Policies and initiatives to promote U.S. manufacturing would be well advised to take a value chain perspective of this economic sector. Currently, our economic statistics do not include pre-production services to manufacturing such as research and development or design or post-production services such as repair and maintenance or sales. Yet, manufacturing firms invest heavily in these services because they are crucial to the success of their business. 

In a new paper, Kate Whitefoot and Walter Valdivia offer a fresh insight into the sector’s labor composition and trends by examining employment in manufacturing from a value chain perspective. While the manufacturing sector shed millions of jobs in the 2002-2010 period—a period that included the Great Recession—employment in upstream services expanded 26 percent for market analysis, 13 percent for research and development, and 23 percent for design and technical services. Average wages for these services increased over 10 percent in that period. Going forward, this pattern is likely to be repeated. Technical occupations, particularly in upstream segments are expected to have the largest increases in employment and wages.

In light of the findings, the authors offer the following recommendations: 

• Federal manufacturing policy: Expand PCAST’s Advanced Manufacturing Partnership recommendations—specifically, for developing a national system of certifications for production skills and establishing a national apprenticeship program for skilled trades in manufacturing—to include jobs outside the factory such as those in research and development, design and technical services, and market analysis.
• Higher education: Institutions of higher education should consider some adjustment to their curriculum with a long view of the coming changes to high-skill occupations, particularly with respect to problem identification and the management of uncertainty in highly automated work environments. In addition, universities and colleges should disseminate information among prospect and current students about occupations where the largest gains of employment and higher wage premiums are expected. 
• Improve national statistics: Supplement the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) with data that permits tracking the entire value chain, including the development of a demand-based classification system. This initiative could benefit from adding survey questions to replicate the data collection of countries with a Value Added Tax—without introducing the tax, that is—allowing in this manner a more accurate estimation of the value added by each participant in a production network.

Whitefoot and Valdivia stress that any collective efforts aimed at invigorating manufacturing must seize the opportunities throughout the entire value chain including upstream and downstream services to production.

Downloads

• Download the paper

Event Information

The Center for 21st Century Security Intelligence seventh annual military and federal fellow research symposium

On March 1, the seventh annual military and federal fellow research symposium featured the independent research produced by members of the military services and federal agencies who are currently serving at think-tanks and universities across the nation. Organized by the fellows themselves, the symposium provides a platform for building greater awareness of the cutting-edge work that America’s military and governmental leaders are producing on key national security policy issues.

With presidential primary season well underway, it’s clear that whoever emerges in November 2016 as the next commander-in-chief will have their hands full with a number of foreign policy and national security choices. This year’s panels explored these developing issues and their prospects for resolution after the final votes have been counted. During their keynote conversation, the Honorable Michèle Flournoy discussed her assessment of the strategic threat environment with General John Allen, USMC (Ret.), who also provided opening remarks on strategic leadership and the importance of military and other federal fellowship experiences.

Video

• Opening remarks and The future of the All-Volunteer Force
• The next generation of terrorism
• Harnessing technology in the future force
• Keynote discussion: Assessing the strategic environment
• To intervene, or not to intervene?

Audio

• Beyond 2016: Security challenges and opportunities for the next administration

Note: FBI Director James Comey recommended this week that no criminal charges be pressed against presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton for her use of a private email server while she was secretary of state. And Attorney General Loretta Lynch has formally closed the Department of Justice’s investigation. But congressional Republicans—who called Comey to testify before the House Oversight committee yesterday—insist that Clinton’s conduct jeopardized U.S. national security.

As I wrote back in February, when it was revealed that 22 of the emails in question were deemed too classified to be made public: “Hillary's emails (even if they were released) could not do anything more than confirm or repudiate what has already been widely investigated.” I called for distinguishing mistakes from crimes and argued that Clinton’s use of a private email server never put America’s security at risk. 

Due to the renewed relevance of that post, it is re-posted below.

What to make of the recent report that 22 emails from Hillary Clinton's private server, written while she was secretary of state during the first Obama term, contain such highly classified material that they cannot be released to the public? Republicans have seized on the latest news to argue that Hillary Clinton was careless or even reckless in her treatment of national secrets. They’ve thereby challenged her credentials and judgment as she pursues the presidency.

