COVID-19 is a sharp reminder of why trade and climate policy matters. How can governments maintain access to critical goods and services, and ensure global supply chains function in times of crisis?

The timing of many trade negotiations is now increasingly uncertain, as are the UK’s plans to host COP26 in November. Policy work continues, however, and the EU has released its draft negotiating text for the new UK-EU trade deal, which includes a sub-chapter specifically devoted to climate. 

This is a timely reminder both of the pressing need for the UK to integrate its trade and climate policymaking and to use the current crisis-induced breathing space in international negotiations - however limited - to catch up on both strategy and priorities on this critical policy intersection.

The UK government has moved fast to reset its external trade relations post-Brexit. In the past month it formally launched bilateral negotiations with the EU and took up a seat at the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an independent member. Until the COVID-19 crisis hit, negotiations were also poised to start with the US.

The UK is also in the climate spotlight as host of COP26, the most important international climate negotiation since Paris in 2015, which presents a vital opportunity for the government to show leadership by aligning its trade agenda with its climate and sustainability commitments in bold new ways.

Not just an empty aspiration

This would send a signal that ‘Global Britain’ is not just an empty aspiration, but a concrete commitment to lead.

Not only is concerted action on the climate crisis a central priority for UK citizens, a growing and increasingly vocal group of UK businesses committed to decarbonization are calling on the government to secure a more transparent and predictable international market place that supports climate action by business.

With COP26, the UK has a unique responsibility to push governments to ratchet up ambition in the national contributions to climate action – and to promote coherence between climate ambition and wider economic policymaking, including on trade. If Britain really wants to lead, here are some concrete actions it should take.

At the national level, the UK can pioneer new ways to put environmental sustainability – and climate action in particular - at the heart of its trade agenda. Achieving the government’s ambitious Clean Growth Strategy - which seeks to make the UK the global leader in a range of industries including electric cars and offshore wind – should be a central objective of UK trade policy.

The UK should re-orient trade policy frameworks to incentivize the shift toward a more circular and net zero global economy. And all elements of UK trade policy could be assessed against environmental objectives - for example, their contribution to phasing out fossil fuels, helping to reverse overexploitation of natural resources, and support for sustainable agriculture and biodiversity.

In its bilateral and regional trade negotiations, the UK can and should advance its environment, climate and trade goals in tandem, and implementation of the Paris Agreement must be a core objective of the UK trade strategy.

A core issue for the UK is how to ensure that efforts to decarbonise the economy are not undercut by imports from high-carbon producers. Here, a ‘border carbon adjustment (BCA)’ - effectively a tax on the climate pollution of imports - would support UK climate goals. The EU draft negotiating text released yesterday put the issue of BCAs front and centre, making crystal clear that the intersection of climate, environment and trade policy goals will be a central issue for UK-EU trade negotiations.

Even with the United States, a trade deal can and should still be seized as a way to incentivize the shift toward a net zero and more circular economy. At the multilateral level, as a new independent WTO member, the UK has an opportunity to help build a forward-looking climate and trade agenda.

The UK could help foster dialogue, research and action on a cluster of ‘climate and trade’ issues that warrant more focused attention at the WTO. These include the design of carbon pricing policies at the border that are transparent, fair and support a just transition; proposals for a climate waiver for WTO rules; and identification of ways multilateral trade cooperation could promote a zero carbon and more circular global economy.  

To help nudge multilateral discussion along, the UK could also ask to join a critical ‘path finder’ effort by six governments, led by New Zealand, to pursue an agreement on climate change, trade and sustainability (ACCTS). This group aims to find ways forward on three central trade and climate issues: removing fossil fuel subsidies, climate-related labelling, and promoting trade in climate-friendly goods and services.

At present, the complex challenges at the intersection of climate, trade and development policy are too often used to defer or side-step issues deemed ‘too hard’ or ‘too sensitive’ to tackle. The UK could help here by working to ensure multilateral climate and trade initiatives share adjustment burdens, recognise the historical responsibility of developed countries, and do not unfairly disadvantage developing countries - especially the least developed.

Many developing countries are keen to promote climate-friendly exports as part of wider export diversification strategies  and want to reap greater returns from greener global value chains. Further, small island states and least-developed countries – many of which are Commonwealth members – that are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and natural disasters, need support to adapt in the face of trade shocks and to build climate-resilient, trade-related infrastructure and export sectors.

As an immediate next step, the UK should actively support the growing number of WTO members in favour of a WTO Ministerial Statement on environmental sustainability and trade. It should work with its key trading partners in the Commonwealth and beyond to ensure the agenda is inclusive, supports achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helps developing countries benefit from a more environmentally sustainable global economy.

As the UK prepares to host COP26, negotiates deals with the EU and US, and prepares for its first WTO Ministerial meeting as an independent member, it must show it can lead the way nationally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. And to ensure the government acts, greater engagement from the UK’s business, civil society and research sectors is critical – we need all hands on deck to forge and promote concrete proposals for aligning UK trade policy with the climate ambition our world needs.

Nigeria’s booming informal trade is costly for society, business and government, yet a critical opportunity exists to formalize such trade and drive more sustainable and less volatile growth, argues a new report from Chatham House.

According to one estimate, informal activity accounts for up to 64 per cent of Nigeria’s GDP. Nigeria's Booming Borders: The Drivers and Consequences of Unrecorded Trade finds that this is a result of obstacles that impede trading through formal channels. These drivers include bureaucratic burdens and other factors, such as:

• The need for Nigerian businesses to produce at least nine documents in order to send an export shipment and at least 13 in order to bring in an import consignment.
• Rigid and dysfunctional foreign-exchange regulations that push most smaller traders into the incompletely regulated parallel exchange market.
• Corruption and unofficial ‘taxation’, especially on major border highways, which delegitimize formal channels and encourage the use of smuggling routes.

As a result, the state loses direct tax revenues that would be generated by formal cross-border trade. This is not just siphoned into the informal economy; some is lost entirely. For example, many shippers opt to dock in neighbouring countries rather than deal with the expense and difficulty of using Nigeria’s ports.

Informal trade also undermines the social contract between the private sector and government. The state lacks tax revenues to pay its officials, improve infrastructure or implement reforms, while traders feel the government provides no services in return for any taxes they might pay.

‘Every day tens of thousands of unofficial payments are made, none destined for the government. Policy-makers need to create an environment that encourages trade to flow through formal channels and capture lost revenue’, says co-author Leena Koni Hoffmann.

‘Formalization would assist Nigeria to pursue more high-quality, high-tech economic activity at a time when rising labour costs in Asia are creating scope for Nigerian manufacturers to compete’, she adds.

