Power Sector Transformation, New Market Dynamics and Geopolitical Implications 7 November 2018 — 8:00AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 6 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The global electricity sector is experiencing profound change due to a confluence of technological innovation, environmental policies and regulatory reform. The effect is most obvious in the EU28, Australia and parts of North America.

However, this is just the beginning and the success of the next phase of electricity sector transformations hinges on enhancing system flexibility to facilitate unhindered low-cost deployment of renewables. It remains to be seen how utilities will seek to navigate this second phase of electricity transformations.

This session starts with a presentation and discussion that focuses on:

• Public and private sector risks of the transformation of the power sector, changes in generation mix and their implications for supply chain, employments and investment patterns.
• The role of government and the regulatory framework in light of changing market structure, new entrants and big data.
• Wider geopolitical issues including the implication for fossil fuel producers and the rise in demand for new materials and changes in land use.
• The possible implications on the power sector on the electrification of heat and transport.

The discussion then moves to the speed of transformation and what this means for existing and new market actors.

The Future of Food Post-Brexit 26 February 2019 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

For almost half a century, the UK’s food system – comprising the totality of food production, transport, manufacturing, retailing and consumption – has been intrinsically and intricately linked to its membership of the European Community and, subsequently, the EU. Arguably, for no other sectors are the challenges and opportunities of Brexit as extensive as they are for UK food and agriculture.

Reforming the UK’s food system won’t be easy. The tight Brexit timeline, the complexities of negotiations and the political pressure to secure new trade deals could lead to decisions that are poorly conceived and become near impossible to correct.

This event will explore the challenges of the UK’s ‘just in time’ food system which only maintains 5-10 days’ worth of groceries country-wide, what the impacts of structural changes will be post-Brexit such as longer inspections of food imports at the border and what the main priorities for policymakers should be in the event of a no-deal Brexit to ensure the country’s food-stock can satisfy demand.

Plant-based 'Meat' and Cultured Meat: Revolutionizing the Livestock Sector 10 April 2019 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 March 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Consensus is building across the scientific, environmental and public health communities that a radical shift away from excessive meat-eating patterns is urgently needed to tackle the unsustainability of the livestock sector. Recognizing the scale of the challenge ahead, public policymakers, civil society and innovators have increasingly sought to prompt shifts in consumer food choices – away from the most resource-intensive meat products and towards more sustainable alternatives.

Meat analogues – plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat also known as ‘lab-grown’ meat – mark a departure from traditional meat alternatives. Both are intended to be indistinguishable from – and in the case of cultured meat biologically equivalent to – animal-derived meat and are marketed principally at meat-eaters. Innovation and investment in meat analogues have increased significantly, but the direction and pace of growth in the meat analogue industry will depend upon a multitude of factors, including public acceptance, civil society support and incumbent industry responses.

This event will explore the challenges of scaling up production and generating demand for meat alternatives. It will also look at the ways policymakers in the UK and EU can impact the direction of the industry while examining what factors will influence consumer acceptance of plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat as substitutes for animal-derived meat.

Mining, Minerals and Metals Expert Roundtable: Forest-Smart Mining Report Launch 10 May 2019 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Driven to Extraction: Can Sand Mining be Sustainable? 5 June 2019 — 1:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation: Power of Siberia I and II and Implications for Global LNG Supplies 27 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

In a new event in the Sustainable Transitions series, the speaker will present an update of Sino-Russian gas cooperation.

To give a comprehensive account of their impact on global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, he will discuss the following points:

• Gas is scheduled to start flowing from the Power of Siberia I (POS) on 2 December 2019. But what is the background of development of POS 1 and what is its current status and prospects?
• What are the chances of exporting gas through the proposed Altai pipeline? Why is the Mongolia export route so significant? And how will it affect the Central Asian Republics and in particular Turkmenistan’s gas export to China?
• What are the implications of both POS I and Altai gas via Mongolia route in the context of global LNG supply?
• What are the prospects for multilateral pipeline gas cooperation in northeast Asia?
• What are the implications for other Arctic onshore LNG supply, in particular, for Novatek’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 1 and 2 to China on top of POS 1 and Altai gas?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Net Zero and Beyond: What Role for Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage? 23 January 2020 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 6 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

In the context of the feasibility of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to net zero, policymakers are beginning to pay more attention to options for removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. A wide range of potential carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options are currently being discussed and modelled though the most prominent among them are bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and afforestation and reforestation.

There are many reasons to question the reliance on BECCS assumed in the models including the carbon balances achievable, its substantial needs for land, water and other inputs and technically and economically viable carbon capture and storage technologies.

This meeting will examine the potentials and challenges of BECCS in the context of other CDR and emissions abatement options. It will discuss the requisite policy and regulatory frameworks to minimize sustainability and socio-political risks of CDR approaches while also avoiding overshooting climate goals.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Environmental Change and Emerging Diseases 28 October 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 October 2020 Online

Understanding how environmental changes are directly and indirectly affecting the emergence and spread of disease has assumed global importance.

There is growing awareness that deforestation and land-use conversion, urbanization, human migration, international commerce, and climate change are having significant impacts on human health, but their impact on increasing infectious disease risks has only become more evident with the coronavirus pandemic.

With climate change, and environmental change more generally, disrupting ecologies, and people interacting with wildlife in new ways, it creates the conditions for new diseases to emerge: a better understanding of the health dimensions of environmental change will be critical to managing pandemic risks in future. 

Our event will examine the relationship between environmental change and disease, how these linkages have manifested in historical outbreaks and in the coronavirus pandemic, and the role of environmental policies in minimizing the risk of future emerging diseases.  What can be done to ensure equitable action? What can we learn from our responses to previous pandemics? And will the growing recognition of the diverse risks arising from climate change motivate more climate action?

This event will launch the Energy, Environment and Resources (EER) Programme’s Environment and Society Discussion Series. This series aims to provide a platform to promote interdisciplinary knowledge sharing and policy dialogue to mitigate and adapt to the impacts that climate change, biodiversity loss and natural resource depletion are having on people and communities globally, and on geopolitics, security and international development.

Sign up to find out about more events in this series here. 

Moving Food up the Political Agenda 14 December 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2020 Online

How can food system transformation be woven into high level biodiversity, nutrition and climate forums in 2021?

Adverse impacts on food security are expected to worsen as global temperatures continue to rise. As well as feeling the impacts of climate change, food systems drive it in a number of ways. Not only do food systems contribute more to greenhouse gas emissions than any other parts of our lives, they are also the leading driver of biodiversity loss, the largest cause of deforestation and occupy the most land globally.

On our current trajectory, 1.5°C of warming could become a reality in the next 5-10 years. Transforming food systems to meet climate, biodiversity and food security goals is crucial. If left to continue, food alone could take us over 1.5°C this century – even with maximum efforts in the energy sector.

Unprecedented levels of action to transform food systems is required over the next decade. The coming year is described as a ‘super year’ given the numerous high-level global events taking place that cover climate, biodiversity and food security. The year ahead has also been identified as the final opportunity to bring global commitments in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

What can be achieved in the super year? How can food system transformation be woven into high level biodiversity, nutrition and climate forums during the super year? How can momentum from the super year be built upon, to ensure meaningful action is taken over the next decade?

What's next for environmental peacebuilding? Lessons learned and opportunities from conflict-affected states 17 February 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2021 Online

 This event explores lessons and opportunities from conflict-affected states.

In the field of peacebuilding, scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of environmental restoration, afforestation and infrastructural renewal for creating the sustainable livelihoods necessary for successful peacebuilding efforts.

Featuring academics writing for International Affairs on environmental peacebuilding in Colombia, Yemen and the Sahel, this webinar discusses the policy implications of the turn to environmental peacebuilding.

This event is part of the Chatham House’s Environment and Society Discussion Series in which the Energy Environment and Resources Programme brings together leading academics and policymakers to discuss key issues in environmental policy.