Clinton has acknowledged some mistakes in the use of a personal email account and server when she led the State Department, but her campaign has dismissed the latest news as evidence of a U.S. government classification system run amok that often slaps a top secret label on even the most innocuous of information. 

With the emails at issue now classified, it’s hard to understand the basis for this dispute very well. Who are we to believe? Most people are probably falling back on their preconceived views about Hillary, but it would be nice to find a more objective way to assess the latest news—especially as primary voting season begins.

A hypothetical

I can't be sure what's going on here either. But there have been reports that some of the sensitive emails might have involved the use of drones in certain parts of the world where the U.S. government has chosen not to announce or publicize its use of that technology. 

Let's explore that, on the hunch that it may be what's behind the latest brouhaha. For years, there has been a great deal of media coverage of how unmanned aerial systems, including armed ones, have been used in the broader war on terror. If there ever were any real secrets here, they have been very badly kept. Certainly, Hillary's emails (even if they were released) could not do anything more than confirm or repudiate what has already been widely investigated, in this country and around the world. It seems quite unlikely that she was so careless as to describe any technical aspects of those drones or to otherwise risk the leakage of information that was truly still secret (in the sense that word is normally used in the English language, rather than the way the U.S. government employs it when making classification determinations).

Hillary's emails (even if they were released) could not do anything more than confirm or repudiate what has already been widely investigated.

Imagine a situation in which the United States government wished to use force as part of a broader military operation that Congress had already approved in broad contours, going back to the 2001 Authorization on the Use of Military Force that followed the 9/11 attack. But the employment of force in a particular place was seen as politically sensitive—less so in the United States, where Congress had already authorized the conflict, but in a foreign country, where the government at issue was not willing or able to publicly support America's use of military force on its territory. This could be a situation where the foreign government in question actually had few qualms about the U.S. action, but did still not wish to be associated with them—in fact, it may have wanted the license to complain about them publicly, both to its own public and other nations. It wanted, in other words, to have its cake and eat it too.

In this situation, whether the U.S. decision to accept such constraints on its action was wise or not, it would not be allowable for an American public official to discuss the policy. The actual use of armed force would occur through covert elements of the U.S. government, and under domestic laws governing such activities. 

We would have twisted ourselves into knots to avoid displeasing a foreign government that otherwise might make a huge stink about our using American military power on its territory—and might even retaliate against us in some way if the information were publicly confirmed. Everyone in that country, the United States, and other places would have a strong suspicion of what we were actually doing, but there would be no official confirmation. It's not exactly plausible deniability. Call it implausible deniability, in fact.

In such a situation, as a top official in the United States, Hillary Clinton would perhaps have been an architect of the policy (or have inherited it from a previous presidency). Either way, she would be expected to abide by it, and treat the information as highly sensitive. If she did not do so, that was indeed a mistake on her part.

Distinguishing mistakes from crimes

But if this thought experiment bears any resemblance to what actually is behind those 22 emails, one more thing should also be clear—no major national secret was at risk of getting out because of Secretary Clinton's misjudgment. Her email practice was potentially a mistake, but no high crime, and America's security was never put at risk.

Of course, it's still up to voters to decide how to weigh this potential issue in the panoply of so many others that influence their choices for president. Even if I’m right in my guess about what's going on here, I don’t claim to be in a position to answer that question for anyone.

Event Information

Barack Obama’s presidency has witnessed widespread change throughout Africa. His four trips there, spanning seven countries, reflect his belief in the continent’s potential and importance. African countries face many challenges that span issues of trade, investment, and development, as well as security and stability. With President Obama’s second term coming to an end, it is important to begin to reflect on his legacy and how his administration has helped frame the future of Africa.

On July 19, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted a discussion on Africa policy. Matthew Carotenuto, professor at St. Lawrence University and author of “Obama and Kenya: Contested Histories and the Politics of Belonging” (Ohio University Press, 2016) discussed his research in the region. He was joined by Sarah Margon, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon partook in and moderated the discussion.

Video

• President Obama’s role in African security and development

Audio

• President Obama’s role in African security and development

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160719_us_africa_transcript

Editor's Note: On Thursday Brookings Visiting Fellow, Amb. Norm Eisen addressed the Italian Parliament to discuss ethics in government, highlighting efforts in the US to improve transparency and accountability. In the speech, Amb. Eisen argues that while ethics reform can be difficult, it is an absolutely essentially part of any democratic system.

