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Setting Policy for What Comes After COVID-19: Dr. Faheem Ahmed ’20

Like many of his classmates, Dr. Faheem Ahmed started the spring semester, primed to put the finishing touches on his MBA. But after COVID-19 began to spread, he relocated to his home in London to complete his degree remotely and work on the frontline of the crisis.




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Recommitting to International Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Indonesia

6 April 2018

Agantaranansa Juanda

Academy Associate, International Law Programme

Jason Naselli

Senior Digital Editor
Agantaranansa Juanda speaks to Jason Naselli about the promises the government has made and the steps that still need to be taken for the country to deliver justice for past violations of human rights.

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Indonesian PM Joko Widodo. Photo: Getty Images.

Does the Indonesian government adequately protect human rights?

It does and it does not; it really depends on the context. Indonesia looks good among its neighbours in Southeast Asia in terms of protection of civil and political rights, and to some extent economic, social and cultural rights, although room for improvements exists.

But one of the promises of the current president, Joko Widodo, during his 2014 campaign was about international criminal justice, which involves rights for many victims of past cases of human rights abuses in Indonesia. In that sense, it does not protect these rights, including the rights to justice, truth, reparations or guarantees of non-recurrence.

For example, in the case of the conflict over independence for East Timor in 1999, there were many gross violations of human rights. However, there has never been any sort of effective judicial process to address gross violations of human rights, and crimes against humanity in particular.

In 1965–66, during the government’s violent anti-communist operations, 500,000 people or more were killed. Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights was tasked with conducting an investigation into this period within its limited mandate, but it led to nothing; there have never been any prosecutions relating to these crimes.

The election promise of the current president was to deal with a number of these past human rights cases, and this promise has not been met at all. His opponent in 2014, Prabowo Subianto, was a former military general involved in alleged past human rights abuses, so it was politically expedient to make such a promise. But it has not been pursued in office.

In 2000, Indonesia established its own Human Rights Court. What is your assessment of its record?

Some human rights activists suggested that the establishment of the Human Rights Court took place under international pressure following the independence of East Timor. To avoid international scrutiny, for example the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal, the government established this court.

Based on the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor in 2000, it was indeed recommended that an international human rights tribunal be set up. Indonesian government rejected the proposal with strong assurances that it would provide justice for atrocities committed by its nationals. So it is fair for some to see the establishment of Indonesia’s Human Rights Court as a political move by the government at that time, in order to avoid scrutiny by the international community.

When it comes to performance, the Human Rights Court actually investigated and prosecuted cases relating to atrocities in East Timor. There were around 100 suspects identified, and 18 were put on trial. Out of these 18, only one trial, of Eurico Guterres, ended in a conviction for crimes against humanity. However, the Indonesian Supreme Court cleared Guterres of all charges in 2008. So the Human Rights Court did take steps, but the net result amounted to essentially nothing. Impunity remains.

So it has not lived up to its mandate, but there is another factor, which is that the founding law of the Human Rights Court does not accommodate international standards of criminal justice. It only covers two of the four categories of crime as outlined in the Rome Statute – crimes against humanity and genocide. It also does not provide adequate protection for victims and witnesses. So there are issues not only with the performance of the Human Rights Court but also with the legislation establishing it.

Why hasn’t Indonesia become a party to the Rome Statute to join the ICC?

The main opposition came from the military, because they were afraid of being targeted by the ICC. There was also a lot of discussion about Indonesia’s ‘sovereign right to prosecute’.

But what those opposing failed to understand is that the ICC is bound by temporal and territorial boundaries, meaning that it will not intervene if the state in question is able and willing to prosecute. So I think accession to the Rome Statute has not taken place because of this misunderstanding.

I think another factor since this was initially raised is there is a focus on other issues. Indonesia is an emerging country economically; there is a focus on building infrastructure. So many in government feel like they are done with the past. But for the millions of victims of past crimes and their families, the past is not done.

So it’s very important at this point in the country’s history to revisit the commitment to international criminal justice to be able to contribute to sustainable peace and development.

What steps could the Indonesian government take to improve how it handles these issues?

The establishment of the Human Rights Court was an important starting point, but clearly there has to be significant reform, both in terms of the substantive law underpinning it and its procedures.

Clearly the domestic laws need to be reformed, but also, an effort needs to be made to improve the courts capacity in terms of manpower and logistical support. This is why the government needs to restart the discussion about becoming a party to the Rome Statute. Through the outreach programme of the ICC, this would give the Human Rights Court the capacity, in terms of manpower and logistical support, to tackle past human rights violations in Indonesia, which the Human Rights Court is currently lacking.

Only if these two steps are taken – reforming the domestic Human Rights Court and restarting discussion about becoming a party to the Rome Statute – will the Indonesian government be able to say it has made progress on international criminal justice.

The Indonesian government is actually running for a seat on the UN Security Council for the period of 2019–20. So I think it is an urgent discussion that the Indonesian government needs to have before it makes another pledge to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. It is difficult to have sustainable peace without justice.




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Migration Deals Risk Undermining Global Refugee Protection

13 April 2018

Amanda Gray Meral

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme
While some aspects of agreements like that between the EU and Turkey reflect a genuine effort to cooperate in addressing the needs of refugees, other elements risk undermining the very essence of the global refugee protection regime.

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A boat carrying migrants approaches shore after making the crossing from Turkey to the Greek island of Lesbos in November 2015. Photo: Getty Images.

Last month the European Commission proposed that the EU should mobilize the next tranche of funding for Turkey (€3 billion) under the EU–Turkey deal agreed in 2016. The deal is part of a rapidly developing strategy on the part of the EU to improve cooperation on migration issues with countries of origin as well as those through which migrants and refugees transit en route to Europe. Since 2015, the EU has ramped up negotiations, with the New Partnership Framework underpinning arrangements with countries such as Niger, Mali and Ethiopia, and endorsing a memorandum of understanding between Italy and Libya in February 2017.

A common thread that runs across all of these deals is their focus on containment in exchange for funding, rather than a principled approach to refugee protection. For example, the EU has committed around €6 billion to Turkey as a contribution towards the cost of humanitarian assistance for the over 3 million Syrian refugees residing there. This funding also operates as an incentive for Turkey to take back all refugees and migrants who have irregularly arrived in Greece via Turkey since the deal entered effect.

Similarly, the EU is providing financial support to Libya in exchange for its cooperation in reducing the flow of migrants and refugees towards Europe, while the New Partnership Framework aims to reduce the number of migrants and refugees departing for Europe in exchange for EU aid. While financial incentives geared towards containment do not amount to new policy, with the increasing number of deals being negotiated, the use of such a strategy appears to be both accelerating and becoming more explicit.

An effective investment?

Implementation of these deals has been hindered by obligations under international law, raising questions not only as to their legality but also their value for money.

Under the EU–Turkey deal, refugees arriving in Greece irregularly were to be returned to Turkey, with an equal number of Syrian refugees resettled to Europe in exchange. However, implementation of this aspect of the deal has been limited.

Under EU asylum law, Greece is obliged to provide access to asylum procedures for those arriving on its shores. Given that most arrivals from Turkey came from refugee-producing countries (including Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq), an individualized assessment of ‘safe third country’ is required before any possible return to Turkey can take place. This requires a finding that Turkey can guarantee effective access to protection for the individual in question, including protection against refoulement (i.e. forced return to a country where he or she is at risk of serious harm or persecution). By the end March 2018, only 2,164 people had been returned to Turkey.

As for Italy, with EU support, under the MOU with Libya it has been training as well as providing funding and logistical support to the Libyan coastguard – including an Italian naval presence in Libyan waters – to intercept boats in the Mediterranean. Given the mounting evidence of abuse of migrants and refugees, whether by Libyan coastguards or inside Libyan detention centres, this raises questions as to whether the support being provided by Italy and the EU amounts to a breach of international law.

Despite concerns about the protection risks for refugees, advocates of such deals claim they have the potential to prevent dangerous journeys, saving lives and interrupting the business model of smugglers. Numbers crossing the Mediterranean have indeed dropped since the deals were agreed. However, in Libya it has created an ‘anti-smuggling’ market which, despite leading to a reduction of migration in the short term, may not be sustainable in the long term if it drives conflict between various non-state actors.

In the case of the EU–Turkey deal, while it has led to a fall in arrivals to the Greek islands in the first six months of 2017, there is also evidence that smugglers were already adapting their routes, forcing refugees and migrants to travel on the more dangerous central Mediterranean route.

For now, at least, these deals appear to have gained significant popular support within the EU. Italy’s approaches in Libya, for example, have been broadly backed by the Italian public – unsurprising given that some polls indicate 50 percent of the Italian population believe migrants to be a threat to public security. However, the drivers of public attitudes towards refugees and migration are complex and, as noted in a policy brief published under the Chatham House–ODI Forum on Refugee and Migration Policy, influenced in part by narratives driven by politicians and the media.

What some of these deals have achieved is the significant flow of aid money towards job creation and economic opportunities for refugees, incentivizing policy change in some contexts and producing real benefits for the refugees concerned (while reducing pressures on them to move onwards via dangerous journeys).

A prominent example is the Jordan Compact, a 2016 agreement between Jordan, the EU and international financial institutions including the World Bank to improve the livelihoods and education of Syrian refugees inside Jordan. While challenges in its implementation remain, including concerns about labour rights, the Jordan Compact has resulted in real improvements in education and access to the labour market for Syrian refugees. The Jordanian government has made policy concessions on access to work permits for Syrian refugees, removing some of the barriers that prevented refugees accessing jobs, while the EU has committed to ease trade barriers for goods produced in Jordanian factories on condition they hire a percentage of Syrian refugees.

Likewise, the EU–Turkey deal’s most successful component has been its financial contribution of €3 billion of aid under the EU Facility for Refugees towards support for the 3.7 million Syrian refugees currently being hosted by Turkey. This includes €1 billion allocated to the Emergency Social Safety Net, described by the European Commission as the ‘largest single humanitarian project in the history of the EU’, directly impacting the livelihoods of some 1.1 million vulnerable refugees.

Moving ahead

While some aspects of these deals reflect a genuine effort to cooperate in addressing the needs of refugees, other elements risk undermining the very essence of the global refugee protection regime.

The diplomatic squabble over a proposed refugee ‘swap’ of 1,250 refugees between the US and Australia in February 2017 highlights the danger of refugees becoming bargaining chips. Similarly, the Kenyan government’s announcement that it would close Dadaab refugee camp in late November 2016 cited the EU-Turkey deal as justification. Migration partnerships which emphasise the securing of EU borders against refugee arrivals may diminish the willingness of states in the Global South to continue to host large numbers of refugees.

While the positive aspects of such deals deserve acknowledgement, understanding their impact on refugee protection must be given greater attention. This is vital not only to ensure their workability but also to ensure that those countries who spearheaded the creation of the global refugee protection regime do not end up undermining its existence.




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Forum on Refugee and Migration Policy - Roundtable 3

Invitation Only Research Event

14 May 2018 - 10:00am to 5:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE London

This roundtable focuses on the economic dimensions of displacement and migration and brings together an international group of experts from government, international organizations, civil society, research institutes and the private sector.   

The event was co-hosted with the Overseas Development Institute.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule




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Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century

Research Event

23 May 2018 - 9:00am to 10:00am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Rt Hon Jeremy Wright QC MP, Attorney General, UK
Chair: Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG, Distinguished Fellow, Chatham House

Cyber intrusions do not respect international borders. At this event, the attorney general will discuss how to apply and shape international law in order to ensure the rules-based international system can adapt to the threats – and opportunities – posed by cyber into the future.

 




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What Next After the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica Revelations?

Research Event

2 July 2018 - 6:00pm to 7:30pm

Chatham House, London

Event participants

Silkie Carlo, Director, Big Brother Watch
Professor David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, University of California, Irvine, School of Law  
Professor Lorna McGregor, Principal Investigator and Co-Director of the ESRC, Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project
James Williams, Oxford Internet Institute
Chair: Harriet Moynihan, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House

Please note this event was originally scheduled on 13 June 2018 and has been postponed to 2 July 2018.

