Yemen suffered from the excessive control of the central government prior to the current conflict. Federalism has been put forward by many Yemeni political parties since the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) as the supposed magic cure for this significant problem. Today, Yemen is more fragmented than ever, its state central institutions have been scattered and lack leadership and the state has lost most of its sovereignty. The prevailing narrative that decentralization through federalism is Yemen’s inevitable path post-conflict often fails to acknowledge that there are prerequisites for effective local governance, beyond political will.  

In a recent article, Osamah Al Rawhani addressed how the weakness of central state institutions is the key challenge to proceeding with federalism in Yemen and highlighted prerequisites and contextual factors that need to be addressed before reforming the structure of the state. He argued that the viability of decentralization relies on the presence of a functioning, representative central government that is capable of devolving power but also able to keep the state from further fragmentation. 

In this webinar, part of the Chatham House project on The Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa, the article’s author will discuss recent developments in Yemen, where shifting frontlines and regional divisions are fragmenting the country in new ways. The speaker will explore alternative approaches to pursue the path of federalism that recognize the current realities and the critical need for strong central institutions. He will also survey the internal and external factors that must be considered to rebuild a stable state in Yemen.

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

The Chatham House Prize is presented annually to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

The CPJ has been recognized for its efforts in defending the right of journalists to report the news without fear of reprisal, at a time when the free press is under serious pressure in many parts of the world.

Highlights of the work of the CPJ during 2017 include the launch of the US Press Freedom Tracker documenting attacks on press freedom in the US and the launch of its Free the Press campaign to raise awareness of journalists imprisoned on anti-state charges around the world. In addition, last year its advocacy helped secure the early release from prison of at least 75 journalists worldwide and helped to win convictions in the murders of six reporters, including Marcos Hernández Bautista in Mexico and Syrian editor Naji Jerf, who was killed in Turkey.

In a climate where the term ‘fake news’ is used to discredit much reporting, the CPJ has robustly supported the fourth estate’s role in contributing to a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Events

The Chatham House Prize 2018 was awarded in a ceremony on Wednesday 28 November at Chatham House in London. The executive director of the committee, Joel Simon, accepted the award and spoke about the importance of safeguarding journalism and free speech, followed by a discussion about the challenges of reporting today with a panel of journalists who have faced these pressures in their work.

Nominees

The nominees for the Chatham House Prize 2018 were:

• The Committee to Protect Journalists
• Mario Draghi, President, European Central Bank
• Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
• Halima Ismail Ibrahim, Chair, National Independent Electoral Commission, Federal Republic of Somalia

About the Chatham House Prize

The Chatham House Prize is presented to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of Chatham House to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

The selection process is independent, democratic and draws on the deep knowledge of Chatham House's research teams, making the Prize a distinctive and unique award in the field of international affairs.

A short-list of nominees is selected by the institute's three presidents from a longer list submitted by the research programmes and departments in their areas of expertise. The recipient is then determined by Chatham House's broad membership base on a one-member, one-vote basis. The award is presented on behalf of the institute's patron, Her Majesty the Queen, representing the non-partisan and authoritative character of the Prize.

The Chatham House Prize was launched in 2005. Previous recipients of the Prize include former Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, former president of Ghana John Kufuor, Médecins Sans Frontières and Melinda Gates, co-founder of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

For more information, please contact:

Chatham House press office
Email: pressoffice@chathamhouse.org
Phone: +44 (0)207 957 5739

CPJ Communications Associate 
Beatrice Santa-Wood
Email: press@cpj.org
Phone: +1 212 300 9032