As Prepared For Delivery

Signora Presidente Boldrini, Madam President Brasseur, honorevoli Parlamentari, fellow panelists and distinguished guests, buon pomerigo. Thanks for inviting me to address the urgent subject of ethical standards in political life. It is an honor to be here in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, in this beautiful and ancient city, to which we Americans owe so many elements of our system of government. And in my town of Washington, DC we also borrowed a lot of your architecture, so we owe you for that as well.

In exchange for all that, as a small form of repayment, I would like to offer some perspectives from the U.S. as you consider the adoption of a code of ethical conduct for the Italian Parliament.

Since we are in the Chamber of Deputies, the equivalent of our U.S. Congress’ House of Representatives, I will start with best practices in that body, based on years of my professional life—too many—spent addressing alleged violations of its codes of conduct, including as a defense lawyer and later as the co-founder of a government watchdog group.

And I think there are also important lessons to be drawn from the new, innovative code of conduct for White House officials we established while I served as the "Ethics Czar" of President Obama. At his direction I helped write that new code, the Obama "ethics pledge," and although I am biased I think it has been effective so far, knock wood, there have been no major White House scandals. So I will talk about the lessons of that code of conduct a bit as well. My reflections are those of a friend and partner nation with plenty of challenges of our own. So I approach the issue with genuine humility in sharing our successes and failures.

I. Government ethics while standing on one leg

So—what is our U.S. view of best practices for the contents of government codes of ethics? In the U.S. and dare I say internationally, there is a pretty well developed set of best practices. In our House of Representatives, for example, our equivalent of this Chamber of Deputies, Rule XXIII is the Code of Official Conduct. It provides rules in four core areas;

• one, for regulating conflicts of interest, that is, situations where personal interests or financial holdings may conflict with official parliamentary duties;
• two, for gifts, particularly those from lobbyists and other persons interested in parliamentary decisions;
• three, for outside employment of parliamentarians before, during and after government service, particularly with lobbyists, a situation which we call in the US the revolving door; and
• four, for parliamentarians’ proper use of official resources, that is, hiring, staff, budget, travel and such.

There is much more detail in our code of conduct, and a few other rules as well, but those four items—conflicts, gifts, employment and resources—are the key. These same four key areas are also at the center of our codes of conduct for employees of our executive branch, as codified in our statutes and regulations, as well as in the Obama ethics pledge.

I emphasize these four key items because, having helped draft one code of conduct, and having often delved into many other codes, I sometimes find that I lose the forest for the trees when working with these codes, that the priorities at least for me sometimes get lost in the detail. So I try to keep the core always in mind, though I should add that the content of any such code must of course be particularized for the circumstances of particular government bodies and jurisdictions. Thus our U.S. House code is five pages long, elaborating on those four core items, and the House Ethics Manual of official guidance for the code is 456 pages long. Our Obama ethics pledge we got onto one page, we were proud of that. And we made everyone read and sign that page. To be fair, we could do that because we built on and added to other rules which already existed, and we did have several pages of definitions and references attached to the pledge.

II. Enforcement and transparency

But a good code is only the beginning. In our U.S. experience, just as important as the code, maybe even more important, is its enforcement. And here is where I want to share some lessons drawn from U.S. challenges in recent years, and how we responded. I am going to add two more items to our check list: enforcement and transparency.

Candidly, even with our parliamentary code of conduct in the U.S., our enforcement has sometime lagged. That is in part because under our Constitution, the ultimate enforcers are the parliamentarians themselves, and so they can at times be understandably reluctant to sanction their colleagues and friends. It's human nature.

For example, from about 1998 to 2004, there was a seven-year truce in filing complaints in our House of Representatives. The government watchdog organization I co-founded helped end that in 2004 by writing a complaint together with a brave but lonely member of Congress who was willing to file it with the House Ethics Committee. The resulting investigation resulted in the discipline of the member investigated, and ultimately helped lead to his party losing majority control of the body.

