The MENA uprisings: Five years on, what role is civil society playing? 31 October 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Online

Panellists examine the protest movements’ legacies in different context and how civil society continues to work towards positive change.

Five years after nation-wide protests in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan demanded systemic changes and political reforms, the situation remains largely unchanged. In some cases, it has deteriorated. Sudan is facing a humanitarian catastrophe amidst an ongoing civil war. Lebanon is dealing with Israeli aggression amidst a severe economic crisis with little response from the caretaker government. In Iraq and Algeria, relative stability masks the reality of increased suppression of dissent. This preservation of the status quo supports the entrenched political structures that strive to uphold it.

The current absence of large-scale street protests in these countries should not be taken as an indication that populations are content with the status quo. The issues that ignited the initial uprisings remain and in many cases have worsened. Despite enormous challenges, activists continue to navigate their systems to survive and instigate change. In the face of increasing difficulties, they are raising awareness of their countries’ predicaments and are finding alternative economic solutions. Additionally they are mobilizing community support, and pushing to voice their disillusionment. All these efforts aim at actively participating in shaping decisions that determines their future.

This webinar explores:

• What has been the impact of the uprisings in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan?
• How are civil society and activists contributing to change within their communities?
• What is the current landscape for civic engagement within the politics, society and economy in these countries?
• What prospects are there for solidarity and cooperation among civil society actors across these regions and beyond?

Harris and Trump's shared goal masks a fundamental AI policy divide Expert comment rgold.drupal 3 November 2024

Both presidential candidates will pursue US tech dominance but differ on the means to achieve it.

There remain some differences between the US presidential candidates’ positions on the governance of artificial intelligence and other emerging technology, notably around competition. 

But under either future administration, US decision-making looks set to be heavily influenced by growing securitization, the aims of the US technology industry and broader competition with China. 

‘Safe’ AI development 

Vice President Kamala Harris attended the inaugural Global AI Safety summit in the UK in 2023, where she announced President Joe Biden’s Executive Order on AI. This significant move by the federal government sought to define national and cyber security guidelines for AI developers and outline privacy and transparency guarantees. It also committed the federal government to a review of the National Security implications of this emerging technology, which was published last week.

In her remarks at the summit, Harris was clear that her definitions of safety extended beyond catastrophic risk mitigation to societal and personal harm. She noted the corrosive effects of some algorithmic decision-making and disinformation on democracy, appealing for AI that is developed ‘in the service of the public interest’.

A number of initiatives developed during the Biden administration have attempted to steer emerging technology as it takes root in society. This includes the establishment of the US AI Safety Institute, various schemes on global AI governance and investment in Public AI projects like the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR).

The US public is largely supportive: polling by the AI Policy Institute (AIPI) points to a majority preference for safety standards governing the US effort to lead in AI, rather than pedal-to-the-metal development. Investment in public options on AI and the infrastructure required to develop and sustain it is a bold direction that the incoming administration should consider expanding.

Biden’s Executive Order on AI has come under fire by the Trump campaign. At a rally in Iowa, Trump explained that he would cancel the order ‘on day one’, echoing a Republican platform that described it as imposing ‘Radical Leftwing ideas’ . 

Trump does, however, have his own track record in technology policy. During his first presidency, his administration passed an Executive Order on AI, stressing that ‘continued American leadership in Artificial Intelligence is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national security of the United States’. The tools and institutions announced as part of the order – including AI research investment, national AI research institutes and AI regulatory guidance including on federal use of AI – echo those of the current administration. 

Four years is a long time in AI, however. As the power of this technology is revealed, talk of safety may give way to talk of security. While the candidates may disagree on the role of the federal government in setting standards, there will be close alignment on the central need for US supremacy in national security. Neither administration seems likely to erect barriers to securitization of AI should it emerge as a critical strategic asset.

