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Projection-space implementation of deep learning-guided low-dose brain PET imaging improves performance over implementation in image-space

Purpose: To assess the performance of full dose (FD) positron emission tomography (PET) image synthesis in both image and projection space from low-dose (LD) PET images/sinograms without sacrificing diagnostic quality using deep learning techniques. Methods: Clinical brain PET/CT studies of 140 patients were retrospectively employed for LD to FD PET conversion. 5% of the events were randomly selected from the FD list-mode PET data to simulate a realistic LD acquisition. A modified 3D U-Net model was implemented to predict FD sinograms in the projection-space (PSS) and FD images in image-space (PIS) from their corresponding LD sinograms/images, respectively. The quality of the predicted PET images was assessed by two nuclear medicine specialists using a five-point grading scheme. Quantitative analysis using established metrics including the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), structural similarity index metric (SSIM), region-wise standardized uptake value (SUV) bias, as well as first-, second- and high-order texture radiomic features in 83 brain regions for the test and evaluation dataset was also performed. Results: All PSS images were scored 4 or higher (good to excellent) by the nuclear medicine specialists. PSNR and SSIM values of 0.96 ± 0.03, 0.97 ± 0.02 and 31.70 ± 0.75, 37.30 ± 0.71 were obtained for PIS and PSS, respectively. The average SUV bias calculated over all brain regions was 0.24 ± 0.96% and 1.05 ± 1.44% for PSS and PIS, respectively. The Bland-Altman plots reported the lowest SUV bias (0.02) and variance (95% CI: -0.92, +0.84) for PSS compared with the reference FD images. The relative error of the homogeneity radiomic feature belonging to the Grey Level Co-occurrence Matrix category was -1.07 ± 1.77 and 0.28 ± 1.4 for PIS and PSS, respectively Conclusion: The qualitative assessment and quantitative analysis demonstrated that the FD PET prediction in projection space led to superior performance, resulting in higher image quality and lower SUV bias and variance compared to FD PET prediction in the image domain.




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Performance of digital PET compared to high-resolution conventional PET in patients with cancer

Recently introduced PET systems using silicon photomultipliers with digital readout (dPET) have an improved timing and spatial resolution, aiming at a better image quality, over conventional PET (cPET) systems. We prospectively evaluated the performance of a dPET system in patients with cancer, as compared to high-resolution (HR) cPET imaging. Methods: After a single FDG-injection, 66 patients underwent dPET (Vereos, Philips Healthcare) and cPET (Ingenuity TF, Philips Healthcare) imaging in a randomized order. We used HR-reconstructions (2x2x2 mm3 voxels) for both scanners and determined SUVmax, SUVmean, lesion-to-background ratio (LBR), metabolic tumor volume (MTV) and lesion diameter in up to 5 FDG-positive lesions per patient. Furthermore, we counted the number of visible and measurable lesions on each PET scan. Two nuclear medicine specialists blindly determined the Tumor Node Metastasis (TNM) score from both image sets in 30 patients referred for initial staging. For all 66 patients, these specialists separately and blindly evaluated image quality (4-point scale) and determined the scan preference. Results: We included 238 lesions that were visible and measurable on both PET scans. We found 37 additional lesions on dPET in 27 patients (41%), which were unmeasurable (n = 14) or invisible (n = 23) on cPET. SUVmean, SUVmax, LBR and MTV on cPET were 5.2±3.9 (mean±SD), 6.9±5.6, 5.0±3.6 and 2991±13251 mm3, respectively. On dPET SUVmean, SUVmax and LBR increased 24%, 23% and 27%, respectively (p<0.001) while MTV decreased 13% (p<0.001) compared to cPET. Visual analysis showed TNM upstaging with dPET in 13% of the patients (4/30). dPET images also scored higher in image quality (P = 0.003) and were visually preferred in the majority of cases (65%). Conclusion: Digital PET improved the detection of small lesions, upstaged the disease and images were visually preferred as compared to high-resolution conventional PET. More studies are necessary to confirm the superior diagnostic performance of digital PET.




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Benefit of improved performance with state-of-the art digital PET/CT for lesion detection in oncology

Latest digital whole-body PET scanners provide a combination of higher sensitivity and improved spatial and timing resolution. We performed a lesion detectability study on two generations of Siemens Biograph PET/CT scanners, the mCT and Vision, to study the impact of improved physical performance on clinical performance. Our hypothesis is that the improved performance of the Vision will result in improved lesion detectability, allowing shorter imaging times or equivalently, lower injected dose. Methods: Data were acquired with the Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging Clinical Trials Network torso phantom combined with a 20-cm diameter cylindrical phantom. Spherical lesions were emulated by acquiring spheres-in-air data, and combining it with the phantom data to generate combined datasets with embedded lesions of known contrast. Two sphere sizes and uptakes were used: 9.89 mm diameter spheres with 6:1 (lung) and 3:1 (cylinder) and 4.95 mm diameter spheres with 9.6:1 (lung) and 4.5:1 (cylinder) local activity concentration uptakes. Standard image reconstruction was performed: ordinary Poisson ordered subsets expectation maximization algorithm with point spread function and time-of-flight modeling and post-reconstruction smoothing with a 5 mm Gaussian filter. The Vision images were also generated without any post-reconstruction smoothing. Generalized scan statistics methodology was used to estimate the area under the localization receiver operating characteristic curve (ALROC). Results: Higher sensitivity and improved TOF performance of Vision leads to reduced contrast in the background noise nodule distribution. Measured lesion contrast is also higher on the Vision due to its improved spatial resolution. Hence, the ALROC values are noticeably higher for the Vision relative to the mCT. Conclusion: Improved overall performance of the Vision provides a factor of 4-6 reduction in imaging time (or injected dose) over the mCT when using the ALROC metric for lesions >9.89 mm in diameter. Smaller lesions are barely detected in the mCT, leading to even higher ALROC gains with the Vision. Improved spatial resolution of the Vision also leads to a higher measured contrast that is closer to the real uptake, implying improved quantification. Post-reconstruction smoothing, however, reduces this improvement in measured contrast, thereby reducing the ALROC values for small, high uptake lesions.




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Data Driven Respiratory Gating Outperforms Device-Based Gating for Clinical FDG PET/CT

A data-driven method for respiratory gating in PET has recently been commercially developed. We sought to compare the performance of the algorithm to an external, device-based system for oncological [18F]-FDG PET/CT imaging. Methods: 144 whole-body [18F]-FDG PET/CT examinations were acquired using a Discovery D690 or D710 PET/CT scanner (GE Healthcare), with a respiratory gating waveform recorded by an external, device based respiratory gating system. In each examination, two of the bed positions covering the liver and lung bases were acquired with duration of 6 minutes. Quiescent period gating retaining ~50% of coincidences was then able to produce images with an effective duration of 3 minutes for these two bed positions, matching the other bed positions. For each exam, 4 reconstructions were performed and compared: data driven gating (DDG-retro), external device-based gating (RPM Gated), no gating but using only the first 3 minutes of data (Ungated Matched), and no gating retaining all coincidences (Ungated Full). Lesions in the images were quantified and image quality was scored by a radiologist, blinded to the method of data processing. Results: The use of DDG-retro was found to increase SUVmax and to decrease the threshold-defined lesion volume in comparison to each of the other reconstruction options. Compared to RPM-gated, DDG-retro gave an average increase in SUVmax of 0.66 ± 0.1 g/mL (n=87, p<0.0005). Although results from the blinded image evaluation were most commonly equivalent, DDG-retro was preferred over RPM gated in 13% of exams while the opposite occurred in just 2% of exams. This was a significant preference for DDG-retro (p=0.008, n=121). Liver lesions were identified in 23 exams. Considering this subset of data, DDG-retro was ranked superior to Ungated Full in 6/23 (26%) of cases. Gated reconstruction using the external device failed in 16% of exams, while DDG-retro always provided a clinically acceptable image. Conclusion: In this clinical evaluation, the data driven respiratory gating technique provided superior performance as compared to the external device-based system. For the majority of exams the performance was equivalent, but data driven respiratory gating had superior performance in 13% of exams, leading to a significant preference overall.




