Climate justice with Chinese characteristics? Expert comment NCapeling 7 November 2022

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), claims to be making sustainability a key feature of the programme.

Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has regularly unveiled a grand new strategic concept every four years or so.

Each has been deeply rooted in the Chinese political system and communicated via ambitious slogans, such as A Harmonious World, or New Types of Great Power Relations. And all have reliably generated both excitement and confusion abroad and within China.

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), is no exception. When Chinese president Xi Jinping introduced it at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2021, it made hardly any splash in the West, perhaps because China has already signalled its determination to shape international development in the post-COVID era.

But the GDI is more than just a new label for an ongoing project. One of its core political functions is to deflect some of the fierce criticism directed at its older sibling, the gigantic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has a tarnished reputation for being neither transparent nor sufficiently ‘green’.

Focus on grants and capacity-building

According to the Chinese government’s initial description of the GDI, sustainability is a key feature of the programme. Unlike the BRI, the GDI will focus less on physical infrastructure projects – such as roads, bridges, digital networks, and coal-fired power plants – and more on sustainable-development grants and capacity-building.

In his remarks about GDI in 2021, Xi placed special emphasis on advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helping developing countries manage the transition to a low-carbon economy.

On paper, then, the GDI appears a laudable initiative. While ongoing geopolitical tensions have deepened divisions between China and the US, derailing collaboration on combatting climate change, China at least is adjusting its diplomacy and aid programmes to position itself as a more attractive partner for those seeking climate security.

Since launching the GDI, it has already created the China-Pacific Island Countries Climate Action Cooperation Centre to help some of the world’s most vulnerable countries mitigate the damage from climate change.

But the GDI is still very much in line with China’s past grand initiatives. Its implementation is opaque and there is considerable flexibility in how it will deliver projects and offer grants. This approach is well understood and frequently practiced by Chinese political elites, following Deng Xiaoping’s famous reform ethos of ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’.

Xi has clearly adopted this approach in introducing the GDI. But whereas Deng was steering China’s domestic economy during a period of isolation after the Cultural Revolution, Xi needs to involve many other countries in his vision. That will not be easy now that Russia’s war in Ukraine and other recent developments have complicated many of China’s international relationships.

China’s leaders recognize the BRI was not warmly received in global development circles, owing partly to its role in increasing both climate and financial risks. In implementing the GDI, they need to rethink some basic assumptions. Although gigantic infrastructure investments drove China’s own economic miracle, the same approach is not necessarily applicable everywhere.

Nor should China’s development aid be relentlessly used to seek diplomatic endorsement from other countries. Instead, producing a clear, concrete action plan with specific regional and thematic points of focus would enhance the GDI’s clarity and credibility.

Consider Xi’s recent pledge to add $1 billion to the $3.1 billion South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund, which will be renamed the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund. If China is serious about the GDI’s green credentials, this money should go towards supporting the clean-energy transition in response to the current oil and gas price crunch.

But the GDI’s success ultimately depends on how China deploys not just financial but political capital. It needs to show it can cooperate constructively with countries in the ‘GDI Friends Group’ launched at the UN in January 2022.

For many group members, the pandemic showed that existing development assistance programs urgently need to be updated to account for their recipients’ specific interests and priorities. After years of hollow diplomatic rhetoric, there is a craving for more meaningful assistance to help countries build resilience against climate-driven natural disasters and other growing threats.

China could help meet this demand, but it also will need to manage expectations. Many in the Global South assume a grand-concept policy such as the GDI will be meticulously planned from within Xi’s cabinet and thus executed to deliver large-scale, rapid results. But the GDI will require broad coordination across a wide range of ministries, agencies, and state-owned banks.

One party but not one voice

China may be ruled by one party, but that doesn’t mean its central administration system can always speak with one voice in supporting sustainable development abroad.

Since launching the BRI in 2013, China has showered the Global South with hundreds of billions of dollars in physical infrastructure investment. With the global climate debate increasingly focusing on the need to mobilize international financing for climate mitigation and adaptation in low and middle-income countries, many will be looking to both China and the advanced economies to provide the necessary support.

The G20 will survive but needs major repair Expert comment NCapeling 15 November 2022

Russia’s attack on Ukraine is the biggest challenge to the existence of the G20 since its foundation.

The leader-level version of the G20 was founded in 2008 to coordinate the international response to the global financial crisis across advanced and major emerging economies.

At the outset it was judged a great success. The 2009 London Summit demonstrated a high degree of unity among the world’s largest economies on a comprehensive action plan to tackle the crisis.

The group’s subsequent performance has disappointed. Particularly during the pandemic and the Donald Trump presidency in the US, the group made only a limited additional contribution to policies which national governments were pursuing in any case.

Nonetheless, its members continued to see it as an essential forum without which it would be even harder to tackle a growing list of global economic challenges. This faith was partly repaid when, following the election of the Joe Biden administration in the US, agreement was reached on the $650 billion special drawing rights (SDR) general allocation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in summer 2021.

Impact of the war in Ukraine

Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine earlier this year, leading western members of the group called for Russia to be suspended from the G20 as Russia’s action ran directly against the key principles of the rules-based international system on which the G20 was founded.

Western countries also walked out of meetings of the G20 Finance Ministers’ and International Monetary and Financial Committee this spring rather than sit at the same table as Russian representatives.

This contrasted with 2014 when Russia was suspended indefinitely from the G7 for its takeover of Crimea but no action was taken against it in the G20.

However, China and India, supported by several other emerging economies declined to suspend Russia, creating a standoff which could have resulted in a rapid collapse of the G20, particularly as its informal structure means that, in contrast to the international financial institutions (IFIs), there are no legal principles or procedures to determine how to address such a situation.

It appears the West has now concluded (rightly) that the G20 is too important as a forum for working with China and the other major emerging economies to be allowed to disappear.

This is likely to be because there are no straightforward alternatives. The G7 is too narrow to fill the role and China is now highly unlikely to attend a future G7 Summit as a guest. The boards of the IFIs are not equipped to coordinate across institutions, which is a vital role of the G20, and the United Nations (UN) system does not offer the scope, speed, leader-level engagement, or flexibility of the G20.

Moreover, as evidenced by the chair’s summary of the third G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ meeting in July, once the group gets past the dispute over how to handle Russia, there is a worthwhile agenda of issues which can be agreed on.

As the 2022 president of the G20, Indonesia has been determined to produce a final communique for the leaders’ summit and it looks increasingly like this will be achieved, even though it was impossible to agree concluding statements for some earlier G20 ministerial meetings.

The key will be to deal with the differences over Ukraine between the West and emerging economies with a short opening paragraph reflecting both views. This would then be followed by a consensus text on all the areas where the two groups do agree.

Russia is unlikely to play a disruptive role as preserving its membership of the group will be its key objective, and it will not want to undermine support among other emerging economies by blocking issues that all agree on.

However, even with a final communique achieved, returning to a fully functioning agenda setting, coordination, and decision-making role for G20 will be very challenging, particularly while the war in Ukraine continues.

Tackling sovereign debt distress should be a top priority

There are critically important issues on which G20 action is urgently needed. Top of the list is the acute problem of sovereign debt distress. Some 60 per cent of low-income countries are now judged to be in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress.

But the existing G20 approach for tackling debt distress in low-income countries, the ‘Common Framework’, is progressing far too slowly, and there is no agreed mechanism for handling the growing list of emerging economies in debt distress.

Without tackling debt distress, it is extremely hard to see how it will be possible to generate the vast flow of private sector climate finance necessary to help the developing world progress to net zero.

And yet the G20 is one of the few forums in which a high-level approach to debt distress can be defined because China – along with the IFIs and the western-based private sector – is a key player in any solution.

Urgent repairs needed

However, there is a critical lack of trust among G20 participants which, although in part a reflection of the disagreements over handling Russia, is also about longer-term factors such as the growing geopolitical tensions between China and the US on trade and investment in high tech.

An example of how this has played out was the action China and India took at the Rome G20 Summit in 2021 in blocking Italy’s efforts to establish a new ministerial task force designed to address the threat of future pandemics – a subject which all G20 countries agree is important.

Beijing briefing: China’s wish for 2023? An end to lockdown The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

Xi Jinping will try to beef up Global South relations in 2023, but weary Chinese and the business sector need pandemic restrictions to end, says Yu Jie.

This past year in Chinese politics was capped by a highly anticipated 20th Party Congress in Beijing in October which marked the beginning of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term. Xi stacked the all-powerful Politburo with male loyalists and left the rest of the world to sift through the implications of his leadership reshuffle.

Meanwhile, Xi made headlines at the G20 summit in Indonesia, maintaining a largely positive tone with President Joe Biden and being caught on camera chiding Canada’s Justin Trudeau for leaks after their talks. So, what can we expect Xi to pull out of the hat in 2023, the Chinese Year of the Rabbit? 

In February and March, the conversations around Beijing dinner tables will focus on the composition of the new central government – the important seats within the Chinese State Council. This body must deliver Xi’s ‘security-oriented’ economic agenda as well as his much-promoted ‘Common Prosperity’ initiative.

Pundits will be paying particular attention to who is put in charge of economic planning, who the new foreign minister might be and who will govern the central bank. I will offer my reading of these tea leaves as the year unfolds.

In April and May, speculation may turn to whether China will finally open its borders to foreign visitors and those compatriots who want to be reunited with loved ones after enduring the pandemic lockdown. While some loosening of restrictions began in November 2022, China is still balancing its twin aims of containing the spread of Covid and re-engineering its economy along similar lines to Europe.

Beijing’s controversial ‘Zero-Covid’ strategy has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated rising levels of youth unemployment and tested the patience of China’s middle class, which has led to unprecedented civil disobedience. Those not employed by the state have been hit particularly hard. It is difficult to see how China’s economy can crank up again until Beijing reduces its internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

A pivot to the Global South

June and July will be prime season for Beijing’s diplomacy with the Global South. Xi recently announced that China would host the third Belt and Road Forum in 2023 – a meeting of heads of states from predominantly developing countries to discuss his flagship foreign affairs initiative. As seen in the Political Report of the 20th Party Congress, Xi has abandoned the ‘new type of great power relations’ language he previously used to describe relations with the US-led western world. 

In its place, Xi is stressing that China should develop its ties with the Global South through his Global Development and Global Security initiatives which were announced in 2021 and 2022 respectively. These aim to reshape the global governance agenda in multilateral forums and project Beijing’s influence on to the developing world.

