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Up in smoke? Global tobacco advocacy and local mobilization in Africa

4 September 2019 , Volume 95, Number 5

Amy S. Patterson and Elizabeth Gill

Even though most African states have signed and ratified the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), a global treaty to limit tobacco use, African states have been slow to pass and implement tobacco control policies like regulations on sales, smoke-free environments and taxes. This article examines how the ineffectiveness of local tobacco-control advocacy contributes to this suboptimal outcome. It asserts that the disconnect between the global tobacco-control advocacy network and local advocates shapes this ineffectiveness. With funding and direction predominately from the Bloomberg Initiative, local advocates emulate the funders' goal of achieving quick, measurable policy results. Their reliance on the network drives African advocates to strive to pass legislation, even in difficult political climates, and to remake their agendas when funders change their priorities. They also emulate the network's focus on evidence-based arguments that stress epidemiological data and biomedical interventions, even when this issue frame does not resonate with policy-makers. Financial dependence can draw local advocates into expectations about patronage politics, undermine their ability to make principled arguments, and lead them to downplay the ways that their home country's socioeconomic and cultural contexts affect tobacco use and control. Based on key informant interviews with African advocates, media analysis and the case-studies of Ghana and Tanzania, the article broadens the study of philanthropy in global health, it adds an African perspective to the literature on global health advocacy, and it deepens knowledge on power dynamics between external funders and local actors in the realms of health and development.




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Tackling Toxic Air Pollution in Cities

Members Event

27 November 2019 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Camilla Hodgson, Environment Reporter, Financial Times

Dr Benjamin Barratt, Senior Lecturer in Chinese Environment, KCL

Dr Susannah Stanway MBChB MSc FRCP MD, Consultant in Medical Oncology Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust

Elliot Treharne, Head of Air Quality, Greater London Authority

Chair: Rob Yates, Head, Centre on Global Health Security, Chatham House

Air pollution has been classified as a cancer-causing agent with evidence showing an increased risk of lung cancer associated with increasing levels of exposure to outdoor air pollution and particulate matter.

Air pollution is also known to increase risks for other diseases, especially respiratory and heart diseases, and studies show that levels of exposure to air pollution have increased significantly in some parts of the world - mostly in rapidly industrializing countries with large populations.

In coordination with London Global Cancer Week partner organizations, this event outlines the evidence linking air pollution and cancer rates in London and other major cities.

Panellists provide a 360° picture of the impact of the rising incidence of cancer across the world, the challenges the cancer pandemic poses to the implementation of universal health coverage and the existing UK contribution to strengthening capacity in cancer management and research in developing countries.

Department/project

Members Events Team




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South Africa Can Easily Afford National Health Insurance

9 December 2019

Robert Yates

Director, Global Health Programme; Executive Director, Centre for Universal Health
Countries with much lower per capita GDP have successfully implemented universal healthcare.

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Builders work on an outside yard at the Nelson Mandela Children's Hospital in Johannesburg in 2016. Photo: Getty Images.

At the United Nations general assembly in September, all countries, including South Africa, reaffirmed their commitment to achieving universal health coverage by 2030. This is achieved when everybody accesses the health services they need without suffering financial hardship.

As governments outlined their universal health coverage plans, it was noticeable that some had made much faster progress than others, with some middle-income countries outperforming wealthier nations. For example, whereas Thailand, Ecuador and Georgia (with national incomes similar to South Africa) are covering their entire populations, in the United States, 30 million people still lack health insurance and expensive health bills are the biggest cause of personal bankruptcy.

The key factor in financing universal health coverage is, therefore, not so much the level of financing but rather how the health sector is financed. You cannot cover everyone through private financing (including insurance) because the poor will be left behind. Instead, the state must step in to force wealthy and healthy members of society to subsidise services for the sick and the poor.

Switching to a predominantly publicly financed health system is, therefore, a prerequisite for achieving universal health coverage.

The National Health Insurance (NHI) Bill, recently presented to parliament, is President Cyril Ramaphosa’s strategy to make this essential transition. In essence, it proposes creating a health-financing system in which people pay contributions (mostly through taxes) according to their ability to pay and then receive health services according to their health needs.

Surprisingly, these reforms have been dubbed 'controversial' by some commentators in the South African media, even though this is the standard route to universal health coverage as exhibited by countries across Europe, Asia, Australasia, Canada and much of Latin America.

