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Russia and the Economic Crisis: No Safe Haven

1 November 2008 , Number 4

Russia is caught in the global crisis and cannot escape its impact. The crucial question is how the Dmitri Medvedev-Vladimir Putin leadership will respond. Putin has presided over a steadily strengthening economy; he now appears ill-equipped to handle crisis and contraction. The signs are not encouraging. Trust and confidence, two essential ingredients vital to resolving any financial crisis, are in short supply. The public could pay a heavy price for the hubris and schadenfreude of their leaders, still ‘dizzy with success’ from years of economic revival and what they perceive as a successful reaffirmation of the country’s great power status.

Julian Cooper,

Professor, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham




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Russian Policy on Iran: Trump and Trap

1 February 2007 , Number 1

Russia is playing a risky game in Iran, continuing to build a nuclear power plant while supporting United Nations sanctions on Tehran for its nuclear policy. Moscow may be hoping for a deal with the west, but if restraint fails and Iran goes nuclear, the missiles would be too close for comfort. Equally a pre-emptive American or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear sites might unleash serious consequences for Russia too.

Yury Fedorov

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

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An Iranian woman passes by mural paintings of Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (L) and the late founder of Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (R)




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Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism: Tomorrow's Threat

1 March 2007 , Number 11

In early November, the retiring head of Britain’s Security Service MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, warned that the danger of a terror attack was ‘serious’ and ‘growing’, with as many as thirty plots underway. Traditional terrorism of the sort practised by the Irish Republican Army has given way to the possibility, if not the expectation, that groups such as Al Qaeda might make use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and materials in an attack in Britain. So what are the dangers?

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Syrian Special Forces in gas masks, Saudi Arabia 1990




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Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Transitional Justice for the Victims of ISIS in Syria

28 April 2020

This paper aims to assist the region’s local authorities, and their key foreign backers, in understanding how transitional justice can provide alternative avenues for holding local ISIS members to account while contributing to the healing of communities.

Haid Haid

Senior Consulting Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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A fighter with the Syrian Democratic Forces monitors prisoners accused of being affiliated with ISIS, at a prison in the northeastern Syrian city of Hassakeh on 25 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.
  • The piecemeal approach to justice is deeply flawed, and raises particular concerns about due process. No precise instruments exist to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. In any event, the scale of the crimes and the number of victims – as well as severe shortages of resources and workers – make dispensation of justice extremely difficult through the traditional legal system.
  • Not all detained ISIS members receive prison sentences. Individuals who did not hold senior roles in the group’s apparatus and are not accused of ‘major’ crimes (in practice, largely defined as fighting for ISIS and murder) are being released under limited reconciliation deals with tribal leaders. But the involvement of local community leaders in those efforts is not enough to ensure positive results. Many victims are upset at seeing ISIS members walk free without even admitting their guilt publicly or apologizing for the pain they caused.
  • To overcome the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework, a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members. A combination of non-judicial mechanisms such as truth commissions, missing persons’ committees, and reparations and victim-healing programmes could play a vital role in providing ISIS victims with a sense of justice while contributing to peacebuilding and stability.
  • Ignoring the urgency of developing a long-term plan to serve justice and contribute to community healing will almost certainly allow ISIS to continue to prevent the recovery and development of northeastern Syria. This, in turn, risks undermining the stability of the country and the region at large.




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It's a man's world: carnal spectatorship and dissonant masculinities in Islamic State videos

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Manni Crone

Islamic State videos have often been associated with savage violence and beheadings. An in-depth scrutiny however reveals another striking feature: that female bodies are absent, blurred or mute. Examining a few Islamic State videos in depth, the article suggests that the invisibility of women in tandem with the ostentatious visibility of male bodies enable gendered and embodied spectators to indulge in homoerotic as well as heterosexual imaginaries. In contrast to studies on visual security and online radicalization which assert that images affect an audience, this article focuses on the interaction between video and audience and argues that spectators are not only rational and emotional but embodied and gendered as well. Islamic State videos do not only attract western foreign fighters through religious–ideological rhetoric or emotional impact but also through gendered forms of pleasure and desire that enable carnal imagination and identification. The article probes the analytical purchase of carnal aesthetics and spectatorship.




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Politics, policy-making and the presence of images of suffering children

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Helen Berents

In 2017 Trump expressed pity for the ‘beautiful babies’ killed in a gas attack on Khan Shaykhun in Syria before launching airstrikes against President Assad's regime. Images of suffering children in world politics are often used as a synecdoche for a broader conflict or disaster. Injured, suffering, or dead; the ways in which images of children circulate in global public discourse must be critically examined to uncover the assumptions that operate in these environments. This article explores reactions to images of children by representatives and leaders of states to trace the interconnected affective and political dimensions of these images. In contrast to attending to the expected empathetic responses prompted by images of children, this article particularly focuses on when such images prompt bellicose foreign policy decision-making. In doing this, the article forwards a way of thinking about images as contentious affective objects in international relations. The ways in which images of children's bodies and suffering are strategically deployed by politicians deserves closer scrutiny to uncover the visual politics of childhood inherent in these moments of international politics and policy-making.




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Social media and the visibility of horrific violence

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Constance Duncombe

Images are central to social media communication. Billions of images are shared across different social media platforms every day: photos, cartoons, GIFs and short video clips are exchanged by users, facilitating or framing discourse on participatory sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. Many of these images depict events of extreme violence, which circulate uninhibited by the conventional constraints associated with traditional news media censorship. A question arises here as to how such images mobilize public and policy-making responses to atrocities. This article examines the political dynamics of violent social media images. I argue that the particular qualities of social media can play an important role in how the digital visibility of horrific violence influences policy-making as a response to such atrocities. There is an important connection between the properties of social media platforms that allow user images to reach a global audience in real time and the emotional responses that this level of circulation generates. In turn, the pressure created by events made globally visible through the circulation of violent images and the audience responses to those images puts governments in a position where they are forced to act, which has significant implications for policy-making.




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Horror, apocalypse and world politics (free)

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Tim Aistrope and Stefanie Fishel

World politics generates a long list of anxiety-inspiring scenarios that threaten to unravel everyday life with sudden and violent destruction. From total war and the concentration camps, through nuclear firestorms, global pandemics and climate disaster, the diabolical violence of the recent past and conceivable future is the stuff of nightmares. Yet International Relations scholars and practitioners are often criticized for being disconnected from the human realities of international calamity. The challenge for both is to engage world politics in a way that foregrounds the human consequences of extreme violence and depravation. In this article, we explore these difficult experiences through popular culture representations of the apocalypse, a subject of intense interest for researchers in a discipline where global destruction is a distinct possibility. However, we take a different route by engaging the apocalypse through the horror genre, the one place where human suffering is explicitly accentuated. We argue that the horror genre is at once an access point for ethical engagement with the human consequences of extreme violence and a complex terrain where dark imaginings can be politically loaded, culturally specific and ethically ambiguous.




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How images frame China's role in African development

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

George Karavas

Political leaders, policy-makers and academics routinely refer to development as an objective process of social change through the use of technical, value-free terms. Images of poverty and inequality are regularly presented as evidence of a world that exists ‘out there’ where development unfolds. This way of seeing reflects the value of scientific forms of knowledge but also sits in tension with the normative foundations of development that take European modernization and industrialization as the benchmark for comparison. The role images play in this process is often overlooked. This article argues that a dominant mode of visuality based on a Cartesian separation between subject and object, underpinning the ascendance of European hegemony and colonialism, aligns with the core premises of orthodox development discourse. An example of how visual representations of development matter is presented through images of Africa–China relations in western media sources. Using widely circulated images depicting China's impact on African development in western news media sources as an example of why visual politics matters for policy-making, the article examines how images play a role in legitimizing development planning by rendering associated forms of epistemological and structural violence ‘invisible to the viewer’.




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Rethinking youth bulge theory in policy and scholarship: incorporating critical gender analysis

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Lesley Pruitt

For decades ‘youth bulge’ theory has dominated understandings of youth in mainstream International Relations. Youth bulge theory has also become part of some public media analyses, mainstream political rhetoric, and even officially enshrined in the foreign policy of some states. Through the ‘youth bulge’ lens, youth—especially males—have been presented as current or future perpetrators of violence. However, this article argues that the youth bulge thesis postulated in mainstream IR is based on flawed theoretical assumptions. In particular, supporters of youth bulge theory fail to engage with existing research by feminist IR scholars and thus take on a biological essentialist approach. This has led to theoretical and practical misunderstandings of the roles youth play in relation to conflict, peace and security. These partial and biased understandings have also resulted in less effective policy-making. In critically reflecting on the ‘youth bulge’ thesis, this article argues that applying gender analysis is crucial to understanding the involvement of young people in general—and young men in particular—in conflict. Doing so will contribute to advancing more accurate analysis in scholarship and policy-making.




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The multilevel identity politics of the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Galia Press-Barnathan and Naama Lutz

This article uses the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that took place in Tel Aviv to explore how cultural mega-events serve both as political arenas and as tools for identity construction, negotiation and contestation. These processes of identity politics are all conducted across national–subnational–international–transnational levels. The hosting of mega-events fleshes out these multiple processes in a very strong manner. We first discuss the politics of hosting mega-events in general. We then examine the identity politics associated more specifically with the Eurovision Song Contest, before examining in depth the complex forms of identity politics emerging around the competition following the 2018 Israeli victory. We suggest that it is important to study together the multiple processes—domestic, international and transnational—of identity politics that take place around the competition, as they interact with each other. Consequently, we follow the various stakeholders involved at these different levels and their interactions. We examine the internal identity negotiation process in Israel surrounding the event, the critical actors debating how to use the stage to challenge the liberal, western, ‘normal’ identity Israel hoped to project in the contest and how other stakeholders (participating states, national broadcasting agencies, participating artists) reacted to them, and finally we examine the behaviour of the institution in charge, the European Broadcasting Union, and national governments. We contribute to the study of mega-events as fields of contestation, to the understanding of the complex, multilevel nature of national identity construction, negotiation and contestation in the current era, and more broadly to the role that popular culture plays in this context.




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Violence, visuality and world politics

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

In the May 2020 issue of International Affairs, we explore the many uses of images in the conduct of global politics.