Technology companies, social media platforms and other internet intermediaries dominate the digital age, and harnessing data in algorithmic and artificial intelligence systems is widespread, from political campaigns to judicial sentencing.

The recent Facebook and Cambridge Analytica revelations provide a sharp illustration of the risks to human rights and democracy posed by data-mining and "platform capital".

These revelations have focused public and policy debate on two key issues. First, they raise questions of how accountability and remedies can be effectively achieved, particularly where companies close in the wake of such revelations. Second, key questions arise on what regulation should look like.

Facebook has pledged to respect privacy of its users better, but how effective is self-regulation? There has been heavy emphasis on the role that the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) can play to improve the protection of privacy and data protection, but will it be enough? What are the implications for international law - how can the established standards in human rights and data protection respond to these challenges?

This event, co-hosted with the ESRC, Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project, will be followed by a drinks reception.

Read the meeting summary on the Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project website. 




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Armed Conflict and Starvation: What Does the Law Say?

Research Event

12 October 2018 - 5:30pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Professor Dapo Akande, Co-Director, Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict 
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House
Ahila Sornarajah, Senior Lawyer, International and EU Law
Chair: Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Distinguished Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House

Millions of civilians suffer hunger and starvation in times of armed conflict. This panel discusses the legal prohibitions on the use of starvation as a method of war, and the obligations on the warring parties to allow access for humanitarian relief.

Department/project

Chanu Peiris

Programme Manager, International Law
+44 (0)20 7314 3686




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China and the International Order

Invitation Only Research Event

21 November 2018 - 12:30pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Harriet Moynihan, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House
Dr Champa Patel, Head, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Rod Wye, Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House

In 2014, the Chinese government announced its intention to strengthen China's discourse power and influence in international legal affairs. Since then, the International Law Programme and Asia-Pacific Programmes at Chatham House have been evaluating the increasing emphasis on international law in China's global governance agenda. Our research includes the hosting of roundtables with a global network of international lawyers including leading Chinese academics.

This meeting will discuss insights emerging from two recent roundtables held in Beijing(opens in new window) and New York in 2018. The Beijing roundtable focussed on China’s approach to emerging areas of international law, including the law applicable to cyber operations, the Arctic, dispute settlement and business and human rights. The New York roundtable discussed the international law relating to peace and security including use of force, sanctions, international humanitarian law applicable to peacekeepers, international criminal law including the crime of aggression and human rights, peace and security.

Harriet Moynihan will discuss China's ambitions to play a more influential role in shaping international law drawing on findings from both roundtables. The meeting will also consider how China's ambitions for the international order fit within China's foreign and domestic policy agenda and changes to global governance generally.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Chanu Peiris

Programme Manager, International Law
+44 (0)20 7314 3686




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Bolton’s Attack on the International Criminal Court May Backfire

20 September 2018

Dr Max du Plessis SC

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme
The US national security advisor’s recent threats look damaging but they may in fact strengthen support for the ICC from other states.

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John Bolton speaks to the Federalist Society on 10 September. Photo: Getty Images.

On 10 September, US National Security Advisor John Bolton used his first major speech since joining the White House to attack the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) potential investigation of American personnel in Afghanistan. The ‘American patriots’, as Bolton describes them, are being investigated for potential torture and ill-treatment of detainees, mostly in 2003 and 2004, during the United States-led invasion of the country.

Bolton has a long history of opposition to the ICC. Although the US signed the ICC Statute under president Bill Clinton, it was ‘unsigned’ by Bolton, then an under-secretary of state in the George W Bush administration.

And when the court first opened its doors in 2002, Bolton helped secure, in what he described on 10 September as one of his ‘proudest achievements’, around 100 bilateral agreements with other countries to prevent them from delivering US personnel to the ICC. Those agreements were often extracted under pressure, with the US threatening to cut off military and other aid to countries that refused to sign.

In recent years under the Obama administration, relations between the US and the ICC improved, and the US offered help and support to the court. Bolton’s attack is aimed at reversing those gains – with measures aimed directly at the court and its staff.

These include: (i) negotiating ‘even more binding, bilateral agreements to prohibit nations from surrendering US persons to the ICC’; (ii) banning ICC judges and prosecutors from entering the US, sanctioning their funds in the US financial system and prosecuting them in the US criminal courts (and doing the ‘same for any company or state that assists an ICC investigation of Americans’); and (iii) ‘taking note if any countries cooperate with ICC investigations of the United States and its allies, and remember[ing] that cooperation when setting US foreign assistance, military assistance and intelligence sharing levels’.

These are serious threats – they would potentially undermine the work of a court that is designed to prosecute the world’s worst crimes. The ICC prosecutor and its judges would be barred entry from the US to attend to vital work of the court.

Some of that work, ironically, is at the behest of the US. For instance, two of the UN Security Council’s referrals to the ICC, one in relation to atrocities committed in Sudan, the other in respect of the crimes committed by Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, were referred with US support. 

Also, the meetings of the ICC Assembly of States Parties are held each year at UN headquarters in New York. Those meetings may have to be held elsewhere if the ICC judges and staff are under threat of arrest.

In the case of the potential torture linked to operations in Afghanistan, the ICC has not been acting on its own initiative in investigating. For example, the Center for Constitutional Rights submitted ‘victim’s representations’ to the ICC on behalf of two of their clients, Sharqawi Al Hajj and Guled Hassan Duran, emphasizing the importance of an ICC investigation of US officials for serious crimes arising out of post-9/11 detention and interrogations.

According to the center, both Al Hajj and Duran were detained by the CIA in black sites or 'proxy-detention' by other countries, tormented and tortured.

Although the US is not a party to the ICC Statute, Afghanistan is, and therefore the court has jurisdiction over US nationals who allegedly committed atrocities in Afghanistan. And it should be noted that the investigation includes pursuing any atrocities committed by the Taliban and Afghan security forces during the same period.

So the basis for attacking the work of the ICC based on this is shaky, and Bolton’s threats raise a number of important international law questions going forward. 

For one, they may be unlawful retaliatory steps, given that the US has obligations to accord at least some privileges and immunities to judges and other personnel of the ICC under the 1947 UN Headquarters Agreement between the UN and US. Counter-measures might be considered by member states of the ICC, either alone, or collectively. 

In this regard, Bolton’s comments about the EU will not go unnoticed: he suggests Europe is a region where ‘the global governance dogma is strong’. The US may yet come to learn just how strong that ‘dogma’ is.

With US abstention from the ICC, the opening remains for Europe and other regions to position themselves at the heart of the international criminal justice regime, thereby – as in response to the US attitude towards climate change – building a network of partnerships with other like-minded nations to compensate for US disengagement.

Further, while the ICC has many critics, and could be improved as an institution, Bolton’s speech may have the effect of galvanizing support for the world’s first permanent international criminal court. That could be a good thing for the court, which is sorely in need of support for its work.

Whatever concerns states may have about the ICC, they may be outweighed by a mutual desire to stand up to perceived bullying by the Trump administration, in favour of the international rule of law. 




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Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part One

17 April 2014

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) jointly organized this four-day meeting at Chatham House for international lawyers to discuss a wide range of issues related to public international law and the rights of individuals.

Sonya Sceats

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme

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The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China's role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China's impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For China University of Political Science and Law, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The roundtable had a total of 22 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 12 non-Chinese (from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




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Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Two

15 November 2014

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable meeting in Beijing on public international law and the rights of individuals.

Sonya Sceats

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme

20140624ChinaHumanRights.jpg

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China's role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China's impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Beijing was hosted by CUPL and involved 20 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing) and 10 non-Chinese (from Australia, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the experts network being built, the second meeting included a mix of participants from the first meeting and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




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Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Three

6 March 2016

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) and the Graduate Institute Geneva held a two-day roundtable meeting in Geneva on public international law and the rights of individuals.

Sonya Sceats

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme

20140624ChinaHumanRights.jpg

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China's role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China's impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Geneva was co-hosted by the Graduate Institute Geneva and involved 19 participants, 9 Chinese (from six research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 11 non-Chinese (from eight research institutions in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the third meeting included a mix of participants from the first two meetings and some new participants

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




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Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four

3 June 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable in Beijing on emerging issues of public international law. 

Harriet Moynihan

Senior Research Fellow, International Law Programme

20140624ChinaHumanRights.jpg

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China's role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China's impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting was co-hosted with CUPL and involved 28 participants, consisting of 19 Chinese participants (from six leading research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and nine nonChinese participants (from eight leading research institutions in Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland, Canada and Singapore).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the fifth meeting included a mix of participants from the previous meetings and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 70

Research Event

29 November 2018 - 6:00pm to 7:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Phil Bloomer, Executive Director, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre
Julie Broome, Director, Ariadne Network
Allison Corkery, Director of Rights Claiming and Accountability Program, Centre for Economic and Social Rights; Atlantic Fellow for Social and Economic Equity, London School of Economics
Chair: Sonya Sceats, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrates its 70th anniversary against a backdrop of fractured global politics and the rise of nationalist forces that reject many of the values the Declaration espouses.

What strategies, tools and networks are civil society and other actors developing to adapt to this complex environment for human rights work?

And what role does the Declaration and the human rights treaties it has inspired play in shaping responses to current global challenges such as deepening inequality, new forms of technology and climate change?

Chanu Peiris

Programme Manager, International Law
+44 (0)20 7314 3686




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Security and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of International Law

Research Event

27 March 2019 - 10:00am to 5:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Koji Tsuruoka, Ambassador of Japan to the United Kingdom
Ben Saul, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House; Challis Chair of International Law, Australian National University
Lee Chen Chen, Director, Singapore Institute of International Affairs
Aniruddha​ Rajput, Member, UN International Law Commission; Consultant, Withersworldwide

 

The rapid growth in the Asia-Pacific’s economic and political power has significant implications for global governance. Asia-Pacific countries such as Japan, India and China – and regional bodies such as ASEAN – are increasingly informing, influencing and seeking to shape international standards and norms.

This conference will bring together international law and policy experts to explore the political and legal dynamics affecting economic relations, security challenges and maritime governance in the region.

Given security and prosperity challenges within the region as well as the increasingly complex environment for global governance, to what extent is international law operating as a tool of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific? In which areas is it a source of friction?

And what are the broader implications for global governance including the development of international law?

Chanu Peiris

Programme Manager, International Law
+44 (0)20 7314 3686




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State Cyber Interventions Below the Threshold of the Use of Force: Challenges in the Application of International Law

Invitation Only Research Event

30 April 2019 - 10:00am to 4:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Chair: Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Distinguished Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House

Under what circumstances will a state-sponsored cyberattack on another state that falls below the threshold of the use of force be a breach of international law – for example, hacking into another state’s electoral databases, usurping inherently governmental functions such as parliamentary processes or an attack on another state’s financial system? In the dynamic field of state cyber operations, persistent, low-level cyberattacks are increasing, as are multilateral attempts to attribute the attacks to the states responsible. There is general agreement that international law applies to cyberspace but the question is how it applies and with what consequences.     
   
This meeting will bring together a small group of academics and practitioners to explore the application of international law to states’ cyber operations that interfere in the internal affairs of another state and which fall below the threshold of the use of force. What is the law on non-intervention in international law and how does it apply to states’ cyber activities? Does the Nicaragua case represent the best expression of the law in this area including the requirement of coercion? And are there any other principles of international law that are relevant? The meeting will also consider processes and procedures for agreeing on the law and best practices.
 
The purpose of the meeting will be to inform a research paper by Chatham House.
 
Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project




at

Engage China to Uphold Multilateralism – But Not at Any Cost

12 June 2019

Harriet Moynihan

Senior Research Fellow, International Law Programme
Where China’s interests align with those of the international community, there are opportunities for the country’s influence and economic power to strengthen the rules-based international order. Where they do not, states that traditionally support that order should join together to push back.

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Students holding Chinese national flags watch the live broadcast of the 40th anniversary celebration of China's reform and opening-up at Huaibei Normal University on 18 December. Photo: Getty Images.