In particular, this event focuses on the role of environmental peacebuilding in creating sustainable livelihoods. From the impact the destruction of infrastructure can have on poverty as a driver of conflict, to the role environmental peacebuilding can play in bringing communities together by creating sustainable shared spaces of employment, the importance of the environmental livelihood creation is difficult to overstate.

Panellists focus on how policymakers can best encourage inclusive and sustainable livelihood creation and on addressing the key challenges such approaches face in the context of environmental peacebuilding efforts.

Climate action and gender equality: Can we close the gap on one without the other? 8 March 2021 — 2:30PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the COP26 presidency, policymakers and experts examine the interrelationship between gender equality and climate action, and highlight innovative examples of policy and practice from around the world.

Marking International Women’s Day, this event organized by the COP26 presidency in partnership with Chatham House, will explore how gender equality and climate action go hand-in-hand. The agreement of the Gender Action Plan (GAP) at COP25 sent the message that the time for gender-responsive climate action is now.

This will be a unique opportunity to hear from policymakers and civil society leaders discussing whether enough is being done, as well as highlighting cutting-edge work around the world and suggesting what the future could hold.

The event will be livestreamed on this event page.

Sand: Monitoring and management for a sustainable future 2 March 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the Global Sand Observatory Initiative, this event outlines the sand challenge, what actions are currently underway to address it, and what else needs to be done.

Please complete your registration on Zoom:

After water, sand is the raw material that the world consumes in the greatest quantity. It is no exaggeration to say that fine sand and coarser materials – the medium-to-coarse-grained pebbles, gravel and rock fragments used in construction – are the building blocks of the modern world.

When bound with cement, sand becomes concrete; when mixed with bitumen, it becomes asphalt; and when heated, it becomes glass. Without sand, we would have no highways, high-rises or high-speed trains. Yet sand – which is used here as shorthand for sand, gravel and crushed rock together – is a resource that is both abundant and finite.

In global terms, it is abundant, especially when compared with many other raw materials, albeit often not available close to where it is needed. It is finite in that the rate at which we are using it far exceeds the natural rate at which it is being replenished by the weathering of rocks by wind and water.

Industrialization, population growth and urbanization have fuelled explosive growth in the demand for sand. Precise data on sand extraction are hard to come by and the lack of data compounds the challenge of managing the resource sustainably.

However, the UN estimates that overall extraction could be in the region of 40 billion tonnes per year, driven primarily by construction sector demand. That equates to 18 kilograms of sand each day for every person on the planet and signals how strategically important these resources are for future sustainable development. Post-COVID-19 recovery investment in infrastructure, digital technologies, tourism and other economic activities are dependent on sand resources.

Current efforts to improve the management of sand resources at local, national and global levels are uneven. This is partly due to unique geological features and geography, but also differences in local manifestations of the ‘sand challenge’, national and regional demand for sand resources, as well as capacities to enforce or implement best practice assessment procedures, extractive practices, environmental management and restoration requirements.

We must put stronger conditions in place for a rapid, just and scaled transition to sustainable sand management. But where to focus our efforts for the greatest positive impact?

From local to global: A roadmap for US climate action 14 April 2021 — 6:30PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 March 2021 Online

Ahead of Biden’s Earth Day Summit, panellists discuss a range of climate issues, from city-level climate management to the international security implications of climate deals.

On their first day in office, the Biden-Harris administration sent a strong message to Americans and allies by rejoining the Paris Agreement. Experienced climate and environmental leaders were appointed to senior leadership roles as part of a ‘whole of government approach’ to climate action.

Although decisive action is welcomed by many Americans and international partners, the divided domestic perspectives on climate and a changed international landscape pose significant challenges.

Ahead of the Earth Day Summit on April 22, an event hosted by Joe Biden to mark America’s formal return to global climate talks, panellists discuss a range of climate issues, from city-level climate management to the international security implications of climate deals.

• How will post-COVID domestic priorities and policy influence the international approach of the US to climate action?
• How will US policy, both foreign and domestic, need to respond to the security and geopolitical elements posed by climate change?
• What actions are needed during the upcoming Earth Day Summit for the US to establish credibility as a climate leader?
• What shape are key debates taking on US-China climate relations ahead of COP 26, and how might climate issues be approached in relation to wider geopolitical tensions?

Prioritizing equity and justice in climate action 30 June 2021 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

London Climate Action Week event: Why understanding equity and justice is essential to the ability to meaningfully inform climate politics.

Citizen-led climate activism is demonstrating the need to think about climate change ‘not just as a problem for science to solve’ but also as a problem of equity, human rights and justice.

The disproportionate impacts of climate change on the poor and the marginalized across the world means that understanding equity and justice is essential for the ability to meaningfully inform climate politics.

Excluding these issues risks ignoring, or intentionally omitting, the consequences of policies, tools and frameworks on those who are most likely to face the severe costs of any climate action or inaction.

In a pivotal year for climate decision-making, this event explores the necessity of equity and justice in climate action and how the world can move the political conversation to one that is more inclusive.

The speakers explore how communities themselves articulate the justice dimensions of climate change and how fairness can create a greener future for current and future generations.

This event is being hosted as a part of Strengthening Climate Diplomacy, a series of events from Chatham House during London Climate Action Week 2021.

COVID-19 and food security in southern Africa 16 July 2021 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa.

Developing climate smart agri-food systems in sub-Saharan Africa is a precondition for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Over the years household food security has been affected by different shocks including climate change and the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

The impact on rural households in southern Africa, in particular, has been significant due to the structure of food systems in the region.

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa and consider how practitioners and policymakers can build more equitable, resilient and better food systems. 

Cities as climate leaders: Progress and ambition 1 December 2021 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 November 2021 Online

This panel discusses the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally.

Cities are critical to tackling the pressing environmental challenges of our time. While they now account for an estimated 75 per cent of global CO2 emissions, cities also offer a unique opportunity for devolved leadership on climate action. At the recent COP26, some significant progress was made in elevating cities’ position on climate action with a flurry of announcements and commitments.

For example, more than 1,000 cities are now committed to the Cities Race to Zero and C40’s Clean Construction Declaration saw multiple cities committing to at least halving emissions from initial construction of buildings by 2030. A raft of financing commitments were also made to improve urban resilience in the face of climate change.

This builds on existing momentum before COP26. Over 50 world cities are now on track to meet Paris Agreement and the Marrakech Partnership is further enabling collaboration between governments and cities within the UNFCCC processes.

Therefore, how we design, build, govern and use our urban places will be a key factor for decarbonization and climate change adaptation.

On the back of COP26, this panel brings together leaders from across urban development sectors to discuss the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally. 

Loss and damage: Where are we now and what happens next? 25 January 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2022 Online

This event discusses the progress of the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations. 

Loss and damage refers to harms and destruction caused by climate change impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation.

While it has gained increasing recognition in international climate change negotiations, turning the concept of loss and damage into tangible action for climate-vulnerable countries has been contentious.

Loss and damage is interwoven with issues of fairness and equity. The issue is highly disputed due to its connection with the historical responsibility of developed countries in causing climate change, as well as associated calls for compensation from developing countries.

At COP26, Scotland became the first government to pledge funds for loss and damage for countries in the Global South. However, most climate-vulnerable countries left disappointed by the failure of the Glasgow Climate Pact to secure the establishment of a dedicated loss and damage financing facility.

Developing countries have made it clear that they will continue to push for a new financing facility in the Glasgow Dialogue, a set of international discussions on loss and damage kicking off in June.

The Environment and Society Discussion Series is hosting two events on loss and damage ahead of that date. This first event outlines the key debates and discuss what progress has been made on advancing the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations to date.

The second event focuses on solutions and possible ways forward, looking ahead to the COP27 negotiations in Egypt later in 2022, where loss and damage is expected to be a high-profile agenda item.

Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK 23 February 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 January 2022 Online

Experts discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives on green taxonomy.

This event will address the controversial additions to the EU green finance taxonomy, including the labelling of some nuclear and gas power sources as “green”. Hear perspectives from the UK, EU and international experts.