Helen Berents and Constance Duncombe

This special section brings together diverse spaces and modes of visuality through specific, sustained attention to the various types of violence depicted. In doing so, these articles draw out a concern for the visual constitution of violence in global politics, and its emotional and political consequences. Individually and collectively, the contributions highlight the ways in which policy-makers and researchers are daily confronted by violent images that influence how complex political problems are seen and consequently understood. Paying attention to the power of the visuality of violence is necessary to understand how certain kinds of policy responses to direct and indirect violence unfold.




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The Changing Nature of Russia’s Military Strategy and Its Tactical Application

Invitation Only Research Event

12 November 2019 - 4:00pm to 5:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Oscar Jonsson, Director, Stockholm Free World Forum (Frivärld)
Mathieu Boulègue, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Chair: ​Alice Billon-Galland, Research Associate, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Russia’s military strategy is increasingly blurring the boundaries between war and peace. As the nature of warfare changes, the Kremlin is adapting its strategies to pursue conflict, especially through non-military means - below the threshold of armed violence. 

Russian military tactics are often mistaken for strategy in the West. Oscar Jonson, author of The Russian Understanding of War, will talk through this debate and explore how the Russian leadership now understands military strategy in the context of modern warfare. Mathieu Boulègue will address the more operational aspects of contemporary warfare for Russia, notably grey zone operations. 

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Political Will Was Not Enough for Justice Reform in Moldova

27 November 2019

Cristina Gherasimov

Former Academy Associate, Russia and Eurasia Programme
The pro-reform Sandu government had the will to dismantle oligarchic power structures, but was taken down by limited political experience.

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Maia Sandu in Germany in July. Photo: Getty Images.

The lack of political will to carry out rule of law reforms is frequently the reason why reforms are not fully implemented. The case of Moldova proves that in societies where strong vested interests still persist, political savviness is equally as important as political will.

Old and new political power brokers in Moldova struck a fragile pact in June to oust Vladimir Plahotniuc. Plahotniuc had built a network of corruption and patronage with the help of the Democratic Party, which he treated as a personal vehicle and which allowed him and a small economic elite circle to enrich themselves off of government institutions and state-owned enterprises, to the detriment of Moldovan citizens and the health of their political process.

Maia Sandu, co-leader of the pro-reform ACUM electoral bloc, then formed a technocratic government with a remit to implement Moldova’s lagging reform agenda. Though made up of ministers with the integrity and political will to implement difficult transformational reforms, its biggest weakness was its coalition partner – the pro-Russian Socialists’ Party and its informal leader, Igor Dodon, the president of Moldova.

Now the Socialists – threatened by how key reforms to the justice system would impact their interests – have joined forces with Plahotniuc’s former allies, the Democratic Party, to oust ACUM, exploiting the party’s lack of political savviness. 

Reform interrupted

It was always clear the coalition would be short-lived. President Dodon and the co-ruling Socialists joined to buy themselves time, with the hope that they could restrict the most far-reaching reforms and tie the hands of ACUM ministers. In less than five months, however, the Sandu government initiated key reforms in the judicial system, aimed at dismantling Plahotniuc’s networks of patronage but also impacting the Socialists, who to a large degree also profited from the previous status quo.

The red line came over a last-minute change in the selection process of the prosecutor general proposed by Sandu on 6 November, which the Socialists claimed was unconstitutional and gave them the justification to put forward a motion of no confidence in the Sandu government. This was conveniently supported by the Democratic Party, who appeared threatened by an independent prosecutor’s office and saw an opportunity to return to power.

Thus, the political will to reform proved insufficient in the absence of a clear strategy on how to address the concerns of the old regime that they would be prosecuted and their vested interests threatened. Here, ACUM’s lack of political experience let them down. With their hands tied from the beginning in a fragile coalition with the Socialists, ACUM were unable to prevent sabotage from within state institutions and their own coalition, and could not find consensus to proceed with more radical methods to tackle corruption.

Less than two days after the Sandu government was out, a new government was sworn in on 14 November. Prime Minister Ion Chicu was an adviser to President Dodon before taking office and former minister of finance under the Plahotniuc-backed government of Pavel Filip, as part of a cabinet of ministers consisting largely of other presidential advisers and former high-level bureaucrats and ministers from the Plahotniuc era. 

The new government

A top priority for the Chicu government is to convince the international community that it is independent from President Dodon, and that its ‘technocrats’ will keep the course of reforms of the Sandu government. This is critical to preserving the financial assistance of Western partners, which the Moldovan government heavily relies on, particularly with a presidential election campaign next year, when they will likely want to create fiscal space for various giveaways to voters.

But within its first week in office, Chicu appears incapable of walking this line. Reverting to the initially proposed pre-selection process of prosecutor general signals that the post could be filled by a loyal appointee of President Dodon. Moreover, Chicu’s first visit abroad was to Russia, allegedly a major financial contributor of the Socialists’ Party. With the Socialists now holding the presidency, government, Chisinau mayoralty, and the parliament speaker’s seat, the danger of an increased Russian influence on key political decisions is very real.

A government steered by President Dodon risks bringing Moldova back to where it was before June, with a political elite mimicking reforms while misusing power for private gains. The biggest danger is that instead of continuing the reform process to bring Moldova back on its European integration path, the new government may focus on strengthening the old patronage system, this time with President Dodon at the top of the pyramid.

Lessons

This new minority government, supported by the Democrats, is a more natural one for President Dodon and therefore has more chances to survive, at least until presidential elections in autumn of 2020. Both the Socialists and the Democrats will likely seek to use this time to rebuild their own methods of capturing state resources. But with the Socialists relying on the Democrats’ votes in parliament, this is a recipe for further political instability.

Similar to Moldova, several other states across the post-Soviet space such as Ukraine and Armenia have had new political forces come to power with the political will and mandate to carry out difficult reforms to strengthen rule of law and fight systemic corruption in their countries. What they all have in common is the lack of political experience of how to create change, while old elites, used to thinking on their feet to defend their vested interests, retain their connections and economic and political influence.

Moldova is a good example of why political will needs to be backed up by clear strategy on how to deal with threatened vested interests in order for new political forces to be able to maintain themselves in power and reforms to be sustainable. When the chance comes again for fresh leaders to come to power, it is importantthey are politically prepared to use it swiftly and wisely.




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Russian Economic Policy and the Russian Economic System: Stability Versus Growth

17 December 2019

How is it possible for the directors of the Russian economy to pursue an orthodox stabilization policy with a great measure of success and yet to have achieved so little to stem the growth slowdown? This paper examines the reasons for the divergence in economic management.

Professor Philip Hanson OBE

Former Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

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Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina, Economic Development Minister Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Mutko, Labour and Social Safety Minister Maxim Topilin, Economy and Finance Department Head Valery Sidorenko, and Russian presidential aide Andrei Belousov (l–r) after a meeting on stimulating economic growth, at Gorki residence, Moscow, on 8 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • Russia’s economic management is currently praised for its achievement of macroeconomic stability. Inflation has been brought down; the budget is in surplus; national debt is low; and the reserves are ample. At the same time, there is much criticism of the failure at present to secure more than very slow economic growth.
  • The macro-stabilization of 2014–18 was of a conventional, ‘liberal’ kind. Public spending was cut, and a budget rule was introduced that (so far) has weakened the link between increases in oil prices and increases in budgetary expenditure. The austerity campaign was harsh. Pensioners, the military, regional budgets and business all lost out, but in reality put up little resistance. The austerity drive was facilitated by the autocratic nature of the regime.
  • The growth slowdown dates from 2012, and cannot simply be blamed on falls in the oil price and sanctions. Rapid growth in 1999–2008 consisted in large part of recovery from the deep recession of the 1990s and the initial development of a services sector. These sources of growth are no longer available; investment is low; and the labour force is declining. The Western world also has a slow growth problem, but at a higher level of per capita output. In Russia, private investment and competition are inhibited by an intrusive and corrupt state. If the rule of law were in place, the economy would perform better in the long run. That would require a profound reform of formal and informal institutions.
  • The leadership wants faster growth, but has powerful incentives not to embark on systemic reform. Even the pragmatic ministers of the ‘economic bloc’ of government, who understand the problem, share this interest in maintaining the status quo. Growth is thus being sought through a highly ambitious programme, in 2018–24, of ‘national projects’, state-led and largely state-financed. This is already running into difficulties.
  • The contrast between successful stabilization and a (so far) unsuccessful growth strategy illustrates the difference between policymaking within a given system and reform of that system. Systemic reform brings with it more potential unintended consequences than do changes in policy. In the case of Russia, movement towards a rule of law could destabilize the social and political system. It is therefore unlikely to be attempted.




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The New Orthodox Church of Ukraine: Opportunities and Challenges of Canonical Independence

Invitation Only Research Event

22 January 2020 - 10:00am to 11:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Archbishop Yevstraty (Zoria) of Chernihiv, Deputy Head of Department for External Church Relations, Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Orthodox Church of Ukraine)

In January 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine a self-governing status, ending its centuries-long subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Russian Orthodox Church condemned this decision and severed its links with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

More than 500 parishes have left the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to join the newly independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).

What challenges is the new church facing? Has its independence been recognized by other Orthodox churches? How is it affected by the schism between Constantinople and Moscow? What are UOC’s priorities in relations with the West and with the Orthodox world?

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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How Putin Tries to Depoliticize Russia’s Youth

7 January 2020

Professor Nikolai Petrov

Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Ekaterina Aleynikova

Independent Analyst
Vladimir Putin’s condescending remarks on Greta Thunberg’s activism say more about the Kremlin’s attitude towards Russian youth than climate change.

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Vladimir Putin meets with representatives of the Russian Student Brigades in the Kremlin. Photo: Getty Images.

Climate change debates have not taken root in Russia. Yet, while speaking at an energy forum in Moscow, Vladimir Putin chose to comment on Greta Thunberg, the prominent 16-year-old Swedish eco-activist. Adopting his usual sarcastically condescending persona, Putin expressed regret that the ‘kind’ and ‘very sincere’ girl was being used by adults for their own political interests in such a ‘cruel, emotional way’.

These remarks may appear to have been intended to dismiss Thunberg’s environmental concerns. However, among the Russian public, concern about climate change is not widespread.

Fridays for Future, the movement started by Thunberg, received little uptake in Russia, inspiring less than 100 people to take to the streets in September. This does not compare to the 50,000 or more people who came out to protest unfair elections and police brutality in Moscow in August. Indeed, Thunberg herself is largely perceived negatively among the Russian public.