AI regulation at home 

American industry will remain the pivotal force shaping the US AI ecosystem, particularly as America jostles for position as the maker of the global rules governing AI. A notable aspect of Biden’s AI Executive Order was where it staked responsibility. Reports by AI and Cloud companies on the safety of their tools and infrastructure are sent to the Department of Commerce.

Under Secretary Gina Raimondo, whose star continues to rise, the department has become significantly more engaged with technology companies. In the absence of any other legal authority, AI governance has therefore sat under the purview of a secretary who herself has noted that they are ‘not a regulator’. 

The trend of industry leaders driving the government agenda on AI is replicated in other departments. There was an outcry over the composition of the new Department of Homeland Security advisory panel, the Artificial Intelligence and Security Board, with civil society groups concerned about the preponderance of industry voices: the 22-member panel includes the CEOs of OpenAI, Anthropic, NVIDIA, IBM, AWS, Adobe, Microsoft and Alphabet.

Under a Harris presidency, these trends seem likely to continue. Plus with deadlock in Congress probable, establishing new legal authorities for emerging technology will be difficult. That will likely mean emerging tech governance remains heavily influenced by the Department for Commerce. 

Like Harris, Trump has his allies in industry. While the Biden administration has courted the CEOs of AI companies who have historically spoken out in favour of regulation, Trump’s allies tend towards a more deregulatory agenda. 

Silicon Valley billionaires Elon Musk and Marc Andreessen have backed Trump’s plans to minimize AI regulation, lauding his support for ‘little tech’. They have also backed reported plans for so-called ‘Manhattan Projects’ to develop military technology, stewarded by ‘industry-led’ agencies. Trump’s aversion to strong regulatory institutions may mean an end to Biden’s anti-trust efforts, benefitting the biggest voices in the room, though his VP pick may disagree. JD Vance has somewhat surprisingly come out strongly in defence of the current chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, and her anti-trust efforts targeting US big tech.

Regardless, business interests will likely shape either a Harris or Trump administration’s approach as the US grapples with balancing the ambitions of its industry with an increasingly protectionist stance towards its biggest import market, China.

Competition abroad

China looms large in the imaginations of both campaigns. 

The US has signalled to its allies that American AI standards should replace Chinese standards. Export controls on semiconductors were expanded in September this year, with key voices in the industry – notably the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea – describing the restrictions as ‘economically motivated’ despite nominally being tied to national security by the US. 

The break-up of Scholz’s coalition government signals the end of Germany’s old economic model Expert comment jon.wallace 12 November 2024

The coalition could not agree how to fund new support for Ukraine and failed to fully implement the ‘Zeitenwende’. A new government must push through reform.

As Europeans were still processing Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US presidential election, an acrimonious break up occurred 4000 miles east of Washington DC.

Reports had been circulating for weeks about the fragile state of Germany’s ‘traffic light’ coalition government led by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, consisting of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party, and liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP).

The expectation had been that the coalition would hold on for a few more weeks and might even be given a new lease of life by Trump’s re-election. Instead, it collapsed on the day Trump’s win was confirmed. An unusually angry Scholtz announced in a live address that he had fired FDP Finance Minister Christian Lindner, effectively breaking up the coalition.

At the heart of the dispute was the so-called ‘debt brake’ – a constitutional mechanism which restricts Germany’s annual public deficit to 0.35 per cent of GDP. Lindner proposed a set of reforms which were unpalatable to the SPD and the Greens. 

In response, Scholz suggested declaring an emergency, which would have suspended the debt brake. That in turn was unacceptable to Lindner, leading to his sacking by the Chancellor.

Practically, this means the SPD and the Greens are now in a minority coalition, without agreement on the 2025 budget or the votes in parliament to pass it. They also still face the challenge of the debt brake.

A vote of confidence will take place in December, with elections to be held before the end of February 2025 latest.

The end of Germany’s economic model

At the root of Germany’s political crisis is the country’s economic model. For decades, Germany relied on a system that depended on cheap Russian gas, cheap imports of consumer goods from China, high-value exports – particularly in the automotive sector – and the US security umbrella.

