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Wide-open competition in D-backs' bullpen

For the final two spots in the D-backs' bullpen, good luck trying to figure that out just yet. In fact, manager Torey Lovullo has even declined to narrow it down to who could be in contention for those spots.




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Greinke discusses commitment to D-backs

Despite a stiff neck, which he says came on a recent airplane flight, D-backs ace Zack Greinke said Saturday that he feels much better physically than he did last year when he reported to Spring Training. Here are five takeaways from Greinke's Saturday session with reporters.




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Covid-19: Nightingale hospitals set to shut down after seeing few patients

The mothballing of Britain’s Nightingale hospitals, some of which have yet to treat a single covid-19 patient, has raised questions about whether resources to fight the pandemic were...




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Vitamin C in Human Health and Disease: Effects, Mechanisms of Action, and New Guidance on Intake




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Reply: Clarifying the Utility of Myocardial Blood Flow and Myocardial Flow Reserve After Cardiac Transplantation




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Reversibility of 68Ga-FAPI-2 Trapping Might Prove an Asset for PET Quantitative Imaging




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First Evidence for a Dose-Response Relationship in Patients Treated with 166Ho Radioembolization: A Prospective Study

166Ho-microspheres have recently been approved for clinical use for hepatic radioembolization in the European Union. The aim of this study was to investigate the absorbed dose–response relationship and its association with overall survival for 166Ho radioembolization in patients with liver metastases. Methods: Patients treated in the HEPAR I and II studies who underwent an 18F-FDG PET/CT scan at baseline, a posttreatment 166Ho SPECT/CT scan, and another 18F-FDG PET/CT scan at the 3-mo follow-up were included for analysis. The posttreatment 166Ho-microsphere activity distributions were estimated with quantitative SPECT/CT reconstructions using a quantitative Monte Carlo–based method. The response of each tumor was based on the change in total lesion glycolysis (TLG) between baseline and follow-up and was placed into 1 of 4 categories, according to the PERCIST criteria, ranging from complete response to progressive disease. Patient-level response was grouped according to the average change in TLG per patient. The absorbed dose–response relationship was assessed using a linear mixed model to account for correlation of tumors within patients. Median overall survival was compared between patients with and without a metabolic liver response, using a log-rank test. Results: Thirty-six patients with a total of 98 tumors were included. The relation between tumor-absorbed dose and both tumor-level and patient-level response was explored. At a tumor level, a significant difference in geometric mean absorbed dose was found between complete response (232 Gy; 95% confidence interval [CI], 178–303 Gy; n = 32) and stable disease (147 Gy; 95% CI, 113–191 Gy; n = 28) (P = 0.01) and between complete response and progressive disease (117 Gy; 95% CI, 87–159 Gy; n = 21) (P = 0.0008). This constitutes a robust absorbed dose–response relationship. At a patient level, a significant difference was found between patients with complete or partial response (210 Gy; 95% CI, 161–274 Gy; n = 13) and patients with progressive disease (116 Gy; 95% CI, 81–165 Gy; n = 9) (P = 0.01). Patients were subsequently grouped according to their average change in TLG. Patients with an objective response (complete or partial) exhibited a significantly higher overall survival than nonresponding patients (stable or progressive disease) (median, 19 mo vs. 7.5 mo; log-rank, P = 0.01). Conclusion: These results confirm a significant absorbed dose–response relationship in 166Ho radioembolization. Treatment response is associated with a higher overall survival.




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TSPO Versus P2X7 as a Target for Neuroinflammation: An In Vitro and In Vivo Study

Neuroinflammation is important in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). The P2X7 receptor (P2X7R) is a promising target for neuroinflammation. The objective of this study was to compare 18F-DPA714, a second-generation translocator protein tracer, with 11C-JNJ717, a novel P2X7R tracer, in vitro and in vivo in ALS. Methods: For the in vitro portion of the study, autoradiography with 18F-DPA714 and 11C-JNJ717 was performed on human ALS brain sections in comparison to immunofluorescence with Iba1 and GFAP. For the in vivo portion, 3 male patients with early-stage ALS (59.3 ± 7.2 y old) and 6 healthy volunteers (48.2 ± 16.5 y old, 2 men and 4 women) underwent dynamic PET/MR scanning with 18F-DPA714 and 11C-JNJ717. Volume-of-distribution images were calculated using Logan plots and analyzed on a volume-of-interest basis. Results: Autoradiography showed no difference in 11C-JNJ717 binding but did show increased 18F-DPA714 binding in the motor cortex correlating with Iba1 expression (glial cells). Similar findings were observed in vivo, with a 13% increase in 18F-DPA714 binding in the motor cortex. Conclusion: In symptomatic ALS patients, 18F-DPA714 showed increased signal whereas 11C-JNJ717 was not elevated.




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Predictive Value of 18F-Florbetapir and 18F-FDG PET for Conversion from Mild Cognitive Impairment to Alzheimer Dementia

The present study examined the predictive values of amyloid PET, 18F-FDG PET, and nonimaging predictors (alone and in combination) for development of Alzheimer dementia (AD) in a large population of patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). Methods: The study included 319 patients with MCI from the Alzheimer Disease Neuroimaging Initiative database. In a derivation dataset (n = 159), the following Cox proportional-hazards models were constructed, each adjusted for age and sex: amyloid PET using 18F-florbetapir (pattern expression score of an amyloid-β AD conversion–related pattern, constructed by principle-components analysis); 18F-FDG PET (pattern expression score of a previously defined 18F-FDG–based AD conversion–related pattern, constructed by principle-components analysis); nonimaging (functional activities questionnaire, apolipoprotein E, and mini-mental state examination score); 18F-FDG PET + amyloid PET; amyloid PET + nonimaging; 18F-FDG PET + nonimaging; and amyloid PET + 18F-FDG PET + nonimaging. In a second step, the results of Cox regressions were applied to a validation dataset (n = 160) to stratify subjects according to the predicted conversion risk. Results: On the basis of the independent validation dataset, the 18F-FDG PET model yielded a significantly higher predictive value than the amyloid PET model. However, both were inferior to the nonimaging model and were significantly improved by the addition of nonimaging variables. The best prediction accuracy was reached by combining 18F-FDG PET, amyloid PET, and nonimaging variables. The combined model yielded 5-y free-of-conversion rates of 100%, 64%, and 24% for the low-, medium- and high-risk groups, respectively. Conclusion: 18F-FDG PET, amyloid PET, and nonimaging variables represent complementary predictors of conversion from MCI to AD. Especially in combination, they enable an accurate stratification of patients according to their conversion risks, which is of great interest for patient care and clinical trials.




