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Lebanon Is Paying the Cost of Its Dysfunctional Politics

26 February 2020

Nadim Shehadi

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
A series of fights to political stalemate have led its economy to the brink and cut it off from its natural economic partners in the Gulf.

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Protests against economic conditions and government inaction turned violent in January. Photo: Getty Images.

To understand Lebanon’s financial collapse, look to its politics.

The country has been deeply damaged by an increasingly dysfunctional political system. A series of compromises have alienated it from its main markets in the Gulf and strangled its economy; anyone that has glanced at fluctuations in Lebanese bank deposits over the last 10 years can see the correlation.

Imagine if Boris Johnson or Donald Trump were obliged to form joint governments with Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders. The result would be paralysis and lack of accountability as each party pulls the country in opposite directions and blames the other for the state of limbo. This has been the state of affairs in Lebanon since the Doha agreement of 2008. 

That agreement followed an 18-month siege that paralyzed Beirut and an attack on the city by Hezbollah’s ‘black shirts’. The Doha formula imposed governments of national unity between Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s pro-Saudi camp and Hezbollah’s pro-Iran camp and their respective internal allies.

The pattern was set: each period of subsequent paralysis was followed by further compromise as the tug of war pulled the country away from its principal economic partners, the Arab Gulf states, with the regional balance of power tilting towards Hezbollah. 

It was not supposed to be like this. The Baabda Declaration in June 2012, reached after a process of national dialogue, was meant to secure Lebanon’s neutrality in regional conflicts, with both sides promising to hold back on external alliances and coexist despite difference over major regional issues like the war in Syria, the standoff between the US and Iran or relations with Israel or the Gulf states.

This has worn away. The Baabda declaration itself became a sham when Hezbollah inserted itself into the war in Syria in support of the Assad regime and overtly got involved in Iraq and Yemen as an Iranian proxy. This was followed by Saudi opposition to concessions by Hariri that led to the election of General Michel Aoun, an ally of Hezbollah, as president in October 2016; again, after a political paralysis that lasted 29 months with no active government and no head of state.  

The Saudis were also furious when President Aoun’s son-in-law, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, abstained from condemning the burning of the Saudi embassy in Tehran at an Arab League meeting in Cairo in January 2016, citing the need to preserve national unity.

Fearing that he was simply providing Hezbollah with protection in the guise of compromise, the Saudis pressured Hariri to resign in November 2017 during a trip to Riyadh, but he later challenged that by retracting on his resignation when back in Beirut. Lebanon was caught between two sides, and as the regional conflict intensified from tension to open confrontation, neutrality was no longer an option.

Gulf connections

An estimated 350,000 Lebanese expats live and work in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. These countries are also the main clients for Lebanese contractors, consultants and advertising companies, some of which have offices there. The domestic tourism industry relies heavily on Arab Gulf visitors and they are a principal source of foreign investments especially in the real estate sector.

Lebanon also enjoyed a certain degree of political and economic protection from the US and the Gulf, and Hezbollah benefited indirectly from that protection, as it also shielded it to a certain degree from sanctions.

The deterioration of relations meant that the country was cut off by its Gulf partners. This was manifested in travel bans for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals to Lebanon and a decrease in investments and bank deposits, as well as a decrease in remittances from Lebanese expats, partly because of economic crisis in the Gulf countries themselves.

Saudi Arabia withdrew $4 billion of aid to the Lebanese army and internal security forces, and no aid or deposits were forthcoming as the economic and financial situation deteriorated. 

The costs to the Lebanese economy include the opportunity cost created by the annual threat of war with Israel, after which trips are cancelled and projects postponed. Hezbollah also controls a section of Beirut port where it pays no duty or taxes. Add to that the economic fallout from the war in Syria, such as the impact on exports, the inflow of refugees and the cost of Hezbollah’s involvement.

The burden of these political factors is difficult to estimate but it constitutes the ransom that the Lebanese economy bears as a cost of the compromise. This is not to absolve Lebanese politicians from corruption or bankers of mismanagement but to add that political factors cannot be ignored.

The cumulative cost and economic impact of being cut off from its main economic partner eventually bankrupted the country. The fiscal and financial aspects, with Lebanon’s inability to service its debt, are but a reflection of these political factors. In the long run, the key to avoiding complete collapse is to restore relations with the GCC and free Lebanon from that very costly grip.




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POSTPONED: Libya: Political Fragmentation, War and Foreign Intervention

Members Event

24 March 2020 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Dr Wolfram Lacher, Senior Associate, German Institute for International and Security Affairs; Author, Libya's Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict
Chair: Maryam Nemazee, Anchor, Al Jazeera

Further speakers to be announced.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

 

Libya's third bout of civil war in a decade began when Khalifa Haftar's Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) launched an offensive on Tripoli in April 2019. Since then, a growing number of foreign states have intervened ever more deeply in the conflict. Warring Libyan armed factions, broadly aligned with either the internationally recognized Government of National Accord or the LAAF, have become increasingly reliant on foreign support to prosecute their war effort.  

Against this backdrop, the panellists will reflect on the forces that have shaped Libya’s trajectory since 2011. As the prospects for international mediation remain bleak, what motivations and grievances are driving the country’s warring parties? How can this war be explained beyond a scramble for the control of Libya’s oil wealth? And are Libyans at risk of being mere pawns in a proxy war?

 

Members Events Team




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Unpacking the role of religion in political transnationalism: the case of the Shi'a Iraqi diaspora since 2003

4 March 2020 , Volume 96, Number 2

Oula Kadhum

This article explores the role of religion in political transnationalism using the case of the Shi'a Iraqi diaspora since 2003. The article focuses on three areas that capture important trends in Shi'a transnationalism and their implications for transnational Shi'a identity politics. These include Shi'a diasporic politics, transnational Shi'a civic activism, and the cultural production of Iraqi Shi'a identity through pilgrimages, rituals and new practices. It is argued that understanding Shi'a Islam and identity formation requires adopting a transnational lens. The evolution of Shi'a Islam is not only a result of the dictates of the Shi'a clerical centres, and how they influence Shi'a populations abroad, but also the transnational interrelationships and links to holy shrine cities, Shi'i national and international politics, humanitarianism and commemorations and rituals. The article demonstrates that Shi'a political transnationalism is unexceptional in that it echoes much of the literature on diasporic politics and development where diaspora involve themselves from afar in the politics and societies of their countries of origin. At the same time, it shows the exceptionalism of Shi'a diasporic movements, in that their motivations and mobilizations are contributing to the reification of sectarian geographical and social borders, creating a transnationalism that is defined by largely Shi'a networks, spaces, actors and causes. The case of Shi'a political transnationalism towards Iraq shows that this is increasing the distance between Shi'is and Iraq's other communities, simultaneously fragmenting Iraq's national unity while deepening Shi'a identity and politics both nationally and supra-nationally.




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POSTPONED: The Development of Libyan Armed Groups since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests

Invitation Only Research Event

18 March 2020 - 9:00am to 10:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Abdul Rahman Alageli, Associate Fellow, MENA Programme, Chatham House
Emaddedin Badi, Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Institute
Tim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, MENA Programme Chatham House
Valerie Stocker, Independent Researcher

Since the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths. While many of these have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. In the west and south of the country,  armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks.

In the east, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will need to address the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities, even while the development of armed groups’ capacities dilutes their accountability to those communities.

This roundtable will discuss the findings of a forthcoming Chatham House research paper, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests’, which presents insights from over 200 interviews of armed actors and members of local communities and posits how international policymakers might seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Georgia Cooke

Project Manager, Middle East and North Africa Programme
+44 (0)20 7957 5740




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The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests

17 March 2020

This paper explores armed group–community relations in Libya and the sources of revenue that have allowed armed groups to grow in power and influence. It draws out the implications for policy and identifies options for mitigating conflict dynamics.

Tim Eaton

Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Abdul Rahman Alageli

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Emadeddin Badi

Policy Leader Fellow, School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute

Mohamed Eljarh

Co-founder and CEO, Libya Outlook

Valerie Stocker

Researcher

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Fighters of the UN-backed Government of National Accord patrol in Ain Zara suburb in Tripoli, February 2020. Photo: Amru Salahuddien

Summary

  • Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths since the emergence of a national governance split in 2014. Many have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. However, the evolution of the Libyan security sector in this period remains relatively understudied. Prior to 2011, Libya’s internal sovereignty – including the monopoly on force and sole agency in international relations – had been personally vested in the figure of Muammar Gaddafi. After his death, these elements of sovereignty reverted to local communities, which created armed organizations to fill that central gap. National military and intelligence institutions that were intended to protect the Libyan state have remained weak, with their coherence undermined further by the post-2014 governance crisis and ongoing conflict. As a result, the most effective armed groups have remained localized in nature; the exception is the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), which has combined and amalgamated locally legitimate forces under a central command.
  • In the west and south of the country, the result of these trends resembles a kind of inversion of security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): the armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks; and have continued to arm, mobilize and integrate themselves into the state’s security apparatus without becoming subservient to it. In the eastern region, the LAAF projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LAAF has co-opted social organizations to dominate political and economic decision-making.
  • The LAAF has established a monopoly over the control of heavy weapons and the flow of arms in eastern Libya, and has built alliances with armed groups in the east. Armed groups in the south have been persuaded to join the LAAF’s newly established command structure. The LAAF’s offensive on the capital, which started in April 2019, represents a serious challenge to armed groups aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). The fallout from the war will be a challenge to the GNA or any future government, as groups taking part in the war will expect to be rewarded. SSR is thus crucial in the short term: if the GNA offers financial and technical expertise and resources, plus legal cover, to armed groups under its leadership, it will increase the incentive for armed groups to be receptive to its plans for reform.
  • Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will necessarily rely on addressing the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities. Yet the development of armed groups’ capacities, along with their increasing access to autonomous means of generating revenue, has steadily diluted their accountability to local communities. This process is likely to be accelerated by the ongoing violence around Tripoli.
  • Communities’ relationship to armed groups varies across different areas of the country, reflecting the social, political, economic and security environment:
  • Despite their clear preference for a more formal, state-controlled security sector, Tripoli’s residents broadly accept the need for    the presence of armed groups to provide security. The known engagement of the capital’s four main armed groups in criminal activity is a trade-off that many residents seem able to tolerate, providing that overt violence remains low. Nonetheless, there is a widespread view that the greed of Tripoli’s armed groups has played a role in stoking the current conflict.
  • In the east, many residents appear to accept (or even welcome) the LAAF’s expansion beyond the security realm, provided that it undertakes these roles effectively. That said, such is the extent of LAAF control that opposition to the alliance comes at a high price.
  • In the south, armed groups draw heavily on social legitimacy, acting as guardians of tribal zones of influence and defenders of their respective communities against outside threats, while also at times stoking local conflicts. Social protections continue to hold sway, meaning that accountability within communities is also limited.
  • To varying extents since 2014, Libya’s armed groups have developed networks that enmesh political and business stakeholders in revenue-generation models:
  • Armed groups in Tripoli have compensated for reduced financial receipts from state budgets by cultivating unofficial and illicit sources of income. They have also focused on infiltrating state institutions to ensure access to state budgets and contracts dispersed in the capital.
  • In the east of the country, the LAAF has developed a long-term strategy to dominate the security, political and economic spheres through the establishment of a quasi-legal basis for receiving funds from Libya’s rival state authorities. It has supplemented this with extensive intervention in the private sector. External patronage supports military operations, but also helps to keep this financial system, based on unsecured debt, afloat.
  • In the south, limited access to funds from the central state has spurred armed groups to become actively involved in the economy. This has translated into the taxation of movement and the imposition of protection fees, particularly on informal (and often illicit) activity.
  • Without real commitment from international policymakers to enforcing the arms embargo and protecting the economy from being weaponized, Libya will be consigned to sustained conflict, further fragmentation and potential economic collapse. Given the likely absence of a political settlement in the short term, international policymakers should seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy by reducing armed groups’ engagement in economic life.
  • In order to reduce illicit activities, international policymakers should develop their capacity to identify and target chokepoints along illicit supply chains, with a focus on restraining activities and actors in closest proximity to violence. Targeted sanctions against rent maximizers (both armed and unarmed) is likely to be the most effective strategy. More effective investigation and restraint of conflict economy actors will require systemic efforts to improve transparency and enhance the institutional capacity of anti-corruption authorities. International policymakers should also support the development of tailored alternative livelihoods that render conflict economy activities less attractive.




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Webinar: How is the MENA Region Dealing with the COVID-19 Outbreak?

Research Event

2 April 2020 - 12:30pm to 1:30pm

Event participants

Omar Dewachi, Associate Professor of Medical Anthropology, Department of Anthropology, Rutgers University
Tin Hinane El Kadi, Associate Fellow, MENA Programme, Chatham House
Moderator: Sanam Vakil, Deputy Head & Senior Research Fellow, MENA Programme, Chatham House

At this webinar, part of the Chatham House MENA Programme Online Event Series, experts will explore how the coronavirus pandemic is impacting the economy, state-society relations and healthcare throughout the Middle East and North Africa. How are governments handling this crisis and what measures have they put in place to stop the spread of the virus? Why are some governments withholding information about the number of cases? What has the response from the public been so far? How is this affecting the region and how does it compare to the global picture?

The event will be held on the record.

Reni Zhelyazkova

Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme
+44 (0)20 7314 3624




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COVID-19 Impact on Refugees is Also Political

31 March 2020

Dr Lina Khatib

Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme
The spread of coronavirus in the Levant puts Syrian as well as other refugees and internally displaced people at particular risk because of the policies and practices of the authorities.