China’s adherence to the rules-based international system is selective, prioritizing certain rules in favour of others. States supportive of that ‘system’ – or, as some argue, systems[1] – should identify areas of mutual strategic interest so that they can draw China further into the global rules-based order and leverage China as a constructive player that potentially also contributes to improvements in such areas. This is particularly apposite at a time when the US is in retreat from multilateralism and Russia seems bent on disrupting the rules-based international order.

Supportive player

There are many reasons for actively engaging with China on mutual areas of interest. China is a committed multilateralist in many areas, recognizing that often international cooperation and frameworks hold the key to its domestic problems, for example in the fields of environmental sustainability and financial regulation.

China’s economic power is valuable in upholding international institutions: China is the UN’s third-largest donor (after the US and Japan) at a time when the UN is facing budgetary shortfalls. China is also the second-highest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget, and the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

China also has a valuable role to play in the settlement of international disputes over trade and investment. China is a big supporter of the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s dispute settlement mechanism, and one of its most active participants;[2] China is currently playing an active role in negotiations to save the WTO’s appellate mechanism from folding in the wake of the US’s refusal to nominate new judges.

The last 15 years have also seen a major shift in Chinese attitudes to investment arbitration, from a general suspicion and limitation of arbitration rights to broad acceptance and incorporation of such rights in China’s trade and investment treaties. China is actively engaged in multilateral negotiations through the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on reforms to investor–state dispute settlement.

China has shown leadership on global climate change diplomacy, urging nations to remain committed to the Paris Agreement in the wake of the US decision to pull out, and has been an important interlocutor with the UK and the EU on these issues. As a strong supporter of the Paris Agreement, but also as the world’s top emitter of carbon dioxide, China has a crucial role to play in pushing forward implementation of the Paris targets. Despite its high emissions, China remains one of the few major economies on track to meet its targets,[3] giving it greater leverage to peer review other parties’ efforts.

A recent report by the UK parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), on China and the rules-based international order, noted that where a body of trust and goodwill is developed with China, there is the possibility of discovering interests that coincide and the ability to work together on issues mutually regarded as of global importance. The report refers to a number of success stories from UK partnership with China in multilateral forums, including in counterproliferation and global health.[4]

Developing areas of global governance

As well as working with the current system, China is increasingly involved in the shaping of newer areas of international law – whether it be submissions to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on procedural rules for the emerging deep-sea mining regime or pitching for a greater role in Arctic governance.[5]

This enthusiasm should be harnessed to promote the international rule of law, but at the same time there needs to be recognition of the strategic goals that drive China’s engagement. China’s interest in the Arctic, while including the desire to protect its ecology and environment, is also about access to marine resources, as well as about the Arctic’s strategic potential for China’s military.

China’s submissions to ITLOS on the rules of procedure for deep-sea mining are constructive, but also reflect an ambition to secure first-mover advantage when commercial mining eventually takes place. Like other major powers working in this policy area, China’s actions are guided by self-interest, but that doesn’t mean its goals can’t be pursued through multilateral rules.

China is also interested in creating new international structures and instruments that further its strategic aims. For example, with Russia (through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) it has proposed an International Code of Conduct for Information Security in the UN.[6]

China is also pondering an array of options for dispute-resolution mechanisms for its Belt and Road projects, including the possibility of an Asian version of the international Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which might sit under the auspices of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).[7]

The creation of new instruments and institutions need not be a threat to the rules-based international order in itself. We have already seen a combination of the creation of parallel complementary regimes alongside the reform of existing institutions, for example in development financing through the AIIB or the New Development Bank (often referred to as the ‘BRICS Bank’); these two banks are relatively conventionally structured along the lines of Western-dominated institutions, albeit with greater Chinese control. Based on these examples, selective adaptation seems more likely than a hostile ‘Eastphalian’ takeover.[8]

Risks

There is, however, a real risk that in certain areas China may promote a rival authoritarian model of governance, assisted by an opportunistic convergence with Russia on issues such as human rights, development and internet governance. In areas where China’s core interests clash with those of the rules-based international order, China has shown itself to be unbending, as in its refusal to abide by the July 2016 decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in its dispute with the Philippines over the South China Sea.[9]

China is becoming more assertive at the UN, but while it seeks to project itself there as a responsible emerging global leader, it is promoting a vision that weakens international norms of human rights, transparency and accountability,[10] while also carrying out practices domestically that raise serious human rights concerns (not least the detention of hundreds of thousands of Uighurs in re-education camps in Xinjiang).[11]

China’s increased dominance geographically and geopolitically through its Belt and Road infrastructure projects carries with it a number of social and economic risks, including smaller states becoming trapped in unsustainable financial debts to China.

But at a recent Chatham House conference on Asia and international law, participants highlighted the limitations on how far China can shape an alternative governance model.[12] China currently lacks soft power, cultural power and language power, all of which are needed in order to embed an alternative model abroad. China also currently lacks capacity and confidence to build coalitions with other states in the UN.

Where it has tried to get buy-in from the international community for its new institutions, such as the China International Commercial Court (CICC) announced in July 2018, there has been scepticism about the standards to be applied.[13] Unless the court can demonstrate sufficient due process, international parties are likely to prefer other centres with a strong reputation for upholding the rule of law, such as those in London, Dubai and Singapore.

Where China does promote its own governance model at the expense of the rules-based international order, states are starting to push back, often in concert. EU member states so far have adopted a joined-up approach to the Belt and Road Initiative. With the exception of Italy, they have refused to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on participation unless China provides much greater transparency on its compliance with international standards.

The EU also recently presented a coordinated response to China on the situation in Xinjiang.[14] Similarly, members of the so-called ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence-sharing alliance (comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US) have acted together in relation to certain incidents of cyber interference attributed to China.[15]

There are also signs of pushback from smaller states closer to home in relation to challenges to national sovereignty, debt diplomacy and financial viability arising from Belt and Road projects. The Sri Lankan government recently reversed the award of a $300 million housing deal to China, instead opting for a joint venture with an Indian company.

China has been downscaling its investments as a way to counter some of the backlash it has received: the most recent Belt and Road summit put forward a more modest set of aspirations. This suggests that there is some scope for states to stand up to China and use leverage to secure better deals.

Many international institutions have been Western-dominated for years;[16] China, together with many emerging and middle powers, has felt for some time that the international architecture does not reflect the world we live in. Given that context, states that champion the rules-based international order should acknowledge China’s desire to update the international order to reflect greater multipolarity, globalization and technological change, while being clear-eyed about their engagement with China. This involves investing in a proper understanding of China and how it works.[17]

Where possible, cooperation with China should lead to outcomes that are backed up by international standards and transparency. The above-mentioned FAC report cites evidence that the UK’s support, and that of other developed countries, had a positive impact in shaping the governance and standards of the AIIB.[18] China has brought in international experts to advise on disputes before the CIIC, which may reassure would-be litigants.

China’s relationship with the rules-based international order needs to be assessed pragmatically and dynamically. China can be a valuable partner in many areas where its objectives are closely aligned with those of the international community – from trade to climate change to peacekeeping.

But where the country’s core interests are at odds with those of the wider international community, an increasingly confident China will strongly resist pressure, including on the South China Sea and human rights. In these areas, states supportive of international law can most powerfully push back through alliances and by ensuring that their own core values are not compromised in the interests of economic benefits.

What needs to happen

  • China’s rising power and selective commitment to multilateralism make it a potentially influential ally in modernizing international governance.
  • China is increasingly involved in shaping newer areas of international law. This enthusiasm could be harnessed in the service of institutional development and reform.
  • Other states should identify areas of mutual strategic interest where China may offer a constructive role, including dispute settlement, health and climate change.
  • However, engagement must not ignore the strategic calculations that drive China’s agenda, or its poor record on civil and political rights, transparency and accountability.
  • Cooperation with China should lead to outcomes that are backed up by international standards and transparency.
  • Where China’s actions undermine the rules-based international order, coordinated action by states supportive of that order is likely to be more effective than acting individually.

Notes

[1] Chalmers, M. (2019), Which Rules? Why There is No Single ‘Rules-Based International System’, RUSI Occasional Paper, April 2019, London: Royal United Services Institute, https://rusi.org/occasional-papers/Which-Rules-Why-There-Is-No-Single-Rules-Based-International-System.

[2] See, for example, Moynihan, H. (2017), China’s Evolving Approach to International Dispute Settlement, Briefing, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/chinas-evolving-approach-international-dispute-settlement.

[3] UN Environment (2018), Emissions Gap Report 2018, p. XVII, https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018.

[4] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2019), China and the Rules-Based International System: Sixteenth Report of Session 2017–19, p. 32, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/612/612.pdf.

[5] Moynihan, H. (2018), ‘China Expands Its Global Governance Ambitions in the Arctic’, Expert Comment, 15 October 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/china-expands-its-global-governance-ambitions-arctic.

[6] Updated version proposed 9 January 2015.

[7] Moynihan, H. (2018), ‘Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four’, Meeting Summary, 3 June 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/exploring-public-international-law-issues-chinese-scholars-part-four.

[8] Chatham House (2019, forthcoming, ‘Security and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of International Law’, conference summary, https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/security-and-prosperity-asia-pacific-role-international-law.

[9] Permanent Court of Arbitration Case No. 2013-19 (Philippines v China), Award of 12 July 2016, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf.

[10] Piccone, T. (2018), China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009_china_human_rights.pdf.

[11] Wye, R. (2018), ‘‘The entire Uyghur population is seemingly being treated as suspect’: China’s persecution of its Muslim minority’, LSE Religion and Global Society blog, 18 September 2018, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionglobalsociety/2018/09/the-entire-uyghur-population-is-seemingly-being-treated-as-suspect-chinas-persecution-of-its-muslim-minority/.

[12] Chatham House (2019, forthcoming, ‘Security and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of International Law’.

[13] Walters, M. (2018), ‘Jury is out over China’s new commercial court, say lawyers’, Law Society Gazette, 1 November 2018, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/jury-is-out-over-chinas-new-commercial-court-say-lawyers/5068125.article.

[14] The Economist (2019), ‘Hope remains for Western solidarity. Look at embassies in Beijing’, 17 April 2019, https://www.economist.com/china/2019/04/20/hope-remains-for-western-solidarity-look-at-embassies-in-beijing.

[15] In December 2018, the Five Eyes attributed the activities of a Chinese cyber espionage group targeting intellectual property and sensitive commercial property to China’s Ministry of State Security.

[16] Roberts, A. (2017), Is International Law International?, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[17] Parton, C. (2019), China–UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference?, RUSI Occasional Paper, February 2019, London: Royal United Services Institute, p. 30, https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/china-uk-relations-where-draw-border-between-influence-and.

[18] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2019), China and the Rules-Based International System, p. 15.

This essay was produced for the 2019 edition of Chatham House Expert Perspectives – our annual survey of risks and opportunities in global affairs – in which our researchers identify areas where the current sets of rules, institutions and mechanisms for peaceful international cooperation are falling short, and present ideas for reform and modernization.




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Strengthen the International Criminal Court

12 June 2019

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG

Distinguished Fellow, International Law Programme
The ICC has been criticized for slow proceedings, weak management and ineffective prosecutions. The good news is that pragmatic reform need not entail fundamental treaty amendment; a culture change and more realistic expectations would go a long way.

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Laurent Gbagbo looks on next to his lawyer Emmanuel Altit before the start of his trial at the ICC on 28 January 2016. Photo by Getty Images.

The 1998 treaty which established the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted at a time when the world (or most of it) was willing to reach multilateral agreements on a variety of topics and was encouraging the development of international criminal justice. The two tribunals, set up by the UN Security Council, for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda had been relatively successful. The time was ripe for states to agree together to set up a permanent international court with wider scope than the two tribunals.

So the ICC was created, with jurisdiction over the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; its jurisdiction for the crime of aggression developed later. The court was given the power to prosecute nationals of states that were parties to the ICC Statute, and also to prosecute where the crime was committed in the territory of a state party, whatever the nationality of the alleged criminals. The court had further jurisdiction when the Security Council referred a situation to it.