In criticising the NHI other stakeholders (often with a vested interest in preserving the status quo) have said that the government’s universal health coverage strategy is unaffordable because it will require higher levels of public financing for health.

Evidence from across the world shows that this is patently false. South Africa already spends more than 8% of its national income on its health sector, which is very high for its income level. Turkey, for example (a good health performer and slightly richer than South Africa), spends 4.3% of its GDP and Thailand (a global universal health coverage leader) spends only 3.7%. Thailand shows what can be accomplished, because it launched its celebrated universal health coverage reforms in 2002 when its GDP per capita was only $1 900 — less than a third of South Africa’s today.

In fact, Thailand’s prime minister famously ignored advice from the World Bank that it could not afford publicly financed, universal health coverage in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis when it extended universal, tax-financed healthcare to the entire population. When these reforms proved a great success, a subsequent president of the World Bank, Dr Jim Kim, congratulated the Thai government for ignoring its previous advice.

Similarly the United Kingdom, Japan and Norway all launched successful universal health coverage reforms at times of great economic difficulty at the end of World War II. These should be salutary lessons for those saying that South Africa can’t afford the NHI. If anything, because universal health reforms generate economic growth (with returns 10 times the public investment), now is exactly the time to launch the NHI.

So there is enough overall funding in the South African health sector to take a giant step towards universal health coverage. The problem is that the current system is grossly inefficient and inequitable because more than half of these funds are spent through private insurance schemes that cover only 16% of the population — and often don’t cover even this population effectively.

Were the bulk of these resources to be channelled through an efficient public financing system, evidence from around the world shows that the health sector would achieve better health outcomes, at lower cost. Health and income inequalities would fall, too.

It’s true that in the long term, the government will have to increase public financing through reducing unfair subsidies to private health insurance and increasing taxes. But what the defenders of the current system don’t acknowledge is that, at the same time, private voluntary financing will fall, rapidly. Most families will no longer feel the need to purchase expensive private insurance when they benefit from the public system. It’s this fact that is generating so much opposition to the NHI from the private insurance lobby.

This is the situation with the National Health Service in the UK and health systems across Europe, where only a small minority choose to purchase additional private insurance. Among major economies, only the United States continues to exhibit high levels of private, voluntary financing.

As a consequence, it now spends an eye-watering 18% of its GDP on health and has some of the worst health indicators in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, including rising levels of maternal mortality. If South Africa doesn’t socialise health financing this is where its health system will end up — a long way from universal health coverage.

What countries celebrating their universal health coverage successes at the UN have shown is that it is cheaper to publicly finance health than leave it to the free market. This is because governments are more efficient and fairer purchasers of health services than individuals and employers. As Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland, the former director general of the World Health Organization, said in New York: 'If there is one lesson the world has learnt, it is that you can only reach UHC [universal health coverage] through public financing.'

This is a step South Africa must take — it can’t afford not to.

This article was originally published by the Mail & Guardian.




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The Political Economy of Universal Health Coverage

Corporate Members Event Nominees Breakfast Briefing Partners and Major Corporates

22 January 2020 - 8:00am to 9:15am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Robert Yates, Head, Centre on Global Health Security, Chatham House
Chair: Professor David R Harper, Senior Consulting Fellow, Centre on Global Health Security, Chatham House; Managing Director, Harper Public Health Consulting Limited
 

At the United Nations General Assembly in September 2019, all governments re-committed their countries to achieving universal health coverage (UHC) whereby ‘all people obtain the health services they need without suffering financial hardship when paying for them’. To achieve UHC, governments will need to oversee health systems that are predominantly publicly financed although countries may use both private and public health providers of health services.

Robert Yates will provide a review of recent transitions towards Universal Health Coverage, highlighting the importance of genuine political commitment by heads of state, and the potential benefits to corporate stakeholders in helping reach this sustainable development goal. What are the political, economic and health benefits of UHC? Why can only public financing mechanisms, rather than a free market in health services, deliver an equitable health system? And what is the role of the private sector within the political economy of UHC?

This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations of Chatham House. If you would like to register your interest, please RSVP to Linda Bedford. We will contact you to confirm your attendance.

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Members Events Team




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New Coronavirus Outbreak: Concern Is Warranted, Panic Is Not

23 January 2020

Professor David Heymann CBE

Distinguished Fellow, Global Health Programme

Lara Hollmann

Research Assistant, Global Health Programme
Whenever there is a new infection in humans, such as the novel coronavirus, it is appropriate to be concerned because we do not know enough about its potential.