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The word Corona written in the sand on the beach in Lebanon's southern city of Saida. amid the spread of coronavirus in the country. Photo by MAHMOUD ZAYYAT/AFP via Getty Images.

As Lebanon strains to contain COVID-19, it is not clear which governmental public health policies apply to refugees. The government announced free testing for coronavirus in the public Rafiq Hariri University Hospital in Beirut but has not mentioned if refugees are eligible.

Lebanon’s coronavirus containment strategy is based on self-reporting and, given incidents of forced deportation and harassment of Syrian refugees from both the authorities and local communities, it is certainly less likely refugees would present themselves to the health authorities for fear of deportation.

Despite agreeing a Lebanon Crisis Response Plan with the UN for refugees, different ministries were left to implement it without coordination, just as Lebanese politicians from all sides started trying to rally popular support for ridding Lebanon from refugees - in particular from Syria, who Lebanese leaders say are causing a strain on the country’s already weak infrastructure.

This finger pointing is coupled with the leaders’ own complete disregard for the rampant corruption and lack of accountability within Lebanon’s political class, which contribute to the weakening of the country’s infrastructure.

For refugees who do find themselves back in Syria, there are different challenges according to which area they are in. In the north-east, the WHO and international NGOs (INGOs) negotiate with both Kurdish authorities as well as the government - each presenting its own hurdles.

Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria have closed the Semalka border with Iraqi Kurdistan, posing a serious dilemma for INGOs offering services in north-east Syria but concerned about their staff safety whose movement is now curtailed.

The government of Syria has stipulated all emergency response must go through its ministries. But this limits what the WHO can do in the country and gives Syrian authorities the ability to block ‘cross-line aid’ which goes from government-controlled to non-government areas.

Despite reports that doctors raised the alarm about suspected cases well before patient zero was confirmed, the government appears to be either covering up the actual extent of the spread of COVID-19 or failing to respond. Some limited testing kits have arrived but testing has barely started.

The WHO’s Syria plan is divided into three regions (north-west, north-east, and areas under government control). But concerns remain as to how workable such a decentralized plan is because of the government’s practices. In January, the UN Security Council did not renew the cross-border response resolution for the Yaroubiye border crossing between Syria and Iraq that the WHO was using to send medical supplies into north-east Syria.

Syrian authorities do not permit recently authorized ‘cross-line’ responders to engage with non-government authorities in areas outside regime control. This essentially voids the authorization to work cross-line as it is practically impossible to implement programs. The WHO has sought approval from the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to move medical supplies by land to north-east Syria.

While promising facilitation, the Ministry’s reply comes with conditions of seeking detailed approval for every shipment. When Eastern Ghouta was under siege, similar conditions led to certain supplies being removed from UN/ICRC convoys to Eastern Ghouta, and there is no guarantee this will not happen again.

Due to lack of capacity in north-east Syria, coronavirus tests conducted by the WHO there must be processed through the Central Public Health Laboratory in Damascus. Samples are transported twice a week from Qamishli to Damascus but no results were ever received from Damascus for those tests.

While the WHO is able to coordinate access to north-west Syria with the Turkish authorities, the prospective coronavirus testing capacity in the Idlib region is low – despite claims that thousands of kits are arriving, a lack of resource on the ground means potentially only 20 tests per day could be done in an area inhabited by an estimated three million people.

Following the recently announced ceasefire in the area, many internally displaced people are returning from the Turkish border to their homes in the north-west, but such mass movement increases the risk of coronavirus spreading. People also continue to move between Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon, posing a challenge to the WHO’s COVID-19 response in the Levant, as the WHO has distinct response plans for each country in the region and it is difficult to coordinate across these plans.

Challenges face refugees even if they head towards Europe due to the potential for conflation between migration control and coronavirus outbreak control. Aurelie Ponthieu, Coordinator for Forced Migration at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) says there is a risk some countries could use COVID-19 to impose draconian measures towards asylum seekers.

The crisis has also put a halt to search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean because European countries are not allowing boats carrying migrants to disembark under the pretext of limiting the spread of coronavirus. And for migrants who already made it - such as in Greece - they are now being put in collective quarantines in asylum centers, often with poor medical facilities.

Ponthieu also reports that migrants being quarantined on overcrowded navy ships docked in Greek ports, making social distancing impossible. And she is concerned the Greek authorities are imposing a curfew on asylum seekers but not on the local population.

UNHCR is stressing that people’s right of asylum must not be overruled by concerns about the spread of coronavirus, while local and international NGOs across the Levant are trying to coordinate their advocacy on lifting restrictions on freedom of movement for humanitarian workers and on other policies and practices by authorities in the region which are adversely affecting refugee and other vulnerable communities.

The international community must not lose sight of the impact of the crisis on refugees and migrants. It is not enough simply to supply humanitarian and medical assistance without paying attention to the policies and practices of the different authorities who have direct control over the fate of vulnerable communities.

The author would like to thank Aurelie Ponthieu and the two INGO field workers who all agreed to be interviewed to inform this analysis piece.




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Webinar: The Environmental Crisis in the MENA Region – Impacts and Mitigation

Research Event

16 April 2020 - 11:30am to 12:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Glada Lahn, Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme, Chatham House
Greg Shapland, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House 
Moderator: Sanam Vakil, Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

The event will be livestreamed on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Climate and environmental issues have largely been marginalized in discussions about the Middle East and North Africa region and yet are critical to peace and security. In this webinar, experts will explore mounting pressures including those related to water (reduced, less reliable and more polluted sources), extreme temperatures, air pollution, land degradation and sea-level rise. Panelists will discuss the potential impact of worsening environmental conditions and what the region's governments can do to protect the health and livelihoods of their peoples.

This webinar is part of the Chatham House MENA Programme's Online Event Series and will be held on the record.

Reni Zhelyazkova

Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme
+44 (0)20 7314 3624




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COVID 19: Assessing Vulnerabilities and Impacts on Iraq

7 April 2020

Dr Renad Mansour

Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative

Dr Mac Skelton

Director, Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS), American University of Iraq, Sulaimani; Visiting Fellow, Middle East Centre, London School of Economics

Dr Abdulameer Mohsin Hussein

President of the Iraq Medical Association
Following 17 years of conflict and fragile state-society relations, the war-torn country is particularly vulnerable to the pandemic.

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Disinfecting shops in Baghdad's Bayaa neighbourhood as a preventive measure against the spread of COVID-19. Photo by AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP via Getty Images.

Iraq is a country already in turmoil, suffering fallout from the major military escalation between the US and Iran, mass protests calling for an end to the post-2003 political system, and a violent government crackdown killing more than 600 and wounding almost 30,000 - all presided over by a fragmented political elite unable to agree upon a new prime minister following Adil abd al-Mehdi’s resignation back in November.

COVID-19 introduces yet another threat to the fragile political order, as the virus exposes Iraq’s ineffective public health system dismantled through decades of conflict, corruption and poor governance.

Iraqi doctors are making every effort to prepare for the worst-case scenario, but they do so with huge structural challenges. The Ministry of Health lacks enough ICU beds, human resources, ventilators, and personal protective equipment (PPE). Bogged down in bureaucracy, the ministry is struggling to process procurements of equipment and medications, and some doctors have made purchases themselves.

But individual efforts can only go so far as many Iraqi doctors are concerned the official numbers of confirmed COVID-19 cases do not reflect the complexity of the situation on the ground.

The ministry relies predominately upon patients self-presenting at designated public hospitals and has only just begun community-based testing in areas of suspected clusters. Reliance on self-presentation requires a level of trust between citizens and state institutions, which is at a historic low. This gap in trust – 17 years in the making – puts Iraq’s COVID-19 response particularly at risk.

Iraq’s myriad vulnerabilities

Certain social and political factors leave Iraq uniquely exposed to the coronavirus. The country’s vulnerability is tied directly to its social, religious and economic interconnections with Iran, an epicenter of the pandemic.

Exchanges between Iran and Iraq are concentrated in two regions, with strong cross-border links between Iraqi and Iranian Kurds in the north-east, and Iraqi and Iranian Shia pilgrims in the south. Cross-border circulation of religious pilgrims is particularly concerning, as they can result in mass ritual gatherings.

The high number of confirmed cases in the southern and northern peripheries of the country puts a spotlight on Iraq's failure in managing healthcare. The post-2003 government has failed to either rebuild a robust centralized healthcare system, or to pave the way for a federalized model.

Caught in an ambiguous middle between a centralized and federalized model, coordination across provinces and hospitals during the coronavirus crisis has neither reflected strong management from Baghdad nor robust ownership at the governorate level.

This problem is part of a wider challenge of managing centre-periphery relations and federalism, which since 2003 has not worked effectively. Baghdad has provided all 18 provinces with instructions on testing and treatment, but only a handful have enough resources to put them into practice. Advanced testing capacity is limited to the five provinces with WHO-approved centers, with the remaining 13 sending swabs to Baghdad.

But the greatest challenge to Iraq’s COVID-19 response is the dramatic deterioration of state-society relations. Studies reveal a profound societal distrust of Iraq’s public healthcare institutions, due to corruption and militarization of medical institutions. Numerous videos have recently circulated of families refusing to turn over sick members - particularly women - to medical teams visiting households with confirmed or suspected cases.

As medical anthropologist Omar Dewachi notes, the ‘moral economy of quarantine’ in Iraq is heavily shaped by a history of war and its impact on the relationship between people and the state. Although local and international media often interpret this reluctance to undergo quarantine as a matter of social or tribal norms, distrusting the state leads many families to refuse quarantine because they believe it resembles a form of arrest.

The management of coronavirus relies upon an overt convergence between medical institutions and security forces as the federal police collaborate with the Ministry of Health to impose curfews and enforce quarantine. This means that, troublingly, the same security establishment which violently cracked down on protesters and civil society activists is now the teeth behind Iraq’s COVID-19 response.

Without trust between society and the political class, civil society organizations and protest movements have directed their organizational structure towards awareness-raising across Iraq. Key religious authorities such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani have called for compliance to the curfew and mobilized charitable institutions.

However, such efforts will not be enough to make up for the lack of governance at the level of the state. In the short-term, Iraq’s medical professionals and institutions are in dire need of technical and financial support. In the long-term, COVID-19 is a lesson that Iraq’s once robust public healthcare system needs serious investment and reform.

COVID-19 may prove to be another catalyst challenging the ‘muddle through’ logic of the Iraqi political elite. International actors have largely been complicit in this logic, directing aid and technical support towards security forces and political allies in the interest of short-term stability, and neglecting institutions which Iraqis rely on for health, education, and well-being.

The response to the crisis requires cooperation and buy-in of a population neglected by 17 years of failed governance. This is a seminal event that may push the country to the brink, exposing and stirring underlying tensions in state-society relations.

This analysis was produced as part of the Iraq Initiative.




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Same Old Politics Will Not Solve Iraq Water Crisis

15 April 2020

Georgia Cooke

Project Manager, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Dr Renad Mansour

Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative

Glada Lahn

Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
Addressing Iraq’s water crisis should be a priority for any incoming prime minister as it is damaging the country’s attempts to rebuild. But successive governments have allowed the problem to fester.

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Punting in the marshes south of the Iraqi city of Ammarah. Photo by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad/Getty Images.

Historically, Iraq lay claim to one of the most abundant water supplies in the Middle East. But the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has reduced by up to 40% since the 1970s, due in part to the actions of neighbouring countries, in particular Turkey, upstream.

Rising temperatures and reduced rainfall due to climate change are also negatively impacting Iraq’s water reserves. Evaporation from dams and reservoirs is estimated to lose the country up to 8 billion cubic metres of water every year.

A threat to peace and stability

Shortages have dried up previously fertile land, increasing poverty in agricultural areas. Shortages have also served to fuel conflict: communities faced with successive droughts and government inertia proved to be easy targets for ISIS recruiters, who lured farmers into joining them by offering money and food to feed their families. Economic hardship for those whose livelihoods relied upon river water has also driven rural to urban migration, putting significant strain on already over-populated towns and cities, exacerbating housing, job and electricity shortages, and widening the gap between haves and have-nots.

But scarcity isn’t the most crucial element of Iraq’s water crisis – contamination is. Decades of local government mismanagement, corrupt practices and a lack of regulation of dumping (it is estimated up to 70% of Iraq’s industrial waste is dumped directly into water) has left approximately three in every five citizens without a reliable source of potable water.

In 2018, 118,000 residents of Basra province were hospitalised with symptoms brought on by drinking contaminated water, which not only put a spotlight on the inadequacies of a crumbling healthcare system but sparked mass protests and a subsequent violent crackdown.

The water crisis is also undermining the stability of the country’s federal governance model, by occasionally sparking disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as between governorates in the south.

The crisis is both a symptom and a cause of poor governance. Iraq is stuck in a cycle whereby government inaction causes shortages and contamination, which result in economic losses, reduced food supply, increased prices and widespread poor health. This in turn leads to increasing levels of poverty, higher demand on services and civil unrest, increasing the pressure on a weak, dysfunctional system of government.

What can be done?

The first priority should be modernising existing water-management infrastructure - a relic of a time when the problem was an excess rather than a shortage of water (the last time Iraq’s flood defences were required was 1968). Bureaucratic hurdles, widespread corruption and an endless cycle of other crises taking precedent prevent good initiatives from being implemented or scaled up.

Diversifying energy sources to improve provision is crucial. Baghdad has a sewage treatment plant that originally ran on its own electricity source, but this capacity was destroyed in 1991 and was never replaced. The city continues to suffer from dangerous levels of water pollution because the electricity supply from the grid is insufficient to power the plant. Solar energy has great potential in sun-drenched Iraq to bridge the gaping hole in energy provision, but successive governments have chosen to focus on fossil fuels rather than promoting investment to grow the renewables sector.