Thus, there was no need for Putin to warn his domestic audience about Thunberg’s ‘mistaken’ cause. In fact, Putin’s key message was not to aimed at the young activist or even the climate change debate. Although presented as spontaneous, his words revealed a carefully-constructed narrative. It was expressed in general terms.

‘Adults must do everything not to bring teenagers and children into extreme situations,’ Putin urged, ‘when somebody uses children and teenagers in their own interests, it only deserves to be condemned.’ In fact, these statements were targeted at delegitimizing any sort of political engagement from young people.

Those familiar with Kremlin propaganda would have recognized this narrative from the statements that have been made about Alexey Navalny’s supporters over the recent years, who have been portrayed as ‘naïve’ and ‘manipulated’. According to the state, young people should be apolitical, and hence any involvement they have in politics must come as a result of manipulation by ‘ill-intended’ adults.

The same attitude is exploited to impose restrictions on individual freedoms, as is the case with the infamous gay propaganda law, which disguises discrimination in the language of protecting children. Portraying the youth as innately dependent legitimizes paternalistic interventions from the state, defining the norms of conduct.

This narrative is part of a wider strategy employed by the Russian government to promote political apathy among the country’s youth. There have been efforts to discourage young people from participating in political protests, such as warnings of expulsion at schools and universities and threats of fines and prosecution against parents whose children attend demonstrations.

A vivid illustration of these efforts is the recent conviction of Yegor Zhukov, a 21-year-old student from Moscow’s Higher School of Economics who discussed regime change on his blog. Instead of the four years in prison for extremism that the prosecutor asked for, he was sentenced to three years of probation, with a prohibition against him posting online as a condition. His sentencing sends a message, to Zhukov and to all young people interested in politics – he is free to go perhaps, but not free to speak out.

It is not all ‘stick’ in the government’s approach to young people. There is also some ‘carrot’. The Kremlin has been paying close attention to the youth ever since the protests of 2011–12, which demonstrated conclusively that growing up under Putin has not prevented young people from imagining alternatives to his regime. Since then, Putin has made a habit of regular meetings with young people, and a number of initiatives have been rolled out to select and reward ‘top performers’.

Through presidential grants, such as the Sirius educational programme in Sochi, the government selects and trains high-achieving students in STEM subjects. This is done under the umbrella of promoting technological innovation.

Thus, there exist clear boundaries over where creative thinking is allowed: it is encouraged in technical sciences, but not in social sciences or humanities. To the ‘right’ type of talented children participating in government programmes, the ‘wrong’ image of Zhukov stands as a stark contrast.

For the majority of young people, Russia’s education system does not support the development of independent, critical thinking. In 2016, Putin personally endorsed an initiative to create a single official history textbook that excludes ‘internal contradictions and double interpretations’. This demonstrates the desire of the regime to promote convergent thinking among the wider population.

This strategy towards Russia’s youth reflects the fears of Putin’s regime, which sees young people as having disruptive potential. There have been false dawns for Russia’s liberal opposition before (most recently in 2012) and, while the summer’s protests were significant, it remains unclear whether the new generation really are more progressive than those who went before.

Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the status quo is apparent among Russia’s youth. They do not see Russia offering them good opportunities. Over 50% of those aged 18–24 reported that they want to emigrate, in a recent survey by Levada Center. Whether this discontent provides the impetus for political change in Russia may depend on the success of the Kremlin’s efforts to depoliticize Russia’s youth.




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Russia's Imperial Nostalgia: Implications for the West

Invitation Only Research Event

31 January 2020 - 11:00am to 12:30pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Sergei Medvedev, Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Vladimir Putin’s goal of restoring Russia’s status as a great power has led to an aggressive foreign policy and confrontation with its immediate neighbours as well as Western countries.

Sergei Medvedev, author of The Return of the Russian Leviathan, will discuss the forces shaping Russian politics and society today as well as how a nostalgia for empire – still widespread in contemporary Russia - has shaped Moscow’s foreign policy.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Three Challenges for UK Peacebuilding Policy in the South Caucasus After Brexit

21 January 2020

Laurence Broers

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Building on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus is a realistic and attainable goal.

2020-01-21-NK.jpg

A building in Nagorny Karabakh flies the flag of the self-proclaimed republic. 'Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh have evolved into examples of what scholars call "de facto states" that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty,' writes Laurence Broers. Photo: Getty Images.

What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.

Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.

Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.

This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.

There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.

Three challenges

This niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.

The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.

Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.

Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.

A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.

Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts.    

The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.

In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.

Recommendations

Britain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways.  

First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.

This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.

Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.

The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live.   

Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.

While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.

The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal.




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POSTPONED: Transitional Justice in Ukraine: What Might it Look Like?

Invitation Only Research Event

17 March 2020 - 9:30am to 1:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Kirsty Brimelow QC, Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers
Miles Jackson, Associate Professor of Law, University of Oxford
Anton Korynevych, Representative of the President of Ukraine for Crimea
Oleksandra Matviychuk, Head of the Board, Centre for Civil Liberties
Taras Tsymbrivksyy, Head, USAID Human Rights in Action Program; Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union

Still grappling with the war in the east and the occupation of Crimea, Ukraine’s new leadership has announced its intention to develop its transitional justice infrastructure to respond to the human rights violations arising from Russia’s aggression. 

Numerous reports (not least ones by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine) list persecutions, illegal detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and killings among the crimes perpetrated in Crimea and parts of occupied Donbas. 

As Ukraine has only just started developing its transitional justice roadmap, this event will seek to discuss viable initial approaches, such as a ‘truth-telling commission’ or amnesties. 

The panellists will also discuss the role for civil society and those directly affected by hostilities in the transitional justice process.  

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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In a COVID-19 World, Russia Sticks to International Distancing

29 March 2020

Mathieu Boulègue

Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
While a global response is needed against the coronavirus crisis, Russia does not see it as in its interests to contribute – and in fact the Kremlin is using the crisis to further destabilise the world.

2020-03-29-Coronavirus-Russia-Moscow

Young woman wearing a face mask in front of St. Basil's Cathedral, Moscow. Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images.

Persistent internet rumours claiming the coronavirus outbreak originated from a secret American pharmaceutical company with the aim of destroying China from within were quickly discredited. Pop culture fans recognised the supposed activities of the Umbrella Corporation as being from the famous Japanese video games series Resident Evil.

However, although fake news, it can likely be attributed to Russian trolls conducting this and other similar activities online, especially when considered within the wider context of how the Russian regime is using this worldwide crisis to further destabilize the West and test its resolve.

Russian trolls never sleep

Russia’s COVID-19 related actions first and foremost take the form of a vast information warfare campaign, with media outlets simultaneously downplaying the threat of the pandemic - ‘it is less dangerous than seasonal flu’ - while stoking fear about what is happening elsewhere in Europe.

For the domestic audience in Russia, some media are reporting the pandemic marks the collapse of the Western world and liberalism altogether, calling it a form of collective punishment. Other point out how fast liberal democracies have curbed individual and entrepreneurial freedoms in order to slow down the viral outbreak, and seek to diminish the credibility of the Western response to the crisis.

Exploiting the coronavirus crisis in this way is a new low in Russia’s wider political warfare campaign to undermine global governance overall, as these activities are detrimental to people's very safety. For example, in Ukraine, it is thought a Russian-engineered disinformation operation may have caused the outburst of violence in the city of Novi Sanzhary following the arrival of evacuees from China.

In the military realm, fake news has been targeting the US-led multinational exercise DEFENDER-Europe 2020. The Russian leadership criticized the exercise as an offensive ‘anti-Russian scenario’ but then used accompanying propaganda that it could actively facilitate the spread of COVID-19 across Europe because of the arrival and movement of large numbers of troops.

The large-scale drills were planned to involve 18 participating nations and should have taken place across ten European countries from April to May 2020. But the exercise has now been scaled down – as has the Russian disinformation targeting it.

And while the world is pre-occupied with managing COVID-19, Moscow is able to grow bolder in its provocations. Recent air incursions were reported into Irish controlled airspace as well as over the North Sea. Although this practice is - unfortunately - routine as part of Russian constant military sabre-rattling, it does increase the risk of tactical errors and miscalculation.

Self-isolation, Kremlin style

Meanwhile, just when a global response is needed to fight the pandemic, Moscow’s response has been, at best, self-serving. On March 22, Russian military reportedly started sending medical equipment and supplies to Italy. While the nature and the scope of this assistance can be doubted, it still represents a charm offensive for Russia to be brought back in from the cold in Europe - since successive Italian leaderships have been accommodating to the Kremlin. And sending virologists to Italy might also be a useful learning curve for Russia’s regime.

But within Russia itself, Vladimir Putin does have to face the problem that, on top of all the projected social and healthcare costs, the coronavirus is also having negative political consequences. On March 25, the ‘popular vote’ - a mock referendum designed to rubber-stamp Putin’s recent constitutional changes - was pushed back. And the Ministry of Communications has been forced to postpone a major exercise aimed at ensuring the ‘stable and safe operation of Runet’ - namely eliminating vulnerabilities in the Russian ‘sovereign’ internet to potential external threats.

Certainly it would be naive to believe Moscow will put self-interest to one side during this pandemic. ‘International distancing’ is not new for the Kremlin, and Russia has been practising self-isolation since at least 2008 through its own actions, most notably in Georgia and Ukraine.

Its self-perception as a ‘besieged fortress’ is being reinforced by this crisis and Russia will, at the very least, likely come out of the crisis feeling vindicated in its view that internationalism is dying or already dead.

With the health systems of many countries under massive strain, and societal resilience being tested by social distancing, the Kremlin continues to probe for weaknesses, and is also carefully watching other countries’ responses to the crisis in terms of adaptation and mobilization of resources.

COVID-19 provides a major intelligence-gathering opportunity for Moscow to learn how well others can implement wartime-like planning in peacetime. In a rapidly changing world, Russia is still Russia.




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Virtual Roundtable: Russia in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Invitation Only Research Event

1 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:30pm

Event participants

Mathieu Boulegue, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Nikolai Petrov, Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Ekaterina Schulmann, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House
Chair: James Nixey, Programme Director, Russia and Eurasia, Chatham House

Politically speaking, Russia has been isolating itself from the West for some years now, feeding its citizens a ‘besieged fortress’ mentality. Its uniqueness, however, means its approach to - and outcome from - the COVID-19 pandemic will also be distinctive. 