Summary

• The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – currently being negotiated between the United States and the European Union – represents a bolder and riskier approach to liberalizing trade than traditional trade deals. It is bolder because it aims to cover a wide range of policy issues that are not typically included, and because it aims to be strategic and extraterritorial in its impact. It is riskier because of the difficulty in getting agreement on these issues between the parties concerned, and because the responses of other countries are uncertain.
• EU and US negotiators have much work to do if a deal is to be reached that realizes TTIP’s full potential. While progress has been made on tariff reduction, considerable ground still needs to be covered on setting standards and regulations affecting trade, which is where TTIP has the most potential to make an impact at a strategic level. Meanwhile, trade scepticism is rising on both sides of the Atlantic, with concerns about the impact of deals like TTIP on jobs and regulatory standards. The negotiation process is also now complicated by the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU. Making a clear and credible strategic case for TTIP may be necessary if the negotiations are to continue and be successful.
• If the United States and the EU are able to agree on the regulations and standards affecting international trade, they will have the scale to define these globally for years to come. International leadership in this area brings commercial advantages and benefits for consumers in the EU and the United States, and it also often is a global public good. However, it sometimes pits EU and US interests against those of other countries, creating scope for conflict over policies in areas such as the rules governing state-owned enterprises.
• There would be benefits to the United Kingdom, the EU and the United States if the United Kingdom joins TTIP once it is agreed. In the intervening period, it makes sense for the United Kingdom to participate actively in EU decisions regarding TTIP while still a member of the EU, as this could help to smooth an eventual British accession to the partnership.
• The soft-power benefits from TTIP are potentially substantial, but they would only be maximized if other strategically important countries, such as Turkey, are able to join. Perhaps the clearest sign of TTIP being likely to meet or exceed the highest ambitions for its strategic impact would be if it has an even broader geographical reach, drawing in countries in other regions.
• The potential security benefits from TTIP are marginal and overhyped. The benefits that unity on trade would bring to transatlantic security are intangible and hard to substantiate. The energy security benefits are likely to be limited, as the volumes of US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the EU are likely to be small. If the EU and the United States are serious about using TTIP to improve security, they should include defence procurement, but this has never been on the agenda.
• Not only do the differences between the EU and the United States mean that it will be difficult to get a deal, they also constrain how any deal would be implemented and exploited for strategic purposes. If TTIP is to succeed at a strategic level, both sides must be disciplined, consistent and coordinated in using it as the reference point in their negotiations with other countries. 
• The United States is more capable of acting strategically than the EU, in part because of the difficulties for EU member states in coalescing around a shared set of strategic objectives. Until the EU is able to do this, the United States is likely to have much more influence over the strategic direction of TTIP. If the EU wants to bridge this gap, then the European Council should start by reaching a political agreement on its objectives and priorities for bringing other countries into TTIP.
• There are also strategic risks from TTIP. One is that by emphasizing the values that are reflected in international rules, the EU and the United States could make it harder for other countries to accept these rules, or make TTIP seem like an attempt to reassert the old world order. Thus, instead of having a magnetic effect, TTIP could create a rift with emerging countries, with some choosing to maintain a distance for political reasons.
• The bigger risk for TTIP, however, is failure. If negotiations break down or a deal is reached that falls short of the ambition set for it, this would send a damaging signal to the rest of the world about the inability of the EU and the United States to work together. The damage would be all the greater if the process was acrimonious, or if it exposed US indifference to Europe or latent anti-Americanism in the EU. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU raises the stakes, particularly for the latter, as it is a blow to the international credibility of the EU. Agreeing TTIP would help to offset this blow, while failure would amplify it.

The liberal international order has always depended on the idea of progress. Since 1945, Western policymakers have believed that open markets, democracy and individual human rights would gradually spread across the entire globe. Today, such hopes seem naïve.

In Asia, the rise of China threatens to challenge US military and economic hegemony. In the Middle East, the United States and its European allies have failed to guide the region toward a more liberal and peaceful future in the wake of the Arab Spring. And Russia’s geopolitical influence has reached heights unseen since the Cold War, as it attempts to roll back liberal advances around its periphery.

But the more important threats to the order are internal. For the past half-century, the European Union has seemed to represent the advance guard of a new liberalism in which nations pool sovereignty and cooperate ever more closely with one another. Today, as it reels from one crisis to the next, the EU has stopped expanding.

Other countries will probably not follow the United Kingdom out of the EU. But few European leaders appear willing to continue relinquishing sovereignty, whether to manage flows of refugees or to ensure the long-term viability of the single currency. Many European politicians are demanding more national sovereign control over their destinies rather than more integration.

Across the Atlantic, the US commitment to global leadership, which until now has sustained the liberal international order through good times and bad, looks weaker than at any point since the Second World War. After the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the chaos that followed the intervention in Libya, President Barack Obama consistently encouraged allies in Europe and the Middle East to take greater responsibility for their own security. In his presidential campaign, President-elect Donald Trump twisted this argument into an explicitly transactional bargain: America would become a mercenary superpower, protecting only those countries that paid, so that it could focus on making itself great again at home. In so doing, he ignored the hard-won lesson that investing in the security of its allies is the best way of protecting America’s own security and economic interests.