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Multimodality Imaging of Inflammation and Ventricular Remodeling in Pressure-Overload Heart Failure

Inflammation contributes to ventricular remodeling after myocardial ischemia, but its role in nonischemic heart failure is poorly understood. Local tissue inflammation is difficult to assess serially during pathogenesis. Although 18F-FDG accumulates in inflammatory leukocytes and thus may identify inflammation in the myocardial microenvironment, it remains unclear whether this imaging technique can isolate diffuse leukocytes in pressure-overload heart failure. We aimed to evaluate whether inflammation with 18F-FDG can be serially imaged in the early stages of pressure-overload–induced heart failure and to compare the time course with functional impairment assessed by cardiac MRI. Methods: C57Bl6/N mice underwent transverse aortic constriction (TAC) (n = 22), sham surgery (n = 12), or coronary ligation as an inflammation-positive control (n = 5). MRI assessed ventricular geometry and contractile function at 2 and 8 d after TAC. Immunostaining identified the extent of inflammatory leukocyte infiltration early in pressure overload. 18F-FDG PET scans were acquired at 3 and 7 d after TAC, under ketamine-xylazine anesthesia to suppress cardiomyocyte glucose uptake. Results: Pressure overload evoked rapid left ventricular dilation compared with sham (end-systolic volume, day 2: 40.6 ± 10.2 μL vs. 23.8 ± 1.7 μL, P < 0.001). Contractile function was similarly impaired (ejection fraction, day 2: 40.9% ± 9.7% vs. 59.2% ± 4.4%, P < 0.001). The severity of contractile impairment was proportional to histology-defined myocardial macrophage density on day 8 (r = –0.669, P = 0.010). PET imaging identified significantly higher left ventricular 18F-FDG accumulation in TAC mice than in sham mice on day 3 (10.5 ± 4.1 percentage injected dose [%ID]/g vs. 3.8 ± 0.9 %ID/g, P < 0.001) and on day 7 (7.8 ± 3.7 %ID/g vs. 3.0 ± 0.8 %ID/g, P = 0.006), though the efficiency of cardiomyocyte suppression was variable among TAC mice. The 18F-FDG signal correlated with ejection fraction (r = –0.75, P = 0.01) and ventricular volume (r = 0.75, P < 0.01). Western immunoblotting demonstrated a 60% elevation of myocardial glucose transporter 4 expression in the left ventricle at 8 d after TAC, indicating altered glucose metabolism. Conclusion: TAC induces rapid changes in left ventricular geometry and contractile function, with a parallel modest infiltration of inflammatory macrophages. Metabolic remodeling overshadows inflammatory leukocyte signal using 18F-FDG PET imaging. More selective inflammatory tracers are requisite to identify the diffuse local inflammation in pressure overload.




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Preoperative Localization of Adenomas in Primary Hyperparathyroidism: The Value of 11C-Choline PET/CT in Patients with Negative or Discordant Findings on Ultrasonography and 99mTc-Sestamibi SPECT/CT

We aimed to assess the value of 11C-choline PET in patients with primary hyperparathyroidism and negative or discordant results on 99mTc-sestamibi imaging and neck ultrasound. Methods: Eighty-seven such patients were assessed and subsequently underwent parathyroidectomy. PET/CT image data were analyzed semiquantitatively using SUVmax and SUV ratios (target to contralateral thyroid gland and carotid artery). A positive PET/CT result was defined as focal uptake significantly higher than regular thyroid tissue. Ectopic foci were also considered positive. Inconclusive PET/CT cases were defined as a lesion with uptake equal to normal thyroid tissue. If no prominent or ectopic uptake was detectable, the PET/CT result was considered negative. Results: When dichotomizing the 11C-choline PET/CT imaging results by defining lesions with both positive and inconclusive uptake as positive, we found 84 of 92 lesions (91.3%) to have true-positive uptake whereas 8 lesions (8.7%) had false-positive uptake. One lesion showed false-negative uptake; the sensitivity was 98.8%. The corresponding positive predictive value for lesions was 91.3%. The mean SUVmax was 6.15 ± 4.92 in 72 lesions with positive uptake (70 patients) and 2.96 ± 2.32 in 20 lesions with inconclusive uptake (18 patients). Conclusion: These results in a large group of patients indicate that 11C-choline PET/CT is a promising tool for parathyroid adenoma localization when ultrasound and 99mTc-sestamibi imaging yield negative or discordant results.




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PET Imaging of Pancreatic Dopamine D2 and D3 Receptor Density with 11C-(+)-PHNO in Type 1 Diabetes

Type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1DM) has traditionally been characterized by a complete destruction of β-cell mass (BCM); however, there is growing evidence of possible residual BCM present in T1DM. Given the absence of in vivo tools to measure BCM, routine clinical measures of β-cell function (e.g., C-peptide release) may not reflect BCM. We previously demonstrated the potential utility of PET imaging with the dopamine D2 and D3 receptor agonist 3,4,4a,5,6,10b-hexahydro-2H-naphtho[1,2-b][1,4]oxazin-9-ol (11C-(+)-PHNO) to differentiate between healthy control (HC) and T1DM individuals. Methods: Sixteen individuals participated (10 men, 6 women; 9 HCs, 7 T1DMs). The average duration of diabetes was 18 ± 6 y (range, 14–30 y). Individuals underwent PET/CT scanning with a 120-min dynamic PET scan centered on the pancreas. One- and 2-tissue-compartment models were used to estimate pancreas and spleen distribution volume. Reference region approaches (spleen as reference) were also investigated. Quantitative PET measures were correlated with clinical outcome measures. Immunohistochemistry was performed to examine colocalization of dopamine receptors with endocrine hormones in HC and T1DM pancreatic tissue. Results: C-peptide release was not detectable in any T1DM individuals, whereas proinsulin was detectable in 3 of 5 T1DM individuals. Pancreas SUV ratio minus 1 (SUVR-1) (20–30 min; spleen as reference region) demonstrated a statistically significant reduction (–36.2%) in radioligand binding (HCs, 5.6; T1DMs, 3.6; P = 0.03). Age at diagnosis correlated significantly with pancreas SUVR-1 (20–30 min) (R2 = 0.67, P = 0.025). Duration of diabetes did not significantly correlate with pancreas SUVR-1 (20–30 min) (R2 = 0.36, P = 0.16). Mean acute C-peptide response to arginine at maximal glycemic potentiation did not significantly correlate with SUVR-1 (20–30 min) (R2 = 0.57, P = 0.05), nor did mean baseline proinsulin (R2 = 0.45, P = 0.10). Immunohistochemistry demonstrated colocalization of dopamine D3 receptor and dopamine D2 receptor in HCs. No colocalization of the dopamine D3 receptor or dopamine D2 receptor was seen with somatostatin, glucagon, or polypeptide Y. In a separate T1DM individual, no immunostaining was seen with dopamine D3 receptor, dopamine D2 receptor, or insulin antibodies, suggesting that loss of endocrine dopamine D3 receptor and dopamine D2 receptor expression accompanies loss of β-cell functional insulin secretory capacity. Conclusion: Thirty-minute scan durations and SUVR-1 provide quantitative outcome measures for 11C-(+)-PHNO, a dopamine D3 receptor–preferring agonist PET radioligand, to differentiate BCM in T1DM and HCs.