This webinar will explore how Russia is adapting its internal politics and its international relations to the ‘new normal’ of today. 

Department/project

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274




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Beware Russian and Chinese Positioning for After the Pandemic

9 April 2020

Keir Giles

Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Authoritarian regimes can use the COVID-19 crisis to improve their international standing, taking advantage of others’ distraction. Their aims are different, but their methods have much in common.

2020-04-09-Russia-Aid-Serbia

An airlifter of the Russian Aerospace Forces prepares to fly to Serbia carrying equipment and professionals during the COVID-19 crisis. Photo by Russian Defence MinistryTASS via Getty Images.

Both Russia and China have mounted combined charm offensives and disinformation campaigns on the back of the pandemic. Shipments of ‘aid’ – reportedly of questionable utility and quality - have gone hand in hand with a concerted effort to deflect any blame from China for the early spread, and an ongoing drive by Russia to undermine states’ confidence and have sanctions lifted.

These concurrent operations have very different objectives, as Russia seeks to subvert international order while China is continuing its bid to demonstrate global leadership - but in both cases, they are seeking long-term gains by exploiting the inattention and distraction of their targets.

Both seek to present themselves as globally responsible stakeholders, but for divergent reasons – especially China which needs the rest of the world to recover and return to stability to ensure its own economic recovery. But despite this, the two campaigns appear superficially similar.

Fertile ground for disinformation

One reason lies in the unique nature of the current crisis. Unlike political issues that are local or regional in nature, COVID-19 affects everybody worldwide. The perceived lack of reliable information about the virus provides fertile ground for information and disinformation campaigns, especially feeding on fear, uncertainty and doubt. But Russia in particular would not be succeeding in its objectives without mis-steps and inattention by Western governments.

Confused reporting on Russia sending medical supplies to the United States showed Moscow taking advantage of a US administration in apparent disarray. Claims Russia was sending ’humanitarian aid’ were only belatedly countered by the US State Department pointing out it had been paid for. Meanwhile the earlier arrival of Russian military equipment in Italy also scored a propaganda victory for Russia, facilitated by curious passivity by the Italian government.

In both cases Russia also achieved secondary objectives. With the United States, Russia scored bonus points by shipping equipment produced by a subsidiary of a company under US sanctions. In the case of Italy, Russian state media made good use of misleading or heavily edited video clips to give the impression of widespread Italian acclaim for Russian aid, combined with disdain for the efforts of the EU.

Beijing’s external information campaigns have sought to deflect or defuse criticism of its early mishandling and misinformation on coronavirus and counter accusations of secrecy and falsifying data while also pursuing an opportunity to exercise soft power. For Moscow, current efforts boost a long-standing and intensive campaign to induce the lifting of sanctions, demonstrating if nothing else that sanctions are indeed an effective measure. Official and unofficial lobbying has intensified in numerous capital cities, and will inevitably find supporters.

But both the aid and the information campaigns are seriously flawed. While appropriate and useful aid for countries that are struggling should of course be welcomed, both Russian and Chinese equipment delivered to Europe has repeatedly been found to be inappropriate or defective

Russian photographs of cardboard boxes stacked loose and unsecured in a transport aircraft bound for the United States sparked alarm and disbelief among military and aviation experts - and there has still been no US statement on what exactly was purchased, and whether it was found to be fit for purpose when it arrived.

Reporting from Italy that the Russian equipment delivered there was ‘80% useless’ has not been contradicted by the Italian authorities. In fact, although the Italian sources criticizing Russia remain anonymous it is striking that - President Trump aside - no government has publicly endorsed materials and assistance received from Russia as actually being useful and helpful.

Even in Serbia, with its traditionally close ties with Russia, the only information forthcoming on the activities of the Russian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops and their equipment that arrived on April 3 was from Russian press releases.

Both countries’ strategic communications efforts are similarly fallible. China’s notoriously heavy-handed approach to its critics is of only limited use in the face of such a severe and immediate threat. One suggestion that the virus originated in the US – an early response to US criticism – has already been walked back by the Chinese diplomat who made it.

And Russia continues to be capable of spectacularly misjudging its targets. When investigative journalists looked more closely at the nature of the assistance to Italy, Russia’s official response was rage and personal threats, laying bare the real nature of the campaign and immediately alienating many of those whom Moscow had sought to win over.

Errors and deficiencies such as these provide opportunities to mitigate the worst side-effects of the campaigns. And actions by individuals can also mitigate much of the impact. The most effective disinformation plays on deeply emotional issues and triggers visceral rather than rational reactions.

Advocates of ’informational distancing’ as well as social distancing suggest a tactical pause to assess information calmly, instead of reacting or spreading it further unthinkingly. This approach would bolster not only calm dispassionate assessment of the real impact of Russian and Chinese actions, but also counter spreading of misinformation on the pandemic as a whole - especially when key sources of disinformation are national leaders seeking to politicize or profit from the crisis.

Limitations of Russian and Chinese altruism must be stated clearly and frankly to fill gaps in public understanding. Where help is genuine, it should of course be welcomed: but if it is the case that assistance received from Moscow or Beijing is not appropriate, not useful, or not fit for purpose, this should be acknowledged publicly.

Even without central direction or coordination with other Russian strategic communications efforts, the self-perpetuating Russian disinformation ecosystem continues to push narratives designed to undermine confidence in institutions and their ability to deal with the crisis. This too must continue to be monitored closely and countered where it matters.

In all cases, miscalculations by Russia or China that expose the true intent of their campaigns – no matter how different their objectives might be - should be watched for closely and highlighted where they occur.

Despite the enormity of the present emergency it is not a time for any government to relax its vigilance over longer-term threats. States must not lose sight of manoeuvres seeking to exploit weakness and distraction. If Russia and China emerge from the current crisis with enhanced authority and unjustifiably restored reputations, this will make it still harder to resist their respective challenges to the current rules-based international order in the future.




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ICC’s Influence Can Be Strengthened by Ukraine’s Case

22 April 2020

Kateryna Busol

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
Second in a two-part series analysing why Ukraine’s attempts at international justice are worth taking - and outlining how the impact goes far beyond just the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Part two examines Ukraine’s appeal to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to seek individual criminal responsibility of the alleged perpetrators of the gravest crimes in occupied Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

2020-04-23-Ukraine-Anniversary-Conflict

Marking the Day of The National Flag of Ukraine, a day before celebrations of the anniversary of state independence. Photo by ANATOLII STEPANOV/AFP via Getty Images.

The recognition by Ukraine of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to consider grave crimes allegedly perpetrated in its territory has led to the ICC Prosecutor’s preliminary examination identifying a wave of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

There are claims of persecution, forced conscription, deportation, sham trials, enforced disappearances, and property seizure - in Crimea. As well as killings, torture, inhuman treatment, sexual violence, and indiscriminate shelling - in Donbas. The court now needs to decide whether to open a full investigation which could lead to charges against specific individuals, as in the trial currently taking place in the Netherlands over MH-17.

However, the ICC does remain a court of last resort as Ukraine retains the principal power to prosecute grave violations perpetrated in its eastern regions and Crimea, with the court only stepping in if Ukraine (or another court with jurisdiction) is either unwilling or unable to do so.

As the evidence mounts up, Ukrainian investigators, prosecutors and judges are becoming more open to cooperation with foreign experts, law firms, human rights NGOs and younger domestic professionals - a significant proportion of whom are women.

Transformation shows determination

This is an unusual shift, given the rigid hierarchical nature of post-Soviet institutions, with elderly males in most of the top positions. The transformation shows the determination to see perpetrators of crimes in Crimea and Donbas tried by the ICC, with joint professional development trainings and joint communications about the alleged crimes.

Ukraine has also been strengthening its institutions. The Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea has been improving quality control of its war crime proceedings, and has taken a strong pro-ICC stance. The Office of the Prosecutor General established a special department to monitor the armed conflict proceedings, and two specialised war crime units have been formed in Donbas.

Although too early to assess progress - given recent prosecution reform and that much-needed legislation on international crimes is still pending – these are promising signs of Ukraine’s intent to take a specialised approach to armed conflict violations. And Ukrainian civil society organisations are also playing a more important role, documenting alleged crimes and sending evidence to the ICC.

Any intervention by the ICC in Ukraine also has a considerable impact on the wider dynamics of addressing international crimes, further extending the court’s reach beyond a focus on Africa which has attracted widespread criticism since it began in 2002.

The ICC has already opened investigations in Georgia, Bangladesh/Myanmar, and Afghanistan, with preliminary examinations in Colombia, Venezuela, Iraq/UK, Palestine, and The Philippines. But the Ukrainian case would further develop the European subtleties of the court’s jurisprudence.

Although the ICC is currently investigating the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, the active phase of that armed conflict lasted for just five days whereas Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine has been ongoing for the six years. The temporal difference in no way diminishes the suffering of victims and the necessity for the proper investigation, prosecution and compensation in the Georgian context.

And yet, going by even the preliminary findings of the ICC prosecutor, the spectrum of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated in Ukraine is much wider. Some incidents, such as the illegal construction of the Crimean Bridge, is an amalgam of the violations against property, cultural heritage and the environment. Cumulatively, the Ukrainian and Georgian cases would substantially contribute to the development of the court’s emerging European lenses.

The Russia-Ukraine armed conflict is also the first instance of armed hostilities of such magnitude and duration in Europe since World War II and the Yugoslav Wars. The ICC’s readiness to take on such geopolitically challenging cases which leave itself open to attack will be tested.

But by examining new contexts - including Ukraine - the ICC would develop a more layered reading of the nature and scope of the crimes it works on. For example, alleged indoctrination and use of children by armed groups in eastern Ukraine is likely to differ from the known practices of abducting and recruiting child soldiers in Africa.

Investigating evidence of Russia’s persecution of pro-Ukrainian activists - forcing them out of Crimea - coupled with the creation of favourable conditions for Russian citizens to relocate to Crimea could lead to proving the existence of a policy of mass colonisation of the peninsula - adding new layers to the court’s jurisprudence on population displacement. And previously under-prosecuted crimes may come to the fore, such as attacks on cultural property or causing the destruction of the environment.