Meanwhile, America’s rebalance to Asia is in jeopardy. With Trump promising to roll back the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Beijing has wasted no time in laying out its own vision for a more integrated Eurasia that may exclude America and in which China will play the leading role. We may be on the brink of a Eurasian century, rather than a Pacific century.

Sustaining an international liberal economic order

In the past, as other political systems have crumbled, the liberal international order has risen to face its challenges. Yet so long as the economies of its leading members remain fragile and their political institutions divided, the order they have championed is unlikely to regain the political momentum that helped democracy spread across the globe. Instead, it will evolve into a less ambitious project: an international liberal economic order that encompasses states with diverse domestic political systems.

This need not be bad news if it allows democracies and their illiberal counterparts to find ways to coexist. Non-Western rising powers, China chief among them, will remain committed to sustaining the international economic order of open markets and free flows of investment. After all, only through continued integration into the global supply chains of goods, services, people and knowledge can emerging markets meet the aspirations of their growing middle classes.

It is in the West’s interests that China’s economic development continues smoothly. US and European markets for goods, services and infrastructure should remain open to Chinese trade and foreign direct investment, as long as Chinese companies abide by their WTO commitments and by US and European rules on security and transparency and the protection of intellectual property. European countries should take the same approach toward Russia, on the condition that Russian companies abide by EU rules. A mutual commitment to the international liberal economic order would help Western governments and their illiberal counterparts keep open other avenues for cooperation on shared challenges, such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Meanwhile, European governments and businesses should take part in the Chinese-led strategy to connect northeast Asia with Europe across the Eurasian continent, a component of a series of regional infrastructure investments known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Today, the world is experiencing a structural decline in growth rates of trade, as emerging markets like China make more of their own products and developed countries bring some production back on-shore. Against this backdrop, ramping up investment in infrastructure that can connect the thriving coastal areas of Asia to their underdeveloped hinterlands and then to Europe could create new opportunities for economic growth in both the liberal and the illiberal worlds.

Similar cooperation will be harder to build with Russia. Russia’s system of centralized, opaque political and economic governance makes deeper integration incompatible with the EU’s market and rules-based system. And NATO members have begun a much-needed upgrading of their military readiness in the face of recent Russian provocations. EU and NATO tensions with Russia will likely persist. However, the initiative to build new Eurasian economic inter-connections could provide an alternative way for the United States and Europe to engage Russia in the future.

A period of awkward coexistence

The countries that built the liberal international order are weaker today than they have been for three generations. But liberal policymakers would be wrong to hunker down or resort to containment. An extended stand-off with those who contest a liberal international order may accidentally lead to outright conflict. A better approach would be for liberal countries to prepare themselves for a period of awkward coexistence with illiberal ones, cooperating on some occasions and competing on others. Time will then tell whose form of government is more resilient. If history is any guide, liberal democracy remains the best bet.

An extended version of this article appears in Foreign Affairs.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

England and Australia are considered standard-bearers of universal access to health services, with the former’s National Health Service (NHS) recognized as a global brand and the latter’s Medicare seen as a leader in the Asia-Pacific region. However, through the exclusion of migrant and refugee groups, each is failing to deliver true universality in their health services. These exclusions breach both their own national policies and of international commitments they have made.

While the marginalization of mobile populations is not a new phenomenon, in recent years there has been a global increase in anti-migrant rhetoric, and such health care exclusions reflect a global trend in which undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are denied rights.

They are also increasingly excluded in the interpretation of phrases such as ‘leave no one behind’ and ‘universal health coverage’, commonly used by UN bodies and member states, despite explicit language in UN declarations that commits countries to include mobile groups.

Giving all people – including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers – access to health care is essential not just for the health of the migrant groups but also the public health of the populations that host them. In a world with almost one billion people on the move, failing to take account of such mobility leaves services ill-equipped and will result in missed early and preventative treatment, an increased burden on services and a susceptibility to the spread of infectious disease.

England

While in the three other nations of the UK, the health services are accountable to the devolved government, the central UK government is responsible for the NHS in England, where there are considerably greater restrictions in access.