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Appropriate Use Criteria for Imaging Evaluation of Biochemical Recurrence of Prostate Cancer After Definitive Primary Treatment




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Prostate-Specific Membrane Antigen PET/CT Combined with Sentinel Node Biopsy for Primary Lymph Node Staging in Prostate Cancer

Our objective was to determine the diagnostic capabilities of combined prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA) PET/CT and sentinel node (SN) biopsy in PSMA PET/CT–negative patients for primary lymph node (LN) staging in prostate cancer (PCa) patients. Methods: Between January 2017 and March 2019, retrospectively, all consecutive patients with diagnosed intermediate- or high-risk primary PCa who underwent preoperative PSMA PET/CT (68Ga or 18F-DCFPyL) followed by robot-assisted radical prostatectomy and extended pelvic LN dissection (ePLND) were included. All patients without suspected LN metastases on PSMA PET/CT were considered candidates for SN biopsy with indocyanine green–99mTc-nanocolloid or 99mTc-nanocolloid with free indocyanine green used as tracers. The ePLND was used as a reference standard. Results: Of 53 patients, 22 had positive PSMA PET/CT results and 31 underwent subsequent SN biopsy after negative PSMA PET/CT results. In total, 23 patients (43%) were pN1, of whom 6 (26%) had negative PSMA PET/CT results and underwent subsequent SN biopsy. The combined use of SN biopsy and PSMA PET/CT identified all pN1 patients (100% sensitivity; 95% confidence interval, 86%–100%) and performed correct nodal staging in 50 of 53 patients (94% diagnostic accuracy; 95% confidence interval, 84%–99%). SN biopsy identified significantly smaller LN metastases (median diameter, 2.0 mm; interquartile range, 1.0–3.8 mm) than PSMA PET/CT (median diameter, 5.5 mm; interquartile range, 2.6–9.3 mm; P = 0.007). Conclusion: Combining both modalities led to a 94% accuracy for nodal staging in diagnosed intermediate- and high-risk primary PCa. Adding SN biopsy in patients with negative PSMA PET/CT results increased the combined sensitivity to 100% for detecting nodal metastases at ePLND. This diagnostic accuracy may provide valuable information for directing further treatment in PCa patients, such as the use of PSMA PET/CT and SN biopsy rather than ePLND as the preferred approach for staging before radiotherapy.




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Comparison of 3 Interpretation Criteria for 68Ga-PSMA11 PET Based on Inter- and Intrareader Agreement

PET using radiolabeled prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA) is now being more widely adopted as a valuable tool to evaluate patients with prostate cancer (PC). Recently, 3 different criteria for interpretation of PSMA PET were published: the European Association of Nuclear Medicine (EANM) criteria, the Prostate Cancer Molecular Imaging Standardized Evaluation criteria, and the PSMA Reporting and Data System. We compared these 3 criteria in terms of interreader, intrareader, and intercriteria agreement. Methods: Data from 104 patients prospectively enrolled in research protocols at our institution were retrospectively reviewed. The cohort consisted of 2 groups: 47 patients (mean age, 64.2 y old) who underwent Glu-NH-CO-NH-Lys-(Ahx)-[68Ga(HBED-CC)] (68Ga-PSMA11) PET/MRI for initial staging of biopsy-proven intermediate- or high-risk PC, and 57 patients (mean age, 70.5 y old) who underwent 68Ga-PSMA11 PET/CT because of biochemically recurrent PC. Three nuclear medicine physicians independently evaluated all 68Ga-PSMA11 PET/MRI and PET/CT studies according to the 3 interpretation criteria. Two of them reevaluated all studies 6 mo later in the same manner and masked to the initial reading. The Gwet agreement coefficient was calculated to evaluate interreader, intrareader, and intercriteria agreement based on the following sites: local lesion (primary tumor or prostate bed after radical prostatectomy), lymph node metastases, and other metastases. Results: In the PET/MRI group, interreader, intrareader, and intercriteria agreement ranged from substantial to almost perfect for any site according to all 3 criteria. In the PET/CT group, interreader agreement ranged from substantial to almost perfect except for judgment of distant metastases based on the PSMA Reporting and Data System (Gwet agreement coefficient, 0.57; moderate agreement), in which the most frequent cause of disagreement was lung nodules. Intrareader agreement ranged from substantial to almost perfect for any site according to all 3 criteria. Intercriteria agreement for each site was also substantial to almost perfect. Conclusion: Although the 3 published criteria have good interreader and intrareader reproducibility in evaluating 68Ga-PSMA11 PET, there are some factors causing interreader disagreement. Further work is needed to address this issue.




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Head-to-Head Comparison of 68Ga-PSMA-11 with 18F-PSMA-1007 PET/CT in Staging Prostate Cancer Using Histopathology and Immunohistochemical Analysis as a Reference Standard

18F-PSMA-1007 is a novel prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA)–based radiopharmaceutical for imaging prostate cancer (PCa). The aim of this study was to compare the diagnostic accuracy of 18F-PSMA-1007 with 68Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT in the same patients presenting with newly diagnosed intermediate- or high-risk PCa. Methods: Sixteen patients with intermediate- or high-risk PCa underwent 18F-PSMA-1007 and 68Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT within 15 d. PET findings were compared between the 2 radiotracers and with reference-standard pathologic specimens obtained from radical prostatectomy. The Cohen -coefficient was used to assess the concordance between 18F-PSMA-1007 and 68Ga-PSMA-11 for detection of intraprostatic lesions. The McNemar test was used to assess agreement between intraprostatic PET/CT findings and histopathologic findings. Sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and negative predictive value were reported for each radiotracer. SUVmax was measured for all lesions, and tumor-to-background activity was calculated. Areas under receiver-operating-characteristic curves were calculated for discriminating diseased from nondiseased prostate segments, and optimal SUV cutoffs were calculated using the Youden index for each radiotracer. Results: PSMA-avid lesions in the prostate were identified in all 16 patients with an almost perfect concordance between the 2 tracers ( ranged from 0.871 to 1). Aside from the dominant intraprostatic lesion, similarly detected by both radiotracers, a second less intense positive focus was detected in 4 patients only with 18F-PSMA-1007. Three of these secondary foci were confirmed as Gleason grade 3 lesions, whereas the fourth was shown on pathologic examination to represent chronic prostatitis. Conclusion: This pilot study showed that both 18F-PSMA-1007 and 68Ga-PSMA-11 identify all dominant prostatic lesions in patients with intermediate- or high-risk PCa at staging. 18F-PSMA-1007, however, may detect additional low-grade lesions of limited clinical relevance.