The UK has committed to creating a green taxonomy to provide a shared understanding of which economic activities count as sustainable. It should be robust and evidence-based, taking an objective and science-based approach to assessing sustainability.

Technical Screening Criteria (TSCs) for the climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation objectives within the UK green taxonomy will be based on those in the EU Taxonomy. The Government is currently reviewing these and expects to consult on UK draft TSCs in the first quarter of 2022, ahead of legislating by the end of 2022.

In recent weeks the European Commission has proposed controversial additional TSCs for the EU taxonomy, most notably the inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in power generation, which are currently being discussed by Member States and the European Parliament.

The inclusion of controversial power sources not only risks affecting investment and deployment patterns in the net-zero transition, but may also be a threat to the authority of the taxonomy as a whole

Key questions for the UK now include whether and how to address these issues in its own taxonomy, and how to promote a science-based ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions that can lead to robust international standards.

This Environment and Society Discussion Series event brings expert voices together to discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives, and is co-organized with E3G.

A deep dive into loss and damage solutions 8 February 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 January 2022 Online

This second event of our loss and damage series cuts through polarized debate by bringing together international experts to discuss innovative legal and financial approaches.

This event will focus on a deep dive into constructive solutions and progress made to address loss and damage.

Following the first event of this two-part series, ‘Loss and Damage – where are we now and what happens next’, this event focuses on a deep dive into constructive solutions and progress made to address loss and damage.

Loss and damage refers to harms and destruction caused by climate change impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation. While it has gained increasing recognition in international climate change negotiations, turning the concept of loss and damage into tangible action for climate-vulnerable countries has been contentious.

Loss and damage is interwoven with issues of fairness and equity. The issue is highly disputed due to its connection with the historical responsibility of developed countries in causing climate change, as well as associated calls for compensation from developing countries.

At COP26, Scotland became the first government to pledge funds for loss and damage for countries in the Global South. However, most climate-vulnerable countries left disappointed by the failure of the Glasgow Climate Pact to secure the establishment of a dedicated loss and damage financing facility.

Developing countries have made it clear that they will continue to push for a new financing facility in the Glasgow Dialogue, a set of international discussions on loss and damage kicking off in June. The Environment and Society Discussion Series is hosting two events on loss and damage ahead of that date.

This second event convenes a deep dive into the progress and potential on loss and damage solutions, while also examining the hurdles that are still to overcome to make loss and damage support a reality.

The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security 13 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

What are the potential impacts on food and energy markets emerging from the situation in Ukraine?

Russia and Ukraine are key players in global energy, food, fertilizer and mineral markets. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, both the threat and reality of resource flows being reduced drove up global prices, and has impacted the day-to-day life of people and businesses around the world.

Developing and nutrition-fragile countries across Africa and the Middle East will be hit the hardest – Somalia, for example, is reliant on Russia and Ukraine for 100 per cent of its wheat imports and is currently experiencing its worst drought in years.

The potential scale of disruption to food and energy markets increases with every week the war continues. This event launches the Environment and Society programme’s latest briefing paper The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security: Cascading risks from rising prices and supply disruptions.

The panel discusses:

• The political, socio-economic and resource pressures already faced by the international community prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• Direct and cascading impacts on the complex and interconnected energy, minerals, food and fertilizer markets, and policy or market responses that may exacerbate these impacts.
• Geopolitical ramifications that will affect the evolution of the conflict, as well as longer-term international cooperation and security.
• Measures that governments can take to build resilience, both to the ongoing impacts of the situation in Ukraine and to future risks of market disruption and geopolitical upheaval.

What does sustainable agriculture mean? 24 May 2022 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 May 2022 Chatham House and Online

Experts compare and contrast visions of ‘sustainable’ agriculture.

There is growing and unprecedented recognition of the adverse effects of food systems on global warming, air and water pollution, biodiversity, soil, and managing the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. At the same time, concern is rising over the role of climate change itself in compromising food security, supply-chain resilience and food price spikes.

Against this backdrop, the need for agriculture to become more ‘sustainable’ is clear. However, there is little consensus over what that means in practice. To address this, Chatham House is launching a new research paper comparing and contrasting the two most commonly articulated versions of ‘sustainable agriculture’.

The first focuses on sparing land for nature and increasing the productivity of agricultural land while minimizing environmental impacts. The second involves scaling up nature-friendly farming while emphasizing demand-side changes to reduce the overall pressure on land.

• How can we understand the arguments in support of either version and the assumptions and ideologies which underpin them?

• What are the implications of promoting one version of agriculture over the other

• How can policy transform agriculture and food systems?

• What should civil society support as ‘sustainable’ choices?

Climate finance and conflict dynamics on the road to COP27 21 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2022 Online

Stakeholders discuss the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity in climate finance and action.

With climate change, fragility and conflict challenges worsening, the role of international climate finance is more urgent than ever.

From the implementation of climate finance and who it reaches to the rush for renewable energy, the inclusion of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity principles often remain absent from climate finance discussions and planning.

With COP27 around the corner and for the occasion of International Peace Day, stakeholders ranging from government representatives to climate activists discuss their perspectives on the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity as part of climate finance and action.

This event was organized in partnership with International Alert.

Food system transformation: A blind spot for climate and biodiversity action? 20 October 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can COP27 and COP15 accelerate the agenda for sustainable food systems and land use?

Tackling the dual crises of climate change and biodiversity loss requires extraordinary levels of action at an unprecedented speed. Agriculture is the biggest user of land, the biggest source of methane emissions, a major contributor to total greenhouse gas emissions and the leading driver of biodiversity loss.

Anything short of a food system transformation puts climate and biodiversity objectives in peril. However, governments have not yet produced credible pathways and strong policies for tackling our growing ‘foodprint’ – the negative impacts of what we grow and eat.

In advance of COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh for climate and COP15 in Montreal for biodiversity, Chatham House has published a new briefing paper which examines aligning food systems with climate and biodiversity targets.

The paper reviews the climate and biodiversity policy landscape to 2030, with a focus on land-based aspects and the inclusion of food and agriculture. The paper highlights serious conflicts between the impacts of the food system and goals to protect and restore biodiversity and mitigate climate change.

In light of this, opportunities for joined-up action on food, climate and biodiversity are identified, including three key steps for countries to take this decade to produce suitably ambitious and effective policies across the climate–biodiversity–food nexus.

This event brings together leading voices from the international policy arenas for climate and biodiversity to react to the briefing paper and discuss how COP27 and COP15 can accelerate the agenda for sustainable food systems and land use.

What happened at COP27? 23 November 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 November 2022 Online

Is the world getting back on track for staying within a 1.5°C temperature rise?

The COP27 summit closes out another year marked by record-breaking floods, deadly heatwaves and other extreme weather events, on top of global energy and food shortages and a cost-of-living crisis.

Remarkable geopolitical shifts including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have weakened commitments to climate goals and led many to worry that governments are backtracking on their climate pledges.

UN officials have urged countries to show up to COP27 with greater ambition but instead of new pledges, the focus is expected to be on whether countries are following through on commitments made at COP26.

This event explored whether COP27 has met the challenge of truly moving the needle, and whether the world is getting back on track for staying within the 1.5°C temperature rise, or for loss and damage and climate justice.

Our expert panel discusses the summit’s overall success and impact on delivering in key areas: climate finance, mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, nature and biodiversity and the just transition.

This event is part of the Waddesdon Club Webinar Series. The Waddesdon Club is a Chatham House initiative to encourage climate leadership in financial and economic policymaking. Since 2016, it has proved a highly successful forum for convening senior policymakers and leading climate scientists with future leaders in finance ministries, central banks and other public sector economic and financial organizations from around the world.

The initiative is supported by Ikea Foundation, KR Foundation and the Rothschild Foundation.

Duterte’s Victory Is Cry for Help From Those Left Behind in Philippines Expert comment sysadmin 12 May 2016

But large support for mainstream parties and a mature democratic system should keep the country from slipping back towards authoritarianism.