Out of all of that came a new enforcement tool in 2008, in our House of Representatives, that I strongly recommend to you: the creation of a new, independent entity, the Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE). This is a nonpartisan fact-finding body that investigates allegations from any source, including whistleblowers who might otherwise be afraid to step forward. OCE then recommends action to the parliamentarians who constitutionally maintain the ultimate decision-making power. Most importantly, the OCE referrals become public, allowing press, civil society and voter accountability. As a result, I believe, since the creation of the OCE for our House in 2008, there have been a significantly higher number of meritorious investigations there than in our Senate, which does not have a comparable body. The total is about 46 OCE referrals and about 20 House disciplinary actions versus just four letters of admonition by our Senate in that period. To be fair the Senate is a smaller body—but not that much smaller!

That last aspect of OCE enforcement—transparency, and the accountability it brings from media, NGOs and the public—is the sixth and final point I want to emphasize. In our U.S. parliamentary ethics system we have many transparency mechanisms: asset disclosures that our parliamentarians file, disclosures that lobbyists must make about their activities, information in campaign finance filings, and more.

To explain the value of transparency, I would like to close by turning to one of our Obama White House ethics transparency innovations. Starting in 2009, we for the first time put on the Internet virtually all visitor records of those coming to the White House. It used to be that just to get a handful of these records you had to file litigation and wait for years to know who was coming to the White House, who they were meeting with and what the subject of the meeting was. Now millions of Obama White House visitor records are online, each with a dozen or so basic categories of information: the name of the visitor, the person visited, the subject of the meeting and so on.

Why is that important? I began by referencing the Obama White House's record in avoiding major scandal. I think there are a number of reasons for that, including the President's own integrity and the new code of conduct we put into place. But an important part of that success story has also been the fact that records of White House meetings go on the Internet for everyone to see. That transparency brings accountability from the press, civil society and the public. That transparency and accountability has in turn powerfully reinforced the code of conduct: it has discouraged people from having meetings they shouldn't have, and if you don't have the meeting, you can't get in trouble for it.

So the U.S. view in one sentence: regulate conflicts, gifts, employment, and resource use, with strong enforcement and above all transparency. Thanks again for inviting me to share the U.S. perspective. Grazie!

Part II of the 2015 Brown Center Report on American Education

Over the next several years, policy analysts will evaluate the impact of the Common Core State Standards (CCSS) on U.S. education.  The task promises to be challenging.  The question most analysts will focus on is whether the CCSS is good or bad policy.  This section of the Brown Center Report (BCR) tackles a set of seemingly innocuous questions compared to the hot-button question of whether Common Core is wise or foolish.  The questions all have to do with when Common Core actually started, or more precisely, when the Common Core started having an effect on student learning.  And if it hasn’t yet had an effect, how will we know that CCSS has started to influence student achievement? 

The analysis below probes this issue empirically, hopefully persuading readers that deciding when a policy begins is elemental to evaluating its effects.  The question of a policy’s starting point is not always easy to answer.  Yet the answer has consequences.  You can’t figure out whether a policy worked or not unless you know when it began.^[i] 

The analysis uses surveys of state implementation to model different CCSS starting points for states and produces a second early report card on how CCSS is doing.  The first report card, focusing on math, was presented in last year’s BCR.  The current study updates state implementation ratings that were presented in that report and extends the analysis to achievement in reading.  The goal is not only to estimate CCSS’s early impact, but also to lay out a fair approach for establishing when the Common Core’s impact began—and to do it now before data are generated that either critics or supporters can use to bolster their arguments.  The experience of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) illustrates this necessity.

After the 2008 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores were released, former Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings claimed that the new scores showed “we are on the right track.”^[ii] She pointed out that NAEP gains in the previous decade, 1999-2009, were much larger than in prior decades.  Mark Schneider of the American Institutes of Research (and a former Commissioner of the National Center for Education Statistics [NCES]) reached a different conclusion. He compared NAEP gains from 1996-2003 to 2003-2009 and declared NCLB’s impact disappointing.  “The pre-NCLB gains were greater than the post-NCLB gains.”^[iii]  It is important to highlight that Schneider used the 2003 NAEP scores as the starting point for assessing NCLB.  A report from FairTest on the tenth anniversary of NCLB used the same demarcation for pre- and post-NCLB time frames.^[iv]  FairTest is an advocacy group critical of high stakes testing—and harshly critical of NCLB—but if the 2003 starting point for NAEP is accepted, its conclusion is indisputable, “NAEP score improvement slowed or stopped in both reading and math after NCLB was implemented.” 