That was some 20 years ago. There is now a perception in many quarters that the ICC has not fulfilled the expectations of its founders. The court’s proceedings are cumbersome and lengthy. Many of the accused are still at large, including Omar al-Bashir, the former president of Sudan. Some €1.5 billion has been spent, and there have been only three convictions for the core international crimes.

There have been criticisms of the judges, the former Prosecutor and other officials, as well as concern over particular decisions of the court. The allegation that the court is only interested in crimes in Africa[1] is perhaps heard less frequently now than it once was (most of the African governments concerned referred the situations in their countries to the ICC themselves), and there has not been the mass walk-out of African states that was once predicted.

Our Shared Humanity: The Arc of Intervention

From Bosnia to the Brahimi Report and from Rwanda to R2P, Annan played a significant role in many critical moments that shaped approaches to peacekeeping and to the protection of civilians. What was the impact?

But in other quarters there is serious unease about the situation in the court. As the UK representative said at a meeting last year, ‘We cannot bury our heads in the sand and pretend everything is fine when it isn’t.’[2]

The negative assessment of the ICC’s work may be countered by the fact that it is the failure of states to cooperate with the court that causes many of the problems. Further, the expectations of states and civil society about the possibilities of international criminal justice have been so high that no court would be able to meet them. It is not possible for one court actually to ‘end impunity’ for international crimes,[3] nor to prevent war-related violence and mass atrocities, nor to satisfy all victims.

Moreover, the criticisms of the ICC come against the background of the global crisis for multilateralism more generally. The present US administration is notoriously hostile towards this international institution.[4]

On the plus side, the establishment of the court has encouraged states to revise their own laws on international crimes and to institute their own prosecutions where it is possible to do so. It is also claimed that the very existence of the court can be a deterrent to potential perpetrators of international crimes. The court has begun to add to the body of international criminal law and has increased the possibility that mass atrocities will be investigated.

But there is indeed some truth in the criticisms made of the internal workings of the court. One problem is that the particular combination of the civil and common law systems that has developed has produced cumbersome procedures regarding the representation of victims at most stages of the proceedings. It has also resulted in endless appeals from huge numbers of small decisions made by one chamber or another.

Then there are the management failures which have led to officials of the court being awarded compensation by the administrative tribunal of the International Labour Organization (ILO) because of the way they were treated by the court, and finally the decision of a few of the judges to take proceedings themselves at the ILO to have their salaries increased. 

Some ICC decisions have been met with surprise. For example, a former vice-president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jean-Pierre Bemba, who was in the custody of the ICC for 10 years, was convicted by a unanimous trial chamber of various crimes and then succeeded on his appeal. Following this and the acquittal of former Côte d’Ivoire president Laurent Gbagbo,[5] there are concerns about the ability of the prosecution to succeed in cases against high-level alleged perpetrators.

Most recently, there has been criticism of the reasoning behind the appeal court decision regarding the immunity – or, rather, lack of immunity – of former president Bashir. And a decision of a chamber of the ICC not to authorize the opening of an investigation in Afghanistan has been seen as shielding the US from possible proceedings (though it has been welcomed by others as a pragmatic approach).

The message that certain problems with the ICC need fixing is coming not just from the writings of academics and the legal blogs,[6] but from governments too, including those, like the UK, which are among the foremost supporters of the court.

The former presidents of the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties (which comprises the representatives of all states parties) say that they ‘are disappointed by the quality of some of [the court’s] judicial proceedings, frustrated by some of the results, and exasperated by the management deficiencies that prevent the Court from living up to its full potential’.[7] 

Changes to remove the worst excesses of the procedures that have evolved could be effected without amendments to the treaty incorporating the ICC Statute. It may be that a change in culture is also needed. More modesty by the court, along with more realism from governments and civil society, is needed.

And, attractive as it might seem to push at the boundaries of the law, the court should be realistic in what it can achieve. It is next to impossible to prosecute a case effectively where there is no cooperation from the state on whose territory the crimes were committed.

What is needed is a court that can undertake efficient and effective criminal proceedings, delivering fair and impartial justice in the small number of cases which it is reasonable to expect it to address, in the light of the evidential challenges, limited resources and limited state cooperation.

Governments should decide together at the Assembly of States Parties to set in hand a review of the ICC’s operations. It has been suggested that a group of experts might be mandated to assess the management of the court;[8] on the basis of their report, governments could agree on the necessary improvements.

Not everything, however, can come within the remit of such a group. Governments should adopt new rules and practices to address matters such as the election process for judges and their training; governments might consider reaching their own understandings on how some provisions of the ICC Statute should be interpreted in practice. Governments should reach out to the many civil society organizations which have supported the court over the years, to ensure that they are involved in the process.

Measures of this kind cannot detract from the fact that the ICC is fundamentally sound and that its role is as necessary as when it was first established. As Richard Goldstone, former chief prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, has said, ‘If there were no ICC in existence today, many people in many countries would be agitating for and demanding one. That we have one is a singular achievement. It behoves us to make it the best possible and to assist it, as States, civil society, and individuals, in the best and most productive way possible.’[9]

What needs to happen

  • Cumbersome procedures, ineffective prosecutions against high-level alleged perpetrators, and weak internal management are among current criticisms of the ICC.
  • Improvements to the court’s effectiveness and credibility may be possible without amending the treaty incorporating the ICC Statute.
  • The Assembly of States Parties should review the ICC’s operations, whether or not with a group of experts, and governments should agree on improvements.
  • New rules and practices should address matters such as the election process for judges and their training.
  • Better management of expectations of the ICC among governments, civil society and the court itself is needed.
  • Governments might consider reaching their own understandings on how some provisions of the ICC Statute should be interpreted in practice.
  • Civil society organizations should be involved in any procedures for reform.

Notes

[1] See, for example, du Plessis, M., Maluwa, T. and O’Reilly, A. (2013), Africa and the International Criminal Court, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2013, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/193415.

[2] GOV.UK (2018), ‘UK statement to ICC Assembly of States Parties 17th session’, 5 December 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-icc-assembly-of-states-parties-17th-session.

[3] As the preamble to the ICC Statute desires. See ICC (2011), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, p. 1, https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/Documents/RS-Eng.pdf.

[4] See the speech of John Bolton, US National Security Advisor. Just Security (2018), ‘Bolton’s Remarks on the International Criminal Court’, 10 September 2018, https://www.justsecurity.org/60674/national-security-adviser-john-bolton-remarks-international-criminal-court/.

[5] Gbagbo was accused of various crimes which took place after Côte d’Ivoire’s election in 2010, in which Gbagbo lost power to Alassane Ouattara. The case was terminated by the court following a year’s hearings in which the prosecution put forward its evidence.

[6] See, for example, Guilfoyle, D. (2019), ‘Reforming the International Criminal Court: Is it Time for the Assembly of State Parties to be the adults in the room?’, EJIL:Talk! blog post, 8 May 2019, https://www.ejiltalk.org/reforming-the-international-criminal-court-is-it-time-for-the-assembly-of-state-parties-to-be-the-adults-in-the-room/.

[7] Al Hussein, Z. R., Stagno Ugarte, B., Wenaweser, C. and Intelman, T. (2019), ‘The International Criminal Court Needs Fixing’, Atlantic Council, 24 April 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-international-criminal-court-needs-fixing.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Goldstone, R. (2019), ‘Acquittals by the International Criminal Court’, EJIL:Talk! blog post, 18 January 2019, https://www.ejiltalk.org/acquittals-by-the-international-criminal-court/. Richard Goldstone is also a former justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa.

This essay was produced for the 2019 edition of Chatham House Expert Perspectives – our annual survey of risks and opportunities in global affairs – in which our researchers identify areas where the current sets of rules, institutions and mechanisms for peaceful international cooperation are falling short, and present ideas for reform and modernization.




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Democratize Trade Policymaking to Better Protect Human Rights

12 June 2019

Dr Jennifer Ann Zerk

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme
There is growing interest in the use of human rights impact assessment to screen proposed trade agreements for human rights risks, and to ensure appropriate risk mitigation steps are taken.

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Tea pickers walk at dawn through the tea plantations of Munnar, Kerala, on 7 May 2017. Copyright: Pardeep Singh Gill/Getty Images

With international trade discourse taking an increasingly transactional and sometimes belligerent tone, it would be easy to overlook the quiet revolution currently under way to bring new voices into trade policy development and monitoring. The traditional division of responsibilities between the executive and legislature – whereby treaties are negotiated and signed by the executive, and the legislature does what is necessary to implement them – may be undergoing some change.

Growing awareness of the implications of trade and investment treaties for many aspects of day-to-day life – food standards, employment opportunities, environmental quality, availability of medicines and data protection, just to name a few – is fuelling demands by people and businesses for more of a say in the way these rules are formulated and developed.

Various options for enhancing public and parliamentary scrutiny of trading proposals have recently been examined by two UK parliamentary select committees.[1] The reason for this interest is obviously Brexit, which has presented UK civil servants and parliamentarians with the unusual (some would say exciting) opportunity to design an approval and scrutiny process for trade agreements from scratch.

Doubtless, EU authorization, liaison and approval procedures (which include a scrutinizing role for the European Parliament) will be influential,[2] as will the European Commission’s experience with stakeholder engagement on trade issues.[3] The recommendations of both UK select committees to include human rights impact assessment processes as part of pre-negotiation preparations[4] echo calls from UN agencies and NGOs for more rigorous and timely analysis of the human rights risks that may be posed by new trading relationships.[5] Again, EU practice with what it terms ‘sustainability impact assessment’ of future trade agreements provides a potential model to draw from.[6] 

However, process is no substitute for action. Human rights impact assessment is never an end in itself; rather, it is a means to a positive end, in this case a trade agreement which is aligned with the trading partners’ respective human rights obligations and aspirations. It bears remembering, though, that the idea of assessing trade proposals for future human rights risks is a relatively recent one. Do we have the tools and resources to make sure that this is a meaningful compliance and risk management exercise?

Thus far there is little evidence that human rights impact assessment and stakeholder engagement exercises are having any real impact on the content of trade agreements.[7] This is the case even in the EU, where practice in these areas is the most advanced and systematic.[8]

There are several possible reasons for this. First, the methodological challenges are enormous. Aside from the crystal-ball gazing needed to forecast the social, economic and environmental effects of a trade intervention well into the future, demonstrating causal links between a trade agreement and a predicted adverse impact is often highly problematic given the number of other economic and political factors that may be in play.[9]

Secondly, there are many challenges around the need to engage with affected people and listen to their views.[10] The sheer number of possible impacts of a trade agreement on different individuals and communities, as well as the range of rights potentially engaged, makes this a difficult (some would say impossible) task. Some prioritization is always necessary.

This makes for difficult decisions about who to engage with and how. Perceived bias or an apparent lack of even-handedness – favouring business compared to civil society, for instance – can sow mistrust about the true aims of such a process, undermining its future effectiveness as participants begin to question whether it is genuine or worthwhile.[11]

The challenges are even more acute where impact assessment practitioners are tasked with investigating potential human rights impacts in other countries. Even if it is possible to get past the inevitable political sensitivities,[12] the sort of in-depth consultations required will be beyond the budget and time constraints of most assignments.[13]

There are good reasons why trade policy should be subject to greater public and parliamentary scrutiny, and why there should be more opportunities for public participation in the formation of new trading regimes. By building more opportunities for stakeholder consultation at these stages, we can acquire perspectives on trade that are not available from other forms of assessment and analysis.

However, policymakers should be wary of overstating the benefits of existing procedural models. Human rights impact assessment processes are still struggling to provide compelling analyses of the relationships between trade agreements and the enjoyment of human rights, let alone a roadmap for policymakers and trade negotiators as to what should be done.[14]

And financial and practical barriers to participation in stakeholder engagement exercises mean that, at best, these will provide only a partial picture of stakeholder impacts and views.

Experiences with human rights impact assessment of trade agreements so far demonstrate the need for realism about two things: first, the extent to which one can sensibly anticipate and analyse human rights-related risks and opportunities in the preparation stages for a new trading agreement; and, second, the extent to which problems identified in this way can be headed off with the right form of words in the treaty itself.