Explainer: Coronavirus - What You Need to Know

World-renowned global health expert Professor David Heymann CBE explains the key facts and work being done on the Coronavirus outbreak.

When it comes to emerging infectious diseases – those newly recognized in humans or in new locations – it is not only what we know that matters but also what we do not know.

An outbreak of a new coronavirus first reported in Wuhan, China, which has so far led to more than 500 confirmed cases and multiple deaths across five countries (and two continents) has prompted the question from several corners of the world: Should we be worried?

Although expert teams coordinated by the World Health Organization (WHO) are working on key questions to get answers as soon as possible, the level of uncertainty is still high.

We do not yet know exactly how deadly the disease is, how best to treat those who get sick, precisely how it is spreading, nor how stable the virus is. It is thought that the virus spread from an animal source, but the exact source is yet to be confirmed and the disease is now in human populations and appears to be spreading from human to human.

It is such uncertainty, inherent in emerging infectious disease outbreaks, that warrants concern. Until they are resolved, it is appropriate for the world to be concerned. It is useful to remember that most established scourges of humanity such as HIV, influenza and tuberculosis likely started as emerging infectious diseases that jumped the species barrier from animals to humans.

Shortly after the Chinese authorities reported the first cases of ‘mystery pneumonia’ in Wuhan, China, to WHO, the virus causing the disease was isolated and identified as being part of the coronavirus family. It belongs to the same virus family as SARS, a highly contagious and life-threatening coronavirus that caused a nine-month epidemic in 2003 that affected 26 countries and resulted in more than 8,000 infections and nearly 800 deaths.

A second novel coronavirus that emerged in 2012 and persists today – MERS, or Middle East Respiratory Syndrome – is less contagious (spread by close contact rather than coughing and sneezing).

The differences between the SARS coronavirus and the MERS coronavirus highlight that, despite belonging to the same virus family, pathogens do not necessarily behave in the same way. It is as yet unknown whether the new virus is, or will turn out to be, more like SARS or MERS, or neither. 

Chinese authorities have confirmed that there is human-to-human transmission. However, it is not yet established whether it is sustained, which would make the outbreak more difficult to control. As of 23 January, the number of cases range from 500 confirmed cases up to an estimated 1,700 cases, according to a disease outbreak model by Imperial College London.

Likewise, we do not know to what extent the virus is able to mutate and if so, how rapidly. Generally, coronaviruses are known to be able to mutate, with the risk that a less contagious form of the virus becomes highly contagious. This could have an impact not only on the transmission pattern and rate but also the death rate. The virus could change in either direction, to become either more or less of a threat.

It is important to take a precautionary approach while uncertainty persists. It is also important not to overreact and for measures to be scientifically sound. Concern over this outbreak is due, but panic is not.

Three virtual networks of experts supporting the response – one of virologists, one of epidemiologists and one of clinicians – are working on the key pieces of the jigsaw puzzle: watching the virus, watching the transmission patterns, and watching the people who have been infected. It is crucial to maintain the ongoing investigation of the disease, stay focused on the science and to keep sharing the necessary information.




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China's 2020: Economic Transition, Sustainability and the Coronavirus

Corporate Members Event

10 March 2020 - 12:15pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Dr Yu Jie, Senior Research Fellow on China, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House
David Lubin, Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme, Chatham House; Managing Director and Head of Emerging Markets Economics, Citi
Jinny Yan, Managing Director and Chief China Economist, ICBC Standard
Chair: Creon Butler, Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme, Chatham House

Read all our analysis on the Coronavirus Response

The coronavirus outbreak comes at a difficult time for China’s ruling party. A tumultuous 2019 saw the country fighting an economic slowdown coupled with an increasingly hostile international environment. As authorities take assertive steps to contain the virus, the emergency has - at least temporarily - disrupted global trade and supply chains, depressed asset prices and forced multinational businesses to make consequential decisions with limited information. 

Against this backdrop, panellists reflect on the country’s nascent economic transition from 2020 onward. What has been China’s progress towards a sustainable innovation-led economy so far? To what extent is the ruling party addressing growing concerns over job losses, wealth inequality and a lack of social mobility? And how are foreign investors responding to these developments in China?

Members Events Team




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How to Fight the Economic Fallout From the Coronavirus

4 March 2020

Creon Butler

Research Director, Trade, Investment & New Governance Models: Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme
Finance ministries and central banks have a critical role to play to mitigate the threat Covid-19 poses to the global economy.