Although the ICC proceedings on Ukraine – along with those being held by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) - are unlikely to bring immediate results, Ukraine has developed an international adjudication strategy based on the available viable options and what can be practically delivered.

The simple act of a reputed international court outlining Russia’s alleged violations in Crimea and Donbas and naming those individually responsible would be an impactful achievement in itself, regardless of whether Russia pays any attention or compensation.

And any international judgments or those of domestic courts such as the Dutch MH-17 proceedings and Russia’s response - predicted to be non-compliance - is an important argument for continuing sanctions against Russia over its conduct in Ukraine.

The mutually reinforcing effect of both the Crimea and Donbas proceedings within Ukraine and at international courts should not be underestimated. These investigations into war crimes, terrorism and human rights issues are deeply relevant - not only for the conflict itself, but also for the development of international law.

Part One of this series assesses Ukraine’s efforts to hold Russia accountable as a state at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).




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Victory and Memory: WW2 Narratives in Modern Day Russia and Ukraine

Invitation Only Research Event

11 May 2020 - 4:00pm to 5:30pm
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Nina Tumarkin, Kathryn Wasserman Davis Professor of Slavic Studies; Professor of History; Director, Russian Area Studies Program, Wellesley College
Georgiy Kasianov, Head, Department of Contemporary History and Politics, Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Chair: Robert Brinkley, Chairman, Steering Committee, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House
In 2020 the world commemorates the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II. The Russian government has organized a wide range of activities to mark the USSR’s victory, aiming to raise the already prominent role of the USSR to a new level. Moscow also uses its narrative about the war as a propaganda tool. Ukraine, which suffered disproportionally huge human losses and material destruction during WWII, is departing from its Soviet legacy by focusing commemorative efforts on honouring the victims of WWII rather than on glorifying victory. 
 
This event will analyze the evolution of the WWII narratives in Russia and Ukraine in recent years. The panellists will discuss the role of those narratives in shaping national discourses and their implications for the countries' respective futures.
 
This event will be held on the record.

Anna Morgan

Administrator, Ukraine Forum
+44 (0)20 7389 3274

Department/project




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Erratum: FTY720/fingolimod decreases hepatic steatosis and expression of fatty acid synthase in diet-induced nonalcoholic fatty liver disease in mice [Errata]




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Plasma membrane asymmetry of lipid organization: fluorescence lifetime microscopy and correlation spectroscopy analysis [Methods]

A fundamental feature of the eukaryotic cell membrane is the asymmetric arrangement of lipids in its two leaflets. A cell invests significant energy to maintain this asymmetry and uses it to regulate important biological processes, such as apoptosis and vesiculation. The dynamic coupling of the inner or cytoplasmic and outer or exofacial leaflets is a challenging open question in membrane biology. Here, we combined fluorescence lifetime imaging microscopy (FLIM) with imaging total internal reflection fluorescence correlation spectroscopy (ITIR-FCS) to differentiate the dynamics and organization of the two leaflets of live mammalian cells. We characterized the biophysical properties of fluorescent analogs of phosphatidylcholine, sphingomyelin, and phosphatidylserine in the plasma membrane of two mammalian cell lines (CHO-K1 and RBL-2H3). Because of their specific transverse membrane distribution, these probes allowed leaflet-specific investigation of the plasma membrane. We compared the results of the two methods having different temporal and spatial resolution. Fluorescence lifetimes of fluorescent lipid analogs were in ranges characteristic for the liquid ordered phase in the outer leaflet and for the liquid disordered phase in the inner leaflet. The observation of a more fluid inner leaflet was supported by free diffusion in the inner leaflet, with high average diffusion coefficients. The liquid ordered phase in the outer leaflet was accompanied by slower diffusion and diffusion with intermittent transient trapping. Our results show that the combination of FLIM and ITIR-FCS with specific fluorescent lipid analogs is a powerful tool for investigating lateral and transbilayer characteristics of plasma membrane in live cell lines.




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Functional recombinant apolipoprotein A5 that is stable at high concentrations at physiological pH [Methods]

APOA5 is a low-abundance exchangeable apolipoprotein that plays critical roles in human triglyceride (TG) metabolism. Indeed, aberrations in the plasma concentration or structure of APOA5 are linked to hypertriglyceridemia, hyperchylomicronemia, myocardial infarction risk, obesity, and coronary artery disease. While it has been successfully produced at low yield in bacteria, the resulting protein had limitations for structure-function studies due to its low solubility under physiological buffer conditions. We hypothesized that the yield and solubility of recombinant APOA5 could be increased by: i) engineering a fusion protein construct in a codon optimized expression vector, ii) optimizing an efficient refolding protocol, and iii) screening buffer systems at physiological pH. The result was a high-yield (25 mg/l) bacterial expression system that produces lipid-free APOA5 soluble at concentrations of up to 10 mg/ml at a pH of 7.8 in bicarbonate buffers. Physical characterization of lipid-free APOA5 indicated that it exists as an array of multimers in solution, and far UV circular dichroism analyses show differences in total α-helicity between acidic and neutral pH buffering conditions. The protein was functional in that it bound and emulsified multilamellar dimyristoyl-phosphatidylcholine vesicles and could inhibit postprandial plasma TG accumulation when injected into C57BL/6J mice orally gavaged with Intralipid.




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Metallopeptidase Stp1 activates the transcription factor Sre1 in the carotenogenic yeast Xanthophyllomyces dendrorhous [Research Articles]

Xanthophyllomyces dendrorhous is a basidiomycete yeast known as a natural producer of astaxanthin, a carotenoid of commercial interest because of its antioxidant properties. Recent studies indicated that X. dendrorhous has a functional SREBP pathway involved in the regulation of isoprenoid compound biosynthesis, which includes ergosterol and carotenoids. SREBP is a major regulator of sterol metabolism and homeostasis in mammals; characterization in fungi also provides information about its role in the hypoxia adaptation response and virulence. SREBP protease processing is required to activate SREBP pathway functions in fungi. Here, we identified and described the STP1 gene, which encodes a metallopeptidase of the M50 family involved in the proteolytic activation of the transcription factor Sre1 of the SREBP pathway, in X. dendrorhous. We assessed STP1 function in stp1 strains derived from the wild-type and a mutant of ergosterol biosynthesis that overproduces carotenoids and sterols. Bioinformatic analysis of the deduced protein predicted the presence of characteristic features identified in homologs from mammals and fungi. The stp1 mutation decreased yeast growth in the presence of azole drugs and reduced transcript levels of Sre1-dependent genes. This mutation also negatively affected the carotenoid- and sterol-overproducing phenotype. Western blot analysis demonstrated that Sre1 was activated in the yeast ergosterol biosynthesis mutant and that the stp1 mutation introduced in this strain prevented Sre1 proteolytic activation. Overall, our results demonstrate that STP1 encodes a metallopeptidase involved in proteolytic activation of Sre1 in X. dendrorhous, contributing to our understanding of fungal SREBP pathways.




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Effects of omega-O-acylceramide structures and concentrations in healthy and diseased skin barrier lipid membrane models [Research Articles]

Ceramides (Cers) with ultralong (~32-carbon) chains and -esterified linoleic acid, composing a subclass called omega-O-acylceramides (acylCers), are indispensable components of the skin barrier. Normal barriers typically contain acylCer concentrations of ~10 mol%; diminished concentrations, along with altered or missing long periodicity lamellar phase (LPP), and increased permeability accompany an array of skin disorders, including atopic dermatitis, psoriasis, and ichthyoses. We developed model membranes to investigate the effects of the acylCer structure and concentration on skin lipid organization and permeability. The model membrane systems contained six to nine Cer subclasses as well as fatty acids, cholesterol, and cholesterol sulfate; acylCer content—namely, acylCers containing sphingosine (Cer EOS), dihydrosphingosine (Cer EOdS), and phytosphingosine (Cer EOP) ranged from zero to 30 mol%. Systems with normal physiologic concentrations of acylCer mixture mimicked the permeability and nanostructure of human skin lipids (with regard to LPP, chain order, and lateral packing). The models also showed that the sphingoid base in acylCer significantly affects the membrane architecture and permeability and that Cer EOP, notably, is a weaker barrier component than Cer EOS and Cer EOdS. Membranes with diminished or missing acylCers displayed some of the hallmarks of diseased skin lipid barriers (i.e., lack of LPP, less ordered lipids, less orthorhombic chain packing, and increased permeability). These results could inform the rational design of new and improved strategies for the barrier-targeted treatment of skin diseases.




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Endocytosis of very low-density lipoproteins: an unexpected mechanism for lipid acquisition by breast cancer cells [Research Articles]

We previously described the expression of CD36 and LPL by breast cancer (BC) cells and tissues and the growth-promoting effect of VLDL observed only in the presence of LPL. We now report a model in which LPL is bound to a heparan sulfate proteoglycan motif on the BC cell surface and acts in concert with the VLDL receptor to internalize VLDLs via receptor-mediated endocytosis. We also demonstrate that gene-expression programs for lipid synthesis versus uptake respond robustly to triglyceride-rich lipoprotein availability. The literature emphasizes de novo FA synthesis and exogenous free FA uptake using CD36 as paramount mechanisms for lipid acquisition by cancer cells. We find that the uptake of intact lipoproteins is also an important mechanism for lipid acquisition and that the relative reliance on lipid synthesis versus uptake varies among BC cell lines and in response to VLDL availability. This metabolic plasticity has important implications for the development of therapies aimed at the lipid dependence of many types of cancer, in that the inhibition of FA synthesis may elicit compensatory upregulation of lipid uptake. Moreover, the mechanism that we have elucidated provides a direct connection between dietary fat and tumor biology.­.