Heightened tension with upstream Turkey could turn water into another cause of regional conflict. But, if approached differently, collaboration between Iraq and its neighbour could foster regional harmony.

Turkey’s elevated geography and cooler climate mean its water reserves suffer 75% less evaporation than Iraq’s. Given that Turkey’s top energy priority is the diversification of its supply of imported hydrocarbons, a win-win deal could see Turkey exchange access to its water-management infrastructure for delivery of reduced cost energy supplies from Iraq.

German-French cooperation on coal and steel in the 1950s and the evolution of economic integration that followed might provide a model for how bilateral cooperation over one issue could result in cooperation with other regional players (in this case Iran and Syria) on a range of other issues. This kind of model would need to consider the future of energy, whereby oil and gas would be replaced by solar-power exports.

These solutions have been open to policymakers for years and yet they have taken little tangible action. While there are leaders and bureaucrats with the will to act, effective action is invariably blocked by a complex and opaque political system replete with vested interests in maintaining power and wealth via a weak state and limited services from central government.

Breaking the cycle

To break this cycle, Iraq needs a group of professional and able actors outside of government to work with willing elements of the state bureaucracy as a taskforce to pressure for action and accountability. Publishing the recommendations from a hitherto withheld report produced in the aftermath of Basra’s 2018 heath crisis would be a great start.

In time, this taskforce could champion the prioritisation of water on the national agenda, the implementation of infrastructure upgrades, and hold more productive conversations with neighbour states.

With such a high degree of state fragmentation and dysfunction in Iraq, looking to the central government to provide leadership will not yield results. Engagement with a coalition of non-state actors can begin to address the water crisis and also open a dialogue around new models of governance for other critical issues. This might even be a starting point for rewriting the tattered social contract in Iraq.

This piece is based on insights and discussion at a roundtable event, Conflict and the Water Crisis in Iraq, held at Chatham House on March 9 as part of the Iraq Initiative.




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Why is it So Hard for Iraq to Form A Government?

25 April 2020

Dr Renad Mansour

Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative
Mustafa al-Kadhimi has emerged as the compromise prime minister designate, but his potential appointment is built on shaky foundations.

2020-04-25-Iraq-Security-COVID

A member of Iraqi security forces stands guard behind a yellow line after the government declared curfew due to coronavirus. Photo by Fariq Faraj Mahmood/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images.

On April 9, Iraqi President Barham Salih gathered the Shia, Kurdish and Sunni political blocs at the presidential palace to task head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi with forming a government.

Kadhimi is the third prime minister-designate assigned since Prime Minister Adil abd al-Mehdi resigned in November, in the wake of mass protests against government corruption and the country’s ethno-sectarian based political system.

Kadhimi’s two predecessors, Muhammad Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan al-Zurfi, both failed to form a government. This third attempt came as Iraq struggles with repeated crises since October 2019, when the government began responding with deadly force to large-scale mass protests, killing more than 600 and injuring tens of thousands.

In January, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani escalated tensions between the United States and Iran, with Iraq stuck in the middle and becoming the home for regular tit-for-tat attacks. The Islamic State — never completely defeated — took advantage of these crises and increased its attacks in disputed territories.

The outbreak of COVID-19 challenges the country’s fragile public health sector, while the decline in the price of oil will make it harder for leaders to pay the public salaries that keep the system (and patronage) moving.

What does the delay in forming a government amid multiple crises mean for the post-2003 Iraqi political system?

Iraq’s post-2003 political system is designed to withstand crisis. Over the years, political parties reflecting the country’s ethnic and sectarian divides have had a tacit understanding that crises represent a risk to their collective interests. These elite stakeholders have together weathered civil war, insurgency and multiple protests — despite deep conflicts with one another.

For instance, in September 2018 protesters attacked most major political party headquarters and the Iranian consulate in Basra, and authorities killed some 20 protesters.

Since the May election of that year, the fragmented Shia elite had been unable to even declare which side has the largest parliamentary bloc, let alone decide on a government.

But after the September crisis, the previously gridlocked parties swiftly came together to form an “understanding” that pushed through the impasse leading to the Mehdi government. In 2020, however, Iraq’s political parties were slower to come back together despite the multiple crises — far greater than 2018. The system is less able to swiftly fix itself, based primarily on the fragmentation of the elite — and their determination to prevent any challenge to their rule.

Why did the two prior attempts fail?

The two previous prime minister-designates each fell short for different reasons. When I met Allawi in February at the prime minister’s guesthouse in Baghdad, he was very clearly convinced that his mandate was to sideline the parties.

He hoped that simply choosing technocratic ministers outside the elite pact, with the support of Moqtada al-Sadr behind him, would garner support from protesters and the disillusioned public. He failed, however, because his cabinet had to go through parliament and the parties rejected what they saw a threat to the elite pact and the system.

Zurfi similarly failed after being directly appointed in March by Salih after the Shia parties failed to come up with a candidate. From the beginning, then, Zurfi faced challenges because parties were not in agreement. He attempted to directly confront his opposition, and spoke out against Iranian influence in Iraq. As a result, Zurfi was unable to even get to parliament with his proposed cabinet, as the Shia parties got back together to bring him down.

The failure of both strategies — Allawi attempting to work outside the elite party system and Zurfi trying to target certain parties — reveals tensions in Iraq’s political system. This fragmentation strains the parties’ ability to swiftly unite, and the system’s ability to withstand crises.

The endemic problems are a consequence of fragmentation, including the failure following the 2018 elections to declare governing parliamentary bloc. Moreover, after that election, newcomers into the political system (two-thirds of the MPs are serving their first term) are increasingly making their own demands and less willing to blindly toe party lines.

Can Kadhimi overcome the impasse?

Kadhimi’s appointment as prime minister-designate nonetheless is on shaky foundations. His appointment had previously faced a veto from Iran and its allied groups which make up the Fateh bloc. Kataeb Hezbollah, an armed group close to Iran and linked to the Popular Mobilization Units, issued a statement accusing Kadhimi with blood on his hands for the deaths of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

Many Fateh bloc members had for months vetoed Kadhimi’s name due to this allegation. Immediately before Kadhimi addressed the nation for the first time, Iraqi state television broadcast a prerecorded statement by PMU (and Fateh) leader Qais al-Khazali, who had also previously accused Kadhimi of spying for the Americans and being complicit in the two killings.

Khazali, who commands the second-largest party within Fateh, accepted the party line to back Kadhimi but came out with his own conditions on television. However, the concerns about the COVID-19 crisis and the collapse of the price of oil finally brought all sides to compromise — a design of the political system.

Kadhimi has signalled he will play by the old rules with these stakeholders. Because of the magnitude of these simultaneous crises, Iraqi politics is moving back to the post-2003 norm. The ethno-sectarian based political system is geared to weather such existential crises more than it is to handling day-to-day governance. Despite the notion of “post-sectarianism” in Iraq, this system is based on ethno-sectarian political party compromise.

In his television address, Khazali, who had previously attempted to move away from sectarian language, explained that the process of selecting a prime minister is reserved to the Shia, who have the right as the majority, and not to Salih, a Kurd.

Over the years Kadhimi has expressed an admiration of the bravery of the protesters and of the importance of civil society. Many Iraqi civil society activists owe their lives to the work of the former intelligence chief. However, he has also been part of the same system that has violently suppressed protesters.

As the compromise prime minister-designate, he will find it difficult to transform his country as long as he plays by the rules of post-2003 Iraq — an irony not lost on the protesters who immediately rejected the candidacy of a man whom until recently many protesters had supported.

This article was originally published in The Washington Post




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Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Transitional Justice for the Victims of ISIS in Syria

28 April 2020

This paper aims to assist the region’s local authorities, and their key foreign backers, in understanding how transitional justice can provide alternative avenues for holding local ISIS members to account while contributing to the healing of communities.

Haid Haid

Senior Consulting Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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A fighter with the Syrian Democratic Forces monitors prisoners accused of being affiliated with ISIS, at a prison in the northeastern Syrian city of Hassakeh on 25 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.
  • The piecemeal approach to justice is deeply flawed, and raises particular concerns about due process. No precise instruments exist to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. In any event, the scale of the crimes and the number of victims – as well as severe shortages of resources and workers – make dispensation of justice extremely difficult through the traditional legal system.
  • Not all detained ISIS members receive prison sentences. Individuals who did not hold senior roles in the group’s apparatus and are not accused of ‘major’ crimes (in practice, largely defined as fighting for ISIS and murder) are being released under limited reconciliation deals with tribal leaders. But the involvement of local community leaders in those efforts is not enough to ensure positive results. Many victims are upset at seeing ISIS members walk free without even admitting their guilt publicly or apologizing for the pain they caused.
  • To overcome the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework, a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members. A combination of non-judicial mechanisms such as truth commissions, missing persons’ committees, and reparations and victim-healing programmes could play a vital role in providing ISIS victims with a sense of justice while contributing to peacebuilding and stability.
  • Ignoring the urgency of developing a long-term plan to serve justice and contribute to community healing will almost certainly allow ISIS to continue to prevent the recovery and development of northeastern Syria. This, in turn, risks undermining the stability of the country and the region at large.




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Can Protest Movements in the MENA Region Turn COVID-19 Into an Opportunity for Change?

29 April 2020

Dr Georges Fahmi

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
The COVID-19 pandemic will not in itself result in political change in the MENA region, that depends on the ability of both governments and protest movements to capitalize on this moment. After all, crises do not change the world - people do.

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An aerial view shows the Lebanese capital Beirut's Martyrs Square that was until recent months the gathering place of anti-government demonstrators, almost deserted during the novel coronavirus crisis, on 26 March 2020. Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images.

COVID-19 has offered regimes in the region the opportunity to end popular protest. The squares of Algiers, Baghdad, and Beirut – all packed with protesters over the past few months – are now empty due to the pandemic, and political gatherings have also been suspended. In Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon, COVID-19 has achieved what snipers, pro-regime propaganda, and even the economic crisis, could not.

Moreover, political regimes have taken advantage of the crisis to expand their control over the political sphere by arresting their opponents, such as in Algeria where the authorities have cracked down on a number of active voices of the Hirak movement. Similarly, in Lebanon, security forces have used the pandemic as an excuse to crush sit-ins held in Martyr’s Square in Beirut and Nour Square in Tripoli.

However, despite the challenges that the pandemic has brought, it also offers opportunities for protest movements in the region. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization in the streets, it has  created new forms of activism in the shape of solidarity initiatives to help those affected by its consequences.

In Iraq, for example, protest groups have directed their work towards awareness-raising and sharing essential food to help mitigate the problem of food shortages and rising prices across the country. In Algeria, Hirak activists have run online campaigns to raise awareness about the virus and have encouraged people to stay at home. Others have been cleaning and disinfecting public spaces. These initiatives increase the legitimacy of the protest movement, and if coupled with political messages, could offer these movements an important chance to expand their base of popular support.

Exposes economic vulnerability

Economic grievances, corruption and poor provision of public services have been among the main concerns of this recent wave of protests. This pandemic only further exposes the levels of economic vulnerability in the region. COVID-19 is laying bare the socio-economic inequalities in MENA countries; this is particularly evident in the numbers of people engaged in the informal economy with no access to social security, including health insurance and pensions.

Informal employment, approximately calculated by the share of the labour force not contributing to social security, is estimated to amount to 65.5% of total employment in Lebanon, 64.4% in Iraq, and 63.3% in Algeria. The crisis has underscored the vulnerability of this large percentage of the labour force who have been unable to afford the economic repercussions of following state orders to stay at home.

The situation has also called attention to the vital need for efficient public services and healthcare systems. According to the fifth wave of the Arab Barometer, 74.4% of people in Lebanon are dissatisfied with their country’s healthcare services, as are 67.8% of people in Algeria and 66.5% in Iraq.

Meanwhile, 66.2% of people in Lebanon believe it is necessary to pay a bribe in order to receive better healthcare, as do 56.2% of people in Iraq and 55.9% in Algeria. The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the need for more government investment in public healthcare systems to render them more efficient and less corrupt, strengthening the protesters’ case for the need for radical socio-economic reforms.

On the geopolitical level, the crisis puts into question the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region. For years, Western powers have directed their aid towards security forces in the interests of combating terrorism but COVID-19 has proved itself to be a much more lethal challenge to both the region and the West.

Facing this new challenge requires international actors to reconsider their approach to include supporting health and education initiatives, as well as freedom of expression and transparency. As argued by Western policymakers themselves, it was China’s lack of transparency and slow response that enabled the proliferation of the virus, when it could have been contained in Wuhan back in December 2019.

This crisis therefore offers regional protest movements the opportunity to capitalize on this moment and push back against the policies of Western powers that have invested in regional stability only to the extent of combating Islamic jihad. 

But crises do not change the world, people do. The COVID-19 pandemic will not in itself result in political change in the MENA region. Rather, it brings opportunities and risks that, when exploited, will allow political actors to advance their own agendas. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization and allowed regimes to tighten their grip over the political sphere, behind these challenges lie real opportunities for protest movements.

The current situation represents a possibility for them to expand their popular base through solidarity initiatives and has exposed more widely the importance of addressing socio-economic inequalities. Finally, it offers the chance to challenge the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region which until now has predominantly focused on combating terrorism.




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Lebanese Women and the Politics of Disruption

Research Event

6 May 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Carmen Geha, Assistant Professor of Public Administration, Leadership and Organisational Development, American University of Beirut
Moderator: Lina Khatib, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
Lebanese women have been at the forefront of the protest movement that has shaken Lebanon since October 2019. The active participation by women and their visibility in Lebanon's protest movement has challenged the gender norms prevalent in Lebanese society and politics. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and the nationwide lockdown that ensued has disrupted women's ability to organize, and is threatening the fragile progress towards female inclusion in the political process.
 
