Mark Carney to chair Chatham House senior advisers News release NCapeling 17 May 2022

Former Bank of England Governor Mark Carney will succeed Sir John Major as chair of Chatham House’s Panel of Senior Advisers.

Chatham House is pleased to announce Mark Carney will succeed Sir John Major as chair of the institute’s Panel of Senior Advisers.

Chatham House senior advisers bring deep, first-hand experience of the policy and business worlds and use their experience, knowledge and networks to advise the institute’s research agenda and disseminate its policy ideas.

Mark Carney is currently United Nations (UN) Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance, UK prime minister Boris Johnson’s special finance adviser on COP26, as well as vice chairman and head of transition investing at Brookfield Asset Management.

He served as Governor of the Bank of England between 2013 and 2020 and as Governor of the Bank of Canada between 2008 and 2013.

Robin Niblett, director and chief executive of Chatham House says: ‘We are delighted to benefit from Mark Carney’s wealth of experience at the highest levels of decision-making on international financial policy, crisis management, and sustainability.

‘His personal commitment to leveraging economic and finance policies to combat climate change aligns with a central plank of the institute’s mission to help governments and societies build a sustainable future.

‘I also want to thank Sir John Major for his invaluable advice and support through such a pivotal time in the institute’s history; we are delighted that he will retain an affiliation as a President Emeritus of Chatham House.’

Sir Nigel Sheinwald, chair of Chatham House, says: ‘Mark Carney is perfectly placed to lead the institute’s Panel of Senior Advisers and help ensure our research is focused on improving international relations in practical ways.

‘His experience and expertise will be of great value as the institute undertakes a leadership transition and welcomes Bronwen Maddox as its new director in the autumn.

‘The Chatham House council greatly appreciates Mark Carney’s engagement in our future success, as we do Sir John’s commitment to the institute these past thirteen years.’

Mark Carney says: ‘I have long respected Chatham House as one of the world’s leading independent institutes on international policy and am honoured to take up the reins from Sir John Major of chairing its eminent Panel of Senior Advisers. Alongside other members of the panel, I look forward to contributing to the relevance and impact of Chatham House’s important work.’

In addition to having been Governor of the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada, Mark Carney also chaired the Financial Stability Board from 2011 to 2018 and, in 2015, established the Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures.

In 2021, he launched the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, to unite net-zero financial sector-specific alliances from across the world into one industry-wide strategic alliance.

Chatham House established the Panel of Senior Advisers in 2009, under Sir John’s Major’s chairmanship, to support the institute in achieving its mission to build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Individually and collectively, members of the panel support the institute in achieving its mission by advising on new topics for debate, offering input to the institute’s research, contributing to its private and public meetings, and disseminating the institute’s ideas across their networks.

The panel does not have governance responsibilities, which reside fully with the Chatham House council.

How the world has changed on my watch The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

As Robin Niblett steps down from his role as Director of Chatham House he reflects on the past 15 years of international affairs

International relations had resumed a steadier rhythm in January 2007 when I became Director of Chatham House. The aftershock of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the Bush administration’s contentious responses in Iraq and its ‘global war on terror’ had settled down somewhat.

That year President George W Bush’s second administration was mending fences with its European allies. China’s GDP growth hit a three-decade peak of 14 per cent, and the idea that this could drive a ‘win-win’ economic cycle did not yet grate. Financial regulators had not woken up to the credit crisis that they had enabled. And the European Union was still obsessed with ‘widening versus deepening’, while Britain tried to have its cake and eat it on the sidelines.

With hindsight, 2007 acted as the fulcrum between a cautiously optimistic post-Cold War world and the contested environment we live in today. Russian President Vladimir Putin chose that year’s Munich Security Conference to deliver a tirade against the injustices of a US-led world, with arguments that presaged this year’s invasion of Ukraine.

By the start of 2008, Alan Greenspan’s belief in the rationality of financial markets turned out to be a fallacy as US and European banks imploded. The subsequent economic turmoil, followed by monetary easing and fiscal austerity, sowed the seeds for the populist politics that emerged on both sides of the Atlantic.

Nevertheless, world leaders did not give up on the promise of international cooperation. The global financial crisis led to the elevation of the G20 as the premier forum for coordinating global economic policy between the world’s major economies.

By 2015, with Barack Obama in the White House, two landmark deals were reached: the Paris Agreement and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an example of truly global cooperation between all five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The next year, China’s first female chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, Fu Ying, pointed to a ‘decentralization of world power’ that might lead to a more inclusive world order.

But this sense of relative optimism about the future masked two fundamental changes. The first was the erosion of the cohesion of democratic societies under the pressures of globalization and the aftershocks of the financial crisis.

Instant access to unintermediated and often manipulated information ended up stimulating and polarizing societies in equal measure, deepening the divide between those searching for the certainties of the past and those open to the uncertainties of a more globalized future.

The second change is the end of the global hierarchy that followed the Second World War, in which the US and the West remained at the top, even with the advent of a more polycentric world. This change is driven by several factors, above all the growing economic and technological parity between China and the US, and by America’s schizophrenic response.

The Obama administration sought to restore a more inclusive form of global leadership, but it unwittingly revealed the limits of US power by breaking its red lines over Bashir al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria and by turning a blind eye to China’s takeover of disputed islands in the South China Sea. Donald Trump’s America First policies then flipped the US into an overbearing version of other self-interested powers. After this zigzagging by the US, leaders in the Middle East have developed their own assertive foreign policies, while two nascent democracies in Southeast Asia, Thailand and Myanmar, are again ruled by military juntas.

EU leaders became obsessed with the idea of strategic autonomy. And, although Joe Biden’s election was welcomed across most of Europe, it could not assuage concerns about the potentially transitory nature of his claim that ‘America is back’.

Putin has seized on this moment of transatlantic uncertainty and post-Covid navel-gazing to try to create a personal legacy as the leader who reunited a greater Russia out of the rubble of the Soviet Union. Instead, he has united Ukrainians and reunited the world’s liberal democracies in opposition to his brutal invasion and blatant rupture of international law. His actions have also drawn the contours of a new, trilateral international system.

Some 40 democracies across North America, Europe and the Indo-Pacific now see Putin and Xi Jinping – given China’s rhetorical support for Putin’s invasion – as interconnected threats to their long-term security. They are organizing to resist, using a re-energized Nato, new structures for Indo-Pacific cooperation and cross-linkages between these two spheres. For their part, Putin and Xi, though not formal allies, are tied together by each one’s need that the other survives and prospers while they are in confrontation with the liberal democracies.

The third, largest and most diverse group of countries are the newly non-aligned. India stands proudly in the foreground, but other major democracies such as Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, and non-democracies such as Egypt and Vietnam, are triangulating strategically between the world’s dominant democratic and authoritarian poles. Multilateral institutions will be weaker as a result.

Does this more divided world presage major conflict between the great powers? Hopefully not; after all, nuclear weapons remain a potent deterrent. Does global division herald the end of economic globalization and of the international cooperation needed to manage shared global challenges? Not necessarily.

While Russia will be excluded from liberal democratic markets for as long as Putin is in the Kremlin, China’s reliance on global markets and the importance of its market to the world make it unlikely that we will return to a new Cold War. Global supply chains and foreign investment will be more tightly circumscribed than today, but they will persist. And international cooperation to combat climate change and manage the environment will continue.

Meanwhile, technological innovation will accelerate, opening new prospects for sustainable development and employment, even as it sharpens the facets of geopolitical competition. And we may soon cross the tipping point at which women hold a critical mass of positions of political and community leadership in many parts of the world. Given that male leaders are, once again, the instigators of the latest spasms of violence, a more gender-balanced approach to leadership holds the prospect of greater political stability and more inclusive and sustainable development.

As I step down as Chatham House Director, I find myself torn between fury at the senseless human tragedy of a drawn-out war in Ukraine and the way its spillover effects are devastating the welfare of hundreds of millions across the globe, and hope that human courage, resilience and ingenuity will nevertheless sustain us on the path to a better future.

I am reassured in this by the knowledge that Chatham House’s researchers, professional staff and increasingly diverse membership mean that it is well placed to help decision-makers and societies navigate this complex world.

The Platinum Jubilee of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II News release NCapeling 1 June 2022

The staff, associate fellows and Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House send congratulations and warmest wishes to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II on the occasion of her momentous Platinum Jubilee.

As the Patron of the institute since her accession to the throne in 1952, HM The Queen has underpinned Chatham House’s independence for seven decades and thereby strengthened the impact of our work on the critical issues facing the world.

HM The Queen lent her personal support to the establishment of the annual Chatham House Prize in 2005 and has presented the award in person on behalf of the institute’s members on three occasions.

Among her other direct engagements with Chatham House, HM The Queen has helped us engage the next generation by supporting and then attending the launch of the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs in 2014, when she met the first intake of Academy fellows.

We are enormously grateful for her continued involvement as Patron of the institute and wish her and the Royal Family a memorable Platinum Jubilee.

Robin Niblett awarded knighthood in Queen's Birthday Honours News release NCapeling 1 June 2022

Chatham House director Dr Robin Niblett CMG receives a knighthood for services to international relations and to British foreign policy.

Chatham House Council and staff congratulate the institute’s director Robin Niblett, who has been appointed as a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George (KCMG) by HM The Queen in her Birthday Honours list.

The citation for the KCMG, awarded at the recommendation of the UK foreign secretary, recognizes Dr Niblett’s ‘outstanding personal contribution to British soft power and influence in his role as director of Chatham House over the last 15 years’.

The citation also states: ‘With exceptional energy and talent, he has greatly enhanced the research reputation of the Institute, strengthened its international convening power, finances and staffing, and modernised its premises, image and diverse outreach’.

Dr Niblett is standing down in the summer and will be replaced by Bronwen Maddox, who joins from the Institute for Government.

Dr Niblett says: ‘I am deeply honoured by this award, which is as much a recognition of the tireless and selfless work of my colleagues at Chatham House throughout my tenure as director.

‘Together, and through challenging times, we have offered a vital source of independent debate and analysis. And, with the engagement of our supporters and a new generation of thinkers and actors, I know the institute will continue to provide creative ideas for a better future.’

SNF Dialogues: Social media, social movements and political change 6 July 2022 — 2:30PM TO 3:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 June 2022 Online

Experts and activists explore how the digital world has changed the nature of social movements and the impact this has on policymaking.

From Extinction Rebellion to Black Lives Matter, social movements are increasingly harnessing social media to project their calls for action. This event, convened in partnership with the SNF Dialogues series, will reflect on the value of social media to social movements and the effects of such digital movements on policymakers. Experts and activists from around the world will explore whether social media is an effective tool for social movements or a distraction, the extent to which digital forms of protest incite social change, and finally if this change has an impact on policy decisions.

The SNF Dialogues, an initiative of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF), are a series of monthly discussions whose goal is to foster the exchange of ideas, inspire a new way of thinking and acting, and encourage and elevate public discourse across geographic boundaries. The Dialogues discussions are free and open to the public, aiming to bring to light timely questions and developments, share informed reflections and concerns, highlight new data and angles, and present fascinating people, projects and ideas.

The Dialogues are curated and moderated by Anna-Kynthia Bousdoukou and are facilitated by the non-profit journalism organization iMEdD (incubator for Media Education and Development).

The discussion will be conducted in English with simultaneous interpretation into Greek. If you wish to watch the discussion in Greek, tune in here.

Redefine the Commonwealth now to safeguard its future Expert comment NCapeling 6 October 2022

Although seen as one of the Queen’s greatest legacies, the Commonwealth must provide tangible benefits to its citizens in an era of geopolitical competition.

The Commonwealth’s breadth allows a wide diversity of countries of different sizes, geographies, cultures, and values to be members – it is both rich and poor, north and south, and ethnically diverse. This makes it more interesting than many other multilateral institutions such as the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU).

But it suffers from an unclear purpose. Since its inception, successive UK governments have grappled with its role – whether it is a preferential trading bloc or merely a source of most of Britain’s post-war immigration.

This lack of purpose – and structure – has left the Commonwealth impotent in dealing with a host of bilateral difficulties between the UK, its overseas territories, and Commonwealth partners in recent years.

Brexit could induce Britain to re-prioritize the Commonwealth, but so far the UK has only signed two new trade deals with Commonwealth members – Australia and New Zealand – while development aid, one of the most tangible ways the UK worked with many Commonwealth countries, has been cut and the UK’s defence focus has pivoted towards the Indo-Pacific and Europe’s Eastern front.

The UK also suffered embarrassing and overwhelming defeats in both the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of its continued occupation of the Chagos Islands and has avoided directly challenging India’s tacit support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the hope of securing a trade deal.

At the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), Boris Johnson reportedly attempted to depose Baroness Scotland, the Commonwealth’s Secretary General, but suffered a humiliating defeat in a vote of Commonwealth members.

These challenges are likely to continue, especially in the wake of the death of HM The Queen which could be seen by republican movements as an opportune time to rally support. Australia and New Zealand’s leaders, both republicans, downplayed the idea of a poll on the monarchy immediately after the Queen’s death, but it would be a mistake to assume this has gone quiet forever. Antigua and Barbuda’s prime minister has already said there will be a referendum on becoming a republic within three years.

Defining a new vision for the future

A concrete vision for the Commonwealth is long overdue and there is no better time to cast one than now. HM The Queen was more than just a figurehead for the Commonwealth and it remains unknown exactly what role King Charles III will see for himself.

But, unlike his mother who was a young, modern Queen heralding a post-imperial future, Charles takes the throne at a later age and at a time when important questions need to be addressed in an increasingly fractured world.

Most importantly the UK should avoid the temptation to define the Commonwealth in terms of shared principles and values. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh all abstained on the United Nations (UN) motion condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Commonwealth members are likely to be similarly divided over China’s territorial claims, the US-China conflict, the net-zero agenda, and nuclear non-proliferation.