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A nematode sterol C4{alpha}-methyltransferase catalyzes a new methylation reaction responsible for sterol diversity [Research Articles]

Primitive sterol evolution plays an important role in fossil record interpretation and offers potential therapeutic avenues for human disease resulting from nematode infections. Recognizing that C4-methyl stenol products [8(14)-lophenol] can be synthesized in bacteria while C4-methyl stanol products (dinosterol) can be synthesized in dinoflagellates and preserved as sterane biomarkers in ancient sedimentary rock is key to eukaryotic sterol evolution. In this regard, nematodes have been proposed to convert dietary cholesterol to 8(14)-lophenol by a secondary metabolism pathway that could involve sterol C4 methylation analogous to the C2 methylation of hopanoids (radicle-type mechanism) or C24 methylation of sterols (carbocation-type mechanism). Here, we characterized dichotomous cholesterol metabolic pathways in Caenorhabditis elegans that generate 3-oxo sterol intermediates in separate paths to lophanol (4-methyl stanol) and 8(14)-lophenol (4-methyl stenol). We uncovered alternate C3-sterol oxidation and 7 desaturation steps that regulate sterol flux from which branching metabolite networks arise, while lophanol/8(14)-lophenol formation is shown to be dependent on a sterol C4α-methyltransferse (4-SMT) that requires 3-oxo sterol substrates and catalyzes a newly discovered 3-keto-enol tautomerism mechanism linked to S-adenosyl-l-methionine-dependent methylation. Alignment-specific substrate-binding domains similarly conserved in 4-SMT and 24-SMT enzymes, despite minimal amino acid sequence identity, suggests divergence from a common, primordial ancestor in the evolution of methyl sterols. The combination of these results provides evolutionary leads to sterol diversity and points to cryptic C4-methyl steroidogenic pathways of targeted convergence that mediate lineage-specific adaptations.­­




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Lipid droplet-associated kinase STK25 regulates peroxisomal activity and metabolic stress response in steatotic liver [Research Articles]

Nonalcoholic fatty liver disease (NAFLD) and nonalcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) are emerging as leading causes of liver disease worldwide and have been recognized as one of the major unmet medical needs of the 21st century. Our recent translational studies in mouse models, human cell lines, and well-characterized patient cohorts have identified serine/threonine kinase (STK)25 as a protein that coats intrahepatocellular lipid droplets (LDs) and critically regulates liver lipid homeostasis and progression of NAFLD/NASH. Here, we studied the mechanism-of-action of STK25 in steatotic liver by relative quantification of the hepatic LD-associated phosphoproteome from high-fat diet-fed Stk25 knockout mice compared with their wild-type littermates. We observed a total of 131 proteins and 60 phosphoproteins that were differentially represented in STK25-deficient livers. Most notably, a number of proteins involved in peroxisomal function, ubiquitination-mediated proteolysis, and antioxidant defense were coordinately regulated in Stk25–/– versus wild-type livers. We confirmed attenuated peroxisomal biogenesis and protection against oxidative and ER stress in STK25-deficient human liver cells, demonstrating the hepatocyte-autonomous manner of STK25’s action. In summary, our results suggest that regulation of peroxisomal function and metabolic stress response may be important molecular mechanisms by which STK25 controls the development and progression of NAFLD/NASH.




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Quantification of bile acids: a mass spectrometry platform for studying gut microbe connection to metabolic diseases [Research Articles]

Bile acids (BAs) serve multiple biological functions, ranging from the absorption of lipids and fat-soluble vitamins to serving as signaling molecules through the direct activation of dedicated cellular receptors. Synthesized by both host and microbial pathways, BAs are increasingly understood as participating in the regulation of numerous pathways relevant to metabolic diseases, including lipid and glucose metabolism, energy expenditure, and inflammation. Quantitative analyses of BAs in biological matrices can be problematic due to their unusual and diverse physicochemical properties, making optimization of a method that shows good accuracy, precision, efficiency of extraction, and minimized matrix effects across structurally distinct human and murine BAs challenging. Herein we develop and clinically validate a stable-isotope-dilution LC/MS/MS method for the quantitative analysis of numerous primary and secondary BAs in both human and mouse biological matrices. We also utilize this tool to investigate gut microbiota participation in the generation of structurally specific BAs in both humans and mice. We examine circulating levels of specific BAs and in a clinical case-control study of age- and gender-matched type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) versus nondiabetics. BAs whose circulating levels are associated with T2DM include numerous 12α-hydroxyl BAs (taurocholic acid, taurodeoxycholic acid, glycodeoxycholic acid, deoxycholic acid, and 3-ketodeoxycholic acid), while taurohyodeoxycholic acid was negatively associated with diabetes. The LC/MS/MS-based platform described should serve as a robust, high-throughput investigative tool for studying the potential involvement of structurally specific BAs and the gut microbiome on both physiological and disease processes.




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Macrophage polarization is linked to Ca2+-independent phospholipase A2{beta}-derived lipids and cross-cell signaling in mice [Research Articles]

Phospholipases A2 (PLA2s) catalyze hydrolysis of the sn-2 substituent from glycerophospholipids to yield a free fatty acid (i.e., arachidonic acid), which can be metabolized to pro- or anti-inflammatory eicosanoids. Macrophages modulate inflammatory responses and are affected by Ca2+-independent phospholipase A2 (PLA2)β (iPLA2β). Here, we assessed the link between iPLA2β-derived lipids (iDLs) and macrophage polarization. Macrophages from WT and KO (iPLA2β–/–) mice were classically M1 pro-inflammatory phenotype activated or alternatively M2 anti-inflammatory phenotype activated, and eicosanoid production was determined by ultra-performance LC ESI-MS/MS. As a genotypic control, we performed similar analyses on macrophages from RIP.iPLA2β.Tg mice with selective iPLA2β overexpression in β-cells. Compared with WT, generation of select pro-inflammatory prostaglandins (PGs) was lower in iPLA2β–/–, and that of a specialized pro-resolving lipid mediator (SPM), resolvin D2, was higher; both changes are consistent with the M2 phenotype. Conversely, macrophages from RIP.iPLA2β.Tg mice exhibited an opposite landscape, one associated with the M1 phenotype: namely, increased production of pro-inflammatory eicosanoids (6-keto PGF1α, PGE2, leukotriene B4) and decreased ability to generate resolvin D2. These changes were not linked with secretory PLA2 or cytosolic PLA2α or with leakage of the transgene. Thus, we report previously unidentified links between select iPLA2β-derived eicosanoids, an SPM, and macrophage polarization. Importantly, our findings reveal for the first time that β-cell iPLA2β-derived signaling can predispose macrophage responses. These findings suggest that iDLs play critical roles in macrophage polarization, and we posit that they could be targeted therapeutically to counter inflammation-based disorders.




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Novel GPR120 agonist TUG891 modulates fat taste perception and preference and activates tongue-brain-gut axis in mice [Research Articles]

GPR120 is implicated as a lipid receptor in the oro-sensory detection of dietary fatty acids. However, the effects of GPR120 activation on dietary fat intake or obesity are not clearly understood. We investigated to determine whether the binding of TUG891, a novel GPR120 agonist, to lingual GPR120 modulates fat preference in mice. We explored the effects of TUG891 on obesity-related hormones and conducted behavioral choice tests on mice to better understand the physiologic relevance of the action of TUG891. In cultured mouse and human taste bud cells (TBCs), TUG891 induced a rapid increase in Ca2+ by acting on GPR120. A long-chain dietary fatty acid, linoleic acid (LA), also recruited Ca2+ via GPR120 in human and mouse TBCs. Both TUG891 and LA induced ERK1/2 phosphorylation and enhanced in vitro release of glucagon-like peptide-1 from cultured human and mouse TBCs. In situ application of TUG891 onto the tongue of anesthetized mice triggered the secretion of pancreatobiliary juice, probably via the tongue-brain-gut axis. Furthermore, lingual application of TUG891 altered circulating concentrations of cholecystokinin and adipokines, associated with decreased circulating LDL, in conscious mice. In behavioral tests, mice exhibited a spontaneous preference for solutions containing either TUG891 or LA instead of a control. However, addition of TUG891 to a solution containing LA significantly curtailed fatty acid preference. Our study demonstrates that TUG891 binds to lingual GPR120 receptors, activates the tongue-brain-gut axis, and modulates fat preference. These findings may support the development of new fat taste analogs that can change the approach to obesity prevention and treatment.




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Separation of postprandial lipoproteins: improved purification of chylomicrons using an ApoB100 immunoaffinity method [Methods]

Elevated levels of triglyceride-rich lipoproteins (TRLs), both fasting and postprandial, are associated with increased risk for atherosclerosis. However, guidelines for treatment are defined solely by fasting lipid levels, even though postprandial lipids may be more informative. In the postprandial state, circulating lipids consist of dietary fat transported from the intestine in chylomicrons (CMs; containing ApoB48) and fat transported from the liver in VLDL (containing ApoB100). Research into the roles of endogenous versus dietary fat has been hindered because of the difficulty in separating these particles by ultracentrifugation. CM fractions have considerable contamination from VLDL (purity, 10%). To separate CMs from VLDL, we produced polyclonal antibodies against ApoB100 and generated immunoaffinity columns. TRLs isolated by ultracentrifugation of plasma were applied to these columns, and highly purified CMs were collected (purity, 90–94%). Overall eight healthy unmedicated adult volunteers (BMI, 27.2 ± 1.4 kg/m2; fasting triacylglycerol, 102.6 ± 19.5 mg/dl) participated in a feeding study, which contained an oral stable-isotope tracer (1-13C acetate). We then used this technique on plasma samples freshly collected during an 8 h human feeding study from a subset of four subjects. We analyzed fractionated lipoproteins by Western blot, isolated and derivatized triacylglycerols, and calculated fractional de novo lipogenesis. The results demonstrated effective separation of postprandial lipoproteins and substantially improved purity compared with ultracentrifugation protocols, using the immunoaffinity method. This method can be used to better delineate the role of dietary sugar and fat on postprandial lipids in cardiovascular risk and explore the potential role of CM remnants in atherosclerosis.




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High density lipoprotein and its apolipoprotein-defined subspecies and risk of dementia [Patient-Oriented and Epidemiological Research]

Whether HDL is associated with dementia risk is unclear. In addition to apoA1, other apolipoproteins are found in HDL, creating subspecies of HDL that may have distinct metabolic properties. We measured apoA1, apoC3, and apoJ levels in plasma and apoA1 levels in HDL that contains or lacks apoE, apoJ, or apoC3 using a modified sandwich ELISA in a case-cohort study nested within the Ginkgo Evaluation of Memory Study. We included 995 randomly selected participants and 521 participants who developed dementia during a mean of 5.1 years of follow-up. The level of total apoA1 was not significantly related to dementia risk, regardless of the coexistence of apoC3, apoJ, or apoE. Higher levels of total plasma apoC3 were associated with better cognitive function at baseline (difference in Modified Mini-Mental State Examination scores tertile 3 vs. tertile 1: 0.60; 95% CI: 0.23, 0.98) and a lower dementia risk (adjusted hazard ratio tertile 3 vs. tertile 1: 0.73; 95% CI: 0.55, 0.96). Plasma concentrations of apoA1 in HDL and its apolipoprotein-defined subspecies were not associated with cognitive function at baseline or with the risk of dementia during follow-up. Similar studies in other populations are required to better understand the association between apoC3 and Alzheimer’s disease pathology.