Choosing 2003 as NCLB’s starting date is intuitively appealing.  The law was introduced, debated, and passed by Congress in 2001.  President Bush signed NCLB into law on January 8, 2002.  It takes time to implement any law.  The 2003 NAEP is arguably the first chance that the assessment had to register NCLB’s effects. 

Selecting 2003 is consequential, however.  Some of the largest gains in NAEP’s history were registered between 2000 and 2003.  Once 2003 is established as a starting point (or baseline), pre-2003 gains become “pre-NCLB.”  But what if the 2003 NAEP scores were influenced by NCLB? Experiments evaluating the effects of new drugs collect baseline data from subjects before treatment, not after the treatment has begun.   Similarly, evaluating the effects of public policies require that baseline data are not influenced by the policies under evaluation.   

Avoiding such problems is particularly difficult when state or local policies are adopted nationally.  The federal effort to establish a speed limit of 55 miles per hour in the 1970s is a good example.  Several states already had speed limits of 55 mph or lower prior to the federal law’s enactment.  Moreover, a few states lowered speed limits in anticipation of the federal limit while the bill was debated in Congress.  On the day President Nixon signed the bill into law—January 2, 1974—the Associated Press reported that only 29 states would be required to lower speed limits.  Evaluating the effects of the 1974 law with national data but neglecting to adjust for what states were already doing would obviously yield tainted baseline data.

There are comparable reasons for questioning 2003 as a good baseline for evaluating NCLB’s effects.  The key components of NCLB’s accountability provisions—testing students, publicizing the results, and holding schools accountable for results—were already in place in nearly half the states.  In some states they had been in place for several years.  The 1999 iteration of Quality Counts, Education Week’s annual report on state-level efforts to improve public education, entitled Rewarding Results, Punishing Failure, was devoted to state accountability systems and the assessments underpinning them. Testing and accountability are especially important because they have drawn fire from critics of NCLB, a law that wasn’t passed until years later.

The Congressional debate of NCLB legislation took all of 2001, allowing states to pass anticipatory policies.  Derek Neal and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach reported that “with the passage of NCLB lurking on the horizon,” Illinois placed hundreds of schools on a watch list and declared that future state testing would be high stakes.^[v] In the summer and fall of 2002, with NCLB now the law of the land, state after state released lists of schools falling short of NCLB’s requirements.  Then the 2002-2003 school year began, during which the 2003 NAEP was administered.  Using 2003 as a NAEP baseline assumes that none of these activities—previous accountability systems, public lists of schools in need of improvement, anticipatory policy shifts—influenced achievement.  That is unlikely.^[vi]

Unlike NCLB, there was no “pre-CCSS” state version of Common Core.  States vary in how quickly and aggressively they have implemented CCSS.  For the BCR analyses, two indexes were constructed to model CCSS implementation.  They are based on surveys of state education agencies and named for the two years that the surveys were conducted.  The 2011 survey reported the number of programs (e.g., professional development, new materials) on which states reported spending federal funds to implement CCSS.  Strong implementers spent money on more activities.  The 2011 index was used to investigate eighth grade math achievement in the 2014 BCR.  A new implementation index was created for this year’s study of reading achievement.  The 2013 index is based on a survey asking states when they planned to complete full implementation of CCSS in classrooms.  Strong states aimed for full implementation by 2012-2013 or earlier.      

Fourth grade NAEP reading scores serve as the achievement measure.  Why fourth grade and not eighth?  Reading instruction is a key activity of elementary classrooms but by eighth grade has all but disappeared.  What remains of “reading” as an independent subject, which has typically morphed into the study of literature, is subsumed under the English-Language Arts curriculum, a catchall term that also includes writing, vocabulary, listening, and public speaking.  Most students in fourth grade are in self-contained classes; they receive instruction in all subjects from one teacher.  The impact of CCSS on reading instruction—the recommendation that non-fiction take a larger role in reading materials is a good example—will be concentrated in the activities of a single teacher in elementary schools. The burden for meeting CCSS’s press for non-fiction, on the other hand, is expected to be shared by all middle and high school teachers.^[vii] 

Table 2-1 displays NAEP gains using the 2011 implementation index.  The four year period between 2009 and 2013 is broken down into two parts: 2009-2011 and 2011-2013.  Nineteen states are categorized as “strong” implementers of CCSS on the 2011 index, and from 2009-2013, they outscored the four states that did not adopt CCSS by a little more than one scale score point (0.87 vs. -0.24 for a 1.11 difference).  The non-adopters are the logical control group for CCSS, but with only four states in that category—Alaska, Nebraska, Texas, and Virginia—it is sensitive to big changes in one or two states.  Alaska and Texas both experienced a decline in fourth grade reading scores from 2009-2013.