Undocumented migrants and refused asylum seekers are entitled to access all health care services if doctors deem it clinically urgent or immediately necessary to provide it. However, the Home Office’s ‘hostile environment’ policies towards undocumented migrants, implemented aggressively and without training for clinical staff, are leading to the inappropriate denial of urgent and clearly necessary care.

One example is the case of Elfreda Spencer, whose treatment for myeloma was delayed for one year, allowing the disease to progress, resulting in her death.

In England, these policies, which closely link health care and immigration enforcement, are also deterring people from seeking health care they are entitled to. For example, medical bills received by migrants contain threats to inform immigration enforcement of their details if balances are not cleared in a certain timeframe. Of particular concern, the NGO Maternity Action has demonstrated that such a link to immigration officials results in the deterrence of pregnant women from seeking care during their pregnancy.

Almost all leading medical organizations in the United Kingdom have raised concerns about these policies, highlighting the negative impact on public health and the lack of financial justification for their implementation. Many have highlighted that undocument migrants use just and estimated 0.3% of the NHS budget and have pointed to international evidence that suggests that restrictive health care policies may cost the system more.

Australia

In Australia, all people who seek refuge by boat are held, and have their cases processed offshore in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Nauru, at a cost of almost A$5 billion between 2013 and 2017. Through this international agreement, in place since 2013, Australia has committed to arrange and pay for the care for the refugees, including health services ‘to a standard of care broadly comparable to that available to the general Australian community under the public health system’.

However, the standard of care made available to the refugees is far from comparable to that available to the general population in Australia. Findings against the current care provision contractor on PNG, Pacific International Hospital, which took over in the last year, are particularly damning.

For instance, an Australian coroner investigating the 2014 death from a treatable leg infection of an asylum seeker held in PNG concluded that the contractor lacked ‘necessary clinical skills’, and provided ‘inadequate’ care. The coroner’s report, issued in 2018, found the company had also, in other cases, denied care, withheld pain relief, distributed expired medication and had generally poor standards of care, with broken or missing equipment and medication, and services often closed when they were supposed to be open.

This has also been reiterated by the Royal Australasian College of Physicians, which has appealed to the Australian government to end its policies of offshore processing immediately, due to health implications for asylum seekers. This echoes concerns of the medical community around the government’s ongoing attempts to repeal the ‘Medivac’ legislation, which enables emergency medical evacuation from PNG and Nauru.

Bad policy

Both governments have signed up to UN Sustainable Development Goals commitment to ‘safe and orderly migration’, an essential component of which is access to health care. The vision for this was laid out in a global action plan on promoting the health of refugees and migrants, agreed by member states at the 2019 World Health Assembly.

However, rather than allow national policies to be informed by such international plans and the evidence put forward by leading health professionals and medical organizations, the unsubstantiated framing of migrants as a security risk and economic burden has curtailed migrant and refugee access to health care.

The inclusion of migrants and refugees within universal access to health services is not merely a matter of human rights. Despite being framed as a financial burden, ensuring access for all people may reduce costs on health services through prevention of costly later-stage medical complications, increased transmission of infections and inefficient administrative costs of determining eligibility.

Thailand provides an example of a middle-income country that recognized this, successfully including all migrants and refugees in its health reforms in 2002. Alongside entitling all residents to join the universal coverage scheme, the country also ensured that services were ‘migrant friendly’, including through the provision of translators. A key justification for the approach was the economic benefit of ensuring a healthy migrant population, including the undocumented population.

The denial of quality health services to refugees and undocumented migrants is a poor policy choice. Governments may find it tempting to gain political capital through excluding these groups, but providing adequate access to health services is part of both governments’ commitments made at the national and international levels. Not only are inclusive health services feasible to implement and good for the health of migrants and refugees, in the long term, they are safer for public health and may save money.

The coronavirus outbreak in China poses a tremendous test for Beijing. Beyond the immediate public health crisis, the Chinese Communist Party faces a stuttering economy, growing public anger and distrust, and a potentially heavy blow to its global reputation.

The hesitant early response to the outbreak sheds light on the way the Chinese bureaucracy approaches crises at a time when the party leadership is tightening control at almost all levels of society. At first, officials in Wuhan attempted to censor online discussions of the virus. This changed only after President Xi Jinping’s call for a much more robust approach was followed by a sudden increase in the state media coverage of the outbreak. There is no doubt that Xi’s intervention will greatly speed up the response to the crisis, which should be welcomed.