The victory of political outsider Rodrigo Duterte in the 2016 Philippines’ elections is proof that a significant minority of the country’s population feels left behind by its recent economic success and estranged from its political elite. However the results of the elections as a whole suggest that most voters opted for a continuation of the current government’s policies.

Duterte looks almost certain to be inaugurated as the next president of the Philippines on 30 June. The country’s presidential voting system – a single round, first-past-the-post election – delivered victory to a populist outsider with 39 per cent support. Two candidates advocating a continuation of the current government’s policies − the Liberal Party’s Mar Roxas and independent Grace Poe − polled a combined 45 per cent. The long-standing factionalism within Philippines elite politics split the ‘anti-Duterte’ vote.

Changing the conversation

The contrast between Duterte and Roxas could hardly be greater. Mar Roxas is the grandson of the first president of an independent Philippines, a graduate of Wharton Business School and a former investment banker in the US. Rodrigo Duterte is a political outsider with an electoral base geographically almost as far from Manila as is possible to get in the Philippines: the city of Davao on the island of Mindanao.

The story of Duterte’s victory is the story of how ‘Duterte managed to change the national conversation from poverty towards crime and corruption,’ says Marites Vitug, editor-at-large of one of the Philippines’ most popular online news sites, Rappler. In January, Duterte was running fourth in opinion polls but a strategy that positioned him as the only opponent to the Manila elite gave him victory. This is the first time a provincial official has made it to the top job.

The headline figures tell us that the Philippines’ economy has done very well under President Benigno Aquino. Between 2010 and 2014, growth averaged 6.3 per cent per year. That fell to a still-impressive 5.8 per cent last year but is expected to pick up this year and next, according to the Asian Development Bank. Growth in agriculture, however, is significantly slower and rural areas feel left behind. While economic growth is benefiting the majority, inequality is worsening and resentment rising in poor villages. The contrast between the metropolitan sophistication of the Makati district in Manila and life in faraway provinces such as Duterte’s Mindanao is widening.

Ironically the Philippines’ economic success is a part of the explanation for the defeat of the ‘mainstream’ presidential candidates. Crime and corruption may have become more important issues simply because more voters have become better off and therefore more likely to be concerned about crime and corruption than before. It’s also undeniable that Duterte has a record for getting things done. Human rights groups rightly criticize his (at best) tolerance of the extra-judicial killing of alleged criminals but his repeated re-election as mayor demonstrates that many citizens are prepared to accept that in exchange for improved personal security. A surprising number of Manila residents have actually moved to Davao because of its better quality of life.

Traditional power bases

However, the results as a whole suggest a narrow majority in favour of current policies. In the vice-presidential race, the Liberal Party candidate Leni Robredo is narrowly ahead of Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, the son of the eponymous former president. Like Duterte she is regarded as a successful mayor of a well-run city, Albay. Duterte’s running mate Alan Cayetano received just 14 per cent of the vote.

In the senate election, Liberals won five of the 12 seats being contested, with a party- backed independent winning a sixth. The opposition, even with boxing champion and national idol Manny Pacquiao running for the United Nationalist Alliance, won four.

Taken as a whole, the results show the enduring nature of traditional Philippines power bases. The country’s many islands and distinct linguistic and cultural regions are virtual fiefs in which families and big bosses can wield almost total power through control of local authorities, businesses, the courts and security forces.

Threat to democracy?

It’s easy to forget that the election of Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 was originally welcomed as a challenge to the traditional elites of Philippine politics. The same accolades are currently greeting Duterte. Could they presage a return to the Philippines’ bad old days?

This seems less likely. Philippine democracy has matured considerably since Marcos declared martial law in 1972. There is a substantial, and vocal, middle class with experience of mobilizing against ‘bad’ presidents. There will also be pressures from international investors and the Philippines’ treaty ally, the United States, for better governance.

The Philippines will chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations next year. That will put Duterte in the international spotlight as host of several international meetings – including the East Asia Summit attended by, among others, the presidents of China, Russia and the US. Since his victory Duterte has promised to act with decorum in office and declared that his election campaign antics were just a ploy to attract attention. Some leaders in Southeast Asia will use his victory to buttress their arguments against allowing their people to freely vote. It’s up to Duterte to decide whether he wants to be an advertisement for – or an argument against – democracy.

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Twenty Years After Hong Kong Handover, Does ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Still Work? Expert comment sysadmin 28 June 2017

This unique constitutional framework can endure – if Hong Kong society can reconcile its different visions of the future.

Twenty years after the handover of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty, the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement – the main aim of which was to guarantee the continuity of Hong Kong’s open society and way of life – can be said to have worked well. Street protests remain a regular feature of Hong Kong’s political culture. Freedom of information and expression are alive and well. Hong Kong retains its ‘capitalist way of life’, its legal system based on common law and independent judiciary, and its status as an international financial centre. As a result the city remains one of the most open economies across Asia, with robust institutions and transparency which are hard to find anywhere else in the region.

Yet the 79-day ‘occupy’ protests of autumn 2014 showed that something is not quite right in the city of Hong Kong.

The protests themselves had a number of causes. Partly they reflected socioeconomic concerns, especially the rise in income inequality and lack of affordable housing. These might have been dealt with to some extent by better governance over the years, but they are also a feature of many societies in the current phase of globalization – a case, perhaps, of too much ‘capitalist way of life’.

Politically, the desire expressed by many in 2014 was for a form of ‘genuine universal suffrage’ for the selection of Hong Kong’s chief executive which went beyond a provision of Hong Kong’s mini constitution, the Basic Law, that candidates should be put forward by a ‘nominating committee’. It was on this point that the possibility of constitutional reform foundered in 2015, leaving Hong Kong no further ahead in its ‘gradual progress’ towards democracy.

But this episode also brought to the surface the tension between different visions for Hong Kong’s future. In particular, many in Hong Kong are still uncomfortable with the ‘one country’ part of the deal, rejected by some (especially young people) in the ways that they conceptualize Hong Kong identity – according to one recent survey, as little as 3.1% of Hong Kong youths identify themselves as ‘Chinese’. These issues are likely to constrain political development for some time to come.

At their sharpest, some of these visions are for some form of self-determination, or even independence, for Hong Kong. This is not just anathema to the national authorities in Beijing, but contradicts a basic tenet of Hong Kong’s handover in 1997, the return to Chinese sovereignty. This is not just something on which Beijing will never compromise, but will seek to challenge.

It is this which explains the sense in Hong Kong that the central government has been looking to become politically more involved since 2014. But the challenge of influencing Hong Kong society is great, and other than strengthening relations with the establishment camp, Beijing has not been able to tighten its grip. If anything, the centre of gravity of Hong Kong politics has continued to drift away from Beijing, not towards it.

How this will play out remains to be seen. Some amelioration of social tensions could help. But the fundamental divergence in visions of Hong Kong’s future will not be resolved so easily.

Looking forward therefore, the key to the continued success of ‘one country, two systems’ lies in Hong Kong society. If mainstream acceptance of the compromises involved can return, then this unique constitutional framework can still work for years to come.

‘Hong Kong is now in the hands of its people – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now.’ Expert comment sysadmin 29 June 2017

Kerry Brown on ‘one country, two systems’, the UK’s diminishing influence and the territory’s future, 20 years after the handover.

1 July marks the 20th anniversary of the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China. Kerry Brown speaks with Jason Naselli about what the future holds for the territory.

How sustainable is the ‘one country, two systems’ framework? Will the arrangement last the full 50 years (until 2047) as originally envisioned?

It is questionable whether the arrangement that exists today was the one envisioned in 1997 when the handover happened. It was always a very abstract, flexible system, granting Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, meaning it could maintain its capitalist system. Of course, in the lead up to 1997 all these things were broadly seen as being in Beijing’s interests to preserve.

But these days, the one thing that few said in 1997 has come to pass – the People’s Republic has maintained one-party rule as a political system, but become one of the world’s great economies. It has been so far a huge success.