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A pedestrian wearing a face mask walks past stock prices in Tokyo on 25 February. Photo: Getty Images.

Epidemics, of the size of Covid-19, have huge economic impacts – not just from the costs of managing the health of people, but stopping them, and keeping the economy working. The 10% fall in global stock markets since it became clear that Covid-19 would not be limited to China has boldly highlighted this.

Suppressing the epidemic, but allowing the economy to still function, requires key decisions, in which central banks and finance ministries play a part.

The role of fiscal and monetary authorities in managing an epidemic economy

The scope to use monetary policy to manage the economic impact of Covid-19 is limited. The fact that the underlying cause of the shock is an infectious disease outbreak (rather than a banking crisis, as in 2008-09) and nominal interest rates are currently close to zero in most major advanced economies reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy.

Since 2010, reductions in fiscal deficits mean there is more scope for supportive fiscal action. But even here, high public debt levels and the desire not to underwrite ‘zombie’ companies that may have been sustained by a decade of ultra-low interest rates remain constraints. 

However, outside broad based fiscal and monetary policies there are six ways in which finance ministries and central banks will play a critical role in responding to the crisis.

first crucial role for finance ministries and central banks is in helping provide the best possible economic evaluation of strict containment measures (trying to isolate each potential case) versus managing the epidemic (delaying the spread of the virus, protecting the most vulnerable and treating the sick, while enabling the majority of people to get on with daily life). Given the economic consequences, they must play a full part, alongside health experts, in advising political leaders on this key decision.

Second, if large numbers of staff are required to work from home to manage the epidemic, they have the lead role in doing whatever is necessary to ensure that financial markets – and thus the wider economy – will continue to function smoothly.

Third, they need to ensure adequate funding for the public health response. Steps that can make an enormous difference to the success of containment strategies, such as strengthening surveillance, and guaranteeing the availability of testing kits and protective equipment for front line health workers, must not fail because of a lack of funding. 

Fourth, they have a lead role in designing targeted economic interventions for the wider economy. Some of these are needed immediately to re-enforce and incentivize strict containment strategies, such as ensuring that employees without full or adequate sick leave cover have the financial support to enable them to report and self-isolate when they get sick. 

Other interventions may help improve the resilience of the economy in accommodating moderate ‘social distancing’ measures; for example, by providing assistance to small firms to help them gear up for home working.

Yet others are needed, as a contingency, to safeguard the most vulnerable sectors (such as tourism, retail and transport) in circumstances where there is a prolonged downturn. The latter may include schemes to allow deferral of tax payments by SMEs, or steps to encourage loan extensions and other forms of liquidity support from the banking system, or by moves to underwrite continued provision of business insurance.

Fifth, national economic authorities will need to play their part in combatting ‘fake news’ through providing transparent and high-quality analysis. This includes providing forecasts on the likely economic impact of the virus under different scenarios, but also detailed information on the support and contingency measures they are considering, so they can be improved and refined through feedback. 

Sixth, they will need to ensure that there is generous international support for poor countries, by ensuring the available multilateral support facilities from the international financial institutions and multilateral development banks are adequately funded and fit for purpose. The World Bank has already announced an initial $12 billion financing package, but much more is likely to be needed.

They also need to support coordinated bilateral aid where this is more effective, as well as special measures to support particularly vulnerable groups, for example, in refugee camps and prisons. Given the importance of distributing sophisticated medical equipment and expertise quickly, it is also important that every effort is made to avoid delays due to customs and migration checks.

Managing the future

The response to the immediate crisis will rightly take priority now, but economic authorities must also play their part in ensuring the world finally takes decisive steps to prevent a repeat of Covid-19 in future.

The experience with SARS, H1N1 and Ebola shows that, while some progress is made after each outbreak, this is often not sustained. This epidemic shows that managing diseases is absolutely critical to the long-term health of global economy, and doubly so in circumstances where traditional central bank and finance ministry tools for dealing with major global economic shocks are limited.

Finance ministries and central banks therefore need to push hard within government to ensure sustained long-term funding of research on prevention and strengthening of public health systems. They also need to ensure that the right lessons are drawn by the private sector on making international supply chains more robust.

Critical to the overall success of the economic effort will be effective international coordination. The G20 was established as the premier economic forum for international economic cooperation in 2010, and global health issues have been a substantive part of the G20 agenda since the 2017 Hamburg Summit. At the same time, G7 finance ministers and deputies remain one of the most effective bodies for managing economic crises on a day-to-day basis and should continue this within the framework provided by the G20.

