining independent humanitarian assistance.

According to the United Nations, Yemen has faced the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in the last decade, with over 20 million people in need of assistance. Years of ongoing conflict have devastated infrastructure, displaced millions, and caused widespread food insecurity and health emergencies. Access to essential services remains a daily struggle, and the escalating economic collapse has left vulnerable communities facing critical shortages in food, water, and medical supplies.

However, humanitarian actors are continually facing challenges in delivering aid to Yemen due to security threats and supply chain barriers, highlighting the urgent need for coordinated and sustainable international assistance.

UN Assistant Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, Julien Harneis, will provide an account of the humanitarian mission and evolving strategies in Yemen, the impact of regional conflicts in the delivery of aid and discuss other key questions including:

Members’ Christmas drinks 11 December 2024 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 November 2024 Chatham House

Join us at 10 St James’s Square for a chance to raise a glass with fellow Chatham House members and staff.

This evening is a special opportunity to meet fellow Chatham House members and staff around the Christmas tree.

Please note this reception is open to members of Chatham House only. Regrettably, we are unable to register non-member guests.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Can Trump do a deal with Putin on Ukraine? Expert comment jon.wallace 12 November 2024

The Kremlin is signalling that it is ready to talk to the incoming US administration. But Trump may find Russia’s terms make him look unacceptably weak.

The nervousness of Ukrainian leadership is understandable. Since Donald Trump’s re-election, Russian President Vladimir Putin has lost no time in preparing the ground for a direct discussion between the US and Russia about the terms for peace in Ukraine – although reports at the weekend that Trump has recently spoken to Putin by phone were swiftly denied by the Kremlin.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made determined efforts in recent months to persuade Trump that Ukraine’s future is worth fighting for. But there is no sign that his messages have brought about a change of heart. 

Trump appears to have no sympathy for Ukraine and no interest in the country – beyond preventing further US commitments to its defence. (Since February 2022, the US has provided $175 billion of economic and military aid to Kyiv, around 7 per cent of total allocated defence spending during that time).

Trump clearly regards Ukraine as an opportunity to demonstrate his power to US voters. If he can bring Putin to the table and end a war that in his view serves no purpose for the American people, it will also boost his claim that he can prevent World War 3.

Seen from Kyiv, the power relationship works in reverse. Putin is drawing Trump – said to be susceptible to flattery – into a negotiation to resolve an issue of great personal importance to him. The Russian president knows the issues in intimate detail, whereas Zelenskyy has genuine reason to fear that Trump might agree to terms whose consequences he does not fully understand.

Putin’s objectives

Putin has not deviated from his goals stated at the start of the full-scale invasion. These are the demilitarization of Ukraine and the replacement of Zelenskyy and his government by a leadership that accepts Moscow’s diktat (‘denazification’).

Putin’s highest priority for talks will be to ensure Ukraine’s neutrality. This will require a firm commitment that Ukraine will not join NATO in the foreseeable future. He will also seek to restrict the size of Ukrainian armed forces and prevent the stationing of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory. 

Putin will also hope to consolidate Russia’s grip on the Crimean peninsula by winning recognition of his annexation of Ukrainian territory. He will likely demand control of those parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions not yet occupied by Russian forces, perhaps trading occupied territories in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia for Ukrainian-held territory in Russia’s Kursk Region.

Lastly, Putin will want sanctions relief. The Russian economy has managed to adapt to US sanctions and reduce their effect, but they are a significant burden on the country’s development. 

The loss of access to Western technology and equipment has halted several major industrial products. If sanctions remain in place, such effects will become more pronounced.

Trump might readily agree to these terms. But to do so without evidence of reciprocal flexibility by Putin will expose him to accusations of naivety and weakness as a negotiator. 

Trump could easily brush aside claims that he was outsmarted by Putin. But a charge that he was a weak negotiator would offend his vanity and damage his image in the view of Chinese policymakers – who will be watching closely. 

It is fair to assume that Trump will want to avoid this perception since he has worked hard to create the impression that China, Iran and others should continue to fear him in his second term.

Putin may therefore need to offer the US a sufficiently large incentive – an outcome that will allow both Washington and Moscow to claim an advantageous agreement. It is not clear what Putin could propose that would be affordable to him and satisfy Trump’s America First agenda. 

Ukrainian hopes

Shortly before the election, Trump spoke of the need to ‘un-unite’ Russia and China. The idea that Putin could help Washington by turning away from China is fantastical.