The report makes a number of recommendations for how Nigeria could encourage more formal trade, including:

• Strengthening the resources and capacity of the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment to coordinate action across key government ministries, departments and agencies, as well as public and private stakeholders.
• Prioritizing engagement in the development of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) trade policies and fully implementing the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons to reduce harassment at borders.
• Allowing banks to operate simple services for small and medium-sized businesses to make trade payments directly from Nigerian naira to CFA francs and vice versa.
• Improving basic facilities that support traders, including improving the efficiency of border posts, installing truck parks and all-weather surfacing on market access roads, and introducing online booking for trucks to enter ports.
• Separating responsibilities for assessing duty and tariff liabilities from revenue collection in order to reduce opportunities for corruption, an approach already tested with success by the Lagos State Internal Revenue Service.
• Increasing funding and technical support for the National Bureau of Statistics, which has a significant role to play in measuring and capturing more of Nigeria’s external trade.

Interviews conducted for the report reveal that business people would welcome the opportunity to pay taxes, but only if they received assurance that these payments would represent a contract with government guaranteeing that conditions for business would be improved.

‘As Africa’s largest economy, formalizing external trade would allow Nigeria to fulfil its potential as the trading engine of the West and Central African economy and shape the business landscape across the region,’ says co-author Paul Melly.

Even though President Barack Obama cautioned that the UK would be at the ‘back of the queue’ for a trade agreement with the US if the country chose to leave the EU, in the post-Brexit world a deal might be struck more swiftly. Various ideas for bringing the UK and US into a formal trade arrangement have been floated – ranging from a bilateral UK-US trade deal, or the UK joining NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement between the US, Canada and Mexico), to the UK becoming a part of the TPP (the Trans-Pacific Partnership that the US is pursuing with 11 other countries along the Pacific Rim). However, one option stands out: opening the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which the US and EU are currently negotiating, to the UK after Brexit.

Good reasons for Britain in TTIP

First, from the perspective of the UK, signing up to TTIP would mean a more comprehensive deal with the US than a bilateral UK−US trade agreement. For instance, Britain is very keen to include financial services regulation in any trade agreement with America, but given Washington’s reluctance, this ambition might only be achievable if other countries like France and Germany throw their financial weight into the negotiations.

Second, continuing involvement in the TTIP negotiations allows London to begin securing its trade position with the US now. Though its influence in the EU may weaken as it heads for the exit, Britain could make the best use of influencing the EU position on TTIP while it is still a member. It could then accept the terms of TTIP and accede as a third party relatively quickly after exiting the EU. Official negotiations on a UK−US-only deal would have to wait until the UK has left the EU, as trade talks fall under the exclusive competence of the EU.

Third, for the US and EU, having the UK as a party to TTIP would ensure the scale of the deal is not reduced, and thereby maintain the strategic appeal and ability to set global standards. At the moment, the UK is the EU’s second-largest economy, accounting for approximately 18 per cent of GDP. With Britain in TTIP, the sheer size of the transatlantic market space will have more pull for other countries to adopt the common transatlantic rules in order to gain market access.

Fourth, the UK joining TTIP as a third party would establish the agreement as an ‘open platform’ that is available for other countries to join. Michael Froman, the United States trade representative, has characterized TTIP as being such an open agreement. EU representatives have been more ambivalent, though this is starting to change in the wake of Brexit. David O’Sullivan, the current EU ambassador to the US, recently said that as ‘we’ve always seen TTIP as a potential open platform, [the] UK could still benefit [from it] even not as a member of the European Union’. While now might not be the right time to expand the TTIP bloc beyond its original participants given that negotiations are already complex and drawn out, it would be beneficial for the negotiating partners to send a strong message that countries that are willing and able to commit to the high TTIP standards will be welcomed later on.

Obstacles to Britain in TTIP

But before the UK could be added to TTIP after Brexit, major hurdles will have to be jumped and crucial questions answered. The first obstacle is actually getting a TTIP deal, which will require significant efforts by political leaders and negotiators on both sides of the Atlantic.

Second, selling the ‘UK in TTIP option’ to Brexiteers will not be an easy task. After all, Leave campaigners argued that the US−EU deal might undermine the NHS and was thus presented as one of the reasons to cut loose from Brussels. As the major rationale behind TTIP is regulatory harmonization, if the UK were to sign up to TTIP it would still have to apply many EU rules. This, however, would go counter to the arguments for leaving the EU in the first place.

Third, it will be a challenging job for the UK to untangle its trade relationship with the EU while at the same time negotiating TTIP together with the EU. It would be easiest if the UK decided to remain a member of the EU customs union. Britain would then be required to impose the EU’s external tariffs on countries like the US. This would fit seamlessly with the ‘UK in TTIP’ option. But as the UK will most likely pull out of the customs union, it will be more complicated than that.

Finally, the timing of Brexit and the TTIP negotiations could cause complications. In the unlikely event that a US-EU free trade deal is concluded and ratified while the UK is still a member of the EU, the agreement (or the parts of it that fall under national competence) would most likely continue to apply to Britain after Brexit without the need for accession. If the TTIP negotiations continue beyond Brexit, then the UK would move from negotiating as part of the EU bloc to becoming a third party. This raises the issue of whether the UK and EU continue to negotiate as one bloc vis-à-vis the US.

Special economic relationship

Still, the depth of the economic ties between the US and UK means that the TTIP option is likely to be welcomed favourably by both countries. The US is the most important single export market for the UK, with goods and services worth £45 billion shipped in 2015. Last year, the US ranked third (after Germany and China) as a source for UK imports. With nearly $1 trillion invested in each other’s economies, the US and the UK are also each other’s largest investors. Given this special economic relationship, Britain is unlikely to be at the ‘back of the queue’ in any event. But the TTIP option is the best path to preserving and strengthening the relationship post-Brexit while also realizing the wider strategic benefits of a transatlantic trade agreement.

A version of this article appeared on Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

With Donald Trump in the White House, US trade policy will probably look very different from the past 70 years - seven decades across which successive Republican and Democratic administrations have participated in and led global trade liberalization initiatives. If the president-elect delivers on his major campaign promises on trade, the negative effects on the American economy would be severe and the United States would give up its role in shaping the global trading system.

But there is no need to panic. Trump will likely leave behind the rhetoric of the campaign trail once he sits in the Oval Office. Trump will probably moderate his proposals, because a faction of the Republican-dominated Congress continues to support free trade. He might also be reined in by his team, though that depends on who best catches the ear of the president: individuals such as Vice-President-elect Mike Pence, who has supported free-trade agreements in the past, or trade-skeptical advisors such as Dan DiMicco, who now heads the transition team for the Office of the United States Trade Representative. 

So what does the Trump presidency actually mean for trade?

Trump won’t likely follow through on his most extreme plans, such as leaving the World Trade Organization. But he will lead a more protectionist United States that focuses on its trade deficits – with particular attention being paid to China and Mexico. Trump will probably impose tariffs on imports from those countries; however, duties will be lower than the mooted 45 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively. With regards to China, Trump will probably bring trade cases against Beijing’s subsidy arrangements and look into alleged currency manipulation (even though most economists accept that the renminbi is no longer undervalued).

Given the prominence of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the campaign trail, Trump will have to address the deal with Canada and Mexico. Whether that means renegotiating or pulling out remains to be seen. One thing is certain: Trump will not move forward with mega-regional trade accords such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Those would-be pacts are a lost opportunity, but this is not the end of the trade world. Trump will focus instead on striking trade deals with individual countries. One such potential bilateral trade deal could be a US–UK agreement, which Trump and his advisers, despite the prognostications of the current president, see at the front of the queue.  