However, to be effective, the US, as current president of the G7, will need to put aside its reservations on multilateral economic cooperation and working with China to provide strong leadership.




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America's Coronavirus Response Is Shaped By Its Federal Structure

16 March 2020

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Dean, Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs; Director, US and the Americas Programme
The apparent capacity of centralized state authority to respond effectively and rapidly is making headlines. In the United States, the opposite has been true.

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Harvard asked its students to move out of their dorms due to the coronavirus risk, with all classes moving online. Photo by Maddie Meyer/Getty Images.

As coronavirus spreads across the globe, states grapple to find the ideal strategy for coping with the global pandemic. And, in China, Singapore, South Korea, the US, the UK, and Europe, divergent policies are a product of state capacity and legal authority, but they also reveal competing views about the optimal role of centralized state authority, federalism, and the private sector.

Although it is too soon to know the longer-term effects, the apparent capacity of centralized state authority in China, South Korea and Singapore to respond effectively and rapidly is making headlines. In the United States, the opposite has been true. 

America’s response is being shaped by its federal structure, a dynamic private sector, and a culture of civic engagement. In the three weeks since the first US case of coronavirus was confirmed, state leaders, public health institutions, corporations, universities and churches have been at the vanguard of the nation’s effort to mitigate its spread.

Images of safety workers in hazmat suits disinfecting offices of multinational corporations and university campuses populate American Facebook pages. The contrast to the White House effort to manage the message, downplay, then rapidly escalate its estimation of the crisis is stark.

Bewildering response

For European onlookers, the absence of a clear and focused response from the White House is bewildering. By the time President Donald Trump declared a national emergency, several state emergencies had already been called, universities had shifted to online learning, and churches had begun to close.

By contrast, in Italy, France, Spain and Germany, the state has led national efforts to shutter borders and schools. In the UK, schools are largely remaining open as Prime Minister Boris Johnson has declared a strategy defined by herd immunity, which hinges on exposing resilient populations to the virus.

But America has never shared Europe’s conviction that the state must lead. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the leading national public health institute and a US federal agency, has attempted to set a benchmark for assessing the crisis and advising the nation. But in this instance, its response has been slowed due to faults in the initial tests it attempted to rollout. The Federal Reserve has moved early to cut interest rates and cut them again even further this week.

But states were the real first movers in America’s response and have been using their authority to declare a state of emergency independent of the declaration of a national emergency. This has allowed states to mobilize critical resources, and to pressure cities into action. After several days delay and intense public pressure, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo forced New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio to close the city’s schools.

Declarations of state emergencies by individual states have given corporations, universities and churches the freedom and legitimacy to move rapidly, and ahead of the federal government, to halt the spread in their communities.

Washington state was the first to declare a state of emergency. Amazon, one of the state’s leading employers, quickly announced a halt to all international travel and, alongside Microsoft, donated $1million to a rapid-response Seattle-based emergency funds. States have nudged their corporations to be first movers in the sector’s coronavirus response. But corporations have willingly taken up the challenge, often getting ahead of state as well as federal action.

Google moved rapidly to announce a move allowing employees to work from home after California declared a state of emergency. Facebook soon followed with an even more stringent policy, insisting employees work from home. Both companies have also met with World Health Organization (WHO) officials to talk about responses, and provided early funding for WHO’s Solidarity Response Fund set up in partnership with the UN Foundation and the Swiss Philanthropy Foundation.

America’s leading research universities, uniquely positioned with in-house public health and legal expertise, have also been driving preventive efforts. Just days after Washington declared a state of emergency, the University of Washington became the first to announce an end to classroom teaching and move courses online. A similar pattern followed at Stanford, Harvard, Princeton and Columbia - each also following the declaration of a state of emergency.

In addition, the decision by the Church of the Latter Day Saints to cancel its services worldwide followed Utah’s declaration of a state of emergency.

The gaping hole in the US response has been the national government. President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency came late, and his decision to ban travel from Europe but - at least initially - exclude the UK, created uncertainty and concern that the White House response is as much driven by politics as evidence.

This may soon change, as the House of Representatives has passed a COVID-19 response bill that the Senate will consider. These moves are vital to supporting state and private efforts to mobilize an effective response to a national and global crisis.

