It is nearly 30 years since Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards published a seminal book, The Macroeconomics of Populism. Their conclusion back then was that the economic policies of populist leaders were quintessentially irresponsible. These governments, blinded by an aim to address perceived social injustices, specialised in profligacy, unbothered by budget constraints or whether they might run out of foreign exchange.

Because of this disregard for basic economic logic, their policy experiments inevitably ended badly, with some combination of inflation, capital flight, recession and default. Salvador Allende’s Chile in the 1970s, or Alan García’s Peru in the 1980s, capture this story perfectly.

These days, the macroeconomics of populism looks different. Of course there are populist leaders out there whose policies follow, more or less, the playbook of the 1970s and 1980s. Donald Trump may prove to be one of those, with a late-cycle fiscal expansion that seemed to have no basis in economic reasoning; Recep Tayyip Erdogan, by some accounts, may be another.

But a much more interesting phenomenon is the apparent surge in populist leaders whose economic policies are remarkably disciplined.

Take Mexico’s president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. When it comes to fiscal policy, it is odd indeed that this fiery critic of neoliberalism seems fully committed to austerity. His budget for 2019 targets a surplus before interest payments of 1 per cent of GDP, and on current plans he intends to increase that surplus next year to 1.3 per cent of GDP. He has upheld the autonomy of the central bank and, so far at least, his overall macroeconomic framework is anything but revolutionary.

Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban offers another example of conservative populism. Under his watch, budget deficits have been considerably lower than they had been previously, helping to push the stock of public debt down from 74 per cent of GDP in 2010, the year Orban took over, to 68 per cent last year.

This emphasis on the virtues of fiscal prudence is also visible in Poland, where Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s PiS has managed public finances with sufficient discipline in the past few years to push the debt/GDP ratio below 50 per cent last year, the first time this has happened since 2009.

The obvious question is: what has changed in the decades since Dornbusch and Edwards went into print?

One answer is that today’s populists tend to strive for national self-reliance, which encourages them to avoid building up any dependence on foreign capital. And since that goal is achieved by keeping a tight rein on macro policy, fiscal indiscipline is avoided in order to limit vulnerability to foreign influences.

Perhaps this is because the 'them', or the perceived enemy, for many of today’s populists tends to be outside the country rather than inside. Broadly speaking, it is the forces of globalisation — and global capital in particular — that are the problem for these leaders, and self-reliance is the only way to keep those forces at arm’s length. This helps to explain why, for example, Orban has been so keen to repay debt to Hungary’s external creditors. He has relied instead on selling bonds to Hungarian households to finance his deficits, even though the interest rates on those bonds are much higher than he would pay to foreign creditors. It also helps explain why the PiS in Poland has presided over a decline in foreign holdings of its domestic bonds. Foreign investors owned 40 per cent of Poland’s domestic government debt back in 2015, but only 26 per cent now.

In other words, among many of today’s populists there is a blurring of the distinction between populism and nationalism. And the nationalistic urge to keep the rest of the world off your back seems to dominate the populist urge to spend money. The perfect example of that instinct is Vladimir Putin: not necessarily a populist, but his administration has been emphatic about the need to keep public spending low and to build solid financial buffers. National self-reliance is an economic obsession for the Russian government, and provides a model for other countries who wish to insulate themselves from international finance.

One of the reasons why the macroeconomics of populism have changed in this way is the historical legacy of economic disaster. If you are a populist leader in a country where financial crisis is part of living memory — as it is in Mexico, Hungary and Russia, say — you might do well to err on the side of conservatism for fear of repeating the mistakes of your predecessors.

But another reason why populism looks different for countries like Poland, Hungary, Mexico and Russia has to do with mere luck. Hungary and Poland, in particular, enjoy the luck of geography: having been absorbed into the EU, they have received financial transfers from Brussels averaging some 3-4 per cent of GDP in the past few years, so that populism in these countries has been solidly underpinned by the terms of their EU membership. López Obrador is enjoying the inheritance of his predecessor’s sound macro policy, together with a buoyant US economy and low US interest rates. Russia has had the good fortune of oil exports to rely on.

The thing about luck is that it can run out. So maybe it’s not quite time yet to bury the old macroeconomics of populism. But for the time being, it seems true to say that many of today’s populists have an unexpectedly robust sense of economic discipline.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

Epidemics, of the size of Covid-19, have huge economic impacts – not just from the costs of managing the health of people, but stopping them, and keeping the economy working. The 10% fall in global stock markets since it became clear that Covid-19 would not be limited to China has boldly highlighted this.

Suppressing the epidemic, but allowing the economy to still function, requires key decisions, in which central banks and finance ministries play a part.

The role of fiscal and monetary authorities in managing an epidemic economy

The scope to use monetary policy to manage the economic impact of Covid-19 is limited. The fact that the underlying cause of the shock is an infectious disease outbreak (rather than a banking crisis, as in 2008-09) and nominal interest rates are currently close to zero in most major advanced economies reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy.

Since 2010, reductions in fiscal deficits mean there is more scope for supportive fiscal action. But even here, high public debt levels and the desire not to underwrite ‘zombie’ companies that may have been sustained by a decade of ultra-low interest rates remain constraints. 