The 1.11 point advantage in reading gains for strong CCSS implementers is similar to the 1.27 point advantage reported last year for eighth grade math.  Both are small.  The reading difference in favor of CCSS is equal to approximately 0.03 standard deviations of the 2009 baseline reading score.  Also note that the differences were greater in 2009-2011 than in 2011-2013 and that the “medium” implementers performed as well as or better than the strong implementers over the entire four year period (gain of 0.99).

Table 2-2 displays calculations using the 2013 implementation index.  Twelve states are rated as strong CCSS implementers, seven fewer than on the 2011 index.^[viii]  Data for the non-adopters are the same as in the previous table.  In 2009-2013, the strong implementers gained 1.27 NAEP points compared to -0.24 among the non-adopters, a difference of 1.51 points.  The thirty-four states rated as medium implementers gained 0.82.  The strong implementers on this index are states that reported full implementation of CCSS-ELA by 2013.  Their larger gain in 2011-2013 (1.08 points) distinguishes them from the strong implementers in the previous table.  The overall advantage of 1.51 points over non-adopters represents about 0.04 standard deviations of the 2009 NAEP reading score, not a difference with real world significance.  Taken together, the 2011 and 2013 indexes estimate that NAEP reading gains from 2009-2013 were one to one and one-half scale score points larger in the strong CCSS implementation states compared to the states that did not adopt CCSS.

As noted above, the 2013 implementation index is based on when states scheduled full implementation of CCSS in classrooms.  Other than reading achievement, does the index seem to reflect changes in any other classroom variable believed to be related to CCSS implementation?  If the answer is “yes,” that would bolster confidence that the index is measuring changes related to CCSS implementation. 

Let’s examine the types of literature that students encounter during instruction.  Perhaps the most controversial recommendation in the CCSS-ELA standards is the call for teachers to shift the content of reading materials away from stories and other fictional forms of literature in favor of more non-fiction.  NAEP asks fourth grade teachers the extent to which they teach fiction and non-fiction over the course of the school year (see Figure 2-1). 

Historically, fiction dominates fourth grade reading instruction.  It still does.  The percentage of teachers reporting that they teach fiction to a “large extent” exceeded the percentage answering “large extent” for non-fiction by 23 points in 2009 and 25 points in 2011.  In 2013, the difference narrowed to only 15 percentage points, primarily because of non-fiction’s increased use.  Fiction still dominated in 2013, but not by as much as in 2009.

The differences reported in Table 2-3 are national indicators of fiction’s declining prominence in fourth grade reading instruction.  What about the states?  We know that they were involved to varying degrees with the implementation of Common Core from 2009-2013.  Is there evidence that fiction’s prominence was more likely to weaken in states most aggressively pursuing CCSS implementation? 

Table 2-3 displays the data tackling that question.  Fourth grade teachers in strong implementation states decisively favored the use of fiction over non-fiction in 2009 and 2011.  But the prominence of fiction in those states experienced a large decline in 2013 (-12.4 percentage points).  The decline for the entire four year period, 2009-2013, was larger in the strong implementation states (-10.8) than in the medium implementation (-7.5) or non-adoption states (-9.8).  

This section of the Brown Center Report analyzed NAEP data and two indexes of CCSS implementation, one based on data collected in 2011, the second from data collected in 2013.  NAEP scores for 2009-2013 were examined.  Fourth grade reading scores improved by 1.11 scale score points in states with strong implementation of CCSS compared to states that did not adopt CCSS.  A similar comparison in last year’s BCR found a 1.27 point difference on NAEP’s eighth grade math test, also in favor of states with strong implementation of CCSS.  These differences, although certainly encouraging to CCSS supporters, are quite small, amounting to (at most) 0.04 standard deviations (SD) on the NAEP scale.  A threshold of 0.20 SD—five times larger—is often invoked as the minimum size for a test score change to be regarded as noticeable.  The current study’s findings are also merely statistical associations and cannot be used to make causal claims.  Perhaps other factors are driving test score changes, unmeasured by NAEP or the other sources of data analyzed here. 