Opportunity to rethink the trade framework

The fact that Trump is not necessarily against free trade per se bears hope. And there is another silver lining in the dark cloud hanging over trade. Trump has pointed to some valid concerns about the current trading system. His victory can be an opportunity to address these shortcomings. 

NAFTA does need an update. The agreement entered into force in 1994 - before the internet took off. Thus, provisions to include standards to protect digital freedoms could modernize NAFTA and expand its scope to cover 21st century economic issues. In addition, labour rights and environmental protections were not included in NAFTA but were incorporated into side agreements with weak, unenforceable provisions. By better addressing labour and environmental issues, NAFTA could be significantly upgraded.

Trump will aim to tackle unfair competition and look to enforce existing trade deals more vigilantly. This is another important and legitimate issue, and could be tackled in conjunction with European allies. The European Commission has recently proposed redesigning and updating its trade defence instruments because non-market economy practices and state intervention by some WTO countries - for example, China’s overcapacity in the steel sector - have hurt domestic industries. Without action by major players such as the United States or the European Union, China would have no incentive to reform its distortionary policies. Trust in the rules-based trading system requires that existing trade agreements are properly and fairly enforced.

Trump’s win highlights the need for better compensation for those who have felt the adverse effects of trade. His victory was partly fuelled by tapping into economic anxieties and appealing to voters who feel left behind by globalization. Better mechanisms to cushion the blows to the losers of globalization are indeed required. In the United States, Trade Adjustment Assistance has been insufficiently funded and is ineffective. More needs to be done to replace the wages of workers whose jobs have been lost due to trade and to provide them with skills training for re-employment. This reconsideration of assistance for those who are hurt by free trade could provide a foundation for the future. Once the current wave of anti-trade sentiment subsides, new trade agreements can be struck that don’t leave so many citizens feeling left behind. 

Instead of worrying about how Trump might blow up the underpinnings of the global trading system, this is an opportunity to rethink what a new trade framework might look like.

This piece was published in collaboration with Real Clear World.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

The leaked record of the five meetings of the UK–US Trade & Investment Working Group held in 2017–18 has led to a controversy in the UK election campaign around the claim that ‘the NHS is up for sale’.

But a careful reading of the leaked documents reveals how remarkably little concerns the NHS – in five meetings over 16 months, the NHS is mentioned just four times. The patent regime and how it affects medicines is discussed in more depth but largely in terms of the participants trying to understand each other’s systems and perspectives. For the most part, the discussions were overwhelmingly about everything else a trade deal would cover other than healthcare – matters such as subsidies, rules of origin and customs facilitation.

But this does not mean there will be no impact on Britain’s health service. There are three main concerns about the possible implications of a US–UK trade deal after Brexit – a negotiation that will of course only take place if the UK remains outside the EU customs union and single market and also does not reach a trade agreement with the EU that proves incompatible with US negotiating objectives.

One concern is that the US aim of securing ‘full market access for US products’, expressed in the US negotiating objectives, will affect the ability of NICE (The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) to prevent the NHS from procuring products that are deemed too expensive in relation to their benefits. It could also affect the ability of the NHS to negotiate with companies to secure price reductions as, for instance, happened recently with Orkambi, a cystic fibrosis drug.

A peculiarity of the main US government healthcare programme (Medicare) is that it has historically not negotiated drug prices, although there are several bills now before Congress aiming to change that. US refusal to negotiate or control prices is one reason that US drug prices are the highest in the world.  

A second concern is that the US objective of securing ‘intellectual property rights that reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in US law’ will result in longer patent terms and other forms of exclusivity that will increase the prices the NHS will have to pay for drugs.

However, it is not immediately apparent that UK standards are significantly different from those in the US – the institutional arrangements differ but the levels of protection offered are broadly comparable. Recent publicity about a potential extra NHS medicine bill of £27 billion resulting from a trade deal is based on the NHS having to pay US prices on all drugs – which seems an unlikely outcome unless the UK contingent are extraordinarily bad negotiators.

Nevertheless, in an analysis section (marked for internal distribution only), the UK lead negotiator noted: ‘The impact of some patent issues raised on NHS access to generic drugs (i.e. cheaper drugs) will be a key consideration going forward.’

A third concern is that the US objective of providing ‘fair and open conditions for services trade’ and other US negotiating objectives will oblige the UK to open up the NHS to American healthcare companies.

This is where it gets complicated. At one point in a discussion on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) the US asked if the UK had concerns about their ‘health insurance system’ (presumably a reference to the NHS). The UK response was that it ‘wouldn’t want to discuss particular health care entities at this time, you’ll be aware of certain statements saying we need to protect our needs; this would be something to discuss further down the line…’

On this exchange the UK lead negotiator commented:  ‘We do not currently believe the US has a major offensive interest in this space – not through the SOE chapter at least. Our response dealt with this for now, but we will need to be able to go into more detail about the functioning of the NHS and our views on whether or not it is engaged in commercial activities…’

On the face of it, these documents provide no basis for saying the NHS would be for sale – whatever that means exactly. The talks were simply an exploratory investigation between officials on both sides in advance of possible negotiations.

But it is a fact that US positions in free trade agreements are heavily influenced by corporate interests. Their participation in framing agreements is institutionalized in the US system and the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries in the US spend, by a large margin, more on lobbying the government than any other sector does. Moreover, President Donald Trump has long complained about ‘the global freeloading that forces American consumers to subsidize lower prices in foreign countries through higher prices in our country’.

It is when (and if) the actual negotiations on a trade deal get under way that the real test will come as the political profile and temperature is raised on both sides of the Atlantic.

This event is  part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum and will take place virtually only.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST. 

This event is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum and will take place virtually only.

International trade has a crucial role to play in tackling climate change. The production and transport of goods is a major contributor to green-house gas emissions, as is the delivery of certain cross-border services. At the same time, it looks inevitable that the COVID-19 pandemic will lead to a radical re-think of global supply chains as companies and governments seek to build in greater resilience while at the same time preserving as far as possible the efficiency gains and lower costs that global supply chains generate when operating normally.

Future international trade rules will have a crucial role to play in addressing both challenges; they represent both an opportunity and a risk. If designed well, they could play a very important role in re-enforcing moves towards a more sustainable use of resources, greater overall alignment of economies with the Paris Agreement, and greater economic resilience. But they could also, if poorly designed and implemented, or overly influenced by strategic political considerations, have significant unintended and negative implications. These include: reduced economic efficiency, increased poverty, unnecessary economic decoupling and reduced consensus on the broader mitigation and adaptation measures required to meet the challenge of climate change.

Against this background, a number of key questions arise: In what areas, if any, do we need to modify or adapt key principles underlying the system of global trade rules in order to respond to the twin challenges of responding to climate change and building greater economic resilience?  Which are the most promising/practical areas on which trade policy experts should focus now to re-launch/re-energize discussions on WTO reform, including, for example, dispute settlement? What national economic policies will be needed to complement the development of new/reformed trade disciplines in these areas? How might future political changes, such as a change in the US administration, affect the prospects for and political momentum behind such deliberations? What in any eventuality is the best way to build the required political momentum?
 