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First-in-Humans Imaging with 89Zr-Df-IAB22M2C Anti-CD8 Minibody in Patients with Solid Malignancies: Preliminary Pharmacokinetics, Biodistribution, and Lesion Targeting

Immunotherapy is becoming the mainstay for treatment of a variety of malignancies, but only a subset of patients responds to treatment. Tumor-infiltrating CD8-positive (CD8+) T lymphocytes play a central role in antitumor immune responses. Noninvasive imaging of CD8+ T cells may provide new insights into the mechanisms of immunotherapy and potentially predict treatment response. We are studying the safety and utility of 89Zr-IAB22M2C, a radiolabeled minibody against CD8+ T cells, for targeted imaging of CD8+ T cells in patients with cancer. Methods: The initial dose escalation phase of this first-in-humans prospective study included 6 patients (melanoma, 1; lung, 4; hepatocellular carcinoma, 1). Patients received approximately 111 MBq (3 mCi) of 89Zr-IAB22M2C (at minibody mass doses of 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 5, or 10 mg) as a single dose, followed by PET/CT scans at approximately 1–2, 6–8, 24, 48, and 96–144 h after injection. Biodistribution in normal organs, lymph nodes, and lesions was evaluated. In addition, serum samples were obtained at approximately 5, 30, and 60 min and later at the times of imaging. Patients were monitored for safety during infusion and up to the last imaging time point. Results: 89Zr-IAB22M2C infusion was well tolerated, with no immediate or delayed side effects observed after injection. Serum clearance was typically biexponential and dependent on the mass of minibody administered. Areas under the serum time–activity curve, normalized to administered activity, ranged from 1.3 h/L for 0.2 mg to 8.9 h/L for 10 mg. Biodistribution was dependent on the minibody mass administered. The highest uptake was always in spleen, followed by bone marrow. Liver uptake was more pronounced with higher minibody masses. Kidney uptake was typically low. Prominent uptake was seen in multiple normal lymph nodes as early as 2 h after injection, peaking by 24–48 h after injection. Uptake in tumor lesions was seen on imaging as early as 2 h after injection, with most 89Zr-IAB22M2C–positive lesions detectable by 24 h. Lesions were visualized early in patients receiving treatment, with SUV ranging from 5.85 to 22.8 in 6 target lesions. Conclusion: 89Zr-IAB22M2C imaging is safe and has favorable kinetics for early imaging. Biodistribution suggests successful targeting of CD8+ T-cell–rich tissues. The observed targeting of tumor lesions suggests this may be informative for CD8+ T-cell accumulation within tumors. Further evaluation is under way.




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Patient Travel Concerns After Treatment with 177Lu-DOTATATE




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A Conversation with John Sunderland, Johannes Czernin, and Thomas Hope




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From the Literature




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Fibrotic Encapsulation Is the Dominant Source of Continuous Glucose Monitor Delays

Continuous glucose monitor (CGM) readings are delayed relative to blood glucose, and this delay is usually attributed to the latency of interstitial glucose levels. However, CGM-independent data suggest rapid equilibration of interstitial glucose. This study sought to determine the loci of CGM delays. Electrical current was measured directly from CGM electrodes to define sensor kinetics in the absence of smoothing algorithms. CGMs were implanted in mice, and sensor versus blood glucose responses were measured after an intravenous glucose challenge. Dispersion of a fluorescent glucose analog (2-NBDG) into the CGM microenvironment was observed in vivo using intravital microscopy. Tissue deposited on the sensor and nonimplanted subcutaneous adipose tissue was then collected for histological analysis. The time to half-maximum CGM response in vitro was 35 ± 2 s. In vivo, CGMs took 24 ± 7 min to reach maximum current versus 2 ± 1 min to maximum blood glucose (P = 0.0017). 2-NBDG took 21 ± 7 min to reach maximum fluorescence at the sensor versus 6 ± 6 min in adipose tissue (P = 0.0011). Collagen content was closely correlated with 2-NBDG latency (R = 0.96, P = 0.0004). Diffusion of glucose into the tissue deposited on a CGM is substantially delayed relative to interstitial fluid. A CGM that resists fibrous encapsulation would better approximate real-time deviations in blood glucose.




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Immunomodulation Followed by Antigen-Specific Treg Infusion Controls Islet Autoimmunity

Optimal immune-based therapies for type 1 diabetes (T1D) should restore self-tolerance without inducing chronic immunosuppression. CD4+Foxp3+ regulatory T cells (Tregs) are a key cell population capable of facilitating durable immune tolerance. However, clinical trials with expanded Tregs in T1D and solid-organ transplant recipients are limited by poor Treg engraftment without host manipulation. We showed that Treg engraftment and therapeutic benefit in nonautoimmune models required ablative host conditioning. Here, we evaluated Treg engraftment and therapeutic efficacy in the nonobese diabetic (NOD) mouse model of autoimmune diabetes using nonablative, combinatorial regimens involving the anti-CD3 (αCD3), cyclophosphamide (CyP), and IAC (IL-2/JES6–1) antibody complex. We demonstrate that αCD3 alone induced substantial T-cell depletion, impacting both conventional T cells (Tconv) and Tregs, subsequently followed by more rapid rebound of Tregs. Despite robust depletion of host Tconv and host Tregs, donor Tregs failed to engraft even with interleukin-2 (IL-2) support. A single dose of CyP after αCD3 depleted rebounding host Tregs and resulted in a 43-fold increase in donor Treg engraftment, yet polyclonal donor Tregs failed to reverse diabetes. However, infusion of autoantigen-specific Tregs after αCD3 alone resulted in robust Treg engraftment within the islets and induced remission in all mice. This novel combinatorial therapy promotes engraftment of autoantigen-specific donor Tregs and controls islet autoimmunity without long-term immunosuppression.