In a recent article, Carmen Geha discussed the politics of representation in the context of women's participation in public life in Lebanon and argued that the country's political system is maintained through tightly-knit informal power relations among sectarian politicians, making women's participation in politics virtually impossible. The article explained how the October 2019 revolution challenged that norm by creating inclusive spaces where women activists could confront politicians and thus, transform the way women participate in politics and public life.
 
In this webinar, part of the Chatham House project on the future of the state in the Middle East and North Africa, the article's author will discuss how women's activism in Lebanon has been affected by the coronavirus-induced lockdown. The speaker will consider how, under current circumstances, women activists can speak up collectively and bring back a movement to contest gender norms in order to build an alternative political model that can better represent women's priorities.
 
You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Reni Zhelyazkova

Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme
+44 (0)20 7314 3624




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Webinar: Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Transitional Justice for the Victims of ISIS in Syria

Research Event

12 May 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm
Add to Calendar

Haid Haid, Senior Consulting Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
Sara Kayyali, Syria Researcher, Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights Watch
Moderator: Lina Khatib, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

You can register your interest here. Alternatively, you can watch the webinar live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.

In a recent research paper, author Haid Haid argues that this approach to justice is deeply flawed as it raises concerns about due process and lacks the precise instruments to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. The paper proposes that a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members.

In this webinar, part of the MENA Programme’s Online Event Series, speakers will examine the benefits of such an approach to justice for overcoming the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework. Panelists will discuss the alternative mechanisms local authorities and their key foreign backers can use to hold local ISIS members to account while contributing to the healing of communities.
 
The event will be held on the record.

Reni Zhelyazkova

Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme
+44 (0)20 7314 3624




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It's a man's world: carnal spectatorship and dissonant masculinities in Islamic State videos

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Manni Crone

Islamic State videos have often been associated with savage violence and beheadings. An in-depth scrutiny however reveals another striking feature: that female bodies are absent, blurred or mute. Examining a few Islamic State videos in depth, the article suggests that the invisibility of women in tandem with the ostentatious visibility of male bodies enable gendered and embodied spectators to indulge in homoerotic as well as heterosexual imaginaries. In contrast to studies on visual security and online radicalization which assert that images affect an audience, this article focuses on the interaction between video and audience and argues that spectators are not only rational and emotional but embodied and gendered as well. Islamic State videos do not only attract western foreign fighters through religious–ideological rhetoric or emotional impact but also through gendered forms of pleasure and desire that enable carnal imagination and identification. The article probes the analytical purchase of carnal aesthetics and spectatorship.




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Politics, policy-making and the presence of images of suffering children

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Helen Berents

In 2017 Trump expressed pity for the ‘beautiful babies’ killed in a gas attack on Khan Shaykhun in Syria before launching airstrikes against President Assad's regime. Images of suffering children in world politics are often used as a synecdoche for a broader conflict or disaster. Injured, suffering, or dead; the ways in which images of children circulate in global public discourse must be critically examined to uncover the assumptions that operate in these environments. This article explores reactions to images of children by representatives and leaders of states to trace the interconnected affective and political dimensions of these images. In contrast to attending to the expected empathetic responses prompted by images of children, this article particularly focuses on when such images prompt bellicose foreign policy decision-making. In doing this, the article forwards a way of thinking about images as contentious affective objects in international relations. The ways in which images of children's bodies and suffering are strategically deployed by politicians deserves closer scrutiny to uncover the visual politics of childhood inherent in these moments of international politics and policy-making.




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Soundscapes of war: the audio-visual performance of war by Shi'a militias in Iraq and Syria

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Helle Malmvig

This article sets out to bring sound and music to the field of visual studies in International Relations. It argues that IR largely has approached the visual field as if it was without sound; neglecting how audial landscapes frame and direct our interpretation of moving imagery. Sound and music contribute to making imagery intelligible to us, we ‘hear the pictures’ often without noticing. The audial can for instance articulate a visual absence, or blast visual signs, bring out certain emotional stages or subjects’ inner life. Audial frames steer us in distinct directions, they can mute the cries of the wounded in war, or amplify the sounds of joy of soldiers shooting in the air. To bring the audial and the visual analytically and empirically together, the article therefore proposes four key analytical themes: 1) the audial–visual frame, 2) point of view/point of audition, 3) modes of audio-visual synchronization and 4) aesthetics moods. These are applied to a study of ‘war music videos’ in Iraq and Syria made and circulated by Shi'a militias currently fighting there. Such war music videos, it is suggested, are not just artefacts of popular culture, but have become integral parts of how warfare is practiced today, and one that is shared by soldiers in the US and Europe. War music videos are performing war, just as they shape how war is known by spectators and participants alike.




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Evidence Against an Important Role of Plasma Insulin and Glucagon Concentrations in the Increase in EGP Caused by SGLT2 Inhibitors

Sodium–glucose cotransport 2 inhibitors (SGLT2i) lower plasma glucose but stimulate endogenous glucose production (EGP). The current study examined the effect of dapagliflozin on EGP while clamping plasma glucose, insulin, and glucagon concentrations at their fasting level. Thirty-eight patients with type 2 diabetes received an 8-h measurement of EGP ([3-3H]-glucose) on three occasions. After a 3-h tracer equilibration, subjects received 1) dapagliflozin 10 mg (n = 26) or placebo (n = 12); 2) repeat EGP measurement with the plasma glucose concentration clamped at the fasting level; and 3) repeat EGP measurement with inhibition of insulin and glucagon secretion with somatostatin infusion and replacement of basal plasma insulin and glucagon concentrations. In study 1, the change in EGP (baseline to last hour of EGP measurement) in subjects receiving dapagliflozin was 22% greater (+0.66 ± 0.11 mg/kg/min, P < 0.05) than in subjects receiving placebo, and it was associated with a significant increase in plasma glucagon and a decrease in the plasma insulin concentration compared with placebo. Under glucose clamp conditions (study 2), the change in plasma insulin and glucagon concentrations was comparable in subjects receiving dapagliflozin and placebo, yet the difference in EGP between dapagliflozin and placebo persisted (+0.71 ± 0.13 mg/kg/min, P < 0.01). Under pancreatic clamp conditions (study 3), dapagliflozin produced an initial large decrease in EGP (8% below placebo), followed by a progressive increase in EGP that was 10.6% greater than placebo during the last hour. Collectively, these results indicate that 1) the changes in plasma insulin and glucagon concentration after SGLT2i administration are secondary to the decrease in plasma glucose concentration, and 2) the dapagliflozin-induced increase in EGP cannot be explained by the increase in plasma glucagon or decrease in plasma insulin or glucose concentrations.




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PARP-1-targeted Auger emitters display high-LET cytotoxic properties in vitro but show limited therapeutic utility in solid tumor models of human neuroblastoma

The currently available therapeutic radiopharmaceutical for high-risk neuroblastoma, 131I-MIBG, is ineffective at targeting micrometastases due to the low linear energy transfer (LET) properties of high-energy beta particles. In contrast, Auger radiation has high-LET properties with nanometer ranges in tissue, efficiently causing DNA damage when emitted in close proximity to DNA. The aim of this study was to evaluate the cytotoxicity of targeted Auger therapy in pre-clinical models of high-risk neuroblastoma. Methods: Using a radiolabeled poly(ADP-ribose) polymerase (PARP) inhibitor, 125I-KX1, we delivered an Auger emitter iodine-125 to PARP-1: a chromatin-binding enzyme overexpressed in neuroblastoma. In vitro cytotoxicity of 125I-KX1 was assessed in nineteen neuroblastoma cell lines, followed by in-depth pharmacological analysis in a sensitive and resistant pair of cell lines. Immunofluorescence microscopy was used to characterize 125I-KX1-induced DNA damage. Finally, in vitro/in vivo microdosimetry was modeled from experimentally derived pharmacological variables. Results: 125I-KX1 was highly cytotoxic in vitro across a panel of neuroblastoma cell lines, directly causing double strand DNA breaks. Based on subcellular dosimetry, 125I-KX1 was approximately twice as effective compared to 131I-KX1, whereas cytoplasmic 125I-MIBG demonstrated low biological effectiveness. Despite the ability to deliver focused radiation dose to the cell nuclei, 125I-KX1 remained less effective than its alpha-emitting analog 211At-MM4, and required significantly higher activity for equivalent in vivo efficacy based on tumor microdosimetry. Conclusion: Chromatin-targeted Auger therapy is lethal to high-risk neuroblastoma cells with potential use in micrometastatic disease. This study provides the first evidence for cellular lethality from a PARP-1 targeted Auger emitter, calling for further investigation into targeted Auger therapy.




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18F-DCFPyL PET/CT Imaging in Patients with Biochemical Recurrence Prostate Cancer after Primary Local Therapy

Objective: To investigate the lesion detection rate of 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT, a prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA) targeted PET agent, in biochemical relapse prostate cancer patients after primary local therapy. Methods: This is a prospective institutional review board-approved study of 90 patients with documented biochemical recurrence (median PSA 2.5 ng/mL, range 0.21-35.5 ng/mL) with negative conventional imaging after primary local therapies, including radical prostatectomy (n = 38), radiation (n = 27) or combination (n = 25). Patients on androgen deprivation therapy were excluded. Patients underwent whole-body 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT (299.9±15.5 MBq) at 2 h p.i. PSMA-PET lesion detection rate was correlated with PSA, PSA kinetics and original primary tumor grade. Results: Seventy patients (77.8%) showed a positive PSMA-PET scan, identifying a total of 287 lesions: 37 prostate bed foci, 208 lymph nodes, and 42 bone/organ distant sites; 11 patients had a negative scan and 9 patients showed indeterminate lesions, which were considered negative in this study. The detection rates were 47.6% (n = 10/21), 50% (n = 5/10), 88.9% (n = 8/9), and 94% (n = 47/50) for PSA >0.2 to <0.5, 0.5 to <1.0, 1 to <2.0, and ≥2.0 ng/mL, respectively. In post-surgical patients, PSA, PSAdt and PSAvel correlated with PET results but the same was not true for post-radiation patients. These parameters also correlated with the extent of disease on PET (intrapelvic vs. extrapelvic). There was no significant difference between the rate of positive scans in patients with higher grade vs lower grade primary tumors (Gleason score ≥4+3 vs <3+4). Tumor recurrence was histology confirmed in 40% (28/70) of patients. On a per-patient basis, positive predictive value was 93.3% (95% CI, 77.6-99.2%) by histopathologic validation, and 96.2% (95% CI, 86.3-99.7%) by the combination of histology and imaging/clinical follow-up. Conclusion: 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT imaging offers high detection rates in biochemically recurrent prostate cancer patients; and is positive in about 50% of patients with PSA <0.5 ng/mL, which could substantially impact clinical management. In post-surgical patients, 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT correlates with PSA, PSAdt and PSAvel suggesting it may have prognostic value. 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT is highly promising for localizing sites of recurrent prostate cancer.




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3-year freedom from progression following 68GaPSMA PET CT triaged management in men with biochemical recurrence post radical prostatectomy. Results of a prospective multi-center trial.

Background: 68Ga PSMA PET CT (PSMA) is increasingly used in men with biochemical recurrence (BCR) post radical prostatectomy (RP), but its longer term prognostic / predictive potential in these men is unknown. The aim of this study was to evaluate the predictive value of PSMA PET for 3 year freedom from progression (FFP) in men with BCR post RP undergoing salvage radiotherapy (sRT). Methods: This prospective multi-center study enrolled 260 men between 2015 and 2017. Eligible patients were referred for PSMA with rising PSA following RP. Management following PSMA was recorded but not mandated. PSMA protocols were standardised across sites and reported prospectively. Clinical, pathological and surgical information, sRT, timing and duration of androgen deprivation (ADT), 3 year PSA results and clinical events were documented. FFP was defined as a PSA rise ≤ 0.2ng/mL above nadir post sRT, with no additional treatment. Results: The median PSA was 0.26ng/mL (IQR 0.15 - 0.59) and follow-up 38 months (IQR 31-43). PSMA was negative in 34.6% (90/260), confined to prostate fossa 21.5% (56/260), pelvic nodes 26.2% (68/260), and distant disease 17.7% (46/260). 71.5% (186/260) received sRT, 38.2% (71/186) to the fossa only, 49.4% (92/186) fossa + pelvic nodes and 12.4% (23/186) nodes alone/SBRT. PSMA was highly predictive of FFP at 3 years following sRT. Overall, FFP was achieved in 64.5% (120/186) of those who received sRT, 81% (81/100) with negative/fossa confined vs. 45% (39/86) for extra fossa disease (p<0.0001). On logistic regression PSMA was more independently predictive of FFP than established clinical predictors, including PSA, T-stage, surgical margin status or Gleason score (P < 0.002). 32% of men with a negative PSMA PET did not receive treatment. Of these, 66% (19/29) progressed, with a mean rise in PSA of 1.59ng/mL over the 3 years. Conclusion: PSMA PET result is highly predictive of FFP at 3 years in men undergoing sRT for BCR following RP. In particular, men with negative PSMA PET or disease identified as still confined to the prostate fossa demonstrate high FFP, despite receiving less extensive radiotherapy and lower rates of additional ADT than those with extra fossa disease.