Need for public oversight

In the absence of greater coordination and leadership from the centre, the US response will pale in comparison to China’s dramatic moves to halt the spread. The chaos across America’s airports shows the need for public oversight. As New York State Governor Cuomo pleaded for federal government support to build new hospitals, he said: ‘I can’t do it. You can’t leave it to the states.'

When it comes to global pandemics, we may be discovering that authoritarian states can have a short-term advantage, but already Iran’s response demonstrates that this is not universally the case. Over time, the record across authoritarian states as they tackle the coronavirus will become more apparent, and it is likely to be mixed.

Open societies remain essential. Prevention requires innovation, creativity, open sharing of information, and the ability to inspire and mobilize international cooperation. The state is certainly necessary, but it is not sufficient alone.




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Webinar: COVID-19 Pandemic Briefing

Members Event Webinar

25 March 2020 - 10:00am to 10:45am

Online

Event participants

Professor David Heymann CBE, Distinguished Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Executive Director, Communicable Diseases Cluster, World Health Organization (1998-03)

Chair: Emma Ross, Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House

The coronavirus pandemic, first detected in Wuhan, China less than three months ago, continues to expand with most countries affected facing unprecedented social and economic impacts. At this juncture, what do we know – and what do we not know – about the COVID-19 pandemic? 

Join us for the first in a weekly series of interactive webinars on the coronavirus with Professor David Heymann helping us to understand the facts and make sense of the latest developments during the global crisis. Why are governments enacting different plans? Is elimination possible without a vaccine? For how long do restrictions need to last? And what happens next?

Professor Heymann is a world-leading authority on infectious disease outbreaks. He led the World Health Organization’s response to SARS and has been advising the organization on its response to the coronavirus. 
 




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Webinar: European Union – The Economic and Political Implications of COVID-19

Corporate Members Event Webinar

26 March 2020 - 5:00pm to 5:45pm

Online

Event participants

Colin Ellis, Chief Credit Officer, Head of UK, Moody’s Investors Service
Susi Dennison, Director, Europe Power Programme, European Council of Foreign Relations
Shahin Vallée, Senior Fellow, German Council of Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Pepijn Bergsen, Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Chair: Hans Kundnani, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House


 

In the past few weeks, European Union member states have implemented measures such as social distancing, school and border closures and the cancellation of major cultural and sporting events in an effort to curb the spread of COVID-19. Such measures are expected to have significant economic and political consequences, threatening near or total collapse of certain sectors. Moreover, the management of the health and economic crises within the EU architecture has exposed tensions and impasses in the extent to which the EU is willing to collaborate to mitigate pressures on fellow member states.

The panellists will examine the European Union's response to a series of cascading crises and the likely impact of the pandemic on individual member states. Can the EU prevent an economic hit from developing into a financial crisis? Are the steps taken by the European Central Bank to protect the euro enough? And are member states expected to manage the crisis as best they can or will there be a united effort to mitigate some of the damage caused?  

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

 




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The G20’s Pandemic Moment

24 March 2020

Jim O'Neill

Chair, Chatham House
The planned emergency meeting of the G20 leaders could be the beginning of smart, thoughtful, collective steps to get beyond this challenging moment in history.

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A researcher works on a vaccine against coronavirus COVID-19 at the Copenhagen University research lab. Photo by THIBAULT SAVARY/AFP via Getty Images.

Having chaired the independent (and global) Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Review for David Cameron, I know a similar approach should have been taken quickly about COVID-19.

Similar not in precise nature but - in so far as incorporating infectious disease modelling, and using economic analysis to try to contain and solve it - it should be applied in parallel.

The AMR Review is well-known for highlighting the potential loss of life as well as the economic costs of an escalating growth of resistance to antimicrobials, and the inaction to prevent it.

In particular we showed that, by 2050, there could be around 10 million people each year dying from AMR, and an accumulated $100trn economic cost to the world from 2015 to 2050.

Horrendous outcomes

What is less focused on, as we showed in our final report, is that to prevent these horrendous outcomes, a 'mere' $42bn would need to be invested globally. This would give an investment return of something like 2,000%.

I shudder to think what policymakers could do if we don’t make these investments and we reach a situation - possibly accelerated itself by escalating the inappropriate use of antibiotics in this COVID-19 crisis - where we run out of useful antibiotics. It will be a much longer time period to find new vaccines to beat COVID-19.

In addition to this crisis, requiring G20 policymakers to back up their generous words about combatting AMR would mean they need to spend around $10bn instigating the generally agreed Market Incentive Awards to promote serious efforts by pharmaceutical companies.