Both recent UK select committee reports place considerable faith in the ability of pre-project transparency and scrutiny processes to flush out potential problems and prescribe solutions. Of course, there may be cases where frontloading the analysis in this way could be useful, for instance where the human rights implications are so clear that they can readily be addressed through upfront commitments by the parties concerned, whether by bespoke or standardized approaches.

More often, though, for a trade agreement running many years into the future, human rights impacts and implications will take time to emerge, suggesting the need for robust monitoring and mitigation frameworks designed with longevity in mind. Ideally, pre-signing approval and assessment processes would lay the groundwork for future action by both trading partners, either jointly or separately (though preferably both).

To this end, as well as developing ideas for more robust substantive provisions on human rights, policymakers should consider the institutional arrangements required – whether pursuant to the trade agreement or by complementary processes – to ensure that human rights-related risks identified during the planning stages are properly and proactively followed up, that emerging risks are tackled in a timely fashion, and that there are opportunities for meaningful stakeholder contributions to these processes.

What needs to happen

  • Trade policymakers can use human rights impact assessment to screen proposed trade treaties for human rights-related risks and to identify possible ways of mitigating those risks, whether through the terms of the agreement itself, domestic law reform or flanking measures.
  • Building more opportunities for stakeholder consultations can enable perspectives on trade to be highlighted that are not available from other forms of assessment.
  • Assessment is complicated, however, by methodological challenges and the difficulties of forecasting a trade agreement’s future impacts. Policymakers need to be realistic about the risks that can be anticipated, and the extent to which many of those identified can be addressed upfront in trade agreements’ terms.
  • These inherent limitations may be overcome to some extent by better ongoing monitoring. Future trade agreements should include more robust human rights risk monitoring and mitigation frameworks, designed with longevity in mind.

Notes

[1] UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (2019), ‘Human Rights Protections in International Agreements, Seventeenth Report of Session 2017–19’, HC 1833 HL paper 310, 12 March 2019, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtrights/1833/1833.pdf; and House of Commons International Trade Committee (2018), ‘UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny, Sixth Report of Session 2017-2019’, HC 1043, 29 December 2018.

[2] European Parliament and Directorate General for External Policies (2019), Parliamentary scrutiny of trade policies across the western world, study paper, March 2019, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/603477/EXPO_STU(2019)603477_EN.pdf.

[3] European Commission (2019), ‘Trade policy and you’, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/index_en.htm.

[4] See UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (2019), ‘Human Rights Protections in International Agreements’, para 12; and House of Commons International Trade Committee (2018), ‘UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny’, paras 124–34.

[5] OHCHR (2003), Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Human Rights, Trade and Investment, 2 July 2003, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, Annex, at para 63; UN Economic and Social Council (2017), ‘General Comment No 24 (2017) of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities’, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, 10 August 2017, para 13; and UN General Assembly (2011), ‘Guiding principles on human rights impact assessment of trade and investment agreements’, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5, 19 December 2011.

[6] European Commission (2016), Handbook for Sustainability Impact Assessment (2nd ed.), Brussels: European Union, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154464.PDF.

[7] Zerk, J. (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, Chatham House Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/human-rights-impact-assessment-trade-agreements.

[8] Ibid., pp. 11–13. For a detailed explanation of the EU’s approach to human rights impact assessment, see European Commission (2016), Handbook for Sustainability Impact Assessment.

[9] Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, pp. 14–21.

[10] Ibid., pp. 21–22.

[11] Ergon Associates (2011), Trade and Labour: Making effective use of trade sustainability impact assessments and monitoring mechanisms, Final Report to DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion European Commission, September 2011; and Gammage, C. (2010), ‘A Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Economic Partnership Agreements: Challenging the Participatory Process’, Law and Development Review, 3(1): pp. 107–34. For a civil society view, see Trade Justice Movement (undated), ‘Trade Justice Movement submission to the International Trade Committee inquiry into UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny’, https://www.tjm.org.uk/resources/briefings/tjm-submission-to-the-international-trade-committee-inquiry-into-uk-trade-policy-transparency-and-scrutiny, esp. paras 23–32.

[12] Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, pp. 20–21.

[13] Ibid., pp. 21–22.

[14] Ibid.

This essay was produced for the 2019 edition of Chatham House Expert Perspectives – our annual survey of risks and opportunities in global affairs – in which our researchers identify areas where the current sets of rules, institutions and mechanisms for peaceful international cooperation are falling short, and present ideas for reform and modernization.




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Tackling Cyber Disinformation in Elections: Applying International Human Rights Law

Research Event

6 November 2019 - 5:30pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Susie Alegre, Barrister and Associate Tenant, Doughty Street Chambers
Evelyn Aswad, Professor of Law and the Herman G. Kaiser Chair in International Law, University of Oklahoma
Barbora Bukovská, Senior Director for Law and Policy, Article 19
Kate Jones, Director, Diplomatic Studies Programme, University of Oxford
Chair: Harriet Moynihan, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House

Cyber operations are increasingly used by political parties, their supporters and foreign states to influence electorates – from algorithms promoting specific messages to micro-targeting based on personal data and the creation of filter bubbles.
 
The risks of digital tools spreading disinformation and polarizing debate, as opposed to deepening democratic engagement, have been highlighted by concerns over cyber interference in the UK’s Brexit referendum, the 2016 US presidential elections and in Ukraine. 
 
While some governments are adopting legislation in an attempt to address some of these issues, for example Germany’s ‘NetzDG’ law and France’s ‘Law against the manipulation of information’, other countries have proposed an independent regulator as in the case of the UK’s Online Harms white paper. Meanwhile, the digital platforms, as the curators of content, are under increasing pressure to take their own measures to address data mining and manipulation in the context of elections. 

How do international human rights standards, for example on freedom of thought, expression and privacy, guide the use of digital technology in the electoral context? What practical steps can governments and technology actors take to ensure policies, laws and practices are in line with these fundamental standards? And with a general election looming in the UK, will these steps come soon enough?
 
This event brings together a wide range of stakeholders including civil society, the tech sector, legal experts and government, coincides with the publication of a Chatham House research paper on disinformation, elections and the human rights framework

Jacqueline Rowe

Programme Assistant, International Law Programme
020 7389 3287




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In Judging Prorogation, UK Supreme Court Marks Evolution, Not Revolution, in Law

3 October 2019

Ruma Mandal

Director, International Law Programme
Despite the political significance, last week’s judgment does not signal a newly activist court.

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The Supreme Court building in Westminster. Photo: Getty Images.

The UK Supreme Court’s ruling last Wednesday has, at least temporarily, scuppered the prime minister’s plans to limit parliamentary debate before the looming Brexit deadline. Some of the prime minister’s allies have attacked the ruling as a ‘constitutional coup’. But a close reading reveals that the court has stayed within its remit to interpret, rather than make, the law.

In a carefully reasoned judgment, the court emphasized that the case was not about Brexit. But the judges certainly did not shy away from the extraordinary nature of the matters before it, noting that such factual situations have ‘never arisen before and are unlikely ever to arise again… But our law is used to rising to such challenges and supplies us with the legal tools to enable us to reason to a solution.’

The key question before the court was whether the prime minister’s decision to seek prorogation was ‘justiciable’ – i.e. amenable to being reviewed by a court. The English and Scottish courts earlier on in these proceedings had come, dramatically, to opposing views on this.

The Supreme Court was not dissuaded by the inherently political considerations involved in the prime minister’s decision, stating that while ‘courts cannot decide political questions, the fact that a legal dispute concerns the conduct of politicians, or arises from a matter of political controversy, has never been sufficient reason for the courts to refuse to consider it’.

The court went on to emphasize that the Crown’s remaining prerogative powers (exercised on the advice of the government or directly by ministers) have long been subject to judicial scrutiny; such oversight is essential to guarding the separation of powers underpinning the UK’s constitution.

So far, so conventional. The full bench of the Supreme Court was required to grapple, though, with a prerogative power that had never been tested before in the courts. And so they delved back to the 1611 Case of Proclamations: ‘the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allow him’. In the court’s view, the legal issue to be resolved was the scope of the power to prorogue (the existence of this particular prerogative not being in dispute).

With no case law available to provide direct guidance on this question, the court, instead, relied on two fundamental principles of the UK’s constitution – parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. What would be the logical consequence of an unlimited power to prorogue? The ability to shut parliament permanently.

The conclusion: this particular prerogative power had limits. The court held that:

‘A decision to prorogue Parliament (or to advise the monarch to prorogue Parliament) will be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive. In such a situation, the court will intervene if the effect is sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course.’

Having come to this conclusion, the court was left to examine what justification had in fact been given, noting that the prime minister’s motives were irrelevant. It noted that no clear reason had been given – the relevant documents were all concerned with preparing for the Queen’s speech.

Noting evidence on normal practice for such preparations, including from a former prime minister, the court found it ‘impossible… to conclude…that there was any reason – let alone a good reason – to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five weeks’.

The court’s decision was neither inevitable nor a radical departure from legal tradition. It represents the gradual evolution of the long-established legal principle that the crown’s powers are set by the law and supervised by the courts.

Courts have traditionally been reticent to rule on prerogative powers which are ‘high politics’ by nature – classic examples include declaring war and negotiating treaties. In recent years, though, the judiciary has shown a growing confidence to grapple with the contours of those prerogative powers that remain. Deference is still shown when looking at how those powers have been used as opposed to the limits of the prerogative in question.

The Supreme Court ruling won’t reassure those who worry about the emergence of an activist court willing to wade (improperly) into the political arena. Nor will it necessarily bring comfort to those anxious about an unwritten constitution in an era where political conventions are fast unravelling.

But divisive court rulings are nothing new, nor are ministerial outbursts about inconvenient judgments. In the current environment, politicians should take particular care not to send mixed messages which undermine the independence of the UK’s judiciary. Public trust in British institutions is dangerously low and the UK can ill-afford further damage to its reputation as a country steeped in democracy and the rule of law.




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Sovereignty and Non-Intervention: The Application of International Law to State Cyberattacks

Research Event

4 December 2019 - 5:30pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Douglas, Legal Director, GCHQ
Zhixiong Huang, Luojia Chair of International Law, Wuhan University
Nemanja Malisevic, Director of Digital Diplomacy, Microsoft
Harriet Moynihan, Associate Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Distinguished Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House

International law applies to cyber operations – but views differ on exactly how. Does state-sponsored interference in another state's affairs using cyber means – for example,  disinformation campaigns in elections, disabling government websites, or disrupting transport systems – breach international law? If so, on what basis and how are the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention relevant? States are increasingly attributing cyber operations to other states and engaging in the debate on how international law applies, including circumstances that would justify countermeasures.

As states meet to debate these issues at the UN, the panel will explore how international law regulates cyberoperations by states, consider the prospects of progress at the UN, and assess the value of other initiatives.

This event coincides with the launch of a Chatham House research paper which analyses how the principles of sovereignty and intervention apply in the context of cyberoperations, and considers a way forward for agreeing a common understanding of cyber norms.

This event will bring together a broad group of actors, including policymakers, the private sector, legal experts and civil society, and will be followed by a drinks reception.

 

Jacqueline Rowe

Programme Assistant, International Law Programme
020 7389 3287




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Security and Prosperity in Asia: The Role of International Law

1 November 2019

The 'Security and Prosperity in Asia' conference looked at the impact of international law in the Asia-Pacific with a focus on regional economic and security issues such as the South China Sea disputes.

Security and Prosperity in Asia Cover Image.jpg

Singapore skyline at sunset, 2016. Photo: Getty Images.

About the Conference

At a time of geopolitical uncertainty and with multilateralism under pressure, this conference brought together diverse actors to explore the evolving role of international law on critical security and economic issues in the Asia-Pacific. From trade agreements to deep-sea mining, cyberwarfare to territorial disputes, the breadth of the discussion illustrated the growing reach of international law in the region.

Hosted by the International Law Programme and the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House on 27 March 2019, the conference focused on three themes: trade and investment, maritime security and governance, and emerging security challenges. What trends are emerging in terms of engagement with international law in the region, and how can international standards play a greater role in encouraging collaboration and reducing tensions? And, with the eastward shift in geopolitical power, how will Asia-Pacific states shape the future of international law?