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3D-Printable Platform for High-Throughput Small-Animal Imaging




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The Impact of Radiobiologically-Informed Dose Prescription on the Clinical Benefit of Yttrium-90 SIRT in Colorectal Cancer Patients

The purpose of this study was to establish the dose-response relationship of selective internal radiation therapy (SIRT) in patients with metastatic colorectal cancer (mCRC), when informed by radiobiological sensitivity parameters derived from mCRC cell lines exposed to yttrium-90 (90Y). Methods: 23 mCRC patients with liver metastases refractory to chemotherapy were included. 90Y bremsstrahlung SPECT images were transformed into dose maps assuming the local dose deposition method. Baseline and follow-up CT scans were segmented to derive liver and tumor volumes. Mean, median, and D70 (minimum dose to 70% of tumor volume) values determined from dose maps were correlated with change in tumor volume and vRECIST response using linear and logistic regression, respectively. Radiosensitivity parameters determined by clonogenic assays of mCRC cell lines HT-29 and DLD-1 after exposure to 90Y or external beam radiotherapy (EBRT; 6MV photons) were used in biological effective dose (BED) calculations. Results: Mean administered radioactivity was 1469±428 MBq (847-2185 MBq), achieving a mean radiation absorbed tumor dose of 35.5±9.4 Gy and mean normal liver dose of 26.4±6.8 Gy. A 1.0 Gy increase in mean, median, and D70 absorbed dose was associated with reduction in tumor volume of 1.8%, 1.8%, and 1.5%, respectively, and increased probability of vRECIST response (odds ratio: 1.09, 1.09, and 1.10 respectively). Threshold mean, median and D70 doses for response were 48.3, 48.8, and 41.8 Gy respectively. EBRT-equivalent BEDs for 90Y are up to 50% smaller than those calculated by applying protraction-corrected radiobiological parameters derived from EBRT alone. Conclusion: Dosimetric studies have assumed equivalence between 90Y SIRT and EBRT, leading to inflation of BED for SIRT and possible under-treatment. Radiobiological parameters for 90Y were applied to a BED model, providing a calculation method that has the potential to improve assessment of tumor control.




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Economic Recovery and Anticorruption in South Africa: Assessing Progress on the Reform Agenda

Invitation Only Research Event

4 December 2019 - 3:00pm to 4:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Professor Nick Binedell, Founding Director and Sasol Chair of Strategic Management, Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS), University of Pretoria

South Africa has significant economic potential based on its resource endowment, quality human capital and well-developed infrastructure compared to the region. However, the country’s economic growth rate has not topped 2 per cent since 2013, and in 2018, was below 1 per cent. This has put a strain on citizens and communities in a country that still suffers from structural inequality, poverty and high unemployment. Economic recovery and anti-corruption were the central pillars of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s 2019 electoral campaign and he has set an investment target of $100 billion. However, voters and investors alike are demanding faster and more visible progress from the country’s enigmatic leader who has a reputation for caution and calculation.

At this event, Professor Nick Binedell will discuss the progress of and opposition to the president’s economic reform agenda and the opportunities for international investment to support long term inclusive and sustainable growth in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




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Angola's Business Promise: Evaluating the Progress of Privatization and Other Economic Reforms

Research Event

21 January 2020 - 2:30pm to 3:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Hon. Manuel José Nunes Júnior, Minister of State for Economic Coordination, Republic of Angola
Chair: Dr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Minister Nunes Júnior will discuss the progress of the Angolan government’s economic stabilization plans and business reform agenda including the privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These reforms could expand Angola’s exports beyond oil and stimulate new industries and more inclusive economic growth.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




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Equatorial Guinea in 2020: Prospects for Economic and Governance Reforms

Research Event

31 January 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Tutu Alicante, Executive Director, EG Justice
Chair: Dr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Despite boasting one of Africa’s highest GDP per capita rates, much of Equatorial Guinea’s population remain in poverty, with the world’s largest gap between its GDP per capita rates and human development index score. Equatorial Guinea’s economy is highly dependent on oil exports but production is in decline. In December 2019, the IMF Executive Board approved a US$282.8 million three-year Extended Fund Facility loan for Equatorial Guinea with provisions for promoting economic diversification, good governance, increasing transparency and fighting corruption. The country is also seeking to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

At this event, Tutu Alicante will discuss prospects for meaningful reforms in Equatorial Guinea to improve economic governance, human rights and achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




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POSTPONED: Pursuing Economic Reform and Growth in South Africa: the view from the African National Congress

Research Event

18 March 2020 - 10:30am to 11:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General, African National Congress (ANC)

The government of South Africa is pursuing a programme of reform to revitalize the economy, strengthen institutions and combat corruption. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 13 February and the budget speech of 26 February represent the most significant articulation of the government’s economic strategy. Central to this is the government’s plans for the energy sector, which is fundamental for reviving the economy, and the reform of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). But questions remain about possible divergence of the approach taken by government ministers from the policy position of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and what this might mean for the sustainability and progress of reform.  

At this event, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General of the ANC, will discuss the party’s assessment of reform efforts to date and priorities for delivering on inclusive growth.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Sahar Eljack

Programme Administrator, Africa Programme
+ 44 (0) 20 7314 3660




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Combining Precursor and Fragment Information for Improved Detection of Differential Abundance in Data Independent Acquisition [Technological Innovation and Resources]

In bottom-up, label-free discovery proteomics, biological samples are acquired in a data-dependent (DDA) or data-independent (DIA) manner, with peptide signals recorded in an intact (MS1) and fragmented (MS2) form. While DDA has only the MS1 space for quantification, DIA contains both MS1 and MS2 at high quantitative quality. DIA profiles of complex biological matrices such as tissues or cells can contain quantitative interferences, and the interferences at the MS1 and the MS2 signals are often independent. When comparing biological conditions, the interferences can compromise the detection of differential peptide or protein abundance and lead to false positive or false negative conclusions.

We hypothesized that the combined use of MS1 and MS2 quantitative signals could improve our ability to detect differentially abundant proteins. Therefore, we developed a statistical procedure incorporating both MS1 and MS2 quantitative information of DIA. We benchmarked the performance of the MS1-MS2-combined method to the individual use of MS1 or MS2 in DIA using four previously published controlled mixtures, as well as in two previously unpublished controlled mixtures. In the majority of the comparisons, the combined method outperformed the individual use of MS1 or MS2. This was particularly true for comparisons with low fold changes, few replicates, and situations where MS1 and MS2 were of similar quality. When applied to a previously unpublished investigation of lung cancer, the MS1-MS2-combined method increased the coverage of known activated pathways.

Since recent technological developments continue to increase the quality of MS1 signals (e.g. using the BoxCar scan mode for Orbitrap instruments), the combination of the MS1 and MS2 information has a high potential for future statistical analysis of DIA data.




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Thorough Performance Evaluation of 213 nm Ultraviolet Photodissociation for Top-down Proteomics [Technological Innovation and Resources]

Top-down proteomics studies intact proteoform mixtures and offers important advantages over more common bottom-up proteomics technologies, as it avoids the protein inference problem. However, achieving complete molecular characterization of investigated proteoforms using existing technologies remains a fundamental challenge for top-down proteomics. Here, we benchmark the performance of ultraviolet photodissociation (UVPD) using 213 nm photons generated by a solid-state laser applied to the study of intact proteoforms from three organisms. Notably, the described UVPD setup applies multiple laser pulses to induce ion dissociation, and this feature can be used to optimize the fragmentation outcome based on the molecular weight of the analyzed biomolecule. When applied to complex proteoform mixtures in high-throughput top-down proteomics, 213 nm UVPD demonstrated a high degree of complementarity with the most employed fragmentation method in proteomics studies, higher-energy collisional dissociation (HCD). UVPD at 213 nm offered higher average proteoform sequence coverage and degree of proteoform characterization (including localization of post-translational modifications) than HCD. However, previous studies have shown limitations in applying database search strategies developed for HCD fragmentation to UVPD spectra which contains up to nine fragment ion types. We therefore performed an analysis of the different UVPD product ion type frequencies. From these data, we developed an ad hoc fragment matching strategy and determined the influence of each possible ion type on search outcomes. By paring down the number of ion types considered in high-throughput UVPD searches from all types down to the four most abundant, we were ultimately able to achieve deeper proteome characterization with UVPD. Lastly, our detailed product ion analysis also revealed UVPD cleavage propensities and determined the presence of a product ion produced specifically by 213 nm photons. All together, these observations could be used to better elucidate UVPD dissociation mechanisms and improve the utility of the technique for proteomic applications.




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Integration of IgA and IgG Autoantigens Improves Performance of Biomarker Panels for Early Diagnosis of Lung Cancer [Research]

Lung cancer (LC) remains the leading cause of mortality from malignant tumors worldwide. In our previous study, we surveyed both IgG and IgM-bound serological biomarkers and validated a panel of IgG-bound autoantigens for early LC diagnosis with 50% sensitivity at 90% specificity. To further improve the performance of these serological biomarkers, we surveyed HuProt arrays, comprised of 20,240 human proteins, for IgA-bound autoantigens because IgAs are a major immunoglobulin isotype in the lung. Integrating with IgG-bound autoantigens, we discovered and validated a combined biomarker panel using ELISA-format tests. Specifically, in Phase I, we obtained IgA-based autoimmune profiles of 69 early stage LC patients, 30 healthy subjects and 25 patients with lung benign lesions (LBL) on HuProt arrays and identified 28 proteins as candidate autoantigens that were significantly associated with early stage LC. In Phase II, we re-purified the autoantigens and converted them into an ELISA-format testing to profile an additional large cohort, comprised of 136 early stage LC patients, 58 healthy individuals, and 29 LBL patients. Integration of IgG autoimmune profiles allowed us to identify and validate a biomarker panel of three IgA autoantigens (i.e. BCL7A, and TRIM33 and MTERF4) and three IgG autoantigens (i.e. CTAG1A, DDX4 and MAGEC2) for diagnosis of early stage LC with 73.5% sensitivity at >85% specificity. In Phase III, the performance of this biomarker panel was confirmed with an independent cohort, comprised of 88 early stage LC patients, 18 LBL patients, and 36 healthy subjects. Finally, a blind test on 178 serum samples was conducted to confirm the performance of the biomarker panel. In summary, this study demonstrates for the first time that an integrated panel of IgA/IgG autoantigens can serve as valuable biomarkers to further improve the performance of early diagnosis of LC.