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Nonsynonymous SNPs in LPA homologous to plasminogen deficiency mutants represent novel null apo(a) alleles [Patient-Oriented and Epidemiological Research]

Plasma lipoprotein (a) [Lp(a)] levels are largely determined by variation in the LPA gene, which codes for apo(a). Genome-wide association studies (GWASs) have identified nonsynonymous variants in LPA that associate with low Lp(a) levels, although their effect on apo(a) function is unknown. We investigated two such variants, R990Q and R1771C, which were present in four null Lp(a) individuals, for structural and functional effects. Sequence alignments showed the R990 and R1771 residues to be highly conserved and homologous to each other and to residues associated with plasminogen deficiency. Structural modeling showed both residues to make several polar contacts with neighboring residues that would be ablated on substitution. Recombinant expression of the WT and R1771C apo(a) in liver and kidney cells showed an abundance of an immature form for both apo(a) proteins. A mature form of apo(a) was only seen with the WT protein. Imaging of the recombinant apo(a) proteins in conjunction with markers of the secretory pathway indicated a poor transit of R1771C into the Golgi. Furthermore, the R1771C mutant displayed a glycosylation pattern consistent with ER, but not Golgi, glycosylation. We conclude that R1771 and the equivalent R990 residue facilitate correct folding of the apo(a) kringle structure and mutations at these positions prevent the proper folding required for full maturation and secretion. To our knowledge, this is the first example of nonsynonymous variants in LPA being causative of a null Lp(a) phenotype.




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Exon 9-deleted CETP inhibits full length-CETP synthesis and promotes cellular triglyceride storage [Research Articles]

Cholesteryl ester transfer protein (CETP) exists as full-length (FL) and exon 9 (E9)-deleted isoforms. The function of E9-deleted CETP is poorly understood. Here, we investigated the role of E9-deleted CETP in regulating the secretion of FL-CETP by cells and explored its possible role in intracellular lipid metabolism. CETP overexpression in cells that naturally express CETP confirmed that E9-deleted CETP is not secreted, and showed that cellular FL- and E9-deleted CETP form an isolatable complex. Coexpression of CETP isoforms lowered cellular levels of both proteins and impaired FL-CETP secretion. These effects were due to reduced synthesis of both isoforms; however, the predominate consequence of FL- and E9-deleted CETP coexpression is impaired FL-CETP synthesis. We reported previously that reducing both CETP isoforms or overexpressing FL-CETP impairs cellular triglyceride (TG) storage. To investigate this further, E9-deleted CETP was expressed in SW872 cells that naturally synthesize CETP and in mouse 3T3-L1 cells that do not. E9-deleted CETP overexpression stimulated SW872 triglyceride synthesis and increased stored TG 2-fold. Expression of E9-deleted CETP in mouse 3T3-L1 cells produced a similar lipid phenotype. In vitro, FL-CETP promotes the transfer of TG from ER-enriched membranes to lipid droplets. E9-deleted CETP also promoted this transfer, although less effectively, and it inhibited the transfer driven by FL-CETP. We conclude that FL- and E9-deleted CETP isoforms interact to mutually decrease their intracellular levels and impair FL-CETP secretion by reducing CETP biosynthesis. E9-deleted CETP, like FL-CETP, alters cellular TG metabolism and storage but in a contrary manner.




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Deficiency in ZMPSTE24 and resulting farnesyl-prelamin A accumulation only modestly affect mouse adipose tissue stores [Research Articles]

Zinc metallopeptidase STE24 (ZMPSTE24) is essential for the conversion of farnesyl–prelamin A to mature lamin A, a key component of the nuclear lamina. In the absence of ZMPSTE24, farnesyl–prelamin A accumulates in the nucleus and exerts toxicity, causing a variety of disease phenotypes. By ~4 months of age, both male and female Zmpste24–/– mice manifest a near-complete loss of adipose tissue, but it has never been clear whether this phenotype is a direct consequence of farnesyl–prelamin A toxicity in adipocytes. To address this question, we generated a conditional knockout Zmpste24 allele and used it to create adipocyte-specific Zmpste24–knockout mice. To boost farnesyl–prelamin A levels, we bred in the "prelamin A–only" Lmna allele. Gene expression, immunoblotting, and immunohistochemistry experiments revealed that adipose tissue in these mice had decreased Zmpste24 expression along with strikingly increased accumulation of prelamin A. In male mice, Zmpste24 deficiency in adipocytes was accompanied by modest changes in adipose stores (an 11% decrease in body weight, a 23% decrease in body fat mass, and significantly smaller gonadal and inguinal white adipose depots). No changes in adipose stores were detected in female mice, likely because prelamin A expression in adipose tissue is lower in female mice. Zmpste24 deficiency in adipocytes did not alter the number of macrophages in adipose tissue, nor did it alter plasma levels of glucose, triglycerides, or fatty acids. We conclude that ZMPSTE24 deficiency in adipocytes, and the accompanying accumulation of farnesyl–prelamin A, reduces adipose tissue stores, but only modestly and only in male mice.




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Monitoring the itinerary of lysosomal cholesterol in Niemann-Pick Type C1-deficient cells after cyclodextrin treatment [Research Articles]

Niemann-Pick disease type C (NPC) disease is a lipid-storage disorder that is caused by mutations in the genes encoding NPC proteins and results in lysosomal cholesterol accumulation. 2-Hydroxypropyl-β-cyclodextrin (CD) has been shown to reduce lysosomal cholesterol levels and enhance sterol homeostatic responses, but CD’s mechanism of action remains unknown. Recent work provides evidence that CD stimulates lysosomal exocytosis, raising the possibility that lysosomal cholesterol is released in exosomes. However, therapeutic concentrations of CD do not alter total cellular cholesterol, and cholesterol homeostatic responses at the ER are most consistent with increased ER membrane cholesterol. To address these disparate findings, here we used stable isotope labeling to track the movement of lipoprotein cholesterol cargo in response to CD in NPC1-deficient U2OS cells. Although released cholesterol was detectable, it was not associated with extracellular vesicles. Rather, we demonstrate that lysosomal cholesterol trafficks to the plasma membrane (PM), where it exchanges with lipoprotein-bound cholesterol in a CD-dependent manner. We found that in the absence of suitable extracellular cholesterol acceptors, cholesterol exchange is abrogated, cholesterol accumulates in the PM, and reesterification at the ER is increased. These results support a model in which CD promotes intracellular redistribution of lysosomal cholesterol, but not cholesterol exocytosis or efflux, during the restoration of cholesterol homeostatic responses.




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The citrus flavonoid nobiletin confers protection from metabolic dysregulation in high-fat-fed mice independent of AMPK [Research Articles]

Obesity, dyslipidemia, and insulin resistance, the increasingly common metabolic syndrome, are risk factors for CVD and type 2 diabetes that warrant novel therapeutic interventions. The flavonoid nobiletin displays potent lipid-lowering and insulin-sensitizing properties in mice with metabolic dysfunction. However, the mechanisms by which nobiletin mediates metabolic protection are not clearly established. The central role of AMP-activated protein kinase (AMPK) as an energy sensor suggests that AMPK is a target of nobiletin. We tested the hypothesis that metabolic protection by nobiletin required phosphorylation of AMPK and acetyl-CoA carboxylase (ACC) in mouse hepatocytes, in mice deficient in hepatic AMPK (Ampkβ1–/–), in mice incapable of inhibitory phosphorylation of ACC (AccDKI), and in mice with adipocyte-specific AMPK deficiency (iβ1β2AKO). We fed mice a high-fat/high-cholesterol diet with or without nobiletin. Nobiletin increased phosphorylation of AMPK and ACC in primary mouse hepatocytes, which was associated with increased FA oxidation and attenuated FA synthesis. Despite loss of ACC phosphorylation in Ampkβ1–/– hepatocytes, nobiletin suppressed FA synthesis and enhanced FA oxidation. Acute injection of nobiletin into mice did not increase phosphorylation of either AMPK or ACC in liver. In mice fed a high-fat diet, nobiletin robustly prevented obesity, hepatic steatosis, dyslipidemia, and insulin resistance, and it improved energy expenditure in Ampkβ1–/–, AccDKI, and iβ1β2AKO mice to the same extent as in WT controls. Thus, the beneficial metabolic effects of nobiletin in vivo are conferred independently of hepatic or adipocyte AMPK activation. These studies further underscore the therapeutic potential of nobiletin and begin to clarify possible mechanisms.




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Role of angiopoietin-like protein 3 in sugar-induced dyslipidemia in rhesus macaques: suppression by fish oil or RNAi [Research Articles]

Angiopoietin-like protein 3 (ANGPTL3) inhibits lipid clearance and is a promising target for managing cardiovascular disease. Here we investigated the effects of a high-sugar (high-fructose) diet on circulating ANGPTL3 concentrations in rhesus macaques. Plasma ANGPTL3 concentrations increased ~30% to 40% after 1 and 3 months of a high-fructose diet (both P < 0.001 vs. baseline). During fructose-induced metabolic dysregulation, plasma ANGPTL3 concentrations were positively correlated with circulating indices of insulin resistance [assessed with fasting insulin and the homeostatic model assessment of insulin resistance (HOMA-IR)], hypertriglyceridemia, adiposity (assessed as leptin), and systemic inflammation [C-reactive peptide (CRP)] and negatively correlated with plasma levels of the insulin-sensitizing hormone adropin. Multiple regression analyses identified a strong association between circulating APOC3 and ANGPTL3 concentrations. Higher baseline plasma levels of both ANGPTL3 and APOC3 were associated with an increased risk for fructose-induced insulin resistance. Fish oil previously shown to prevent insulin resistance and hypertriglyceridemia in this model prevented increases of ANGPTL3 without affecting systemic inflammation (increased plasma CRP and interleukin-6 concentrations). ANGPTL3 RNAi lowered plasma concentrations of ANGPTL3, triglycerides (TGs), VLDL-C, APOC3, and APOE. These decreases were consistent with a reduced risk of atherosclerosis. In summary, dietary sugar-induced increases of circulating ANGPTL3 concentrations after metabolic dysregulation correlated positively with leptin levels, HOMA-IR, and dyslipidemia. Targeting ANGPTL3 expression with RNAi inhibited dyslipidemia by lowering plasma TGs, VLDL-C, APOC3, and APOE levels in rhesus macaques.




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Alirocumab, evinacumab, and atorvastatin triple therapy regresses plaque lesions and improves lesion composition in mice [Research Articles]

Atherosclerosis-related CVD causes nearly 20 million deaths annually. Most patients are treated after plaques develop, so therapies must regress existing lesions. Current therapies reduce plaque volume, but targeting all apoB-containing lipoproteins with intensive combinations that include alirocumab or evinacumab, monoclonal antibodies against cholesterol-regulating proprotein convertase subtilisin/kexin type 9 and angiopoietin-like protein 3, may provide more benefit. We investigated the effect of such lipid-lowering interventions on atherosclerosis in APOE*3-Leiden.CETP mice, a well-established model for hyperlipidemia. Mice were fed a Western-type diet for 13 weeks and thereafter matched into a baseline group (euthanized at 13 weeks) and five groups that received diet alone (control) or with treatment [atorvastatin; atorvastatin and alirocumab; atorvastatin and evinacumab; or atorvastatin, alirocumab, and evinacumab (triple therapy)] for 25 weeks. We measured effects on cholesterol levels, plaque composition and morphology, monocyte adherence, and macrophage proliferation. All interventions reduced plasma total cholesterol (37% with atorvastatin to 80% with triple treatment; all P < 0.001). Triple treatment decreased non-HDL-C to 1.0 mmol/l (91% difference from control; P < 0.001). Atorvastatin reduced atherosclerosis progression by 28% versus control (P < 0.001); double treatment completely blocked progression and diminished lesion severity. Triple treatment regressed lesion size versus baseline in the thoracic aorta by 50% and the aortic root by 36% (both P < 0.05 vs. baseline), decreased macrophage accumulation through reduced proliferation, and abated lesion severity. Thus, high-intensive cholesterol-lowering triple treatment targeting all apoB-containing lipoproteins regresses atherosclerotic lesion area and improves lesion composition in mice, making it a promising potential approach for treating atherosclerosis.




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Role of pyruvate kinase M2 in oxidized LDL-induced macrophage foam cell formation and inflammation [Research Articles]

Pyruvate kinase M2 (PKM2) links metabolic and inflammatory dysfunction in atherosclerotic coronary artery disease; however, its role in oxidized LDL (Ox-LDL)-induced macrophage foam cell formation and inflammation is unknown and therefore was studied. In recombinant mouse granulocyte-macrophage colony-stimulating factor-differentiated murine bone marrow-derived macrophages, early (1–6 h) Ox-LDL treatment induced PKM2 tyrosine 105 phosphorylation and promotes its nuclear localization. PKM2 regulates aerobic glycolysis and inflammation because PKM2 shRNA or Shikonin abrogated Ox-LDL-induced hypoxia-inducible factor-1α target genes lactate dehydrogenase, glucose transporter member 1, interleukin 1β (IL-1β) mRNA expression, lactate, and secretory IL-1β production. PKM2 inhibition significantly increased Ox-LDL-induced ABCA1 and ABCG1 protein expression and NBD-cholesterol efflux to apoA1 and HDL. PKM2 shRNA significantly inhibited Ox-LDL-induced CD36, FASN protein expression, DiI-Ox-LDL binding and uptake, and cellular total cholesterol, free cholesterol, and cholesteryl ester content. Therefore, PKM2 regulates lipid uptake and efflux. DASA-58, a PKM2 activator, downregulated LXR-α, ABCA1, and ABCG1, and augmented FASN and CD36 protein expression. Peritoneal macrophages showed similar results. Ox-LDL induced PKM2- SREBP-1 interaction and FASN expression in a PKM2-dependent manner. Therefore, this study suggests a role for PKM2 in Ox-LDL-induced aerobic glycolysis, inflammation, and macrophage foam cell formation.




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Hepatic PLIN5 signals via SIRT1 to promote autophagy and prevent inflammation during fasting [Research Articles]

Lipid droplets (LDs) are energy-storage organelles that are coated with hundreds of proteins, including members of the perilipin (PLIN) family. PLIN5 is highly expressed in oxidative tissues, including the liver, and is thought to play a key role in uncoupling LD accumulation from lipotoxicity; however, the mechanisms behind this action are incompletely defined. We investigated the role of hepatic PLIN5 in inflammation and lipotoxicity in a murine model under both fasting and refeeding conditions and in hepatocyte cultures. PLIN5 ablation with antisense oligonucleotides triggered a pro-inflammatory response in livers from mice only under fasting conditions. Similarly, PLIN5 mitigated lipopolysaccharide- or palmitic acid-induced inflammatory responses in hepatocytes. During fasting, PLIN5 was also required for the induction of autophagy, which contributed to its anti-inflammatory effects. The ability of PLIN5 to promote autophagy and prevent inflammation were dependent upon signaling through sirtuin 1 (SIRT1), which is known to be activated in response to nuclear PLIN5 under fasting conditions. Taken together, these data show that PLIN5 signals via SIRT1 to promote autophagy and prevent FA-induced inflammation as a means to maintain hepatocyte homeostasis during periods of fasting and FA mobilization.




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Serum amyloid A is not incorporated into HDL during HDL biogenesis [Research Articles]

Liver-derived serum amyloid A (SAA) is present in plasma where it is mainly associated with HDL and from which it is cleared more rapidly than are the other major HDL-associated apolipoproteins. Although evidence suggests that lipid-free and HDL-associated forms of SAA have different activities, the pathways by which SAA associates and disassociates with HDL are poorly understood. In this study, we investigated SAA lipidation by hepatocytes and how this lipidation relates to the formation of nascent HDL particles. We also examined hepatocyte-mediated clearance of lipid-free and HDL-associated SAA. We prepared hepatocytes from mice injected with lipopolysaccharide or an SAA-expressing adenoviral vector. Alternatively, we incubated primary hepatocytes from SAA-deficient mice with purified SAA. We analyzed conditioned media to determine the lipidation status of endogenously produced and exogenously added SAA. Examining the migration of lipidated species, we found that SAA is lipidated and forms nascent particles that are distinct from apoA-I-containing particles and that apoA-I lipidation is unaltered when SAA is overexpressed or added to the cells, indicating that SAA is not incorporated into apoA-I-containing HDL during HDL biogenesis. Like apoA-I formation, generation of SAA-containing particles was dependent on ABCA1, but not on scavenger receptor class B type I. Hepatocytes degraded significantly more SAA than apoA-I. Taken together, our results indicate that SAA’s lipidation and metabolism by the liver is independent of apoA-I and that SAA is not incorporated into HDL during HDL biogenesis.




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Model systems for studying the assembly, trafficking, and secretion of apoB lipoproteins using fluorescent fusion proteins [Research Articles]

apoB exists as apoB100 and apoB48, which are mainly found in hepatic VLDLs and intestinal chylomicrons, respectively. Elevated plasma levels of apoB-containing lipoproteins (Blps) contribute to coronary artery disease, diabetes, and other cardiometabolic conditions. Studying the mechanisms that drive the assembly, intracellular trafficking, secretion, and function of Blps remains challenging. Our understanding of the intracellular and intraorganism trafficking of Blps can be greatly enhanced, however, with the availability of fusion proteins that can help visualize Blp transport within cells and between tissues. We designed three plasmids expressing human apoB fluorescent fusion proteins: apoB48-GFP, apoB100-GFP, and apoB48-mCherry. In Cos-7 cells, transiently expressed fluorescent apoB proteins colocalized with calnexin and were only secreted if cells were cotransfected with microsomal triglyceride transfer protein. The secreted apoB-fusion proteins retained the fluorescent protein and were secreted as lipoproteins with flotation densities similar to plasma HDL and LDL. In a rat hepatoma McA-RH7777 cell line, the human apoB100 fusion protein was secreted as VLDL- and LDL-sized particles, and the apoB48 fusion proteins were secreted as LDL- and HDL-sized particles. To monitor lipoprotein trafficking in vivo, the apoB48-mCherry construct was transiently expressed in zebrafish larvae and was detected throughout the liver. These experiments show that the addition of fluorescent proteins to the C terminus of apoB does not disrupt their assembly, localization, secretion, or endocytosis. The availability of fluorescently labeled apoB proteins will facilitate the exploration of the assembly, degradation, and transport of Blps and help to identify novel compounds that interfere with these processes via high-throughput screening.




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Composition-function analysis of HDL subpopulations: influence of lipid composition on particle functionality [Research Articles]

The composition-function relationship of HDL particles and its effects on the mechanisms driving coronary heart disease (CHD) is poorly understood. We tested the hypothesis that the functionality of HDL particles is significantly influenced by their lipid composition. Using a novel 3D-separation method, we isolated five different-sized HDL subpopulations from CHD patients who had low preβ-1 functionality (low-F) (ABCA1-dependent cholesterol-efflux normalized for preβ-1 concentration) and controls who had either low-F or high preβ-1 functionality (high-F). Molecular numbers of apoA-I, apoA-II, and eight major lipid classes were determined in each subpopulation by LC-MS. The average number of lipid molecules decreased from 422 in the large spherical α-1 particles to 57 in the small discoid preβ-1 particles. With decreasing particle size, the relative concentration of free cholesterol (FC) decreased in α-mobility but not in preβ-1 particles. Preβ-1 particles contained more lipids than predicted; 30% of which were neutral lipids (cholesteryl ester and triglyceride), indicating that these particles were mainly remodeled from larger particles not newly synthesized. There were significant correlations between HDL-particle functionality and the concentrations of several lipids. Unexpectedly, the phospholipid:FC ratio was significantly correlated with large-HDL-particle functionality but not with preβ-1 functionality. There was significant positive correlation between particle functionality and total lipids in high-F controls, indicating that the lipid-binding capacity of apoA-I plays a major role in the cholesterol efflux capacity of HDL particles. Functionality and lipid composition of HDL particles are significantly correlated and probably both are influenced by the lipid-binding capacity of apoA-I.