The relationship between Beijing and Moscow is far more complex than it appears on the surface. But the two share the common strategic goal of reducing the global influence of the US and its allies and have established much deeper relations since Trump left office in 2020.

It is also hard to see a new arms control proposal coming from Moscow that would interest Trump. The hope in Kyiv is that Trump will quickly recognize that the deal he would like to strike will not materialize because the underlying and connected issues – such as Russia–China relations – are more complex than he imagines. 

The one consolation for Ukrainians is that the Kremlin was disappointed by Trump during his first term, since despite his friendly signals no major results were achieved. The Trump administration supplied anti-tank weapons to Ukraine and fiercely opposed the building of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline connecting Russia and Germany.

Who Trump listens to

While Trump’s approach to negotiating with Moscow is likely to be highly personal and idiosyncratic, the preparation of talks will depend heavily on those he appoints to key positions. At this stage, it is unclear who in the new administration will be responsible for coordinating Russia policy and to what extent they might challenge Trump’s thinking.

The break-up of Scholz’s coalition government signals the end of Germany’s old economic model Expert comment jon.wallace 12 November 2024

The coalition could not agree how to fund new support for Ukraine and failed to fully implement the ‘Zeitenwende’. A new government must push through reform.

As Europeans were still processing Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US presidential election, an acrimonious break up occurred 4000 miles east of Washington DC.

Reports had been circulating for weeks about the fragile state of Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition government led by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, consisting of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party, and liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP).

The expectation had been that the coalition would hold on for a few more weeks and might even be given a new lease of life by Trump’s re-election. Instead, it collapsed on the day Trump’s win was confirmed. An unusually angry Scholtz announced in a live address that he had fired FDP Finance Minister Christian Lindner, effectively breaking up the coalition.

At the heart of the dispute was the so-called ‘debt brake’ – a constitutional mechanism which restricts Germany’s annual public deficit to 0.35 per cent of GDP. Lindner proposed a set of reforms which were unpalatable to the SPD and the Greens. 

In response, Scholz suggested declaring an emergency, which would have suspended the debt brake. That in turn was unacceptable to Lindner, leading to his sacking by the Chancellor.

Practically, this means the SPD and the Greens are now in a minority coalition, without agreement on the 2025 budget or the votes in parliament to pass it. They also still face the challenge of the debt brake.

A vote of confidence will take place in December, with elections to be held before the end of February 2025 latest.

The end of Germany’s economic model

At the root of Germany’s political crisis is the country’s economic model. For decades, Germany relied on a system that depended on cheap Russian gas, cheap imports of consumer goods from China, high-value exports – particularly in the automotive sector – and the US security umbrella.

With Russian energy no longer viable, the global economic landscape shifting, and Donald Trump on his way back to the White House, that model is no longer workable. And Germany’s economy is expected to contract by 0.2 per cent in 2024 – a contraction for the second year running.

The ‘Zeitenwende’, announced by Scholz in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, should have signalled a turnaround of both foreign and economic policy, given how much the two are interconnected. Yet on both fronts, too little changed.

Germany’s reliance on Russian gas did come to an abrupt end in 2022. And Germany is Ukraine’s second largest military aid donor after the US, while accepting the most Ukrainian refugees.

But the ‘Zeitenwende’ turnaround ended there. Scholz’s coalition government failed to prepare for long-term investment in defence at the levels required by creating an off-budget defence spending fund which would have run out in 2027. The draft budget for 2025 showed defence spending would have been cut, as would support for Ukraine.

Germany has also struggled to turn around its economic woes, with the car industry particularly affected. Cheap Chinese EVs and new energy technologies are competing with Germany’s most powerful companies. Volkswagen, the country’s largest car manufacturer, has announced plant closures and layoffs due to shrinking profit margins.  

To the west, Trump’s threat to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports meant share prices of Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedez-Benz and Porsche all dropped between 4 to 7 per cent following news of his re-election.

To the east, trade tensions between the EU and China are intensifying. Yet rather than choosing to diversify, German companies have doubled down on their bets in China, with German investment in the country rising from €6.5bn for the whole of 2023 to €7.3bn in the first half of 2024 alone – only exposing carmakers further.

Germany’s support for Ukraine

Like French President Emmanuel Macron, Scholz had already been weakened by the results of the European Parliamentary elections in June. With the collapse of his traffic light coalition, the EU’s Franco-German ‘engine’ is now well and truly stalled – until new leadership can be found. This weakness comes at a perilous moment when clear, united European leadership, and much increased funding, is needed to shore up support for Ukraine.