The Commonwealth’s breadth – its greatest strength – means consensus is often impossible, and so should not be the goal. Instead the Commonwealth should focus on tangible areas of cooperation where there is mutual interest such as trade, aid, and migration.

The UK and its allies may find that diplomatic efforts – such as condemning China or Russia for human rights abuses – are more successful if they have listened to and acted on fellow Commonwealth countries’ concerns, from post-COVID vaccine provision to climate financing. Boosting the aid budget and opening borders may prove more important in engaging developing country partners than traditional diplomatic avenues.

Liz Truss’s British International Investment project could be a valuable vehicle for financing, especially if it leverages private sector funding, but many Commonwealth countries are feeling the more immediate impact of the UK’s aid cuts. In these circumstances many have already turned to Chinese infrastructure financing.

This is where the Commonwealth could be valuable. In the Pacific, it links certain island nations to the UK, Australia, and New Zealand at a time of renewed geopolitical competition with China in the Pacific. The fact the Commonwealth is not explicitly about promoting a particular ideology or countering China is helpful.

Commonwealth should be less UK-centric

There is also no reason why all the Commonwealth operations need to be based in London, which is not only expensive but also reinforces an approach to governance that assumes everything must be decided by civil servants in London. As the world’s largest democracy, India is an obvious alternative candidate although its reluctance to condemn Russia’s invasion and its domestic political tensions may count against it.

It is also important the Commonwealth’s wealthier members – the UK, Canada, and Australia – provide financing for countries such as India to take on extra responsibilities. The Commonwealth Games is a good place to start – despite having 72 competing nations and territories, the games have only been held three times outside the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The Commonwealth also needs to be forward-looking and one of its most exciting assets is its demographic youthfulness. Europe, China, and the US have ageing populations whereas Nigeria, India, and Bangladesh have some of the world’s largest young populations.

The UK must avoid conflict with Europe and China Expert comment NCapeling 10 October 2022

Liz Truss says she wants to take a tough line but any freedom to forge her own foreign policy is a casualty of the economic turmoil following her first budget.

The tax-cutting budget from new UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng was clearly not inhibited by any apparent concern for the markets’ response. But the interest rate rise it contributed to and the scepticism raining down on the Truss government should force a recognition that economic vulnerability now constrains what the UK tries to do abroad.

That would mean taking a more cautious approach than the new UK prime minister seems to want to adopt. The Treasury and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) may sit next to each other in Whitehall’s parade of 18th century buildings, but a huge gulf lies between them.

When talking to officials, it is striking how those in one building make decisions without reference to the other. Foreign policy is made with no consideration of the UK’s need to borrow money in the markets, and budgets are written with little calculation of the effect of decisions next door – although the Cabinet Office does at least try to reconcile these.

But that approach is a luxury which the budget response and the sharp rise in national debt it will bring makes no longer affordable.

Repairing EU trade relations is priority

The first lesson is that any worsening of trade relations with the European Union (EU) is not now something the UK can afford to contemplate. The markets would take an even dimmer view of national finances if the UK were to become embroiled in an even more fractious trade dispute with its closest and largest trading partner.

When campaigning for the Conservative party leadership, Liz Truss talked tough on the Northern Ireland protocol and her unwillingness to compromise much with the EU. Since she became prime minister, sounds from both the UK and EU have been much more conciliatory, with suggestions that a deal could be just a few details away.

And yet the Truss government is still pressing ahead with the controversial legislation which would enable the UK unilaterally to walk away from parts of the treaty it signed – the House of Lords will debate the bill and its most contentious measures, such as the extensive new powers it gives ministers, on 11 October.

But there are suggestions from officials that, although Truss would lose too much face by withdrawing the legislation, the government may choose not to contest any Lords amendments vigorously.

That would be wise. The prime minister should know the financial path she has chosen with her chancellor makes carrying out the threats of walking away from a deal too costly to afford. As it is, the markets are hardly looking with equanimity on the prospect of the UK borrowing £100 billion to shield consumers from rising gas prices.

A £43 billion package of proposed tax cuts with no explanation – yet – of how the government will pay for them would be even less comfortable were the UK to take such a hard line on the Northern Ireland protocol that it provokes a trade war with the EU. Brussels can also make those calculations and, for all the recent talk of concessions, is expected to hold fast to its new position.

For the same reasons, the UK cannot afford to talk about taking a tougher line on China – as the prime minister has already done – without clearly knowing what the economic impact would be and being sure voters are prepared to pay this price. Years of courting commercial links with China mean they now weave their way through the UK economy.

The dependence of universities on Chinese students and the income they bring is already well-known and heavily debated – but the exposure of the UK economy to digital technology and components from China is even greater, and China is now the largest source of imports for the UK with £63.6 billion or 13.3 per cent of all goods imports according to the Office for National Statistics.

Much of that was laptops, computers, telecoms and phones as well as toys and clothes; there are few households or offices that will not have these products. China is also the sixth largest destination for UK exports, with £18.8 billion or 5.8 per cent of goods exports, much of it machinery and cars.

Scottish Liberal Democrat peer Lord Purvis expressed concern at these figures because of the implication that the UK’s ability to take a tough line with China on human rights was now enormously circumscribed. And defence and intelligence chiefs are also warning of the UK’s vulnerability.

Taking a hard line needs context

There are signs the government is concerned enough to begin to map out this economic vulnerability but no signs that it yet has a full picture. Without knowing the economic hit of a frostier relationship, and confidence the House of Commons accepts it, Liz Truss would be brave to label China ‘a threat to national security’ – as her supporters indicated during the leadership campaign – when she updates the integrated review of defence and security in the coming months.

Of course, foreign policy should not be inspired by commercial concerns alone. There are wider reasons to develop a clearer China strategy to help lay out a more consistent future path. On his recent trip to East Asia, UK foreign secretary James Cleverly heard from UK partners that they were disconcerted by the lurch from George Osborne’s ‘golden years’ to the Truss charge of a China ‘threat’.

When Liz Truss was UK foreign secretary, some forecast she would pursue mercantilism given her focus on forging post-Brexit trade deals but, as it turned out, that was not the spirit of her tenure.

After Truss, the UK can still rebuild its global reputation Expert comment NCapeling 20 October 2022

Following a chaotic few weeks as UK prime minister, Liz Truss has stepped down. And that is the best outcome for her party and for the country.

Liz Truss could not command support for her calamitous – and misnamed – mini-budget. And once her new Chancellor Jeremy Hunt had overturned its provisions, she had no mission or credibility left.

The budget pushed interest rates higher and they did not fall much on the scrapping of it, leaving her open to the charge she pushed up mortgage and interest costs for every person and business in the country. Her apology for ‘mistakes made’ was not going to reverse that, so her MPs were right to tell her to go.

Her departure does mark a victory for at least some of the UK’s institutions, even if it might not seem that way to observers around the world.

The position of the UK parliament has been reaffirmed, and so has that of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – it will be a long time before a government tries to dispense with the comments of the independent watchdog of national finances.

This also reinforces the principle that governments must explain how they will pay for their programmes. The Bank of England remains unencumbered – despite Truss’s apparent intentions of giving it a pro-growth addition to its mandate – to pursue its aim of tackling inflation.

New leader needs legitimacy quickly

The Conservative party has a chance – perhaps – to produce another prime minister without being forced into a general election, as that is the constitutional principle in the UK’s parliamentary system.

But the clamour that the new leader, as the third prime minister in one year, lacks legitimacy may prove impossible to resist for long.

In attempting to select a leader with a chance of uniting the party, the Conservatives are right to be considering options for restricting this leadership election to MPs should there be only one candidate with enough support.

But no such candidate may emerge and the pressure within the Commons – and the country – for an early election will not let up.

There is no question the UK’s standing in the world has been severely battered by this episode and by the revolving door of prime ministers. For the UK to regain respect – and an image of reliability – it needs to move fast and find someone capable of putting policies into action.

Those policies need to be based on economic stability but must also include a resolution of the relationship with Europe as much of the current upheaval represents the bitter aftermath of Brexit.

Concluding a deal with Brussels over the Northern Ireland protocol – avoiding ripping up the treaty the UK signed – and continuing to smooth the considerable friction that the exit from the EU has brought for exporters is essential work for the next prime minister.

Pursuing a deal for scientists to take part in the European Union (EU) Horizon research should be a priority. UK universities and researchers are already reluctantly preparing for a future where that does not come, with signs of the feared drain of talent already clear.

UK’s international reputation now at risk

Beyond that, there is much about UK policy which needs clarifying if the country is to regain its international standing. Just weeks from the start of COP27 and less than one year since the Glasgow climate change summit it hosted, the UK position on climate change commitments appears in flux.

The UK government pledge to help Ukraine is clear and has won it gratitude there and respect within Europe, but its intentions for defence spending are less clear.

Independent Thinking: War in Ukraine, Congress in China Audio NCapeling 21 October 2022

The inaugural episode of our new podcast examines the latest developments surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Xi Jinping’s political report from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests examine latest developments surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, as well as Xi Jinping’s political report from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.  

Bronwen is joined by Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, Orysia Lutsevych, head of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House, and Dr Yu Jie, senior research fellow in Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific programme.

Independent Thinking is a regular podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts to provide insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Rishi Sunak and the UK, John Kerry on COP27 Audio NCapeling 28 October 2022

The second episode of our new podcast examines the changes in the UK government as Rishi Sunak become prime minister and looks ahead to COP27 with John Kerry.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests discuss the arrival in Number 10 of Rishi Sunak, the UK’s youngest prime minister of modern times as well as its third of 2022, alongside analysing the Chatham House event with US Special Presidential Envoy on Climate John Kerry. 

Bronwen’s guests from Chatham House are John Kampfner, executive director of the UK in the World Initiative, Hans Kundani, associate fellow with the Europe programme, and Anna Åberg, research associate with the Environment and Society programme.

They are joined by Sir Simon Fraser, formerly of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Chatham House’s deputy chairman. 

Independent Thinking is a regular podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts to provide insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Lula wins in Brazil, US midterms Audio NCapeling 4 November 2022

The third episode of our new podcast analyses the results from the Brazil presidential election, and looks ahead to the crucial midterm elections in the US next week.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests examine the tight election result from Brazil and its impact on both the country and the region, and preview the US midterm elections being held on 8 November and the start of COP27.

In Brazil, former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva beat incumbent Jair Bolsonaro by the narrowest of margins. Meanwhile in the US, the Democrats are fighting to retain the House and Senate from a resurgent Republican Party still enamoured with Donald Trump.

Joining Bronwen Maddox this week are Leslie Vinjamuri, director of Chatham House’s US and Americas programme, Christopher Sabatini, senior fellow on Latin America in the same programme, and Ana Yang, executive director of Chatham House’s Sustainability Accelerator.

Independent Thinking: US midterms surprise, COP27 begins Audio NCapeling 11 November 2022

The fourth episode of our new podcast analyses early results from the US midterm elections and brings the latest insights from a crucial COP27.

The US midterm elections threw up some surprising results with the anticipated Republican ‘red wave’ failing to materialize. Meanwhile at COP27 in Egypt, world leaders met in the first week of the summit. What did their presence achieve?

To find out, returning to the podcast this week with Bronwen Maddox are Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the Chatham House US and Americas programme who was in Atlanta Georgia for the midterms, and Anna Aberg, research associate in the Environment and Society programme who is on the ground at COP27.

Joining them are Peter Trubowitz, professor of international relations and director of the Phelan US Centre at the London School of Economics and Antony Froggart, deputy director and senior research fellow in the Environment and Society programme.

Independent Thinking: Iran protests, Iraq's invasion legacy Audio NCapeling 17 November 2022

Episode five of our new weekly podcast has a Middle East focus with insights into what is driving the ongoing protests in Iran, and the progress of Iraq in the years since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Since September, Iran has been swept by thousands of women-led protests, demanding an end to the morality police and the even calling for the fall of the Islamic Republic.

Meanwhile at Chatham House this week saw our Iraq Initiative conference 2022, which delved heavily into the multiple challenges facing Iraq two decades on from the invasion which toppled Saddam Hussein.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week are the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa programme deputy director Dr Sanam Vakil and senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour, who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative. They are joined by Sanya Burgess, digital investigations journalist with Sky News.

COP27: What was achieved, and what needs to happen now Expert comment NCapeling 20 November 2022

Chatham House environment experts give their initial reaction to the end of COP27, examining how much progress was achieved, and the key issues still to be worked on.

Loss and Damage fund is a historic moment

Anna Aberg

COP27 will go down in history as the UN climate change conference where the Loss and Damage fund was agreed. After decades of pushing, this is a momentous victory for climate-vulnerable developing countries.

The shift in the conversation – and in the positions of developed countries – since COP26 is remarkable. It is critical parties continue to build on the positive momentum created in Sharm as challenging discussions on how the new loss and damage fund will work – and who will contribute to it financially – ensue.

Tim Benton

Overall COP27 was a hectic, sometimes chaotic, event. The COP advanced some matters but on others failed to drive ambition towards the sort of climate action required to keep alive the possibility of restricting climate change within the envelope of the Paris agreement.

Loss and Damage progressed but, especially in week two, the risk was of going backwards in this COP relative to COP26 in Glasgow. The final cover declaration managed to avoid the worst, but also avoided the best.

Notably disappointing was that, although food systems were much in debate unlike in previous COPs, there was still significant political resistance to fully adopting a systems approach. Globally, food systems emit about one-third of all greenhouse gasses, while poor diets – in rich and poor countries alike – are arguably the single biggest factor in ill-health and early death.

COP27 maintained a firm focus on supply-side solutions to tackle food insecurity, avoiding the politically more contentious demand-side issues of ensuring nutritious and sustainable diets for all.