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Head-to-head comparison of 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT in patients with metastatic, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors: a prospective study

Purpose: 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 is an antagonist for somatostatin receptor used in neuroendocrine imaging. The purpose of this study is to compare 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT in patients with metastatic, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors. Methods: Patients with histologically-proven, metastatic and/or unresectable, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors were prospectively recruited in this study. They received an intravenous injection of 68Ga-DOTATATE (4.0 ± 1.3 mCi) on the first day and 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 (4.0 ± 1.4 mCi) on the second day. Whole-body PET/CT scans were performed at 40 to 60 minutes after injection on the same scanner. Physiologic uptake of normal organs, lesion numbers, and lesion uptake were compared. Results: Twenty-nine patients were prospectively enrolled in the study. The SUVmax of the spleen, renal cortex, adrenal glands, pituitary glands, stomach wall, normal liver parenchyma, small intestine, pancreas, and bone marrow were significantly lower on 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 than on 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT (P<0.001). 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 detected significantly more liver lesions (539 vs. 356, P = 0.002), but fewer bone lesions (156 vs. 374, P = 0.031, Figure 3) than 68Ga-DOTATATE. The tumor-to-background ratio of liver lesions was significantly higher on 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 (7.6 ± 5.1 vs. 3.4 ± 2.0, P<0.001). 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT showed comparable results for primary tumors and lymph node metastases based on either patient-based or lesion-based comparison. Conclusion: 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 performs better in the detection ability and TBR of liver metastases. However, 68Ga-DOTATATE outperforms 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 in the detection of bone metastases. The differential affinity of different metastatic sites provides key information for patient selection in imaging and peptide receptor radionuclide therapy.




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Tau PET imaging with 18F-PI-2620 in patients with Alzheimer's disease and healthy controls: a first-in-human study

18F-PI-2620 is a positron emission tomography (PET) tracer with high binding affinity for aggregated tau, a key pathologic feature of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and other neurodegenerative disorders. Preclinically, 18F-PI-2620 binds to both, 3R and 4R tau isoforms. The purpose of this first-in-human study was to evaluate the ability of 18F-PI-2620 to detect tau pathology in AD patients using PET imaging, as well as to assess its safety and tolerability of this new tau PET tracer. Methods: Participants with clinical diagnosis of probable AD and healthy controls (HC) underwent dynamic 18F-PI-2620 PET imaging for 180 min. 18F-PI-2620 binding was assessed visually and quantitatively using Distribution Volume Ratios (DVR) estimated from non-invasive tracer kinetics and standardized uptake value ratios (SUVR) measured at different time points post-injection (p.i.) with the cerebellar cortex as the reference region. Time-activity curves and SUVR were assessed in AD and HC, as well as DVR and SUVR correlations and effect size (Cohen’s d) over time. Results: 18F-PI-2620 showed peak brain uptake around 5 min p.i. and fast wash-out in non-target regions. In AD subjects, focal asymmetric uptake was evident in temporal and parietal lobes, precuneus, and posterior cingulate cortex. DVR and SUVR in these regions were significantly higher in AD compared to HC. Very low background signal was observed in HC. 18F-PI-2620 administration was safe and well tolerated. SUVR time activity curves in most regions and subjects achieved a secular equilibrium after 40 min p.i.. A strong correlation (R2 > 0.93) was found between non-invasive DVR and SUVR for all imaging windows starting >30 min p.i.. Similar effect sizes between AD and HC groups were obtained across the different imaging windows. 18F-PI-2620 uptake in neocortical regions was significantly correlated with the degree of cognitive impairment. Conclusion: Initial clinical data obtained in AD and HC demonstrate the high image quality with excellent signal-to-noise of 18F-PI-2620 PET for imaging tau deposition in AD subjects. Non-invasive quantification using DVR and SUVR for 30 min imaging windows between 30-90 min p.i., e.g. 45-75 min, provides robust and significant discrimination between AD and HC subjects. 18F-PI-2620 uptake in expected regions is highly correlated to neurocognitive performance.




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Evaluation of dosimetry, quantitative methods and test-retest variability of 18F-PI-2620 PET for the assessment of tau deposits in the human brain

18F-PI-2620 is a next generation tau positron emission tomography (PET)-tracer that has demonstrated ability to image the spatial distribution of suspected tau pathology. The objective of this study was to assess the tracer biodistribution, dosimetry and quantitative methods of 18F-PI-2620 in the human brain. Full kinetic modelling approaches to quantify tau load were investigated. Non-invasive kinetic modeling approaches and semi-quantitative methods were evaluated against the full tracer kinetics. Finally, the reproducibility of PET measurements from test and retest scans was assessed. Methods: Three healthy controls (HC) and 4 Alzheimer disease (AD) subjects underwent two dynamic PET scans including arterial sampling. Distribution volume ratio (DVR) was estimated using full tracer kinetics (2 Tissue Compartment (2TC) models, Logan Graphical Analysis (LGA)) and non-invasive kinetic models (Non-Invasive Logan Graphical Analysis (NI-LGA) and the multilinear reference tissue model (MRTM2)). Standardized uptake value ratio (SUVR) was determined at different imaging windows after injection. Correlation between DVR and SUVR, effect size (Cohen’s d) and test-retest variability (TRV) were evaluated. Additionally, 6 HC subjects received one tracer administration and underwent whole-body PET for dosimetry calculation. Organ doses and the whole-body effective dose were calculated using OLINDA 2.0. Results: Strong correlation was found across different kinetic models (R2 >0.97) and between DVR(2TC) and SUVRs between 30 to 90 min with R2>0.95. Secular equilibrium was reached around 40 min post injection (p.i.) in most regions and subjects. The TRV and effect size for the SUVR across different regions was similar at 30-60 min (TRV=3.8%, d=3.80), 45-75 min (TRV=4.3%, d=3.77) and 60-90 min (TRV=4.9%, d=3.73) and increased at later time points. Elimination was via the hepatobiliary and urinary system. The whole-body effective dose was determined to be 33.3±2.1 μSv/MBq for an adult female and 33.1±1.4 μSv/MBq for an adult male with a 1.5 hour urinary bladder voiding interval. Conclusion: 18F-PI-2620 exhibits fast kinetics, suitable dosimetry and low TRV. DVR measured using the 2TC model with arterial sampling correlated strongly with DVR measured by NI-LGA, MRTM2 and SUVR. SUVR can be used for 18F-PI-2620 PET quantification of tau deposits avoiding arterial blood sampling. Static 18F-PI-2620 PET scans between 45-75min p.i. provide excellent quantification accuracy, large effect size and low TRV.




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Combined Visual and Semi-quantitative Evaluation Improves Outcome Prediction by Early Mid-treatment 18F-fluoro-deoxi-glucose Positron Emission Tomography in Diffuse Large B-cell Lymphoma.

The purpose of this study was to assess the predictive and prognostic value of interim FDG PET (iPET) in evaluating early response to immuno-chemotherapy after two cycles (PET-2) in diffuse large B-cell lymphoma (DLBCL) by applying two different methods of interpretation: the Deauville visual five-point scale (5-PS) and a change in standardised uptake value by semi-quantitative evaluation. Methods: 145 patients with newly diagnosed DLBCL underwent pre-treatment PET (PET-0) and PET-2 assessment. PET-2 was classified according to both the visual 5-PS and percentage SUV changes (SUV). Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis was performed to compare the accuracy of the two methods for predicting progression-free survival (PFS). Survival estimates, based on each method separately and combined, were calculated for iPET-positive (iPET+) and iPET-negative (iPET–) groups and compared. Results: Both with visual and SUV-based evaluations significant differences were found between the PFS of iPET– and iPET+ patient groups (p<0.001). Visually the best negative (NPV) and positive predictive value (PPV) occurred when iPET was defined as positive if Deauville score 4-5 (89% and 59%, respectively). Using the 66% SUV cut-off value, reported previously, NPV and PPV were 80 and 76%, respectively. SUV at 48.9% cut-off point, reported for the first time here, produced 100% specificity along with the highest sensitivity (24%). Visual and semi-quantitative SUV<48.9% assessment of each PET-2 gave the same PET-2 classification (positive or negative) in 70% (102/145) of all patients. This combined classification delivered NPV and PPV of 89% and 100% respectively, and all iPET+ patients failed to achieve or remain in remission. Conclusion: In this large consistently treated and assessed series of DLBCL, iPET had good prognostic value interpreted either visually or semi-quantitatively. We determined that the most effective SUV cut-off was at 48.9%, and that when combined with visual 5-PS assessment, a positive PET-2 was highly predictive of treatment failure.




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Initial studies with [11C]vorozole positron emission tomography detect over-expression of intra-tumoral aromatase in breast cancer

Introduction: Aromatase inhibitors are the mainstay of hormonal therapy in estrogen receptor positive, postmenopausal breast cancer, although response rate is just over 50%. The goal of the present study was to validate and optimize positron emission tomography (PET) with 11C-vorozole for measuring aromatase expression in postmenopausal breast cancer. Methods: Ten newly diagnosed, postmenopausal women with biopsy confirmed breast cancer were administered 11C-vorozole intravenously and PET emission data collected between 40 – 90 minutes post-injection. Tracer injection and scanning were repeated 2 hours after ingestion of 2.5mg letrozole p.o. Mean and maximal standard uptake values and ratios to non-tumor tissue (SUVs, SUVRs) were calculated for tumor and non-tumor regions at baseline and after letrozole. Biopsy specimens from the same tumors were stained for aromatase using immunohistochemistry and evaluated for stain intensity and the percentage of immune-positive cells. Results: Seven of the 10 women (70%) demonstrated increased focal uptake of tracer (SUVR>1.1) coinciding with the mammographic location of the lesion. The other 3 women (30%) did not show increased uptake in the tumor (SUVR <1.0). All of the cases with SUVR above 1.1 had SUVs above 2.4 and there was no overlap in SUV between the two groups, with mean SUV in tumors overexpressing aromatase (SUVR>1.1) ranging from 2.47 to 13.6, while tumors not overexpressing aromatase (SUVR<1) ranged from 0.8 to 1.8. Pretreatment with letrozole reduced tracer uptake in the majority of subjects; although the %blocking varied across and within tumors. Tumors with high SUV in vivo also showed high staining intensity on IHC. Conclusion: PET with 11C-vorozole is a useful technique for measuring aromatase expression in individual breast lesions, enabling a non-invasive quantitative measurement of baseline and post-treatment aromatase availability in primary tumors and metastatic lesions.




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Pre-treatment 18F-FDG PET/CT Radiomics predict local recurrence in patients treated with stereotactic radiotherapy for early-stage non-small cell lung cancer: a multicentric study

Purpose: The aim of this retrospective multicentric study was to develop and evaluate a prognostic FDG PET/CT radiomics signature in early-stage non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) patients treated with stereotactic radiotherapy (SBRT). Material and Methods: Patients from 3 different centers (n = 27, 29 and 8) were pooled to constitute the training set, whereas the patients from a fourth center (n = 23) were used as the testing set. The primary endpoint was local control (LC). The primary tumour was semi-automatically delineated in the PET images using the Fuzzy locally adaptive Bayesian algorithm, and manually in the low-dose CT images. A total of 184 IBSI-compliant radiomic features were extracted. Seven clinical and treatment parameters were included. We used ComBat to harmonize radiomic features extracted from the four institutions relying on different PET/CT scanners. In the training set, variables found significant in the univariate analysis were fed into a multivariate regression model and models were built by combining independent prognostic factors. Results: Median follow-up was 21.1 (1.7 – 63.4) and 25.5 (7.7 – 57.8) months in training and testing sets respectively. In univariate analysis, none of the clinical variables, 2 PET and 2 CT features were significantly predictive of LC. The best predictive models in the training set were obtained by combining one feature from PET, namely information correlation 2 (IC2) and one from CT (Flatness), reaching a sensitivity of 100% and a specificity of 96%. Another model combining 2 PET features (IC2 and Strength), reached sensitivity of 100% and specificity of 88%, both with an undefined hazard ratio (HR) (p<0.001). The latter model obtained an accuracy of 0.91 (sensitivity 100%, specificity 81%), with a HR undefined (P = 0.023) in the testing set, however other models relying on CT radiomics features only or the combination of PET and CT features failed to validate in the testing set. Conclusion: We showed that two radiomic features derived from FDG PET were independently associated with LC in patients with NSCLC undergoing SBRT and could be combined in an accurate predictive model. This model could provide local relapse-related information and could be helpful in clinical decision-making.




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Differential expression of glucose transporters and hexokinases in prostate cancer with a neuroendocrine gene signature: a mechanistic perspective for FDG imaging of PSMA-suppressed tumors

Purpose: Although the incidence of de novo neuroendocrine prostate cancer (NEPC) is rare, recent data suggests that low expression of prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA) is associated with a spectrum of neuroendocrine (NE) hallmarks and androgen receptor (AR)-suppression in prostate cancer (PC). Previous clinical reports indicate that PCs with a phenotype similar to NE tumors can be more amenable to imaging by 18F-Fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) rather than PSMA-targeting radioligands. In this study, we evaluated the association between NE gene signature and FDG uptake-associated genes including glucose transporters (GLUTs) and hexokinases, with the goal of providing a genomic signature to explain the reported FDG-avidity of PSMA-suppressed tumors. Methods: Data mining approaches, cell lines and patient-derived xenograft (PDX) models were used to study the levels of 14 members of the SLC2A family (encoding GLUT proteins), 4 members of the hexokinase family (genes: HK1 to 3 and GCK) and PSMA (FOLH1 gene) following AR-inhibition and in correlation with NE hallmarks. Also, we characterize a NE-like PC (NELPC) subset among a cohort of primary and metastatic PC samples with no NE histopathology. We measured glucose uptake in a NE-induced in vitro model and a zebrafish model by non-radioactive imaging of glucose uptake using fluorescent glucose bioprobe, GB2-Cy3. Results: This work demonstrates that a NE gene signature associates with differential expression of genes encoding GLUT and hexokinase proteins. In NELPC, elevated expression of GCK (encoding glucokinase protein) and decreased expression of SLC2A12 correlated with earlier biochemical recurrence. In tumors treated with AR-inhibitors, high expression of GCK and low expression of SLC2A12 correlated with NE histopathology and PSMA gene suppression. GLUT12-suppression and amplification of glucokinase was observed in NE-induced PC cell lines and PDX models. A higher glucose uptake was confirmed in low-PSMA tumors using a GB2-Cy3 probe in a zebrafish model. Conclusion: NE gene signature in NEPC and NELPC associates with a distinct transcriptional profile of GLUTs and HKs. PSMA-suppression correlates with GLUT12-suppression and glucokinase-amplification. Alteration of FDG uptake-associated genes correlated positively with higher glucose uptake in AR and PSMA-suppressed tumors. Zebrafish xenograft tumor models are an accurate and efficient pre-clinical method for monitoring non-radioactive glucose uptake.