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Online Disinformation and Political Discourse: Applying a Human Rights Framework

6 November 2019

Although some digital platforms now have an impact on more people’s lives than does any one state authority, the international community has been slow to hold to account these platforms’ activities by reference to human rights law. This paper examines how human rights frameworks should guide digital technology.

Kate Jones

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme

2019-11-05-Disinformation.jpg

A man votes in Manhattan, New York City, during the US elections on 8 November 2016. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Online political campaigning techniques are distorting our democratic political processes. These techniques include the creation of disinformation and divisive content; exploiting digital platforms’ algorithms, and using bots, cyborgs and fake accounts to distribute this content; maximizing influence through harnessing emotional responses such as anger and disgust; and micro-targeting on the basis of collated personal data and sophisticated psychological profiling techniques. Some state authorities distort political debate by restricting, filtering, shutting down or censoring online networks.
  • Such techniques have outpaced regulatory initiatives and, save in egregious cases such as shutdown of networks, there is no international consensus on how they should be tackled. Digital platforms, driven by their commercial impetus to encourage users to spend as long as possible on them and to attract advertisers, may provide an environment conducive to manipulative techniques.
  • International human rights law, with its careful calibrations designed to protect individuals from abuse of power by authority, provides a normative framework that should underpin responses to online disinformation and distortion of political debate. Contrary to popular view, it does not entail that there should be no control of the online environment; rather, controls should balance the interests at stake appropriately.
  • The rights to freedom of thought and opinion are critical to delimiting the appropriate boundary between legitimate influence and illegitimate manipulation. When digital platforms exploit decision-making biases in prioritizing bad news and divisive, emotion-arousing information, they may be breaching these rights. States and digital platforms should consider structural changes to digital platforms to ensure that methods of online political discourse respect personal agency and prevent the use of sophisticated manipulative techniques.
  • The right to privacy includes a right to choose not to divulge your personal information, and a right to opt out of trading in and profiling on the basis of your personal data. Current practices in collecting, trading and using extensive personal data to ‘micro-target’ voters without their knowledge are not consistent with this right. Significant changes are needed.
  • Data protection laws should be implemented robustly, and should not legitimate extensive harvesting of personal data on the basis of either notional ‘consent’ or the data handler’s commercial interests. The right to privacy should be embedded in technological design (such as by allowing the user to access all information held on them at the click of a button); and political parties should be transparent in their collection and use of personal data, and in their targeting of messages. Arguably, the value of personal data should be shared with the individuals from whom it derives.
  • The rules on the boundaries of permissible content online should be set by states, and should be consistent with the right to freedom of expression. Digital platforms have had to rapidly develop policies on retention or removal of content, but those policies do not necessarily reflect the right to freedom of expression, and platforms are currently not well placed to take account of the public interest. Platforms should be far more transparent in their content regulation policies and decision-making, and should develop frameworks enabling efficient, fair, consistent internal complaints and content monitoring processes. Expertise on international human rights law should be integral to their systems.
  • The right to participate in public affairs and to vote includes the right to engage in public debate. States and digital platforms should ensure an environment in which all can participate in debate online and are not discouraged from standing for election, from participating or from voting by online threats or abuse.




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Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law

Research Event

21 January 2020 - 5:30pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Andrew Cayley, Director, Service Prosecuting Authority, UK Ministry of Defence
Larry Lewis, Vice President and Director, Center for Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence, CNA
Jelena Pejic, Senior Legal Adviser, International Committee of the Red Cross
Chair: Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Distinguished Fellow, International Law Programme, Chatham House
Countries should have adequate systems in place for investigating violations of international humanitarian law, for launching criminal prosecutions for war crimes and for inquiring into responsibility for unlawful actions of national armed forces. There also needs to be proper counting and recording of the civilian casualties of military operations.
 
This event, which will be introduced by the director of the UK Service Prosecuting Authority, Andrew Cayley, will discuss the new report by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law, Guidelines on Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Law, Policy and Good Practice, as well as the problems and challenges associated with recording civilian casualties of armed conflict.
 
This meeting is the third in a series of three commemorating the 70th anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions supported by the British Red Cross. It will be followed by a drinks reception.

Jacqueline Rowe

Programme Assistant, International Law Programme
020 7389 3287




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The Application of International Law to State Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

2 December 2019

Hostile cyber operations by one state against another state are increasingly common. This paper analyzes the application of the sovereignty and non-intervention principles in relation to states’ cyber operations in another state below the threshold of the use of force. 

Harriet Moynihan

Senior Research Fellow, International Law Programme

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A computer hacked by a virus known as Petya. The Petya ransomware cyberattack hit computers of Russian and Ukrainian companies on 27 June 2017. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • The vast majority of state-to-state cyberattacks consist of persistent, low-level intrusions that take place below the threshold of use of force. International law, including the principle of non-intervention in another state’s internal affairs and the principle of sovereignty, applies to these cyber operations.
  • It is not clear whether any unauthorized cyber intrusion would violate the target state’s sovereignty, or whether there is a threshold in operation. While some would like to set limits by reference to effects of the cyber activity, at this time such limits are not reflected in customary international law. The assessment of whether sovereignty has been violated therefore has to be made on a case by case basis, if no other more specific rules of international law apply.
  • In due course, further state practice and opinio iuris may give rise to an emerging cyber-specific understanding of sovereignty, just as specific rules deriving from the sovereignty principle have crystallized in other areas of international law.
  • Before a principle of due diligence can be invoked in the cyber context, further work is needed by states to agree upon rules as to what might be expected of a state in this context.
  • The principle of non-intervention applies to a state’s cyber operations as it does to other state activities. It consists of coercive behaviour by one state that deprives the target state of its free will in relation to the exercise of its sovereign functions in order to compel an outcome in, or conduct with respect to, a matter reserved to the target state.
  • In practice, activities that contravene the non-intervention principle and activities that violates sovereignty will often overlap.
  • In order to reach agreement on how international law applies to states’ cyber operations below the level of use of force, states should put their views on record, where possible giving examples of when they consider that an obligation may be breached, as states such as the UK, Australia, France and the Netherlands have done.
  • Further discussion between states should focus on how the rules apply to practical examples of state-sponsored cyber operations. There is likely to be more commonality about specific applications of the law than there is about abstract principles.
  • The prospects of a general treaty in this area are still far off. In due course, there may be benefit in considering limited rules, for example on due diligence and a prohibition on attacking critical infrastructure, before tackling broad principles.




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Power Politics Could Impede Progress on Responsible Regulation of Cyberspace

3 December 2019

Harriet Moynihan

Senior Research Fellow, International Law Programme
A new Chatham House paper examines the prospects of countries reaching agreement on issues of sovereignty and non-intervention in cyberspace in the face of persistent, low-level, state-to-state cyber attacks.

2019-11-29-Intl-Law-Cyberattacks.jpg

A computer hacked by a virus known as Petya. The Petya ransomware cyberattack hit computers of Russian and Ukrainian companies on 27 June 2017. Photo: Getty Images.

In discussions to date about how international law applies in cyberspace, commentators have tended to focus their attention on how the rules on the use of force, or the law of armed conflict, apply to cyber activities conducted by states that give rise to physical damage, injury or death.

But in practice, the vast majority of state cyberattacks fall below this threshold. Far more common are persistent, low-level attacks that may leave no physical trace but that are capable of doing significant damage to a state’s ability to control its systems, often at serious economic cost.

Such cyber incursions might include network disruptions in the operation of another government’s websites; tampering with electoral infrastructure to change or undermine the result; or using cyber means to destabilize another state’s financial sector.

For these kinds of cyber operation, the principle of sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention in another state’s internal affairs, are the starting point.

A UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) agreed in 2013 and 2015 that the principles in the UN Charter, including sovereignty and the prohibition on intervention in another state’s affairs, apply to states’ activities in cyberspace. The 2015 GGE also recommended eleven (non-binding) norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

However, states have not yet reached agreement on how to apply these principles. Until recently, there has also been very little knowledge of what states actually do in cyberspace, as they usually conduct cyber operations covertly and have been reluctant to put their views on record.

A new Chatham House research paper analyses the application of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to state cyberattacks that fall below the principle of use of force. As well as analysing the application of the law in this area, the paper also makes recommendations to governments on how they might best make progress in reaching agreement in this area.

Existing rules or new rules?

As the research paper makes clear, there is currently some debate, principally between countries in the West, about the extent to which sovereignty is a legally binding rule in the context of cyberspace and, if so, how it and the principle of non-intervention might apply in practice.

In the last few years, certain states have put on record how they consider international law to apply to states’ activities in cyberspace, namely the UK, Australia, France and the Netherlands. While there may be some differences in their approaches, which are discussed in the paper, there also remains important common ground: namely, that existing international law already provides a solid framework for regulating states’ cyber activities, as it regulates every other domain of state-to-state activity.

There is also an emerging trend for states to work together when attributing cyberattacks to hostile states, enabling them to call out malign cyber activity when it violates international law. (See, for example, the joint statements made in relation to the NotPetya cyber attack and malicious cyber activity attributed to the Russian government).

However, other countries have questioned whether existing international law as it stands is capable of regulating states’ cyber interactions and have called for ‘new legal instruments’ in this area.

This includes a proposal by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (led by Russia and China) for an International Code of Conduct on Information Security, a draft of which was submitted to the UN in 2011 and 2015, without success. The UN has also formed a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) under a resolution proposed by Russia to consider how international law applies to states’ activities in cyberspace.

The resolution establishing the OEWG, which began work earlier this year, includes the possibility of the group ‘introducing changes to the rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States’ agreed in the 2013 and 2015 GGE reports. In the OEWG discussions at the UN in September, several countries claimed that a new legal instrument was needed to fill the ‘legal vacuum’ (Cuba) or ‘the gap of ungoverned areas’ (Indonesia).

It would be concerning if the hard-won consensus on the application of international law to cyberspace that has been reached at past GGEs started to unravel. In contrast to 2013 and 2015, the 2017 meeting failed to reach an agreement.

On 9 December, a renewed GGE will meet in New York, but the existence of the OEWG exploring the same issues in a separate process reflects the fact that cyber norms have become an area of geopolitical rivalry.

Aside from the application of international law, states are also adopting divergent approaches to the domestic regulation of cyberspace within their own territory. The emerging trend towards a ‘splinternet’ – i.e. between states that believe the internet should be global and open on the hand, and those that favour a ‘sovereignty and control’ model on the other  – is also likely to make discussions at the GGE more challenging.

Distinct from the international law concept of sovereignty is the notion of ‘cybersovereignty’, a term coined by China to describe the wide-ranging powers it assumes under domestic law to regulate its citizens’ access to the internet and personal data within its territory. This approach is catching on (as reflected in Russia’s recently enacted ‘Sovereign Internet Law’), with other authoritarian states likely to follow suit.

The importance of non-state actors

In parallel with regional and UN discussions on how international law applies, a number of initiatives by non-state actors have also sought to establish voluntary principles about responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, a multi-stakeholder body that has proposed principles, norms and recommendations to guide responsible behaviour by all parties in cyberspace, recently published its final report. The Cybersecurity Tech Accord  aims to promote collaboration between tech companies on stability and resilience in cyberspace. President Macron’s ‘Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace’ has to date received the backing of 67 states, 139 international and civil society organizations, and 358 private-sector organizations.

It remains to be seen in the long term whether the parallel processes at the UN will work constructively together or be competitive. But notwithstanding the challenging geopolitical backdrop, the UN GGE meeting next week at the least offers states the opportunity to consolidate and build on the results of past meetings; to increase knowledge and discussion about how international law might apply; and to encourage more states to put their own views of these issues on the record.




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POSTPONED: Supporting Civic Space: The Role and Impact of the Private Sector

Invitation Only Research Event

16 March 2020 - 11:00am to 5:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

A healthy civic space is vital for an enabling business environment. In recognition of this, a growing number of private sector actors are challenging, publicly or otherwise, the deteriorating environment for civic freedoms.