However, outside broad based fiscal and monetary policies there are six ways in which finance ministries and central banks will play a critical role in responding to the crisis.

A first crucial role for finance ministries and central banks is in helping provide the best possible economic evaluation of strict containment measures (trying to isolate each potential case) versus managing the epidemic (delaying the spread of the virus, protecting the most vulnerable and treating the sick, while enabling the majority of people to get on with daily life). Given the economic consequences, they must play a full part, alongside health experts, in advising political leaders on this key decision.

Second, if large numbers of staff are required to work from home to manage the epidemic, they have the lead role in doing whatever is necessary to ensure that financial markets – and thus the wider economy – will continue to function smoothly.

Third, they need to ensure adequate funding for the public health response. Steps that can make an enormous difference to the success of containment strategies, such as strengthening surveillance, and guaranteeing the availability of testing kits and protective equipment for front line health workers, must not fail because of a lack of funding. 

Fourth, they have a lead role in designing targeted economic interventions for the wider economy. Some of these are needed immediately to re-enforce and incentivize strict containment strategies, such as ensuring that employees without full or adequate sick leave cover have the financial support to enable them to report and self-isolate when they get sick. 

Other interventions may help improve the resilience of the economy in accommodating moderate ‘social distancing’ measures; for example, by providing assistance to small firms to help them gear up for home working.

Yet others are needed, as a contingency, to safeguard the most vulnerable sectors (such as tourism, retail and transport) in circumstances where there is a prolonged downturn. The latter may include schemes to allow deferral of tax payments by SMEs, or steps to encourage loan extensions and other forms of liquidity support from the banking system, or by moves to underwrite continued provision of business insurance.

Fifth, national economic authorities will need to play their part in combatting ‘fake news’ through providing transparent and high-quality analysis. This includes providing forecasts on the likely economic impact of the virus under different scenarios, but also detailed information on the support and contingency measures they are considering, so they can be improved and refined through feedback. 

Sixth, they will need to ensure that there is generous international support for poor countries, by ensuring the available multilateral support facilities from the international financial institutions and multilateral development banks are adequately funded and fit for purpose. The World Bank has already announced an initial $12 billion financing package, but much more is likely to be needed.

They also need to support coordinated bilateral aid where this is more effective, as well as special measures to support particularly vulnerable groups, for example, in refugee camps and prisons. Given the importance of distributing sophisticated medical equipment and expertise quickly, it is also important that every effort is made to avoid delays due to customs and migration checks.

Managing the future

The response to the immediate crisis will rightly take priority now, but economic authorities must also play their part in ensuring the world finally takes decisive steps to prevent a repeat of Covid-19 in future.

The experience with SARS, H1N1 and Ebola shows that, while some progress is made after each outbreak, this is often not sustained. This epidemic shows that managing diseases is absolutely critical to the long-term health of global economy, and doubly so in circumstances where traditional central bank and finance ministry tools for dealing with major global economic shocks are limited.

Finance ministries and central banks therefore need to push hard within government to ensure sustained long-term funding of research on prevention and strengthening of public health systems. They also need to ensure that the right lessons are drawn by the private sector on making international supply chains more robust.

Critical to the overall success of the economic effort will be effective international coordination. The G20 was established as the premier economic forum for international economic cooperation in 2010, and global health issues have been a substantive part of the G20 agenda since the 2017 Hamburg Summit. At the same time, G7 finance ministers and deputies remain one of the most effective bodies for managing economic crises on a day-to-day basis and should continue this within the framework provided by the G20.

However, to be effective, the US, as current president of the G7, will need to put aside its reservations on multilateral economic cooperation and working with China to provide strong leadership.

There has been a stark contrast between messaging coming from the international community and trends on the ground as Libya’s latest bout of civil war enters its eighth month.

Led by Germany, some states have been trying to build consensus for a ceasefire ahead of a summit that is expected to be held in Berlin in the next few months. Today marks the date of one of the final planning meetings for the summit.

The increasing use of drone technology, airstrikes and further influxes of fighters trend points in the opposite direction. Warring groups in Libya continue to receive support from external states, undermining international efforts to de-escalate the conflict. A UN arms embargo goes largely unenforced. As the Berlin process unfolds, there is little evidence to suggest that these external states will shift their positions.

The launch of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) offensive on Tripoli in April sunk a UN-planned ‘national conference’, intended to be held less than two weeks later, to negotiate a framework for transition out of Libya’s governance crisis. Yet, Haftar has so far failed in his objective of capturing Tripoli. While his offensive continues, had he the capacity to capture the city, he would have done so already.

This has created a conundrum for peace talks: there appears to be little chance of negotiating a deal with Haftar, while it is also hard to see how a deal could be reached without him.

The field marshal has little interest in accepting a withdrawal, even a partial one, of his forces. His opponents – who have found unity in their shared efforts to defeat Haftar’s forces – will not accept a ceasefire that leaves the LAAF on the hinterlands of the capital. Similarly, a deal apparently agreed in Abu Dhabi between Haftar and Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj in February is also dead in the water.