Despite China’s experience with the SARS epidemic between 2002 and 2004, the sluggish reaction by officials in Wuhan should not have come as a surprise. The tendency among bureaucrats to play down crises is deeply entrenched. And, ironically, the party leadership’s recent push for greater bureaucratic accountability and its promise of stiffer punishment for those who take a 'do little' approach have also contributed to the habit of covering up disasters.

Xi has launched an ambitious programme to reform the governance of the Communist Party and re-centralize political control. This has reinforced the tendency of officials to avoid making important decisions and instead to wait for instructions from the party leadership.

For decades, local governments have made things happen in China. But with tighter regulation of lower-level bureaucrats, civil servants across the system now seem less ready, and able, to provide their input, making ineffective and even mistaken policy more likely.

Moreover, the coronavirus outbreak could not have happened at a worse time. Last year was tumultuous and saw China fighting an economic slowdown while also dealing with an increasingly hostile international environment. Now, as the authorities take steps to contain the disease, economic activity has come to a near standstill, with public transport curbed and restaurants and entertainment venues shuttered.

This contrasts with SARS, when double-digit growth in gross domestic product enabled Beijing to raise government expenditure to tackle the outbreak. Today, the Chinese economy is running into some of the most difficult challenges it has faced since the global financial crisis.

In response to the slowdown in growth, Beijing has adopted loose fiscal policy, with an emphasis on public investment. It also continues to push big banks to cut interest rates for individual borrowers and small businesses which were already suffering from the effects of the trade war with the US before the coronavirus struck.

The outbreak should give new impetus to governments, not least those that have close economic ties with China. Being a great power with ambitions for global leadership, as well as domestic reform, is not easy. Even without multi-party elections, it involves increasing, and often uncomfortable, scrutiny. As President Xi himself has put it: the road is long and the task is weighty.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

In response to the changing geopolitical landscape in Asia, both China and the United States attempt to alter the regional order in their own favour, both in the economic and security realms. This article shows how diverging views on future arrangements are leading to strategic shifts and increasing tension between these two Great Powers. As part of its quest for Great-Power status, China has been actively pushing its regional initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as adopting assertive security policies towards its neighbours. In contrast, in order to counter China's growing influence America's regional strategy is undergoing a subtle shift from ‘rebalancing to Asia’ to focusing on the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region. However, amid an intensifying trade war and other challenges facing the region, China has chosen to moderate its proactive foreign policy-orientation in the past few years. In particular, China has made attempts to downplay its domestic rhetoric, rebuild strategic relationship with India and Japan, and to reassure ASEAN states in the South China Sea. In response to the Indo-Pacific strategy, it would be more effective for China to articulate a more inclusive regional vision and promote an institutional framework that also accommodates a US presence in the region.

Australia has been among the most prominent advocates of the increasingly popular Indo-Pacific concept. This article argues that Canberra's enthusiasm for the concept stems from its appeal to the two dominant traditions of Australian foreign policy—a ‘dependent ally’ tradition and a ‘middle power’ approach. While these two traditions are typically seen as being in tension, the Indo-Pacific concept provides a rare point of convergence between them. The article begins by outlining the appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept to each of these traditions. Using a case-study of recent Australian policy toward the South China Sea disputes, however, the article then demonstrates that Australia has in practice implemented its stated Indo-Pacific strategy far less consistently than its very vocal support would appear to suggest. This disjuncture is attributed to the growing influence of a third, generally understudied, ‘pragmatic’ Australian foreign policy tradition. Because Australia has been such a prominent champion of the Indo-Pacific concept, the article concludes that this divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to have a negative impact on the concept's broader international appeal and sustainability, particularly among Australia's south-east Asian neighbours.