The analysis also found that fourth grade teachers in strong implementation states are more likely to be shifting reading instruction from fiction to non-fiction texts.  That trend should be monitored closely to see if it continues.  Other events to keep an eye on as the Common Core unfolds include the following:

1.  The 2015 NAEP scores, typically released in the late fall, will be important for the Common Core.  In most states, the first CCSS-aligned state tests will be given in the spring of 2015.  Based on the earlier experiences of Kentucky and New York, results are expected to be disappointing.  Common Core supporters can respond by explaining that assessments given for the first time often produce disappointing results.  They will also claim that the tests are more rigorous than previous state assessments.  But it will be difficult to explain stagnant or falling NAEP scores in an era when implementing CCSS commands so much attention.   

2.  Assessment will become an important implementation variable in 2015 and subsequent years.  For analysts, the strategy employed here, modeling different indicators based on information collected at different stages of implementation, should become even more useful.  Some states are planning to use Smarter Balanced Assessments, others are using the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC), and still others are using their own homegrown tests.   To capture variation among the states on this important dimension of implementation, analysts will need to use indicators that are up-to-date.

3.  The politics of Common Core injects a dynamic element into implementation.  The status of implementation is constantly changing.  States may choose to suspend, to delay, or to abandon CCSS.  That will require analysts to regularly re-configure which states are considered “in” Common Core and which states are “out.”  To further complicate matters, states may be “in” some years and “out” in others.

A final word.  When the 2014 BCR was released, many CCSS supporters commented that it is too early to tell the effects of Common Core.  The point that states may need more time operating under CCSS to realize its full effects certainly has merit.  But that does not discount everything states have done so far—including professional development, purchasing new textbooks and other instructional materials, designing new assessments, buying and installing computer systems, and conducting hearings and public outreach—as part of implementing the standards.  Some states are in their fifth year of implementation.  It could be that states need more time, but innovations can also produce their biggest “pop” earlier in implementation rather than later.  Kentucky was one of the earliest states to adopt and implement CCSS.  That state’s NAEP fourth grade reading score declined in both 2009-2011 and 2011-2013.  The optimism of CCSS supporters is understandable, but a one and a half point NAEP gain might be as good as it gets for CCSS.

Downloads

• Download the report

Recently, Brookings has posted two articles commenting on proposals to raise the full retirement age for Social Security retirement benefits from 67 to 70. One revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of how the program actually works and what the effects of the policy change would be. The other proposes changes to the system that would subvert the fundamental purpose of the Social Security in the name of ‘reforming’ it.

A number of Republican presidential candidates and others have proposed raising the full retirement age. In a recent blog, Robert Shapiro, a Democrat, opposed this move, a position I applaud. But he did so based on alleged effects the proposal would in fact not have, and misunderstanding about how the program actually works. In another blog, Stuart Butler, a conservative, noted correctly that increasing the full benefit age would ‘bolster the system’s finances,’ but misunderstood this proposal’s effects. He proposed instead to end Social Security as a universal pension based on past earnings and to replace it with income-related welfare for the elderly and disabled (which he calls insurance).

Let’s start with the misunderstandings common to both authors and to many others. Each writes as if raising the ‘full retirement age’ from 67 to 70 would fall more heavily on those with comparatively low incomes and short life expectancies. In fact, raising the ‘full retirement age’ would cut Social Security Old-Age Insurance benefits by the same proportion for rich and poor alike, and for people whose life expectancies are long or short. To see why, one needs to understand how Social Security works and what ‘raising the full retirement age’ means.

People may claim Social Security retirement benefits starting at age 62. If they wait, they get larger benefits—about 6-8 percent more for each year they delay claiming up to age 70. Those who don’t claim their benefits until age 70 qualify for benefits -- 77 percent higher than those with the same earnings history who claim at age 62. The increments approximately compensate the average person for waiting, so that the lifetime value of benefits is independent of the age at which they claim. Mechanically, the computation pivots on the benefit payable at the ‘full retirement age,’ now age 66, but set to increase to age 67 under current law. Raising the full retirement age still more, from 67 to 70, would mean that people age 70 would get the same benefit payable under current law at age 67. That is a benefit cut of 24 percent. Because the annual percentage adjustment for waiting to claim would be unchanged, people who claim benefits at any age, down to age 62, would also receive benefits reduced by 24 percent.