Amid this logjam, there has been an increasing interest in the economic content of the Berlin summit. Countries supportive of Haftar argue that his alliance has legitimate concerns over the management of Libya’s economy and, particularly, the dominant role of the Tripoli-based central bank and its governor in supporting armed groups.

For some within these countries, changing the leadership of the central bank and a finding means of limiting the dominance of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) over the state’s resources – thus reducing flows of funding to armed groups fighting Haftar – could present a point of agreement in Berlin.

But their focus on financial management in Tripoli is not mirrored by interest in holding the rival central bank in the eastern city of Bayda – an institution unrecognized by the international community – to account for its pursuit of its own monetary policy. This is built on approximately $23 billion of unsecured debt from commercial banks and $11 billion of currency supplied by Russia.

Indeed, very few of the conversations surrounding parameters for Berlin contain details of what would be asked of eastern-based actors beyond pursuit of an audit of the Tripoli and Bayda central banks (only the Tripoli bank is recognized by the international community).

Clearly, the GNA and its allies would have no incentive to accept provisions that limit their means to mobilize resources for the war while its opponents do not receive the same scrutiny. 

However, it is possible to capitalize on the broad interest in economic content to reach some points of agreement over the management of the economy and state institutions. Rather than seeking to replace individuals aligned with one faction for those aligned with another, or expecting asymmetrical concessions from the GNA and its allies, this effort must instead focus on structures and processes that exacerbate the conflict and represent major grievances for the warring parties.

Importantly, this would include the establishment of a system of transparency and accountability for the management of Libya’s finances.  The opacity of current processes enables the support of patronage-based networks with no effective oversight.

Linked to this, the development of effective processes for budgeting and allocating funds could help to reduce graft.

And, finally, rationalizing the role of state institutions to agree their roles and responsibilities, creating the room for reforms to Libya’s system of state employment and subsidies through provision of direct payments to Libyan citizens, is essential.  

An economic commission that comprises members from across political and institutional divides – receiving political support from international powers and technical support from international financial institutions – could be an effective approach. Such a commission could match an inclusive, Libyan-led process with international support to progressively harmonize economic and financial policy between rival authorities and develop consensus for a process of institutional reunification in Libya.

This would constitute a major element of an eventual political settlement and reduce the risk of a limited set of actors capturing the system at the expense of the others – an outcome which would likely result in future bouts of violence.

Such a commission would offer a means of addressing a key driver of the conflict by decentralizing aspects of Libya’s governance, moving away from the dominance of Tripoli and the current winner-take-all system. 

These issues cannot be put to one side, to follow progress on the security front. The remarkable resilience that Libya’s economy has shown over the last seven months should not be taken for granted. It has become increasingly difficult for Libya’s institutions to insulate themselves from the conflict as both sides seek to mobilize resources to sustain their war effort.

The LAAF is increasingly looking to sideline civilian authorities in eastern Libya. On the other side, the GNA has found means of routing funds to armed groups fighting Haftar.

In September, a dispute over the supply of jet fuel between the LAAF and the National Oil Corporation resulted in the establishment of a parallel Brega Petroleum Marketing Company, the state-owned company that possesses a monopoly over fuel distribution.

Meanwhile, other major problems lurk under the surface.  The banking sector is in an increasingly perilous state and debts continue to mount all around, with those in the east not accounted for by Tripoli’s official authorities.  

Through the establishment of an economic commission, the Berlin process provides an opportunity and – most importantly – a mechanism to address these problems while also helping to maintain the basic functionality of the state.  Even if a ceasefire deal does not materialize, initiating negotiations about the future shape of the state and its economy would be a significant step forward.

The transition of power in Oman from the deceased Sultan Qaboos to his cousin and the country’s new ruler, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, has been smooth and quick, but the new sultan will soon find that he has a task in shoring up the country’s economic position.

Above all, the fiscal and debt profile of the country requires careful management. Fiscal discipline was rare for Oman even during the oil price spike of the 2000s. Although oil prices only collapsed in 2014, Oman has been registering a fiscal deficit since 2010, reaching a 20.6 per cent high in 2016. As long as fiscal deficits remain elevated, so will Oman’s need to finance those deficits, predominately by borrowing in the local and international market.

Oman’s Debt-to-GDP ratio has been rising at a worrying pace, from 4.9 per cent in 2014 to an IMF-estimated 59.8 per cent in 2019. By 2024, the IMF is forecasting the ratio to reach nearly 77 per cent. A study by the World Bank found that if the debt-to-GDP ratio in emerging markets exceeds 64 per cent for an extended period, it slows economic growth by as much as 2 per cent each year.

Investors are willing to lend to Oman, but the sultanate is paying for it in terms of higher spreads due to the underlying risk markets are placing on the rising debt profile of the country. For instance, Oman has a higher sovereign debt rating than Bahrain yet markets perceive it to be of higher risk, making it costlier to borrow. Failure to address the fiscal and debt situation also risks creating pressure on the country’s pegged currency.

If oil revenues remain low, Sultan Haitham will have to craft a daring strategy of diversification and private sector growth. He is well placed for this: Sultan Haitham headed Oman’s Vision 2040, which set out the country’s future development plans and aspirations, the first Gulf country to embark on such an assessment. However, like all vision documents in the Gulf, Oman’s challenge will be implementation.