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Guidance Document: Validation of a High-Performance Liquid Chromatography-Tandem Mass Spectrometry Immunopeptidomics Assay for the Identification of HLA Class I Ligands Suitable for Pharmaceutical Therapies [Commentary]

For more than two decades naturally presented, human leukocyte antigen (HLA)-restricted peptides (immunopeptidome) have been eluted and sequenced using liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS). Since, identified disease-associated HLA ligands have been characterized and evaluated as potential active substances. Treatments based on HLA-presented peptides have shown promising results in clinical application as personalized T cell-based immunotherapy. Peptide vaccination cocktails are produced as investigational medicinal products under GMP conditions. To support clinical trials based on HLA-presented tumor-associated antigens, in this study the sensitive LC-MS/MS HLA class I antigen identification pipeline was fully validated for our technical equipment according to the current US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA) guidelines.

The immunopeptidomes of JY cells with or without spiked-in, isotope labeled peptides, of peripheral blood mononuclear cells of healthy volunteers as well as a chronic lymphocytic leukemia and a bladder cancer sample were reliably identified using a data-dependent acquisition method. As the LC-MS/MS pipeline is used for identification purposes, the validation parameters include accuracy, precision, specificity, limit of detection and robustness.




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Human Hepatocyte Nuclear Factor 4-{alpha} Encodes Isoforms with Distinct Transcriptional Functions [Research]

HNF4α is a nuclear receptor produced as 12 isoforms from two promoters by alternative splicing. To characterize the transcriptional capacities of all 12 HNF4α isoforms, stable lines expressing each isoform were generated. The entire transcriptome associated with each isoform was analyzed as well as their respective interacting proteome. Major differences were noted in the transcriptional function of these isoforms. The α1 and α2 isoforms were the strongest regulators of gene expression whereas the α3 isoform exhibited significantly reduced activity. The α4, α5, and α6 isoforms, which use an alternative first exon, were characterized for the first time, and showed a greatly reduced transcriptional potential with an inability to recognize the consensus response element of HNF4α. Several transcription factors and coregulators were identified as potential specific partners for certain HNF4α isoforms. An analysis integrating the vast amount of omics data enabled the identification of transcriptional regulatory mechanisms specific to certain HNF4α isoforms, hence demonstrating the importance of considering all isoforms given their seemingly diverse functions.




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Glucose availability but not changes in pancreatic hormones sensitizes hepatic AMPK activity during nutritional transition in rodents [Metabolism]

The cellular energy sensor AMP-activated protein kinase (AMPK) is a metabolic regulator that mediates adaptation to nutritional variations to maintain a proper energy balance in cells. We show here that suckling-weaning and fasting-refeeding transitions in rodents are associated with changes in AMPK activation and the cellular energy state in the liver. These nutritional transitions were characterized by a metabolic switch from lipid to glucose utilization, orchestrated by modifications in glucose levels and the glucagon/insulin ratio in the bloodstream. We therefore investigated the respective roles of glucose and pancreatic hormones on AMPK activation in mouse primary hepatocytes. We found that glucose starvation transiently activates AMPK, whereas changes in glucagon and insulin levels had no impact on AMPK. Challenge of hepatocytes with metformin-induced metabolic stress strengthened both AMPK activation and cellular energy depletion under limited-glucose conditions, whereas neither glucagon nor insulin altered AMPK activation. Although both insulin and glucagon induced AMPKα phosphorylation at its Ser485/491 residue, they did not affect its activity. Finally, the decrease in cellular ATP levels in response to an energy stress was additionally exacerbated under fasting conditions and by AMPK deficiency in hepatocytes, revealing metabolic inflexibility and emphasizing the importance of AMPK for maintaining hepatic energy charge. Our results suggest that nutritional changes (i.e. glucose availability), rather than the related hormonal changes (i.e. the glucagon/insulin ratio), sensitize AMPK activation to the energetic stress induced by the dietary transition during fasting. This effect is critical for preserving the cellular energy state in the liver.




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Digital Transformation Office chief executive Paul Shetler announces public service work schedule

Paul Shetler reveals the digital projects about to hit the federal bureaucracy. Starting with Canberra.




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How Australian public service's digital reforms will happen, according to the Digital Transformation Office

The millions of customers, the short deadline: how the public service's digital revolution will start.




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Public service to ban paper in boxes: New digital policy to make sweeping reforms across APS

One powerful agency head warns against "tyranny of small person" as sweeping reforms released for public service.




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Australian public service failing to share information: Public Sector Data Management report

A report has revealed stunning examples of public service inefficiency when it comes to releasing and managing data.




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Troubled myGov website to be taken from Human Services and given to Digital Transformation Office for streamlining

Malcolm Turnbull's DTO has been critical of myGov, now it has the chance to show it can do better.




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Digital Transformation Agency boss Paul Shetler resigns

Agile government takes a stumble as digital pioneer logs off after just six weeks.




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Skin barrier lipid enzyme activity in Netherton patients is associated with protease activity and ceramide abnormalities

Jeroen van Smeden
Apr 7, 2020; 0:jlr.RA120000639v1-jlr.RA120000639
Research Articles




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A novel GPER antagonist protects against the formation of estrogen-induced cholesterol gallstones in female mice

Chelsea DeLeon
May 1, 2020; 61:767-777
Research Articles




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Ebola virus matrix protein VP40 hijacks the host plasma membrane to form the virus envelope

Souad Amiar
Apr 15, 2020; 0:jlr.ILR120000753v1-jlr.ILR120000753
Images in Lipid Research




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Episode 77 - The Internet of Tulips (IoT) Bitcoin, the platform wars and Christmas tech gifts

We finally get the IoT acronym the pod has been waiting for as we discuss Bitcoin and 17th century Dutch finance. Charlotte Jee informs Henry Burrell, David Price and Scott Carey.


Scott then leads us down the winding road of the so-called platform wars, in a week when Google blocked the Amazon Echo Show from streaming YouTube. Is this a bump in the road or will services be cut from rival hardware?


And finally, led by David, the pod discusses its favourite tech of the year and what you might consider buying for friends and family for Christmas.

 

See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.




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Skin barrier lipid enzyme activity in Netherton patients is associated with protease activity and ceramide abnormalities [Research Articles]

Individuals with Netherton syndrome (NTS) have increased serine protease activity, which strongly impacts the barrier function of the skin epidermis and leads to skin inflammation. Here, we investigated how serine protease activity in NTS correlates with changes in the stratum corneum ceramides, which are crucial components of the skin barrier. We examined two key enzymes involved in epidermal ceramide biosynthesis, glucocerebrosidase (GBA) and acid-sphingomyelinase (ASM). We compared in situ expression levels and activities of GBA and ASM between NTS patients and controls and correlated the expression and activities with i) stratum corneum ceramide profiles, ii) in situ serine protease activity, and iii) clinical presentation of patients. Using activity-based probe labeling, we visualized and localized active, epidermal GBA, and a newly developed in situ zymography method enabled us to visualize and localize active ASM. Reduction in active GBA in NTS patients coincided with increased ASM activity, particularly in areas with increased serine protease activity. NTS patients with scaly erythroderma exhibited more pronounced anomalies in GBA and ASM activities than patients with ichthyosis linearis circumflexa. They also displayed a stronger increase in stratum corneum ceramides processed via ASM. We conclude that changes in the localization of active GBA and ASM correlate with i) altered stratum corneum ceramide composition in NTS patients, ii) local serine protease activity, and iii) the clinical manifestation of NTS. 




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Ebola virus matrix protein VP40 hijacks the host plasma membrane to form the virus envelope [Images in Lipid Research]




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Russia’s Uncertain Regime Transformation

11 March 2020

Professor Nikolai Petrov

Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Dr Ben Noble

Lecturer in Russian Politics, University College London; Senior Research Fellow, HSE, Moscow
Despite the drama, Vladimir Putin’s announcement endorsing a constitutional change allowing him to remain president from 2024 does surprisingly little to change the status quo.

2020-03-11-Putin-Constitution.jpg

Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses lawmakers debating on the second reading of the constitutional reform bill during a session of the State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament March 10, 2020. Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images.