This roundtable is convened by the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the US and the Americas Programme and it is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The event will take place virtually only.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST.

The US and China have entered into an increasingly confrontational relationship over trade and technology. This may force Europe to make difficult choices between the two economic superpowers – or perform a balancing act. Although the recent US-China phase-1 trade deal has eased the relationship for now, the trade and technology tensions are a structural issue and are likely to persist.

The debate over Huawei’s participation in 5G networks is an example of how the UK and other countries may face competing priorities in economic, security and foreign policy. Can Europe avoid a binary choice between the US and China? Is it possible for the EU to position itself as a third global power in trade, technology and standard-setting? What strategies should Europeans adopt to keep the US and China engaged in the rules-based international order and what does the future hold for trade multilateralism?

Sir Simon Fraser will join us for a discussion on Europe’s future role between the US and China. Sir Simon is Managing Partner of Flint Global and Deputy Chairman of Chatham House. He previously served as Permanent Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Head of the UK Diplomatic Service from 2010 to 2015. Prior to that he was Permanent Secretary at the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. He has also served as Director General for Europe in the FCO and Chief of Staff to European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

Trade and investment between the UK and Latin America is woefully underdeveloped. Latin America’s agricultural powerhouses Brazil and Argentina only accounted for a total of 1.6% of the UK’s agricultural market across eight sectors in 2018, all of those areas in which Argentina and Brazil have substantial comparative advantages. 

Conversely, UK exports to the large Latin American economies remain far below their potential.  To cite a few examples, in 2018 in the electrical equipment sector, the UK only exported $95.7 million of those products to Brazil, making the ninth largest economy in the world only the 42nd export market for those goods from the UK; Mexico only imported $91.4 million of UK-made electrical goods, placing it directly behind Brazil as UK’s market for those goods.

As we look to the future, any improvement to the relationship will depend on two factors: 1) how the UK leaves the EU and 2) whether Latin American agricultural producers can improve their environmental practices and can meet the production standards established by the EU and likely maintained by a potential post-Brexit Britain.

In the first meeting of the working group,  Chatham House convened a range of policymakers, practitioners and academics to explore this topic in depth, identify the key issues driving this trend, and begin to consider how improvements might best be made. Subsequent meetings will focus on specific sectors in commerce and investment.

We would like to thank BTG Pactual, Cairn Energy plc, Diageo, Equinor, Fresnillo Management Services, HSBC Holdings plc and Wintershall Dea for their generous support of the Latin America Initiative.

This event is  part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum and will take place virtually only.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST. 

This event is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum and will take place virtually only.

International trade has a crucial role to play in tackling climate change. The production and transport of goods is a major contributor to green-house gas emissions, as is the delivery of certain cross-border services. At the same time, it looks inevitable that the COVID-19 pandemic will lead to a radical re-think of global supply chains as companies and governments seek to build in greater resilience while at the same time preserving as far as possible the efficiency gains and lower costs that global supply chains generate when operating normally.

Future international trade rules will have a crucial role to play in addressing both challenges; they represent both an opportunity and a risk. If designed well, they could play a very important role in re-enforcing moves towards a more sustainable use of resources, greater overall alignment of economies with the Paris Agreement, and greater economic resilience. But they could also, if poorly designed and implemented, or overly influenced by strategic political considerations, have significant unintended and negative implications. These include: reduced economic efficiency, increased poverty, unnecessary economic decoupling and reduced consensus on the broader mitigation and adaptation measures required to meet the challenge of climate change.

Against this background, a number of key questions arise: In what areas, if any, do we need to modify or adapt key principles underlying the system of global trade rules in order to respond to the twin challenges of responding to climate change and building greater economic resilience?  Which are the most promising/practical areas on which trade policy experts should focus now to re-launch/re-energize discussions on WTO reform, including, for example, dispute settlement? What national economic policies will be needed to complement the development of new/reformed trade disciplines in these areas? How might future political changes, such as a change in the US administration, affect the prospects for and political momentum behind such deliberations? What in any eventuality is the best way to build the required political momentum?
 
This roundtable is convened by the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the US and the Americas Programme and it is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The event will take place virtually only.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST.

International trade rules and policies are deeply relevant to environmental performance. On the one hand, trade flows, rules and policies can exacerbate environmental challenges as consumers regularly purchase goods produced or disposed of in unsustainable ways in other countries therefore 'exporting' environmental costs. On the other hand, trade rules and flows can be harnessed to support environmental agendas and impact commercial and trade prospects positively.

The speakers will discuss the urgent need for greater political leadership and inclusive policy dialogue on environment and trade to address its development and competitiveness. Which priorities should form the heart of a forward-looking environment and trade 2.0 agenda in the context of the UN’s SDGs? What role can international trade play in helping deliver sustainable food and land use systems? And how can stakeholders promote the scaling-up of the many initiatives underway and serve as a vehicle for transformative change toward a more sustainable economy at the national and international level?

This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations of Chatham House. If you'd like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford.

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

COVID-19 is a sharp reminder of why trade and climate policy matters. How can governments maintain access to critical goods and services, and ensure global supply chains function in times of crisis?

The timing of many trade negotiations is now increasingly uncertain, as are the UK’s plans to host COP26 in November. Policy work continues, however, and the EU has released its draft negotiating text for the new UK-EU trade deal, which includes a sub-chapter specifically devoted to climate. 

This is a timely reminder both of the pressing need for the UK to integrate its trade and climate policymaking and to use the current crisis-induced breathing space in international negotiations - however limited - to catch up on both strategy and priorities on this critical policy intersection.

The UK government has moved fast to reset its external trade relations post-Brexit. In the past month it formally launched bilateral negotiations with the EU and took up a seat at the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an independent member. Until the COVID-19 crisis hit, negotiations were also poised to start with the US.

The UK is also in the climate spotlight as host of COP26, the most important international climate negotiation since Paris in 2015, which presents a vital opportunity for the government to show leadership by aligning its trade agenda with its climate and sustainability commitments in bold new ways.

Not just an empty aspiration

This would send a signal that ‘Global Britain’ is not just an empty aspiration, but a concrete commitment to lead.

Not only is concerted action on the climate crisis a central priority for UK citizens, a growing and increasingly vocal group of UK businesses committed to decarbonization are calling on the government to secure a more transparent and predictable international market place that supports climate action by business.

With COP26, the UK has a unique responsibility to push governments to ratchet up ambition in the national contributions to climate action – and to promote coherence between climate ambition and wider economic policymaking, including on trade. If Britain really wants to lead, here are some concrete actions it should take.

At the national level, the UK can pioneer new ways to put environmental sustainability – and climate action in particular - at the heart of its trade agenda. Achieving the government’s ambitious Clean Growth Strategy - which seeks to make the UK the global leader in a range of industries including electric cars and offshore wind – should be a central objective of UK trade policy.