In the age of climate change, renewable energy is a serious economic opportunity, which Oman has to keep pursuing. If cheap electricity is generated it could also be exported to other Gulf states and to south Asia. In Oman, the share of renewables in total electricity capacity was around 0.5 per cent in 2018; the ambition is to reach 10 per cent by 2025.

However, in order to reach this target, Oman would have to take additional measures such as enhancing its regulatory framework, introducing a transparent and gradual energy market pricing policy and integrating all stakeholders, including the private sector, into a wider national strategy.

Mining could provide another economic opportunity for Oman’s diversification efforts, with help from a more robust mining law passed last year. The country has large deposits of metals and industrial minerals and its mountains could have gold, palladium, zinc, rare earths and manganese.

Oman’s strategic location connecting the Gulf and Indian Ocean with east Africa and the Red Sea could also boost the country’s economy. The Duqm special economic zone, which is among the largest in the world, could become the commercial thread between Oman, south Asia and China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative.’

Oman has taken important steps to make its economy more competitive and conducive to foreign direct investment. Incentives include a five-year renewable tax holiday, subsidized plant facilities and utilities, and custom duties relief on equipment and raw materials for the first 10 years of a firm’s operation in Oman.

A private sector economic model that embraces small- and medium-sized enterprises as well as greater competition and entrepreneurship would help increase opportunities in Oman. Like all other Gulf economies, future employment in Oman will have to be driven be the private sector, as there is little space left to grow the public sector.

Privatization needs to continue. Last year’s successful sale of 49 per cent of the electricity transmission company to China’s State Grid is a very positive step. The electricity distribution company as well as Oman Oil are next in line for some form of partial privatization.

The next decade will require Oman to be even more adept in its competitiveness as the region itself tries to find its new bearings. Take tourism for instance; Oman hopes to double its contribution to GDP from around 3 per cent today to 6 per cent by 2040 and the industry is expected to generate half a million jobs by then. Over the next 20 years, Oman will most likely be facing stiff competition in this area not only by the UAE but by Saudi Arabia as well.

The new sultan has an opportunity to embark on deeper economic reforms that could bring higher growth, employment opportunities and a sustainable future. But he has a big task.

There is a broad consensus that Libya’s rentier, patronage-based system of governance is a driver, and not only a symptom, of Libya’s continuing conflict. The dysfunction of Libya’s economic system of governance has been exacerbated by the governance split that has prevailed since 2014 whereby rival administrations of state institutions have emerged. Despite these challenges, a system of economic interdependence, whereby forces aligned with Field Marshal Haftar control much of the oil and gas infrastructure and the UN-backed Government of National Accord controls the means of financial distribution, has largely prevailed. Yet, at the time of writing, this is under threat: a damaging oil blockade is being implemented by forces aligned with Haftar and those state institutions that do function on a national basis are finding it increasingly difficult to avoid being dragged into the conflict.

This roundtable will bring together analysts and policymakers to discuss these dynamics and look at possible remedies. Jason Pack, non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, will present the findings of his latest paper on the issue which recommends the formation of 'a Libyan-requested and Libyan-led International Financial Commission vested with the requisite authorities to completely restructure the economy.' Tim Eaton, who has been leading Chatham House’s work on Libya’s conflict economy, supporting UNSMIL’s efforts in this field, will act as respondent.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Since the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths. While many of these have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. In the west and south of the country,  armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks.

In the east, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will need to address the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities, even while the development of armed groups’ capacities dilutes their accountability to those communities.

This roundtable will discuss the findings of a forthcoming Chatham House research paper, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests’, which presents insights from over 200 interviews of armed actors and members of local communities and posits how international policymakers might seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Summary

• Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths since the emergence of a national governance split in 2014. Many have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. However, the evolution of the Libyan security sector in this period remains relatively understudied. Prior to 2011, Libya’s internal sovereignty – including the monopoly on force and sole agency in international relations – had been personally vested in the figure of Muammar Gaddafi. After his death, these elements of sovereignty reverted to local communities, which created armed organizations to fill that central gap. National military and intelligence institutions that were intended to protect the Libyan state have remained weak, with their coherence undermined further by the post-2014 governance crisis and ongoing conflict. As a result, the most effective armed groups have remained localized in nature; the exception is the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), which has combined and amalgamated locally legitimate forces under a central command.
• In the west and south of the country, the result of these trends resembles a kind of inversion of security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): the armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks; and have continued to arm, mobilize and integrate themselves into the state’s security apparatus without becoming subservient to it. In the eastern region, the LAAF projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LAAF has co-opted social organizations to dominate political and economic decision-making.
• The LAAF has established a monopoly over the control of heavy weapons and the flow of arms in eastern Libya, and has built alliances with armed groups in the east. Armed groups in the south have been persuaded to join the LAAF’s newly established command structure. The LAAF’s offensive on the capital, which started in April 2019, represents a serious challenge to armed groups aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). The fallout from the war will be a challenge to the GNA or any future government, as groups taking part in the war will expect to be rewarded. SSR is thus crucial in the short term: if the GNA offers financial and technical expertise and resources, plus legal cover, to armed groups under its leadership, it will increase the incentive for armed groups to be receptive to its plans for reform.
• Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will necessarily rely on addressing the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities. Yet the development of armed groups’ capacities, along with their increasing access to autonomous means of generating revenue, has steadily diluted their accountability to local communities. This process is likely to be accelerated by the ongoing violence around Tripoli.
• Communities’ relationship to armed groups varies across different areas of the country, reflecting the social, political, economic and security environment:
• Despite their clear preference for a more formal, state-controlled security sector, Tripoli’s residents broadly accept the need for    the presence of armed groups to provide security. The known engagement of the capital’s four main armed groups in criminal activity is a trade-off that many residents seem able to tolerate, providing that overt violence remains low. Nonetheless, there is a widespread view that the greed of Tripoli’s armed groups has played a role in stoking the current conflict.
• In the east, many residents appear to accept (or even welcome) the LAAF’s expansion beyond the security realm, provided that it undertakes these roles effectively. That said, such is the extent of LAAF control that opposition to the alliance comes at a high price.
• In the south, armed groups draw heavily on social legitimacy, acting as guardians of tribal zones of influence and defenders of their respective communities against outside threats, while also at times stoking local conflicts. Social protections continue to hold sway, meaning that accountability within communities is also limited.
• To varying extents since 2014, Libya’s armed groups have developed networks that enmesh political and business stakeholders in revenue-generation models:
• Armed groups in Tripoli have compensated for reduced financial receipts from state budgets by cultivating unofficial and illicit sources of income. They have also focused on infiltrating state institutions to ensure access to state budgets and contracts dispersed in the capital.
• In the east of the country, the LAAF has developed a long-term strategy to dominate the security, political and economic spheres through the establishment of a quasi-legal basis for receiving funds from Libya’s rival state authorities. It has supplemented this with extensive intervention in the private sector. External patronage supports military operations, but also helps to keep this financial system, based on unsecured debt, afloat.
• In the south, limited access to funds from the central state has spurred armed groups to become actively involved in the economy. This has translated into the taxation of movement and the imposition of protection fees, particularly on informal (and often illicit) activity.
• Without real commitment from international policymakers to enforcing the arms embargo and protecting the economy from being weaponized, Libya will be consigned to sustained conflict, further fragmentation and potential economic collapse. Given the likely absence of a political settlement in the short term, international policymakers should seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy by reducing armed groups’ engagement in economic life.
• In order to reduce illicit activities, international policymakers should develop their capacity to identify and target chokepoints along illicit supply chains, with a focus on restraining activities and actors in closest proximity to violence. Targeted sanctions against rent maximizers (both armed and unarmed) is likely to be the most effective strategy. More effective investigation and restraint of conflict economy actors will require systemic efforts to improve transparency and enhance the institutional capacity of anti-corruption authorities. International policymakers should also support the development of tailored alternative livelihoods that render conflict economy activities less attractive.

The speaker will outline the importance of economic cooperation in the transatlantic relationship and consider recent developments in the global economy.

Economic populism is on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have made protectionist arguments and appealed to voters who feel left behind by globalization. In Europe, left-wing groups like Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain as well as far-right groups like France’s Front National, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the UK Independence Party are capitalizing on the anti-globalization mood.

Manifestations of the current anti-trade and anti-globalization movements include opposition to trade initiatives like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as populist calls for an end to the austerity measures and economic reforms that were introduced in the wake of the euro crisis. There have been questions regarding whether capitalism can respond to the rise in inequality seen in many Western states. Many populists also share a distrust of those they perceive as elite policy-makers and a desire to reclaim national sovereignty from international institutions. Thus, the rise of populism could have far-reaching consequences for trade and economic policy-making and the existing trade and broader economic architectures.

The US and the Americas Programme at Chatham House and the German Marshall Fund of the United States in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung will convene an expert roundtable to provide insight and analysis geared towards examining key drivers behind the rise of economic populism, its implications for the international economic system, and possible ways to mitigate the effects of populism in the economic arena.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

The Chatham House Rule

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

Summary

• As the US government and European governments once again grapple with the challenges of reinforcing and expanding the transatlantic economic relationship, traditional negotiations over trade or tax policy may soon be upstaged by a far thornier and more important issue: how to regulate the storage, protection and analysis of data.
• Growth in the traditional global trade in goods and services has levelled off, but cross-border data flows continue to expand rapidly and the challenges of developing policies that protect privacy, security and innovation are already tremendous. For example, data analytics are driving dramatic productivity gains in industry, particularly for large and complex installations whose safety and efficiency will increasingly depend on flows of data across jurisdictions. Meanwhile, ‘fintech’ (financial technology) start-ups and large banks alike are testing new modes of accumulating, analysing and deploying customer data to provide less expensive services and manage the risk profile of their businesses.
• While the US debate on the use of data has often been framed around the trade-off between national security and personal privacy, Europeans often face an even more complex set of concerns that include worries that their digital and technology firms lag behind dominant US competitors. The political and regulatory uncertainty helps neither side, and leaves transatlantic companies struggling to comply with uncertain and conflicting rules in different jurisdictions.
• A global consensus on data regulation is currently well out of reach, but given the expanding importance of data in so many areas, basic agreement on regulatory principles is crucial between the US and the EU. This paper proposes a ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’, which could help shape a common understanding. While it would hardly resolve all concerns – or indeed contradictions – around the prevailing traditions on both sides of the Atlantic, it could provide the basis for better cooperation and establish a framework to protect the promise of the digital age amid an unpredictable and emotional debate.