With Putin’s current term as head of state due to run out in 2024, the question everybody has been asking is what he will do to remain in power. The Russian president’s recent speech, made in person in the State Duma during the second reading of his own constitutional reform bill, has been interpreted by many as a clear answer. Summaries such as “Putin forever” and “perpetual Putin” abound. But the reality is not so clear.

Putin has not committed to standing for re-election in 2024, never mind staying in power until 2036, when two additional six-year terms from 2024 would run out. What he has done is provide the constitutional grounds to retain power as president. It creates a highly credible option without committing him to it.

And the uncertainty matters. Because as long as members of the elite are unsure whether Putin will take up the option to remain president, they are kept in check.

Broader constitutional reform

With the flurry of interest around Putin’s announcement, we should not lose sight of his moves to further strengthen the presidency. As part of the broader constitutional reform package, Russia’s existing “super-presidency” will gain additional powers, such as the authority to fire top-tier judges and to block legislation when the legislature has overridden a presidential veto (in other words, a “super-veto”).

The proposals also put the autonomy of local self-government at risk, with Moscow and regional executives gaining the constitutional power to hire and fire officials who are not even technically part of the state. And the president now has a formalised role as “general leader” of the government. Putin is creating the “Great Presidency”.

However, the majority of constitutional changes do not relate to the presidency – they have different purposes. Firstly, to revitalise support for the regime which took a hit following unpopular pension reforms in 2018. Secondly, to distract or appease those worried by Putin remaining in a strengthened presidency. And perhaps most significantly, to boost turnout in the nationwide vote on reforms.

This desire to re-energise popular support becomes apparent as the changes – some of which will have to be inserted rather awkwardly into the constitution’s structure – focus on three elements aimed squarely at improving the regime’s appeal: increased material support from the state for citizens, including indexing state pensions; an emphasis on “traditional values”, including a declaration that marriage can only be a union between a man and a woman; and increased Russian sovereignty, including a “nationalisation” of the elite, with a constitutional ban on top-level officials having bank accounts abroad. 

Constitutional reform is, moreover, the most visible part of a broader political transformation already underway, including a major propaganda drive. Putin has promised a significant increase in resources for its “maternity capital” programme, putting more money in the pockets of young Russian families.

And he has instructed Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s government to focus on delivering his “national projects” – goals aimed at improving Russians’ lives across a range of areas, from infrastructure to education and healthcare.

Taking advantage of several imminent historical milestones is also on the cards. It has been reported Putin will sign the constitutional reform bill on March 18 – the anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. And May 9 is the 75th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War (the Russian term for the Second World War), with foreign dignitaries invited to attend events in Moscow.

Putin has also been filling the airwaves with a high-production-values series called “20 Questions for Vladimir Putin”, as well as holding public meetings with citizens in provinces such as Cherepovets and Ivanovo. There is a clear aim to demonstrate the president is not only still in control, but also concerned with the well-being of everyday Russians.

With parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2021 the Kremlin knows that, to maintain its control of a super-majority of seats in the State Duma, its ratings-raising drive has to work – even if it does always have the option of using manifestly authoritarian methods for realising desired election results. A proposal to call early State Duma elections was made during the second reading of Putin’s reform bill, but was quickly withdrawn after Putin spoke out against the idea.

Russia’s complex architecture of “power”

Throughout this transformation, maintaining control of the elite – particularly of the siloviki – is key for Putin. A reshuffling and removal of senior officials in the Procuracy has seen Yury Chaika replaced as general prosecutor by Ivan Krasnov, previously a deputy chair of the Investigative Committee, which is widely seen as a rival structure in Russia’s complex architecture of “power” bodies.

When considered alongside the constitutional changes giving the president broader powers in appointing regional prosecutors, this is textbook “divide and rule”. Power balancing is also on display with the Security Council, as the job description for Dmitry Medvedev’s new role as its deputy chair could provide fertile ground for clashes with the body’s secretary, Nikolai Patrushev.

Pitting rival patronal networks against each other means Putin can keep rivals in check within the broader structure of the “Great Presidency”, while staying firmly in control himself.

The prospect of Putin remaining president is unlikely to be popular. According to data from independent Russian polling agency the Levada Centre, only 27 per cent of Russians want Putin to stay in the post after 2024. This figure could, of course, change in either direction as the prospect becomes more real for Russians. But if Putin’s announcement galvanises mass opposition, the authorities may well use responses to the COVID-19 outbreak to keep protesters at bay – something already on display in Moscow.

What this all means for Russia is that, despite the drama, considerable uncertainty remains following Putin’s announcement. What we can say for certain, however, is that it dashes hopes of serious political change any time soon.




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Why is it So Hard for Iraq to Form A Government?

25 April 2020

Dr Renad Mansour

Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative
Mustafa al-Kadhimi has emerged as the compromise prime minister designate, but his potential appointment is built on shaky foundations.

2020-04-25-Iraq-Security-COVID

A member of Iraqi security forces stands guard behind a yellow line after the government declared curfew due to coronavirus. Photo by Fariq Faraj Mahmood/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images.

On April 9, Iraqi President Barham Salih gathered the Shia, Kurdish and Sunni political blocs at the presidential palace to task head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi with forming a government.

Kadhimi is the third prime minister-designate assigned since Prime Minister Adil abd al-Mehdi resigned in November, in the wake of mass protests against government corruption and the country’s ethno-sectarian based political system.

Kadhimi’s two predecessors, Muhammad Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan al-Zurfi, both failed to form a government. This third attempt came as Iraq struggles with repeated crises since October 2019, when the government began responding with deadly force to large-scale mass protests, killing more than 600 and injuring tens of thousands.

In January, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani escalated tensions between the United States and Iran, with Iraq stuck in the middle and becoming the home for regular tit-for-tat attacks. The Islamic State — never completely defeated — took advantage of these crises and increased its attacks in disputed territories.

The outbreak of COVID-19 challenges the country’s fragile public health sector, while the decline in the price of oil will make it harder for leaders to pay the public salaries that keep the system (and patronage) moving.

What does the delay in forming a government amid multiple crises mean for the post-2003 Iraqi political system?

Iraq’s post-2003 political system is designed to withstand crisis. Over the years, political parties reflecting the country’s ethnic and sectarian divides have had a tacit understanding that crises represent a risk to their collective interests. These elite stakeholders have together weathered civil war, insurgency and multiple protests — despite deep conflicts with one another.

For instance, in September 2018 protesters attacked most major political party headquarters and the Iranian consulate in Basra, and authorities killed some 20 protesters.

Since the May election of that year, the fragmented Shia elite had been unable to even declare which side has the largest parliamentary bloc, let alone decide on a government.

But after the September crisis, the previously gridlocked parties swiftly came together to form an “understanding” that pushed through the impasse leading to the Mehdi government. In 2020, however, Iraq’s political parties were slower to come back together despite the multiple crises — far greater than 2018. The system is less able to swiftly fix itself, based primarily on the fragmentation of the elite — and their determination to prevent any challenge to their rule.

Why did the two prior attempts fail?

The two previous prime minister-designates each fell short for different reasons. When I met Allawi in February at the prime minister’s guesthouse in Baghdad, he was very clearly convinced that his mandate was to sideline the parties.

He hoped that simply choosing technocratic ministers outside the elite pact, with the support of Moqtada al-Sadr behind him, would garner support from protesters and the disillusioned public. He failed, however, because his cabinet had to go through parliament and the parties rejected what they saw a threat to the elite pact and the system.

Zurfi similarly failed after being directly appointed in March by Salih after the Shia parties failed to come up with a candidate. From the beginning, then, Zurfi faced challenges because parties were not in agreement. He attempted to directly confront his opposition, and spoke out against Iranian influence in Iraq. As a result, Zurfi was unable to even get to parliament with his proposed cabinet, as the Shia parties got back together to bring him down.

The failure of both strategies — Allawi attempting to work outside the elite party system and Zurfi trying to target certain parties — reveals tensions in Iraq’s political system. This fragmentation strains the parties’ ability to swiftly unite, and the system’s ability to withstand crises.

The endemic problems are a consequence of fragmentation, including the failure following the 2018 elections to declare governing parliamentary bloc. Moreover, after that election, newcomers into the political system (two-thirds of the MPs are serving their first term) are increasingly making their own demands and less willing to blindly toe party lines.

Can Kadhimi overcome the impasse?

Kadhimi’s appointment as prime minister-designate nonetheless is on shaky foundations. His appointment had previously faced a veto from Iran and its allied groups which make up the Fateh bloc. Kataeb Hezbollah, an armed group close to Iran and linked to the Popular Mobilization Units, issued a statement accusing Kadhimi with blood on his hands for the deaths of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

Many Fateh bloc members had for months vetoed Kadhimi’s name due to this allegation. Immediately before Kadhimi addressed the nation for the first time, Iraqi state television broadcast a prerecorded statement by PMU (and Fateh) leader Qais al-Khazali, who had also previously accused Kadhimi of spying for the Americans and being complicit in the two killings.