The UK should re-orient trade policy frameworks to incentivize the shift toward a more circular and net zero global economy. And all elements of UK trade policy could be assessed against environmental objectives - for example, their contribution to phasing out fossil fuels, helping to reverse overexploitation of natural resources, and support for sustainable agriculture and biodiversity.

In its bilateral and regional trade negotiations, the UK can and should advance its environment, climate and trade goals in tandem, and implementation of the Paris Agreement must be a core objective of the UK trade strategy.

A core issue for the UK is how to ensure that efforts to decarbonise the economy are not undercut by imports from high-carbon producers. Here, a ‘border carbon adjustment (BCA)’ - effectively a tax on the climate pollution of imports - would support UK climate goals. The EU draft negotiating text released yesterday put the issue of BCAs front and centre, making crystal clear that the intersection of climate, environment and trade policy goals will be a central issue for UK-EU trade negotiations.

Even with the United States, a trade deal can and should still be seized as a way to incentivize the shift toward a net zero and more circular economy. At the multilateral level, as a new independent WTO member, the UK has an opportunity to help build a forward-looking climate and trade agenda.

The UK could help foster dialogue, research and action on a cluster of ‘climate and trade’ issues that warrant more focused attention at the WTO. These include the design of carbon pricing policies at the border that are transparent, fair and support a just transition; proposals for a climate waiver for WTO rules; and identification of ways multilateral trade cooperation could promote a zero carbon and more circular global economy.  

To help nudge multilateral discussion along, the UK could also ask to join a critical ‘path finder’ effort by six governments, led by New Zealand, to pursue an agreement on climate change, trade and sustainability (ACCTS). This group aims to find ways forward on three central trade and climate issues: removing fossil fuel subsidies, climate-related labelling, and promoting trade in climate-friendly goods and services.

At present, the complex challenges at the intersection of climate, trade and development policy are too often used to defer or side-step issues deemed ‘too hard’ or ‘too sensitive’ to tackle. The UK could help here by working to ensure multilateral climate and trade initiatives share adjustment burdens, recognise the historical responsibility of developed countries, and do not unfairly disadvantage developing countries - especially the least developed.

Many developing countries are keen to promote climate-friendly exports as part of wider export diversification strategies  and want to reap greater returns from greener global value chains. Further, small island states and least-developed countries – many of which are Commonwealth members – that are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and natural disasters, need support to adapt in the face of trade shocks and to build climate-resilient, trade-related infrastructure and export sectors.

As an immediate next step, the UK should actively support the growing number of WTO members in favour of a WTO Ministerial Statement on environmental sustainability and trade. It should work with its key trading partners in the Commonwealth and beyond to ensure the agenda is inclusive, supports achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helps developing countries benefit from a more environmentally sustainable global economy.

As the UK prepares to host COP26, negotiates deals with the EU and US, and prepares for its first WTO Ministerial meeting as an independent member, it must show it can lead the way nationally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. And to ensure the government acts, greater engagement from the UK’s business, civil society and research sectors is critical – we need all hands on deck to forge and promote concrete proposals for aligning UK trade policy with the climate ambition our world needs.

The leaked record of the five meetings of the UK–US Trade & Investment Working Group held in 2017–18 has led to a controversy in the UK election campaign around the claim that ‘the NHS is up for sale’.

But a careful reading of the leaked documents reveals how remarkably little concerns the NHS – in five meetings over 16 months, the NHS is mentioned just four times. The patent regime and how it affects medicines is discussed in more depth but largely in terms of the participants trying to understand each other’s systems and perspectives. For the most part, the discussions were overwhelmingly about everything else a trade deal would cover other than healthcare – matters such as subsidies, rules of origin and customs facilitation.

But this does not mean there will be no impact on Britain’s health service. There are three main concerns about the possible implications of a US–UK trade deal after Brexit – a negotiation that will of course only take place if the UK remains outside the EU customs union and single market and also does not reach a trade agreement with the EU that proves incompatible with US negotiating objectives.

One concern is that the US aim of securing ‘full market access for US products’, expressed in the US negotiating objectives, will affect the ability of NICE (The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) to prevent the NHS from procuring products that are deemed too expensive in relation to their benefits. It could also affect the ability of the NHS to negotiate with companies to secure price reductions as, for instance, happened recently with Orkambi, a cystic fibrosis drug.

A peculiarity of the main US government healthcare programme (Medicare) is that it has historically not negotiated drug prices, although there are several bills now before Congress aiming to change that. US refusal to negotiate or control prices is one reason that US drug prices are the highest in the world.  

A second concern is that the US objective of securing ‘intellectual property rights that reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in US law’ will result in longer patent terms and other forms of exclusivity that will increase the prices the NHS will have to pay for drugs.

However, it is not immediately apparent that UK standards are significantly different from those in the US – the institutional arrangements differ but the levels of protection offered are broadly comparable. Recent publicity about a potential extra NHS medicine bill of £27 billion resulting from a trade deal is based on the NHS having to pay US prices on all drugs – which seems an unlikely outcome unless the UK contingent are extraordinarily bad negotiators.

Nevertheless, in an analysis section (marked for internal distribution only), the UK lead negotiator noted: ‘The impact of some patent issues raised on NHS access to generic drugs (i.e. cheaper drugs) will be a key consideration going forward.’

A third concern is that the US objective of providing ‘fair and open conditions for services trade’ and other US negotiating objectives will oblige the UK to open up the NHS to American healthcare companies.

This is where it gets complicated. At one point in a discussion on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) the US asked if the UK had concerns about their ‘health insurance system’ (presumably a reference to the NHS). The UK response was that it ‘wouldn’t want to discuss particular health care entities at this time, you’ll be aware of certain statements saying we need to protect our needs; this would be something to discuss further down the line…’

On this exchange the UK lead negotiator commented:  ‘We do not currently believe the US has a major offensive interest in this space – not through the SOE chapter at least. Our response dealt with this for now, but we will need to be able to go into more detail about the functioning of the NHS and our views on whether or not it is engaged in commercial activities…’

On the face of it, these documents provide no basis for saying the NHS would be for sale – whatever that means exactly. The talks were simply an exploratory investigation between officials on both sides in advance of possible negotiations.

But it is a fact that US positions in free trade agreements are heavily influenced by corporate interests. Their participation in framing agreements is institutionalized in the US system and the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries in the US spend, by a large margin, more on lobbying the government than any other sector does. Moreover, President Donald Trump has long complained about ‘the global freeloading that forces American consumers to subsidize lower prices in foreign countries through higher prices in our country’.

It is when (and if) the actual negotiations on a trade deal get under way that the real test will come as the political profile and temperature is raised on both sides of the Atlantic.

Bangladesh's recent gains in economic and social indices, set against its record of corruption and poor civil rights, has at times been termed the ‘Bangladesh Paradox’. Yet this label is overly simplistic; the current situation proves that these trends can coexist.