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Comparison between 18F-FDG-PET- and CT-based criteria in non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) patients treated with Nivolumab

Due to their peculiar mechanism of action, the evaluation of radiological response to immune checkpoint inhibitors (ICI) presents many challenges in solid tumors. We aimed to compare the evaluation of first response to Nivolumab by means of CT-based criteria with respect to fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography (FDG-PET) response criteria in non-small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC) patients. Methods: 72 patients with advanced NSCLC were recruited in a mono-institutional ancillary trial within the expanded access program (EAP; NCT02475382) for Nivolumab. Patients underwent CT scan and FDG-PET at baseline and after 4 cycles (first evaluation). In case of progressive disease (PD), an additional evaluation was performed after two further cycles in order to confirm progression. We evaluated the response to treatment with CT scan by means of response evaluation criteria in solid tumors (RECIST) 1.1 and Immuno-related Response Criteria (IrRC) and with FDG-PET by means of PERCIST and immunotherapy-modified-PERCIST (imPERCIST) criteria. The concordance between CT- and PET-based criteria and the capability of each method to predict overall survival (OS) were evaluated. Results: 48/72 patients were evaluable for first response assessment with both PET- and CT-based criteria. We observed low concordance between CT- and PET-based criteria (Kappa value of 0.346 and 0.355 and Kappa value of 0.128 and 0.198 between PERCIST and imPERCIST versus RECIST and irRC respectively). Looking at OS, IrRC were more reliable to distinguish responders from non-responders. However thanks to the prognostic value of partial metabolic response assessed by both PERCIST and Immuno-PERCIST, PET-based response maintained prognostic significant in patients classified as progressive disease on the basis of irRC. Conclusion: Even though the present study did not support the routine use of FDG-PET in the general population of NSCLC patients treated with ICI, it suggests the added prognostic value of the metabolic response assessment, potentially improving the therapeutic decision-making.




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Inflammation-based index and 68Ga-DOTATOC PET-derived uptake and volumetric parameters predict outcome in neuroendocrine tumor patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC

We performed post-hoc analyses on the utility of pre-therapeutic and early interim 68Ga-DOTA-Tyr3-octreotide (68Ga-DOTATOC) positron emission tomography (PET) tumor uptake and volumetric parameters and a recently proposed biomarker, the inflammation-based index (IBI), for peptide receptor radionuclide therapy (PRRT) in neuroendocrine tumor (NET) patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC in the setting of a prospective phase II trial. Methods: Forty-three NET patients received up to four cycles of 1.85 GBq/m²/cycle 90Y-DOTATOC with a maximal kidney biologic effective dose of 37 Gy. All patients underwent a 68Ga-DOTATOC PET/computed tomography (CT) at baseline and seven weeks after the first PRRT cycle. 68Ga-DOTATOC-avid tumor lesions were semi-automatically delineated using a customized standardized uptake value (SUV) threshold-based approach. PRRT response was assessed on CT using RECIST 1.1. Results: Median progression-free survival (PFS) and overall survival (OS) were 13.9 and 22.3 months, respectively. An SUVmean higher than 13.7 (75th percentile (P75)) was associated with better survival (hazard ratio (HR) 0.45; P = 0.024), whereas a 68Ga-DOTATOC-avid tumor volume higher than 578 ml (P75) was associated with worse OS (HR 2.18; P = 0.037). Elevated baseline IBI was associated with worse OS (HR 3.90; P = 0.001). Multivariate analysis corroborated independent associations between OS and SUVmean (P = 0.016) and IBI (P = 0.015). No significant correlations with PFS were found. A composite score based on SUVmean and IBI allowed to further stratify patients in three categories with significantly different survival. On early interim PET, a decrease in SUVmean of more than 17% (P75) was associated with worse survival (HR 2.29; P = 0.024). Conclusion: Normal baseline IBI and high 68Ga-DOTATOC tumor uptake predict better outcome in NET patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC. This can be used for treatment personalization. Interim 68Ga-DOTATOC PET does not provide information for treatment personalization.




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Quantitative test-retest measurement of 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC (PSMA-11) in tumor and normal tissue

The PET radiotracer 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC (68Ga-PSMA-11) shows potential as an imaging biomarker for recurrent and metastatic prostate cancer. The purpose of this study was to determine repeatability of 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC in a test-retest trial in subjects with metastatic prostate adenocarcinoma. Methods: Subjects with metastatic prostate cancer underwent two PET/CT scans with 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC within 14 days (mean 6 ± 4 d). Lesions in bone, nodes, prostate/bed, and visceral organs as well as representative normal tissues (salivary glands and spleen) were segmented separately by two readers. Absolute and percent differences in SUVmax and SUVmean were calculated for all test-retest regions. Repeatability was assessed using percentage difference, within-subject coefficient of variation (wCV), repeatability coefficient (RC), and Bland-Altman analysis. Results: 18 subjects were evaluated, 16 of which demonstrated local or metastatic disease on 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC PET/CT. A total of 136 lesions were segmented in bone (n = 99), nodes (n = 27), prostate/bed (n = 7), and viscera (n = 3). The wCV for SUVmax was 11.7% for bone lesions and 13.7% for nodes. The RC was ±32.5% SUVmax for bone lesions and ±37.9% SUVmax for nodal lesions, meaning 95% of the normal variability between two measurements will be within these numbers, so larger differences are likely attributable to true biological changes in tumor rather than normal physiologic or measurement variability. wCV in the salivary glands and spleen was 8.9% and 10.7% SUVmean, respectively. Conclusion: Repeatability measurements for PET/CT test-retest with 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC show a wCV 12-14% SUVmax and RC ±33-38% SUVmax in bone and nodal lesions. These estimates are an important aspect of 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC as a quantitative imaging biomarker. These estimates are similar to those reported for 18F-FDG, suggesting that 68Ga-PSMA-HBED-CC PET/CT may be useful in monitoring response to therapy.




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Imaging P-glycoprotein Induction at the Blood-Brain Barrier of a Beta-Amyloidosis Mouse Model with 11C-Metoclopramide PET

P-glycoprotein (ABCB1) plays an important role at the blood-brain barrier (BBB) in promoting the clearance of neurotoxic beta-amyloid (Aß) peptides from the brain into the blood. ABCB1 expression and activity were found to be decreased in the brains of Alzheimer disease (AD) patients. Treatment with drugs which induce cerebral ABCB1 activity may be a promising approach to delay the build-up of Aß deposits in the brain by enhancing the clearance of Aß peptides from the brain. The aim of this study was to investigate whether PET with the weak ABCB1 substrate radiotracer 11C-metoclopramide can measure ABCB1 induction at the BBB in a beta-amyloidosis mouse model (APP/PS1-21 mice) and in wild-type mice. Methods: Groups of wild-type and APP/PS1-21 mice aged 50 or 170 days underwent 11C-metoclopramide baseline PET scans or scans after intraperitoneal treatment with the rodent pregnane X receptor (PXR) activator 5-pregnen-3β-ol-20-one-16α-carbonitrile (PCN, 25 mg/kg) or its vehicle over 7 days. At the end of the PET scans, brains were harvested for immunohistochemical analysis of ABCB1 and Aß levels. In separate groups of mice, radiolabeled metabolites of 11C-metoclopramide were determined in plasma and brain at 15 min after radiotracer injection. As an outcome parameter of cerebral ABCB1 activity, the elimination slope of radioactivity washout from the brain (kE,brain) was calculated. Results: PCN treatment resulted in an increased clearance of radioactivity from the brain as reflected by significant increases in kE,brain (from +26% to +54% relative to baseline). Immunohistochemical analysis confirmed ABCB1 induction in the brains of PCN-treated APP/PS1-21 mice with a concomitant decrease in Aß levels. There was a significant positive correlation between kE,brain values and ABCB1 levels in the brain. In wild-type mice, a significant age-related decrease in kE,brain values was found. Metabolite analysis showed that the majority of radioactivity in the brain was composed of unmetabolized 11C-metoclopramide in all animal groups. Conclusion: 11C-metoclopramide can measure ABCB1 induction in the mouse brain without the need to consider an arterial input function and may find potential application in AD patients to non-invasively evaluate strategies to enhance the clearance properties of the BBB.




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18F-Fluorodeoxyglucose Positron Emission Tomography / Computed Tomography in Left-Ventricular Assist Device Infection: Initial Results Supporting the Usefulness of Image-Guided Therapy

Background: Accurate definition of the extent and severity of left-ventricular assist device (LVAD) infection may facilitate therapeutic decision making and targeted surgical intervention. Here, we explore the value of 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) positron emission tomography/computed tomography (PET/CT) for guidance of patient management. Methods: Fifty-seven LVAD-carrying patients received 85 whole-body 18F-FDG PET/CT scans for the work-up of device infection. Clinical follow-up was obtained over a period of up to two years. Results: PET/CT showed various patterns of infectious involvement of the 4 LVAD components: driveline entry point (77% of cases), subcutaneous driveline path (87%), pump pocket (49%) and outflow tract (58%). Driveline smears revealed staphylococcus or pseudomonas strains as the underlying pathogen in a majority of cases (48 and 34%, respectively). At receiver-operating characteristics analysis, an 18F-FDG standardized uptake value (SUV) >2.5 was most accurate to identify smear-positive driveline infection. Infection of 3 or all 4 LVAD components showed a trend towards lower survival vs infection of 2 or less components (P = 0.089), while involvement of thoracic lymph nodes was significantly associated with adverse outcome (P = 0.001 for nodal SUV above vs below median). Finally, patients that underwent early surgical revision within 3 months after PET/CT (n = 21) required significantly less inpatient hospital care during follow-up when compared to those receiving delayed surgical revision (n = 11; p<0.05). Conclusion: Whole-body 18F-FDG PET/CT identifies the extent of LVAD infection and predicts adverse outcome. Initial experience suggests that early image-guided surgical intervention may facilitate a less complicated subsequent course.




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18F-fluorodexyglucose Position Emission Tomography identifies altered brain metabolism in patients with Cri du Chat syndrome

Cri-Du-Chat Syndrome (CdCs) is a rare genetic disease caused by a deletion in the short arm of chromosome 5 (5p) with a variable clinical spectrum. To date no study in literature has ever investigated the alterations of brain glucose metabolism in these subjects by means of [18F]fluoro-2-deoxy-d-glucose Positron Emission Tomography/Computed Tomography (18F-FDG PET/CT). The aims of this study were to detect difference in brain FDG metabolism in patients affected by CdCs with different clinical presentations and identify possible "brain metabolic phenotypes" of this syndrome. Methods: 6 patients (age: 5 M and 1 F, age range: 10-27) with CdCs were assessed for presence of cognitive and behavioral symptoms with a battery of neuropsychological tests and then classified as patient with a severe or mild phenotype. Then, patients underwent a brain 18F-FDG PET/CT scan. PET/CT findings were compared to a control group, matched for age and sex, by using statistical parametric mapping (SPM). Association of different clinical phenotypes and 18F-FDG PET/CT findings was investigated. Results: Four patients presented a severe phenotype, whereas 2 patients demonstrated mild phenotype. SPM single subject and group analysis compared to the control cohort revealed a significant hypometabolism in the left temporal lobe (BAs 20, 36 and 38), in the right frontal subcallosal gyrus (BA 34) and caudate body, and in the cerebellar tonsils (p<0.001). Hypermetabolism (P = 0.001) was revealed in the right superior and precentral frontal gyrus (BA 6) in patient group compared to the control cohort. In SPM single subject analysis the hypermetabolic areas were detected only in patients with a severe phenotype. Conclusion: This study revealed different patterns of brain glucose metabolism in patients with severe and mild phenotype compared to control subjects. In particular, the hypermetabolic abnormalities in the brain, evaluated by18F-FDG PET/CT, seem to correlate with the severe phenotype in patients with CdCs.




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Does 2-FDG-PET Accurately Reflect Quantitative In vivo Glucose Utilization?