Sport will dominate throughout August and September. While Beijing’s spending spree on football promotion might have failed to see the national side qualify for the World Cup, its table tennis team has proved invincible and continues to cheer up the nation. I will offer my own verdict on why there is such a stark contrast between the success of the two men’s teams and explain the meaning of sports in modern Chinese society.

In October and November, young graduates will begin their careers while new university students start to arrive on campus. Chinese students are constantly subjected to strenuous testing. And like their western peers, they face the inevitable pressures of finding a job, repaying the mortgage and other everyday facts of life.

The burnout of China’s Generation Z 

The term ‘involution’ – neijuan – has been adopted by China’s Generation Z to describe their feelings of burnout at the ever-increasing expectations associated with high performance. Equally, they have strong opinions about their own government as well as western liberal democracies. China’s leaders of the future will come from their ranks so it will be worthwhile spending some time trying to understand what makes them tick.

Whatever the Year of the Rabbit holds for China, billions of its people will want to have their life return to normal without the fear of having the wrong colour – yellow or red – on their Covid health QR code. Only a green code shows a person is healthy and free to move around. The Covid threat has hovered over people for three years and as borders reopen, they may be holding their breath. 

A slowing economy dimming consumer confidence and a precarious international environment make it look even harder for President Xi to pursue the agenda outlined in October 2022. As the Year of the Rabbit dawns, China doesn’t need a Mad Hatter or a March Hare, instead it urgently needs a sound path to economic recovery and a plan to reopen its borders that works for everyone. 

China’s zero-COVID cannot continue, reopening is needed Expert comment NCapeling 1 December 2022

Unsure of how to loosen rules, local officials have doubled down on severe restrictions behind so much economic damage. Reopening will quell public anger.

When President Xi Jinping was seen unmasked at the G20 summit in Indonesia, he maintained a largely positive tone with President Joe Biden and other world leaders. This left an impression that China was on the verge of withdrawing its zero-COVID strategy.

A set of loosening policy measures introduced by Beijing seemed to further suggest that China was on track to reopen. As outlined in the 20th party congress, Xi wants to forge a pathway towards economic modernization and this means building economic resilience and a further increase in household incomes.

However, a series of displays of public defiance against the government’s zero-COVID policy has left the rest of the world perplexed. Some loosening of restrictions announced on 11 November by the central government, with the number of new cases still rising rapidly, left the provincial governments in confusion as to which direction to turn.

Absolute political loyalty

The persistent slogan of ‘zero-COVID’ was in stark contrast to the slackening of restrictions. Local officials decided to double down on stringent COVID measures as a way of displaying absolute political loyalty to the top, which inevitably caused daily agonies among large parts of the Chinese population.

This decision-making process sheds some light on the way the Chinese bureaucracy approaches crises at a time when the party leadership is tightening political control. Lower-level officials avoided making important decisions and instead decided to wait for instructions from the top. As the rules were unclear, they implemented policies according to past precedents, in this case zero-COVID, which had worked relatively well for China in 2020 and 2021.

For decades, local governments have been major political actors in China and have known what works best under local conditions. But with tighter regulation being exercised by lower-level bureaucrats and civil servants, there is less opportunity for the input of local knowledge, increasing the risk of ineffective policies being implemented.

Away from Beijing, those not employed by the state have been hit particularly hard by zero-COVID measures. The strategy has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated rising levels of youth unemployment, and tested the patience of the entire country.

Billions of Chinese people want to have their life return to normal without the fear of having the wrong colour – yellow or red – on their COVID health QR code or endless mandatory testing. Only a green code shows that a person is healthy and able to move around freely.

Economy is suffering

China is still balancing its twin aims of containing the spread of COVID and re-engineering its economy along similar lines to the rest of the world. It is difficult to see how China’s economy can crank up again until the country reduces its internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

Russia and China in Antarctica: Implications for the Five Eyes 15 December 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 December 2022 Online

This event explores Russia’s and China’s postions on the Antarctic and offers a critical assessment of their actions in the region.

Ever since the 1959 Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), signed at the height of Cold War, Antarctica has remained a demilitarized continent.

Today, even though the ATS is not in immediate danger of collapse, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are no longer insulated from wider geopolitical tension, with China and Russia posing challenges to regional governance. 
 
This event also discusses key recommendations for the Five Eyes regarding Russian and Chinese current and future efforts at undermining the ATS and Antarctic governance. 

The discussion is informed by Mathieu Boulègue’s paper ‘Russia and China in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean: Implications for the Five Eyes’ published by the Sea Power Centre of the Royal Australian Navy.

Director's briefing: Key challenges for China’s economy in 2023 6 February 2023 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 January 2023 Chatham House

This event examines the structural challenges facing the Chinese economy in the wake of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

This event examines the structural challenges facing the Chinese economy after the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022 and how President Xi Jinping is responding to short and long-term domestic pressures.

The panel, including Professor Huang Yiping, discuss how quickly the Chinese economy could rebound after the Chinese government abandoned its ‘Zero COVID-19’ policy in December 2022 and to what extent the Chinese economy is pivoting toward Xi Jinping’s stated goal of ‘self-reliance’. The panel also discuss the broader implications for the global economy.
 
Key questions to be explored:

• Which sectors will China prioritize in pursuit of greater economic self-reliance?

• If China is turning inward, how will it drive technological innovation in the coming years?

• Is China’s economy robust enough to withstand geopolitical turbulence and other external shocks?

This event is held under the Chatham House Rule.

Beijing briefing: China bets on warmer EU relations The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

With the Sino-US Xi relationship cooling, Xi Jinping is sending a new diplomatic team to Europe – but his ties to Putin may mean slow progress, writes Yu Jie.

It has been a momentous year for Beijing. Twelve months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its relations with the West have become more strained than ever. And after President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term in office at the 20th Party Congress, the country has embarked on a chaotic exit from the Covid lockdown amid hopes the economy will rebound quickly.

Some are already asking if Beijing will set a course correction in its diplomatic priorities to spare itself some of the setbacks it incurred in 2022. But when it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. 

The Chinese leadership seeks to create a stable external environment to allow its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was adopted in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi is likely to follow it as a time-honoured recipe for diplomatic reconciliation.

China’s awkward position

Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its failure to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. Xi and his colleagues have begun to realize that cooperation with Russia comes with substantial limits to avoid undermining China’s own political priorities and longer-term economic interests.

Interestingly, pundits interpreted the omission of ‘pursuing new types of great power relations’ in the 20th Party Congress report as an acceptance by the party leadership that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is likely to remain, with little prospect of improvement in the short term.

Chinese diplomatic literature has always presented Russia as a great power, but the abandonment of such terms signals that Beijing is keen to put clear daylight between itself and Vladimir Putin, although international commentators may argue this is not enough and nothing has changed.

There has been little sign of China using its influence to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. Facing, as it feels it now does, a ‘collective West’ and not the Americans alone, Beijing has concluded there are few reasons not to move closer to Russia.

But a reset would appear necessary if China is to tackle its domestic economic woes. So far, Beijing’s main political tactic has been to reassure European countries that it is willing to use its ties with Russia to restrain Putin from entertaining the deployment of nuclear weapons. That was the message conveyed during the visit of Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, and it will be said again when both President Emmanuel Macron of France and Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, each visit later this year.

Economically, China has traditionally relied on its relationships with the European Union and the United States to support innovation and growth. So, a perceived isolation from ‘a collective West’ is not an attractive option given Xi’s hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after dropping the country’s ‘zero-covid’ policy. A precarious bilateral tie with the US has already reduced Beijing’s choice of partners and consumers. Worsening Sino-US relations and a tightening of access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted Beijing not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but to reconfigure its approach to foreign affairs.

China is making a renewed push to strengthen ties with the Global South, which does not see the war in Ukraine as black and white as the West does. Such a move is only possible because five decades of engagement with the ‘collective West’ has allowed China to emerge from poverty and become a global economic powerhouse.

A new diplomatic team

In an attempt to reset the tone of China’s relations with the EU, its largest trading partner, Xi has formed a new diplomatic team headed by Qin Gang, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is returning from his post in Washington as ambassador to the US and who has a background in European affairs. Achieving warmer relations will be easier said than done, however, as China has maintained its ‘neutrality’ at Russia’s aggression since February 2022.

Review: The Cultural Revolution still haunts China The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

Tania Branigan’s searching ‘Red Memory’ reveals the costs to Chinese society of not addressing that upheaval’s lingering injustices, writes Nathan Law.

Red Memory: Living, Remembering and Forgetting China’s Cultural Revolution
Tania Branigan, Faber, £20

The Cultural Revolution, a decade-long socio-political upheaval initiated by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966, caused as many as two million deaths and reshaped China. Under the influence of Mao’s personality cult, an entire nation was mobilized to purge the ‘reactionary elements’ in society and the Chinese Communist Party through public denunciation and demolition of traditional heritages.

Children turned on their parents; pupils murdered their teachers, and those who survived the summary public trials were often banished – as a young Xi Jinping himself was, living in a cave for seven years, after his father fell from favour.

Impossible moral choices

In her engaging and sensitive narrative account of the revolution’s upheaval and its consequences, Tania Branigan, the Guardian’s China correspondent between 2008 and 2015, speaks to some of those who survived those terrible years, considers their impossible moral choices and explores the far-reaching legacy of the revolution in present-day China.

Mao urged the party to cleanse itself of its ‘class enemies’: ‘capitalists’ such as landowners and shopkeepers, but also artists, farmers and university professors. Often their family members were tainted by association and persecuted. Branigan captures the awful sense of intimate betrayal and tragedy nowhere more than in the testimony of Zhang Hongbing, a lawyer turned zealous Red Guard.

Zhang denounced his mother, a hospital worker, as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ because her father owned land. She was eventually executed but not before her son struck her twice during her arrest to show his party loyalty. ‘What I did to my mother was worse even than to an animal,’ the remorseful Zhang tells Branigan.

Zhang points out that his actions were far from uncommon: ‘The whole country was doing it.’ This unreconciled sense of betrayal and fear still blights China: ‘Our society is ethically hollow. If we trace these problems to their roots, we are likely to find them in the Cultural Revolution,’ one survivor is quoted as writing.

Branigan encapsulates the difficulties around reconciliation and remembering in the story of Song Binbin. As a schoolgirl in 1966, she and two classmates were the first to pin up a poster attacking teachers for urging students to focus on their work instead of the revolution. Song’s classmates then beat the school vice principal Bian Zhongyun to death in the playground. The case was never properly investigated, and the death was dismissed as an accident.