Diane Coyle will join us for a discussion on the impact that new technologies will have on transatlantic economic transformations in the future.

Economic growth rates in the US and Europe have been decelerating over the last decades, and the growth that has materialised has not been equally shared by all.

While technological advancements have contributed to widening inequality of income and wealth, at the same time, technological change is a driving force in improving living standards.

Looking ahead, what role will new technologies play in economic transformations and disruptions?

How can leaders in government and business on both sides of the Atlantic best harvest the potential and respond to the challenges of technological change and its impact on the economy?

This event is part of the US and Americas Programme ongoing series on Transatlantic Perspectives on Common Economic Challenges.

This series examines some of the principal global challenges that we face today and potentially differing perspectives from across Europe and the US.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Megan Greene will join us for a discussion on the prospect of future economic and political uncertainty on both sides of the Atlantic.

The first year of Donald Trump’s presidency and the ongoing saga of Brexit negotiations underscore the amount of uncertainty about the economic future on both sides of the Atlantic.

Despite that, business and consumer confidence in the US and continental Europe have soared. Are we still stuck in secular stagnation, or are we breaking out of the low growth, low inflation, low rate environment we’ve been in for years?

What opportunities and risks are posed by this year’s elections in France and Germany, the upcoming elections in Italy, and the mid-term elections in the US?

This event is part of the US and Americas Programme ongoing series on Transatlantic Perspectives on Common Economic Challenges. This series examines some of the principal global challenges that we face today and potentially differing perspectives from across Europe and the US.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Read all our analysis on the Coronavirus Response

The coronavirus outbreak comes at a difficult time for China’s ruling party. A tumultuous 2019 saw the country fighting an economic slowdown coupled with an increasingly hostile international environment. As authorities take assertive steps to contain the virus, the emergency has - at least temporarily - disrupted global trade and supply chains, depressed asset prices and forced multinational businesses to make consequential decisions with limited information. 

Against this backdrop, panellists reflect on the country’s nascent economic transition from 2020 onward. What has been China’s progress towards a sustainable innovation-led economy so far? To what extent is the ruling party addressing growing concerns over job losses, wealth inequality and a lack of social mobility? And how are foreign investors responding to these developments in China?

Epidemics, of the size of Covid-19, have huge economic impacts – not just from the costs of managing the health of people, but stopping them, and keeping the economy working. The 10% fall in global stock markets since it became clear that Covid-19 would not be limited to China has boldly highlighted this.

Suppressing the epidemic, but allowing the economy to still function, requires key decisions, in which central banks and finance ministries play a part.

The role of fiscal and monetary authorities in managing an epidemic economy

The scope to use monetary policy to manage the economic impact of Covid-19 is limited. The fact that the underlying cause of the shock is an infectious disease outbreak (rather than a banking crisis, as in 2008-09) and nominal interest rates are currently close to zero in most major advanced economies reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy.

Since 2010, reductions in fiscal deficits mean there is more scope for supportive fiscal action. But even here, high public debt levels and the desire not to underwrite ‘zombie’ companies that may have been sustained by a decade of ultra-low interest rates remain constraints. 

However, outside broad based fiscal and monetary policies there are six ways in which finance ministries and central banks will play a critical role in responding to the crisis.

A first crucial role for finance ministries and central banks is in helping provide the best possible economic evaluation of strict containment measures (trying to isolate each potential case) versus managing the epidemic (delaying the spread of the virus, protecting the most vulnerable and treating the sick, while enabling the majority of people to get on with daily life). Given the economic consequences, they must play a full part, alongside health experts, in advising political leaders on this key decision.

Second, if large numbers of staff are required to work from home to manage the epidemic, they have the lead role in doing whatever is necessary to ensure that financial markets – and thus the wider economy – will continue to function smoothly.

Third, they need to ensure adequate funding for the public health response. Steps that can make an enormous difference to the success of containment strategies, such as strengthening surveillance, and guaranteeing the availability of testing kits and protective equipment for front line health workers, must not fail because of a lack of funding. 

Fourth, they have a lead role in designing targeted economic interventions for the wider economy. Some of these are needed immediately to re-enforce and incentivize strict containment strategies, such as ensuring that employees without full or adequate sick leave cover have the financial support to enable them to report and self-isolate when they get sick. 

Other interventions may help improve the resilience of the economy in accommodating moderate ‘social distancing’ measures; for example, by providing assistance to small firms to help them gear up for home working.

Yet others are needed, as a contingency, to safeguard the most vulnerable sectors (such as tourism, retail and transport) in circumstances where there is a prolonged downturn. The latter may include schemes to allow deferral of tax payments by SMEs, or steps to encourage loan extensions and other forms of liquidity support from the banking system, or by moves to underwrite continued provision of business insurance.