The Awami League government, in power since 2009, has increased political stability, delivered unprecedented economic and social advances, and adopted a counter-terrorism strategy to stamp out extremist groups. At the same time, it is criticized for curbing civil rights and failing to hold credible elections. However, as the two previous regimes have demonstrated, the rights situation is unlikely to improve even if the Awami League were replaced.

How did worsening rights become a feature of the state irrespective of its political dispensation? An unresolved contest between political and non-political state actors may hold the key to that puzzle. The perils of the current dispensation have recently manifested in weakening economic indicators, which jeopardize the very stability and social progress for which the country has garnered much praise.

The idea that trade agreements should be subject to human rights impact assessment has been gathering momentum in recent years. This idea springs from concern – particularly on the part of trade unions and civil society organizations – that states are not presently doing enough to anticipate and address the human rights-related issues that arise from their trading arrangements with other countries.

This meeting will coincide with the launch of a research paper on human rights impact assessment by Dr Jennifer Zerk. It will bring together experts from law, trade policy, human rights impact assessment practice and civil society to take stock of progress so far and consider the future prospects for human rights impact assessment as a risk-analysis and policymaking tool in the trade context.  

The meeting will explore the key risks and benefits of the human rights impact assessment of trade agreements. What legal, political and practical challenges have been encountered so far? In what ways could communication, stakeholder consultation and follow-up of findings be improved? And what is needed to build political and stakeholder support for these kinds of processes?  

This meeting will be followed by a reception. 

With international trade discourse taking an increasingly transactional and sometimes belligerent tone, it would be easy to overlook the quiet revolution currently under way to bring new voices into trade policy development and monitoring. The traditional division of responsibilities between the executive and legislature – whereby treaties are negotiated and signed by the executive, and the legislature does what is necessary to implement them – may be undergoing some change.

Growing awareness of the implications of trade and investment treaties for many aspects of day-to-day life – food standards, employment opportunities, environmental quality, availability of medicines and data protection, just to name a few – is fuelling demands by people and businesses for more of a say in the way these rules are formulated and developed.

Various options for enhancing public and parliamentary scrutiny of trading proposals have recently been examined by two UK parliamentary select committees.[1] The reason for this interest is obviously Brexit, which has presented UK civil servants and parliamentarians with the unusual (some would say exciting) opportunity to design an approval and scrutiny process for trade agreements from scratch.

Doubtless, EU authorization, liaison and approval procedures (which include a scrutinizing role for the European Parliament) will be influential,[2] as will the European Commission’s experience with stakeholder engagement on trade issues.[3] The recommendations of both UK select committees to include human rights impact assessment processes as part of pre-negotiation preparations[4] echo calls from UN agencies and NGOs for more rigorous and timely analysis of the human rights risks that may be posed by new trading relationships.[5] Again, EU practice with what it terms ‘sustainability impact assessment’ of future trade agreements provides a potential model to draw from.[6] 

However, process is no substitute for action. Human rights impact assessment is never an end in itself; rather, it is a means to a positive end, in this case a trade agreement which is aligned with the trading partners’ respective human rights obligations and aspirations. It bears remembering, though, that the idea of assessing trade proposals for future human rights risks is a relatively recent one. Do we have the tools and resources to make sure that this is a meaningful compliance and risk management exercise?

Thus far there is little evidence that human rights impact assessment and stakeholder engagement exercises are having any real impact on the content of trade agreements.[7] This is the case even in the EU, where practice in these areas is the most advanced and systematic.[8]

There are several possible reasons for this. First, the methodological challenges are enormous. Aside from the crystal-ball gazing needed to forecast the social, economic and environmental effects of a trade intervention well into the future, demonstrating causal links between a trade agreement and a predicted adverse impact is often highly problematic given the number of other economic and political factors that may be in play.[9]

Secondly, there are many challenges around the need to engage with affected people and listen to their views.[10] The sheer number of possible impacts of a trade agreement on different individuals and communities, as well as the range of rights potentially engaged, makes this a difficult (some would say impossible) task. Some prioritization is always necessary.

This makes for difficult decisions about who to engage with and how. Perceived bias or an apparent lack of even-handedness – favouring business compared to civil society, for instance – can sow mistrust about the true aims of such a process, undermining its future effectiveness as participants begin to question whether it is genuine or worthwhile.[11]

The challenges are even more acute where impact assessment practitioners are tasked with investigating potential human rights impacts in other countries. Even if it is possible to get past the inevitable political sensitivities,[12] the sort of in-depth consultations required will be beyond the budget and time constraints of most assignments.[13]

There are good reasons why trade policy should be subject to greater public and parliamentary scrutiny, and why there should be more opportunities for public participation in the formation of new trading regimes. By building more opportunities for stakeholder consultation at these stages, we can acquire perspectives on trade that are not available from other forms of assessment and analysis.

However, policymakers should be wary of overstating the benefits of existing procedural models. Human rights impact assessment processes are still struggling to provide compelling analyses of the relationships between trade agreements and the enjoyment of human rights, let alone a roadmap for policymakers and trade negotiators as to what should be done.[14]

And financial and practical barriers to participation in stakeholder engagement exercises mean that, at best, these will provide only a partial picture of stakeholder impacts and views.

Experiences with human rights impact assessment of trade agreements so far demonstrate the need for realism about two things: first, the extent to which one can sensibly anticipate and analyse human rights-related risks and opportunities in the preparation stages for a new trading agreement; and, second, the extent to which problems identified in this way can be headed off with the right form of words in the treaty itself.

Both recent UK select committee reports place considerable faith in the ability of pre-project transparency and scrutiny processes to flush out potential problems and prescribe solutions. Of course, there may be cases where frontloading the analysis in this way could be useful, for instance where the human rights implications are so clear that they can readily be addressed through upfront commitments by the parties concerned, whether by bespoke or standardized approaches.

More often, though, for a trade agreement running many years into the future, human rights impacts and implications will take time to emerge, suggesting the need for robust monitoring and mitigation frameworks designed with longevity in mind. Ideally, pre-signing approval and assessment processes would lay the groundwork for future action by both trading partners, either jointly or separately (though preferably both).

To this end, as well as developing ideas for more robust substantive provisions on human rights, policymakers should consider the institutional arrangements required – whether pursuant to the trade agreement or by complementary processes – to ensure that human rights-related risks identified during the planning stages are properly and proactively followed up, that emerging risks are tackled in a timely fashion, and that there are opportunities for meaningful stakeholder contributions to these processes.

Notes

[1] UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (2019), ‘Human Rights Protections in International Agreements, Seventeenth Report of Session 2017–19’, HC 1833 HL paper 310, 12 March 2019, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtrights/1833/1833.pdf; and House of Commons International Trade Committee (2018), ‘UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny, Sixth Report of Session 2017-2019’, HC 1043, 29 December 2018.

[2] European Parliament and Directorate General for External Policies (2019), Parliamentary scrutiny of trade policies across the western world, study paper, March 2019, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/603477/EXPO_STU(2019)603477_EN.pdf.

[3] European Commission (2019), ‘Trade policy and you’, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/index_en.htm.

[4] See UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (2019), ‘Human Rights Protections in International Agreements’, para 12; and House of Commons International Trade Committee (2018), ‘UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny’, paras 124–34.