In fact, given that the financial crisis we are also now in means companies are greatly dependent on our governments for their future survival, perhaps the pharma Industry will finally understand the real world concept of 'Pay or Play', where companies that don’t try to find new antibiotics are taxed to provide the pool of money for others that are bold enough to try. And realise there is a world coming of different risk-rewards for all, including them.

When applied to the COVID-19 challenge, it is useful to look at the required investment in accelerating as much as possible the efforts to find useful vaccines to beat it, but also to immediately introduce the therapeutics and diagnostics in countries that are so poorly prepared.

Those Asian countries affected early include a number that seem to have coped so far in keeping the crisis to a minimum because they had the appropriate therapeutics and diagnostics, despite not having vaccines. A sum of approximately $10 bn from the G20 would be sufficient to cover all these vital areas.

Now consider the economics of social distancing. As soon as it became apparent that our policymakers were heeding the Chinese method of trying to suppress COVID-19, it was immediately obvious that our economies would - at least for a short period - sustain the collapse of GDP that China self-imposed in February. From industrial production and other regular monthly data, the Chinese economy has declined by around 20%.

It is quite likely many other economies - probably each of the G7 countries - will experience something not too dissimilar in March. And, to stop our complex democracies from further immediate pressure including social disharmony, governments in many countries have needed to undertake dramatic unconventional steps.

Here in the UK, our new chancellor effectively had three budgets within less than a fortnight. And outside of the £330bn loan policy he has announced, at least £50bn worth of economic stimulus has been announced.

Many other G20 countries have undertaken their own versions of what I call 'People’s QE', many of them bigger packages - the US appears to be contemplating a stimulus as much as $2 trillion.

But, for the sake of illustration, if the UK package were the price for three months social distancing and this was repeated across the G20, then the total cost for all G20 countries - adjusted for relative size - would be in the vicinity of $1trillion.

If this isn’t accompanied by steps involving the best therapeutics and diagnostics, and we have to keep everyone isolated for one year, it would become at least $4trillion.

This may be 'back of the envelope' calculations which ignores the almost inevitable challenges for social cohesion in so many nations. But the G20 must spend something around $10bn immediately to put in absolute best standards all over the world, and another $10 bn to kickstart the market for new antibiotics.

This is a version of an article that first appeared in Project Syndicate.




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Webinar: Weekly COVID-19 Pandemic Briefing

Members Event Webinar

1 April 2020 - 10:00am to 10:45am

Online

Event participants

Professor David Heymann CBE, Distinguished Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Executive Director, Communicable Diseases Cluster, World Health Organization (1998-03)

Chair: Emma Ross, Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House

The coronavirus pandemic, first detected in Wuhan, China over three months ago, continues to expand with most countries affected facing unprecedented social and economic impacts. At this moment, what do we know – and what do we not know – about the COVID-19 pandemic? 

Join us for the second in a series of interactive webinars on the coronavirus with Professor David Heymann helping us to understand the facts and make sense of the latest developments during the global crisis. This week we will be focusing on the issue of testing. To what extent has scientific understanding of the COVID-19 virus developed in the last week? How can the UK increase its testing capacity? What is the role of global cooperation in this pandemic and what does that really mean? 

Professor Heymann is a world-leading authority on infectious disease outbreaks. He led the World Health Organization’s response to SARS and has been advising the organization on its response to the coronavirus. 

This event is open to Chatham House Members only. Not a member? Find out more.




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Webinar: Weekly COVID-19 Pandemic Briefing – The Role of International Collaboration

Members Event Webinar

8 April 2020 - 11:30am to 12:15pm

Online

Event participants

Professor David Heymann CBE, Distinguished Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Executive Director, Communicable Diseases Cluster, World Health Organization (1998-03)
Chair: Emma Ross, Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House
 

The coronavirus pandemic, first detected in Wuhan, China, continues to expand with most countries affected facing unprecedented social and economic impacts. At this moment, what do we know – and what do we not know – about the COVID-19 pandemic? 

The third in a series of interactive webinars on the coronavirus with Professor David Heymann helping us to understand the facts and make sense of the latest developments during the global crisis. This week we will be focusing on the role of international collaboration, after briefly discussing key current debates, including the role of masks for the general population.

Professor Heymann is a world-leading authority on infectious disease outbreaks. He led the World Health Organization’s response to SARS and has been advising the organization on its response to the coronavirus. 