However, this corporate activism is often limited and largely ad hoc. It remains confined to a small cluster of multinationals leaving potential routes for effective coordination and collaboration with other actors underexplored.

This roundtable will bring together a diverse and international group of business actors, civil society actors and foreign policy experts to exchange perspectives and experiences on how the private sector can be involved in issues around civic space. The meeting will provide an opportunity to explore the drivers of – and barriers to – corporate activism, develop a better understanding of existing initiatives, identify good practice and discuss practical strategies for the business community.

This meeting will be the first of a series of roundtables at Chatham House in support of initiatives to build broad alliances for the protection of civic space. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 

Jacqueline Rowe

Programme Assistant, International Law Programme
020 7389 3287




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Kate Jones

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme

Biography

Kate focuses on cyber and human rights law issues, and is author of Chatham House’s research paper on Online Disinformation and Political Discourse: Applying a Human Rights Framework.

Kate is based at the University of Oxford, where she is a member of the Law Faculty and directs the Diplomatic Studies Programme, a set of postgraduate courses for diplomats. 

She gained much of her experience in human rights law and public international law as a lawyer at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, both in London and overseas as Legal Adviser at the UK Mission to the United Nations in Geneva and then Deputy Permanent Representative at the UK Delegation to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. 

She took her undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in law at the University of Oxford, and qualified as a solicitor at Norton Rose.

Areas of expertise

  • Cyber and human rights law (disinformation, elections, social media platforms, etc)
  • Human rights law
  • Public international law
  • Diplomatic skills and training

Past experience

2015 - presentDirector, Diplomatic Studies Programme; Member of University Law Faculty; Fellow of Kellogg College, University of Oxford
2014-15Research and Outreach Specialist, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
2011-14Deputy Permanent Representative, UK Delegation to Council of Europe
2008-11Legal Adviser, UK Mission to the United Nations
2002-07Assistant Legal Adviser, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1997-2001Trainee, then Assistant Solicitor, Norton Rose
1999Judicial Assistant, Court of Appeal (secondment)




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Seventy Years of the Geneva Conventions: What of the Future?

24 March 2020

Seventy years after the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, there are challenges that remain to be addressed. This briefing takes three pertinent examples, and discusses possibilities for addressing them.

Emanuela-Chiara Gillard

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme

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Rescue of the wounded in Duma city by Syrian Red Crescent paramedics, 2 February 2018. Photo: Samer Bouidani/NurPhoto/Getty

Summary

  • The 70th anniversary of the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions was commemorated in 2019. But violations of the Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocols are widespread.
  • Contemporary conflicts have been marked by violations of some of the foundational rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) relating to the protection of the wounded and sick and of providers of medical assistance.
  • A further area of IHL that has come under strain and scrutiny are the rules regulating humanitarian relief operations and their application to sieges and blockades.
  • War has a huge impact on children, and the treatment of children in armed conflict is another area of the law that requires further attention.
  • In the current political climate, it is unlikely that new treaties will be negotiated to address emerging issues or uncertainties in the law.
  • Other measures must be explored, including the adoption of domestic measures to implement existing law; support for processes that interpret the law; and initiatives to promote compliance with the law by organized armed groups.
  • One overarching challenge is the interplay between IHL and counterterrorism measures. It can undermine the protections set out in IHL, and hinder principled humanitarian action and activities to promote compliance with the law by organized armed groups.




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Bulletin updated at 19:45 HKT - 03/05/2020

There is no warning in force.




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12-LOX catalyzes the oxidation of 2-arachidonoyl-lysolipids in platelets generating eicosanoid-lysolipids that are attenuated by iPLA2{gamma} knockout [Signal Transduction]

The canonical pathway of eicosanoid production in most mammalian cells is initiated by phospholipase A2-mediated release of arachidonic acid, followed by its enzymatic oxidation resulting in a vast array of eicosanoid products. However, recent work has demonstrated that the major phospholipase in mitochondria, iPLA2γ (patatin-like phospholipase domain containing 8 (PNPLA8)), possesses sn-1 specificity, with polyunsaturated fatty acids at the sn-2 position generating polyunsaturated sn-2-acyl lysophospholipids. Through strategic chemical derivatization, chiral chromatographic separation, and multistage tandem MS, here we first demonstrate that human platelet-type 12-lipoxygenase (12-LOX) can directly catalyze the regioselective and stereospecific oxidation of 2-arachidonoyl-lysophosphatidylcholine (2-AA-LPC) and 2-arachidonoyl-lysophosphatidylethanolamine (2-AA-LPE). Next, we identified these two eicosanoid-lysophospholipids in murine myocardium and in isolated platelets. Moreover, we observed robust increases in 2-AA-LPC, 2-AA-LPE, and their downstream 12-LOX oxidation products, 12(S)-HETE-LPC and 12(S)-HETE-LPE, in calcium ionophore (A23187)-stimulated murine platelets. Mechanistically, genetic ablation of iPLA2γ markedly decreased the calcium-stimulated production of 2-AA-LPC, 2-AA-LPE, and 12-HETE-lysophospholipids in mouse platelets. Importantly, a potent and selective 12-LOX inhibitor, ML355, significantly inhibited the production of 12-HETE-LPC and 12-HETE-LPE in activated platelets. Furthermore, we found that aging is accompanied by significant changes in 12-HETE-LPC in murine serum that were also markedly attenuated by iPLA2γ genetic ablation. Collectively, these results identify previously unknown iPLA2γ-initiated signaling pathways mediated by direct 12-LOX oxidation of 2-AA-LPC and 2-AA-LPE. This oxidation generates previously unrecognized eicosanoid-lysophospholipids that may serve as biomarkers for age-related diseases and could potentially be used as targets in therapeutic interventions.




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Glucocerebrosidases catalyze a transgalactosylation reaction that yields a newly-identified brain sterol metabolite, galactosylated cholesterol [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

β-Glucocerebrosidase (GBA) hydrolyzes glucosylceramide (GlcCer) to generate ceramide. Previously, we demonstrated that lysosomal GBA1 and nonlysosomal GBA2 possess not only GlcCer hydrolase activity, but also transglucosylation activity to transfer the glucose residue from GlcCer to cholesterol to form β-cholesterylglucoside (β-GlcChol) in vitro. β-GlcChol is a member of sterylglycosides present in diverse species. How GBA1 and GBA2 mediate β-GlcChol metabolism in the brain is unknown. Here, we purified and characterized sterylglycosides from rodent and fish brains. Although glucose is thought to be the sole carbohydrate component of sterylglycosides in vertebrates, structural analysis of rat brain sterylglycosides revealed the presence of galactosylated cholesterol (β-GalChol), in addition to β-GlcChol. Analyses of brain tissues from GBA2-deficient mice and GBA1- and/or GBA2-deficient Japanese rice fish (Oryzias latipes) revealed that GBA1 and GBA2 are responsible for β-GlcChol degradation and formation, respectively, and that both GBA1 and GBA2 are responsible for β-GalChol formation. Liquid chromatography–tandem MS revealed that β-GlcChol and β-GalChol are present throughout development from embryo to adult in the mouse brain. We found that β-GalChol expression depends on galactosylceramide (GalCer), and developmental onset of β-GalChol biosynthesis appeared to be during myelination. We also found that β-GlcChol and β-GalChol are secreted from neurons and glial cells in association with exosomes. In vitro enzyme assays confirmed that GBA1 and GBA2 have transgalactosylation activity to transfer the galactose residue from GalCer to cholesterol to form β-GalChol. This is the first report of the existence of β-GalChol in vertebrates and how β-GlcChol and β-GalChol are formed in the brain.




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Deletion of fatty acid transport protein 2 (FATP2) in the mouse liver changes the metabolic landscape by increasing the expression of PPAR{alpha}-regulated genes [Lipids]

Fatty acid transport protein 2 (FATP2) is highly expressed in the liver, small intestine, and kidney, where it functions in both the transport of exogenous long-chain fatty acids and the activation of very-long-chain fatty acids. Here, using a murine model, we investigated the phenotypic impacts of deleting FATP2, followed by a transcriptomic analysis using unbiased RNA-Seq to identify concomitant changes in the liver transcriptome. WT and FATP2-null (Fatp2−/−) mice (5 weeks) were maintained on a standard chow diet for 6 weeks. The Fatp2−/− mice had reduced weight gain, lowered serum triglyceride, and increased serum cholesterol levels and attenuated dietary fatty acid absorption. Transcriptomic analysis of the liver revealed 258 differentially expressed genes in male Fatp2−/− mice and a total of 91 in female Fatp2−/− mice. These genes mapped to the following gene ontology categories: fatty acid degradation, peroxisome biogenesis, fatty acid synthesis, and retinol and arachidonic acid metabolism. Targeted RT-quantitative PCR verified the altered expression of selected genes. Of note, most of the genes with increased expression were known to be regulated by peroxisome proliferator–activated receptor α (PPARα), suggesting that FATP2 activity is linked to a PPARα-specific proximal ligand. Targeted metabolomic experiments in the Fatp2−/− liver revealed increases of total C16:0, C16:1, and C18:1 fatty acids; increases in lipoxin A4 and prostaglandin J2; and a decrease in 20-hydroxyeicosatetraenoic acid. We conclude that the expression of FATP2 in the liver broadly affects the metabolic landscape through PPARα, indicating that FATP2 provides an important role in liver lipid metabolism through its transport or activation activities.




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Determination of globotriaosylceramide analogs in the organs of a mouse model of Fabry disease [Lipids]

Fabry disease is a heritable lipid disorder caused by the low activity of α-galactosidase A and characterized by the systemic accumulation of globotriaosylceramide (Gb3). Recent studies have reported a structural heterogeneity of Gb3 in Fabry disease, including Gb3 isoforms with different fatty acids and Gb3 analogs with modifications on the sphingosine moiety. However, Gb3 assays are often performed only on the selected Gb3 isoforms. To precisely determine the total Gb3 concentration, here we established two methods for determining both Gb3 isoforms and analogs. One was the deacylation method, involving Gb3 treatment with sphingolipid ceramide N-deacylase, followed by an assay of the deacylated products, globotriaosylsphingosine (lyso-Gb3) and its analogs, by ultra-performance LC coupled to tandem MS (UPLC-MS/MS). The other method was a direct assay established in the present study for 37 Gb3 isoforms and analogs/isoforms by UPLC-MS/MS. Gb3s from the organs of symptomatic animals of a Fabry disease mouse model were mainly Gb3 isoforms and two Gb3 analogs, such as Gb3(+18) containing the lyso-Gb3(+18) moiety and Gb3(−2) containing the lyso-Gb3(−2) moiety. The total concentrations and Gb3 analog distributions determined by the two methods were comparable. Gb3(+18) levels were high in the kidneys (24% of total Gb3) and the liver (13%), and we observed Gb3(−2) in the heart (10%) and the kidneys (5%). These results indicate organ-specific expression of Gb3 analogs, insights that may lead to a deeper understanding of the pathophysiology of Fabry disease.




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MtrP, a putative methyltransferase in Corynebacteria, is required for optimal membrane transport of trehalose mycolates [Lipids]

Pathogenic bacteria of the genera Mycobacterium and Corynebacterium cause severe human diseases such as tuberculosis (Mycobacterium tuberculosis) and diphtheria (Corynebacterium diphtheriae). The cells of these species are surrounded by protective cell walls rich in long-chain mycolic acids. These fatty acids are conjugated to the disaccharide trehalose on the cytoplasmic side of the bacterial cell membrane. They are then transported across the membrane to the periplasm where they act as donors for other reactions. We have previously shown that transient acetylation of the glycolipid trehalose monohydroxycorynomycolate (hTMCM) enables its efficient transport to the periplasm in Corynebacterium glutamicum and that acetylation is mediated by the membrane protein TmaT. Here, we show that a putative methyltransferase, encoded at the same genetic locus as TmaT, is also required for optimal hTMCM transport. Deletion of the C. glutamicum gene NCgl2764 (Rv0224c in M. tuberculosis) abolished acetyltrehalose monocorynomycolate (AcTMCM) synthesis, leading to accumulation of hTMCM in the inner membrane and delaying its conversion to trehalose dihydroxycorynomycolate (h2TDCM). Complementation with NCgl2764 normalized turnover of hTMCM to h2TDCM. In contrast, complementation with NCgl2764 derivatives mutated at residues essential for methyltransferase activity failed to rectify the defect, suggesting that NCgl2764/Rv0224c encodes a methyltransferase, designated here as MtrP. Comprehensive analyses of the individual mtrP and tmaT mutants and of a double mutant revealed strikingly similar changes across several lipid classes compared with WT bacteria. These findings indicate that both MtrP and TmaT have nonredundant roles in regulating AcTMCM synthesis, revealing additional complexity in the regulation of trehalose mycolate transport in the Corynebacterineae.