[5] OHCHR (2003), Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Human Rights, Trade and Investment, 2 July 2003, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, Annex, at para 63; UN Economic and Social Council (2017), ‘General Comment No 24 (2017) of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities’, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, 10 August 2017, para 13; and UN General Assembly (2011), ‘Guiding principles on human rights impact assessment of trade and investment agreements’, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5, 19 December 2011.

[6] European Commission (2016), Handbook for Sustainability Impact Assessment (2nd ed.), Brussels: European Union, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154464.PDF.

[7] Zerk, J. (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, Chatham House Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/human-rights-impact-assessment-trade-agreements.

[8] Ibid., pp. 11–13. For a detailed explanation of the EU’s approach to human rights impact assessment, see European Commission (2016), Handbook for Sustainability Impact Assessment.

[9] Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, pp. 14–21.

[10] Ibid., pp. 21–22.

[11] Ergon Associates (2011), Trade and Labour: Making effective use of trade sustainability impact assessments and monitoring mechanisms, Final Report to DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion European Commission, September 2011; and Gammage, C. (2010), ‘A Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Economic Partnership Agreements: Challenging the Participatory Process’, Law and Development Review, 3(1): pp. 107–34. For a civil society view, see Trade Justice Movement (undated), ‘Trade Justice Movement submission to the International Trade Committee inquiry into UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny’, https://www.tjm.org.uk/resources/briefings/tjm-submission-to-the-international-trade-committee-inquiry-into-uk-trade-policy-transparency-and-scrutiny, esp. paras 23–32.

[12] Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, pp. 20–21.

[13] Ibid., pp. 21–22.

[14] Ibid.

This essay was produced for the 2019 edition of Chatham House Expert Perspectives – our annual survey of risks and opportunities in global affairs – in which our researchers identify areas where the current sets of rules, institutions and mechanisms for peaceful international cooperation are falling short, and present ideas for reform and modernization.

The entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on 30 May, after only three years of negotiations, is an economic, political and diplomatic milestone for the African Union (AU) and its member states, crucial for economic growth, job creation, and making Africa a meaningful player in international trade. But the continent will have to work together to ensure that the potential benefits are fully realized.

A necessary innovation

With its advances in maintaining peace and security, abundant natural resources, high growth rates, improved linkages to global supply chains and a youthful population, Africa is emerging as a new global centre of economic growth, increasingly sought after as a partner by the world’s biggest economies. Governments from across Africa have been taking a more assertive role in international markets, including through proactive diversification of trading partners, and the continent remains a strong advocate for the multilateral trading system.

However, this is not yet reflected in outcomes. The African Union does not have observer status at the World Trade Organization, despite diplomatic efforts in the past decade. Africa has less than a three per cent share of global trade, and the growing trend towards protectionism across the global economy may only increase the vulnerability of a disunited Africa. Its fractured internal market means that trade within Africa is lower than for any other region on the globe, with intra-African trade just 18 per cent of overall exports, as compared to 70 per cent in Europe.

The AfCFTA is the continent’s tool to address the disparity between Africa’s growing economic significance and its peripheral place in the global trade system, to build a bridge between present fragmentation and future prosperity. It is an ambitious, comprehensive agreement covering trade in goods, services, investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy. It has been signed by all of Africa’s states with the exception of Eritrea.

It is the AU's Agenda 2063 flagship project, brought about by the decisions taken at the January 2012 African Union Summit to boost intra-African trade and to fast track the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area. It builds upon ambitions enshrined in successive agreements including the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty. Access to new regional markets and reduced non-tariff barriers are intended to help companies scale up, driving job creation and poverty reduction, as well as attracting inward investment to even Africa’s smaller economies.

The signing in 2018 of the instruments governing the Single Air Transport Market and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment provided another step towards the gradual elimination of barriers to the movement of goods, services and people within the continent.

Tests to come

However, while progress is being made towards the ratification of the AfCFTA, much remains to be done before African countries can fully trade under its terms. The framework for implementation is still under development, and the creation of enabling infrastructure that is critical for connectivity will take time to develop and requires extensive investment.

So, the first test for the AfCFTA will be the level to which Africa’s leaders make it a domestic priority, and whether a consensus can be maintained across the AU’s member states as the costs of implementation become clear.

There is no guarantee that the gains of free trade will be evenly distributed. They will mainly depend on the extent to which countries embrace industrialization, liberalization of their markets and opening of their borders for free movement of goods and people – policies that some incumbent leaders may be reluctant to implement. Political will to maintain a unified negotiating position with diverse stakeholders, including the private sector, will come under increasing stress.  

A second challenge is how the AfCFTA relates to already existing trade arrangements, notably with the EU.  The AU has long preferred to pursue a continent-to-continent trading arrangement instead of the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements being sought by the EU under the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) framework to which, with the exception of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa, all African states belong. The signing of the AfCFTA is one important step towards making this possible.

But there are currently negotiations under the ACP to replace the Cotonou Accord (the framework governing trade between ACP members and the EU, including Economic Partnership Agreements [EPAs], that is due to expire in 2020). Negotiations on the African pillar of the accord are due to take place after the AfCFTA has entered into force. So African states and the AU will face the challenge of balancing their commitment to the ACP bloc with pursuing their own interests.

And though the AfCFTA should supersede any other agreements, the EPAs or their successors, will continue to govern day-to-day trading, in parallel to the new pan-African market. It is not yet clear how these contradictions will be reconciled.

A new role for the AU?

The AU will need to play an active role as the main interlocutor with Africa´s international trading partners, with the AfCFTA secretariat being the arbiter of internal tensions and trade disputes. The AU´s engagement at continental level has to date revolved mainly around headline political diplomacy, security and peacekeeping. With the continental free market becoming a reality, an effective pivot to economic diplomacy will be critical for growth and development.

With the AfCFTA, the AU has endeavoured to address Africa’s unsustainable position in global trade, to stimulate growth, economic diversification and jobs for its growing population. Much will depend on the commitment of African leaders to maintaining a unified negotiating position to implement the agreement and the AU’s capacity to effectively move from political to economic diplomacy.

Theresa May’s announcement in 2018 on the UK’s ambition to become the G7’s largest investor in Africa by 2022 has been followed by similar stated ambitions at the recent UK-Africa Investment Summit, which saw the attendance of 16 African heads of states. Such ambitions mirror overtures from various international players including a call for a ‘comprehensive strategy for Africa’ by the EU in 2019. While the UK’s recent expansion of its diplomatic networks in Africa and the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement with the Southern African Customs Union and Mozambique appear promising, there are significant challenges to deepening partnerships including visa restrictions and complex business environments.
 
At this event, the panellists will assess the future of trade and investment relations between the UK and Africa. Amid a proliferation of new trading partners including Asia’s emerging economies, Russia and the Gulf states, what are the points of change and continuity in the long-standing relationship between Africa and the UK? And what are the challenges and opportunities facing governments and businesses in Africa and the UK in efforts to build long-lasting economic ties?
 