Hong Kong therefore has diminished in importance over the years to the point that maintaining at least some semblance of one country, two systems is almost like an act of charity. It has been nibbled at, compromised and seems to grow weaker by the day. Most in Hong Kong would say there is a system: one country, one system. That’s the deal.

The central government’s deepening involvement in the territory’s politics is a subject of growing controversy in Hong Kong. Does the Chinese government need to alter its approach?

Not particularly. It doesn’t want to see Hong Kong fail as an economy. That doesn’t suit its interests at all. But nor does it want a truculent, disobedient polity that is meant to be part of its sovereign territory.

So it has increasingly set political parameters. Hong Kong can have its unique system – as long as it is obedient. And on the whole, that is the deal that all of the city’s chief executives until now have internally understood perfectly.

As part of the 1997 handover, the UK has ‘a continuing moral and political obligation’ to Hong Kong. How will this relationship play out as Brexit shifts Britain’s place in the world?

The Foreign Office offers a six-monthly report to Parliament, updating on how the handover deal is going. As the years go on, however, it becomes increasingly illusive how the UK has any real locus to say much about the situation on Hong Kong. It did say, rightly, that the detainment of one of the booksellers taken in in 2015 was a violation of the treaty because he was British. This was the strongest wording that has ever appeared from an official British source. But with dependence on creating a new kind of relationship with China now foremost in people’s minds because of Brexit and other economic pressures, it is not surprising that the priority increasingly lies elsewhere.

With direct management of Hong Kong gone, the UK was always going to be more and more irrelevant. That has happened. And in any case, relations with China have had to become more complex and multifaceted. Hong Kong was always the tail wagging the dog for the UK relations with China. Now there has been a rebalancing, the calculation always has to be how much unilaterally supporting Hong Kong will damage relations with Beijing. This has become an increasingly asymmetrical question: in a playoff, preserving links with Beijing will always prevail. That’s just the reality of the new world we are seeing come into being.

Hong Kong has played an important financial role for China over the past 20 years, but where will it fit as markets and financial institutions on the mainland mature?

It maintains is role as a major RMB hub, and as a finance centre. But it is surrounded by competition. Singapore, and Sydney, and other places in the region have RMB deals. Shanghai and Tianjin aspire to be portals for entry to the domestic Chinese market. Hong Kong every day has to think of new ways to maintain its relevance and beat back competition. So far, it has done well. But this is an issue it can never be complacent about.

What has been the most significant change in Hong Kong society since 1997?

The rising cultural and linguistic influence of the mainland on Hong Kong. Hong Kong has maintained its difference – but it has had to change. It is clear that Hong Kong is now in the hands of Hong Kongese – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now. The culture, identity and future of the territory are in their hands. In that sense, they have autonomy.

China, Liu Xiaobo and the New Reality of Human Rights Expert comment sysadmin 18 July 2017

Liu Xiaobo, Chinese Nobel laureate and human rights campaigner, died on 13 July while serving an 11-year prison sentence for ‘subversion’. Steve Tsang tells Jason Naselli that the reaction to Liu’s death reflects the growing confidence of the Chinese government that it can ignore Western criticism.

What does the Communist Party’s handling of the case of Liu Xiaobo tell us about its approach to dissidents and freedom of speech in the Xi era?

What it tells us is the party is tightening control much more than before. The Liu Xiaobo case shows that the party is not comfortable with people asking for the constitution of the People’s Republic of China to be enforced. Charter 08, for which Liu Xiaobo was jailed, ultimately amounts to asking for the rights of Chinese citizens, as articulated in the constitution, to be fully implemented. That resulted in Liu Xiaobo being incarcerated.

But what is really important isn’t so much that the party is tightening its control – that is happening anyway. What is more important is that the party is not that worried about how the Liu Xiaobo case affects international opinion.

If that’s the case, what lessons should countries looking to trade with China but concerned about human rights abuses take from Liu’s case?

We haven’t seen any major Western country come out to strongly and clearly hold the Chinese government to account over Liu Xiaobo’s human rights situation. A few leading governments have asked for Liu Xiaobo’s widow to be allowed to choose to stay or leave China. But so far there is no indication of any government backing that up with anything concrete.

That is very weak support for human rights in China. And it reflects a new reality: of the unwillingness of leading democracies to challenge the Chinese government on human rights matters, and the confidence on the part of the Chinese government to simply ignore what the rest of the world may think about it.

Given that there has been much discussion of China taking a larger global leadership role in the wake of an inward political turn in the US, what are the implications of Liu’s case for China’s global standing?

The implications are really small. There is a stronger expectation and desire to see China playing a global role because Donald Trump has damaged the standing of the United States as a global leader. It is not because of something that the Chinese government has done; it’s because of Trump.

That wider context hasn’t changed. So the Chinese government’s calculation is that the negative international reaction to Liu Xiaobo’s death will blow over in a matter of days – at worst, a couple of weeks – and then things will get back to normal.

There is no serious reason to believe that the Chinese government is wrong in their calculation. At the moment, the major Western countries are focusing on the economic relationship, and doing what they have to do pro forma about human rights issues in China. No major Western government is going to say that they are going to reconsider a major trade deal with China because of how Liu Xiaobo or his family has been treated. The Chinese government knows that and they act accordingly.

Moving on from the international reaction, how does Liu’s situation resonate within China?

Most Chinese don’t even know who Liu Xiaobo is. Within China, you cannot even search Liu Xiaobo’s name, or any permutation of Liu Xiaobo’s name, or the English initials of Liu Xiaobo. Anything potentially about or related to Liu Xiaobo is being censored.

Some things still get through; the ingenuity of a lot of bloggers is infinite. But most Chinese don’t even know what happened to Liu Xiaobo, or if they do, they mostly see him as a shill of the Western world trying to infiltrate and destabilize China.

If Western governments won’t engage China over human rights, what implications does that have for the global treatment of human rights as China becomes a bigger global player?

You can ‘engage’ in the sense of raising the issue with the Chinese authorities, as indeed the UK government and the German government have done, for example. But they haven’t actually taken any concrete steps.

The type of engagement where Western governments would get the Chinese government to demonstrate that something concrete was being done to improve the human rights situation – that era has gone. It is not going to come back in the foreseeable future. And therefore, the situation in terms of human rights in China will not be improving in the foreseeable future.

But what is more significant is how the Chinese government is asserting itself and dealing with domestic and international challenges, including on human rights issues. For many other countries around the world, China is showing an example for how to deal with the West. They don’t see it as being negative; they see it in positive terms.

There are still more countries in the world that abuse human rights than respect human rights. Most of those governments are pleased to see what the Chinese government has done in terms of how it handles the West.

Root Causes of Rohingya Crisis Must Not be Ignored Expert comment sysadmin 28 September 2017

The focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis in Myanmar, whether at the global or regional level.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent speech on the Rohingya crisis was - at best - light on details on how the current situation could be remedied and - at worst - full of easily disproven assertions.

While she does not directly control the military, it is her government that is blocking humanitarian access to the areas affected by the violence. And the Rohingya have faced systemic persecution and discrimination for decades.

Some may argue this is simply realpolitik and that any public support for the Rohingya could mean facing a backlash from the military and a large part of her support base. But arguably, she does have moral authority (which helped her in the past to stand up to the military generals) that is now being eroded by her ambivalence in speaking out.

However, the focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis – whether at the global or regional level.

Undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys

Since the attacks on border and military posts by the armed group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017, there has been a strong military crackdown against the Rohingya in Rakhine state: a substantial number of Rohingya villages destroyed; close to half a million people Rohingya fleeing into Bangladesh and tens of thousands internally displaced within Myanmar.

Prince bin Ra’ad , UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has called the crisis a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and tens of thousands of Rohingya are still undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys seeking sanctuary. In response, the UN and EU have focused on addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh, which is already home to many formerly displaced Rohingya communities.