2-Deoxy-2-[18F]fluoro-D-glucose (2-FDG) with positron emission tomography (2-FDG-PET) is undeniably useful in the clinic, among other uses, to monitor change over time using the 2-FDG standardized uptake values (SUV) metric. This report suggests some potentially serious caveats for this and related roles for 2-FDG PET. Most critical is the assumption that there is an exact proportionality between glucose metabolism and 2-FDG metabolism, called the lumped constant, LC. This report describes that LC is not constant for a specific tissue and may be variable before and after disease treatment. The purpose of this work is not to deny the clinical value of 2-FDG PET; it is a reminder that when one extends the use of an appropriately qualified imaging method, new observations may arise and further validation would be necessary. Current understanding of glucose-based energetics in vivo is based on the quantification of glucose metabolic rates with 2-FDG PET, a method that permits the non-invasive assessment in various human disorders. However, 2-FDG is only a good substrate for facilitated-glucose transporters (GLUTs) but not for sodium-dependent glucose co-transporters (SGLTs), which have recently been shown to be distributed in multiple human tissues. Thus, the GLUT-mediated in vivo glucose utilization measured by 2-FDG PET would be blinded to the potentially substantial role of functional SGLTs in glucose transport and utilization. Therefore, in these circumstances the 2-FDG LC used to quantify in vivo glucose utilization should not be expected to remain constant. 2-FDG LC variations have been especially significant in tumors, particularly at different stages of cancer development, affecting the accuracy of quantitative glucose measures and potentially limiting the prognostic value of 2-FDG, as well as its accuracy in monitoring treatments. SGLT-mediated glucose transport can be estimated using α-methyl-4-deoxy-4-[18F]fluoro-D-glucopyranoside (Me-4FDG). Utilizing both 2-FDG and Me-4FDG should provide a more complete picture of glucose utilization via both GLUT and SGLT transporters in health and disease stages. Given the widespread use of 2-FDG PET to infer glucose metabolism, appreciating the potential limitations of 2-FDG as a surrogate for glucose metabolic rate and the potential reasons for variability in LC is relevant. Even when the readout for the 2-FDG PET study is only an SUV parameter, variability in LC is important, particularly if it changes over the course of disease progression (e.g., an evolving tumor).




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Quantitative 3D assessment of 68Ga-DOTATOC PET/MRI with diffusion-weighted imaging to assess imaging markers for gastroendopancreatic neuroendocrine tumors: Preliminary results

68Ga-DOTATOC-PET/MRI (68Gallium-DOTATOC-positron emission tomography/magnetic resonance imaging) combines the advantages of PET in the acquisition of metabolic-functional information with the high soft tissue contrast of MRI. Standardized uptake values (SUV) in tumors were suggested as a measure of somatostatin receptor expression. A challenge with receptor ligands is, that the distribution volume is confined to tissues with tracer-uptake, potentially limiting SUV quantification. In this study, different functional, three-dimensional (3D) SUV, apparent diffusion coefficient (ADC) parameters and arterial tumor enhancement were tested for the characterization of gastroendopancreatic neuroendocrine tumors (GEP-NET). Methods: For this single-center, cross-sectional study, 22 patients with 24 histologically confirmed GEP-NET lesions (15 men/7 women; median, 61 years, range, 43-81 years), who received hybrid 68Ga-DOTA-PET/MRI examinations at 3T between January 2017 and July 2019 met eligibility criteria. SUVs, tumor-to-background ratios (TBR), the total functional tumor volume (TFTV), ADCmean and ADCmin were measured based on volumes of interest (VOI) and examined with receiver operating characteristic analysis to determine cut-off values for differentiation between low and intermediate grade GEP-NET. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients were used to assess correlations between functional imaging parameters. Results: The ratio of PET-derived SUVmean and diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI)-derived ADCmin was introduced as a combined variable to predict tumor grade, outperforming single predictors. Based on a threshold ratio of 0.03 to be exceeded, tumors could be classified as grade 2 with a sensitivity of 86% and specificity of 100%. SUV and functional ADC values as well as arterial contrast enhancement parameters showed non-significant and mostly negligible correlations. Conclusion: As receptor density and tumor cellularity appear to be independent, potentially complementary phenomena, the combined PET/MRI ratio SUVmean/ADCmin may be used as a novel biomarker, allowing to differentiate between grade 1 and 2 GEP-NET.




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Head to head prospective comparison of quantitative lung scintigraphy and segment counting in predicting pulmonary function of lung cancer patients undergoing video-assisted thoracoscopic lobectomy

Prediction of post-operative pulmonary function in lung cancer patients before tumor resection is essential for patient selection for surgery and is conventionally done with a non-imaging segment counting method (SC) or a two-dimensional planar lung perfusion scintigraphy (PS). The purpose of this study was to compare quantitative analysis of PS to single photon emission computed tomography/computed tomography (SPECT/CT) and to estimate the accuracy of SC, PS and SPECT/CT in predicting post-operative pulmonary function in patients undergoing lobectomy. Methods: Seventy-five non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) patients planned for lobectomy were prospectively enrolled (68% males, average age 68.1±8 years ). All patients completed pre-operative forced expiratory volume capacity (FEV1), diffusing capacity of the lung for carbon monoxide (DLCO), Tc99m-MAA lung perfusion scintigraphy with PS and SPECT/CT quantification. A subgroup of 60 patients underwent video-assisted thoracoscopic (VATS) lobectomy and measurement of post-operative FEV1 and DLCO. Relative uptake of the lung lobes estimated by PS and SPECT/CT were compared. Predicted post-operative FEV1 and DLCO were derived from SC, PS and SPECT/CT. Prediction results were compared between the different methods and the true post-operative measurements in patients who underwent lobectomy. Results: Relative uptake measurements differed significantly between PS and SPECT/CT in right lung lobes, with a mean difference of -8.2±3.8, 18.0±5.0 and -11.5±6.1 for right upper, middle and lower lobes respectively (p<0.001). The differences between the methods in the left lung lobes were minor with a mean difference of -0.4±4.4 (p>0.05) and -2.0±4.0 (p<0.001) for left upper and lower lobes respectively. No significant difference and strong correlation (R=0.6-0.76, p<0.001) were found between predicted post-operative lung function values according to SC, PS, SPECT/CT and the actual post-operative FEV1 and DLCO. Conclusion: Although lobar quantification parameters differed significantly between PS and SPECT/CT, no significant differences were found between the predicted post-operative lung function results derived from these methods and the actual post-operative results. The additional time and effort of SPECT/CT quantification may not have an added value in patient selection for surgery. SPECT/CT may be advantageous in patients planned for right lobectomies but further research is warranted.




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Hyper-progressive Disease in Patients With Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer Treated With Checkpoint Inhibitors: The Role of 18F-FDG PET/CT

Introduction: A new pattern of response, so-called hyper-progressive disease (HPD), is emerging during treatment with immune checkpoint inhibitors (ICI). Our aim was to investigate the prevalence of such phenomenon and to assess its association with clinical variables and metabolic parameters by 18F-fludeoxyglucose positron emission tomography/computed tomography (18F-FDG PET/CT). Methods: Data from 50 patients (34 male, 16 female, median age 73) with non-small cell lung carcinoma (NSCLC) and treated with ICI were prospectively collected. All patients underwent contrast-enhanced CT, 18F-FDG PET/CT, and complete peripheral blood sample at baseline before ICI. HPD was defined according to clinical and radiologic criteria. Because of the rapid disease progression or worsening of clinic conditions, radiologic response assessment was available for 46 patients. OS were analyzed using the Kaplan–Meier method and the log-rank test. A Cox proportional hazards regression analysis was used to evaluate factors independently associated with OS. Median follow-up was 12.4 months (9.7-15.2 months). Results: We identified the following response categories: 10 cases as complete/partial response (CR/PR), 17 cases with stable disease (SD), 5 patients with progressive disease (PD), and 14 with HPD. Among metabolic parameters we observed a statistically significant association between HPD status and tumor burden, expressed by both MTV (756.1ml for HPD vs 475.6ml for non-HPD, P = 0.011) and TLG (287.3 for HPD vs 62.1 for non-HPD, P = 0.042). Among clinical variables, 12/14 patients (85.7%) within the HPD group compared with 8/32 patients (25%) in the non-HDP group had more than two metastatic sites (p<0.001). In addition, the derived neutrophil-to-lymphocyte ratio (dNLR) and platelet counts was significantly associated with HPD status (P = 0.038, P = 0.025, respectively). Survival analysis showed a median OS of 4 months for HPD group compared with 15 months within non-HPD patients (P = 0.003). Likewise, median OS was significantly different when we considered all the response categories: CR/PR, SD, PD, and HPD (P = 0.001). Finally, Multivariate analysis identified MTV and dNLR as independent predictors for OS. Conclusion: Our results suggest that the use of ICI might represent a concern in patients with high metabolic tumor burden and inflammatory indexes at baseline. However Additional studies are needed.




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Positron lymphography via intracervical 18F-FDG injection for pre-surgical lymphatic mapping in cervical and endometrial malignancies

Rationale: The presence of metastasis in local lymph nodes (LNs) is a key factor influencing choice of therapy and prognosis in cervical and endometrial cancers; therefore, the exploration of sentinel LNs (SLNs) is highly important. Currently, however, SLN mapping requires LN biopsy for pathologic evaluation, since there are no clinical imaging approaches that can identify tumor-positive LNs in early stages. Staging lymphadenectomy poses risks, such as leg lymphedema or lymphocyst formation. Furthermore, in 80% to 90% of patients, the explored LNs are ultimately tumor free, meaning the vast majority of patients are unnecessarily subjected to lymphadenectomy. Methods: Current lymphoscintigraphy methods only identify the anatomic location of the SLNs but do not provide information on their tumor status. There are no non-invasive methods to reliably identify metastases in LNs before surgery. We have developed positron lymphography (PLG), a method to detect tumor-positive LNs, where 18F-fluoro-2-deoxy-D-glucose (18F-FDG) is injected interstitially into the uterine cervix the day of surgery, and its rapid transport through the lymphatic vessels to the SLN is then visualized with dynamic positron emission tomography/computed tomography (PET/CT). We previously showed that PLG was able to identify metastatic LNs in animal models. Here, we present the first results from our pilot clinical trial (clinical trials identifier NCT02285192) in 23 patients with uterine or cervical cancer. On the morning of surgery, 18F-FDG was injected into the cervix, followed by an immediate dynamic PET/CT scan of the pelvis and a delayed 1-h whole body scan. Results: There were 3 (15%) node-positive cases on final pathologic analysis, and all LNs (including one with a focus of only 80 tumor cells) were identified by PLG except one node with an 11-mm micrometastasis. There were 2 (10%) false-positive cases with PLG, in which final pathology of the corresponding SLNs was negative for tumor. Methods: Current lymphoscintigraphy methods only identify the anatomic location of the SLNs but do not provide information on their tumor status. There are no non-invasive methods to reliably identify metastases in LNs before surgery. We have developed positron lymphography (PLG), a method to detect tumor-positive LNs, where 18F-fluoro-2-deoxy-D-glucose (18F-FDG) is injected interstitially into the uterine cervix the day of surgery, and its rapid transport through the lymphatic vessels to the SLN is then visualized with dynamic positron emission tomography/computed tomography (PET/CT). We previously showed that PLG was able to identify metastatic LNs in animal models. Here, we present the first results from our pilot clinical trial (clinical trials identifier NCT02285192) in 23 patients with uterine or cervical cancer. On the morning of surgery, 18F-FDG was injected into the cervix, followed by an immediate dynamic PET/CT scan of the pelvis and a delayed 1-h whole body scan. Results: There were 3 (15%) node-positive cases on final pathologic analysis, and all LNs (including one with a focus of only 80 tumor cells) were identified by PLG, except for one node with an 11-mm micrometastasis. There were 2 (10%) false-positive cases with PLG, in which final pathology of the corresponding SLNs was negative for tumor. Conclusion: This first-in-human study of PLG in women with uterine and cervical cancer demonstrates its feasibility and its ability to identify patients with nodal metastases, and warrants further evaluation in additional studies.




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Management of patients with renal failure undergoing dialysis during 131I therapy for thyroid cancer

Objectives: Radioactive iodine (131I) therapy may be used to treat thyroid cancer in end-stage renal disease patients who undergo hemodialysis. Because iodine predominantly utilizes renal clearance, treatment management in hemodialysis patients may be problematic, and no formal recommendations on hemodialysis currently exist. This work details our experience with treating thyroid cancer with iodine in chronic renal failure patients who require hemodialysis and details the therapeutic dosimetry results obtained during treatment to ensure that the dose to the bone marrow (BM) was acceptable. Methods: We treated 6 patients in the metabolic radiotherapy unit after thyroid stimulation. Two hemodialysis sessions in the metabolic radiotherapy unit were performed at 42 and 90 hours after radiopharmaceutical administration. BM toxicity was estimated with activity measurements from blood samples and with whole-body measurements that were regularly repeated during hospitalization and measured with a gamma counter. The patients underwent thyroid and hematologic monitoring to assess treatment efficacy and therapeutic toxicity in the short, medium and long term. Results: Whole-body activity was reduced on average by 66.7% [60.1-71.5] after the first dialysis session and by 53.3% [30.4-67.8] after the second. The mean estimated total absorbed dose to the BM was 0.992 Gy for all patients [0.431 – 2.323]. We did not observe any significant hematologic toxicity, and the clinical, biological and ultrasound test results confirmed the success of ablative treatment for the majority of patients. Conclusion: An approximately 30% reduction from the nominal dose in the amount of 131I activity for hemodialysis patients with thyroid cancer appears to strike an appropriate balance between the absence of BM toxicity and therapeutic efficacy. To avoid overirradiation, we recommend pretherapeutic dosimetry studies for metastatic patients to calculate the amount of activity to be administered as well as dosimetry monitoring during the hemodialysis sessions performed after therapeutic dose administration and under the same conditions.