The pain of remembering

In 2014, Song apologized publicly for the poster and expressed a sense of guilt for not intervening on Bian’s behalf. But Bian’s widower rejected the apology. Song did not speak to Branigan herself, instead allowing her friends to speak in her defence. ‘They had spoken of truth and reconciliation, but not once of justice. Every remark brought them towards closure, not accountability,’ Branigan writes.

The inability to come to terms with the past pervades the book, most of whose interviewees express feelings of resentment, fear and shame about the Cultural Revolution. I sensed the same emotions when, as a boy, I talked to a neighbour in Hong Kong who was then in his 70s. He escaped from China in the late 1960s due to political and economic strains. He simply nodded and fell silent when I asked him to elaborate.

As Branigan writes: ‘Most Cultural Revolution survivors had learnt to bend with the will of the time; not only to do as they were told but to imply that doing so was their own idea. It was better – safer – to stay silent or lie.’

This collective trauma is exacerbated by official unwillingness to address the past. The Cultural Revolution warrants no more than a few paragraphs in official textbooks with no mention of the suffering it unleashed. Documents of the period that might tarnish the CCP remain unavailable; any attempts to interrogate the Cultural Revolution are condemned as ‘historical nihilism’ by the party.

China is attempting a precarious balancing act Expert comment NCapeling 9 March 2023

In its efforts to maintain ties with both Russia and Europe, China is having to wade through conflicting interests and rapidly changing sentiments.

Precisely how far China will go in supporting Russia has been one of the most important questions of the war in Ukraine.

On 20 February, US secretary of state Antony Blinken warned China may soon provide arms (‘lethal support’) to Moscow. But then, on 24 February – the anniversary of Russia’s invasion – China released a position paper calling for a political settlement to end the conflict, tellingly omitting any mention of its ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia.

China’s goal was to present itself as a neutral mediator. In fact, Beijing’s ties with Russia remain unchanged, even if this relationship has grown more exasperating for Chinese diplomats over the past year.

Their job is to continue striking a delicate balance, a task that is becoming increasingly difficult as Russian president Vladimir Putin doubles down on nuclear brinkmanship and reckless rhetoric.

Staying out of the Ukraine war

With Putin extolling the law of the jungle in its most brutal form, China must be careful not to involve itself too much in the conflict. After all, Russia is clearly losing, and China has high hopes of repairing ties with major European economies.

But Putin is of course keen to signal that China has his back. That is why he recently rolled out the red carpet for China’s top diplomat Wang Yi and then alluded to an (unconfirmed) upcoming visit by Chinese president Xi Jinping.

Such diplomatic developments allow him to present China’s ambivalent position as, in fact, an endorsement of the invasion. While the costs of aligning with Russia could easily outweigh the benefits for China, one must remember that China’s reasons for maintaining good relations with the Kremlin go beyond the war in Ukraine.

For starters, the two countries share a 2,672-mile (4,300-kilometer) border – roughly equivalent to the width of Europe – and the frontier’s exact location was not even finally settled until the beginning of this century, after generations of negotiations that included some 2,000 meetings.

Yet to this day, the spectre of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s and 1960s looms large on both sides and it is not likely to be exorcised anytime soon. With China focused on moves by the US and its allies in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, it simply cannot afford sabre-rattling or unrest on its other borders.

Moreover, unlike the collective West, China’s foreign policy has always been shaped by interests rather than by values. Even with respect to Russia, the two countries’ bond is based mainly on shared resentment of US hegemony. By deepening their bilateral cooperation in recent years, they have been able to achieve a level of great-power status with which to counterbalance America.

But Putin’s misadventure in Ukraine has forced Xi and China’s newly minted Politburo to manage a new set of economic, financial, and political risks.

Russia’s war has left the West more firmly united than it has been in years. As China’s relations with the US have reached new lows, Chinese leaders want to avoid also alienating the European Union (EU), which is one of the country’s biggest trading partners.

This is why Xi and Chinese diplomats have been so careful not to accept the Kremlin’s talking points in full. Being isolated from the ‘collective West’ is not an attractive option for China, given its hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after years of the zero-COVID policy.

Balancing Europe with the Global South

In seeking to keep diplomatic and trade channels open, China’s main tactic has been to reassure European countries that it will use its own ties with Russia to restrain Putin from deploying nuclear weapons.

At the same time, China is making a renewed push to strengthen its ties with the Global South where many countries do not see the war in Ukraine in the same stark moral terms as the West does.

The emphasis on energy and food security in China’s recent position paper may have struck a chord with developing countries that have been reeling from the war’s negative knock-on effects on their economies.

Beijing briefing: China aims for tech self-reliance The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Xi Jinping’s new appointments are tasked with a technology led recovery, but they face a daunting task to restore growth, writes Yu Jie.

The three-day state visit to Moscow by President Xi Jinping in March may have eclipsed the National People’s Congress in Beijing a fortnight earlier, but as Xi seeks to establish a new global order with China at its centre, the political events in the Great Hall of People provide an important insight into the country’s longer-term economic plans.

While a new cohort of cabinet members was appointed to sit on the State Council for the next five years, much of the attention remains on China’s economic stimulus plan to enable a rapid post-Covid recovery, as well as proposals to restructure central government.

Mountainous task

Three aspects of this year’s Congress deserve deeper scrutiny: Li Qiang’s confirmation as premier to succeed Li Keqiang’s decade-long subdued tenure under Xi; the extent to which Xi’s new cabinet sheds light on China’s economic and scientific self-reliance; and the unveiling of a major restructuring of central government administration in sectors such as finance and science.

China’s new premier initially faces the mountainous task of restoring growth and market confidence. During a press conference much shorter than his predecessor would hold, Li Qiang praised China’s private business sector and repeated the words ‘China remains open to foreign business’ to address the growing anxieties among foreigners and Chinese private entrepreneurs.

Beside the daunting task of economic recovery, Li Qiang faces another big challenge. Unlike his predecessors, he has never worked as a vice premier and overseen ministries under the State Council. The test for him will be to pursue a sound economic recovery plan while coordinating numerous central government agencies. He will also need to regulate relations among provincial heads who have a tendency to argue endlessly over the distribution of public finances.

Even though Xi is secure in his third term, his involvement in shaping and implementing macro-economic policies is keenly felt. Li Qiang made explicit the State Council under his leadership will be the chief implementor of all policies approved by the president. This is a less equal working partnership with Xi than his predecessors on the State Council enjoyed in the past.

Beijing published its official plan to restructure its central government administration announcing planned cuts of 5 per cent of its civil service. The newly established Central Commission on Finance intends to deal with systemic financial risks and to coordinate the financial regulatory bodies, central bank and Ministry of Finance. This is seen to reflect the Chinese leadership’s growing concern with the poor performance of local government loans and debt as well of the volatility of the property market, all of which threaten huge uncertainty for the economy.

As well as reorganizing the financial sector, Xi’s intention to pursue an integrated national strategy combining economic and scientific self-reliance has led to significant appointments following the Congress. As a starter, a new Central Commission for Science under the party leadership has been established. This commission will focus on providing a renewed impetus to accelerate China’s drive to achieve ‘scientific reliance’ and to ease the choke points in the economy, such as the supply chain for semiconductors.

It remains unclear who will head this new commission or who will be on it, however, as scant detail has been made public. It is seen as a direct response to the tough measures adopted by the United States designed to dent China’s ambitions of technology supremacy.

Departure from the past

New appointees to the Politburo come with substantial backgrounds in science as well as a solid track record of running state-owned enterprises. This is a departure from the past.

Instead of inserting financial specialists, Xi appointed two scientists, Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, as the vice premiers overseeing science, education and industrial policies. This signals that Xi intends to prioritize science and innovation during his third term. The appointment of technocrats to the State Council is seen as a move to strengthen innovation and prepare the Chinese economy, political system and society for potential external shocks.

India-China relations: Is the Quad the answer? Interview NCapeling 28 March 2023

The threat of China’s military aggression is being felt across the world, but this is a phenomenon India has been contending with for decades.

India’s border with China became the site of tense conflict in 2020, which led to India reinvesting in the Quad. Arzan Tarapore discusses key issues from his International Affairs article, such as how India is responding to increased aggression at the border and how a reinvigorated Quad may hold answers to balancing China in the Indo-Pacific.

What have India-China relations been like in the past?

Relations between India and China have varied over the decades. In the years following World War Two there was some hope they would find common cause in their international outlooks but that was quite quickly extinguished with their border war of 1962.

Since then, the two countries have oscillated between detente and tension. It took decades for them to normalize their relations and slowly build trust through several confidence-building agreements.

More recently it seemed the two countries were both willing to set aside their border dispute in order to profit from their burgeoning economic relationship – as, for both, there is no question development and economic growth is the primary national objective.

The question has been the extent to which their unresolved sovereignty and security issues undermine those goals as, at the same time, they both began paying more attention to the security of their territorial claims.

China in particular matched its explosive economic growth with startling military modernization and assertiveness. Its long-standing military doctrine and terrain advantages means it relies heavily on quality military infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau and it has accelerated the pace of those infrastructure upgrades and expansion.

In the 2010s, India belatedly began to improve its own transport infrastructure near the border, which threatened to reduce China’s military advantages. The earlier quiet on the border began to crack and China began launching border incursions with increasing frequency and scale.

This was a dynamic, iterative process, with incursions prompting India to accelerate its infrastructure development, which in turn probably prompted more incursions by China.

What happened around 2020 to change their relationship?

The cycle of competitive security policies on the border reached a tipping point in 2020 with Chinese incursions at multiple points simultaneously in Ladakh, apparently designed to establish a new status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian and Chinese-controlled territory.

The Indian political leadership played down the incursions but both Indian and Chinese militaries rushed to reinforce their positions near the border. They held multiple rounds of military talks which made halting progress.

On 15 June 2020, a skirmish resulted in the loss of 20 Indian troops, and an unknown number of Chinese troops. In the weeks that followed, both sides further reinforced their positions in a scramble to gain positional advantage.

How has India responded to China’s increasing military might?

The Indian government’s response to the Chinese landgrab was to threaten the entire bilateral relationship. In a reversal of decades of policy, it argued China had demolished the painstakingly constructed confidence-building measures on the border, and so the relationship could not continue as normal until the border crisis was resolved.

It imposed new restrictions on Chinese investment in India – even as overall trade continued to increase – and adopted a more assertive diplomatic posture.

Strategically, the 2020 border crisis had two major effects. First, it reinforced the Indian proclivity to see its northern borders as the primary threat to Indian national security.