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A Critical Insulin TCR Contact Residue Selects High-Affinity and Pathogenic Insulin-Specific T Cells

Type 1 diabetes is an autoimmune-mediated disease that culminates in the targeted destruction of insulin-producing β-cells. CD4 responses in NOD mice are dominated by insulin epitope B:9-23 (InsB9-23) specificity, and mutation of the key T-cell receptor (TCR) contact residue within the epitope prevents diabetes development. However, it is not clear how insulin self-antigen controls the selection of autoimmune and regulatory T cells (Tregs). Here we demonstrate that mutation of insulin epitope results in escape of highly pathogenic T cells. We observe an increase in antigen reactivity, clonality, and pathogenicity of insulin-specific T cells that develop in the absence of cognate antigen. Using a single TCR system, we demonstrate that Treg development is greatly diminished in mice with the Y16A mutant epitope. Collectively, these results suggest that the tyrosine residue at position 16 is necessary to constrain TCR reactivity for InsB9-23 by both limiting the development of pathogenic T cells and supporting the selection of Tregs.




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A Hybrid Insulin Epitope Maintains High 2D Affinity for Diabetogenic T Cells in the Periphery

β-Cell antigen recognition by autoreactive T cells is essential in type 1 diabetes (T1D) pathogenesis. Recently, insulin hybrid peptides (HIPs) were identified as strong agonists for CD4 diabetogenic T cells. Here, using BDC2.5 transgenic and NOD mice, we investigated T-cell recognition of the HIP2.5 epitope, which is a fusion of insulin C-peptide and chromogranin A (ChgA) fragments, and compared it with the WE14 and ChgA29–42 epitopes. We measured in situ two-dimensional affinity on individual live T cells from thymus, spleen, pancreatic lymph nodes, and islets before and after diabetes. Although preselection BDC2.5 thymocytes possess higher affinity than splenic BDC2.5 T cells for all three epitopes, peripheral splenic T cells maintained high affinity only to the HIP2.5 epitope. In polyclonal NOD mice, a high frequency (~40%) of HIP2.5-specific islet T cells were identified at both prediabetic and diabetic stages comprising two distinct high- and low-affinity populations that differed in affinity by 100-fold. This high frequency of high- and low-affinity HIP2.5 T cells in the islets potentially represents a major risk factor in diabetes pathogenesis.




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{beta}-Cell Stress Shapes CTL Immune Recognition of Preproinsulin Signal Peptide by Posttranscriptional Regulation of Endoplasmic Reticulum Aminopeptidase 1

The signal peptide of preproinsulin is a major source for HLA class I autoantigen epitopes implicated in CD8 T cell (CTL)–mediated β-cell destruction in type 1 diabetes (T1D). Among them, the 10-mer epitope located at the C-terminal end of the signal peptide was found to be the most prevalent in patients with recent-onset T1D. While the combined action of signal peptide peptidase and endoplasmic reticulum (ER) aminopeptidase 1 (ERAP1) is required for processing of the signal peptide, the mechanisms controlling signal peptide trimming and the contribution of the T1D inflammatory milieu on these mechanisms are unknown. Here, we show in human β-cells that ER stress regulates ERAP1 gene expression at posttranscriptional level via the IRE1α/miR-17-5p axis and demonstrate that inhibition of the IRE1α activity impairs processing of preproinsulin signal peptide antigen and its recognition by specific autoreactive CTLs during inflammation. These results underscore the impact of ER stress in the increased visibility of β-cells to the immune system and position the IRE1α/miR-17 pathway as a central component in β-cell destruction processes and as a potential target for the treatment of autoimmune T1D.




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Manual acupuncture versus sham acupuncture and usual care for prophylaxis of episodic migraine without aura: multicentre, randomised clinical trial




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Clinical characteristics of 113 deceased patients with coronavirus disease 2019: retrospective study




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Opioid agonist treatment and risk of mortality during opioid overdose public health emergency: population based retrospective cohort study




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Prediction models for diagnosis and prognosis of covid-19 infection: systematic review and critical appraisal




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Use of electronic medical records in development and validation of risk prediction models of hospital readmission: systematic review




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Viral load dynamics and disease severity in patients infected with SARS-CoV-2 in Zhejiang province, China, January-March 2020: retrospective cohort study




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Estimated population wide benefits and risks in China of lowering sodium through potassium enriched salt substitution: modelling study




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Prevalence of diabetes recorded in mainland China using 2018 diagnostic criteria from the American Diabetes Association: national cross sectional study




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Use of sodium-glucose co-transporter 2 inhibitors and risk of serious renal events: Scandinavian cohort study




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Association between tax on sugar sweetened beverages and soft drink consumption in adults in Mexico: open cohort longitudinal analysis of Health Workers Cohort Study




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Use of genetic variation to separate the effects of early and later life adiposity on disease risk: mendelian randomisation study




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Conrad George and André Sheckleford | Incorrect layoff procedures can lead to future liability

OP-CONTRIBUTION: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS The COVID-19 pandemic is hitting businesses and the economy in a manner perhaps not seen since the Second World War. This, of course, has affected the ability of employers to pay their employees. The COVID-19...




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Playa to cut Jamaican room count 40% with sale of two Jewels

The sale of two Jewel properties will inject US$60 million into loss-making Playa Resorts while reducing the hotel rooms it operates in Jamaica by more 40 per cent. Playa announced the sale of Jewel Runaway Bay Beach Resort...




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FTC puts Total gas market share at 30% - Sees no threat to competition from Epping deal

THE ACQUISITION of Epping resulted in Total Jamaica controlling nearly a third of the retail gasolene market, but that’s not enough to lessen competition, the Fair Trading Commission, FTC, has found. “The acquisition is unlikely to have either the...




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Digital Jamaica throws sales lifeline to furniture companies

DESPITE TUMBLING sales and challenges with hire-purchase accounts, two of the largest retailers of home furniture and appliances, Courts Jamaica and Singer Jamaica, have found glimmers of hope during the COVID-19 pandemic. That’s because work-from...




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Challenges and Opportunities in the Fight Against Corruption

Members Event

9 December 2019 - 6:30pm to 7:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Rory Stewart, Member of Parliament for Penrith and The Border (2010-19); Secretary of State for International Development (2019)

Chair: Daniel Bruce, Chief Executive, Transparency International UK

Drawing on his experience in government, Rory Stewart shares his observations into the impact corruption can have on society.

This event is organized in association with Transparency International UK as part of Transparency International UK’s Annual Lecture series.

Members Events Team




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Reflections on the Brexit Election

Invitation Only Research Event

6 December 2019 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Alistair Burt, Conservative Member of Parliament (1983-97 and 2001-19); Minister of State for the Middle East, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Minister of State at the Department for UK International Development (2017-19)

On 12 December 2019, the United Kingdom will hold one of its most crucial elections in the 21st century. The result will have a direct impact on the Brexit process and will most likely determine the country’s future direction for years to come.  