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COQ11 deletion mitigates respiratory deficiency caused by mutations in the gene encoding the coenzyme Q chaperone protein Coq10 [Lipids]

Coenzyme Q (Qn) is a vital lipid component of the electron transport chain that functions in cellular energy metabolism and as a membrane antioxidant. In the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, coq1–coq9 deletion mutants are respiratory-incompetent, sensitive to lipid peroxidation stress, and unable to synthesize Q6. The yeast coq10 deletion mutant is also respiratory-deficient and sensitive to lipid peroxidation, yet it continues to produce Q6 at an impaired rate. Thus, Coq10 is required for the function of Q6 in respiration and as an antioxidant and is believed to chaperone Q6 from its site of synthesis to the respiratory complexes. In several fungi, Coq10 is encoded as a fusion polypeptide with Coq11, a recently identified protein of unknown function required for efficient Q6 biosynthesis. Because “fused” proteins are often involved in similar biochemical pathways, here we examined the putative functional relationship between Coq10 and Coq11 in yeast. We used plate growth and Seahorse assays and LC-MS/MS analysis to show that COQ11 deletion rescues respiratory deficiency, sensitivity to lipid peroxidation, and decreased Q6 biosynthesis of the coq10Δ mutant. Additionally, immunoblotting indicated that yeast coq11Δ mutants accumulate increased amounts of certain Coq polypeptides and display a stabilized CoQ synthome. These effects suggest that Coq11 modulates Q6 biosynthesis and that its absence increases mitochondrial Q6 content in the coq10Δcoq11Δ double mutant. This augmented mitochondrial Q6 content counteracts the respiratory deficiency and lipid peroxidation sensitivity phenotypes of the coq10Δ mutant. This study further clarifies the intricate connection between Q6 biosynthesis, trafficking, and function in mitochondrial metabolism.




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AIG1 and ADTRP are endogenous hydrolases of fatty acid esters of hydroxy fatty acids (FAHFAs) in mice [Metabolism]

Fatty acid esters of hydroxy fatty acids (FAHFAs) are a newly discovered class of signaling lipids with anti-inflammatory and anti-diabetic properties. However, the endogenous regulation of FAHFAs remains a pressing but unanswered question. Here, using MS-based FAHFA hydrolysis assays, LC-MS–based lipidomics analyses, and activity-based protein profiling, we found that androgen-induced gene 1 (AIG1) and androgen-dependent TFPI-regulating protein (ADTRP), two threonine hydrolases, control FAHFA levels in vivo in both genetic and pharmacologic mouse models. Tissues from mice lacking ADTRP (Adtrp-KO), or both AIG1 and ADTRP (DKO) had higher concentrations of FAHFAs particularly isomers with the ester bond at the 9th carbon due to decreased FAHFA hydrolysis activity. The levels of other lipid classes were unaltered indicating that AIG1 and ADTRP specifically hydrolyze FAHFAs. Complementing these genetic studies, we also identified a dual AIG1/ADTRP inhibitor, ABD-110207, which is active in vivo. Acute treatment of WT mice with ABD-110207 resulted in elevated FAHFA levels, further supporting the notion that AIG1 and ADTRP activity control endogenous FAHFA levels. However, loss of AIG1/ADTRP did not mimic the changes associated with pharmacologically administered FAHFAs on extent of upregulation of FAHFA levels, glucose tolerance, or insulin sensitivity in mice, indicating that therapeutic strategies should weigh more on FAHFA administration. Together, these findings identify AIG1 and ADTRP as the first endogenous FAHFA hydrolases identified and provide critical genetic and chemical tools for further characterization of these enzymes and endogenous FAHFAs to unravel their physiological functions and roles in health and disease.




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The transcriptional regulator MEIS2 sets up the ground state for palatal osteogenesis in mice [Gene Regulation]

Haploinsufficiency of Meis homeobox 2 (MEIS2), encoding a transcriptional regulator, is associated with human cleft palate, and Meis2 inactivation leads to abnormal palate development in mice, implicating MEIS2 functions in palate development. However, its functional mechanisms remain unknown. Here we observed widespread MEIS2 expression in the developing palate in mice. Wnt1Cre-mediated Meis2 inactivation in cranial neural crest cells led to a secondary palate cleft. Importantly, about half of the Wnt1Cre;Meis2f/f mice exhibited a submucous cleft, providing a model for studying palatal bone formation and patterning. Consistent with complete absence of palatal bones, the results from integrative analyses of MEIS2 by ChIP sequencing, RNA-Seq, and an assay for transposase-accessible chromatin sequencing identified key osteogenic genes regulated directly by MEIS2, indicating that it plays a fundamental role in palatal osteogenesis. De novo motif analysis uncovered that the MEIS2-bound regions are highly enriched in binding motifs for several key osteogenic transcription factors, particularly short stature homeobox 2 (SHOX2). Comparative ChIP sequencing analyses revealed genome-wide co-occupancy of MEIS2 and SHOX2 in addition to their colocalization in the developing palate and physical interaction, suggesting that SHOX2 and MEIS2 functionally interact. However, although SHOX2 was required for proper palatal bone formation and was a direct downstream target of MEIS2, Shox2 overexpression failed to rescue the palatal bone defects in a Meis2-mutant background. These results, together with the fact that Meis2 expression is associated with high osteogenic potential and required for chromatin accessibility of osteogenic genes, support a vital function of MEIS2 in setting up a ground state for palatal osteogenesis.




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Certain ortho-hydroxylated brominated ethers are promiscuous kinase inhibitors that impair neuronal signaling and neurodevelopmental processes [Cell Biology]

The developing nervous system is remarkably sensitive to environmental signals, including disruptive toxins, such as polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs). PBDEs are an environmentally pervasive class of brominated flame retardants whose neurodevelopmental toxicity mechanisms remain largely unclear. Using dissociated cortical neurons from embryonic Rattus norvegicus, we found here that chronic exposure to 6-OH–BDE-47, one of the most prevalent hydroxylated PBDE metabolites, suppresses both spontaneous and evoked neuronal electrical activity. On the basis of our previous work on mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAPK)/extracellular signal-related kinase (ERK) (MEK) biology and our observation that 6-OH–BDE-47 is structurally similar to kinase inhibitors, we hypothesized that certain hydroxylated PBDEs mediate neurotoxicity, at least in part, by impairing the MEK–ERK axis of MAPK signal transduction. We tested this hypothesis on three experimental platforms: 1) in silico, where modeling ligand–protein docking suggested that 6-OH–BDE-47 is a promiscuous ATP-competitive kinase inhibitor; 2) in vitro in dissociated neurons, where 6-OH–BDE-47 and another specific hydroxylated BDE metabolite similarly impaired phosphorylation of MEK/ERK1/2 and activity-induced transcription of a neuronal immediate early gene; and 3) in vivo in Drosophila melanogaster, where developmental exposures to 6-OH–BDE-47 and a MAPK inhibitor resulted in offspring displaying similarly increased frequency of mushroom-body β–lobe midline crossing, a metric of axonal guidance. Taken together, our results support that certain ortho-hydroxylated PBDE metabolites are promiscuous kinase inhibitors and can cause disruptions of critical neurodevelopmental processes, including neuronal electrical activity, pre-synaptic functions, MEK–ERK signaling, and axonal guidance.




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Bulletin updated at 00:00 HKT 10/May/2020

General Situation:
A trough of low pressure will edge towards the coast of Guangdong today and linger over the region in the following couple of days. There will be thundery showers over Guangdong. With the anticyclone aloft strengthening in the middle and latter parts of this week, the weather over southern China will improve and it will be hot.

Date/Month: 10/05 (Sunday)
Wind: South force 3.
Weather: Sunny intervals and a few showers. Isolated thunderstorms later.
Temp range: 28 - 32 C
R.H. range: 65 - 95 per Cent

Date/Month: 11/05 (Monday)
Wind: South force 2 to 3.
Weather: Mainly cloudy with occasional showers and a few squally thunderstorms.
Temp range: 26 - 30 C
R.H. range: 70 - 95 per Cent

Date/Month: 12/05 (Tuesday)
Wind: Light winds force 2.
Weather: Mainly cloudy with a few showers and thunderstorms.
Temp range: 25 - 29 C
R.H. range: 70 - 95 per Cent

Date/Month: 13/05 (Wednesday)
Wind: Southeast force 3.
Weather: Sunny intervals and one or two showers.
Temp range: 26 - 30 C
R.H. range: 65 - 90 per Cent

Date/Month: 14/05 (Thursday)
Wind: Southeast force 3.
Weather: Sunny periods.
Temp range: 26 - 31 C
R.H. range: 60 - 85 per Cent

Date/Month: 15/05 (Friday)
Wind: South to southeast force 3.
Weather: Sunny periods.
Temp range: 27 - 32 C
R.H. range: 60 - 85 per Cent

Date/Month: 16/05 (Saturday)
Wind: South force 3.
Weather: Sunny periods.
Temp range: 27 - 32 C
R.H. range: 60 - 85 per Cent

Date/Month: 17/05 (Sunday)
Wind: South force 3 to 4.
Weather: Sunny periods.
Temp range: 28 - 32 C
R.H. range: 70 - 90 per Cent

Date/Month: 18/05 (Monday)
Wind: South force 3 to 4.
Weather: Sunny periods and isolated showers.
Temp range: 28 - 32 C
R.H. range: 70 - 90 per Cent

Sea surface temperature at 2 P.M. 09/05/2020 at North Point was 25 degrees C.
Soil temperatures at 7 A.M. 09/05/2020 at Hong Kong Observatory :
0.5 M below surface was 27.6 degrees C
1.0 M below surface was 26.4 degrees C




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Bulletin updated at 00:45 HKT 10/05/2020

An anticyclone aloft brought hot weather to southern China yesterday. Locally, it was hot with sunny periods and isolated showers. A trough of low pressure will edge towards the coast of Guangdong today and linger over the region in the following couple of days. There will be thundery showers over Guangdong.

Weather forecast for Hong Kong:
Mainly cloudy with a few showers. Sunny intervals during the day. There will be isolated thunderstorms later. Hot with temperatures ranging between 28 and 32 degrees. Moderate southerly winds.

Outlook: There will be showers and thunderstorms on Monday and Tuesday. The weather will improve gradually in the following couple of days.




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WYSIWYG Web Builder 9.1 update

WYSIWYG Web Builder 9.1 fixes known problems, adds new features and includes other improvements.




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WYSIWYG Web Builder 9.2 update

WYSIWYG Web Builder 9.2 fixes known problems, adds new features and includes other improvements.




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WYSIWYG Web Builder 9.3 update

WYSIWYG Web Builder 9.3 fixes known problems, adds new features and includes other improvements.




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WYSIWYG Web Builder 9.4 update

WYSIWYG Web Builder 9.4 fixes known problems, adds new features and includes other improvements.




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WYSIWYG Web Builder 10.1 update

WYSIWYG Web Builder 10.1 fixes known problems, adds new features and includes other improvements.




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WYSIWYG Web Builder 10.2 update

WYSIWYG Web Builder 10.2 fixes known problems, adds new features and includes other improvements.




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WYSIWYG Web Builder 10.3 update

WYSIWYG Web Builder 10.3 fixes known problems, adds new features and includes other improvements.




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WYSIWYG Web Builder 10.4 update

WYSIWYG Web Builder 10.4 fixes known problems, adds new features and includes other improvements.