India has heavily reinforced the border, reassigning some major formations and making numerous new investments in military capability to manage the threat. The significance of this however is that, in the context of budget scarcity, these military improvements come at the cost of potential increases in India’s capability in the Indian Ocean region – ultimately a more consequential zone of competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The Indian government may yet change course and reallocate resources for power projection but, at this stage, I see no evidence of that.

The second major strategic effect of the crisis was to unleash Indian cooperation with its partners, especially the US and the reinvigorated Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

India has generally avoided formal international alliances, and the Quad was in hiatus for years – why has India invested in it now?

India had always been mindful not to embrace external partners too closely so as to maintain its freedom of action and to not provoke a Chinese reaction. But since the Ladakh crisis, New Delhi has a newfound willingness to work more closely with the US, Japan, and Australia – because it calculates correctly that these partnerships enhance its freedom to act, and that China has already adopted the aggressive posture India feared.

It is important to note however that the border crisis was not the only driver of India’s strategic adjustment. The crisis coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic which highlighted to India the ineffectiveness of existing international institutional arrangements.

For New Delhi, then, the twin crises of Ladakh and the pandemic stressed the need for new international arrangements, and the Quad offered the best combination of agility and capability to meet the most pressing challenges of the Indo-Pacific region.

What do the Quad partners hope to achieve in their renewed partnership?

Beginning in 2021, the Quad assumed far greater significance. The first national leader summits happened – which have since continued at regular intervals – and its members have all agreed to a continually expanding agenda of work.

It seeks to provide international public goods, and everything from climate action to telecommunications regulations. Critically, it has limited its security role to some niche and relatively unprovocative areas, such as humanitarian assistance and maritime domain awareness – issues which benefit the Indo-Pacific as a whole and do not intensify security competition. It has certainly eschewed military cooperation.

Interestingly, the four Quad countries have also separately accelerated their military cooperation, bilaterally, trilaterally, and even quadrilaterally. But that cooperation lies outside the formal mechanisms of the Quad.

What impact will these Quad actions have on Chinese aggression and the Indo-Pacific region?

This Quad approach, which I call ‘zone balancing’ in my article, is specifically designed to build the capacity and resilience of regional states, and to not inflame dyadic security competition.

The relatively uncompetitive character of these activities helps to deflate Chinese claims that the Quad is an antagonistic new bloc, and to ameliorate southeast Asian states’ concerns over the potential intensification of strategic competition.

But the Quad’s agenda is not fixed and not bounded. It has expanded year on year and may continue to extend into new areas. This gives it a degree of flexibility and coercive leverage as Beijing cannot be confident about the Quad’s future direction.

This slate of activities has a lot of utility in building the Quad’s regional legitimacy and habits of cooperation among its members. But it conspicuously does not address the region’s most pressing security challenges.

It is not, in its current form, equipped to manage the challenge of territorial disputes or aggression. So the Quad will not address India’s unresolved border dispute with China, potential crises over Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

I would argue, however, that the four members of the Quad have unparalleled advantages of capacity and geography. With further military cooperation, even outside the formal structures of the Quad, they have the potential to deter Chinese aggression, but that remains subject to their political preferences.

Will other countries in different parts of the world adopt similar balancing strategies?

Zone balancing could be an attractive strategy for other countries which want to either avoid the costs of hard military balancing, or to not provoke their rivals.

It has been used in the past – such as the Marshall Plan during the early Cold War – and I would not be surprised if other countries competing with China, or even China itself, use it.

Chinese supply chains could tip the balance in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 29 March 2023

Disrupting supply chains of critical minerals to those supporting Ukraine could give China a key advantage in its wider international trade competition.

Direct military intervention from China into the war on Ukraine, with Chinese troops and airmen appearing at the front line, would be highly escalatory and highly unlikely.

Equipping Russia with weapons and equipment is much more likely – if indeed it hasn’t already happened – and considering the West is supplying armaments to Ukraine, a joust with western technologies would be an interesting development to follow.

But if Chinese weapons underperform in the heat of battle, this may have implications for the current situation with Taiwan and the US, as a poor outcome on the Ukraine front could give the West more confidence over the tensions in the South China Sea. And the use of Chinese weapons in Ukraine would also be a feast for Western technical intelligence to capture.

Creating economic disruption

A much more likely development for China is to put in place export controls on critical minerals for Western powers supplying arms to Ukraine. This is a significant lever which China has used before during its fishing dispute with Japan in 2010 when hi-tech industrial production in Japan was affected by shortages of China-sourced critical minerals. Once normal supplies were resumed, Japan started to stockpile critical mineral reserves.

In October 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) passed a new statute enabling – when necessary – restriction of critical mineral supplies to third party nations intending to use them for defence and security applications, adding a ‘versatile weapon to Beijing’s arsenal’ in its trade competition with the US.

That legal control has been applied to Lockheed Martin production of Taiwan-bound F-35s and it applies not only to critical minerals mined on the Chinese mainland, but also to Chinese-controlled enterprises within international supply chains, of which there are many.

Responding to any such restrictions by opening up new mines and setting up new supply chains can take more than a decade, so the countries involved may need to start stockpiling critical materials as Japan has been doing since 2010.

Commodity markets also need to be ready for some interesting price wobbles – a persistent problem in critical minerals extractives investment as is overcoming environmental, social, and governance (ESG) challenges in this new game of global supplies.

In addition, those markets include the London Metal Exchange, now owned by Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing whose biggest shareholder is the Hong Kong government which is struggling to operate with complete independence from Beijing.

Splitting the West’s consensus

By extending the thinking on China’s potential to throttle global critical mineral supply chains and the ensuing latency of extraction from new mining resources, progress to the Paris Agreement 2050 goals on climate change will inevitably be affected.

Given there are no supply chain assurance mechanisms, such as distributed ledger technologies, in place within global mining supply chains, a key issue to overcome would be how the West assures China that critical mineral supplies are not destined for military applications.

But if China’s default position becomes a total refusal to supply client nations unless end-to-end assurances can be achieved to prove non-military use, the West’s aspirations regarding the Paris 2050 goals will certainly be put in jeopardy, or even made unachievable.

An important mechanism of resistance to β-lactam antibiotics is via their β-lactamase–catalyzed hydrolysis. Recent work has shown that, in addition to the established hydrolysis products, the reaction of the class D nucleophilic serine β-lactamases (SBLs) with carbapenems also produces β-lactones. We report studies on the factors determining β-lactone formation by class D SBLs. We show that variations in hydrophobic residues at the active site of class D SBLs (i.e. Trp105, Val120, and Leu158, using OXA-48 numbering) impact on the relative levels of β-lactones and hydrolysis products formed. Some variants, i.e. the OXA-48 V120L and OXA-23 V128L variants, catalyze increased β-lactone formation compared with the WT enzymes. The results of kinetic and product studies reveal that variations of residues other than those directly involved in catalysis, including those arising from clinically observed mutations, can alter the reaction outcome of class D SBL catalysis. NMR studies show that some class D SBL variants catalyze formation of β-lactones from all clinically relevant carbapenems regardless of the presence or absence of a 1β-methyl substituent. Analysis of reported crystal structures for carbapenem-derived acyl-enzyme complexes reveals preferred conformations for hydrolysis and β-lactone formation. The observation of increased β-lactone formation by class D SBL variants, including the clinically observed carbapenemase OXA-48 V120L, supports the proposal that class D SBL-catalyzed rearrangement of β-lactams to β-lactones is important as a resistance mechanism.

Epoxide hydrolases (EHs) have been characterized and engineered as biocatalysts that convert epoxides to valuable chiral vicinal diol precursors of drugs and bioactive compounds. Nonetheless, the regioselectivity control of the epoxide ring opening by EHs remains challenging. Alp1U is an α/β-fold EH that exhibits poor regioselectivity in the epoxide hydrolysis of fluostatin C (compound 1) and produces a pair of stereoisomers. Herein, we established the absolute configuration of the two stereoisomeric products and determined the crystal structure of Alp1U. A Trp-186/Trp-187/Tyr-247 oxirane oxygen hole was identified in Alp1U that replaced the canonical Tyr/Tyr pair in α/β-EHs. Mutation of residues in the atypical oxirane oxygen hole of Alp1U improved the regioselectivity for epoxide hydrolysis on 1. The single site Y247F mutation led to highly regioselective (98%) attack at C-3 of 1, whereas the double mutation W187F/Y247F resulted in regioselective (94%) nucleophilic attack at C-2. Furthermore, single-crystal X-ray structures of the two regioselective Alp1U variants in complex with 1 were determined. These findings allowed insights into the reaction details of Alp1U and provided a new approach for engineering regioselective epoxide hydrolases.

Mitochondria are specialized compartments that produce requisite ATP to fuel cellular functions and serve as centers of metabolite processing, cellular signaling, and apoptosis. To accomplish these roles, mitochondria rely on the genetic information in their small genome (mitochondrial DNA) and the nucleus. A growing appreciation for mitochondria's role in a myriad of human diseases, including inherited genetic disorders, degenerative diseases, inflammation, and cancer, has fueled the study of biochemical mechanisms that control mitochondrial function. The mitochondrial transcriptional machinery is different from nuclear machinery. The in vitro re-constituted transcriptional complexes of Saccharomyces cerevisiae (yeast) and humans, aided with high-resolution structures and biochemical characterizations, have provided a deeper understanding of the mechanism and regulation of mitochondrial DNA transcription. In this review, we will discuss recent advances in the structure and mechanism of mitochondrial transcription initiation. We will follow up with recent discoveries and formative findings regarding the regulatory events that control mitochondrial DNA transcription, focusing on those involved in cross-talk between the mitochondria and nucleus.

The QT interval is a recording of cardiac electrical activity. Previous genome-wide association studies identified genetic variants that modify the QT interval upstream of LITAF (lipopolysaccharide-induced tumor necrosis factor-α factor), a protein encoding a regulator of endosomal trafficking. However, it was not clear how LITAF might impact cardiac excitation. We investigated the effect of LITAF on the voltage-gated sodium channel Nav1.5, which is critical for cardiac depolarization. We show that overexpressed LITAF resulted in a significant increase in the density of Nav1.5-generated voltage-gated sodium current INa and Nav1.5 surface protein levels in rabbit cardiomyocytes and in HEK cells stably expressing Nav1.5. Proximity ligation assays showed co-localization of endogenous LITAF and Nav1.5 in cardiomyocytes, whereas co-immunoprecipitations confirmed they are in the same complex when overexpressed in HEK cells. In vitro data suggest that LITAF interacts with the ubiquitin ligase NEDD4-2, a regulator of Nav1.5. LITAF overexpression down-regulated NEDD4-2 in cardiomyocytes and HEK cells. In HEK cells, LITAF increased ubiquitination and proteasomal degradation of co-expressed NEDD4-2 and significantly blunted the negative effect of NEDD4-2 on INa. We conclude that LITAF controls cardiac excitability by promoting degradation of NEDD4-2, which is essential for removal of surface Nav1.5. LITAF-knockout zebrafish showed increased variation in and a nonsignificant 15% prolongation of action potential duration. Computer simulations using a rabbit-cardiomyocyte model demonstrated that changes in Ca2+ and Na+ homeostasis are responsible for the surprisingly modest action potential duration shortening. These computational data thus corroborate findings from several genome-wide association studies that associated LITAF with QT interval variation.