Yet the final outcome is far from predictable. It seems quite certain that the 2019 election is unlikely to produce a clear two-party share of the vote as happened back in 2017. Public trust in politicians is low and party loyalty is looser than ever. Polls show that Brexit it overwhelmingly considered as the main issue among the electorate alongside a deep concern about the future of public services. This raises multiple questions: can the 2019 election represent a chance to unite the country and move on? Will cross-party identities of ‘Leavers’ and ‘Remainers’ translate to how people vote in the election? And what will the outcome mean for Brexit and the future of party politics in Britain? 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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Can the New European Commission Deliver on Its Promises to Africa?

4 December 2019

Fergus Kell

Projects Assistant, Africa Programme

Damir Kurtagic

Former Academy Robert Bosch Fellow, Africa Programme
Familiar promises of equal partnership must be backed by bolder action, including an expanded budget, internal reform and a rethink of its approach to trade negotiations.

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Jutta Urpilainen, new EU commissioner for international partnerships, at the European Parliament in Brussels in October. Photo: Getty Images.

The new European Commission, headed by Ursula von der Leyen, assumed office on 1 December, and there are early signs that Africa will begin near the top of their foreign policy priorities. Policy towards Africa under the new EU administration is yet to be fully defined, but its contours are already visible in the selection of commissioners and assignment of portfolios.  

Although rumours of a dedicated commissioner for Africa were unfounded, the appointment of Jutta Urpilainen to the new role of commissioner for international partnerships – replacing the former post of development commissioner – is a strong signal of ongoing change in EU development thinking, away from bilateral aid towards trade and investment, including by the private sector. 

This may have significant consequences for the EU’s relationship with Africa. In her mission letter to Urpilainen in September, von der Leyen listed the first objective as a new ‘comprehensive strategy for Africa’. Urpilainen, Finland’s finance minister before being posted to Ethiopia as special representative on mediation, has also described her appointment as an opportunity to move on from traditional measures of aid delivery. 

Ambition or incoherence? 

However, this ambition may be at odds with other EU priorities and practices, notably managing migration and institutions and instruments for governing EU–Africa relations that remain rooted in a ‘traditional’ model of North–South development cooperation rather than equitable partnership.

Another newly created post will see Margaritis Schinas assume the role of vice-president for promoting the European way of life – formerly ‘protecting our European way of life’ before a backlash saw it changed – a reminder that migration will remain high on the EU’s foreign policy agenda. The new high representative for foreign and security policy and chief EU diplomat, Josep Borrell, has highlighted the need for bilateral partnership with countries of origin and transit, mainly in Africa. 

Negotiations also continue to stall on a replacement to the Cotonou Agreement, the 20-year partnership framework between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states, which now looks certain to be extended for at least 12 months beyond its expiry in February 2020.

Ambiguities in the EU’s negotiating approach have certainly contributed to the delay: having pushed initially for a separate regional pillar for Africa that would be opened to the North African countries (who are not ACP members) and include a loosely defined role for the African Union, this would later be abandoned in favour of a dual-track process on separate new agreements with the AU and ACP respectively.

The EU also continues to pursue controversial economic partnership agreements under the aegis of Cotonou, despite their increasing appearance of incompatibility with the pathbreaking African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – one of the clearest expressions to date of African agency.

The EU has so far attempted to gloss over this incoherence, claiming that EPAs can somehow act as the ‘building blocks’ for Africa-wide economic integration. But tensions are appearing between EU departments and within the commission, with the European External Action Service inclined to prioritize a more strategic continental relationship with the AU, while the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development remains committed to the ACP as the conduit for financial support and aid delivery.

And it is unlikely to get away with such incoherence for much longer. Change is now urgent, as numerous countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue to attract the strategic and commercial interests of the EU’s competitors: from established players such as China and potentially in future the UK, which is intent on remodelling its Africa ties post-Brexit, to emerging actors such as Turkey or Russia, which held its first Africa summit in October. 

The need for delivery

If the EU is serious about its rhetoric on equal partnership, it must therefore move beyond convoluted hybrid proposals. Delivering on the Juncker administration’s proposal to increase funding for external action by 30 per cent for 2021–27 would mark an important first step, particularly as this involves streamlining that would see the European Development Fund – the financial instrument for EU-ACP relations – incorporated into the main EU budget.

The new commission should therefore continue to exert pressure on the European Council and European Parliament to adopt this proposal, as negotiations on this financial framework have been repeatedly subject to delay and may not be resolved before the end of the year. 

Beyond this, proactive support for the AfCFTA and for structural transformation more broadly must be prioritized ahead of vague promises for a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as held out by Juncker in his final State of the Union address in 2018. 

The significance of internal EU reforms for Africa should also not be discounted. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, for instance, has placed the African sector at a particular disadvantage and has made it harder to compete even in domestic markets, let alone in the distant EU export markets. EU efforts to stimulate inflows of private investments into the African agricultural sector, abolish import tariffs and offer technical support for African producers to satisfy EU health and safety regulations will be of little use if they are undermined by heavy subsidies across Europe.

Ultimately, changes to job titles alone will be insufficient. The new commission’s rhetoric, while ambitious, differs little from that of the previous decade – Africa has heard the promise of a ‘partnership of equals’ and of ‘shared ownership’ since before the advent of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy in 2007. Now is the time for truly bold steps to implement this vision.




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Polish-British Belvedere Forum 2020

Research Event

3 March 2020 - 2:00pm to 4 March 2020 - 3:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Belvedere Forum is a leading annual British and Polish bilateral dialogue bringing together a diverse group of actors from civil society, politics, business, academia and NGOs. It seeks to strengthen and deepen the extensive partnership between the two countries by exploring political, economic, social and cultural issues through debate and discussion.

The forum is an annual event alternating between the UK and Poland. Originally created in 2017 by the governments of the UK and Poland, the forum is now jointly organized by Chatham House and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw.

Anna Dorant-Hayes

Executive Assistant to the Director
+44 (0)20 7957 5702




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Schapiro Lecture: The Would-Be Federation Next Door – What Next for Britain?

Members Event

6 February 2020 - 6:00pm to 7:15pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Helen Thompson, Professor of Political Economy, University of Cambridge; Host, Talking Politics
Chairs: Hans Kundnani, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House
Laura Cram, Professor of European Politics, University of Edinburgh. Co-Editor, Government and Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics
 

Helen Thompson reflects on the changing nature of the EU as a federation and will seek to map post-Brexit options for the UK within this history. 

Since its beginning in the 1950s, the evolution of European integration has created a series of predicaments for the UK which has been forced again and again to redefine its relationship with the European entity. As Britain seeks to leaves the European Union, it will again need to find a new relationship with it at a time when the future of the US commitment to Europe is also uncertain.
 