Khazali, who commands the second-largest party within Fateh, accepted the party line to back Kadhimi but came out with his own conditions on television. However, the concerns about the COVID-19 crisis and the collapse of the price of oil finally brought all sides to compromise — a design of the political system.

Kadhimi has signalled he will play by the old rules with these stakeholders. Because of the magnitude of these simultaneous crises, Iraqi politics is moving back to the post-2003 norm. The ethno-sectarian based political system is geared to weather such existential crises more than it is to handling day-to-day governance. Despite the notion of “post-sectarianism” in Iraq, this system is based on ethno-sectarian political party compromise.

In his television address, Khazali, who had previously attempted to move away from sectarian language, explained that the process of selecting a prime minister is reserved to the Shia, who have the right as the majority, and not to Salih, a Kurd.

Over the years Kadhimi has expressed an admiration of the bravery of the protesters and of the importance of civil society. Many Iraqi civil society activists owe their lives to the work of the former intelligence chief. However, he has also been part of the same system that has violently suppressed protesters.

As the compromise prime minister-designate, he will find it difficult to transform his country as long as he plays by the rules of post-2003 Iraq — an irony not lost on the protesters who immediately rejected the candidacy of a man whom until recently many protesters had supported.

This article was originally published in The Washington Post




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Algeria’s Perfect Storm: COVID-19 and Its Fallout

6 May 2020

Adel Hamaizia

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Yahia H. Zoubir

Senior Professor of International Studies, KEDGE Business School; Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Coronavirus is a godsend for Algeria’s government to introduce restrictive measures beyond those needed to contain COVID-19. But its new leaders are missing a chance to gain legitimacy, which will offset the socio-economic fallout of the drop in oil prices.

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Algerian volunteers prepare personal protection equipment (PPE) to help combat the coronavirus epidemic in the capital Algiers. Photo by RYAD KRAMDI/AFP via Getty Images.

Although protests successfully ended Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 20-year sultanistic rule a little over one year ago, demands have been continuing to dismantle the system, get rid of the old personnel, and institute democracy.

The controversial election in December of Abdelmadjid Tebboune — who has inherited a disastrous situation — has not tempered the determination of the Hirak protest movement. As a former minister and prime minister under Bouteflika, the new president has won little legitimacy, and protests have continued.

Now COVID-19 is worsening already dire economic conditions, such as a sharp drop in oil prices. By the beginning of May, statistics showed 10% of confirmed cases have ended in fatality, the highest percentage in the region.

Maintaining an authoritarian style

Hirak had already called for the suspension of the marches — mobilising online instead — before the government’s measures, which include curfews and lockdowns, demonstrating a high sense of duty. But instead of appeasing Hirak’s demands, the government has maintained the authoritarian style of its predecessors.

Tebboune released more than 5,000 prisoners on March 31 but kept prisoners of conscience and leaders of the hirak imprisoned, then subsequently imprisoned journalists and activists. It even passed a controversial penal law, that also covers fake news, and may be used to justify actions against journalists.

The regime wishes to see an end to the Hirak, and rejects accusations of totalitarianism by insisting freedom and a democratic climate exist in Algeria.

Tebboune’s actions contradict his praise for the ‘blessed’ hirak and his promises of instituting the rule of law. In proclaiming the measures, the government has shown disappointing leadership, acting in an authoritarian fashion.

Tebboune also declared proudly that Algeria was fully prepared to fight the coronavirus epidemic, an optimistic claim given the country has only 400 intensive care unit (ICU) beds, or one per 100,000 people. Despite hundreds of billions of hydrocarbon dollars accumulating during the Bouteflika-era, Algeria’s health system ranks 173 out of 195 countries.

Algerians often refer to hospitals as ‘mouroirs’, meaning ‘places for the dying’. Not only has the state failed to build modern hospitals but basic hygienic conditions are lacking, and government officials prefer being treated overseas. A 2014 project to build five university hospitals was abandoned, leaving the health sector in deplorable shape.

Before Chinese assistance arrived, the glaring lack of equipment to protect caregivers and care for the sick was evident. Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad admitted the health system required a ‘total overhaul’. The president recently stated Algeria’s doctors are among the 'best in the world' but didn't address why almost 15,000 Algerian doctors practice in France.

Strict containment measures are in sync with most countries but implementation is challenging when most people live in overcrowded urban dwellings (the average household consists of 5.9 members).

Water shortages in many areas makes good hygiene and decontamination impossible, while schools and universities find online teaching difficult when many students do not possess laptops or internet connections. And only 20% of Algerians have debit cards in a cash-dominated economy because of low trust in the public-dominated banking sector, making online shopping capability low.

An already declining macroeconomic situation is worsening due to COVID-19. The IMF revised its 2020 estimates for Algeria, forecasting a catastrophic contraction of -5.2% in a country where hydrocarbons account for 93% of export revenues and 60% of its budget.

Foreign currency reserves are now an estimated $55 billion (expected to fall to $44billion by the end of 2020), down from $200 billion in 2014, and Algerian crude has recently traded close to production costs, with the fiscal breakeven oil price at $157.

In line with its historic aversion to external borrowing, Tebboune recently ruled out seeking financial support from the ‘IMF or other foreign banks’, as he argued such borrowing undermines sovereign foreign policy because - when indebted - ‘we cannot talk about either Palestine or Western Sahara’, two causes dear to Algeria. ‘Friendly countries’ - most likely a reference to China - are said to have offered to grant loans which have been declined for now.

The government is forecasted to face a 20% budget shortfall this year, but Algeria’s fiscal response to COVID-19 is actually the largest among the regional hydrocarbon exporters at an estimated 8% of GDP, compared to an average of 3.2%. However, the government revised downwards its 2020 public spending by 50% (a second cut in a month, from an initial 30% reduction), halting state projects and slashing its $41 billion import bill by 25% while expanding agricultural production. National oil company SONATRACH will also cut planned investment by half to $7 billion but plans have been revealed to develop other natural resources including gold, uranium and phosphates.

But recent growth rates are insufficient to create jobs for those entering the labour market. Despite government attempts to support a rather anaemic ‘formal’ private sector, estimates are 700,000 jobs could be lost due to potential bankruptcies from reduced activity and a loss of markets abroad.

Facing potential social unrest and the quasi-preservation of a tired social contract, the government has committed to upholding public sector wages - including for 50% of the civil servants told to stay home - protecting sacrosanct, unsustainable subsidies, and increasing health expenditure to strengthen the capacity to combat COVID-19.

A supplementary finance law will include various measures that support businesses and the economic fallout. However, while the government is to be commended for its efforts to aid businesses, supporting large swathes of the population is challenging as approximately 50% of the workforce operate in the informal economy.

Weak administrative capacity and insufficient data to implement cash transfers makes the planned ‘solidarity allowance’ of 10,000 dinars ($80) for Ramadan difficult to allocate to those who most need it (especially those in the informal sector). Families, communities, and religious organisations continue to be a social safety net.

So COVID-19 has not created new problems, it has merely magnified and exacerbated the numerous inequalities and failures of the Bouteflika regime to sufficiently invest in human security (economic, food, health environmental, personal, community, and political). Typically, whenever oil prices and related earnings dwindle, the political system promises to reform and diversify the economy. Tebboune is repeating this same old tune.

There are positive elements, such as the government’s realization it must initiate genuine reforms. And local enterprises have been successfully producing artificial respirators, surgical masks, and other materials. Algerians, including the Hirak, are showing great social solidarity.

But the government must capitalize on these positive actions by introducing real change. Because, if not, Hirak will certainly be back in force once the crisis is over, and operating in an environment of worsening socioeconomic problems. The medicine of the past will not work.




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Fourier transform mass spectrometry [Invited]

This article provides an introduction to Fourier transform-based mass spectrometry (FTMS). The key performance characteristics of FTMS, mass accuracy and resolution, are presented in the view of how they impact the interpretation of measurements in proteomic applications. The theory and principles of operation of two types of mass analyzer, Fourier transform ion cyclotron resonance and Orbitrap, are described. Major benefits as well as limitations of FTMS technology are discussed in the context of practical sample analysis, and illustrated with examples included as figures in this text and in the accompanying slide set. Comparisons highlighting the performance differences between the two mass analyzers are made where deemed useful in assisting the user with choosing the most appropriate technology for his/her application. Recent developments of these high-performing mass spectrometers are mentioned to provide a future outlook.




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Bayesian Proteoform Modeling Improves Protein Quantification of Global Proteomic Measurements [Technology]

As the capability of mass spectrometry-based proteomics has matured, tens of thousands of peptides can be measured simultaneously, which has the benefit of offering a systems view of protein expression. However, a major challenge is that with an increase in throughput, protein quantification estimation from the native measured peptides has become a computational task. A limitation to existing computationally-driven protein quantification methods is that most ignore protein variation, such as alternate splicing of the RNA transcript and post-translational modifications or other possible proteoforms, which will affect a significant fraction of the proteome. The consequence of this assumption is that statistical inference at the protein level, and consequently downstream analyses, such as network and pathway modeling, have only limited power for biomarker discovery. Here, we describe a Bayesian model (BP-Quant) that uses statistically derived peptides signatures to identify peptides that are outside the dominant pattern, or the existence of multiple over-expressed patterns to improve relative protein abundance estimates. It is a research-driven approach that utilizes the objectives of the experiment, defined in the context of a standard statistical hypothesis, to identify a set of peptides exhibiting similar statistical behavior relating to a protein. This approach infers that changes in relative protein abundance can be used as a surrogate for changes in function, without necessarily taking into account the effect of differential post-translational modifications, processing, or splicing in altering protein function. We verify the approach using a dilution study from mouse plasma samples and demonstrate that BP-Quant achieves similar accuracy as the current state-of-the-art methods at proteoform identification with significantly better specificity. BP-Quant is available as a MatLab ® and R packages at https://github.com/PNNL-Comp-Mass-Spec/BP-Quant.




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Soundscapes of war: the audio-visual performance of war by Shi'a militias in Iraq and Syria

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Helle Malmvig

This article sets out to bring sound and music to the field of visual studies in International Relations. It argues that IR largely has approached the visual field as if it was without sound; neglecting how audial landscapes frame and direct our interpretation of moving imagery. Sound and music contribute to making imagery intelligible to us, we ‘hear the pictures’ often without noticing. The audial can for instance articulate a visual absence, or blast visual signs, bring out certain emotional stages or subjects’ inner life. Audial frames steer us in distinct directions, they can mute the cries of the wounded in war, or amplify the sounds of joy of soldiers shooting in the air. To bring the audial and the visual analytically and empirically together, the article therefore proposes four key analytical themes: 1) the audial–visual frame, 2) point of view/point of audition, 3) modes of audio-visual synchronization and 4) aesthetics moods. These are applied to a study of ‘war music videos’ in Iraq and Syria made and circulated by Shi'a militias currently fighting there. Such war music videos, it is suggested, are not just artefacts of popular culture, but have become integral parts of how warfare is practiced today, and one that is shared by soldiers in the US and Europe. War music videos are performing war, just as they shape how war is known by spectators and participants alike.




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Political Will Was Not Enough for Justice Reform in Moldova

27 November 2019

Cristina Gherasimov

Former Academy Associate, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The pro-reform Sandu government had the will to dismantle oligarchic power structures, but was taken down by limited political experience.

2019-11-26-Sandu.jpg

Maia Sandu in Germany in July. Photo: Getty Images.

The lack of political will to carry out rule of law reforms is frequently the reason why reforms are not fully implemented. The case of Moldova proves that in societies where strong vested interests still persist, political savviness is equally as important as political will.

Old and new political power brokers in Moldova struck a fragile pact in June to oust Vladimir Plahotniuc. Plahotniuc had built a network of corruption and patronage with the help of the Democratic Party, which he treated as a personal vehicle and which allowed him and a small economic elite circle to enrich themselves off of government institutions and state-owned enterprises, to the detriment of Moldovan citizens and the health of their political process.

Maia Sandu, co-leader of the pro-reform ACUM electoral bloc, then formed a technocratic government with a remit to implement Moldova’s lagging reform agenda. Though made up of ministers with the integrity and political will to implement difficult transformational reforms, its biggest weakness was its coalition partner – the pro-Russian Socialists’ Party and its informal leader, Igor Dodon, the president of Moldova.

Now the Socialists – threatened by how key reforms to the justice system would impact their interests – have joined forces with Plahotniuc’s former allies, the Democratic Party, to oust ACUM, exploiting the party’s lack of political savviness. 

Reform interrupted

It was always clear the coalition would be short-lived. President Dodon and the co-ruling Socialists joined to buy themselves time, with the hope that they could restrict the most far-reaching reforms and tie the hands of ACUM ministers. In less than five months, however, the Sandu government initiated key reforms in the judicial system, aimed at dismantling Plahotniuc’s networks of patronage but also impacting the Socialists, who to a large degree also profited from the previous status quo.

The red line came over a last-minute change in the selection process of the prosecutor general proposed by Sandu on 6 November, which the Socialists claimed was unconstitutional and gave them the justification to put forward a motion of no confidence in the Sandu government. This was conveniently supported by the Democratic Party, who appeared threatened by an independent prosecutor’s office and saw an opportunity to return to power.

Thus, the political will to reform proved insufficient in the absence of a clear strategy on how to address the concerns of the old regime that they would be prosecuted and their vested interests threatened. Here, ACUM’s lack of political experience let them down. With their hands tied from the beginning in a fragile coalition with the Socialists, ACUM were unable to prevent sabotage from within state institutions and their own coalition, and could not find consensus to proceed with more radical methods to tackle corruption.

Less than two days after the Sandu government was out, a new government was sworn in on 14 November. Prime Minister Ion Chicu was an adviser to President Dodon before taking office and former minister of finance under the Plahotniuc-backed government of Pavel Filip, as part of a cabinet of ministers consisting largely of other presidential advisers and former high-level bureaucrats and ministers from the Plahotniuc era. 

The new government

A top priority for the Chicu government is to convince the international community that it is independent from President Dodon, and that its ‘technocrats’ will keep the course of reforms of the Sandu government. This is critical to preserving the financial assistance of Western partners, which the Moldovan government heavily relies on, particularly with a presidential election campaign next year, when they will likely want to create fiscal space for various giveaways to voters.

But within its first week in office, Chicu appears incapable of walking this line. Reverting to the initially proposed pre-selection process of prosecutor general signals that the post could be filled by a loyal appointee of President Dodon. Moreover, Chicu’s first visit abroad was to Russia, allegedly a major financial contributor of the Socialists’ Party. With the Socialists now holding the presidency, government, Chisinau mayoralty, and the parliament speaker’s seat, the danger of an increased Russian influence on key political decisions is very real.

A government steered by President Dodon risks bringing Moldova back to where it was before June, with a political elite mimicking reforms while misusing power for private gains. The biggest danger is that instead of continuing the reform process to bring Moldova back on its European integration path, the new government may focus on strengthening the old patronage system, this time with President Dodon at the top of the pyramid.

Lessons

This new minority government, supported by the Democrats, is a more natural one for President Dodon and therefore has more chances to survive, at least until presidential elections in autumn of 2020. Both the Socialists and the Democrats will likely seek to use this time to rebuild their own methods of capturing state resources. But with the Socialists relying on the Democrats’ votes in parliament, this is a recipe for further political instability.

Similar to Moldova, several other states across the post-Soviet space such as Ukraine and Armenia have had new political forces come to power with the political will and mandate to carry out difficult reforms to strengthen rule of law and fight systemic corruption in their countries. What they all have in common is the lack of political experience of how to create change, while old elites, used to thinking on their feet to defend their vested interests, retain their connections and economic and political influence.

Moldova is a good example of why political will needs to be backed up by clear strategy on how to deal with threatened vested interests in order for new political forces to be able to maintain themselves in power and reforms to be sustainable. When the chance comes again for fresh leaders to come to power, it is importantthey are politically prepared to use it swiftly and wisely.




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Russia’s Uncertain Regime Transformation

11 March 2020

Professor Nikolai Petrov

Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Dr Ben Noble

Lecturer in Russian Politics, University College London; Senior Research Fellow, HSE, Moscow
Despite the drama, Vladimir Putin’s announcement endorsing a constitutional change allowing him to remain president from 2024 does surprisingly little to change the status quo.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses lawmakers debating on the second reading of the constitutional reform bill during a session of the State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament March 10, 2020. Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images.

With Putin’s current term as head of state due to run out in 2024, the question everybody has been asking is what he will do to remain in power. The Russian president’s recent speech, made in person in the State Duma during the second reading of his own constitutional reform bill, has been interpreted by many as a clear answer. Summaries such as “Putin forever” and “perpetual Putin” abound. But the reality is not so clear.

Putin has not committed to standing for re-election in 2024, never mind staying in power until 2036, when two additional six-year terms from 2024 would run out. What he has done is provide the constitutional grounds to retain power as president. It creates a highly credible option without committing him to it.

And the uncertainty matters. Because as long as members of the elite are unsure whether Putin will take up the option to remain president, they are kept in check.

Broader constitutional reform

With the flurry of interest around Putin’s announcement, we should not lose sight of his moves to further strengthen the presidency. As part of the broader constitutional reform package, Russia’s existing “super-presidency” will gain additional powers, such as the authority to fire top-tier judges and to block legislation when the legislature has overridden a presidential veto (in other words, a “super-veto”).