Within the region, Sheikh Hasina’s secular Awami League government in Bangladesh initially proposed joint military operations with Myanmar against the ARSA - in part because of concerns about the long standing relationship between Rohingya political or armed groups and the Jamaat-e-Islami, an ally of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

However, faced with massive refugee flows, Bangladesh turned its focus to the humanitarian crisis while stressing that Myanmar must allow the return of refugees. Bangladesh’s concern is partly motivated by internal security concerns. If the current situation becomes protracted, with no clear resolution in sight, frustration could create the conditions for further radicalisation within Rohingya communities.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has yet to come to grips with the situation. Despite its mandate to ensure peace and stability within the region, its policy of non-interference and consensus trumps the need to secure and maintain stability. Instead countries have responded bilaterally - for example, Indonesia sent its foreign minister to both Myanmar and Bangladesh while Malaysia has been consistently vocal about its concerns.

So this raises broader questions on the effectiveness of ASEAN. Currently celebrating its 50th anniversary, ASEAN needs to decide how to mediate and resolve issues with regional implications as its principle of non-intervention effectively blocks any constructive discussion on the Rohingyas ongoing statelessness and impact of this on the region.

However, there is also an opportunity here for ASEAN to consider how mediation and negotiation could potentially manage such crises. And there is a historical precedent: the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indo-Chinese refugees saw cooperation between recipient countries in the region and the international community on how to resettle Vietnamese refugees (although Cold War considerations did play a part in that specific crisis).

India and China have both backed Myanmar, reflecting their economic and security interests in the country but also motivated by each wanting to contain the influence of the other within Myanmar. Rakhine is important with its natural resources and coastal location and, as China is not directly affected by the refugee crisis, it has less to lose than others in standing by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government.

India is nearing completion of the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, connecting the Bay of Bengal with the northeast Indian state of Mizoram, and sees Myanmar as an important market for its regional ambitions. For parts of the Indian administration, the crisis plays to a domestic narrative that some of the Rohingya already settled in Jammu and Kashmir have links to armed groups in Pakistan and are an internal security concern.

So while India is providing humanitarian aid to Bangladesh, it is also threatening to deport almost 40,000 Rohingya. The case is currently being heard at the Indian Supreme Court, but given that the Rohingya lack citizenship in Myanmar, it is not clear to where they would be deported.

Myanmar, ASEAN and other affected countries need to show political will to find a solution to the Rohingya’s long-standing issue of statelessness - discrimination was legally formalised in a 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, which recognised 135 ethnicities for citizenship but excluded the Rohingya.

The root causes of this crisis – long standing discrimination, persecution and lack of citizenship – cannot be ignored. There is a need for a comprehensive peace process, which recognises the ethnic and religious diversity within Myanmar.

And incentives, such as improving infrastructure, access to services and livelihoods, may also be needed to ensure there is a lasting solution that allows the Rohingya return and thrive as part of Myanmar society.

Without such a response, it is difficult to see an end to the current impasse.

The Hard Truth Is Rohingya Refugees Are Not Going Home Expert comment sysadmin 6 October 2017

The only likely outcome of the crisis is the near-permanent presence of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya along the Bangladesh border.

The harrowing scenes of human suffering on the Myanmar–Bangladesh border have provoked outpourings of sympathy and some firm statements by international politicians. At least half a million people have been brutally expelled from their homes and are now living in miserable conditions in muddy refugee camps and storm-drenched shanty towns. As the international community debates how to respond, it needs to take a clear-eyed view of the situation and recognise a brutal truth: the refugees are almost certainly not going home.

Consequently, policymakers must not hide behind the fiction that Bangladesh is only temporarily hosting the refugees in preparation for their rapid return home. Over-optimistic assumptions now will lead to worse misery in the long term. Instead, the world needs to plan on the basis that Bangladesh will be hosting a very large and permanent refugee population.

The expulsion of the Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State in northwestern Myanmar is the culmination of decades of discriminatory policies enacted by the country’s military rulers since 1962. In 1978, the Burmese military’s ‘Operation Dragon King’ pushed 200,000 Muslims into Bangladesh. International pressure forced the military to allow most of them to return. Then, in 1991–92, the military again expelled a quarter of a million people. Bangladesh forced some of them back over the border and eventually the military agreed to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to manage the repatriation of most of the remainder.

State-sponsored abuses of the Rohingya and ethnic violence perpetrated against them by chauvinists among the ethnic Rakhine population have continued. The abuse became dramatically worse in 2012 when tens of thousands of Rohingya were forced to flee their homes, although most remained inside the country. This year, armed attacks by self-proclaimed defenders of the Rohingya, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, gave the military an excuse to mount what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’.

It is tempting to believe that, as before, the Myanmar government will allow the expelled Rohingya to return after international pressure. However, recent geopolitical developments in southeast Asia and the election of a democratic government in Myanmar in 2015 make this much less likely.

Southeast Asia is now an arena of geopolitical competition between China and its rivals: mainly the United States, India and Japan. All are battling for influence. Both China and India have made public statements of support for Myanmar’s government in the current crisis. In that context, diplomatic pressure or economic sanctions imposed by Europe or the United States will only have one effect – to push Myanmar towards China.

Moreover, those in the EU and US who want to see democracy survive in Myanmar will be unwilling to push the elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi too far. There is an extraordinary degree of hostility towards the Rohingya among the majority Bamar population. This has broken out into street violence on occasions but even where the situation is calm, anti-Muslim prejudice is easily awoken. The current government is very unlikely to challenge such sentiments at a time when it is trying to preserve its position against the military’s continuing domination of political and economic life.

Myanmar is one of the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations but ASEAN is unlikely to impose any meaningful pressure. Only Malaysia has been publicly critical of Myanmar’s government. Indonesia has attempted to mediate – its foreign minister Retno Marsudi has held face-to-face meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi – but without apparent effect. Both countries have sent aid and volunteers to the Rohingya refugee camps but there is absolutely no talk of sanctions or other overt pressure.

The question then is: what will happen to the refugees? One option could be resettlement, but neither Bangladesh nor any of the other states in the region are willing to take them in. Malaysia already hosts 60,000 registered Rohingya refugees and probably another 150,000 unregistered ones. Unknown thousands of Rohingya have fled to Thailand and Indonesia by boat but have often fallen victim to unscrupulous human traffickers in cahoots with local officials. Thailand has already said it will refuse to allow new ‘boat people’ to land.

The only likely outcome therefore is the near-permanent presence of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya along the Bangladesh border. Delaying preparations for a permanent refugee population in the hope that they will be allowed to re-cross the border back into Myanmar will only make the situation worse. Seventy years ago, another ‘temporary’ movement of people into refugee camps created decades of instability around the Middle East. The world must remember the Palestinians as it plans for the future of the Rohingya.

Artificial Intelligence Apps Risk Entrenching India’s Socio-economic Inequities Expert comment sysadmin 14 March 2018

Artificial intelligence applications will not be a panacea for addressing India’s grand challenges. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is high on the Indian government’s agenda. Some days ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Wadhwani Institute for Artificial Intelligence, reportedly India’s first research institute focused on AI solutions for social good. In the same week, Niti Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant argued that AI could potentially add $957 billion to the economy and outlined ways in which AI could be a ‘game changer’.

During his budget speech, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced that Niti Aayog would spearhead a national programme on AI; with the near doubling of the Digital India budget, the IT ministry also announced the setting up of four committees for AI-related research. An industrial policy for AI is also in the pipeline, expected to provide incentives to businesses for creating a globally competitive Indian AI industry.

Narratives on the emerging digital economy often suffer from technological determinism — assuming that the march of technological transformation has an inner logic, independent of social choice and capable of automatically delivering positive social change. However, technological trajectories can and must be steered by social choice and aligned with societal objectives. Modi’s address hit all the right notes, as he argued that the ‘road ahead for AI depends on and will be driven by human intentions’. Emphasising the need to direct AI technologies towards solutions for the poor, he called upon students and teachers to identify ‘the grand challenges facing India’ – to ‘Make AI in India and for India’.

To do so, will undoubtedly require substantial investments in R&D, digital infrastructure and education and re-skilling. But, two other critical issues must be simultaneously addressed: data bias and access to technology gains.