Assuming Brexit takes place, to what extent could the federalization of the EU pose issues for the UK? What does a move towards federalization mean for security globally? And how would Britain and Northern Ireland navigate a relationship with a customs union federation?
 
The Schapiro Lecture is published in Government and Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics.


 

Event attributes

Livestream

Members Events Team




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Don’t Be Afraid of Political Fragmentation

16 December 2019

Pepijn Bergsen

Research Fellow, Europe Programme
If managed correctly, splintering and more volatile political systems – so-called ‘Dutchification’ – need not be a ticket to political and policy paralysis.

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Voters cast their vote as part of the Dutch general elections on March 15, 2017 at a polling station in a mill in Oisterwijk. Photo by ROB ENGELAAR/AFP via Getty Images.

In recent decades, political party systems across Europe have fragmented and electoral volatility has increased. The number of parties represented in parliaments across the continent has grown and the formerly dominant mainstream parties have seen their support base collapse, forcing parties into often uncomfortable and unstable coalitions.

From the United Kingdom to Germany, politicians and commentators talk of such scenarios in often apocalyptic terms and associate it with political instability and policy paralysis.

They shouldn’t. Instead they should focus their energy on making these increasingly competitive political markets work.

The Netherlands is frequently held up as a prime example of this process, which is therefore sometimes referred to as ‘Dutchification’. Its highly proportional political system has created the opportunity for new parties and specific interest groups to win parliamentary representation, ranging from an animal rights party and a party catering specifically to the interests of the elderly.

This has been accompanied by increased electoral volatility. In the 1970s, less than 15% of seats in the Dutch parliament would change party at any election, but in the last election in 2017, this was just over a quarter. The system also created space for the relatively early rise of populist far-right parties, though it was not the cause of their rise.

Nevertheless, despite the regularly difficult coalition politics, it remains one of the most well-governed countries in the world.

A short history of fragmentation

Looking at the effective number of parties represented in parliaments, the number of parties, corrected for their size, provides a good measure of the extent of fragmentation. In the Netherlands this steadily increased from around four in the 1980s to over eight following the election in 2017. Even the populist far-right vote has fragmented, with two parties partly competing for the same electorate. In other countries it has been a more recent phenomenon. Spain remained a de facto two-party system until the financial crisis. Dissatisfaction with both mainstream parties has seen challenger parties on both the left and the right attract significant support, making it harder to form stable coalitions. Political fragmentation decreased slightly in Italy in recent years, but that was from a high base as it shot up in the early 1990s when the post-war political settlement crumbled.

German politics, long a hallmark of stability, is struggling with the decrease in support for the parties that dominated its political scene in the post-war period. The Christian Democrats and Social Democrats only barely managed to win a majority together in the election in 2017, at 53.4% of the vote compared with the 81.3% achieved 30 years earlier. The latest polls suggest they would only get to 40% together if an election were held today.

A similar trend is visible within the European Parliament. Whereas the two largest groups in the European Parliament, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, together won 66% of the vote in the election in 1999, they did not even manage to win a majority together in 2019, taking just 39.5% of the vote.

No crisis of democracy

If electoral volatility and political fragmentation does indeed constitute some sort of crisis of democracy, we should expect to see voters become unhappy about how their national democracy functions. Largely, the opposite seems to be the case.

In the Netherlands, satisfaction with its democracy went up at the same time as Dutchification did its work. Similar trends are visible in other highly fragmented European political systems, often those with very proportional systems. Despite regular minority governments, satisfaction with democracy is above 90% in Denmark and at 80% in Sweden, according to the latest Eurobarometer data.

In comparison, it stood at 52% in the United Kingdom and 53% in France, where the electoral system has, at least on the surface, prevented the kind of fragmentation supposedly plaguing proportional systems.

Satisfaction with democracy seems to be affected by a number of factors. This includes the state of the economy, particularly in countries that were hit the hardest by the global financial and euro zone crises. Nevertheless, the data suggests that, even if we can’t say that Dutchification by definition leads to more satisfaction with democracy, it is clearly not associated with falling faith in the system.

A competitive political market

Dutchification should be seen as accompanying a more competitive political marketplace. A more emancipated, demanding and politically engaged electorate than in the post-war decades is willing to shop around instead of merely vote according to socioeconomic class or other dividing lines, such as religious ones. The fragmented parliaments that emerge as a result provide better representation of different groups within European societies.

This makes life harder for Europe’s political parties and politicians, as they juggle large coalitions, or changing coalitions under minority governments, but provides voters with more choice and democratic renewal. If handled correctly this would also allow more responsiveness to shifts in public opinion.

Such democratic creative destruction in competitive political markets is to be celebrated in a well-functioning democracy. Just as companies prefer to operate in an oligopoly, political parties prefer the stability of limited political competition. But wishing for this kind of stability comes perilously close to preferring stability over proper representation.

Worrying about Dutchification risks confusing a crisis of the traditional mainstream parties with a crisis of democracy. For some countries, particularly those like the Netherlands and Denmark which have longer histories of consensus-based politics and coalition building, this is an easier adjustment. But this should not be an excuse to not attempt to make politics work better as they were forced to go through, arguably still ongoing, adjustment processes too.

Instead of investing in futile attempts to get back to how things were in the old days, or hoping this will somehow magically happen, political leaders and parties across Europe need to reassess how they deal with the new reality of Dutchification.




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Britain Must Balance a Transatlantic Heart With a European Head

19 December 2019

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
Returning from an EU-rooted foreign and economic policy to one which is more international in outlook will be difficult, take time, and be more costly than the new UK government currently envisages.

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Boris Johnson chairs the first cabinet meeting after winning a majority of 80 seats in the 2019 UK general election. Photo by Matt Dunham – WPA Pool/Getty Images.

The convincing general election win for the Conservative Party and Boris Johnson opens a new chapter in British history. On 31 January 2020, Britain will withdraw from the EU and return to its historical position as a separate European power.

Recognising the strategic significance of this change, the Queen’s speech opening the new parliament stated that 'the government will undertake the deepest review of Britain's security, defence, and foreign policy since the end of the Cold War'. But in what context?

Prime Minister Boris Johnson and other Brexit supporters have yearned for Britain to return to its exceptional trajectory. In their view, Britain can once again become a trading nation - more global in outlook and ambition than its European neighbours, freed from the shackles of an ageing and fractured European continent and its deadening regulatory hand.

This imagery makes good copy. But the 21st century does not offer Britain the same opportunities as did the 18th, 19th or early 20th centuries. This is a different world, and Britain’s position in it needs to be crafted with a sharp eye to what is possible.