In plain English, ‘raising the full benefit age from 67 to 70' is simply a 24 percent across-the-board cut in benefits for all new claimants, whatever their incomes and whatever their life-expectancies.

Thus, Robert Shapiro mistakenly writes that boosting the full-benefit age would ‘effectively nullify Social Security for millions of Americans’ with comparatively low life expectancies. It wouldn’t. Anyone who wanted to claim benefits at age 62 still could. Their benefits would be reduced. But so would benefits of people who retire at older ages.

Equally mistaken is Stuart Butler’s comment that increasing the full-benefit age from 67 to 70 would ‘cut total lifetime retirement benefits proportionately more for those on the bottom rungs of the income ladder.’ It wouldn’t. The cut would be proportionately the same for everyone, regardless of past earnings or life expectancy.

Both Shapiro and Butler, along with many others including my other colleagues Barry Bosworth and Gary Burtless, have noted correctly that life expectancies of high earners have risen considerably, while those of low earners have risen little or not at all. As a result, the lifetime value of Social Security Old-Age Insurance benefits has grown more for high- than for low-earners. That development has been at least partly offset by trends in Social Security Disability Insurance, which goes disproportionately to those with comparatively low earnings and life expectancies and which has been growing far faster than Old-Age Insurance, the largest component of Social Security.

But even if the lifetime value of all Social Security benefits has risen faster for high earners than for low earners, an across the board cut in benefits does nothing to offset that trend. In the name of lowering overall Social Security spending, it would cut benefits by the same proportion for those whose life expectancies have risen not at all because the life expectancy of others has risen. Such ‘evenhandeness’ calls to mind Anatole France’s comment that French law ‘in its majestic equality, ...forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in streets, or steal loaves of bread.’

Faulty analyses, such as those of Shapiro and Butler, cannot conceal a genuine challenge to policy makers. Social Security does face a projected, long-term funding shortfall. Trends in life expectancies may well have made the system less progressive overall than it was in the past. What should be done?

For starters, one needs to recognize that for those in successive age cohorts who retire at any given age, rising life expectancy does not lower, but rather increases their need for Social Security retirement benefits because whatever personal savings they may have accumulated gets stretched more thinly to cover more retirement years.

For those who remain healthy, the best response to rising longevity may be to retire later. Later retirement means more time to save and fewer years to depend on savings. Here is where the wrong-headedness of Butler’s proposal, to phase down benefits for those with current incomes of $25,000 or more and eliminate them for those with incomes over $100,000, becomes apparent. The only source of income for full retirees is personal savings and, to an ever diminishing degree, employer-financed pensions. Converting Social Security from a program whose benefits are based on past earnings to one that is based on current income from savings would impose a tax-like penalty on such savings, just as would a direct tax on those savings. Conservatives and liberals alike should understand that taxing something is not the way to encourage it.

Still, working longer by definition lowers retirement income needs. That is why some analysts have proposed raising the age at which retirement benefits may first be claimed from age 62 to some later age. But this proposal, like across-the-board benefit cuts, falls alike on those who can work longer without undue hardship and on those in physically demanding jobs they can no longer perform, those whose abilities are reduced, and those who have low life expectancies. This group includes not only blue-collar workers, but also many white-collar employees, as indicated by a recent study of the Boston College Retirement Center. If entitlement to Social Security retirement benefits is delayed, it is incumbent on policymakers to link that change to other ‘backstop’ policies that protect those for whom continued work poses a serious burden. It is also incumbent on private employers to design ways to make workplaces friendlier to an aging workforce.

The challenge of adjusting Social Security in the face of unevenly distributed increases in longevity, growing income inequality, and the prospective shortfall in Social Security financing is real. The issues are difficult. But solutions are unlikely to emerge from confusion about the way Social Security operates and the actual effects of proposed changes to the program. And it will not be advanced by proposals that would bring to Social Security the failed Vietnam War strategy of destroying a village in order to save it.