Although the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has become popular in the foreign policy discourse of some countries, we have yet to see any significant institution-building in the Indo-Pacific region. Borrowing insights from functional institutionalism and political leadership studies of international regimes, we introduce a ‘leadership–institution’ model to explore the problems and prospects of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific. Through a comparative case study of the institutionalization of the Asia–Pacific vs the Indo-Pacific, we argue that two crucial factors contributed to the slow institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific as a regional system in world politics: the lack of ideational leadership from an epistemic community and the weak executive leadership from a powerful state. While ideational leaders can help states identify and expand common interests in cooperation, executive leadership will facilitate states to overcome operational obstacles in cooperation, such as the ‘collective action’ problem and the ‘relative gains’ concern. The future of institution-building in the Indo-Pacific will depend on whether and how these two leadership roles are played by scholars and states in the region. In the conclusion, we discuss the challenges of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific and highlight China as a wild card in the future of Indo-Pacific regionalism.

This article explores the role of religion in political transnationalism using the case of the Shi'a Iraqi diaspora since 2003. The article focuses on three areas that capture important trends in Shi'a transnationalism and their implications for transnational Shi'a identity politics. These include Shi'a diasporic politics, transnational Shi'a civic activism, and the cultural production of Iraqi Shi'a identity through pilgrimages, rituals and new practices. It is argued that understanding Shi'a Islam and identity formation requires adopting a transnational lens. The evolution of Shi'a Islam is not only a result of the dictates of the Shi'a clerical centres, and how they influence Shi'a populations abroad, but also the transnational interrelationships and links to holy shrine cities, Shi'i national and international politics, humanitarianism and commemorations and rituals. The article demonstrates that Shi'a political transnationalism is unexceptional in that it echoes much of the literature on diasporic politics and development where diaspora involve themselves from afar in the politics and societies of their countries of origin. At the same time, it shows the exceptionalism of Shi'a diasporic movements, in that their motivations and mobilizations are contributing to the reification of sectarian geographical and social borders, creating a transnationalism that is defined by largely Shi'a networks, spaces, actors and causes. The case of Shi'a political transnationalism towards Iraq shows that this is increasing the distance between Shi'is and Iraq's other communities, simultaneously fragmenting Iraq's national unity while deepening Shi'a identity and politics both nationally and supra-nationally.

This special section brings together diverse spaces and modes of visuality through specific, sustained attention to the various types of violence depicted. In doing so, these articles draw out a concern for the visual constitution of violence in global politics, and its emotional and political consequences. Individually and collectively, the contributions highlight the ways in which policy-makers and researchers are daily confronted by violent images that influence how complex political problems are seen and consequently understood. Paying attention to the power of the visuality of violence is necessary to understand how certain kinds of policy responses to direct and indirect violence unfold.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the implications of pre-existing global trends such as rising protectionism and mounting trade tensions for the future of economic globalization. The global health crisis has since led to widespread lockdowns, paralysed supply chains and interrupted shipments of medical equipment between trade partners thereby further exposing the vulnerabilities of an integrated global economy

Against this backdrop, the panellists will assess the impact of the coronavirus on economic globalization and global supply chains. To what extent might the health emergency encourage a re-evaluation of economic integration? How should governments and industries prepare for a resumption of activities under the auspices of a ‘new normal’ where ‘just-in-time’ methods of production may not be resilient enough to systemic shocks and challenges? Can a globalized supply and demand system become more resilient to shocks? And with China beginning to recover from the crisis, what might be the role of Chinese industry in rebooting global supply chains?

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

The violence in South Sudan this week suggests there could be worse times to come for the country. It will exacerbate the deep-rooted inter- and intra-tribal tensions that have defined the political landscape in South Sudan since it gained independence in 2011. It could also create a refugee dilemma for the country’s neighbours.

The dynamics of the leadership struggle between President Salva Kiir, a Dinka, and former vice president Riek Macher, a Nuer, colours politics throughout the country, illustrating the prevalence of political tribalism at the highest office. Following Kiir’s dismissal of Machar and the entire cabinet in July, neither this week’s attempted coup nor its heavy suppression will have come as a surprise to many in South Sudan.

The perception of Dinka domination pervading the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) by other ethnic groups is not new. But it has become increasingly marked in a country with a fragile economy, limited opportunities for employment and deep-rooted patrimonialism throughout all tiers of government.

While there is a long-standing rivalry for power between the Dinka and Nuer, South Sudan’s two largest tribal groups, others, such as the Equatorians, perceive both groups as monopolizing power. Addressing this perceived inequity within the government will be integral to move beyond political tribalism towards an inclusive system of government that guarantees minority representation. Without this change, discontent and frustrations within the disenfranchised rural communities that make up the majority of the population are liable to rise to the surface, as this week’s events demonstrate.