Geopolitics undergoing wrenching change

This is not declinism. The UK remains an economically strong and politically influential country by relative global standards – it is currently the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world, and the second largest donor of official development assistance. It has ubiquitous cultural brands from fashion and music to the royal family, and an eminent diplomatic and security position at the heart of all of the world’s major international institutions and alliances, from NATO and the UN security council to the IMF, G7, G20 and Commonwealth. 

But Britain leaves the EU just as the geopolitical landscape is undergoing wrenching change. The United States has turned inwards, closer to its own historic norm, and is undermining the international institutions which it created alongside Britain in the 1940s. China’s international influence is on the rise alongside its vast and still growing economy, challenging traditional norms of individual freedom and public transparency.

Russia is navigating the cracks and crevices of the fracturing rules-based international order with ruthless efficiency. Sensing the change in the wind, many governments are now back-tracking on their post-Cold War transitions to more open and democratic societies.

The implications of this new context have yet to be fully internalised by those who look forward to Britain’s future outside the EU. Britain will be negotiating new trade deals in an increasingly transactional, fragmented and protectionist international economic environment. It will be trying to sell its world-class services into markets where national control over finance, law, technology and media is increasingly prized.

Making new diplomatic inroads will be no easier. The government will face strong internal and external criticism if it lends security assistance to states that are simultaneously clamping down on their citizens’ rights. With the number of military personnel in decline and investment in new equipment stretched across multiple expensive platforms, the UK could struggle to project meaningful defence cooperation to new security partners in Asia at the same time as upholding its NATO commitments and its deployments in conflict zones around the world.

Britain also opens its new global chapter at a time when it is changing domestically. There is no over-riding reason for a missionary British foreign policy – neither the economic returns or image of national glory that drove Empire, nor the existential defence of its land, interests and freedom that drove it during the Cold War.

Stretching liberal interventionism to Iraq, as Tony Blair did when he was prime minister, and to Libya as David Cameron did in 2011, has injected a deep dose of popular scepticism to the idea that Britain - with or without allies - can or should help make the world in its own image.

This more defensive mindset – epitomised by parliament’s refusal to use military force to punish President Bashar al Assad’s regime for using chemical weapons against its citizens in 2013 – will not abate soon. Especially when the new government’s political bandwidth will be stretched by fiendishly complex trade-offs between its financial promises to support domestic renewal, the imperatives of striking and implementing a new free trade agreement with the EU, and the economic consequences of leaving the single market.

All this points to the fact that the most important step for Britain at the beginning of this new national chapter will be to establish an effective partnership with the EU and its member states. They face the same international risks as Britain and have as much to gain from the preservation of rules-based international behaviour. Recognising the continued interdependence between Britain and the EU will offer both sides greater leverage in a more competitive and hostile world.

A new transatlantic relationship

Once it has agreed its new relationship with the EU, Britain can turn to crafting its new relationship with the mighty United States. US-UK economic interdependence and close security ties should help discipline the bilateral economic relationship. The more difficult challenge will be for the UK to avoid falling into fissures between the US and the EU over how to manage bilateral relations with China and Russia, particularly if President Trump wins a second term.

Britain will have to get used to this difficult balancing act between its transatlantic heart and European head after Brexit. This makes it all the more important for the UK to develop new diplomatic and commercial initiatives with countries that are also struggling to cope with the current uncertain, transactional international environment.

Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand can grow as bilateral economic partners and as allies in international institutions, such as the G7, OECD and WTO. They may even open a door to British engagement in regional trade arrangements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP), which do not require the same political commitments as EU membership.

Turning from an EU-rooted foreign and economic policy to one that is once again more international in outlook will be difficult, take time and be more costly than the government currently envisages. The irony is that for this to be successful requires sustained political investment by the Johnson government to build a strong relationship with the EU that it is focused on leaving.




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Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region

Members Event

5 March 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

HE George Vella, President, Republic of Malta

Chair: Dr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

The president of Malta discusses the current security challenges in the Mediterranean region, reflecting on the role of international cooperation in addressing climate change, migration and refugee flows.

Members Events Team




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The UK, US and Mauritius: Decolonization, Security, Chagos and the ICJ

Invitation Only Research Event

30 January 2020 - 8:15am to 9:15am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Professor Philippe Sands QC, Professor of Law, UCL 
Richard Burt, Managing Partner, McLarty Associates
Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme; Dean, Queen Elizabeth II Academy, Chatham House

The Chagos archipelago in the Indian Ocean has garnered media attention recently after the UK failed to abide by a UN deadline to return the islands to Mauritius. The US has landed in the middle of the dispute as a 1965 agreement with the UK has allowed the US to establish a military base on one of the islands, Diego Garcia, which has since become instrumental in US missions in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. 

In February 2019, an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the Chagos archipelago was unlawfully dismembered from Mauritius, in violation of the right to self-determination and that the United Kingdom is under an obligation to end its administration of the Chagos archipelago ‘as rapidly as possible’. The UN General Assembly subsequently voted overwhelmingly in favour of the UK leaving the islands by the end of November 2019 and the right of the former residents who were removed by the UK to return. The UK does not accept the ICJ and UN rulings and argues that the islands are needed to protect Britain from security threats while Mauritius has made clear the base can remain.

Professor Philippe Sands QC, professor of law at University College London and lead counsel for Mauritius on the ICJ case on Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, will be joining Ambassador Richard Burt, US chief negotiator in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the former Soviet Union for a discussion on the fate of the archipelago including the future of the military base and the right of return of former residents.  

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

US and Americas Programme




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Britain’s Soft Power Potential: In Conversation with Penny Mordaunt

Members Event

5 February 2020 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Penny Mordaunt MP, Member of Parliament for Portsmouth North; Secretary of State for Defence (2019); Secretary of State for International Development (2017-2019)

Chair: Thomas Raines, Director, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Drawing on her experience as secretary of state for defence and secretary of state for international development, Penny Mordaunt discusses how soft power can protect, promote and project Britain’s international interests and foreign policy agenda.

Often defined as the capacity to influence others without coercion or force, soft power differs from traditional military capabilities in favour of more subtle forms of influence rooted in values, culture and civic institutions.

Consistently upholding democratic values and human rights can contribute to a nation’s soft power as much as its cultural icons and legacies.  However, utilising soft power – the power of attractiveness – is not straightforward: the government is only part of a broad mix of institutions and actors with a role to play.

Can the UK develop a long term approach that brings together all of the components of its soft power for a common purpose?

What are the key sources of Britain’s soft power? How has Brexit affected perceptions of Britain internationally? And with the UK’s departure from the European Union now confirmed, how should we think about its soft power in the future?

Members Events Team