With Russian energy no longer viable, the global economic landscape shifting, and Donald Trump on his way back to the White House, that model is no longer workable. And Germany’s economy is expected to contract by 0.2 per cent in 2024 – a contraction for the second year running.

The ‘Zeitenwende’, announced by Scholz in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, should have signalled a turnaround of both foreign and economic policy, given how much the two are interconnected. Yet on both fronts, too little changed.

Germany’s reliance on Russian gas did come to an abrupt end in 2022. And Germany is Ukraine’s second largest military aid donor after the US, while accepting the most Ukrainian refugees.

But the ‘Zeitenwende’ turnaround ended there. Scholz’s coalition government failed to prepare for long-term investment in defence at the levels required by creating an off-budget defence spending fund which would have run out in 2027. The draft budget for 2025 showed defence spending would have been cut, as would support for Ukraine.

Germany has also struggled to turn around its economic woes, with the car industry particularly affected. Cheap Chinese EVs and new energy technologies are competing with Germany’s most powerful companies. Volkswagen, the country’s largest car manufacturer, has announced plant closures and layoffs due to shrinking profit margins.  

To the west, Trump’s threat to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports meant share prices of Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedez-Benz and Porsche all dropped between 4 to 7 per cent following news of his re-election.

To the east, trade tensions between the EU and China are intensifying. Yet rather than choosing to diversify, German companies have doubled down on their bets in China, with German investment in the country rising from €6.5bn for the whole of 2023 to €7.3bn in the first half of 2024 alone – only exposing carmakers further.

Germany’s support for Ukraine

Like French President Emmanuel Macron, Scholz had already been weakened by the results of the European Parliamentary elections in June. With the collapse of his traffic light coalition, the EU’s Franco-German ‘engine’ is now well and truly stalled – until new leadership can be found. This weakness comes at a perilous moment when clear, united European leadership, and much increased funding, is needed to shore up support for Ukraine.

John M. Dietschy
Aug 1, 2004; 45:1375-1397
Thematic Reviews

Chatham House appoints Tim Benton as Research Director for Energy, Environment and Resources News Release sysadmin 30 May 2019

Chatham House is pleased to announce that Professor Tim Benton has been appointed as research director of the Energy, Environment and Resources Department.

Strengthening Our Commitment to the Next Generation News Release NCapeling 9 November 2020

Panel of Young Advisers and Queen Elizabeth II Academy Ambassadors underscore our drive to reach, engage and inspire young people to change their world.

New Chatham House History Examines our Defining Moments News Release NCapeling 18 January 2021

'A History of Chatham House: its People and Influence from the 1920s to the 2020s' will examine the impact on policymaking of our first 100 years.

Implications of post-COVID-19 Restructuring of Supply Chains for Global Investment Governance 14 July 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

As companies rethink and diversify their supply chains in order to enhance resilience, what will this mean for current and future global investment governance?

What are the risks of negative effects on inclusivity and transparency? Does this shift create an opportunity to advance good governance of cross-border investment practices?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

The Future of Investment Dispute Settlement Regimes 30 June 2020 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Is an ‘atomized’ approach to cross-border investment dispute resolution inevitable? Has the multiplicity of mechanisms helped or hindered inclusivity in and transparency in governance? Is there a need for, and scope to, increase the international coordination of dispute resolution mechanisms? If so, what form should it take? What could be the implications for international economic law?

Insights from Climate Policy: Engaging Subnational Governments in Global Platforms 10 June 2020 — 2:45PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

How have subnational governments shaped the global agenda and created momentum on climate change where national and international governance processes could not?

Can these advances be converted into meaningful collaboration channels for policy development? What works, or does not, when it comes to engagement with multilateral negotiation processes? What ingredients are necessary for success? What are the broader implications of these trends for inclusivity and innovation in international governance?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

The Implication of Greater Use of Investment Screening 26 June 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 11 February 2021 Online

What is driving the trend towards greater use of investment screening by nation states and regional economic groupings?