Business Briefing: Assessing the geopolitical implications of EU AI regulation 17 September 2024 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 August 2024 Chatham House

Join us for this critical discussion of how the EU AI Act will shape the world’s approach to the technology.

Join us for this critical discussion of how the EU AI Act will shape the world’s approach to the technology

Governments, technology companies and civil society groups across the world are now advocating firmer AI regulation. Machine learning algorithms have changed the way we interact with technology and powered much of our online lives for decades: why has this pendulum swung back so far toward greater control, and why now?

In 2023 the UK government seized the initiative with its Bletchley AI Safety Summit. The event attempted to address the so called ‘frontier risks’ associated with AI development. Global competition on AI is reflected in AI governance efforts in China, US, the Gulf and beyond. But to date, it is the EU that has led the West in passing AI legislation. The EU AI Act, has separated AI systems into graded risk categories carrying different regulatory requirements, and it remains to be seen whether global AI will feel the Brussels effect.

This conversation will cover the following questions:

• Critics have painted regulation including the AI Act as anti-innovation. Is this a fair assessment?
• What lessons can we learn from the successes and shortcomings of GDPR?
• How do we tackle the challenge of low public trust in AI and low public trust in government technology projects, particularly in Western democracies?
• Does the proliferation of safety institutes, and the AI office, point to the emergence of a new type of technical governance institution? What is its future?

30 Years of Non-Maghreb: What next for Algeria-Morocco relations? 10 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 August 2024 Online

Experts discuss Algeria-Morocco relations and implications for regional actors.

In 1989, the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) brought a promise of economic integration and strengthening of ties between Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia for the benefit and prosperity of their societies.

Decades on, very little has been accomplished in developing the Maghreb project, and the region remains one of the least integrated in the world, despite significant social and cultural similarities between member countries. The last time the full UMA leadership met was back in 1994, with August 2024 marking 30 years of closed borders between Algeria and Morocco.

Relations between the two largest Maghreb countries have deteriorated further since 2020 due to disagreements over issues of Western Sahara, and, most recently, the Abraham Accords, with Algeria cutting diplomatic ties with Morocco in 2021.

In this webinar, experts will discuss:

• Which primary obstacles are hindering Maghreb integration and Algeria-Morocco relations?
• What are the costs and implications for regional countries?
• What are the positions of Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania?
• What is required for a rapprochement and how can external partners support this? 

In conversation with David Miliband: Finding a new approach to tackle conflict, climate and extreme poverty 11 September 2024 — 5:00PM TO 5:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

David Miliband discusses how the climate crisis, extreme poverty and conflict are becoming inextricably linked and how the global community must respond.

Combatting the climate crisis, ending protracted conflicts, and alleviating poverty are three of the greatest priorities for international action. However, these three challenges become increasingly concentrated in a handful of countries. The subsequent feedback loop makes addressing these challenges even more complex.

The International Rescue Committee’s (IRC’s) work in crisis-affected communities highlights this new geography of crisis. Just 16 countries, which are both climate-vulnerable and conflict-affected. This represents 43% of all people living in extreme poverty, 44% of all people affected by natural disasters and 79% of all people in humanitarian need. This trend towards the concentration of crisis is only deepening. In three decades, the number of conflict-affected, climate-vulnerable states has increased from 44% to more than two-thirds.

Affected countries - like Sudan, Myanmar, and Syria - are also among the least supported financially. Debt burdens are siphoning away critical resources needed for adaptation and resilience. Humanitarian aid budgets are being slashed by donor governments. The private sector refuses to invest in these communities they view as too risky. And the international financial institutions meant to alleviate poverty and spur climate action are not well-designed to work with crisis-affected states or local communities. With the upcoming COP29 Summit in Azerbaijan focused on the New Collective Quantified Goal for climate finance, vulnerable communities will be watching closely whether they will get support in their fight against the worst impacts of the climate crisis.

Conflict, the climate crisis, and extreme poverty are taking their toll. But how can the world best respond?

Key questions to be discussed during the session include:

• At a time of political disruption, how does the West engage with vulnerable countries? What actions should be prioritised in providing support to such countries?
• Can global institutions evolve to better protect vulnerable and displaced people from conflict and climate-risk, particularly as geopolitical rivalries reduce space for cooperation?
• What is the UK’s role in supporting climate action in fragile states and how does this align with its agenda on the Sustainable Development Goals and extreme poverty?

In conversation with HRH Prince Turki AlFaisal 13 September 2024 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

This event will discuss how the ongoing Gaza war is impacting the region and the role external actors can play to support de-escalation.

The Gaza war, now in its tenth month, continues with ever-worsening consequences for Palestinians and no end in sight. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also heightened tensions across the Middle East with fears of a broader regional war that would include Iran and aligned groups from the ‘axis of resistance’.

Against this backdrop, ceasefire negotiations supported by regional and international mediators, have not amounted to an agreement nor have there been any concrete proposals for a way forward out of the crisis by key actors such as the United States, Gulf countries or other key stakeholders.

In this event, His Royal Highness Prince Turki AlFaisal will discuss how the Gaza war and related developments are impacting the Middle East, and will share his views on the role of regional and external actors in supporting de-escalation efforts.

The addresses:

• How are Middle Eastern countries managing regional security and heightened tensions with Iran and aligned groups in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen?
• What role are Gulf countries playing in efforts to de-escalate tensions?
• How can they support short- and long-term planning for a way forward in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
• How are relationships between Middle East countries and external powers such as the United States changing as a result of the Gaza war?

In person places for this event are balloted. Confirmations will be sent by email on Monday 9 September at 3pm or a placed on the waiting list. Virtual registrations are confirmed immediately.

Individual membership provides you with the complete Chatham House experience, connecting you with a unique global policy community. Find out more about membership.

Sustainability Accelerator Summer Drinks 2024 6 September 2024 — 5:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 August 2024 Chatham House

Join us for the Sustainability Accelerator’s annual summer drinks reception.

This event brings together a diverse group of thinkers and changemakers from our network, as well as our collaboration partners, to reflect on our successes over the past year and give an opportunity to meet new people.

The reception will follow the Sustainability Accelerator’s annual UnConference, but is a separate event. Unless you have received confirmation of your place at UnConference, you must register for the summer drinks reception via this webpage to secure your place.

Islamic radicalisation in Central Asia 18 September 2024 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts analyse rising foreign recruitment, current counter-radicalisation efforts and challenge past Chatham House predictions made of the Central Asia region.

In 2014, Chatham House released a report titled The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim Radicalisation in the Central Asian Republics. At that time, a significant, Western-funded counter-radicalisation industry was addressing what was believed to be a major issue of Islamic violent extremism in the region.

Over the past decade, two key developments have occurred. First, Western interest in the region has declined in favour of traditional geopolitical concerns. Second, while violent extremism incidents within Central Asia remain rare, there has been a notable recruitment of Central Asians by foreign groups, with several attacks carried out by Central Asians overseas.

In this event, the original report’s authors, John Heathershaw and David Montgomery, will discuss whether the report’s arguments are still valid and how we might answer these questions today.

This raises several questions:

• What did the report accurately predict, and where did it fall short?
• How can we explain the lack of violent extremist organisations (VEOs) within Central Asia but the presence of Central Asians in VEOs abroad?
• Could repression by Central Asian states both domestically and transnationally have contributed to this issue?
• What, if anything, can the counter-radicalisation industry do today to address this problem more effectively?

Please note that in-person places are limited. Please wait for confirmation before participating. 

A world in transition and the future of the global workforce 15 October 2024 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 22 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

How are migration and global megatrends shaping international labour?

As the fallout of 2024’s ‘Election Super-Year’ becomes clearer, international policymakers and business leaders must now equip themselves to face the challenges and opportunities of the three key transitions that will dominate the next few decades: the journey toward a greener and healthier world; the transition to a more technologically adept society; and the development of a secure and productive economy for all.

The adaption and evolution of the global workforce is an essential component of all three of these transitions and therefore a prescient analysis of how migration, workforce policies and modern technology trends will impact this ecosystem is essential.

Upskilling the workforce will no doubt remain a key focus for stakeholders. But the question remains, how do these plans move beyond the ‘ideas-phase’ and become policies that will keep pace in the fast-paced, modern and digital workplace?

It may prove harder than ever for these ideas to come to fruition, with the rise of populist and nationalist political thinking fragmenting the balance between local and international labour. Indeed, this often leads to reduced attractiveness of skilled foreign labour in domestic markets.

This puts global business in a very powerful position though, as companies can play an important role in readdressing these narratives, shaping the future of workforce policies and using examples of best practice to improve access, mobility and ultimately economic productivity, for the benefit of all.

Through this event, in partnership with EY, the panel analyses how migration, skills development agendas and global megatrends, such as technology, sustainability and the global economy, will shape developments in the years to come.

A networking breakfast precedes this event, served between 0800 and 0900 BST.

Director’s Briefing: Assessing foreign policy challenges for the next US president 5 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

This briefing will explore what challenges might await the winner of 2024 US presidential election.

As the 2024 US Presidential election draws closer, the future direction of American foreign policy seems ever more uncertain. Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential candidate, appears to be embracing many of Biden’s policies, but she brings a different background, and most likely a different team, so change is likely.  Donald Trump has more well-known views on foreign policy, but the context for a second Trump administration would be very different than the first.

The next U.S. President will be confronted a world in need of leadership with two major wars, a more assertive and capable China, a climate crisis, ungoverned technological change, emerging powers that demand a seat at the table, and debt distress across much of the developing world.

Please join us for this critical conversation covering:

• How will US-China strategic competition and the threat of conflict over Taiwan challenge US policy makers?
• What are the risks and challenges posed by Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
• How does war in the Middle East and the threat of regional escalation shape US foreign policy?

How can young people in MENA thrive despite economic and political insecurity? 24 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 August 2024 Online

Experts share insights on how young people navigate challenges and find opportunities in a changing domestic and regional landscape.