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Evaluation of 11C-NR2B-SMe and its Enantiomers as PET Radioligands for Imaging the NR2B Subunit within the NMDA Receptor Complex in Rats

[S-Methyl-11C](±)-7-methoxy-3-(4-(4-(methylthio)phenyl)butyl)-2,3,4,5-tetrahydro-1H-benzo[d]azepin-1-ol (11C-NR2B-SMe) and its enantiomers were synthesized as candidates for imaging the NR2B subunit within the N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor with positron emission tomography (PET). Methods: Brains were scanned with PET for 90 min after intravenous injection of one of the candidate radioligands into rats. To detect any NR2B specific binding of radioligand in brain, various pre-blocking or displacing agents were evaluated for their impact on the PET brain imaging data. Radiometabolites from brain and other tissues were measured ex vivo and in vitro. Results: Each radioligand gave high early whole brain uptake of radioactivity, followed by a brief fast decline and then a slow final decline. 11C-(S)-NR2B-SMe was studied extensively. Ex vivo measurements showed that radioactivity in rat brain at 30 min after radioligand injection was virtually unchanged radioligand. Only less lipophilic radiometabolites appeared in plasma. High-affinity NR2B ligands, Ro-25-6981, ifenprodil, and CO10124, showed increasing preblock of whole brain radioactivity retention with increasing dose (0.01 to 1.25 mg/kg, i.v.). Five 1 antagonists (FTC146, BD1407, F3, F4, and NE100) and four 1 agonists ((+)-pentazocine, (±)-PPCC, PRE-084, (+)-SKF10047) were ineffective preblocking agents, except FTC146 and F4 at high dose. Two potent 1 receptor agonists, TC1 and SA4503, showed dose-dependent preblocking effects in the presence or absence of pharmacological 1 receptor blockade with FTC146. Conclusion: 11C-(S)-NR2B-SMe has adequate NR2B-specific PET signal in rat brain to warrant further evaluation in higher species. TC1 and SA4503 likely have off-target binding to NR2B in vivo.




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Repeatability of Quantitative 18F-DCFPyL PET/CT Measurements in Metastatic Prostate Cancer.

Quantitative evaluation of radiolabeled Prostate-Specific Membrane Antigen (PSMA) PET scans may be used to monitor treatment response in patients with prostate cancer (PCa). To interpret longitudinal differences in PSMA uptake, the intrinsic variability of tracer uptake in PCa lesions needs to be defined. The aim of this study was to investigate the repeatability of quantitative 18F-DCFPyL (a second generation 18F-PSMA-ligand) PET/CT measurements in patients with PCa. Methods: Twelve patients with metastatic PCa were prospectively included, of which 2 were excluded from final analyses. Patients received two whole-body 18F-DCFPyL PET/CT scans (median dose 317 MBq; uptake time 120 min), within median 4 days (range 1-11 days). After semi-automatic (isocontour-based) tumor delineation, the following lesion-based metrics were derived: Tumor-to-Blood ratio (TBRmean, TBRpeak, and TBRmax), Standardized Uptake Value (SUVmean, SUVpeak, SUVmax, normalized to bodyweight), tumor volume, and total lesion tracer uptake (TLU). Additionally, patient-based Total Tumor Volume (sum of PSMA-positive tumor volumes; TTV) and Total Tumor Burden (sum of all lesion TLUs; TTB) were derived. Repeatability was analyzed using repeatability coefficients (RC) and intra-class correlations (ICC). Additionally, the effect of point spread function (PSF) image reconstruction on the repeatability of uptake metrics was evaluated. Results: In total, 36 18F-DCFPyL PET positive lesions were analyzed (up to 5 lesions per patient). RCs of TBRmean, TBRpeak, and TBRmax were 31.8%, 31.7%, and 37.3%, respectively. For SUVmean, SUVpeak, SUVmax the RCs were 24.4%, 25.3% and 31.0%, respectively. All ICC were ≥0.97. Tumor volume delineations were well repeatable, with RC 28.1% for individual lesion volumes and RC 17.0% for TTV. TTB had a RC of 23.2% and 33.4%, when based on SUVmean and TBRmean, respectively. Small lesions (<4.2mL) had worse repeatability for volume measurements. The repeatability of SUVpeak, TLU, and all patient-level metrics were not affected by PSF-reconstruction. Conclusion: 18F-DCFPyL uptake measurements are well repeatable and can be used for clinical validation in future treatment response assessment studies. Patient-based TTV may be preferred for multicenter studies since its repeatability was both high and robust to different image reconstructions.




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Will SPECT/CT Cameras soon be able to display Absorbed Doses? Dosimetry from Single Activity Concentration Measurements.




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11C-(+)-PHNO Trapping Reversibility for Quantitative PET Imaging of Beta-Cell-Mass in Patients with Type-1 Diabetes




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Individual mapping of innate immune cell activation is a candidate marker of patient-specific trajectories of disability worsening in Multiple Sclerosis

Objective: To develop a novel approach to generate individual maps of white matter (WM) innate immune cell activation using 18F-DPA-714 translocator protein (TSPO) positron emission tomography (PET), and to explore the relationship between these maps and individual trajectories of disability worsening in patients with multiple sclerosis (MS). Methods: Patients with MS (n = 37), whose trajectories of disability worsening over the 2 years preceding study entry were calculated, and healthy controls (n = 19) underwent magnetic resonance magnetic and 18F-DPA-714 PET. A threshold of significant activation of 18F-DPA-714 binding was calculated with a voxel-wise randomized permutation-based comparison between patients and controls, and used to classify each WM voxel in patients as characterized by a significant activation of innate immune cells (DPA+) or not. Individual maps of innate immune cell activation in the WM were employed to calculate the extent of activation in WM regions-of-interests and to classify each WM lesion as "DPA-active", "DPA-inactive" or "unclassified". Results: Compared with the WM of healthy controls, patients with MS had a significantly higher percentage of DPA+ voxels in the normal-appearing WM, (NAWM in patients=24.9±9.7%; WM in controls=14.0±7.8%, p<0.001). In patients with MS, the percentage of DPA+ voxels showed a significant increase from NAWM, to perilesional areas, T2 hyperintense lesions and T1 hypointense lesions (38.1±13.5%, 45.0±17.9%, and 51.9±22.9%, respectively, p<0.001). Among the 1379 T2 lesions identified, 512 were defined as DPA-active and 258 as DPA-inactive. A higher number of lesions classified as DPA-active (OR=1.13, P = 0.009), a higher percentage of DPA+ voxels in the NAWM (OR=1.16, P = 0.009) and in T1-spin-echo lesions (OR=1.06, P = 0.036), were significantly associated with a retrospective more severe clinical trajectory in patients with MS. Conclusion: A more severe trajectory of disability worsening in MS is associated with an innate immune cells activation inside and around WM lesions. 18F-DPA-714 PET may provide a promising biomarker to identify patients at risk of severe clinical trajectory.




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Demarcation of Sepsis-Induced Peripheral and Central Acidosis with pH-Low Insertion Cyclic (pHLIC) Peptide

Acidosis is a key driver for many diseases, including cancer, sepsis, and stroke. The spatiotemporal dynamics of dysregulated pH across disease remains elusive and current diagnostic strategies do not provide localization of pH alterations. We sought to explore if PET imaging using hydrophobic cyclic peptides that partition into the cellular membrane at low extracellular pH (denoted as "pHLIC") can permit accurate in vivo visualization of acidosis. Methods: Acid-sensitive cyclic peptide c[E4W5C] pHLIC was conjugated to bifunctional maleimide-NO2A and radiolabeled with copper-64 (t1/2 = 12.7 h). C57BL/6J mice were administered LPS (15 mg/kg) or saline (vehicle) and serially imaged with [64Cu]Cu-c[E4W5C] over 24 h. Ex vivo autoradiography was performed on resected brain slices and subsequently stained with cresyl violet to enable high-resolution spatial analysis of tracer accumulation. A non- pH-sensitive cell-penetrating control peptide (c[R4W5C]) was used to confirm specificity of [64Cu]Cu-c[E4W5C]. CD11b (macrophage/microglia) and TMEM119 (microglia) immunostaining was performed to correlate extent of neuroinflammation with [64Cu]Cu-c[E4W5C] PET signal. Results: [64Cu]Cu-c[E4W5C] radiochemical yield and purity was >95% and >99% respectively, with molar activity >0.925 MBq/nmol. Significantly increased [64Cu]Cu-c[E4W5C] uptake was observed in LPS-treated mice (vs. vehicle) within peripheral tissues including blood, lungs, liver, and small intestines (P < 0.001-0.05). Additionally, there was significantly increased [64Cu]Cu-c[E4W5C] uptake in the brains of LPS-treated animals. Autoradiography confirmed increased uptake in the cerebellum, cortex, hippocampus, striatum, and hypothalamus of LPS-treated mice (vs. vehicle). Immunohistochemical (IHC) analysis revealed microglial/macrophage infiltrate, suggesting activation in brain regions containing increased tracer uptake. [64Cu]Cu-c[R4W5C] demonstrated significantly reduced uptake in the brain and periphery of LPS mice compared to the acid-mediated [64Cu]Cu-c[E4W5C] tracer. Conclusion: Here, we demonstrate that a pH-sensitive PET tracer specifically detects acidosis in regions associated with sepsis-driven pro-inflammatory responses. This study suggests that [64Cu]Cu-pHLIC is a valuable tool to noninvasively assess acidosis associated with both central and peripheral innate immune activation.




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64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT for Imaging Patients with Known or Suspected Somatostatin Receptor-Positive Neuroendocrine Tumors: Results of the First US Prospective, Reader-Blinded Clinical Trial

Studies demonstrate that the investigational 64Cu-DOTATATE radiopharmaceutical may provide diagnostic and logistical benefits over available imaging agents for patients with somatostatin receptor (SSTR)-positive neuroendocrine tumors (NETs). Accordingly, we aimed to prospectively determine the lowest dose of 64Cu-DOTATATE that facilitates diagnostic quality scans and evaluated the diagnostic performance and safety in a phase III study of patients with SSTR-expressing NETs. Methods: A dose-ranging study was conducted in 12 patients divided into 3 dose groups (111 MBq [3.0 mCi], 148 MBq [4.0 mCi], and 185 MBq [5.0 mCi] ± 10%) to determine the lowest dose of 64Cu-DOTATATE that produced diagnostic quality PET/CT images. Using the 64Cu-DOTATATE dose identified in the dose-ranging study, 3 independent nuclear medicine physicians who were blinded to all clinical information read PET/CT scans from 21 healthy volunteers and 42 NET-positive patients to determine those with "Disease" and "No Disease," as well as "Localized" versus "Metastatic" status. Blinded-reader evaluations were compared to a patient-specific standard of truth (SOT), which was established by an independent oncologist who used all previously available pathology, clinical, and conventional imaging data. Diagnostic performance calculated for 64Cu-DOTATATE included sensitivity, specificity, negative predictive value, positive predictive value, and accuracy. Inter- and intra-reader reliability, as well as ability to differentiate between localized and metastatic disease, was also determined. Adverse events (AEs) were recorded from 64Cu-DOTATATE injection through 48 hours post-injection. Results: The dose-ranging study identified 148 MBq (4.0 mCi) as the optimal dose to obtain diagnostic quality PET/CT images. Following database lock, diagnostic performance from an initial majority read of the 3 independent readers showed a significant 90.9% sensitivity (P = 0.0042) and 96.6% specificity (P < 0.0001) for detecting NETs, which translated to a 100.0% sensitivity and 96.8% specificity after correcting for an initial SOT misread. Excellent inter- and intra-reader reliability, as well as ability to distinguish between localized and metastatic disease, was also noted. No AEs were related to 64Cu-DOTATATE, and no serious AEs were observed. Conclusion: 64Cu-DOTATATE PET/CT is a safe imaging technique that provides high-quality and accurate images at a dose of 148 MBq (4.0 mCi) for the detection of somatostatin-expressing NETs.




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PET/CT imaging with a 18F-labeled galactodendritic unit in a galectin-1 overexpressing orthotopic bladder cancer model

Galectins are carbohydrate-binding proteins overexpressed in bladder cancer (BCa) cells. Dendritic galactose moieties have a high affinity for galectin-expressing tumor cells. We radiolabeled a dendritic galactose carbohydrate with fluorine-18 – 18F-labeled galactodendritic unit 4 – and examined its potential in imaging urothelial malignancies. Methods: The 18F-labeled 1st generation galactodendritic unit 4 was obtained from its tosylate precursor. We conducted in vivo studies in galectin-expressing UMUC3 orthotopic BCa model to determine the ability of 18F-labeled galactodendritic unit 4 to image BCa. Results: Intravesical administration of 18F-labeled galactodendritic unit 4 allowed specific accumulation of the carbohydrate radiotracer in galectin-1 overexpressing UMUC3 orthotopic tumors when imaged with PET. The 18F-labeled galactodendritic unit 4 was not found to accumulate in non-tumor murine bladders. Conclusion: The 18F-labeled galactodendritic unit 4 and similar analogs may be clinically relevant and exploitable for PET imaging of galectin-1 overexpressing bladder tumors.




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In vivo instability of 177Lu-DOTATATE during peptide receptor radionuclide therapy

Peptide receptor radiotherapy using 177Lu-labeled somatostatin ligand analogs is a well-established treatment for neuroendocrine tumors (NET), with 177Lu-DOTATATE having acquired marketing authorization in Europe and the USA. The investigation of the pharmacokinetics of those radiopharmaceuticals in vivo in humans is crucial for personalized treatment management and understanding of treatment effects. It requires input data on the in vivo stability of the radiopharmaceuticals in blood and plasma. The work presented here is devoted to the investigation of in vivo stability of 177Lu-DOTATATE in humans affected by NET. Unexpectedly, fast metabolism of the radiopharmaceutical was observed, with fraction of intact 177Lu-DOTATATE in plasma decreasing rapidly to 23±5% (mean ± SD) at 24 h and 1.7±0.9% at 96 h after injection.