This event will be followed by a drinks reception.

This event is open to Chatham House Corporate Members and corporate contacts of Chatham House's Africa Programme only.

Not a member? Find out more. For further information on the different types of Chatham House events, visit Our Events Explained.

 

 

In this article, we examine China's promotion of the renminbi (RMB) in international oil trade and explore its implications for the international currency system in the short and the long term. The article traces the rise of the RMB in international oil trade in recent years and provides an analysis of its impact on the internationalization of the Chinese currency. We argue that despite the increasing use of the yuan in oil trade in recent years, in the short term it is highly unlikely that a petro-RMB system will emerge to rival the petrodollar system. Unlike the petrodollar, which combines the qualities of a master currency, a top currency and a negotiated currency, China lacks the economic leadership and the political and geopolitical leverages to make the RMB a major petrocurrency. Although the emergence of the RMB-denominated Shanghai oil futures is an important development, the absence of highly developed financial markets and a strong legal system in China hinders its potential. In the long run, the RMB may take on a more prominent role in the international oil trade as China's weight as an oil importer rises. More importantly, the overuse of financial sanctions by the US government has begun to undermine the role of the dollar within and beyond the oil trade. In addition, the rise of alternative energy sources will diminish the centrality of oil in the world economy, thus reducing the significance of petrocurrencies—whether the dollar or the RMB—in shaping the international currency system.

In the five months since the last extension of the Brexit deadline, the questions about the UK’s trading relationship with the EU remain as open as before, as do those about what sort of relationship it should seek with other partners.

The world has not stood still, however, and so the UKTPO is convening another panel to consider constructive ways of moving forward. The panel will discuss potential trajectories for UK trade policy, followed by a question and answer session.

The UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) is a partnership between Chatham House and the University of Sussex which provides independent expert comment on, and analysis of, trade policy proposals for the UK as well as training for British policymakers through tailored training packages.

At this event, which forms the second annual UK Trade Policy Observatory conference, there will be six presentations over the course of the day before concluding with a panel discussion and Q&A. This year’s conference will focus on the following legal areas of trade policy:

• Blockchain: Creating and Eliminating Trade in Services
• China's Role in the International Trading System
• Official Export Support: Compliance and Competition Concerns
• Strategic Litigation and Health Regulation: Implications for International Economic Law
• Development, Labour Standards and Sustainability in Trade Agreements
• Retaining Versus Reforming EU Food Safety Legislation: Selected Issues for a US-UK Trade Negotiation

To register for this event, please click here. 

The upcoming UK general election is arguably a 'Brexit election', and as such, whoever wins the election will have little time to get their strategy for Brexit up and running to meet the new Brexit deadline of 31 January 2020. But what are the political parties’ policies for the UK's future trade? This event will present and discuss what the five main parties’ manifestos imply for future UK trade. Each manifesto will be presented and analysed by a fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) and will be followed by a Q&A session. 

The entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on 30 May, after only three years of negotiations, is an economic, political and diplomatic milestone for the African Union (AU) and its member states, crucial for economic growth, job creation, and making Africa a meaningful player in international trade. But the continent will have to work together to ensure that the potential benefits are fully realized.

A necessary innovation

With its advances in maintaining peace and security, abundant natural resources, high growth rates, improved linkages to global supply chains and a youthful population, Africa is emerging as a new global centre of economic growth, increasingly sought after as a partner by the world’s biggest economies. Governments from across Africa have been taking a more assertive role in international markets, including through proactive diversification of trading partners, and the continent remains a strong advocate for the multilateral trading system.

However, this is not yet reflected in outcomes. The African Union does not have observer status at the World Trade Organization, despite diplomatic efforts in the past decade. Africa has less than a three per cent share of global trade, and the growing trend towards protectionism across the global economy may only increase the vulnerability of a disunited Africa. Its fractured internal market means that trade within Africa is lower than for any other region on the globe, with intra-African trade just 18 per cent of overall exports, as compared to 70 per cent in Europe.

The AfCFTA is the continent’s tool to address the disparity between Africa’s growing economic significance and its peripheral place in the global trade system, to build a bridge between present fragmentation and future prosperity. It is an ambitious, comprehensive agreement covering trade in goods, services, investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy. It has been signed by all of Africa’s states with the exception of Eritrea.

It is the AU's Agenda 2063 flagship project, brought about by the decisions taken at the January 2012 African Union Summit to boost intra-African trade and to fast track the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area. It builds upon ambitions enshrined in successive agreements including the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty. Access to new regional markets and reduced non-tariff barriers are intended to help companies scale up, driving job creation and poverty reduction, as well as attracting inward investment to even Africa’s smaller economies.

The signing in 2018 of the instruments governing the Single Air Transport Market and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment provided another step towards the gradual elimination of barriers to the movement of goods, services and people within the continent.

Tests to come

However, while progress is being made towards the ratification of the AfCFTA, much remains to be done before African countries can fully trade under its terms. The framework for implementation is still under development, and the creation of enabling infrastructure that is critical for connectivity will take time to develop and requires extensive investment.

So, the first test for the AfCFTA will be the level to which Africa’s leaders make it a domestic priority, and whether a consensus can be maintained across the AU’s member states as the costs of implementation become clear.

There is no guarantee that the gains of free trade will be evenly distributed. They will mainly depend on the extent to which countries embrace industrialization, liberalization of their markets and opening of their borders for free movement of goods and people – policies that some incumbent leaders may be reluctant to implement. Political will to maintain a unified negotiating position with diverse stakeholders, including the private sector, will come under increasing stress.  

A second challenge is how the AfCFTA relates to already existing trade arrangements, notably with the EU.  The AU has long preferred to pursue a continent-to-continent trading arrangement instead of the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements being sought by the EU under the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) framework to which, with the exception of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa, all African states belong. The signing of the AfCFTA is one important step towards making this possible.

But there are currently negotiations under the ACP to replace the Cotonou Accord (the framework governing trade between ACP members and the EU, including Economic Partnership Agreements [EPAs], that is due to expire in 2020). Negotiations on the African pillar of the accord are due to take place after the AfCFTA has entered into force. So African states and the AU will face the challenge of balancing their commitment to the ACP bloc with pursuing their own interests.

And though the AfCFTA should supersede any other agreements, the EPAs or their successors, will continue to govern day-to-day trading, in parallel to the new pan-African market. It is not yet clear how these contradictions will be reconciled.

A new role for the AU?

The AU will need to play an active role as the main interlocutor with Africa´s international trading partners, with the AfCFTA secretariat being the arbiter of internal tensions and trade disputes. The AU´s engagement at continental level has to date revolved mainly around headline political diplomacy, security and peacekeeping. With the continental free market becoming a reality, an effective pivot to economic diplomacy will be critical for growth and development.

With the AfCFTA, the AU has endeavoured to address Africa’s unsustainable position in global trade, to stimulate growth, economic diversification and jobs for its growing population. Much will depend on the commitment of African leaders to maintaining a unified negotiating position to implement the agreement and the AU’s capacity to effectively move from political to economic diplomacy.