Fifth, national economic authorities will need to play their part in combatting ‘fake news’ through providing transparent and high-quality analysis. This includes providing forecasts on the likely economic impact of the virus under different scenarios, but also detailed information on the support and contingency measures they are considering, so they can be improved and refined through feedback. 

Sixth, they will need to ensure that there is generous international support for poor countries, by ensuring the available multilateral support facilities from the international financial institutions and multilateral development banks are adequately funded and fit for purpose. The World Bank has already announced an initial $12 billion financing package, but much more is likely to be needed.

They also need to support coordinated bilateral aid where this is more effective, as well as special measures to support particularly vulnerable groups, for example, in refugee camps and prisons. Given the importance of distributing sophisticated medical equipment and expertise quickly, it is also important that every effort is made to avoid delays due to customs and migration checks.

Managing the future

The response to the immediate crisis will rightly take priority now, but economic authorities must also play their part in ensuring the world finally takes decisive steps to prevent a repeat of Covid-19 in future.

The experience with SARS, H1N1 and Ebola shows that, while some progress is made after each outbreak, this is often not sustained. This epidemic shows that managing diseases is absolutely critical to the long-term health of global economy, and doubly so in circumstances where traditional central bank and finance ministry tools for dealing with major global economic shocks are limited.

Finance ministries and central banks therefore need to push hard within government to ensure sustained long-term funding of research on prevention and strengthening of public health systems. They also need to ensure that the right lessons are drawn by the private sector on making international supply chains more robust.

Critical to the overall success of the economic effort will be effective international coordination. The G20 was established as the premier economic forum for international economic cooperation in 2010, and global health issues have been a substantive part of the G20 agenda since the 2017 Hamburg Summit. At the same time, G7 finance ministers and deputies remain one of the most effective bodies for managing economic crises on a day-to-day basis and should continue this within the framework provided by the G20.

However, to be effective, the US, as current president of the G7, will need to put aside its reservations on multilateral economic cooperation and working with China to provide strong leadership.

In the past few weeks, European Union member states have implemented measures such as social distancing, school and border closures and the cancellation of major cultural and sporting events in an effort to curb the spread of COVID-19. Such measures are expected to have significant economic and political consequences, threatening near or total collapse of certain sectors. Moreover, the management of the health and economic crises within the EU architecture has exposed tensions and impasses in the extent to which the EU is willing to collaborate to mitigate pressures on fellow member states.

The panellists will examine the European Union's response to a series of cascading crises and the likely impact of the pandemic on individual member states. Can the EU prevent an economic hit from developing into a financial crisis? Are the steps taken by the European Central Bank to protect the euro enough? And are member states expected to manage the crisis as best they can or will there be a united effort to mitigate some of the damage caused?  

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

 

Since the 2018 economic crisis, when the value of the lira plummeted and borrowing costs soared, Turkey’s economy has achieved a miraculous ‘V-shaped’ economic recovery from a recession lasting three quarters to a return back to quarterly growth above 1 per cent in the first three months of 2019.

But this quick turnaround has been built on vast amounts of cheap credit used to re-stimulate a consumption and construction boom. This so-called ‘triple C’ economy generated a rapid growth spurt akin to a modestly able professional sprinter injected with steroids.

This has made the currency vulnerable. The lira has steadily depreciated by 11 per cent against the US dollar since the beginning of 2019 and crossed the rate of 6 lira versus the US dollar on 7 February. And there are further warning signs on the horizon.

Credit bonanza

Statistics reveal that Turkish domestic credit grew by around 13 per cent on average throughout 2019.  The credit bonanza is still ongoing. Mortgage-backed home sales jumped by a record high of 600 per cent last December alone and the 2019 budget deficit catapulted by 70 per cent due to higher government spending.

Turkey’s central bank fuelled this credit expansion by cutting interest rates aggressively to below inflation and, since the start of this year, purchasing lira-denominated bonds equivalent to around one-third of total acquisitions last year to push yields lower.

Equally, it has linked bank lending to reserve requirements – the money that banks have to keep at the central bank – to boost borrowings via state and private banks. Banks with a ‘real’ loan growth (including inflation) of between 5 and 15 per cent enjoy a 2 per cent reserve ratio on most lira deposits, which authorities adjusted from an earlier band of 10-20 per cent that did not consider double-digit inflation.

Cumulatively, bond purchases (effectively quantitative easing) and reserve management policies have also contributed to eased credit conditions.

Commercial banks have also reduced deposit rates on lira accounts to less than inflation to encourage consumption over saving. Together with low lending rates, the boost to the economy has flowed via mortgages, credit card loans, vehicle leasing transactions and general business borrowings.

Accordingly, stimulus is at the forefront of the government’s economic approach, as it was in 2017 and 2018. It does not seem to be implementing structural change to re-orient growth away from consumption towards productivity. 

In addition, governance is, again, a central issue. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s near total monopolization of policymaking means he guides all domestic and external policies. He forced out the previous central bank governor, Murat Cetinkaya, in July 2019 because he did not share the president’s desire for an accelerated pace of interest rate reductions.

New challenges

Despite the similarities, the expected future financial turbulence will be materially different from its 2018 predecessor in four crucial respects. 