While government policies since independence have been careful to use the language of inclusivity, the reality is very different. Jonglei, the largest of South Sudan’s ten states and home of the Nuer, has seen severe fighting between the Dinka, Nuer and Murle, for example. In December 2011 tribal attacks and counterattacks between Nuer and Murle caused at least 1,000 deaths. 

These tensions have been further aggravated by the failure of the central government to provide even basic levels of local governance, made worse by systemic corruption and patrimonialism. The extent of corruption, and the government’s lack of control over it, was demonstrated in 2012 when President Kiir issued a somewhat plaintive call to his government officials to return stolen cash.

Government reforms and legislation have stripped traditional authorities of their former functions and roles within local society, without reintegrating them into new roles within the government apparatus or providing viable alternatives. This has resulted in inconsistent and disparate systems of local governance throughout South Sudan, contributing to existing perceptions of inequity. This is often assumed to be based on tribal factors, regardless of whether this is in fact the case.

With tensions appearing to be unabated in the capital, Juba, and with the dry season approaching, which will facilitate a more mobile population, there is significant potential for security to deteriorate further. And it may not recover for a long time. Disgruntled and marginalized, the tribal populations that have felt excluded from the political process, or in the case of the Nuer, undermined in that process, may use the current political turbulence to bring matters to a head and challenge the authority of South Sudan’s leading figures.

A lasting conflict in South Sudan would likely lead to further displacement of people, which would place an increased strain on host communities in neighbouring countries. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda already have a long history of accepting refugees from the Sudanese civil war. With the current flows of displaced populations from conflicts in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo however, an additional influx of South Sudanese refugees would have the potential to overburden and destabilize the region further.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Australia’s new foreign minister will reflect on the country’s relations and policy priorities within the Asia-Pacific region. The speaker will also discuss how Australia is working to build Asian regional architecture and to strengthen the international rules-based order.

ASK A QUESTION: Send questions for the speaker by email to questions@chathamhouse.org or using #askCH on Twitter. A selection will be put to her during the event.

Following 21 years since the adoption of the Beijing declaration by 189 states, China has the opportunity to lead the way in prioritizing gender-inclusive growth policies on the G20 agenda, as it is hosting the G20 this year.

This roundtable will examine specific challenges in China, a country with a high heterogeneity in the labour force and among its population. The event will bring together representatives of government, business and civil society to continue the dialogue that Chatham House started one year ago in Beijing. Taking stock of the progress achieved so far, the participants will analyse what type of recommendations can have a positive impact in both rural and high- density populated areas.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The Chatham House Rule 

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule. 

This event is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. We would like to take this opportunity to to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc and EY for their generous support of the forum. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the implications of pre-existing global trends such as rising protectionism and mounting trade tensions for the future of economic globalization. The global health crisis has since led to widespread lockdowns, paralysed supply chains and interrupted shipments of medical equipment between trade partners thereby further exposing the vulnerabilities of an integrated global economy

Against this backdrop, the panellists will assess the impact of the coronavirus on economic globalization and global supply chains. To what extent might the health emergency encourage a re-evaluation of economic integration? How should governments and industries prepare for a resumption of activities under the auspices of a ‘new normal’ where ‘just-in-time’ methods of production may not be resilient enough to systemic shocks and challenges? Can a globalized supply and demand system become more resilient to shocks? And with China beginning to recover from the crisis, what might be the role of Chinese industry in rebooting global supply chains?

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

This special section brings together diverse spaces and modes of visuality through specific, sustained attention to the various types of violence depicted. In doing so, these articles draw out a concern for the visual constitution of violence in global politics, and its emotional and political consequences. Individually and collectively, the contributions highlight the ways in which policy-makers and researchers are daily confronted by violent images that influence how complex political problems are seen and consequently understood. Paying attention to the power of the visuality of violence is necessary to understand how certain kinds of policy responses to direct and indirect violence unfold.

In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.

Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.

The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.

Continental and national leadership

Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.

He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.

International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.

Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.

Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.

Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.

Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.

COVID-19 has sharpened thinking

As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.

For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R300 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.

But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.

There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.

South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.

COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.

Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.

But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.