• How is the COVID-19 crisis affecting this trend?
• What will the economic implications be?
• Will this help or hinder inclusivity and transparency in investment governance?
• Is there a role for international safeguards and/or international coordination of national/regional approaches to investment screening?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Expert

Expert

Expert

Expert

Erythromycin-resistance methyltransferases are SAM dependent Rossmann fold methyltransferases that convert A2058 of 23S rRNA to m6 2A2058. This modification sterically blocks binding of several classes of antibiotics to 23S rRNA, resulting in a multidrug-resistant phenotype in bacteria expressing the enzyme. ErmC is an erythromycin resistance methyltransferase found in many Gram-positive pathogens, whereas ErmE is found in the soil bacterium that biosynthesizes erythromycin. Whether ErmC and ErmE, which possess only 24% sequence identity, use similar structural elements for rRNA substrate recognition and positioning is not known. To investigate this question, we used structural data from related proteins to guide site-saturation mutagenesis of key residues and characterized selected variants by antibiotic susceptibility testing, single turnover kinetics, and RNA affinity–binding assays. We demonstrate that residues in α4, α5, and the α5-α6 linker are essential for methyltransferase function, including an aromatic residue on α4 that likely forms stacking interactions with the substrate adenosine and basic residues in α5 and the α5-α6 linker that likely mediate conformational rearrangements in the protein and cognate rRNA upon interaction. The functional studies led us to a new structural model for the ErmC or ErmE-rRNA complex.

L. Oeding
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 227-250.
Abstract, references and article information

A. V. Silantyev
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 75-149.
Abstract, references and article information

Realizing the Potential of Extractives for Industrial and Economic Development 18 October 2018 — 5:30PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Over the past two decades, the extractives industries have risen in importance for many low- and middle- income countries their prospects for economic development and poverty reduction. During a period of rising commodities prices, the development of extractives became increasingly attractive to both governments and companies. There was - and remains - much discussion about their potential to support inclusive development.

However, there are also risks and uncertainties associated with the extractives industries and many things can, and do, go wrong. Fluctuations in commodity prices can be hard to manage and can lead to considerable fiscal pressures. In the longer-term, climate change and the various policy responses to this, will profoundly affect the extractives sector as renewables replace fossil fuels in the global energy mix.

Managing the extractives sectors will therefore remain highly challenging especially in low-income countries where institutions are often weak. This roundtable will bring together some of the foremost academics and practitioners working in the extractives industries and also in economic development to discuss a major new UNU-WIDER study Extractive Industries: The Management of Resources as a Driver of Sustainable Development.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Environmental Change and Emerging Diseases 28 October 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 October 2020 Online

Understanding how environmental changes are directly and indirectly affecting the emergence and spread of disease has assumed global importance.

There is growing awareness that deforestation and land-use conversion, urbanization, human migration, international commerce, and climate change are having significant impacts on human health, but their impact on increasing infectious disease risks has only become more evident with the coronavirus pandemic.

With climate change, and environmental change more generally, disrupting ecologies, and people interacting with wildlife in new ways, it creates the conditions for new diseases to emerge: a better understanding of the health dimensions of environmental change will be critical to managing pandemic risks in future. 

Our event will examine the relationship between environmental change and disease, how these linkages have manifested in historical outbreaks and in the coronavirus pandemic, and the role of environmental policies in minimizing the risk of future emerging diseases.  What can be done to ensure equitable action? What can we learn from our responses to previous pandemics? And will the growing recognition of the diverse risks arising from climate change motivate more climate action?

This event will launch the Energy, Environment and Resources (EER) Programme’s Environment and Society Discussion Series. This series aims to provide a platform to promote interdisciplinary knowledge sharing and policy dialogue to mitigate and adapt to the impacts that climate change, biodiversity loss and natural resource depletion are having on people and communities globally, and on geopolitics, security and international development.