Firstly, foreign investors will only be marginally involved. Turkey has shut out foreign investors since 2018 from lira-denominated assets by restricting lira swap arrangements. Unsurprisingly, the non-resident holdings of lira bonds has plummeted from 20 per cent in 2018 to less than 10 per cent today.

Secondly, the Turkish government has recently introduced indirect domestic capital controls by constraining most commercial transactions to the lira rather than to the US dollar or euro to reduce foreign currency demand in light of short-term external debt obligations of $191 billion.

Thirdly, the Turkish state banks are intervening quite regularly to soften Lira volatility, thereby transitioning from a ‘free float’ to a ‘managed float’. So far, they have spent over $37 billion over the last two years in a futile effort to buttress the lira. This level of involvement in currency markets cannot be maintained.

Fourthly, the Turkish state is being far more interventionist in the Turkish stock exchange and bond markets to keep asset prices elevated. Government-controlled local funds have participated in the Borsa Istanbul and state banks in sovereign debt to sustain rallies or reverse a bear market.  

All these measures have one running idea: exclude foreign investors and no crisis will recur. Yet, when the credit boom heads to a downturn sooner or later, Turks will probably escalate lira conversions to US dollars; 51 per cent of all Turkish bank deposits are already dollar-denominated and the figure is still rising.

If Turkey’s limited foreign reserves cannot satisfy the domestic dollar demand, the government may have to impose comprehensive capital controls and allow for a double digit depreciation in the value of the lira to from its current level, with significant repercussions on Turkey’s political stability and economic climate.

To avoid this scenario, it needs to restore fiscal and monetary prudence, deal the with the foreign debt overhang in the private sector and focus on productivity-improving economic and institutional reforms to gain the confidence of global financial markets and Turks alike.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been regarded by international society as a major policy tool in China's geo-economic strategy. Under this policy platform, Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructure and industrial sectors across Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific nations. It is widely believed that such huge amount of investment will inevitably generate significant geostrategic repercussions in these regions. In response to the BRI, the United States and other powers have come up with a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. This article attempts to address the following question: what impact is the BRI likely to have on the security ties between China and the other major players in the Indo-Pacific? The author finds that the BRI may significantly transform China's international security policy and the expansion of Beijing's security influence may further intensify the security competition between China and other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The article also proposes a new analytical angle for the study of geo-economics that unpacks the role of economic activities and processes in generating geopolitical intentions and catalysing geopolitical competition.

The outbreak of COVID-19 has demonstrated the wide-ranging and immediate impact a systemic shock can have on the global economy including the financial loss caused by the emergency shutdown of many retail operations, the loss of income for individuals who are forced to stay indoors and the major disruption to supply chains. The longer term impacts are still being realized and depend heavily on the ability of industry and the government to respond effectively to the direct economic shock caused by the pandemic.

Systemic shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic demand immediate responses, but should also encourage governments and industries to re-examine their recovery processes, their resilience and their forward planning. In this webinar, the panellists will discuss the short and long-term impacts of the current crisis and explore how industry can help ensure that the global economy is able to recover from, and build resilience to, future systemic shocks. How do business leaders move from making decisions to reimagining a ‘new normal’ and reforming their practices? What are the critical decisions that businesses should consider when planning for this 'new normal'? And how far can these decisions be based on expected changes to governmental or intergovernmental regulation of different sectors?   

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

In the last 100 years, global economic crises from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the 2008 financial crash have contributed to significant political changes in Europe, often leading to a rise in popularity for extremist parties and politics. As Europe contends with a perceived crisis of democracy - now compounded by the varied responses to the coronavirus outbreak - how should we understand the relationship between externally-driven economic crises, political upheaval and democracy?

The panellists will consider the parallels between the political responses to some of the greatest economic crises Europe has experienced in the last century. Given that economic crises often transcend borders, why does political disruption vary between democracies? What can history tell us about the potential political impact of the unfolding COVID-19-related economic crisis? And will the unprecedented financial interventions by governments across Europe fundamentally change the expectations citizens have of the role government should play in their lives?

This event is based on a recent article in The World Today by Hans Kundnani and Pepijn Bergsen who are both researchers in Chatham House's Europe Programme. 'Crawling from the Wreckage' is the first in a series of articles that look at key themes in European political discourse from the last century. You can read the article here. 

This event is open to Chatham House Members. Not a member? Find out more.

This event is part of the Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US, Americas and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.  Participants should not come to Chatham House for these events.

Only a few months into 2020, the coronavirus pandemic has presented a huge challenge for China’s ruling party against an already tumultuous 12 months of economic slowdown coupled with an increasingly hostile international environment. The crisis looks set to worsen a deteriorating relationship between the US and China as the two countries battle to avoid further economic ramifications. It has also undermined President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s domestic political legitimacy and economic growth.

The panellists will examine the wider geopolitical fallout of the coronavirus pandemic and discuss China’s future economic planning. How will the COVID-19 outbreak further strain the US-China relationship? What effect will this have on global trade and vulnerable supply chains at a time when cooperation is needed more than ever? And to what extent is the ruling party addressing growing concerns over job losses, wealth inequality and a lack of social mobility?

This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations and selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you'd like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford.