Editors’ Note: It is time to establish a regional reconstruction strategy for the Middle East, argues Sultan Barakat, that involves collective vision, broad participation, smart security, equality, and other key elements.This post originally appeared in Huffington Post.

The World Bank is hosting its annual Fragility Forum this week with the aim of making progress on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. This week has also seen a fragile ceasefire in Syria, potentially landmark elections in Iran, and a violent clash between Jordanian security and so-called Islamic State members. Together these developments have prompted me to reassess what needs to be done to resolve the issues of conflict and fragility in the Middle East.

For the Middle East, the starting point should be to move away from any process that reinforces the image of the West devising solutions and proposing "new" visions to the region. Such approaches are reminiscent of the Sykes-Picot agreement or the neoconservatives' "grand strategy" of the early 2000s and do not appreciate that the Middle East has changed fundamentally since 2011. The region, at all levels, now expects to be treated with dignity and to be the driving force behind its own development.

It is high time to pull together to establish a "Regional Reconstruction Strategy" that can address all sorts of violence, not just Islamist-related conflict. The region needs an ever-evolving strategy that maintains a holistic, problem-solving outlook while drawing on various forms of intervention (e.g. community driven development, inter-regional development projects, targeted counterinsurgency operations, stabilization, statebuilding, etc.) without being straightjacketed by any one toolkit or template. Novel approaches rooted in genuine regional leadership, broad participation, youth engagement, and the utilization of technology will increasingly need to be applied. The pillars of such a strategy should be a collective regional vision, effective local participation, smart security, reconciliation and justice, equity, reconstruction and development, and capacity.

Collective Vision: With the aspirations of the Arab Spring unrealized and many countries descending into sectarianism, what is needed now is a collective vision that goes beyond national borders. This would include pooling the region's resources, specifically all the ingredients for large-scale development, such as human resources, an educated population, capital, mobility, and nature. We could then look to the day when region-wide development is synergistic and not predatory or a zero-sum game. What Morocco has achieved with solar energy is a shining example—a visionary investment has addressed regional developmental and environmental challenges, stimulated employment, and raised confidence that hi-tech and innovative sectors can thrive in the Middle East. Such a broad vision is crucial if the region is to leapfrog into the twenty-first century and not remain in a vicious cycle of conflict and failed development.

Key to an inclusive and non-adversarial vision will be both accepting and embracing Islam as a majority religion while building on human security as an area of common ground. For this to happen some real changes are required in places such as Iran and Saudi Arabia—which would enable both to exercise their regional leadership in coalescing a constructive collective vision rather than perpetuating sectarian hostility.

Broad Participation: It is important that the regional vision recognizes that development requires an active civil society, a free media, and rooting action and ideas at the local level and with popular participation. The process of engaging in a region-wide consultation where contributions are coming from schools, villages, city halls, political parties, unions, and many other civic forums can help the region start dreaming about what it wants to look like in the 50 years to come.

Smart Security: Instead of a collective vision for development we have one for defense, formed with the excuse of the Islamic State group. All appreciate that a minimum level of security is important for implementing reconstruction, but a lack of security cannot be a pretext to do nothing. Experience has shown that delaying reconstruction efforts pushes people down the slope of conflict and violence and leads to dependence on humanitarian assistance. The region needs to find ways of better understanding the granular texture of security at local and regional levels so that strategies can be developed in which localized insecurity does not hold back development in other areas. This could support "spot reconstruction" efforts that create exemplars of what a degree of stability combined with reconstruction intervention can achieve in the midst of larger instability.

Reconciliation and Justice: No long-term investment in reconstruction can be protected without genuine reconciliation across the region. Twenty years ago the main fault line was Israel-Palestine. Today, there are many additional fault lines that need to be addressed, including Muslim-Christian tensions, tensions between displaced and host communities, and tensions between Sunni and Shiite communities. The most fundamental way to initiate reconciliation is to make sure that the rule of law applies to all and that everyone has access to justice regardless of the mechanism. On this a lot can be built on local and traditional systems for achieving justice and reconciliation.

Equity: A common mistake with reconstruction is that it proceeds without sufficient regulation and monitoring to ensure that benefits are equitably distributed. This region has repeatedly seen how easily reconstruction "lords" (most of whom were previously warlords) can emerge to line their pockets at the expense of the general public, thus perpetuating that country's crisis. World Bank arguments for the private sector to take the lead in reconstruction in Afghanistan and elsewhere have done nothing but strengthen this model. Assad's efforts to liberalize Syria's economy prior to 2011 led to the further enrichment of a corrupt elite, contributing to what we see today. Going forward, reconstruction efforts must take into consideration the poorest and least capable—so that nobody is left out.

Reconstruction and Development: There is an urgent need to find new ways of inducing development through international engagement with the region. The current instability has shifted spending toward security and away from the basics of development. As a result, some of the most important development indicators—freedom of expression, women's participation, poverty, quality of education—have taken a step back. All this is happening when the region is facing financial challenges due to severely reduced oil prices. This may prove to be an opportunity as some countries needed a good wake-up call to the pernicious effects of a model of capital development in which billions of dollars are invested in the West, generating jobs and stabilizing economies thousands of miles away at the expense of the region. If the West wants to help the region it should seek to focus minds within the Arab world on the value of investment in addressing regional problems in a mutually beneficial way. Ultimately a more stable region will lead to more prosperous neighbors both in the East and the West.

Building Capacity: To do this we must invest enormous amounts in fostering sustainable capacity at regional, national, and local levels. It is essential to invest in education at all levels, in particular going beyond primary education to support the young men and women that will become leaders with the conviction and capabilities to rebuild the region. In a rush to capture development, we have focused on the hard sciences, engineering, business studies, and computer science while ignoring our own culture, languages, and history. We must correct this imbalance, and it is time we develop our ideas in our own language and not rely on translation.

For all this to happen, fragility must be addressed within a coherent regional vision, not individual national plans. It would be constructive if the international community and donors would try to view the region as a whole—as one canvas in which to facilitate cross-border mobility of population, capital, ideas, and labor—and encourage regional responsibility with different countries leading in their areas of competency. International partners can support this with new and innovative forms of funding that utilize collateral guarantees from the region, not just individual countries. If we can embrace a truly regional approach, there may be a day when we elevate human dignity and human development above petty politics and sectarianism.

Event Information

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 19, 2016, about the ongoing reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The panelists included Omar Shaban, director of Pal-Think, a research institution based in Gaza; and Naglaa Elhag, head of rehabilitation and international development at the Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS). Sultan Barakat, the BDC’s director of research, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Barakat opened by noting the slow progress of reconstruction in Gaza. Almost two years since the cessation of hostilities between Hamas and Israel, the rebuilding process has stalled for a number of reasons. First, the distribution of aid money pledged by donor countries during the October 2014 Cairo Conference has slowed. According to the World Bank, as of March 31, 2016, donor countries had dispersed only 40 percent of the pledged money. At the current rate, the fulfillment of all pledges will not occur until 2019, two years after the target date. Second, construction materials only enter Gaza from one border crossing. As a result of the sluggish rebuilding process, only 9 percent of totally damaged houses and 45 percent of partially damaged houses in Gaza have been repaired, leaving over 14,800 families internally displaced. Additionally, job opportunities promised by various construction projects have failed to materialize, leading to increased feelings of desperation and frustration among Gaza’s population.

Shaban expanded on these developments, expressing the notion that the people in Gaza feel neglected. Due to the high levels of frustration, he feels that a new round of hostilities between militants and Israel could happen at any moment. He explained further by highlighting the volatility of the area and mentioning how previous conflicts were easily ignited by an array of incidents: a kidnapping, a cross-border raid, an assassination, continuous rocket fire. Since frustration among Gazans continues to mount, arguably to its highest level, renewed conflict seems almost certain. Consequently, Shaban argued, fear of another round of conflict between Hamas and Israel has instilled a sentiment of donor fatigue. Donors do not want to see their support go to waste in another round of destruction, turning the delivery of assistance into an exercise of futility.

Shaban attributed this attitude among some donors to the lack of a political solution to the crisis in Gaza. Hamas, the de-facto governing authority in Gaza, does not work for the people, nor does the Palestinian Authority (PA), based in Ramallah. Neither body provides economic opportunities for Gazans, as those employed by either the PA or Hamas often do not receive their salaries. Reconciliation talks between both groups failed to establish a unity government. Egypt, Israel, and the United States would feel more comfortable negotiating with a unity government, presumably dominated by the PA, not Hamas, which each of the aforementioned countries designate as a terrorist organization. If the PA does reach an agreement with Hamas, Egypt has implied that it would open its border with Gaza at Rafah, as long as the PA stations a security presence at the crossing. This could enhance the slow trickle of construction materials into Gaza, allow for the increased export of commercial goods, and also enable Gazans to leave and return at a higher rate than currently permitted. According to Shaban, opening another access point for Gaza to the outside world would temporarily ease the burden faced by Gaza’s citizens, but the current crisis requires a solution to ameliorate the economic and political situation in the long term.

Elhag opened her remarks by reviewing the difficulties of implementing aid projects in Gaza. While working in Gaza for the QRCS, she noticed little progress from international agencies, as they do not address the main problems, typically taking short cuts, which she highlighted by stating, “We don’t treat the wounds, we cover it with a bandage.” To elaborate on this point she mentioned that lack of access in and out of Gaza and the Israeli naval blockade as two factors hindering reconstruction. Due to these restrictions, aid workers have difficulty entering Gaza. Elhag surmised that the lack of accountability on the part of international agencies and the Israelis and the fear of aid projects being destroyed again because of the political situation both contribute to the stalled reconstruction, producing grim realities in Gaza.

Furthermore, Elhag explained that a resolution to the Gaza crisis does not rest on the distribution of money. She believes that only solutions from both sides of the conflict will end the suffering in Gaza. To exemplify the frustrations felt by donors, Elhag noted that since 2008, QRCS invested $100 million in housing units and other aid projects in Gaza, but some of these projects were destroyed during the 2014 war. QRCS observed this and shifted their focus to securing food sources and enhancing the education and health sectors in Gaza.

At the conclusion of Elhag’s observations, Barakat asked the panel where the money donated for reconstruction goes and how the Gaza reconstruction mechanism (GRM) works. Shaban described how the money actually gets funneled through the PA’s ministry of finance in Ramallah, before it reaches Gaza. Hamas officials or members of Gaza’s civil society do not oversee any aspect of aid distribution. So from the start, the distribution of funds lacks transparency, as the PA gives the money to the U.N. office in Gaza, which administers the GRM. From there, the United Nations composes a list of people in Gaza that require construction materials. The Israeli administrative body in the ministry of defense, the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (Cogat), must approve the names on the list. Construction materials can then be distributed through the GRM. Shaban concluded his explanation of the GRM by noting the many levels of bureaucracy involved have created a slow distribution process for a populace in desperate need.

From the regional perspective, some Arab states’ past political differences with Hamas has stymied political progress in Gaza, but the panel agreed that some of these relationships, especially with Saudi Arabia, are on the mend. The work of regional actors like Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey could help push a reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas. Shaban proposed allowing some Hamas members to take part in any future coalition government, as some of their relationships in Sinai could help Egypt secure the troubled region. Cooperation on security matters between Egypt and Hamas could inspire enough confidence in the Egyptians for them to open the Rafah crossing.

Ending the discussion, Barakat clarified the proposals of the panel by reiterating the need for donors to fulfill aid pledges. The GRM needs reform, especially through the inclusion of Gaza’s civil society in the reconstruction process. Finally, reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, as well as Egypt and Hamas, would help foster security cooperation at the borders.

Video

• Reviving the stalled reconstruction of Gaza

Transcript

• Event Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• gaza transcript

Two years after Hamas and Israel agreed to a cessation of hostilities, reconstruction in Gaza has been painfully slow. This was the focus of a panel discussion at the Brookings Doha Center on April 19. As Senior Fellow and Director of Research Sultan Barakat explained, rebuilding has stalled in part because the distribution of aid money pledged by donor countries during the October 2014 Cairo Conference has slowed; according to the World Bank, donor countries had dispersed only 40 percent of the pledged money as of the end of March. At this rate, the pledged funds will not be dispersed until 2019, two years after the target date.

Moreover, construction materials only enter Gaza through one border crossing and must be cleared by layers of bureaucracy. As Omar Shaban—director of Pal-Think, a research institution in Gaza—explained, money for Gaza reconstruction is funneled through the PA’s ministry of finance in Ramallah, which transfers it to the U.N. office in Gaza. The United Nations composes a list of people in Gaza that require construction materials, and the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (Cogat)—an Israeli administrative body in the ministry of defense—must approve the names on the list. The U.N. then distributes construction materials. Shaban emphasized that the bureaucratic nature of this process has slowed reconstruction considerably, adding that the process isn’t transparent enough, since neither Hamas officials nor members of Gaza’s civil society oversee any aspect of aid distribution.

As a result of the sluggish rebuilding process, Barakat said, only 9 percent of totally damaged houses and 45 percent of partially damaged houses in Gaza have been repaired, leaving over 14,800 families internally displaced. Meanwhile, promised job opportunities in construction projects have failed to materialize, exacerbating feelings of desperation and frustration among Gaza’s population.

[T]he process isn’t transparent enough [said Shaban], since neither Hamas officials nor members of Gaza’s civil society oversee any aspect of aid distribution.

Shaban agreed that people in Gaza feel neglected. With high levels of frustration, he expressed fear that a new round of hostilities between militants and Israel could begin at any time. Previous conflicts were easily ignited—by a kidnapping, a cross-border raid, an assassination, or continuous rocket fire. Shaban argued that the volatility of the situation may be heightening fatigue among donors, who do not want to see their support go to waste in another round of destruction.

Naglaa Elhag, head of rehabilitation and international development at the Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS), discussed the difficulties of implementing aid projects in Gaza. She argued that international agencies do not always address the main problems and typically take shortcuts, saying of her own organization and others: “We don’t treat the wounds, we cover it with a bandage.” She highlighted various factors slowing reconstruction, including the lack of accountability on the part of international agencies, fears of renewed conflict, and the Palestinian political stalemate. Since 2008, according to Elhag, QRCS invested $100 million in housing units and other aid projects in Gaza, but some were destroyed during the 2014 war. As a result, QRCS shifted its focus away from physical reconstruction and towards food security, education, and health. 

A related problem is the Palestinian political stalemate. According to Shaban, neither Hamas (the de-facto governing authority in Gaza) nor the Palestinian Authority (PA, based in Ramallah) provides economic opportunities for Gazans, and those nominally on Palestinian government payrolls often do not receive their salaries. Reconciliation talks have failed to establish a unity government, making Egypt, Israel, and the United States reticent to negotiate. Egypt has indicated that if the PA does reach an agreement with Hamas, it would open its border with Gaza at Rafah (presuming the PA has a security presence there). This could increase the flow of construction materials into Gaza, allow for the increased export of commercial goods, and enable Gazans to come and go more frequently. But while opening another crossing for Gaza would temporarily ease the burden faced by the people there, Shaban stressed that a long-term political and economic solution is needed. Elhag, too, emphasized that a resolution to the Gaza crisis isn’t about the distribution of money—rather, she believes a joint Israeli-Palestinian solution is needed to end the suffering in Gaza. 

In the past, tensions between some Arab states and Hamas have also hampered progress in Gaza, but the panelists agreed that some of these relationships—especially with Saudi Arabia—are on the mend. Regional actors like Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey could help push a reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas, which would help improve the situation in Gaza. And as Barakat stressed in conclusion, there is an urgent need for donors to fulfill aid pledges and for the Gaza reconstruction mechanism to become more inclusive, so that Gazans themselves can more fully participate in rebuilding their neighborhoods. 

The initial drive to rebuild the Gaza Strip following last summer’s destructive war between Israel and Hamas has gradually stalled. Only a tiny percentage of funds pledged at an October donor’s conference have reached Gaza, and thousands remain homeless. What factors have caused these failures in the reconstruction of Gaza? How can the Palestinian leadership and the international community work to avoid past mistakes?

In this Policy Briefing, Sultan Barakat and Omar Shaban draw on their extensive post-war reconstruction expertise to provide policy advice on approaching the daunting task of rebuilding the devastated Gaza Strip. The authors outline a reconstruction strategy that seeks to engage and empower local stakeholders in Gaza, while improving transparency to ensure accountability to the Palestinian people.

Ultimately, the authors propose a collaborative Gaza Reconstruction Council to oversee the reconstruction process, with representatives from Palestinian civil society groups and political parties, international agencies, and key regional countries. This council would oversee a specialized trust fund that would receive and administer donor monies, breaking the cycle of foreign funds failing to effectively contribute to the reconstruction of Gaza.

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