While computers have been mimicking human intelligence for some decades now, a massive increase in computational power and the quantity of available data are enabling a process of ‘machine learning.’ Instead of coding software with specific instructions to accomplish a set task, machine learning involves training an algorithm on large quantities of data to enable it to self-learn; refining and improving its results through multiple iterations of the same task. The quality of data sets used to train machines is thus a critical concern in building AI applications.

Much recent research shows that applications based on machine learning reflect existing social biases and prejudice. Such bias can occur if the data set the algorithm is trained on is unrepresentative of the reality it seeks to represent. If for example, a system is trained on photos of people that are predominantly white, it will have a harder time recognizing non-white people. This is what led a recent Google application to tag black people as gorillas.

Alternatively, bias can also occur if the data set itself reflects existing discriminatory or exclusionary practices. A recent study by ProPublica found for example that software that was being used to assess the risk of recidivism in criminals in the United States was twice as likely to mistakenly flag black defendants as being at higher risk of committing future crimes.

The impact of such data bias can be seriously damaging in India, particularly at a time of growing social fragmentation. It can contribute to the entrenchment of social bias and discriminatory practices, while rendering both invisible and pervasive the processes through which discrimination occurs. Women are 34 per cent less likely to own a mobile phone than men – manifested in only 14 per cent of women in rural India owning a mobile phone, while only 30 per cent of India’s internet users are women.

Women’s participation in the labour force, currently at around 27 per cent, is also declining, and is one of the lowest in South Asia. Data sets used for machine learning are thus likely to have a marked gender bias. The same observations are likely to hold true for other marginalized groups as well.

Accorded to a 2014 report, Muslims, Dalits and tribals make up 53 per cent of all prisoners in India; National Crime Records Bureau data from 2016 shows in some states, the percentage of Muslims in the incarcerated population was almost three times the percentage of Muslims in the overall population. If AI applications for law and order are built on this data, it is not unlikely that it will be prejudiced against these groups.

(It is worth pointing out that the recently set-up national AI task force is comprised of mostly Hindu men – only two women are on the task force, and no Muslims or Christians. A recent article in the New York Times talked about AI’s ‘white guy problem’; will India suffer from a ‘Hindu male bias’?)

Yet, improving the quality, or diversity, of data sets may not be able to solve the problem. The processes of machine learning and reasoning involve a quagmire of mathematical functions, variables and permutations, the logic of which are not readily traceable or predictable. The dazzle of AI-enabled efficiency gains must not blind us to the fact that while AI systems are being integrated into key socio-economic systems, their accuracy and logic of reasoning have not been fully understood or studied.

The other big challenge stems from the distribution of AI-led technology gains. Even if estimates of AI contribution to GDP are correct, the adoption of these technologies is likely to be in niches within the organized sector. These industries are likely to be capital- rather than labour-intensive, and thus unlikely to contribute to large-scale job creation.

At the same time, AI applications can most readily replace low- to medium-skilled jobs within the organized sector. This is already being witnessed in the outsourcing sector – where basic call and chat tasks are now automated. Re-skilling will be important, but it is unlikely that those who lose their jobs will also be those who are being re-skilled – the long arch of technological change and societal adaptation is longer than that of people’s lives. The contractualization of work, already on the rise, is likely to further increase as large industries prefer to have a flexible workforce to adapt to technological change. A shift from formal employment to contractual work can imply a loss of access to formal social protection mechanisms, increasing the precariousness of work for workers.

The adoption of AI technologies is also unlikely in the short- to medium-term in the unorganized sector, which engages more than 80 per cent of India’s labor force. The cost of developing and deploying AI applications, particularly in relation to the cost of labour, will inhibit adoption. Moreover, most enterprises within the unorganized sector still have limited access to basic, older technologies – two-thirds of the workforce are employed in enterprises without electricity. Eco-system upgrades will be important but incremental. Given the high costs of developing AI-based applications, most start-ups are unlikely to be working towards creating bottom-of-the-pyramid solutions.

Access to AI-led technology gains is thus likely to be heavily differentiated – a few high-growth industries can be expected, but these will not necessarily result in the welfare of labour. Studies show that labour share of national income, especially routine labour, has been declining steadily across developing countries.

We should be clear that new technological applications themselves are not going to transform or disrupt this trend – rather, without adequate policy steering, these trends will be exacerbated.

Policy debates about AI applications in India need to take these two issues seriously. AI applications will not be a panacea for addressing ‘India’s grand challenges’. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures, even making them technologically binding.

In addition to developing AI applications and creating a skilled workforce, the government needs to prioritize research that examines the complex social, ethical and governance challenges associated with the spread of AI-driven technologies. Blind technological optimism might entrench rather than alleviate the grand Indian challenge of inequity and growth.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

The Migration-Deportation-Return Nexus 6 June 2018 — 1:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 May 2018 Chatham House, London

In 2015, the unprecedented numbers of migrants crossing borders subjected the EU to extraordinary moral and political pressure, as the number of asylum-seekers soared 122 per cent to 1.3 million people.

In response, the EU has sought to accelerate the deportation of failed asylum-seekers and migrants who arrive without proper documentation. The European Commission has recommended that “all leverage and incentives” be used to “ensure that third countries fulfil their international obligation to take back their own nationals residing irregularly in Europe.”

The Valletta Action Plan, the EU-Turkey deal, the Brussels Agreement with Afghanistan, the EU deal with Nigeria and the new “results-oriented Partnership Framework” signal more restrictive approaches and an outsourcing of the securitization of migration.

However, the EU’s attempt to reconcile its legal and humanitarian obligations with stronger measures has encountered some serious challenges.

This roundtable stimulates dialogue on the circumstances surrounding migrant youth both in Afghanistan and the Edo state in Nigeria, and identifies key questions for further research on the ground.

Contextualising young people’s experiences within a “migration-deportation-return” nexus provides an entry point for the identification of both the commonalities and specifics of the challenges and risks that migrant youth face.

In line with UNICEF’s policy priorities related to children on the move, and initiating global debates in child rights and development, this collaboration forms part of the efforts that seek to inform global research and policy agenda for this most vulnerable of groups under the radar.

The intended outcome of this collaboration is to begin developing a set of core objectives and indicators to help guide the EU, Afghanistan and Nigeria in their treatment of youth, and to facilitate improved donor and host government understanding of the issues.

Participants include experts, researchers, academics, representatives of civil society and governmental institutions.

Attendance is by invitation-only.

The event is co-hosted with UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti and the University of Cambridge.

Climate Change and the Pacific: Impacts and Adaptation 27 November 2018 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 14 November 2018 Royal Academy of Arts

Putting the Hong Kong Crisis into Historical and Comparative Perspective 14 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

This roundtable will focus on current events unfolding in Hong Kong, where the territory has been convulsed with protests for several months.

The speakers will examine how class, race and poverty play into the conflict. Taking a comparative approach, they will examine the generational divide, looking at the ideological gulf between the older, more conservative and pro-Beijing population versus the younger, more pro-democracy protesters. The discussion will also draw upon the erosion of trust between police and the wider public.

While acknowledging the unique features of this wave of unrest, the speakers will draw parallels, placing the current crisis in Hong Kong beside events that have occurred in other periods and other places.

Parallels to be explored include those with Shanghai struggles of the 1910s through 1980s and upheavals and crackdowns in the former Soviet bloc during the Cold War.

Demographics and politics

Analysing political trends based on demographics is growing as the global population changes and traditional political affiliations are replaced.

Major issues for Chatham House research include the impact of the growth of young people in the developing world, significant increases in population aging in the developed world, and the impact of increasing urbanization on political engagement.

Gender and diversity also play an important part in changing political attitudes, while predicting voting behaviour is becoming ever harder to do accurately, as the methods and technology used by younger generations to engage with politics differ hugely from more traditional approaches.

Refugees and migration

Examining the humanitarian and policy challenges in dealing with the highest global number of refugees and displaced people since the Second World War.

There are many reasons why people cannot stay in their own countries. Many flee from violence, war, hunger, extreme poverty, because of their sexual or gender orientation, or from the consequences of climate change.

But also many believe they have a better chance of finding work in another country because they have the education or capital to seek opportunities elsewhere, they may want to join relatives or friends, or want to start or finish their education.

Chatham House research helps facilitate dialogue between an increasingly diverse group of actors influencing refugee and migration policy globally, enhancing cooperation and contributing to the identification of practical solutions. 

The Moving Energy Initiative is a ground-breaking international partnership which examines the provision of sustainable energy for refugees and displaced people, giving particular consideration to the context of the displaced communities, such as their cultural traditions, collective capacities, needs, and technology available to them.

Gender and equality

Exploring empowerment in areas such as women’s rights, equality and discrimination, the sharing of unpaid work, and the role of gender in achieving the SDGs.

Many women are still excluded from economic decision-making within their own household, receive lower salaries than men, and work longer hours. They are also often excluded from the labour market, do not have access to finance, and are denied property rights.

Wider areas of interest include examining the potential for foreign policies that prioritize gender equality, the physical, cultural and practical challenges to integrating women into close combat roles in the military, and the future of women in peace and security.

Equality and diversity research work also examines why people from black and minority ethnic groups still do less well in terms of education and the jobs they do than people from other groups, and considers the rights of workers across the world. It is strongly linked with promoting human rights and freedoms, based on principles such as dignity and respect.

Bangladesh: The Trade-Off Between Economic Prosperity and Human Rights 11 March 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Bangladesh’s recent gains in economic and social indices, set against its record of corruption and poor civil rights, has at times been termed the ‘Bangladesh Paradox’. Yet this label is overly simplistic; the current situation proves that these trends can coexist.

The Awami League government, in power since 2009, has increased political stability, delivered unprecedented economic and social advances, and adopted a counter-terrorism strategy to stamp out extremist groups. At the same time, it is criticized for curbing civil rights and failing to hold credible elections. However, as the two previous regimes have demonstrated, the rights situation is unlikely to improve even if the Awami League were replaced.

How did worsening rights become a feature of the state irrespective of its political dispensation? An unresolved contest between political and non-political state actors may hold the key to that puzzle. The perils of the current dispensation have recently manifested in weakening economic indicators, which jeopardize the very stability and social progress for which the country has garnered much praise.

Webinar: Hong Kong: Dissent in the Age of Coronavirus 17 April 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 April 2020

Street protests demanding greater autonomy and democratization in Hong Kong upended the city for seven months last year. However, with the outbreak of the coronavirus in China in late January, the protests quickly died out. What does this mean for the city’s protest movement?

The speaker will argue that, despite the lack of high-profile street rallies, protest in the city is continuing. It is building on and evolving from last year’s protest movement albeit in different forms. At the same time, the Hong Kong authorities, emboldened by a hard line from Beijing, have begun cracking down on activists and protesters in the city as they seek to put a lid on dissent ahead of important Legislative Council elections scheduled for this September.

In this webinar, the speaker will look at the current state of dissent in Hong Kong and prospects for Hong Kong’s future.

This event will be held on the record.

India's Response to COVID-19: Political and Social Implications 12 May 2020 — 12:00PM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 May 2020

On March 23rd, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi ordered the world’s largest lockdown on its population of 1.3 billion. The strict measures were praised by some for their success in slowing the spread of coronavirus but faced criticism for the lack of warning which led millions of migrant workers to return home without assistance. Recently the government has begun to lift restrictions in an attempt to revive the economy.

The Indian government has sought technological solutions to contain the pandemic and these have raised concerns around privacy, surveillance, equity and mass use. Furthermore, some low wage workers are forced to accept these solutions if they are to return to work, leaving them with little choice.

In this webinar, the speakers discuss the economic, political and healthcare implications of the coronavirus pandemic on India. Will India seek to rethink its strategy for leadership in the post-COVID-19 global order? Is it possible to develop technologies that can effectively limit the spread of the coronavirus and ensure privacy?

The speakers argue that careful consideration of the second and third-order effects of the pandemic, and the tools being used to contain it, are necessary to preserve rights, liberties, and even democracy.

Webinar: On the Front Line: The Impact of COVID-19 on Asia's Migrant Workers 21 May 2020 — 2:00PM TO 2:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 May 2020

Asia’s army of migrant workers are on the frontline in confronting the health and economic effects of COVID-19. Lacking formal safety nets, health care access, and facing social dislocation, hundreds of millions across the region are bearing the brunt of the coronavirus lockdown. Asian governments have scrambled to come up with an effective health and humanitarian response, exposing public apathy and significant shortcomings in public policy.

Is better regional coordination necessary to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 on migrant labourers? Is the private sector in Asia part of the problem or part of the solution?

In this webinar, the speakers will discuss the likely implications of lasting economic damage on the livelihoods of Asia’s migrant workers, as well as responses and measures to effectively mitigate the impact.

Webinar: Gandhi's Vision for India 15 June 2020 — 12:00PM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 June 2020

In 1931, Mahatma Gandhi visited Chatham House as part of his campaign for Indian independence. Addressing an overflowing hall, he described the poverty and the religious conflict that plagued India at the time.

Today, India is the world’s fifth largest economy and more than 270 million people have been lifted out of poverty in just a decade. But poverty in India remains widespread and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is only expected to exacerbate the situation. Meanwhile, the communal violence that erupted in Delhi earlier this year reflects intensifying religious tensions under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

In this webinar, the speakers discuss Gandhi’s global legacy and to what extent we are seeing a re-awakening of his principles across modern India.

This event is part of a series, held in the context of the Chatham House Centenary in 2020, bringing together historians, practitioners and current policymakers to discuss contemporary problems of international relations.

The 2020 Inner Mongolia Language Protests: Wider Meanings for China and the Region 24 November 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 November 2020 Online

Speakers discuss the historical roots of the language issue, as well as the wider significance of the protests in China.

Please note this is an online event. Please register on Zoom using the link below to secure your registration.

In September thousands of people protested in Inner Mongolia in opposition to a government move to replace Mongolian language with Standard Mandarin in three school subjects – history, politics and Chinese language.

Announced less than a week before the start of the new school year, the policy also requires schools to use new national textbooks in Chinese, instead of regional textbooks. The mass protests and classroom walk-outs reflect ethnic Mongolian’s anxiety that their native language may be eliminated. What has the government’s response to the protests been?

Rethinking European and Afghan policy approaches to migration 9 February 2021 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2021 Online

Speakers argue for a more multidimensional approach to migration, and for a nuanced reassessment of policy.

Please note this is an online event. Please register using the link below to finalize your registration.

Afghanistan is a key country of origin for asylum seekers in Europe, and the prime global recipient of EU development assistance. It was one of the first nations to conclude a migration partnership agreement with the EU, in 2016.

Implementation has been thwarted, however, by war and violence, limited state capacity, entrenched economic deprivation, internal displacement and the unfolding impact of COVID-19.

The speakers argue for a more multidimensional approach to migration, and for a nuanced reassessment of policy. They underscore the strength of Afghanistan’s responses to migration, returns, reintegration, security and peace, and point to the need for synchronizing the EU’s policy approaches.

They argue that effective policy must consider the historical significance of mobility for Afghanistan and the need for coherent regional responses to migration.

This event launches the publication The EU and the Politics of Migration Management in Afghanistan.

Jan Goedgebeur, Jorik Jooken, On-Hei Solomon Lo, Ben Seamone and Carol T. Zamfirescu
Math. Comp. 93 (), 3059-3082.
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Gurmeet K. Bakshi, Jyoti Garg and Gabriela Olteanu
Math. Comp. 93 (), 3027-3058.
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Pierre Lairez, Eric Pichon-Pharabod and Pierre Vanhove
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2985-3025.
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Torin Greenwood, Jonathan Kariv and Noah Williams
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2959-2983.
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Daniel A. Goldston, Apoorva Panidapu and Jordan Schettler
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2943-2958.
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Zhaonan Wang and Yingpu Deng
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2921-2942.
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