Sign up to find out about more events in this series here. 

What's next for environmental peacebuilding? Lessons learned and opportunities from conflict-affected states 17 February 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2021 Online

 This event explores lessons and opportunities from conflict-affected states.

In the field of peacebuilding, scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of environmental restoration, afforestation and infrastructural renewal for creating the sustainable livelihoods necessary for successful peacebuilding efforts.

Featuring academics writing for International Affairs on environmental peacebuilding in Colombia, Yemen and the Sahel, this webinar discusses the policy implications of the turn to environmental peacebuilding.

This event is part of the Chatham House’s Environment and Society Discussion Series in which the Energy Environment and Resources Programme brings together leading academics and policymakers to discuss key issues in environmental policy.

In particular, this event focuses on the role of environmental peacebuilding in creating sustainable livelihoods. From the impact the destruction of infrastructure can have on poverty as a driver of conflict, to the role environmental peacebuilding can play in bringing communities together by creating sustainable shared spaces of employment, the importance of the environmental livelihood creation is difficult to overstate.

Panellists focus on how policymakers can best encourage inclusive and sustainable livelihood creation and on addressing the key challenges such approaches face in the context of environmental peacebuilding efforts.

Sand: Monitoring and management for a sustainable future 2 March 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the Global Sand Observatory Initiative, this event outlines the sand challenge, what actions are currently underway to address it, and what else needs to be done.

Please complete your registration on Zoom:

After water, sand is the raw material that the world consumes in the greatest quantity. It is no exaggeration to say that fine sand and coarser materials – the medium-to-coarse-grained pebbles, gravel and rock fragments used in construction – are the building blocks of the modern world.

When bound with cement, sand becomes concrete; when mixed with bitumen, it becomes asphalt; and when heated, it becomes glass. Without sand, we would have no highways, high-rises or high-speed trains. Yet sand – which is used here as shorthand for sand, gravel and crushed rock together – is a resource that is both abundant and finite.

In global terms, it is abundant, especially when compared with many other raw materials, albeit often not available close to where it is needed. It is finite in that the rate at which we are using it far exceeds the natural rate at which it is being replenished by the weathering of rocks by wind and water.

Industrialization, population growth and urbanization have fuelled explosive growth in the demand for sand. Precise data on sand extraction are hard to come by and the lack of data compounds the challenge of managing the resource sustainably.

However, the UN estimates that overall extraction could be in the region of 40 billion tonnes per year, driven primarily by construction sector demand. That equates to 18 kilograms of sand each day for every person on the planet and signals how strategically important these resources are for future sustainable development. Post-COVID-19 recovery investment in infrastructure, digital technologies, tourism and other economic activities are dependent on sand resources.

Current efforts to improve the management of sand resources at local, national and global levels are uneven. This is partly due to unique geological features and geography, but also differences in local manifestations of the ‘sand challenge’, national and regional demand for sand resources, as well as capacities to enforce or implement best practice assessment procedures, extractive practices, environmental management and restoration requirements.

We must put stronger conditions in place for a rapid, just and scaled transition to sustainable sand management. But where to focus our efforts for the greatest positive impact?

Daniel A. Goldston, Apoorva Panidapu and Jordan Schettler
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2943-2958.
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Buyang Li, Zongze Yang and Zhi Zhou
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2557-2586.
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Time: 10:00 AM, Location: E1.012 (Hearing Room)

Christian Weiss
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 199-209.
Abstract, references and article information

Ta Cong Son, Tran Manh Cuong, Le Quang Dung and Le Van Dung
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 111 (), 153-165.
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Paweł Hitczenko and Nick Wormald
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5411-5427.
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Ferdinand Ihringer
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5355-5365.
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Frederic Heihoff
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5229-5247.
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