The proposals also put the autonomy of local self-government at risk, with Moscow and regional executives gaining the constitutional power to hire and fire officials who are not even technically part of the state. And the president now has a formalised role as “general leader” of the government. Putin is creating the “Great Presidency”.

However, the majority of constitutional changes do not relate to the presidency – they have different purposes. Firstly, to revitalise support for the regime which took a hit following unpopular pension reforms in 2018. Secondly, to distract or appease those worried by Putin remaining in a strengthened presidency. And perhaps most significantly, to boost turnout in the nationwide vote on reforms.

This desire to re-energise popular support becomes apparent as the changes – some of which will have to be inserted rather awkwardly into the constitution’s structure – focus on three elements aimed squarely at improving the regime’s appeal: increased material support from the state for citizens, including indexing state pensions; an emphasis on “traditional values”, including a declaration that marriage can only be a union between a man and a woman; and increased Russian sovereignty, including a “nationalisation” of the elite, with a constitutional ban on top-level officials having bank accounts abroad. 

Constitutional reform is, moreover, the most visible part of a broader political transformation already underway, including a major propaganda drive. Putin has promised a significant increase in resources for its “maternity capital” programme, putting more money in the pockets of young Russian families.

And he has instructed Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s government to focus on delivering his “national projects” – goals aimed at improving Russians’ lives across a range of areas, from infrastructure to education and healthcare.

Taking advantage of several imminent historical milestones is also on the cards. It has been reported Putin will sign the constitutional reform bill on March 18 – the anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. And May 9 is the 75th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War (the Russian term for the Second World War), with foreign dignitaries invited to attend events in Moscow.

Putin has also been filling the airwaves with a high-production-values series called “20 Questions for Vladimir Putin”, as well as holding public meetings with citizens in provinces such as Cherepovets and Ivanovo. There is a clear aim to demonstrate the president is not only still in control, but also concerned with the well-being of everyday Russians.

With parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2021 the Kremlin knows that, to maintain its control of a super-majority of seats in the State Duma, its ratings-raising drive has to work – even if it does always have the option of using manifestly authoritarian methods for realising desired election results. A proposal to call early State Duma elections was made during the second reading of Putin’s reform bill, but was quickly withdrawn after Putin spoke out against the idea.

Russia’s complex architecture of “power”

Throughout this transformation, maintaining control of the elite – particularly of the siloviki – is key for Putin. A reshuffling and removal of senior officials in the Procuracy has seen Yury Chaika replaced as general prosecutor by Ivan Krasnov, previously a deputy chair of the Investigative Committee, which is widely seen as a rival structure in Russia’s complex architecture of “power” bodies.

When considered alongside the constitutional changes giving the president broader powers in appointing regional prosecutors, this is textbook “divide and rule”. Power balancing is also on display with the Security Council, as the job description for Dmitry Medvedev’s new role as its deputy chair could provide fertile ground for clashes with the body’s secretary, Nikolai Patrushev.

Pitting rival patronal networks against each other means Putin can keep rivals in check within the broader structure of the “Great Presidency”, while staying firmly in control himself.

The prospect of Putin remaining president is unlikely to be popular. According to data from independent Russian polling agency the Levada Centre, only 27 per cent of Russians want Putin to stay in the post after 2024. This figure could, of course, change in either direction as the prospect becomes more real for Russians. But if Putin’s announcement galvanises mass opposition, the authorities may well use responses to the COVID-19 outbreak to keep protesters at bay – something already on display in Moscow.

What this all means for Russia is that, despite the drama, considerable uncertainty remains following Putin’s announcement. What we can say for certain, however, is that it dashes hopes of serious political change any time soon.




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Webinar: Russian Disinformation's Golden Moment: Challenges and Responses in the COVID-19 Era

Invitation Only Research Event

7 May 2020 - 3:00pm to 4:30pm

Event participants

Anneli Ahonen, Head, StratCom East Task Force, European External Action Service
Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Thomas Kent, Adjunct Associate Professor, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; Senior Fellow, the Jamestown Foundation
Chairs:
James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House
Glen Howard, President, The Jamestown Foundation
The COVID-19 pandemic provides the ideal environment for malign influence to thrive as it feeds on fear and a vacuum of authoritative information. What are the current challenges posed by Russian disinformation, and how should Western nations be responding?
 
In this discussion, jointly hosted by the Jamestown Foundation and the Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme, the speakers will consider what best practice looks like in safeguarding Western societies against the pernicious effects of disinformation. 
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Virtual Roundtable: Land Reform in Ukraine: Is Zelenskyy's Government Getting it Right?

Invitation Only Research Event

14 May 2020 - 12:00pm to 1:30pm
Add to Calendar
Ihor Petrashko, Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Ukraine
Andriy Dykun, Chair, Ukrainian Agricultural Council
Vadim Tolpeco, Ukrlandfarming Plc
Chair: Orysia Lutsevych, Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House
Ukraine is known as the ‘breadbasket of Europe’ thanks to its grain exports. On 31 March 2020, the Ukrainian parliament passed a landmark law ending a 19-year ban on the sale of privately owned agricultural land. Due to come into force in July 2021, the law applies to 41.5 million hectares of farmland and economists predict substantial economic gains from this liberalization.
 
This event will discuss the impact of the law on Ukraine’s agricultural sector and food security. How can the government best implement this reform and ensure that small and medium-sized agricultural companies increase their productivity? What does this change mean for Ukraine’s capacity to export grain? Can the country’s food supply withstand crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic? What role could foreign direct investors play in boosting production?
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Quantification of bile acids: a mass spectrometry platform for studying gut microbe connection to metabolic diseases [Research Articles]

Bile acids (BAs) serve multiple biological functions, ranging from the absorption of lipids and fat-soluble vitamins to serving as signaling molecules through the direct activation of dedicated cellular receptors. Synthesized by both host and microbial pathways, BAs are increasingly understood as participating in the regulation of numerous pathways relevant to metabolic diseases, including lipid and glucose metabolism, energy expenditure, and inflammation. Quantitative analyses of BAs in biological matrices can be problematic due to their unusual and diverse physicochemical properties, making optimization of a method that shows good accuracy, precision, efficiency of extraction, and minimized matrix effects across structurally distinct human and murine BAs challenging. Herein we develop and clinically validate a stable-isotope-dilution LC/MS/MS method for the quantitative analysis of numerous primary and secondary BAs in both human and mouse biological matrices. We also utilize this tool to investigate gut microbiota participation in the generation of structurally specific BAs in both humans and mice. We examine circulating levels of specific BAs and in a clinical case-control study of age- and gender-matched type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) versus nondiabetics. BAs whose circulating levels are associated with T2DM include numerous 12α-hydroxyl BAs (taurocholic acid, taurodeoxycholic acid, glycodeoxycholic acid, deoxycholic acid, and 3-ketodeoxycholic acid), while taurohyodeoxycholic acid was negatively associated with diabetes. The LC/MS/MS-based platform described should serve as a robust, high-throughput investigative tool for studying the potential involvement of structurally specific BAs and the gut microbiome on both physiological and disease processes.




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Worming our way toward multiple evolutionary origins of convergent sterol pathways [Commentary]




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Role of pyruvate kinase M2 in oxidized LDL-induced macrophage foam cell formation and inflammation [Research Articles]

Pyruvate kinase M2 (PKM2) links metabolic and inflammatory dysfunction in atherosclerotic coronary artery disease; however, its role in oxidized LDL (Ox-LDL)-induced macrophage foam cell formation and inflammation is unknown and therefore was studied. In recombinant mouse granulocyte-macrophage colony-stimulating factor-differentiated murine bone marrow-derived macrophages, early (1–6 h) Ox-LDL treatment induced PKM2 tyrosine 105 phosphorylation and promotes its nuclear localization. PKM2 regulates aerobic glycolysis and inflammation because PKM2 shRNA or Shikonin abrogated Ox-LDL-induced hypoxia-inducible factor-1α target genes lactate dehydrogenase, glucose transporter member 1, interleukin 1β (IL-1β) mRNA expression, lactate, and secretory IL-1β production. PKM2 inhibition significantly increased Ox-LDL-induced ABCA1 and ABCG1 protein expression and NBD-cholesterol efflux to apoA1 and HDL. PKM2 shRNA significantly inhibited Ox-LDL-induced CD36, FASN protein expression, DiI-Ox-LDL binding and uptake, and cellular total cholesterol, free cholesterol, and cholesteryl ester content. Therefore, PKM2 regulates lipid uptake and efflux. DASA-58, a PKM2 activator, downregulated LXR-α, ABCA1, and ABCG1, and augmented FASN and CD36 protein expression. Peritoneal macrophages showed similar results. Ox-LDL induced PKM2- SREBP-1 interaction and FASN expression in a PKM2-dependent manner. Therefore, this study suggests a role for PKM2 in Ox-LDL-induced aerobic glycolysis, inflammation, and macrophage foam cell formation.