Across the Middle East and North Africa young people between the ages of 15 and 29 comprise around 24 per cent of the population in the region. As the complex regional geopolitical developments unfold, the majority of these young people are living in a time of economic and political insecurity, with many, such as Iraqis and Libyans, also growing up during conflict and uncertainty.

Enhanced education and employment programs are key opportunities for development and stability in the region. Despite this, limited resources and competing priorities have meant that governments often struggle to deliver competitive educational and employment opportunities and lack the capacity and funding for education reform and active labour market policy development. Key tensions that pit modernity and autonomy against tradition and control continue to frame the education and skills development landscape.

This webinar will address:

• The challenges young people within the MENA region face in different contexts;
• The role education and employment play in developing skills for 21st century challenges;
• Spaces for young people to practice citizenship and participate in political processes;
• Youth’s economic prospects while navigating the tumultuous backdrop of enduring conflict and authoritarianism. 

Member’s question time: Is Russia losing the South Caucasus? 22 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 September 2024 Online

Join us and ask Chatham House Senior Research Fellow, Natalie Sabanadze anything about the situation in the Caucasus. Submit your questions in advance.

Whilst Russia focuses on its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the situation at its southern border is evolving. Relations between the three states in the South Caucasus and Moscow have never been easy as Russia tried to maintain its dominance by leveraging vulnerabilities, playing one side against another to keep conflicts simmering and even engaging in open military aggression.  Although the violence seen in the 1990s and early 2000s has abated, the war in Ukraine has had an indirect impact on the region, bringing a change to the status quo.

Russia abandoned its long-standing support for Armenia, allowing for the collapse of Nagorny-Karabakh and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with the backing of Turkey. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as a dominant regional player with Baku recently declaring its interest to join BRICS.  Turkey’s influence has grown, while Armenia frustrated by Russia’s change of heart has been turning cautiously towards the EU and the US.

In Georgia, meanwhile, the ruling party has been consolidating its grasp on power, rolling back democratic reforms and pivoting away from the West. Georgia’s long-awaited European integration process has been suspended, following the adoption of the Russian-style foreign agents legislation.

Join us as our Senior Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme answers your questions in this quick-fire session assessing the extent to which the Russian influence has changed since the start of the invasion of Ukraine and who is there to fill the vacuum; how geopolitical contestation in the region is going to impact aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and much more.

Submit your questions to Natalie Sabanadze in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.

Making the circular economy work for global development: how the UN Summit of the Future can deliver 23 September 2024 — 6:15PM TO 9:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2024 Online

This policy roundtable focusses on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.

As the world looks beyond the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) towards the post-2030 era, integrating the principles of the circular economy into the future global development agenda becomes imperative.  

A new Chatham House research paper about the role of the circular economy for the SDGs and their possible extension into the post-2030 development agenda will be launched in September 2024 during the UN Summit of the Future and the New York Climate Week. The paper outlines the rationale for the integration of circular economy goals into for the next crucial phase of international development and how to meet net-zero 2050 targets. It provides actionable recommendations on international cooperation mechanisms for policymakers and stakeholders at the UN Summit for the Future in 2024 and beyond.

The aim of the roundtable is to bring together stakeholders and leaders from intergovernmental organisations, business, governments and civil society. The focus of the roundtable meeting is: 

• Reflections on the Summit of the Future and the role of circularity for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.
• Discussion on key aspects of the institutional arrangements and international coordination that are needed for a globally coordinated approach to achieve an inclusive circular economy that supports SDG implementation. 
• Development of joint strategies on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy as a follow-up from the Summit of the Future.

The objective is to emerge from the roundtable with a clearer roadmap for translating the recommendations for international coordination into concrete actions, with a shared commitment to driving meaningful change on the international level.

The event is co-hosted by Chatham House and partners from the Global Circular Economy Roadmap initiative including the African Circular Economy Network, the African Development Bank, Circular Change, Circular Innovation Lab, Circle Economy, EU CE Stakeholder Platform, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Institute of Global Environmental Strategies, Sitra, UNIDO, World Business Council on Sustainable Development, World Economic Forum and the Wyss Academy for Nature.

Further background information is available on the initiative website.

More speakers to be announced.

Fostering inclusive health systems amidst geopolitical instability 13 October 2024 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 11 September 2024 Sheraton Berlin Grand Hotel Esplanade

How can we build trust and inclusivity in the health sector in a fractured geopolitical environment?

Building trust in government, service provision and delivery are crucial considerations for policymakers who aim to make local, national and international health systems more inclusive. In the health space, trust can be a matter of life and death. Understanding and modulating policies that account for the trust factor, alongside the geopolitical determinants of health, can lead to more inclusive decision making and thus better health outcomes for larger proportions of a population.

International unity is key to addressing the challenges posed by geopolitical instability, which include disinformation campaigns, rising nationalism and growing divisions between states. If countries can find common ground through an inclusive approach to health, the effects could be transformative in achieving global health and equity targets.

This discussion, held in partnership with Haleon, will examine what it takes to foster trust and resilience in the health sector, achieve global inclusivity aims and chart a path for the public and private spheres to come together to navigate a fractured geopolitical environment.

• In what ways can localised health inclusivity data help policymakers to alleviate gaps in healthcare provision and why is this an essential element in instilling trust across the system?
• What role should multilateral organizations play in setting precedents for health inclusivity around the world?
• How do health inclusivity policies empower the service user and help reduce the burden placed on public healthcare systems?
• How can the health sector come together to ensure individuals are included within their own health decisions, are able to access services regardless of demographics and geography and trust their healthcare providers?

This event will be held at the Sheraton Hotel, Grand Esplanade, Berlin in the margins of the World Health Summit. You do not need a ticket for the World Health Summit to attend this event.

Labour Party Conference – International affairs networking brunch 24 September 2024 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Labour – Grace 1 Suite, Hilton Hotel, Liverpool

Hosted by Sir Simon Fraser, Chairman of Chatham House.

This event is taking place at the Hilton Hotel, Grace 1 Suite, Liverpool.

You are warmly invited to join us for an exclusive networking brunch at the 2024 Labour Party Conference.

Sir Simon Fraser, Chairman of Chatham House, and Olivia O’Sullivan, Director of Chatham House’s UK in the World Programme, will deliver opening remarks, followed by an interactive networking session where you will have the chance to engage with a wide range of stakeholders. Join us to connect with key senior parliamentary, corporate and media attendees at the Labour Party Conference.

This event will be taking place outside of the secure zone.

In conversation with Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK 17 October 2024 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

The former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine offers insight into the evolution of Russia’s war against his country, and what to expect next.

More than two and a half years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Ukraine has consistently adapted to Moscow’s advances by implementing new strategies.

Ukraine’s recent incursion into Russia’s Kursk region demonstrated operational tactical ingenuity, surprising both Russia and Ukraine’s Western supporters. Success against the Russian Black Sea Fleet has already showcased how Ukraine can skilfully beat back Russian aggression. And increasing numbers of targeted strikes on Russian supply depots and airfields are disrupting Russian operations behind the front lines.

Critical Western supplies continue to resource Ukraine’s military. But questions linger over the quantity and sustainability of these supplies. Kyiv will be watching the US presidential election in November as its biggest backer goes to the polls with the possibility of an outcome that could seriously affect the war. Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to edge forward in Donbas, despite heavy casualties, and strike at Ukrainian towns and cities from the air, demonstrating that President Putin has no intention of relinquishing the fight.

Amid these complexities, Ambassador Zaluzhnyi will discuss how the war is changing both sides, advances on the battlefield, and what dangers lie ahead for Ukraine in the coming months. Other key questions include:

• What kind of enemy is Russia today and how to secure its strategic defeat in Ukraine;
• How have new strategies, such as the recent incursion into the Kursk region, affected the state of play on the battlefield?
• What technologies and armaments does Ukraine need from its Western allies in both the short and long term?

Individual membership provides you with the complete Chatham House experience, connecting you with a unique global policy community. Find out more about membership.

In conversation with Martin Griffiths: How can a divided world address conflict? 1 October 2024 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

The former United Nations Under-Secretary-General describes how a weakening multilateralism system and dysfunctional political diplomacy can be revitalized by a humanitarian approach.

The 2024 US Election: Global Consequences 26 September 2024 — 5:30PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 September 2024 Online

This webinar explores what is at stake for US policy in key regions around the globe.

In the lead up to the 2024 US presidential election, Chatham House experts discuss:

• What is at stake for US policy towards China, Europe, and Latin America and what challenges will confront the next US president?

• Can the US lead when its partners and allies are continually dissatisfied by the new turn in its trade and economic policy?

• What are the core humanitarian challenges and how can they be addressed?

US domestic polarization and implications for the presidential election 30 September 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 September 2024 Online

This webinar explores the rise of polarization amongst the US public and implications for the upcoming election.

Domestic polarization has been on the rise in the US in recent years, with Democrats and Republicans moving further away from the centre on key policy issues. As polarization increases, so too do concerns about the state of US democracy and prospects of political violence surrounding the upcoming presidential election. 

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• What are the driving forces of the growing political divide in the US?
• How far apart are voters on key election issues, from healthcare to immigration to national security?
• How is partisan polarisation altering the effectiveness of US foreign policy and influencing America’s role in the world?

In conversation with Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi 14 October 2024 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

The former Speaker of the House of Representatives discusses challenges to American democracy and the importance of leadership in an election year.

As the US gears up for the 2024 Presidential election, the importance of leadership in politics has come to the fore. As the Harris and Trump campaigns move towards election day, the heightened sense of strong leadership is central to the position of both candidates.

Following her first election to the House in 1987, Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi has been central to American political leadership for over two decades. Serving as the 52nd Speaker of the House of Representative, Speaker Pelosi rose to become one of the most powerful and consequential Speakers in American political history.

Following the release of her recent book The Art of Power, Speaker Pelosi will discuss how she became a master legislator, working with numerous presidents, her political legacy in the house and her leadership during a contentious time in US politics.

Business Briefing: US election geopolitical and economic risk scenarios 10 October 2024 — 11:45AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 September 2024 Chatham House

Please join us for this critical discussion of the US Election related global business risks.

The outcome of the US presidential election will have significant, intersecting implications for global as well as American business. At stake will be the degree of continuity and stability on both the domestic and international fronts, with a Harris presidency pursuing policies building broadly on the Biden Administration and a second Trump Administration departing sharply from them—with both shaped and limited by control of Congress.

An already volatile geopolitical environment and global economy may become even more unpredictable in the face of potential American political instability and uncertain leadership in the international community.

Please join us for this critical session to discuss:

• How might trade policy differ between a Harris and Trump presidency? Will national security pressures, especially over China, lead to greater policy commonalities than expected?

• What might differing approaches to decarbonization and the energy transition mean for the future of policy toward EVs, critical mineral supply chains, and ‘green’ industrial subsidy?

• How might each Administration approach fiscal policy? Will either push for a tightening to the current loose policy—and what may be implications for US debt and the dollar?

• What economic effects can we expect in the case of a disputed election result or non-peaceful transfer of power—and will Corporate America be compelled to make public statements?

Looking ahead to the 2024 US Presidential Election 2 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

This panel explores the state of the US presidential election following the vice presidential debate.

With only weeks to go, this panel looks at the state of the 2024 US presidential election.

Harris and Trump are campaigning to drive up voter enthusiasm and bring undecided voters to their side.

What are the key issues shaping voter’s preferences and how may this impact voter turnout? What can we expect in the weeks ahead?

Funding Ukraine’s recovery 15 October 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 September 2024 Online

The expert panel explores the role of the private sector in financing recovery projects.

Despite the ongoing war, recovery and reconstruction is under way in Ukraine. The question of how to push and finance the pipeline of the recovery projects remains one of the key challenges for the Ukrainian government. Most importantly, there is an outstanding question about how foreign investors can participate in the process.

Energy, together with access to finance and uninterrupted export routes is one of the key pillars of Ukraine’s wartime economy. In the coming months, Ukraine faces an ultimate test on its capacity to implement energy projects to restore energy generation. It is a test case for how effectively Kyiv raises public and private funds and delivers results to mitigate destruction as the war continues.

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• What funding streams and mechanisms are currently in place?
• What does the new Ukraine Investment Framework offer?
• How successful is the energy sector in generating necessary funding?
• What role for private-public partnerships? Do we have examples?

This event is organised in partnership with Ukrainian project ‘The Recovery Spending Watchdog’ financed by the EU. The project is a joint effort of the Centre for Economic Strategy, the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, and the NGO ‘Technologies for Progress’.

Security and defence 2025 6 March 2025 — 8:00AM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

Join senior policymakers, business leaders and international security experts at Chatham House for a day of thought-provoking discussions exploring the tools needed to equip military forces with for an increasingly insecure future.

You will receive further instructions regarding your registration soon.

Future-proofing a fracturing world

The security and defence landscape is characterised by rapid change and evolving threats to global stability. The uncertainties of a complex geopolitical environment, with war on multiple fronts, are exacerbated by the array of threats presented across the domains of conflict - from land, sea and air through to space and technology. From drone swarm attacks in the Donbas, utilising the latest battlefield technology to gain advantages on the land and in the air, through to the battle for primacy in the space domain above the strategically important, yet inhospitable Arctic shipping lanes, the domains of conflict are becoming increasingly intertwined. A holistic strategy fit to tackle the threats of a fracturing world will rely on effective collaboration between the public and private sectors.

The 2025 Security and Defence conference brings together global policymakers, senior military and armed forces figures, business leaders and civil society experts. An insightful day of keynotes, high-level panel dialogues, and ‘under-the-Rule’ spotlights will explore how advanced technology is shaping the battlefield, examine how security architectures can be redesigned to support the end goal of peace, and address the future of arms control measures. Discussions will also unpack how forward-thinking defence actors might unlock fresh opportunities alongside current challenges. Forging stronger ties with partners to future-proof institutions and develop the architecture that will sustain security and defence ecosystems into the future will be crucial to ensuring that fighting forces are equipped, not just for the conflicts of today, but the security challenges of tomorrow.

Why attend?

• Learn more about the areas that leaders across the security and defence ecosystem are prioritizing and how they aim to counter emerging threats in order to foster resilience in this environment.
• Gain an understanding of the array of threats that are present, both across the domains of conflict and also the different regions of the world.
• In-person networking opportunities with senior leaders from across the government, international militaries and global business, as well as access to exclusive ‘under-the-Rule’ sessions.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Israel-Palestine: Is peace possible? 7 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

As Israel’s war in Gaza reaches the year mark, and with war spreading, what can the world expect in the Middle East?

A year on from the 7 October Hamas attacks on Israel which sparked a deadly war in Gaza, significant escalation in Lebanon and regional instability, Chatham House will host experts to explore the profound impacts of the conflict and what lies ahead.

The conversation will look at the humanitarian toll in Gaza and Lebanon, the international community’s response and the spreading of the conflict beyond Israel and Palestine. Regional players, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, will be discussed as well as their influence and involvement in these dynamics.

Looking forward, the discussion will focus on potential pathways to peace and stability in Gaza and the broader Middle East.

Key questions considered by the panel include:

• What is the state of Israeli and Palestinian leadership one year on?
• What would it take for Israel to stop its military campaign in Lebanon?
• How are regional powers’ responses changing?
• How likely is a Palestinian state in the future? What must happen to realise it?
• What is the role of the international community?
• What is Iran’s role in the crisis and how should policymakers respond?

Individual membership provides you with the complete Chatham House experience, connecting you with a unique global policy community. Find out more about membership.

What are MENA countries’ priorities for climate action and COP? 24 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 October 2024 Online

Experts discuss the impacts of COP27 and 28 on the region and priorities for COP29.

In November this year, all eyes will be on Azerbaijan as Baku hosts the 29th UN Climate Conference (COP). Hosting COP offers an opportunity to push for climate action that reflects the host country’s unique circumstances, as well as regional interests. COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and COP27 in Egypt highlighted the climate priorities for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), one of the world’s most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change.

From rising temperatures and deadly heatwaves, to extreme weather events such as heavy rainstorms, sandstorms, and cyclones, climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include water scarcity, food security, and the preservation of livelihoods increasingly threatening the region’s social and economic stability.

While there has been some progress in advancing formal negotiations on key issues, the gap between COP agreements and tangible actions to address the increasingly severe effects of climate change in the MENA region remains vast. 

This webinar aims to assess:

• What are the key tangible impacts of COP27 and COP28 in Egypt and the UAE respectively on driving climate action in the region?
• How do MENA countries balance COP28’s landmark agreement to transition away from fossil fuels with their unique national circumstances?
• How will the region benefit from COP28 breakthrough in integrating the issues of climate, peace and security in climate action through the ‘Declaration of Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace’?
• What are the priorities for COP29 and how do they align with the climate agenda in the MENA region?

Celebrating Black History Month at Chatham House 24 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 October 2024 Chatham House

Join us for the ‘Beyond expectations: The impact and legacy of migration exhibition 2024’ exhibition and drinks reception.

About the Photographer  

Neil Kenlock, a photographer and media professional, has lived in London since arriving from Jamaica in 1963 to join his parents. He spent the early years of his career as a professional photographer, specialising in fashion, beauty, celebrities, and the cultural lifestyles of Black people in the UK. In the late 1960s and 1970s, he captured images of the UK Black Panther movement and documented demonstrations and anti-racism protests across the country.

“Neil Kenlock helps us to better understand the story of London’s Black communities and to appreciate the huge artistic and cultural impact they have had on all our lives. He is a significant photographer whose work documents a key chapter in London’s post-war history.” — Mike Seaborne, former curator of photographs at the Museum of London.

About the exhibition

This exhibition unveils a collection of photographs by Neil Kenlock, capturing Black British individuals who migrated from their homelands and settled in the UK. Curated by his daughter Emelia Kenlock, the series explores the theme of ‘expectations’ and its enduring legacy, featuring African and Caribbean subjects who brought their skills, passions, and dreams—contributions that have profoundly shaped British culture today.

Reflecting on the work, Kenlock stated: “Over 50 years since the concept of ‘black excellence’ first manifested, and more than 70 years since the Windrush, I truly hope this exhibition will add to the national cultural narrative and resonate with new audiences.” 

Shaping modern Britain: the role of African and Caribbean communities 24 October 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

As part of Black History Month, this event celebrates the enduring contributions of African and Caribbean communities to the UK.

When British colonial rule ended, newly independent countries in Africa and the Caribbean retained influences such as the English language and governance systems modelled on that of the UK. Initially, these post-independence relations were largely marked by the UK’s soft power, shaping the nation-building processes in these regions.

Over time, however, this influence has become a two-way exchange. African and Caribbean cultures have profoundly shaped modern Britain – from music and food to sports, arts, literature and beyond. These evolving dynamics have not only enriched the UK’s cultural landscape but also provided significant benefits for diaspora communities, fostering a sense of belonging and promoting cultural exchange. Diaspora groups and civil society organizations have adeptly utilised these connections to advocate for their communities and advance their interests.

At this event, speakers will explore how African and Caribbean influences rose to prominence in the UK and how this cultural momentum can be harnessed to build stronger, forward-looking partnerships. By highlighting the shared histories and more vibrant present-day exchanges, this event will explore how these ties can be used to break down stereotypes, promote social cohesion, and contribute to a more inclusive future.

This event forms part of our series of events celebrating Black History Month, including a photo exhibition and drinks reception.

Iraq Initiative Conference 2024 20 November 2024 — 9:30AM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Our sixth annual Iraq Initiative conference will convene Iraqi and international policymakers, experts and civil society in London to discuss the critical questions for Iraq’s future, and the country’s trajectory in the year ahead.

Over two decades following regime change, Iraq appears to be on a path to recovery and growth. With the support of high oil prices, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s government is implementing an ambitious plan to develop critical infrastructure, enhance ties with neighbouring countries, and renegotiate relationships with international partners like the US and UN. The political system has rebounded from a series of shocks and is in the process of consolidating and centralising power in Baghdad under the governing Shia Coordination Framework.

However, underlying political, economic, security, and regional challenges, if not addressed, threaten this apparent stability and frustrate longer-term hope for a better future. Despite the country’s wealth, many young Iraqis struggle to find jobs while the space for civic activism shrinks. Meanwhile, the escalation of violence across the region threatens to engulf Iraq in further conflict. With the 2025 parliamentary election approaching, infighting within the governing coalition also suggests political turmoil in the year ahead.

The key questions explored through each session include:

• How can the Sudani government tackle the roots of these obstacles to ensure that development can be sustained over time?
• What are the key steps to coherent and effective state-building?
• And how can regional and international actors support this process?

This conference is part of Chatham House’s Iraq Initiative.

This year’s conference features RE-PLAY – a video art exhibition curated by Dr Tamara Chalabi of the Ruya Foundation. The artists featured in this exhibition, spanning multiple generations both within Iraq and in the Iraqi diaspora, use their work to grapple with complex notions of Iraqi identity through the thematic issues of heritage, exile, disconnection, freedom of expression, and other persistent issues explored in this show.

Simultaneous English-Arabic interpretation will be available for all conference sessions. This event is part of Chatham House’s Iraq Initiative.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Civilian priorities for ending the war in Sudan 31 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Dr Abdalla Hamdok, former prime minister of Sudan and chairperson of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadum), will discuss the prospects for conflict resolution in Sudan.

The intensification of fighting across Sudan demonstrates that both warring parties and their allies are continuing to pursue an outright military victory in the war, with little regard for the human cost. Diplomatic efforts, including the US-led Geneva talks in August, have produced little progress towards a ceasefire.  Meanwhile, the conflict has resulted in widespread devastation, mass displacement, and an escalating hunger crisis.

Civilian perspectives on ending the war, their vital efforts in providing lifesaving humanitarian assistance, and the aspiration of many Sudanese for a more inclusive and democratic Sudan, have been sidelined by the interests and actions of the belligerent parties.

At this event, Dr Abdalla Hamdok will discuss options for reaching a ceasefire and seeking a peaceful political resolution to the conflict. He will also address the urgent need for an international response to what has become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must ‘register interest’ in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Monday 28 October at 15:00.

Is the world ready for the next pandemic? 29 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

In a joint event with The Elders, Helen Clark, Ban Ki-moon and other experts discuss the policies needed to prevent the next health catastrophe. A drinks reception will follow this event.

The world faces multiple interlinked existential threats such as pandemics and the climate crisis, exacerbated by conflict and extreme poverty. However, the multilateral system is failing to respond with sufficient urgency or impact. As the fifth anniversary of the COVID-19 pandemic approaches, Chatham House and The Elders will discuss the risk of a general slide into complacency. 

Amid the expanding outbreak of mpox in Africa, rich countries continue to withhold stockpiled mpox vaccines. The failure to release the required amount is contributing to the diseases spread across the continent. 

Meanwhile, the Pandemic Accord negotiations are in overtime, with nations unable to reach agreement over concerns around sovereignty and resource distribution in any future pandemic. Similarly, a proposal to include a UN Emergency Platform in the recent Summit of the Future to strengthen the multilateral response to complex global shocks was shelved due to political deadlock.

Can the world learn from past mistakes and break the cycle of panic and neglect? In today’s fractious and polarized geopolitical context, what would it take for leaders to do what’s necessary? And why is it so critical to have equity at the heart of any sustainable global response?

Join Chatham House for this event in which the panel discuss key questions including:

• Five years on from COVID-19, who is showing global leadership today in preparing for future pandemics?
• Are international organizations and institutions fit for purpose to respond to pandemics in a multipolar geopolitical environment? How can they best adapt?
• What can be done to clarify and detoxify current debates around sovereignty to improve global pandemic prevention, preparedness and response?

Numerous iron-sulfur (Fe-S) proteins with diverse functions are present in the matrix and respiratory chain complexes of mitochondria. Although [4Fe-4S] clusters are the most common type of Fe-S cluster in mitochondria, the molecular mechanism of [4Fe-4S] cluster assembly and insertion into target proteins by the mitochondrial iron-sulfur cluster (ISC) maturation system is not well-understood. Here we report a detailed characterization of two late-acting Fe-S cluster-carrier proteins from Arabidopsis thaliana, NFU4 and NFU5. Yeast two-hybrid and bimolecular fluorescence complementation studies demonstrated interaction of both the NFU4 and NFU5 proteins with the ISCA class of Fe-S carrier proteins. Recombinant NFU4 and NFU5 were purified as apo-proteins after expression in Escherichia coli. In vitro Fe-S cluster reconstitution led to the insertion of one [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster per homodimer as determined by UV-visible absorption/CD, resonance Raman and EPR spectroscopy, and analytical studies. Cluster transfer reactions, monitored by UV-visible absorption and CD spectroscopy, showed that a [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster-bound ISCA1a/2 heterodimer is effective in transferring [4Fe-4S]2+ clusters to both NFU4 and NFU5 with negligible back reaction. In addition, [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster-bound ISCA1a/2, NFU4, and NFU5 were all found to be effective [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster donors for maturation of the mitochondrial apo-aconitase 2 as assessed by enzyme activity measurements. The results demonstrate rapid, unidirectional, and quantitative [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster transfer from ISCA1a/2 to NFU4 or NFU5 that further delineates their respective positions in the plant ISC machinery and their contributions to the maturation of client [4Fe-4S] cluster-containing proteins.

The human cardiovascular system has adapted to function optimally in Earth's 1G gravity, and microgravity conditions cause myocardial abnormalities, including atrophy and dysfunction. However, the underlying mechanisms linking microgravity and cardiac anomalies are incompletely understood. In this study, we investigated whether and how calpain activation promotes myocardial abnormalities under simulated microgravity conditions. Simulated microgravity was induced by tail suspension in mice with cardiomyocyte-specific deletion of Capns1, which disrupts activity and stability of calpain-1 and calpain-2, and their WT littermates. Tail suspension time-dependently reduced cardiomyocyte size, heart weight, and myocardial function in WT mice, and these changes were accompanied by calpain activation, NADPH oxidase activation, and oxidative stress in heart tissues. The effects of tail suspension were attenuated by deletion of Capns1. Notably, the protective effects of Capns1 deletion were associated with the prevention of phosphorylation of Ser-345 on p47phox and attenuation of ERK1/2 and p38 activation in hearts of tail-suspended mice. Using a rotary cell culture system, we simulated microgravity in cultured neonatal mouse cardiomyocytes and observed decreased total protein/DNA ratio and induced calpain activation, phosphorylation of Ser-345 on p47phox, and activation of ERK1/2 and p38, all of which were prevented by calpain inhibitor-III. Furthermore, inhibition of ERK1/2 or p38 attenuated phosphorylation of Ser-345 on p47phox in cardiomyocytes under simulated microgravity. This study demonstrates for the first time that calpain promotes NADPH oxidase activation and myocardial abnormalities under microgravity by facilitating p47phox phosphorylation via ERK1/2 and p38 pathways. Thus, calpain inhibition may be an effective therapeutic approach to reduce microgravity-induced myocardial abnormalities.

The cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) is a plasma membrane anion channel that plays a key role in controlling transepithelial fluid movement. Excessive activation results in intestinal fluid loss during secretory diarrheas, whereas CFTR mutations underlie cystic fibrosis (CF). Anion permeability depends both on how well CFTR channels work (permeation/gating) and on how many are present at the membrane. Recently, treatments with two drug classes targeting CFTR—one boosting ion-channel function (potentiators) and the other increasing plasma membrane density (correctors)—have provided significant health benefits to CF patients. Here, we present an image-based fluorescence assay that can rapidly and simultaneously estimate both CFTR ion-channel function and the protein's proximity to the membrane. We monitor F508del-CFTR, the most common CF-causing variant, and confirm rescue by low temperature, CFTR-targeting drugs and second-site revertant mutation R1070W. In addition, we characterize a panel of 62 CF-causing mutations. Our measurements correlate well with published data (electrophysiology and biochemistry), further confirming validity of the assay. Finally, we profile effects of acute treatment with approved potentiator drug VX-770 on the rare-mutation panel. Mapping the potentiation profile on CFTR structures raises mechanistic hypotheses on drug action, suggesting that VX-770 might allow an open-channel conformation with an alternative arrangement of domain interfaces. The assay is a valuable tool for investigation of CFTR molecular mechanisms, allowing accurate inferences on gating/permeation. In addition, by providing a two-dimensional characterization of the CFTR protein, it could better inform development of single-drug and precision therapies addressing the root cause of CF disease.

The main protease (3CL Mpro) from SARS–CoV-2, the etiological agent of COVID-19, is an essential enzyme for viral replication. 3CL Mpro possesses an unusual catalytic dyad composed of Cys145 and His41 residues. A critical question in the field has been what the protonation states of the ionizable residues in the substrate-binding active-site cavity are; resolving this point would help understand the catalytic details of the enzyme and inform rational drug development against this pernicious virus. Here, we present the room-temperature neutron structure of 3CL Mpro, which allowed direct determination of hydrogen atom positions and, hence, protonation states in the protease. We observe that the catalytic site natively adopts a zwitterionic reactive form in which Cys145 is in the negatively charged thiolate state and His41 is doubly protonated and positively charged, instead of the neutral unreactive state usually envisaged. The neutron structure also identified the protonation states, and thus electrical charges, of all other amino acid residues and revealed intricate hydrogen-bonding networks in the active-site cavity and at the dimer interface. The fine atomic details present in this structure were made possible by the unique scattering properties of the neutron, which is an ideal probe for locating hydrogen positions and experimentally determining protonation states at near-physiological temperature. Our observations provide critical information for structure-assisted and computational drug design, allowing precise tailoring of inhibitors to the enzyme's electrostatic environment.

Dilated cardiomyopathy (DCM) is associated with mutations in cardiomyocyte sarcomeric proteins, including α-tropomyosin. In conjunction with troponin, tropomyosin shifts to regulate actomyosin interactions. Tropomyosin molecules overlap via tropomyosin–tropomyosin head-to-tail associations, forming a continuous strand along the thin filament. These associations are critical for propagation of tropomyosin's reconfiguration along the thin filament and key for the cooperative switching between heart muscle contraction and relaxation. Here, we tested perturbations in tropomyosin structure, biochemistry, and function caused by the DCM-linked mutation, M8R, which is located at the overlap junction. Localized and nonlocalized structural effects of the mutation were found in tropomyosin that ultimately perturb its thin filament regulatory function. Comparison of mutant and WT α-tropomyosin was carried out using in vitro motility assays, CD, actin co-sedimentation, and molecular dynamics simulations. Regulated thin filament velocity measurements showed that the presence of M8R tropomyosin decreased calcium sensitivity and thin filament cooperativity. The co-sedimentation of actin and tropomyosin showed weakening of actin-mutant tropomyosin binding. The binding of troponin T's N terminus to the actin-mutant tropomyosin complex was also weakened. CD and molecular dynamics indicate that the M8R mutation disrupts the four-helix bundle at the head-to-tail junction, leading to weaker tropomyosin–tropomyosin binding and weaker tropomyosin–actin binding. Molecular dynamics revealed that altered end-to-end bond formation has effects extending toward the central region of the tropomyosin molecule, which alter the azimuthal position of tropomyosin, likely disrupting the mutant thin filament response to calcium. These results demonstrate that mutation-induced alterations in tropomyosin–thin filament interactions underlie the altered regulatory phenotype and ultimately the pathogenesis of DCM.