Start of implementation phase demands renewed urgency

Bernice Lee

It has often been said climate action is moving from target-setting into the implementation phase. What COP27 shows is that, as the implementation phase begins, integrity and accountability will be ever more critical, as the voices of the vulnerable economies and the youth remind the world time and time again.

This compromised outcome is also a reminder that the delivery of climate action begins at home, as does the bread-and-butter politics of money and influence. It is significant the link between fossil energy and climate impacts has now been openly made in the international arena, regardless of whether it appeared in the final cover agreement.

As the dust settles, there will be many questions and reflection over tactics chosen by different parties and actors, and much to be learned that can help those pushing for more breakthrough moments at COP28.

Antony Froggatt

There was insufficient progress on the energy transition both in and around COP27. Few countries followed through on their promises to increase the ambition of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), although Australia and the European Union (EU) were rare exceptions among the developed countries.

Higher fossil fuel prices, due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, can and should have resulted in an accelerated energy transition. Yet the language in the final decision around carbon reductions and energy at best repeats the language of COP26 and does not reflect the renewed urgency of the situation, stemming from accelerating climate impacts and the weaponization of fossil fuels in Russia’s conflict.

At COP28, parties to the UNFCCC will finalize a Global Stock Take which will include a review of national progress in meeting carbon abatement targets. This will be a key moment and unfortunately is likely to highlight once again how much faster the world needs to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels.

Fossil fuel discussions show failure of imagination

Glada Lahn

Overshadowed by the pain of developing country fuel importers and European attempts to replace Russian gas, discussion of fossil fuels was fraught. The text, which called for accelerating the ‘phasedown of unabated coal’ use for the first time only last year, failed to expand to include oil and gas, despite calls to do so from India, the US, EU, and UK. Gas use also appeared to gain a pass via the inclusion of ‘low emission’ energy alongside renewables.

Given that extracting and burning oil and gas accounts for 40 per cent of all annual greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), and leaders agree on the need for ‘deep, rapid and sustained’ emission cuts, that language is beyond logical argument. However, current dependencies, fears of stranded investments, and a failure of imagination won out.

Stronger than usual oil and gas industry presence led to a higher number of meetings focused on decarbonization of the sector. Major producer countries such as Canada and Saudi Arabia were keen to emphasize technologies to ‘clean up’ rather than phase down their fuels as the future.

Not all developing country governments with hydrocarbon reserves see the ‘phase down’ text as conflicting with their economic interests. Large oil and gas exporter Colombia supported the inclusion of ‘all fossil fuels’ and Kenya, a country which had been pursuing oil and coal prospects, became a friend of the high ambition Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance which seeks a ‘managed phase out of oil and gas supply’.

A vocal contingent of African civil society meanwhile railed against health and ecology-damaging oil and gas projects and investments that would lock them into a high emissions future.

With stronger resolve to reorient finance towards net zero both in Sharm el-Sheikh and at the concurrent G20 summit in Bali, the practicalities of economic adaptation to the shift out of fossil fuels – including just transition for workers – rose up the agenda. These issues will overtake the wrangle over wording in the run up to COP28.

Adaptation must now move to the forefront

Ruth Townend

There are three pillars of climate action: mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. This year progress was made on mitigation and loss and damage but, to avoid wild spiralling of the latter, adaptation must have its day in the sun in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at COP28 next year.

Adaptation lacks a concrete goal, akin to the 1.5 degree limit, and few countries have set out plans to adapt to climate change. Momentum will come when the promised ‘global goal on adaptation’ (GGA) is finally defined, to help mobilize finance and spur implementation.

The Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh (GLASS) work programme to achieve this has so far lacked focus. At COP27, parties decided to define a framework to measure the goal’s achievement and enable reviews of progress over the next year.

Some concrete progress on adaptation was seen at the COP: UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for worldwide extreme weather early warning systems within the next five years, while the Adaptation Fund received more than $230 million for the most climate-vulnerable in 2022.

The call from Glasgow to double adaptation finance was repeated, but overall, progress was muted, when parties really needed to come together for implementation of this crucial element of climate action.

Not enough done for agriculture and food security

Richard King

It is welcome that the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture – adopted in 2017 as the first and only formal UNFCCC agenda item focusing on agriculture and food security – has concluded in a decision to implement a new four-year work programme focused on implementing solutions.

While this has an objective of promoting holistic approaches to addressing climate impacts both on and from agriculture and food security, it disappointingly falls short of taking a food systems lens that includes all activities and actors from farm to fork.

There is now a small window of opportunity until March 2023 for governments and civil society to shape and broaden this agenda for the next four years. If not in the negotiating halls, then certainly in the myriad side events and discussions focusing on the issue, this year’s COP has clearly demonstrated a growing appreciation of the imperative of tackling food systems in their entirety.

An overarching and integrated approach to sustainable food production, distribution, and retail; nutrition and dietary shifts; and addressing food loss and waste will be vital to making comprehensive headway in addressing climate change and other planetary and social challenges.

It is important the parties at COP28 in the UAE seize this rising momentum to become the first climate negotiations to make tangible progress on transforming food systems towards sustainability, equitability, and resilience.

Rainforest leadership challenges traditional aid

Thiago Kanashiro Uehara

COP27 served well as a business fair for entrepreneurs wishing to benefit from new carbon markets. But forests, peatlands, and nature-based solutions did not receive the attention they deserve in guaranteeing climate security.

The good news is the COP26 pledges on forest finance, for the Congo basin, and for indigenous peoples (IP) and local communities’ (LC) forest tenure are pretty much alive, with disbursement rates at decent levels, albeit rarely directly to IP and LC-led organizations. The bad news is the financialization of forest governance and voluntary sustainability standards in global supply chains are solution ‘myths’ and were exposed by scientists as such at the conference.

On the second day of COP27, there was a last-minute launch led by the Global North, with Rishi Sunak and Emmanuel Macron announcing the ‘forests and climate leaders’ partnership’. One week later, at the G20 Bali summit, ministers from Indonesia, DR Congo, and Brazil announced a South-South rainforest leadership alliance – referred by some as the ‘OPEC of forests’ – challenging traditional forms of top-down international aid.

The climate crisis is one symptom of the inequality crisis engulfing our world at present. The African COP represented a step forward in addressing climate justice, an improvement over COP26 in Glasgow, where the issue was virtually denied.

The time has come for Global North constituents to work together with self-fashioned ‘solution countries’, such as the DRC now and Brazil after 2023. An ‘implementation COP’ will be successful only after establishing a new framework of co-leadership in climate action based on principles of justice and strong sustainability.

Outcomes of an African COP

Christopher Vandome

Africa’s contribution to the global energy transition cannot be at the expense of its own industrialization.

While pledges of increased financing for adaptation and the landmark establishment of a fund for loss and damage are important steps, the reality of under-disbursement and delivery of promised funds is causing many African leaders to rethink their engagement with multilateral climate initiatives.

African leaders are intent on advancing their own strategies for energy generation and adaptation that deliver on national priorities of job creation, sustainable growth, and environmental protection.

Many countries strategies involve exploiting gas reserves. But with mounting global pressures against further hydrocarbon extraction, African leaders need to demonstrate to international partners that these operations are part of a long-term transition away from other fossil fuels and contribute towards poverty alleviation.

Leaders need to be coordinated in their demands to international partners on how to phase out over time as well as de-risk potential stranded assets. President Ramaphosa’s unveiling of the investment plan for the South African Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) was a significant mark of progress to unlocking the $8.5 billion pledge for lowering the economy’s reliance on coal.

While progress has at times faltered over the past year, it has been critical that South Africa articulate its own needs and desired energy mix, rather than this be internationally prescribed. It has also demonstrated to other African nations that bilateral not multilateral initiatives may offer a fast-track route to green finance.

Independent Thinking: China protests, North Korea missile tests Audio NCapeling 1 December 2022

Episode seven of our new weekly podcast examines the civil unrest in China and the ongoing development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.

Anti-lockdown protests are sweeping the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. What does the unrest say about China’s response to COVID-19? How serious a challenge is it to Xi Jinping’s legitimacy so soon after the Party Congress?

Meanwhile, 2022 has been a record year for Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches. How far has North Korea’s nuclear programme and its missile systems developed, and what does it mean for the country’s neighbours?

Joining Bronwen Maddox in the studio this week from the Chatham House Asia-Pacific programme are its director Ben Bland and senior research fellow Dr Yu Jie. Joining the panel is special guest Ankit Panda, the Stanton senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and editor-at-large for The Diplomat magazine.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Reporting Putin’s wars Audio NCapeling 8 December 2022

Episode eight of our new weekly podcast reflects on almost one year of war in Ukraine, and 12 years of war in Syria.

In the studio with Bronwen Maddox is special guest Oz Katerji, a war correspondent and freelance journalist who in the early stages of the Syrian uprising reported on the brutality of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and its impact on neighbouring Lebanon and Turkey.

Having written extensively on Syria and the Middle East, in January 2022 he journeyed to Ukraine and was in Kyiv on 24 February as Russia began its invasion. He has reported extensively on the battle for Ukraine’s capital, and later the Donbas, in Foreign Policy magazine, the New Statesman and Rolling Stone.

Joining Bronwen and Oz to discuss the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria from Chatham House are James Nixey, director of the Russia and Eurasia programme, and Lina Khatib, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme.

Independent Thinking: The UK tilts to the Indo-Pacific Audio NCapeling 14 December 2022

Episode nine discusses the UK’s foreign policy ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific and whether its desire to be a strategic player in the region is sustainable.

The past 18 months has seen the deployment of a Royal Navy carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific, the emergence of the AUKUS partnership, talk of closer diplomatic ties with India and ASEAN and, in the context of Brexit, the UK potentially joining the CPTPP pan-Pacific trade deal.

But just how sustainable is a UK presence in the Indo-Pacific? And what are the UK’s strategic objectives in the region?

Joining Bronwen Maddox to discuss the UK’s high ambitions in the Indo-Pacific are Shashank Joshi, defence editor at The Economist, and Veerle Nouwens, senior research fellow at RUSI and the co-author of a recent Chatham House report on transatlantic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Independent Thinking: Insurrections and elections in Brazil and the US Audio NCapeling 20 January 2023

Episode 11 examines disinformation in the US and Brazil, the role played by social media platforms, and how conspiracy theories percolate online.

The storming in Brasilia of government institutions by supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro echoed the events seen at the US Capitol building on 6 January 2021. This week’s guests discuss the impact on Brazil.

The panel also examines the state of politics in the US going into 2023. How are things shaping up for Joe Biden’s presidency after the mid-terms now that a new Congress has been sworn in? And what are the challenges being faced more broadly by the American body politic two years on from the insurrection at Capitol Hill.

Joining guest host Leslie Vinjamuri this week from Chatham House is Christopher Sabatini, senior research fellow for Latin America, Serusha Govender, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation academy fellow, and Alex Krasodomski, senior research associate at the Digital Society Initiative.

Independent Thinking: Western tanks head for Ukraine Audio NCapeling 26 January 2023

Episode 12 of our weekly podcast analyses the deployment of international battle tanks to Ukraine and the contentious diplomacy putting pressure on Germany.

The panel examines what kind of capabilities will new weapons give to Ukraine amid fears of a new Russian offensive looming in the spring, and the intense pressure Olaf Scholz’s German government has been under since the invasion of Ukraine started.

How has Germany’s standing changed over the past 12 months, and what are the challenges facing the country in its relations with Russia as a long and cold winter sets in?   

Joining Bronwen Maddox this week from Chatham House are Orysia Lutsevych, head of the Ukraine Forum, and Marion Messmer, senior research fellow in the International Security programme, along with Jeremy Cliffe, writer-at-large for The New Statesman magazine, and Ed Arnold, research fellow for European security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Myanmar, the coup two years on Audio NCapeling 2 February 2023

Episode 13 of our weekly podcast focuses on the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, marking the two-year anniversary of the coup there by the Tatmadaw armed forces.

In February 2021 the Tatmadaw overthrew the democratically-elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar and, since then, the country has descended into a brutal and complex civil war.

Our panel analyses the state of the country and its people two years on. Can Myanmar hold together, can democracy ever be restored? And is the world ignoring a major humanitarian crisis in the making?

With Bronwen Maddox to discuss the issues are two journalists who have both covered Myanmar extensively. Sebastian Strangio is an author and the Southeast Asia editor at The Diplomat, and Ali Fowle is a freelance journalist with Al Jazeera and the BBC.

Joining them in the studio from Chatham House are Ben Bland, director of our Asia-Pacific programme, and Rashmin Sagoo, director of our International Law programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Biden and the Republicans, AUKUS Audio NCapeling 9 February 2023

Episode 14 of our weekly podcast examines the Chinese balloon saga, the State of the Union address, and updates on the AUKUS deal 18 months after it was signed.

This week saw US president Joe Biden address an unruly joint session of Congress, during which he discussed America’s place in the world, China, Ukraine, and the state of the US economy.

As a new presidential cycle begins at the mid-point of Biden’s presidency, the panel analyses how Biden is doing and the challenges that lie ahead for him.

Also it is now 18 months since the announcement of the AUKUS partnership between the UK, US and Australia to develop nuclear hunter killer submarines. What does AUKUS mean for Australia, non-proliferation, and the Indo-Pacific more broadly?

Finally, the panel discusses China’s balloon over Montana in the US. Was it a signal from Beijing and what was it trying to photograph?

Joining guest host John Kampfner this week from Chatham House are Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the US and the Americas programme and Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme. They are joined by Dr Euan Graham, Shangri-La Dialogue senior fellow for defence and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Health not independence is focus for Sturgeon successor Expert comment NCapeling 15 February 2023

Nicola Sturgeon’s star may have been fading, but Rishi Sunak and Keir Starmer will be relieved at the exit of one of the UK’s most influential politicians.

Nicola Sturgeon has left at the right time, maybe even a bit late. Although one of the most influential politicians the UK has seen in recent times, she was also one of the most divisive.

Her ability to fan Scotland’s sense of difference from England brought new hope to the independence movement, but this cause – by which she measured herself above all others – has been losing ground and for now, looks to be in abeyance.

Neat and disciplined, Sturgeon could not have presented a greater contrast to Boris Johnson in the first months of the pandemic. That was one of her finest moments.

She used the powers of the devolved government to make different lockdown decisions for Scotland – never all that different from those in England but often announced just a few hours earlier.

Although analysts surmise that these made little difference to the death rate – although poverty and other health support factors make comparisons hard – she used the platform, with the cameras on her, to ram home the point that Scotland could set its own rules.

Rallying young voters to independence

Her second greatest moment was in the aftermath of Brexit. Scots voted overwhelmingly to stay in the European Union (EU) and so, she argued, they should have the right to leave the UK to join that other union. Younger voters in particular responded, rallying to the independence cause.

But two recent setbacks showed her star was fading. She lost the Supreme Court battle to hold a second independence referendum in November, when she was told Scotland simply did not have the powers to hold one on its own if Westminster said no – and the UK government did just that. It was hard to see how her campaign for independence could move forwards.

And her planned reforms to the gender recognition process in Scotland have been blocked by the UK government – but unease about her reforms within Scotland meant this rebuff did not win her the support at home she hoped for. She was also accused of playing politics by pressing ahead with unpopular reforms simply because of their potential to discomfit the UK government.

Health, education, and public services need attention

Other challenges were also building up and, even if less eye-catching, her successor is likely to focus on health and education above the birth of a new nation. Sturgeon’s critics have long argued that under Scottish National Party rule, health, education, and other public services have declined.

In elections, these factors can be eclipsed by passions about independence but it is rare in political life for a leader to be insulated from public anger on this front. This is almost certainly where her successor will want to focus first.

Independent Thinking: Humanitarian disaster in Syria and Turkey Audio NCapeling 16 February 2023

Episode 15 of our weekly podcast examines the far-reaching consequences of the earthquakes which struck Turkey and Syria on the region’s fragile geopolitics.

With thousands killed and international aid flooding in, what hope is there for the many thousands of people in Syria and Turkey caught between the groups and governments involved in conflict for more than a decade.

The panel aslo discusses the political impact within Turkey, as fears grow that President Recep Tyap Erdogan may postpone the upcoming election amid outcries over corruption and the devastating loss of life.

Joining Bronwen this week is Lina Sinjab, Syrian filmmaker and BBC journalist covering the Middle East, Charles Lister, senior fellow and director of the Syria programme at the Middle East Institute, and Ziya Meral, senior associate fellow on Turkey at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Russia’s invasion one year on Audio NCapeling 23 February 2023

Episode 16 of our weekly podcast examines the global impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine one year on from when Vladimir Putin launched his all-out assault.

Following a decision which unleashed the largest war seen in Europe since 1945, with hundreds of thousands of casualties on all sides, the panel examines the impact of the invasion for Ukraine and its people, but also the world.

Also under discussion are key insights from the recent Munich Security Conference, and the announcement this week by Russian president Vladimir Putin to susend his country’s participation in the vital New START nuclear weapons treaty.

Joining Bronwen on the show this week from the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House is programme director James Nixey and associate fellow Samantha de Bendern, alongside Patricia Lewis, director of our International Security programme. They are joined on the panel by Mariya Ionova, a Ukrainian opposition MP.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Nigeria votes, Northern Ireland deal Audio NCapeling 2 March 2023

Episode 17 of our weekly podcast examines the outcome of Nigeria’s presidential election and the new deal for Northern Ireland negotiated by the UK and EU.

On 24 February, millions of Nigerians went to the polls in an election widely seen as crucial for the direction of the country, with the winner Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared the new president-elect. The panel discusses the state of Nigeria’s democracy and what lies ahead for the new administration.

In addition, UK prime minister Rishi Sunak and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen announced a new deal for Northern Ireland with implications for all the UK. Three years after the UK formally left the European Union (EU), has Rishi Sunak now got Brexit done?

Joining Bronwen Maddox are Leena Koni Hoffman, associate fellow with the Chatham House Africa programme, Aanu Adeoye, West African correspondent for the Financial Times and an academy associate at Chatham House, and Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: India, International Women's Day Audio NCapeling 9 March 2023

Episode 18 of our weekly podcast examines issues for women working in international affairs, and tackles India’s domestic politics and international standing.

Our panel this week discuss their experiences working professionally in global affairs and what advice they have for other women wanting to work in public policy.

India is also under discussion as Chatham House hosted Rahul Gandhi, leading Indian politician and former president of the Indian National Congress (INC). The panel considers his remarks about India’s internal quandaries and international perceptions of the country, almost a decade on from the 2014 election which brought Narendra Modi and the BJP to power.

Joining Bronwen Maddox from Chatham House are Rashmin Sagoo, director of the International Law programme, Anna Aberg from the Environment and Society programme, Armida van Rij from the International Security programme, and Isabella Wilkinson, research associate on cybersecurity. They are joined by Dr Mukulika Banerjee, who was until recently the director of the LSE South Asia Centre.

UK is too tight on the money and too vague on China Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2023

The new UK Integrated Review fills gaps left by the last one but is dominated by defence. It needs more clarity on Europe, trade, and development – and more money.

Following a long two years, the UK’s Integrated Review from March 2021 now looks prescient in calling Russia the main threat to UK interests. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the main – but not the only – reason forcing an update of the review only 24 months later.

The UK’s commitment to Ukraine is now centre stage and so therefore is its cost, which immediately exposes a prime weakness of this review. An extra £5 billion on defence is more than nothing, as was originally rumoured, but far less than £11 billion which UK defence secretary Ben Wallace argues is needed.

UK military support for Ukraine cost £2.3 billion in the past year and a continuation will use up £2 billion of the new money. The report also notes £3 billion will go on infrastructure for building nuclear submarines at Barrow and nuclear training. That does not leave much for anything else.

There is a pledge to end the reduction of the armed forces which is essential if the UK contribution to Ukraine and European defence is to be credible. But an ambition to spend 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence by an unspecified date is all but meaningless – albeit prudent phrasing given fiscal uncertainties.

China challenge is one of balance

Ministers have been wrestling for months over their choice of language on China, and ‘epoch defining challenge’ is what has emerged, while also expressing concern over China’s links with Russia. But the review is careful to stop short of calling China a threat as Liz Truss intended.

The choice of vocabulary reflects a long desire to balance forging commercial ties with an increasing wariness of data and security threats under President Xi’s leadership of China. The UK wants to support the US in its concerns but not to presume conflict is inescapable.

The review does acknowledge the threat to Taiwan for the first time. Two years ago, it was fiercely criticized for not including any mention of that despite the potential disruption supposedly being ‘far more damaging than the renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine’ as MPs on the Foreign Affairs Select Committee put it.

But again the question of resources is inescapable. The ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ which the UK declared two years ago is offered not just as a recognition of the region’s political and economic heft in any vision of the future, but as a favour to the US.

The UK lacks the resources to make that tilt credible in terms of substantial support to the US – nor, arguably, would it do the US any favours by neglecting the defence of Europe or the Middle East, which gets scant mention.

The AUKUS announcement on the same day appears to fill that gap. UK prime minister Rishi Sunak was in San Diego, California to greet the declaration that Australia will draw on British designs for its new nuclear submarines – a decision which brings more British jobs and underpins an alliance of both symbolic and practical weight in the region. But for the UK to play its part fully, it may need to divert resources from elsewhere, and this review sidesteps that hard choice.

More broadly, the UK would benefit from considering how to respond to the reality of China’s rise – analysing what happens to supply chains if tension disrupted them and how it might use membership of the Asia-Pacific CPTPP trading bloc, which appears likely to happen soon.

One of the biggest omissions in the 2021 review was relations with Europe and that is somewhat remedied but more is needed. The UK has been a leader for Europe in its clear response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – almost the only common thread of passionate agreement between the three UK prime ministers since the invasion – but it should now consider if it wants to take part in joint development of military assets. And a clear statement of cooperation with European Union (EU) governments would be a boost to NATO.

There is also now a Europe-shaped hole in the review’s discussion of trade. The 2021 version mentioned trade 79 times with the focus on new trade agreements outside Europe. It is now clear, if it was not before, these make little difference to GDP. The recent repairing of relations with the EU – and France in particular – may yield more practical results two years from now.

UK power in the world is changing

The review is also largely silent on another difficulty in the UK’s foreign policy which are the aims and size of its development aid – much changed from its original goal of poverty reduction to a focus on national interest with a reduced budget. This is sensitive political territory but must be better spelled out to count as a plan.

The FCDO intends to appoint a second permanent under-secretary to deliver the government’s development priorities and the minister for international development will join the National Security Council. This acknowledges the disruption caused by the merger of the FCO with DFID and the need for development staff to have clear leadership as well as, hopefully soon, a clear policy.

The pledge of a one-off payment of £20 million for the BBC World Service 42 foreign language channels for two years is welcome too as an acknowledgement of their ‘soft power’ value, especially in parts of the world where democracy is absent or in retreat.

Independent Thinking: UK Integrated Review, Georgia protests Audio NCapeling 16 March 2023

Episode 19 of our weekly podcast examines the AUKUS deal, UK defence priorities, and the state of Georgia’s democracy following anti-government protests.

The UK and Australia will soon be building nuclear submarines together, but is the UK’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific sustainable? Two years on from the last Integrated Review, has the UK finally clarified its foreign policy priorities on Russia, China, and on defence? And is the money there to do it all?

Also on the show, the panel discusses Georgia following recent anti-government protests in Tbilisi. Following the Rose revolution in 2003, Georgia seemed to be on a path towards closer ties with NATO and the European Union (EU). But the country’s government has recently moved closer to Russia and Vladimir Putin. What is the state of Georgia’s democracy and where is the country heading?

Joining Bronwen Maddox from Chatham House is Creon Butler, director of our Global Economy and Finance programme, Professor Andrew Dorman, editor of the International Affairs journal, and Alice Billon-Galland, research fellow in our Europe Programme.

They are joined by Natia Seskuria, associate fellow with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Arthur Snell, former diplomat and host of the podcast Doomsday Watch.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Consequences of the Iraq war Audio NCapeling 23 March 2023

Episode 20 of our weekly podcast marks 20 years since the invasion of Iraq, with special guest Clare Short who resigned from the UK government over the issue.

Launched amid fears that Saddam Hussein was acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq war changed the Middle East and inflicted huge damage with effects that persist today.

This week’s panel examines the war from the perspective of those in power in London when the decision was made to commit UK forces to the invasion, and with those in Iraq who lived with the consequences.   

Joining Bronwen Maddox is special guest Clare Short, former Secretary of State for International Development, who served in the UK cabinet and resigned after the invasion began, becoming one of the best-known critics of prime minister Tony Blair’s approach to the war.

On the panel from Chatham House is Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme, and three members of the Middle East and North Africa programme; the director Dr Lina Khatib, senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative, and research associate Hayder Al-Shakeri.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Accumulation of the microtubule-associated protein tau is associated with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In AD brain, tau is abnormally phosphorylated at many sites, and phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 plays critical roles in tau accumulation and toxicity. Microtubule affinity–regulating kinase 4 (MARK4) phosphorylates tau at those sites, and a double de novo mutation in the linker region of MARK4, ΔG316E317D, is associated with an elevated risk of AD. However, it remains unclear how this mutation affects phosphorylation, aggregation, and accumulation of tau and tau-induced neurodegeneration. Here, we report that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases the abundance of highly phosphorylated, insoluble tau species and exacerbates neurodegeneration via Ser-262/356–dependent and –independent mechanisms. Using transgenic Drosophila expressing human MARK4 (MARK4wt) or a mutant version of MARK4 (MARK4ΔG316E317D), we found that coexpression of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased total tau levels and enhanced tau-induced neurodegeneration and that MARK4ΔG316E317D had more potent effects than MARK4wt. Interestingly, the in vitro kinase activities of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D were similar. When tau phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 was blocked by alanine substitutions, MARK4wt did not promote tau accumulation or exacerbate neurodegeneration, whereas coexpression of MARK4ΔG316E317D did. Both MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased the levels of oligomeric forms of tau; however, only MARK4ΔG316E317D further increased the detergent insolubility of tau in vivo. Together, these findings suggest that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases tau levels and exacerbates tau toxicity via a novel gain-of-function mechanism and that modification in this region of MARK4 may affect disease pathogenesis.

Synapse loss is associated with motor and cognitive decline in multiple neurodegenerative disorders, and the cellular redistribution of tau is related to synaptic impairment in tauopathies, such as Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia. Here, we examined the cellular distribution of tau protein species in human tau overexpressing line 66 mice, a transgenic mouse model akin to genetic variants of frontotemporal dementia. Line 66 mice express intracellular tau aggregates in multiple brain regions and exhibit sensorimotor and motor learning deficiencies. Using a series of anti-tau antibodies, we observed, histologically, that nonphosphorylated transgenic human tau is enriched in synapses, whereas phosphorylated tau accumulates predominantly in cell bodies and axons. Subcellular fractionation confirmed that human tau is highly enriched in insoluble cytosolic and synaptosomal fractions, whereas endogenous mouse tau is virtually absent from synapses. Cytosolic tau was resistant to solubilization with urea and Triton X-100, indicating the formation of larger tau aggregates. By contrast, synaptic tau was partially soluble after Triton X-100 treatment and most likely represents aggregates of smaller size. MS corroborated that synaptosomal tau is nonphosphorylated. Tau enriched in the synapse of line 66 mice, therefore, appears to be in an oligomeric and nonphosphorylated state, and one that could have a direct impact on cognitive function.

Alzheimer's disease (AD) is characterized by neuronal loss and accumulation of β-amyloid-protein (Aβ) in the brain parenchyma. Sleep impairment is associated with AD and affects about 25–40% of patients in the mild-to-moderate stages of the disease. Sleep deprivation leads to increased Aβ production; however, its mechanism remains largely unknown. We hypothesized that the increase in core body temperature induced by sleep deprivation may promote Aβ production. Here, we report temperature-dependent regulation of Aβ production. We found that an increase in temperature, from 37 °C to 39 °C, significantly increased Aβ production in amyloid precursor protein-overexpressing cells. We also found that high temperature (39 °C) significantly increased the expression levels of heat shock protein 90 (Hsp90) and the C-terminal fragment of presenilin 1 (PS1-CTF) and promoted γ-secretase complex formation. Interestingly, Hsp90 was associated with the components of the premature γ-secretase complex, anterior pharynx-defective-1 (APH-1), and nicastrin (NCT) but was not associated with PS1-CTF or presenilin enhancer-2. Hsp90 knockdown abolished the increased level of Aβ production and the increased formation of the γ-secretase complex at high temperature in culture. Furthermore, with in vivo experiments, we observed increases in the levels of Hsp90, PS1-CTF, NCT, and the γ-secretase complex in the cortex of mice housed at higher room temperature (30 °C) compared with those housed at standard room temperature (23 °C). Our results suggest that high temperature regulates Aβ production by modulating γ-secretase complex formation through the binding of Hsp90 to NCT/APH-1.

How modular renewables can reduce the costs of relying on carbon capture Expert comment LToremark 10 October 2024

COP29 must raise countries’ ambitions to deploy vastly more low-cost modular renewable technologies to help meet the tripling of renewables target set at COP28 and reduce our reliance on expensive carbon capture systems.

The most important international climate conference is around the corner. COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan will be especially important because next year countries will submit their five-yearly national climate plans – or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – as set out under the Paris Agreement.

At COP28 in Dubai last year, the final text was heralded as a last-minute success as – somewhat surprisingly – it was the first ever COP to commit to ‘transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner’. To support this, over 200 countries also committed to triple renewable capacity by 2030.

Under current NDCs, even if all countries achieve their most ambitious decarbonization plans, the world would still fall 30 per cent short of tripling renewable capacity by 2030. 

At COP29 in November, hosted by a petrostate, additional agreement is needed to operationalize the removal of fossil fuels from the global energy system and set the ambition for those crucial NDCs in 2025. Failing to do so means the opportunity to triple renewables by 2030 will slip away. But the actions of oil producing nations, international oil companies, their associated supply chains and networks of lobbyists have in recent years done their best to disrupt and slow down the energy transition and water down key negotiations during COPs and elsewhere. 

During the final days of COP28, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sent private letters to its 13 members – including COP28 host the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – urging them to ‘proactively reject any text or formula that targets energy, i.e. fossil fuels, rather than emissions’. OPEC members own 80 per cent of global oil reserves.

Due to the startling decline in the cost of renewables and electric vehicles, fossil fuel producers are increasingly concerned. To fight back they are turning to carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and carbon removal options, which would enable the continued burning of fossil fuels – and protect their assets and business models.

A key battle ground for oil and gas producers is the difference between abated and unabated fossil fuels.

Abatement is the process of capturing CO₂ as fossil fuels are burnt to prevent a proportion of those CO₂ emissions from entering the atmosphere, either by using that CO₂ in products or storing it in geological formations deep underground in near perpetuity, commonly referred to as CCS.

After COP28 there was optimism that the final agreement was significant and covered all fossil fuels without ambiguity around whether they are unabated or abated. 

But the definition of unabated has not actually been agreed within the COP process. During the 2021 COP26 summit, the Glasgow Climate Pact mentioned unabated in reference to coal. Could a gas power station capturing 51 per cent of the emitted CO₂ be considered abated?

And what about the so-called downstream emissions? Downstream emissions from cars, planes, tanker ships and diesel generators etc make up 50–80 per cent of the total emissions from oil – and there are no plans to attach mini-CCS systems to cars.

CCS and engineered carbon removals are also likely to be expensive. Analysis by the Oxford Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment has shown that high CCS pathways to net zero emissions in 2050 would cost at least $30 trillion more than a low CCS pathway with more renewables – roughly $1 trillion more per year.

The costs of CCS have also remained the same for the past 40 years, while the costs of renewables like solar, wind and lithium-ion batteries have dropped radically. Solar costs have declined by 90 per cent in the last decade. 

The rapid cost reductions of solar, wind and batteries are due to their modular nature. Around 70 billion solar cells will be manufactured this year, the majority in China. It is the repetitive modular manufacturing process that has led to rapid efficiency improvements and cost reductions. Each Tesla has around 7,000 lithium-ion battery cells, and the price of these modular batteries fell 14 per cent between 2022 and 2023 alone. 

The modular criteria can help define the technology winners of the future, technologies we should selectively support and accelerate over the coming years. 

While huge industrial power stations, oil rigs and refineries have their benefits, they are not modular in the same way. Their economy of scale is in the large size of each asset. CCS is bolted on to fossil fuel infrastructure but there are less than 50,000 fossil fuel producing assets globally. By contrast, there were 1.5 billion solar panels produced in 2022. The cost of deploying CCS is therefore unlikely to benefit from the rapid cost reductions of modular renewables. Nuclear even less so. There are 440 nuclear power stations in operation today, they take many years to build and remain hugely expensive. 

In conversation with the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds 17 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

The Minister of State for Development discusses the new government’s international development priorities.

Following its election victory in July 2024, the new government has set out an ambition to reset its relationships with countries in the Global South. Its stated mission is to modernise the UK’s approach to international development, helping to create ‘a world free from poverty on a liveable planet’.

Where can the UK make a meaningful difference in a more volatile and insecure world? The government is looking to address priorities including unsustainable debt, empowering women and girls, conflict prevention, and unlocking climate finance. But it does this with a much-reduced Official Development Assistance budget, in a world where progress to meet the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is off track. And while the UK has been debating its own approach to development, the landscape has been changing, with non-allied states vying for influence in the Global South, and developing countries themselves becoming more vocal on climate, debt, and global institutional reform. What kind of role can the government set out for the UK in this context?

In this discussion, the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds, Minister of State for Development in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, will lay out her priorities for meeting international development goals over the coming parliament.

Individual membership provides you with the complete Chatham House experience, connecting you with a unique global policy community. Find out more about membership.

European Hub for Contemporary China

The European Hub for Contemporary China is a three-year project focused on original research on China.

The European Hub for Contemporary China (EuroHub4Sino) is a three-year project, which began in October 2023, to produce original research on China. It also seeks to create an online platform that pools a wide array of European knowledge and expertise on contemporary China in one publicly accessible research platform. The project is run by a consortium of eight partners across six European states.

Find out more by visiting the project website.

EuroHub4Sino is co-funded by the European Union. UK participants in Horizon Europe Project European Hub for Contemporary China are supported by UKRI grant numbers 10108183 and 10108749.

What the US election means for trade policy Expert comment LJefferson 10 October 2024

Kamala Harris and Donald Trump could not be more different when it comes to trade, despite a changed economic landscape.

Trade policy is playing a relatively subdued role in this autumn’s US election. Yes, former president Trump has proposed tariffs of anywhere from 20 per cent to 100 per cent, asserting the revenue could fund policy areas from deficit reduction to childcare, all while growing US employment and promoting world peace.
  
But unlike 2020, or even more 2016, the international trade architecture has not been a lively part of this year’s campaign. The two parties now start from a shared expectation of an international economic landscape shaped more by competition and industrial policy than by continued liberalization. However, the two presidential candidates’ views of which trade tools to use, and whether to proceed with allies and partners or unilaterally, could not be more different.

New set of trade expectations

A large part of the relative calm has to do with the emergence of a new set of expectations on trade that are shared across Republicans and Democrats, and that are unlikely to shift in the next four years regardless of who occupies the White House.

First, neither party can field the support to pass a traditional comprehensive free trade agreement through Congress. While each party still has a wing of elected officials who would like to see the US return to negotiating deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or attempt expansive new deals with Europe or in the Western Hemisphere, they are unlikely to reach critical mass in the immediate future, regardless of who holds the White House – or who controls Congress.

This shift in perception of the relative value of such deals – and their potential to cause political blowback for legislators – also means that the cost to any administration that wanted to propose such a deal would be high.

Second, there is broad bipartisan support to continue measures aimed at promoting US security in the face of high-technology challenges from Beijing that have both military and security applications. This means continued US activism in export controls and other more innovative measures.

Less divergence on clean energy

While there is also cross-party enthusiasm for approaches to building up US manufacturing that fall under the rubric of industrial policy, the parties diverge significantly when it comes to specific content. However, around clean energy that divergence will be less than the campaign trail rhetoric suggests.

Because clean energy generation is spread so broadly across the United States – with a great deal of wind and solar generation in Republican-governed ‘red states,’ and investment from the Inflation Reduction Act flowing to red states as much or more than blue ones – such incentives, and their effects on trade policy, are here to stay. Despite this, a Republican presidency or Congress will certainly seek to water down or eliminate parts of the Inflation Reduction Act that focus specifically on transition away from fossil fuels.
 
Coupled with this commitment to making America a clean energy superpower, there is considerable cross-party interest in trade initiatives that promote clean energy and manufacturing – whether from a climate perspective or a pure economic competitiveness perspective. A wide range of creative proposals are buzzing around Congress and think-tanks – from a carbon border measure, to resuscitating the Global Steel Arrangement, to critical mineral-focused deals. Though the topic is often overlooked in overviews of trade policy, it is the one where we are most likely to see classic trade tools used.

A vast difference between the two candidates

Beyond those broad strokes of an emerging ‘new Washington consensus,’ as former US trade representative and current head of the Council on Foreign Relations Michael Froman describes it: who wins the presidency will make a vast difference in what Washington does on trade – and how it aims to achieve its goals.

A Harris administration will aim to develop shared economic security agendas with allies and partners – quite possibly expanding beyond the Biden Administration’s G7 focus to pursue more deals with a broader range of partners. Trump, on the other hand, has explicitly said he will pursue US economic interests at the expense of allies and partners. ‘Under my leadership,’ he said in a speech in Georgia last month, ‘we’re going to take other countries’ jobs,’ specifically citing allies Germany and South Korea as targets.

While Vice-President Harris has criticized Trump’s tariff proposals, and noted their likely negative effects on consumers, she has not signalled that she would make changes to the tariffs on China first imposed by President Trump and then adjusted by President Biden. 
A Trump administration would use tariffs aggressively, but it remains absolutely unclear how. 

The UK must focus on how the Chagos decision is implemented to gain its benefits and minimize risks Expert comment jon.wallace 11 October 2024

The UK decision was welcomed by India and the US, and shows a capacity for fresh thinking. But the transfer of sovereignty must be handled carefully.

The UK announced on 3 October that it would cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

There are potential strategic and reputation-related upsides for the UK from the decision – but these can only be realized if the deal is implemented in ways that meet the UK’s stated goals.

First, the UK aims to safeguard the utility and security of the joint US–UK base on Diego Garcia. It also intends for the decision to benefit the Chagossians, who were displaced by the British decision in 1965 to separate the Archipelago from Mauritius as part of a deal to grant Mauritian independence.

The decision has already proved deeply controversial in the UK, provoking sustained criticism from former Conservative government ministers and commentary that has branded it naive, dangerous, and a blow to British prestige.

Part of the reason for the welter of criticism may be the apparent suddenness of the announcement. The impression that this was a hasty decision is likely because it came just three months after the Labour government came to office. But this belies the far longer gestation period around the decision.

World opinion

In fact, the previous Conservative UK government decided to begin negotiations over sovereignty of Chagos – following Mauritius bringing the matter to the International Court of Justice. In 2019, the court issued a non-binding opinion in favour of Mauritius.

The same year the UN General Assembly voted 116 in favour to 6 against, and with 56 abstentions, for a resolution ‘welcoming a 25 February 2019 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legal consequences of separating the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, demanding that the UK unconditionally withdraw its colonial administration from the area within six months’ to ‘enable Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory.’

But returning the islands will not necessarily boost the UK’s international standing. Issues relating to the Archipelago are complex, and it will take work to convince interested international parties that the UK is acting fairly against a colonized and displaced population.

Mauritius has no pre-colonial history of controlling the Chagos islands, which are located some 1,500 miles away from Mauritius across a vast sprawl of the Indian Ocean. It is true that the Chagos Islands were a colonial remnant, but to ensure that UK is seen by global audiences to be acting fairly, the handover of sovereignty must be carefully handled. Perhaps the greatest reputational risk will come from failing to adequately account for the rights of Chagossians.  

The more pertinent historical injustice has been to them. And reporting by the BBC has shown that at least some Chagossians were dismayed by not having been consulted in negotiations between the UK and Mauritius.

The UK government announcement on the deal did state that that ‘the welfare of Chagossians’ will be paramount and that ‘the UK will capitalize a new trust fund, as well as separately provide other support, for the benefit of Chagossians’. But for the Chagossians, there will be a clamour to see this realized in full.

Strategic interests

On the strategic question, the utility of the joint US–UK military base on Diego Garcia has been guaranteed in a 99-year lease. As the UK negotiator Jonathan Powell has explained, this deal was reached in close consultation with US officials and puts the base on legally safe ground for the first time in decades. 

Indeed, Powell has explained that Joe Biden was keen to reach agreement ahead of the US elections so that US military access to Diego Garcia was safeguarded against any possible contrary decision by a possible returning Trump presidency.

There are understandable concerns that, as a result of the decision, China may develop commercial ports in the region and seek to compete with India for economic and strategic relationships. But this is a long-term matter of concern to monitor, regardless of the UK’s decision on Chagos.

Chinese naval influence in the Indian Ocean is currently limited, compared to its assertiveness in the South China Sea, where it is building artificial islands, or in the South Pacific where it is pursuing policing assistance deals like that secured with the Solomon Islands.

And the strategic situations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are not at all alike. Indeed, the Chagos Islands are far closer to India and its economic influence than they are to any other major economic power. 

The fact that India has welcomed the UK’s decision over Chagos sovereignty is noteworthy, given the UK’s separate attempts to modernize and expand its bilateral relations with New Delhi.

In the long run, it is likely that India will play a leading role in Indian Ocean security, and the UK will want to be well-placed to explore how to play a role as an effectively partner.

The more pertinent immediate concern is the implications for other overseas UK territorial responsibilities. There are legitimate questions to be raised over setting a precedent that could undermine RAF Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, which remained sovereign UK bases after Cyprus’s independence in 1960.

Grassroots to global: Young changemakers against violence 24 October 2024 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 October 2024 Chatham House

As part of Black History Month, this event will look at how youth activism against violence can influence change.

To address the alarming increase knife crime, a 10% rise in knife-related homicides between April 2022 and March 2023, the UK government launched a coalition of community leaders, campaigners and policy makers to tackle this tragic loss of life.

With people under 25 disproportionately affected, the ‘knife crime epidemic’ represents an example of how youth activist groups are central to tackling the problem. Organisations for and operated by young people form a key part of the strategy to ensure people are better protected from violent crime.

Around the world, a network of youth groups are similarly striving to make a difference and build a better life for future generations. Operating in different political and economic conditions, there are learnings to be found in groups working across the world.

This session will discuss how grassroot activism and youth organisations can influence governments to prevent young people falling into crime, the role of race and religion, and whether organisations are improving in their effectiveness around the world.

This event is a collaboration with Integrate UK.

India–Russia relations Explainer LToremark 14 October 2024

Explaining the history and current state of the relationship between India and Russia, its geopolitical significance, the importance of trade and defence cooperation, and the impact of the war in Ukraine.

What is the history of India’s relationship with Russia? 

The two countries established diplomatic relations in April 1947, shortly before India gained independence. India was on a quest to achieve economic self-sufficiency, so the then-Soviet Union was an important partner in terms of providing support for the country’s heavy industry, with investment in mining, energy and steel production. India’s economic planning model was also based on the Soviet five-year plan.

There is a high degree of historical affinity towards Russia in India, particularly among the older generation of policy elites. This is because the Soviet Union supported India during the Cold War, notably during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, in which the US and China sided with Pakistan. This was arguably the peak of the Indo–Soviet relationship and also the year that the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

But even before that, the Soviet Union had supported India. During the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the USSR played a mediating role and hosted the so-called Tashkent summit in 1966 where a peace treaty was signed.

The Soviet Union also used its UN Security Council veto several times in support of India, half a dozen times between 1957 and 1971. This was usually on the issue of Kashmir and once with respect to India’s military intervention in Goa to end Portuguese rule. It was also routine for the Indian prime minister to stop over in Moscow on the way back from Washington.

The relationship has continued into the post-Cold War period. Annual summits have been held since 2000, when a strategic partnership was signed (and subsequently upgraded in 2010). India and Russia have also been holding so-called 2+2 meetings – joint meetings with foreign and defence ministers – since 2021.

India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has referred to the India–Russia relationship as the one constant in global politics over the last half century.

What is the current relationship between India and Russia? 

Russia remains a key strategic partner for India for both practical and ideological reasons. On the practical side, India benefits significantly from access to discounted Russian crude oil, which has increased from less than 2 per cent of India’s total imports before the Russian invasion of Ukraine to over 40 per cent in June 2024. Indian companies have also benefitted from exporting refined Russian oil products, some of which have found their way onto Western markets.

But energy cooperation is not confined to oil. It also includes cooperation in the nuclear space, where there is a strong historical foundation. When India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, the Soviet Union did not shun cooperation with India – unlike the US. Compared to the US, Russia has also been able to better navigate India’s civil nuclear liability law, which was put in place in 2010. In February 2024, India and Russia upgraded an agreement to build six civil nuclear power plants in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

The other area of practical cooperation is defence. Russia accounts for over 50 per cent of India’s in-service military platforms. India is also the largest recipient of Russian arms exports, including the S400 missile defence system. There has been joint production of several platforms, such as the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which has been exported to third countries, starting with the Philippines. 

Russia has been a preferred arms supplier for India for many years because it provides arms at reasonable prices without end user constraints, and is often able to supply sensitive technologies, which other countries are not.

There is also a long-standing economic relationship. India and Russia aim to increase bilateral trade from $68 billion to $100 billion by the end of this decade. Connectivity initiatives include the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor and the International North-South Transport Corridor.

There are regular interactions between the leaders of the two countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin have met 17 times in the last decade and have held annual summits since 2000, with a few exceptions – and a notable gap following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

There is also a push to try and negotiate bilateral visa free access for Indians to increase people-to-people and tourism exchanges between the two countries.

There is also an ideological component to the relationship, which is often overlooked. One aspect is that India has a long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, which means engaging all major poles of influence in the international system – including Russia. There is also the aforementioned historical affinity due to Soviet support for India during the Cold War.

But the relationship is undergoing a managed decline. It does not have the same level of strategic importance as it did during the Cold War.

Although India still depends on Russia for a large proportion of its military hardware, since the 1990s there has been a push to diversify. As part of the ‘Make in India’ campaign, there is an attempt to strengthen domestic defence production as well as diversify to other countries. Between 2009 and 2013, 76 per cent of India’s arms imports were from Russia, but this has dropped to 36 per cent between 2019 and 2023 according to SIPRI.

While this trend predates the war in Ukraine, it has been accelerated by the war. There has been a delay in the delivery of several defence platforms, most notably the S400 missile defence system, as well as spare parts for fighter jets. The prolonged war of attrition in Ukraine has also undermined Indian confidence in some Russian military hardware.

There is decline on the ideological side too. India is trying to project a world view that is non-Western but not explicitly anti-Western. This puts it out of sync with Russia’s world view, and that of countries like China and Iran. 

India is increasingly aloof or estranged from forums where Russia plays a prominent role, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Modi did not attend the July 2024 SCO summit. When India held the presidency of the SCO in 2023 it was a low-profile presidency and there was a virtual summit. In contrast, India’s high-profile G20 presidency in 2023 was framed as the country’s ‘coming out party’.

While Modi and Putin met in July 2024, it was the first time that they had met since September 2022, a significant gap.

What is more, their economic interactions are highly skewed. There is roughly $68 billion in trade between the two countries but $60 billion of that is oil imports. India’s large share of Russian crude imports also means that Russia holds a surplus of Indian rupees, which has caused some friction in terms of rouble-rupee trade.

On the Indian side, there have also been concerns about a number of Indian nationals that have been duped into fighting for Russia in the Ukraine conflict.

But although the relationship is not what it once was, Russia will remain a key strategic partner for India for the foreseeable future.

Does India support Russia’s war on Ukraine? 

India has neither condoned nor condemned Russia’s actions. The Indian government has been vocal in expressing its displeasure of the war and Modi has said that now is ‘not an era of war’. He has also expressed sorrow for the bombing of a children’s hospital, hit by Russian airstrikes in July 2024. During his August 2024 visit to Ukraine, Modi said that India’s position is not neutral, but that it stands on the side of peace.

But there is a gap between rhetoric and reality. India in fact maintains quite a neutral position. It has abstained in UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. It did not endorse the joint communique produced at a peace conference in Switzerland in June 2024, which Modi also did not attend. And the G20 leaders’ declaration that was concluded under India’s G20 presidency had no mention of Russian actions in Ukraine.

India has also emerged as the second-biggest supplier of restricted critical technologies to Russia (behind China), helping to fuel Russia’s war machine.

This reflects India’s practical or pragmatic considerations, including its dependence on Russian military hardware and access to discounted Russian crude. But there is also a degree of sympathy in New Delhi for the Russian narrative of the war, that Moscow’s actions were sparked by NATO expansion into Russia’s self-perceived sphere of influence.

In theory, India is well positioned to play the role of a potential mediator. It maintains close ties with both Moscow and Washington, unlike other countries that have close relations with Russia, such as China, Iran or North Korea. The West has been understanding of India’s strategic constraints in terms of its dependence on Russian military hardware and its energy needs. But so far, India’s actions have been largely driven by self-interest. Despite its statements, it has not made any peace proposals like those of Turkey or China.

Indian symbolism over substance was also clear in Modi’s summer 2024 meetings with Putin and Zelenskyy.

Modi visited Putin in July 2024 – a visit that coincided with Russian airstrikes in Ukraine. Zelenskyy called the meeting a devastating blow to peace efforts. And the optics of Modi hugging Putin while a Ukrainian children’s hospital was bombed prompted a degree of damage control by New Delhi, leading to Modi’s visit to Ukraine in August 2024.

His visit to Ukraine was an attempt to reaffirm India’s position of neutrality on the war and its long-standing position of strategic autonomy. It was also an attempt at a course correction in India’s relationship with Ukraine. Modi was the first Indian prime minister to visit Ukraine since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1993.

How does China impact India–Russia relations? 

China is an important consideration in terms of India’s strategic calculations towards Russia. One of the reasons New Delhi is eager to maintain engagement with Russia is fears that Moscow is becoming increasingly beholden to Beijing following its invasion of Ukraine. India wants to provide Russia with strategic options as it becomes increasingly isolated and wants to deter it from becoming a client state of China. In parts of the West, that is already seen as a foregone conclusion, but Russia is not yet seen as a lost cause in India.

The other point to keep in mind is that China and India largely see eye to eye on the Ukraine war. Neither see their close relationship with Moscow as translating into overt support for Russian actions in Ukraine. Both countries believe they are playing a constructive role through their purchase of discounted Russian crude, which is helping to control global energy prices.

But a key watch point is what would Russia’s position be on possible future hostilities between China and India. Historically, Moscow has played a relatively neutral position and has occasionally offered to play a mediating role. It has even leaned in India’s favour on occasion and has provided it with more advanced military platforms than it has provided China. 

The fear in New Delhi is that this could be shifting and in the future Moscow could side with China in a potential conflict or tensions with India. That would be a game changer for India and would prompt it to rethink its relationship with Russia.

China’s economic policy pendulum has swung towards stimulus – but keep expectations low Expert comment jon.wallace 14 October 2024

Beijing historically swings between stimulus and frugality. But Xi Jinping’s ambition for self-reliance will constrain any new efforts to boost the economy.

Policymakers in Beijing have spent the past three weeks trying to convince the world that they are determined to deliver meaningful support to China’s sagging economy. 

Since late September statements have come from the central bank, which promised to cut interest rates, release liquidity, and provide funding to securities firms; from the politburo, which said it wanted to stabilize the real estate market, boost the capital market and shift towards looser fiscal and monetary policy; from the government’s main planning body, which promised a package of policies to support domestic demand; and from the finance minister himself, who at the weekend committed to issue more debt to recapitalize banks, support local governments and aid unhappy consumers.

Though details have been scant, the Chinese stock market has responded enthusiastically to this flurry of rhetoric. But the bigger question for the global economy is whether a boost in Chinese demand can return the country to its former status as a reliable destination for global exports and capital.

With that measure of success in mind, it is worth keeping expectations low. For the past 15 years, Chinese authorities have been wrestling with two conflicting objectives: to grow the economy, and to minimize the risk of financial instability. Those goals sit uneasily with each other because the effort to boost growth has relied on borrowing; and yet a rise in debt can increase the risk of a debt crisis.  

Chinese policymaking has responded to this dilemma by taking on a pendulum-like quality. Sometimes the authorities boost the economy by funding more investment spending. At other times that stimulus gets reined back as policymakers worry about the economy’s indebtedness.

In the aftermath of the great financial crisis of 2008, for example, Beijing’s over-riding priority was to protect the Chinese economy from the risk of recession by implementing a huge credit-financed stimulus to spur investment in infrastructure and real estate. 

By 2012, though, concerns about over-indebtedness began to dominate, and a withdrawal of stimulus saw the Chinese economy sag. In late 2015,a new round of stimulus measures emerged, only to be withdrawn again around 2018.

With that pendulum in mind, the optimistic take on what policymakers have said in recent weeks is that we are now back in stimulus mode. That’s true in part, but three factors suggest that this time is a little different.

Different times

First, China’s rising debt burden increases authorities’ worries about financial stability. Data from the BIS show that China’s private sector debt almost doubled in the past 15 years to 200 per cent of GDP at the end of 2023. The comparable debt stock for the US and the Eurozone was much lower, at 150 per cent each.

Second, ideology is playing a growing role in shaping Chinese economic policy. The most visible effect has been to prioritize Chinese state-owned enterprises, at the expense of the private sector. This became especially visible in 2021 with a campaign against the ‘unrestrained expansion of capital’ – Beijing’s way of expressing its anxiety that China’s corporate sector was behaving in a manner inconsistent with Chinese Communist Party goals. 

Although that phrase is no longer current, entrepreneurs’ animal spirits remain in the doldrums. They are likely to stay there as long as President Xi Jinping’s preference is for ‘bigger, better, stronger’ state-owned enterprises, which use capital much less efficiently than private firms.

Third, today Chinese policy is shaped by Beijing’s perception of geopolitical risks that it faces. Those risks became starkly apparent in February 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when essentially every country that prints a reserve currency joined to freeze Russia’s access to its foreign exchange reserves. That enveloped the Russian economy in a network of sanctions that sharply constrained its access to a whole range of imports.

It is not difficult to consider a similar scenario confronting China. Beijing’s approach to economic policy is therefore heavily influenced by the need to insulate itself from that kind of risk (though Chinese policy had in any case been tilting in this direction for years).

‘Asymmetric decoupling’

This policy can be described as ‘asymmetric decoupling’: a simultaneous effort on the one hand to reduce China’s reliance on the rest of the world by substituting imports with domestic production; and, on the other hand, to increase the rest of the world’s reliance on China by establishing itself as a ‘zhizao qiangguo’, or manufacturing powerhouse.

This is the right context in which to understand a central economic goal of the authorities, which is to reduce the economy’s dependence on real estate investment. 

The intention is to allow capital and credit resources to migrate to new sectors of the economy that will help to build that manufacturing powerhouse: high-tech and green energy, in particular. What that means in practice is that any forthcoming support for the real estate sector will be rather limited.

What are the top economic priorities for the new US President? 19 November 2024 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 15 October 2024 Chatham House

A post-US election discussion on the outlook for US economic policy and implications for the global economy.

A fortnight on from the US Presidential and Congressional elections, this expert panel, organised by Chatham House’s Global Economy and Finance Programme in collaboration with the Society of Professional Economists, will consider the outlook for US economic policy and implications for the global economy.

Questions for discussion will include:

• What will the economic priorities of the new President be? What will be the role of industrial strategy/green transition, regulation, trade, migration and fiscal policy?
• How far will the President be constrained by other branches of the US government, including Congress, the courts and state governments?
• What will the implications be for the global economy broadly and through the specific channels of trade, investment, monetary policy and debt?
• How will the new President handle economic and financial relations with the US’s traditional G7 allies, China and the Global South?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

How Beijing is closing surveillance gaps in the South China Sea The World Today iallan.drupal 15 October 2024

The discovery of a new radar system on China’s Triton Island military base shows that Beijing is rapidly developing its intelligence capacities in contested waters, write John Pollock and Damien Symon.

New satellite images reveal how the Chinese military is dramatically expanding its capabilities on Triton Island, which looks set to become a one of Beijing’s key signal intelligence bases in the South China Sea.

Once completed, the radar system would significantly increase China’s signals intercept and electronic warfare capabilities across the disputed Paracel Islands archipelago and add to a wider surveillance network spanning much of the South China Sea.

The enhanced facility on Triton is likely to offer a challenge to China’s competitors in the region and internationally.

China seized control of the Paracels from Vietnam in a 1974 naval battle, and competition for access to it waters has intensified since the recent discovery of oil and gas reserves. Chinese and Vietnamese maritime militia clashed off the coast of Triton in 2014.

In addition, American, British and Australian naval forces have for the past decade patrolled the waters to collectively challenge China’s contested ‘nine-dash-line’ claim to large stretches of the South China Sea. 

Overlapping anti-stealth network

A year after work was first identified on Triton, satellite images from Maxar have helped build a clearer picture of Beijing’s efforts to defend this strategic waterway.

The most striking development is the construction of a new radar system, known as SIAR – synthetic impulse and aperture radar – which purportedly detects stealth aircraft. The counter-stealth radar on Triton is characterized by its distinctive octagonal structure, which resembles another SIAR system built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, south of the Paracels, in 2017. A half-completed tower also sits near the SIAR radar on Triton, which is likely to be the operations centre.

Once completed, the radar on Triton will form what is believed to be a wider network of at least three overlapping counter-stealth radars built across Chinese bases in the South China Sea over the past decade, including on Hainan Island, home to several Chinese naval bases. 

The positioning of the radar on Triton, 320km south of Hainan, is telling, says J. Michael Dahm, Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies at the Mitchell Institute. 

‘SIAR radars cannot see over the curve of the Earth, which means there is a gap in China’s air surveillance coverage between Subi Reef and Hainan Island. The Triton Island site will help close that gap’, said Dahm.

The aim, he suggests, is to give China contiguous counter-stealth radar coverage of the South China Sea.

More construction underway

The satellite images reveal other building projects on Triton. One is a large pad at the end of the road network which will probably be used as a launching point for a mobile anti-ship missile battery. The building at the northeast end of the road is probably a storage building for missile transport vehicles. 

Diminishing Vietnam’s options

The development of a new counter-stealth radar system and other suspected signals intercept structures on Triton represents a notable increase in China’s intelligence capabilities in the Paracels. The Chinese Communist Party has not disclosed the purpose of the building work on Triton, but its effects on regional and global competitors are likely to be wide ranging.

For Vietnam, which is rapidly expanding its own bases in the South China Sea, the intelligence structures on Triton would significantly diminish its capacity to operate undetected in the area. Alongside existing radar on Triton which can detect sea-going vessels, Beijing now has the potential to track Vietnamese air movements and gain forewarning of Hanoi’s manoeuvres in the area, including efforts to access oil and gas deposits.

The desire to strengthen control over these resources may explain why China is fortifying Triton Island, says Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House. ‘The developments might be a warning that China is planning to mount another drilling expedition’, he suggests.

The US election could create the need for a G7 alternative – without American representation Expert comment jon.wallace 15 October 2024

Traditional allies of the US need to find a way to work together on some global policy issues even when the US itself is not engaged. A ‘G6 plus’ group could provide an answer.

When Jamaica pulled out of the nascent West Indies Federation in 1961, Trinidad and Tobago’s then prime minister, Dr Eric Williams, famously said ‘One from ten leaves nought’. In the run up to the US elections on 5 November, the US’s longstanding allies need to ask themselves if the same logic must apply to the G7. 

A Donald Trump victory will result in stark differences between the US and its closest partners on key global economic issues. US allies would no doubt try and persuade the new president to moderate his position, but experience suggests that this will have little, if any, effect.  

They may then want to work around the US, or on a parallel track. But doing so will be very hard unless they have a framework for discussing and developing ideas collectively. Could some form of ‘G6 plus’ forum help?

The role of the G7 today

The G7 no longer acts as a steering group for the global economy. However, it remains a critical forum for the US and its allies to coordinate their efforts to help solve global problems, to defend common Western interests, to resolve internal disputes and to underpin information exchange. 

In the past two years, the G7 has come to be seen by the US and other members as one of the most effective international mechanisms. It has played a critical role coordinating Western efforts to recover from the last pandemic and prepare for future ones.  

It has been pivotal in weakening Russia’s economy following the attack on Ukraine and has acted to strengthen Western economic security and resilience more broadly.  

The G7 has also responded to ‘Global South’ calls for help in dealing with the pandemic aftermath and the Ukraine war. 

Trump’s approach to the G7

The problem is that the G7’s effectiveness depends critically on full US engagement, sometimes as a leader of initiatives (such as the decision to impose an ‘oil price cap’ on Russia in autumn 2022) or as an essential partner. 

If elected, former President Trump is likely to abandon the G7 as an instrument of international economic policy. This is effectively what happened during his first presidency and there are reasons to expect this to be repeated. 

Many of Trump’s international economic policies are highly controversial with US allies, including his apparent determination to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, impose across the board 10-20 per cent tariffs and even punish countries for not using the dollar. His domestic policies, including mass deportation of undocumented immigrants and aggressive deregulation and fiscal easing could lead to further sharp disagreements.  

Furthermore, Trump demonstrates general antipathy towards multilateralism. Under his presidency, US representatives in the G7 and G20 sought to weaken core values and policies that have underpinned international economic cooperation for decades – including the importance of a rules based international system, the IMF’s global safety net role, and the responsibility of the advanced world to assist the poorest countries financially.  

Other G7 and G20 countries tried to preserve as much as possible of the previous consensus. But in the case of climate change, the only solution was to have a separate text for the US. Critically, such efforts diverted time and attention from the enormous challenges facing the world at the time. 

Trump went through four different G7/G20 Sherpas during his presidency and disowned the final declaration of the 2018 Canadian G7 summit after hundreds of hours of negotiation, and despite previously signing off on the text. The US failed to host a final leaders’ summit, even virtually, during his administration’s G7 presidency.  

Of course, how far Trump carries through his most radical policies will depend, among other things, on the outcome of the Congressional elections and the stance taken by US courts. 

He may also have second thoughts if elected. His first administration sometimes supported significant multilateral economic initiatives, notably the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative and ‘Common Framework’ for debt rescheduling. 

But, in the event of a second Trump administration, the most likely scenario for the G7 is a repeat of the paralysis of 2017-20, which would be even more costly today.

Should Vice President Kamala Harris win on 5 November, the situation should in theory be very different. She will likely continue with President Joe Biden’s collaborative approach to the G7.

Nonetheless, major issues may still arise where America’s allies want to take a fundamentally different approach and need a mechanism to do so. These could include policy on the WTO, de-risking the economic relationship with China, restricting carbon leakage, and regulating US-dominated big tech.  

How should US allies respond?

No US ally will want to be seen to be leading development of a new ‘G6’ that excludes the US. The top priority will be securing the best possible relationship with the incoming president. Political weakness and/or new governments in France, Germany, the UK and Japan will add to this hesitancy.

Any new forum will therefore need to be as low profile as possible. The concept should initially be discussed in private by sherpas from each participating country. Once established, officials should as far as possible meet online. Leaders should only meet online, at least initially.  

Participants should be fully transparent about the forum’s existence and avoid any grand ‘framing’ along the lines of the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’. Instead, it should be described as a practical, largely technocratic forum intended to coordinate activity among Western economic powers in those areas where the US chooses not to engage. A suitably innocuous name – such as the ‘the sustainable growth club’ could help.

Topics should be limited to those requiring urgent collective global action, such as climate, health, tech governance, development finance and trade – and where the US federal government is not an ‘essential’ partner. Such a forum should not therefore address defence.  

Moldova and Georgia face crucial elections – and diverging paths Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2024

The two countries face unusually consequential elections where their populations must choose between moving unambiguously towards the West – or towards closer ties with Russia.

Moldova and Georgia both go to the polls at the end of October; Moldova for presidential elections on the 20^th and Georgia for parliamentary elections on the 26^th. The two countries share a number of similarities – beyond their justified reputation as world-class wine producers. They are both small, low- to middle-income countries that have struggled to consolidate their democracies and have experienced oligarchic political influence. Both are candidate countries for EU membership, with Moldova a step ahead having been invited to start negotiations. 

For both countries these elections represent a fork in the road: either move unambiguously into the Western world, or step back from it and become more closely tied to Russia again and its way of governance. However, the second option has caused yet-to-be-resolved territorial conflicts in both countries – Transnistria for Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia.

Some would say it should not be such a ‘zero sum’ choice. Why must a nation choose between Russia and the West? While that may be a fair statement for countries like India or South Africa, it does not work for Russia’s former colonies, which Moscow wishes to control. 

Moldova and Georgia’s final similarity is that they face Russian interference and attempts to manipulate votes in their elections. In Moldova this has been especially brazen with the uncovering in September of a $15 million vote-buying scheme, including instructions on who to vote for distributed to over 130,000 citizens. Russian interference in Georgia’s election is less overt but at the same time more endemic considering its government has in effect been captured by pro-Russia forces.

Diverging paths

But this is where the similarities end and the contrasts become clear.

Moldova has a young, pro-Western and equality-conscious government, and 44 of the 100 MPs in its parliament are women. In this election, Maia Sandu is seeking her second and final term as president. The election is combined with a referendum asking the people if they wish to embed Moldova’s EU aspirations into the country’s constitution. The results of both the presidential election and the EU referendum will be close, reflecting a genuine split in attitudes (and debate) in the country. 

Georgia’s EU aspirations, meanwhile, are already embedded in its constitution – but that has not prevented Tbilisi from pivoting away from the West. Polls show   that around 80 per cent of Georgia’s population desires EU (and NATO) membership – rising to 90 per cent among the under 30s – but its government seems determined to deny them that future. 

Its new ‘foreign agents’ law is seemingly copy-pasted from Russia – and incompatible with EU membership. The election can be seen as a de facto referendum on the EU too. Georgia’s accession is suspended until its political crisis is resolved. 

Georgia faces other challenges to its democracy. Due to the country’s limited presidential powers, Georgia is in effect run by the unelected Bidzina Ivanishvili – founder of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party – whose relationship with Russia is murky at best. Judging by his recent speeches, Ivanishvili now blames the Western world not just for igniting the war in Ukraine, but also for the war in Georgia 16 years ago which resulted in the loss of 20 per cent of its territory at the hands of Russia. This extraordinary position is both factually incorrect and out of step with the Georgian people.

Both countries are now at a critical point. Whatever the outcome in Moldova, the election will pass off peacefully and competently. Its problems (Russia aside) are demographic and economic, and the country’s pro-Russian opposition is relatively weak.

Georgia’s election looks like it is going to be messy. Ivanishvili’s party will likely manipulate the election to a win. There is still a chance that Georgia’s pro-Western but also weak opposition will regain power and return the country to its European path. But if the manipulation by the incumbency is heavy, people will likely take to the streets in protest, as in April this year – and in the 2003 Rose Revolution.

Regime change via popular revolution shows political immaturity but the Georgian people may feel it is the only way they can have their views represented and their ambitions realised. 

Can the world avoid a new nuclear arms race? 18 November 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

The Doomsday Clock stands at 90 seconds to midnight – the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been. As geopolitical competition intensifies, nuclear risks are resurging at an alarming rate. The collapse of key arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has removed crucial safeguards against arms races. Efforts to extend or replace existing treaties face significant hurdles in the current geopolitical climate.

Nuclear rhetoric has become more aggressive, as evidenced by Russian and North Korean nuclear threats. Several nuclear-armed states are also engaging in extensive modernization programmes of their nuclear arsenals, potentially fuelling a new arms race.

Despite these pressures, the number of nuclear possessor states has held steady so far. The ongoing Iranian efforts to build nuclear weapons is the closest attempt by a new state to acquire nuclear weapons. As the global security environment becomes more and more tense, existing nuclear possessor states increasingly rely on their nuclear weapons. This might threaten the global consensus against nuclear proliferation.

This session examines these competing pressures and propose strategies to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons use and proliferation. Our expert panel explores diplomatic initiatives, technical measures, and policy innovations to address these critical challenges.

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• Are we already in the middle of a global nuclear arms race?
• How can international arms control treaties be negotiated in the current geopolitical environment?
• Does a new US president change the nuclear calculus? Is the US still able to reassure allies of its ‘extended deterrence’?
• How can we reduce the risk of additional proliferation? Which states might want to acquire nuclear weapons and what can we do about it?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Resetting Africa-Europe relations: From self-deception to economic transformation 28 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts assess the status of ties between Africa and Europe in a rapidly changing world, launching a new book that explores how misconceptions in the relationship can harm Africa’s economic agenda.

The relationship between Africa and Europe has long been shaped by colonial legacies, power imbalance and shifting geopolitical interests.

Almost three years on from the last EU-AU summit in Brussels in February 2022, questions remain over the delivery of headline commitments under the continent-to-continent partnership – ranging from the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure strategy to wider climate financing promises.

As Africa seeks to strengthen its standing on the global stage, marked by the African Union’s upcoming debut at the G20 summit in November, a critical reassessment of these dynamics is needed to examine whether the continent’s relationship with Europe can overcome stigmatized narratives in search of genuine economic benefit.

At this event, which launches a new book by Professor Carlos Lopes: The Self-Deception Trap: Exploring the Economic Dimensions of Charity Dependency within Africa-Europe Relations, speakers assess the prospects for a transformative shift towards a more equitable and mutually beneficial Africa-Europe partnership.

Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering

This project examines the nature of the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Iran in relation to Middle Eastern countries and in the context of broader regional dynamics.

The 2016–21 period in Turkish–Iranian relations, which was marked by both sides’ structured cooperation through the Astana Process and Sochi summits on conflict management in Syria, and their largely shared opposition to US policy in Syria and at the broader regional level, to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referendum, and to the blockade of Qatar, has run its course. 

However, the new shape of these bilateral relations remains undefined, and understanding them is essential to effective policymaking in the region. How they will evolve will have direct ramifications for Iraq, Syria, regional Kurdish geopolitics, and the process of regional reordering and connectivity in the Middle East and South Caucasus. They will also have direct implications for US and European policymaking and role in the region. 

This project studies the evolving nature of Turkish–Iranian relations through Iraq, Syria and regional Kurdish politics. It examines how Turkey and Iran approach regional connectivity projects and major regional initiatives, and how ongoing regional developments, including the war in Gaza, have and may impact Turkey–Iran relations and EU, US and UK security considerations and policy towards the two countries.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey. 

Evolving Turkey–Iran Relations and Implications for Regional Reordering is a project of the CATS Network.

What is COP29 and why is it important? Explainer jon.wallace 17 October 2024

The COP29 summit will see negotiators try to agree how to finance the climate action the world urgently needs.

COP29, the 29th UN annual conference on climate change, takes place in Baku, Azerbaijan from 11–22 November 2024.

Every COP conference is an important opportunity for international collaboration on climate change. COP29 will have a particular focus on how to make finance available to developing countries for climate action.

COP29 is already contentious, because Azerbaijan’s economy is highly dependent on fossil fuels, the main cause of climate change. That means that Azerbaijan’s government, which will preside over the summit, has a strong incentive to avoid rapid multilateral progress towards phasing out fossil fuels. 

It’s urgent that progress is made at COP29. Climate action lags far behind both what has been promised by countries, and what scientists agree is needed. The impacts of climate change are also rapidly escalating, while backlash against government policies to reduce fossil fuel use is being seen in many places around the world. 

What is a ‘COP’?

The ‘Conference of the Parties’ or ‘COP’ is an annual event that brings together the governments which have signed up to environmental action under the United Nations (UN). 

Governments or ‘parties’ attend the climate change COP if they are part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or the international environmental treaties the Kyoto Protocol (1997) or the landmark and legally binding Paris Agreement (2015).

World leaders, ministers, and negotiators convene at the COP to negotiate and rubber stamp plans to jointly address climate change and its impacts. 

Civil society, businesses, international organizations and the media normally ‘observe’ proceedings to bring transparency, accountability and wider perspectives to the process.

‘Mission 1.5°C’ 

COP28, the 2023 climate conference held in Dubai, was the first of three consecutive COP summits intended to ‘reset’ global climate action – what the UN calls the ‘Roadmap to Mission 1.5°C’ – the ambition to keep global temperatures from rising more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. 

To support continuity and progress across the three COPs, the UAE (COP28), Azerbaijan (COP29) and Brazil (COP30) have formed a COP presidential ‘Troika’ or group of three.

In 2023 the first ‘global stocktake’ of international action to address climate change indicated that the world was far off track for targets set by the Paris Agreement. The ‘UAE Consensus’ agreement, which formed the main output of COP28, set out how parties should respond. 

COP29, the second of the three COPs, is intended to get the finance in place to enable this response. COP30, to be held in Brazil in 2025, will then try to agree how a new round of nationally determined climate plans or ‘contributions’ to global climate efforts (NDCs) should be put into action.

COP29 will be the third consecutive COP held in an authoritarian state, and the second consecutive COP hosted by a petro-state. Taken together, the ‘Troika’ hosts make up the world’s 4th largest oil producer, after the United States, Russia and Saudi Arabia. 

This presents both an opportunity and a risk: the countries are well placed to understand and tackle the core issue of fossil fuel extraction and use. But they also have strong incentives to stall, distract and deflect the negotiations away from phasing out fossil fuels.

Key issues at COP29

Finance – money on the table, and a New Collective Quantified Goal

COP29 has a remit to secure funding for a ‘course correction’ on global climate action. Countries’ revised climate plans (NDCs) are due in February 2025. For developing countries to deliver new ambitious NDCs, however, COP29 must first make clear what finance will be available to help them.

Climate finance is one of the thorniest issues in the negotiations. The previous climate finance goal, of $100 billion per year from developed to developing countries between 2020-25, was symbolic (being a fraction of the sum actually needed) and contentious (developed countries did not meet the target until 2022, and then only with accusations of double-counting). 

A New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQGs), to be agreed at COP29, will need to reflect developing countries’ needs and priorities. Estimates vary, but it is accepted that the scale will be trillions, not billions. To bridge this enormous gap, private finance will need to be mobilized and broader reforms made to global financial architecture. Issues such as subsidies, fossil fuel profits and ‘solidarity levies’ will also need to be on the table. 

Little progress has been made in the run-up to COP29. Parties disagree on who should pay, how much should be paid, what forms the funding should take (loans or grants) and how the funds should be accessed. 

Also up for debate is how funds should be directed – towards mitigating the impacts of climate change (preventing climate change becoming worse), adapting to its effects, or supporting countries to manage loss and damage (climate impacts that have already happened or cannot be avoided).  

In discussions of the NCQG to date, developed countries have consistently called for higher income developing countries, such as China and India, to contribute. 

Such countries have pushed back forcefully against this. For a new goal to be agreed, such divisions will need to be resolved.

Enhanced transparency?

COPs act as showcases for international agreement, but many processes rumble on behind the scenes. COP29 will be an important moment for transparency under the Paris Agreement, as the Parties’ first Biennial Enhanced Transparency Reports (BTRs) are due in December 2024. 

BTRs are an important tool in the Paris Agreement, requiring countries to provide a snapshot of their progress in cutting emissions, setting climate policies, and providing resources for national and international climate action. 

BTRs are meant to build the evidence base for strong NDCs, build trust and promote ambitious climate action. They are also meant to help developing countries showcase achievements and attract climate finance. 

The COP29 presidency has launched the Baku Global Climate Transparency Platform to encourage participation, and support countries in finalising their BTRs. The Platform is meant to provide space for collaboration between government, NGO and private sector stakeholders. 

This is one of the areas in which COP29 host, Azerbaijan, runs into criticism. The country ranks highly on indexes of corruption, and has repeatedly restricted space for NGOs and wider civil society actors through a series of escalating government crackdowns, including imprisonment of environmental activists, in the run-up to the conference.

Will the next US president invest in Middle East stability or walk away? Expert comment LToremark 17 October 2024

Harris and Trump look set to continue US deprioritization of the region, but they would do better to enlist the support of their partners.

When stability in the Middle East feels so distant, it is much to the dismay of America’s partners that conflict management in the region has fallen down the list of US priorities. As Israel’s war in Gaza has reached its tragic one-year milestone, a new front has opened in Lebanon and further direct escalation between Israel and Iran seems imminent, it is hoped that the next US president will take a bolder role.

Namely, leaders in the UK, Europe and the Middle East are looking to whoever is in the White House to do more to restrain Israel, deliver self-determination – if not a peace process – for Palestine, and contain Iran’s interventionist regional role and nuclear programme.

While it is naive to expect either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump to prioritize conflict management in the Middle East above immigration, the economy, the war in Ukraine or competition with China, the past year has shown the danger of ignoring or sidestepping cascading and glaring regional challenges. 

For Harris or Trump to have a more sustainable impact in the region, they must enlist the support of European, British and Middle Eastern partners and work collectively to build multilateral processes that can set a stronger foundation for regional stability.

Repercussions of deprioritization

The Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, led many to believe that a new era of integration was possible in the Middle East. To some, it also vindicated the US decision to deprioritize the region that had started with Barack Obama’s presidency and his drawing down from ‘forever wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. Presidents Trump and Biden continued that approach, encouraging America’s partners in the Middle East to assume greater responsibility for regional stability. Notably, neither renewed negotiations with Iran despite both committing to deliver a stronger deal with Tehran.

The shock of the 7 October attacks shattered that view, and the longer overhang of the US decision to deprioritize the region has visibly played out over the past twelve months. 

While the Biden administration marshalled full political and military support for Israel and there is not – yet – a direct regional war with Iran, the US has been unsuccessful in multiple areas: delivering a ceasefire agreement, securing the release of hostages, maintaining regular humanitarian relief and producing a so-called ‘day after’ plan of action.  

Moreover, the US temporary arrangement with Iran to prevent nuclear acceleration in exchange for marginal sanctions relief has also shown the limits of compartmentalization when managing a portfolio of issues with Tehran.  

No new approach

Trump and Harris’s policy approaches to conflict in the region further show their limited intent to change course on the Middle East. Both leaders are aware that Middle East politics, particularly on Israel–Palestine and Iran – the key issues requiring urgent attention – has become a US partisan minefield that could alienate voters. Despite their different plans, with Trump inclined to be more unilateral, they will both continue the trend of gradually deprioritizing conflict management in favour of greater burden sharing by those in the region.  

President Trump has promised a tougher approach aimed at curtailing conflict and advancing US interests. On Iran, Trump has made clear that he would return to a policy of maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic, perhaps to come to new agreement with Tehran or alternatively to constrain Iran even further.  He has championed his administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. Trump has argued that this approach put economic strain on Iran and reduced its ability to fund proxy groups. 

His advisers have also indicated that they would extend this pressure campaign and provide maximum support to the Iranian opposition and activists. Yet without clear goals or a willingness to negotiate with Tehran to contain further nuclear advancements, the result may well be another round of instability.  

Should he return to office, Trump has indicated that he would immediately put an end to the war in Gaza, though how remains unclear. More broadly, he would likely double down on the agreements to promote Israeli–Saudi normalization and attempt to bypass the Palestinian leadership, focusing on broader regional normalization. But sidestepping Palestinian self-determination, which since 7 October has been the condition for broader Arab normalization, will be difficult for Saudi Arabia to sell to its broader, now politicized, public.  

Many Middle East leaders, including those from the Arabian peninsula, might welcome the return of a Trump presidency, but Trump’s ‘America First’ policy did not provide Arab Gulf leaders, especially Riyadh, with protection from Iran’s attack on Saudi oil facilities seen in September 2019.  

Trump also promised without success to deliver a bigger, better Iran deal that would extend the JCPOA and include compromises on Tehran’s support for proxy groups and constraints on its missile programme. Rather than imposing his previous strategy, a second Trump presidency would be more effective if it worked collaboratively with transatlantic and regional partners on regional security issues pertaining to Israel–Palestine and Iran.  

Continuation and reinforcement?

Despite her recent tough talk on Iran, it is expected that Harris will reinforce the current wave of diplomatic efforts to deescalate and manage tensions with Tehran, rather than advocate for ‘maximum pressure’.  

Harris would likely build on efforts to revive a new paradigm that could contain Iran’s nuclear programme. She is expected to emphasize a strategy of engagement combined with pressure to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, while addressing its regional activities.   

Now that Iran has provided missiles and drones to Russia, it is clear that Tehran’s transfer of lethal aid needs an urgent response beyond continued reliance on sanctions. Harris’s team would be wise to pursue a multilateral negotiation process bringing together Europe and the UK, who are already discussing these issues, to collectively engage Tehran on a broader deal.

Moreover, winning support from Israel and the Gulf is a necessary condition to build a more sustainable Iranian agreement. 

Addressing Russia’s use of forced displacement in Ukraine 7 November 2024 — 12:30PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts consider the role international law could play in responding to Russia’s forcible movement of people during its war against Ukraine.

In the two and a half years since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, evidence has emerged of Russia’s use of forced deportation and forcible transfer. Russia has also employed arbitrary detention as a tool of war and occupation.

Much attention has been on the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and his children’s commissioner Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. These warrants were issued in relation to the alleged war crimes concerning the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia and the unlawful transfer of thousands of children from occupied areas of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian citizens are being arrested and sent to Russia to serve prison sentences. They are often detained without charge and conviction.

This panel discussion explores:

• What evidence is emerging of Russia using unlawful deportation and transfer of children, and the arbitrary detention of civilians?
• What is the role and significance of international law on these issues?
• What challenges might these practices create for later peace negotiations, as well as the securing of justice?
• What is the process of releasing illegally detained Ukrainians, and Ukrainian children in particular, and reuniting them with their families? How do Russian volunteers inside Russia cooperate with Ukrainian NGOs to facilitate family reunification?

The event includes a screening of part of the documentary After the Rain: Putin’s Stolen Children. 

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.