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A novel GPER antagonist protects against the formation of estrogen-induced cholesterol gallstones in female mice [Research Articles]

Many clinical studies and epidemiological investigations have clearly demonstrated that women are twice as likely to develop cholesterol gallstones as men, and oral contraceptives and other estrogen therapies dramatically increase that risk. Further, animal studies have revealed that estrogen promotes cholesterol gallstone formation through the estrogen receptor (ER) α, but not ERβ, pathway. More importantly, some genetic and pathophysiological studies have found that G protein-coupled estrogen receptor (GPER) 1 is a new gallstone gene, Lith18, on chromosome 5 in mice and produces additional lithogenic actions, working independently of ERα, to markedly increase cholelithogenesis in female mice. Based on computational modeling of GPER, a novel series of GPER-selective antagonists were designed, synthesized, and subsequently assessed for their therapeutic effects via calcium mobilization, cAMP, and ERα and ERβ fluorescence polarization binding assays. From this series of compounds, one new compound, 2-cyclohexyl-4-isopropyl-N-(4-methoxybenzyl)aniline (CIMBA), exhibits superior antagonism and selectivity exclusively for GPER. Furthermore, CIMBA reduces the formation of 17β-estradiol-induced gallstones in a dose-dependent manner in ovariectomized mice fed a lithogenic diet for 8 weeks. At 32 μg/day/kg CIMBA, no gallstones are found, even in ovariectomized ERα (–/–) mice treated with 6 μg/day 17β-estradiol and fed the lithogenic diet for 8 weeks. In conclusion, CIMBA treatment protects against the formation of estrogen-induced cholesterol gallstones by inhibiting the GPER signaling pathway in female mice. CIMBA may thus be a new agent for effectively treating cholesterol gallstone disease in women.­




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 64285: The SCD Type 2 Loader transformation in SAS Data Integration Studio generates "ERROR 22-322: Syntax error, expecting one of the following:..."

If your business key column is a name literal, like " business key "n, a syntax error occurs when that variable name does not follow standard SAS naming conventions.




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Problem Notes for SAS®9 - 65295: The order of columns is not maintained when you select columns for output in the Business Rules transformation

In SAS Data Integration Studio, the columns that you select to include in the target table in a Business Rules transformation appear in the Selected columns area in a random order. Th




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Uniform patch to mark 150 years of pro baseball

All 30 Major League teams will wear special "MLB 150" patches on their uniforms for the entire 2019 season in honor of the 150th anniversary of the 1869 Cincinnati Red Stockings, the first openly all-salaried professional baseball team.




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Overexpression of GPR40 in Pancreatic {beta}-Cells Augments Glucose Stimulated Insulin Secretion and Improves Glucose Tolerance in Normal and Diabetic Mice

Objective:

GPR40 is a G protein-coupled receptor regulating free fatty acid-induced insulin secretion. We have generated transgenic mice overexpressing the human GPR40 gene (hGPR40-Tg) under control of the mouse insulin II promoter and have used them to examine the role of GPR40 in the regulation of insulin secretion and glucose homeostasis.

Research Design and Methods:

Normal (C57BL/6J) and diabetic (KK) mice overexpressing the human GPR40 gene under control of the insulin II promoter were generated, and their glucose metabolism and islet function were analyzed.

Results:

In comparison with nontransgenic littermates, hGPR40-Tg mice exhibited improved oral glucose tolerance with an increase in insulin secretion. Although islet morphological analysis showed no obvious differences between hGPR40-Tg and nontransgenic (NonTg) mice, isolated islets from hGPR40-Tg mice enhanced insulin secretion in response to high glucose (16 mM) than those from NonTg mice with unchanged low glucose (3 mM)-stimulated insulin secretion. In addition, hGPR40-Tg islets significantly increased insulin secretion against a naturally occurring agonist palmitate in the presence of 11 mM glucose. hGPR40-Tg mice were also found to be resistant to high fat diet-induced glucose intolerance, and hGPR40-Tg harboring KK mice showed augmented insulin secretion and improved oral glucose tolerance compared to nontransgenic littermates.

Conclusions:

Our results suggest that GPR40 may have a role in regulating glucose-stimulated insulin secretion and plasma glucose levels in vivo, and that pharmacological activation of GPR40 may provide a novel insulin secretagogue beneficial for the treatment of type 2 diabetes.




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Revisiting Proinsulin Processing: Evidence That Human {beta}-Cells Process Proinsulin With Prohormone Convertase (PC) 1/3 But Not PC2

Insulin is first produced in pancreatic β-cells as the precursor prohormone proinsulin. Defective proinsulin processing has been implicated in the pathogenesis of both type 1 and type 2 diabetes. Though there is substantial evidence that mouse β-cells process proinsulin using prohormone convertase 1/3 (PC1/3) then prohormone convertase 2 (PC2), this finding has not been verified in human β-cells. Immunofluorescence with validated antibodies reveals that there was no detectable PC2 immunoreactivity in human β-cells and little PCSK2 mRNA by in situ hybridization. Similarly, rat β-cells were not immunoreactive for PC2. In all histological experiments, PC2 immunoreactivity in neighbouring α-cells acts as a positive control. In donors with type 2 diabetes, β-cells had elevated PC2 immunoreactivity, suggesting that aberrant PC2 expression may contribute to impaired proinsulin processing in β-cells of patients with diabetes. To support histological findings using a biochemical approach, human islets were used for pulse-chase experiments. Despite inhibition of PC2 function by temperature blockade, brefeldin-A, chloroquine, and multiple inhibitors that blocked production of mature glucagon from proglucagon, β-cells retained the ability to produce mature insulin. Conversely, suppression of PC1/3 blocked processing of proinsulin but not proglucagon. By demonstrating that healthy human β-cells process proinsulin by PC1/3 but not PC2 we suggest that there is a need to revise the longstanding theory of proinsulin processing.




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Lactation vs Formula Feeding: Insulin, Glucose and Fatty Acid Metabolism During the Postpartum Period

Milk production may involve a transient development of insulin resistance in non-mammary tissues to support redistribution of maternal macronutrients to match the requirements of the lactating mammary gland. In the present study, adipose and liver metabolic responses were measured in the fasting state and during a 2-step (10 and 20 mU/m2/min) hyperinsulinemic-euglycemic clamp with stable isotopes, in 6-week postpartum women who were lactating (n=12) or formula-feeding (n=6) their infants and who were closely matched for baseline characteristics (e.g., parity, body composition, intrahepatic lipid). When controlling for the low insulin concentrations of both groups, the lactating women exhibited a fasting rate of endogenous glucose production (EGP) that was 2.6-fold greater, and a lipolysis rate that was 2.3-fold greater than the formula-feeding group. During the clamp, the groups exhibited similar suppression rates of EGP and lipolysis. In the lactating women only, higher prolactin concentrations were associated with greater suppression rates of lipolysis, lower intrahepatic lipid and plasma triacylglycerol concentrations. These data suggest that whole-body alterations in glucose transport may be organ specific and facilitate nutrient partitioning during lactation. Recapitulating a shift toward noninsulin-mediated glucose uptake could be an early postpartum strategy to enhance lactation success in women at risk for delayed onset of milk production.




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Two- and three-color STORM analysis reveals higher-order assembly of leukotriene synthetic complexes on the nuclear envelope of murine neutrophils [Computational Biology]

Over the last several years it has become clear that higher order assemblies on membranes, exemplified by signalosomes, are a paradigm for the regulation of many membrane signaling processes. We have recently combined two-color direct stochastic optical reconstruction microscopy (dSTORM) with the (Clus-DoC) algorithm that combines cluster detection and colocalization analysis to observe the organization of 5-lipoxygenase (5-LO) and 5-lipoxygenase–activating protein (FLAP) into higher order assemblies on the nuclear envelope of mast cells; these assemblies were linked to leukotriene (LT) C4 production. In this study we investigated whether higher order assemblies of 5-LO and FLAP included cytosolic phospholipase A2 (cPLA2) and were linked to LTB4 production in murine neutrophils. Using two- and three-color dSTORM supported by fluorescence lifetime imaging microscopy we identified higher order assemblies containing 40 molecules (median) (IQR: 23, 87) of 5-LO, and 53 molecules (62, 156) of FLAP monomer. 98 (18, 154) molecules of cPLA2 were clustered with 5-LO, and 77 (33, 114) molecules of cPLA2 were associated with FLAP. These assemblies were tightly linked to LTB4 formation. The activation-dependent close associations of cPLA2, FLAP, and 5-LO in higher order assemblies on the nuclear envelope support a model in which arachidonic acid is generated by cPLA2 in apposition to FLAP, facilitating its transfer to 5-LO to initiate LT synthesis.




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MicroRNA Networks in Pancreatic Islet Cells: Normal Function and Type 2 Diabetes

Lena Eliasson
May 1, 2020; 69:804-812
Small Noncoding RNAs in Diabetes