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In Search of the American State

6 April 2020

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Dean, Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs; Director, US and the Americas Programme
The urgent need for US leadership to drive forward a coordinated international response to coronavirus is developing rapidly alongside snowballing demands for Washington to step up its efforts at home.

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Exercising in front of a deserted Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC. Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images.

As the US surgeon general warns Americans to brace for ‘our Pearl Harbor moment’, the US faces a week in which it may see the worst of the global pandemic. The absence of US leadership at the global level has enabled the Security Council’s inaction. And at the G7, President Trump actively obstructed efforts to agree a joint statement.

US efforts to increase its support of international aid to the tune of $274million are minimal, not least in light of a 50% reduction in its support for the World Health Organization (WHO) and radically diminished support for other global health programmes as well. International coordination is essential to mitigate unregulated competition for critical medical supplies, manage border closures, and guarantee international economic stability.

True, it won’t be possible to control the epidemic at home if the global effort to defeat the pandemic fails. But the absence of leadership from Washington at home is palpable. And what happens at home sets a natural limit on America’s internationalism.

Both solution and problem

In response to the coronavirus crisis, the US state is proving to be a solution - and a problem. The dramatic response to the economic crisis is evident with the $2.3trillion stimulus package signed into law by President Trump boldly supported by both Democrats and Republicans in the most significant piece of bipartisan legislation passed in decades.

America’s political economy is unrecognisable, moving left and looking increasingly more European each week as Congress and the executive branch agree a series of stimulus packages designed to protect citizens and businesses. Some elements of this legislation were more familiar to Americans, notably $200bn in corporate tax breaks.

But Congress also agreed unemployment insurance, and cheques - one in April, one in May – to be sent directly to those Americans most directly hit by the economic impact of COVID-19. In effect, this is adopting a temporary universal basic income.

The stimulus plan also dedicated $367bn to keep small businesses afloat for as long as the economy is shuttered. Already the government is negotiating a fourth stimulus package, but the paradox is that without rigorous steps to halt the health crisis, no level of state intervention designed to solve the economic response will be sufficient.

The scale of the state’s economic intervention is unprecedented, but it stands in stark contrast to Washington’s failure to coordinate a national response to America’s health crisis. An unregulated market for personal protective equipment and ventilators is driving up competition between cities, states, and even the federal government.

In some cases, cities and states are reaching out directly beyond national borders to international organisations, foreign firms and even America’s geopolitical competitors as they search for suppliers. In late March, the city of New York secured a commitment from the United Nations to donate 250,000 protective face masks.

Now Governor Cuomo has announced New York has secured a shipment of 140 ventilators from the state of Oregon, and 1,000 ventilators from China. The Patriots even sent their team plane to China to pick up medical supplies for the state of Massachusetts. And following a phone call between President Putin and President Trump, Russia sent a plane with masks and medical equipment to JFK airport in New York.

Networks of Chinese-Americans in the United States are rapidly mobilising their networks to access supplies and send them to doctors and nurses in need. And innovative and decisive action by governors, corporates, universities and mayors drove America’s early response to coronavirus.

This was critical to slowing the spread of COVID-19 by implementing policies that rapidly drove social distancing. But the limits of decentralized and uncoordinated action are now coming into sharp focus. President Trump has so far refused to require stay-at-home orders across all states, leaving this authority to individual governors. Unregulated competition has driven up prices with the consequence that critical supplies are going to the highest bidder, not those most in need.

Governor Cuomo’s call for a nationwide buying consortium has so far gone unheeded and, although the Federal Emergency Management Agency has attempted to deliver supplies to states most in need, the Strategic National Stockpile is depleting fast. Without critical action, the federal government risks hindering the ability of cities and states to get the supplies they need.

But President Trump is reluctant to fully deploy his powers under the Defense Production Act (DPA). In March, he did invoke the DPA to require certain domestic manufacturers to produce ventilators. But calls for it to be used to require manufacturers to produce PPE (personal protective equipment), control costs, and manage allocations has so far gone unheeded by a president generally opposed to state interventions for managing the economy.

It is true that federalism and a deep belief in competition are critical to the fabric of US history and politics, and innovations made possible by market values of entrepreneurism and competition cannot be underestimated. In the search for a vaccine, this could still prove to be key.

But with current estimates that more Americans will die from coronavirus than were killed in the Korean and Vietnam wars combined, it is clear now is the time to reimagine and reinvent the role of the American state.

In the absence of a coordinated effort driven by the White House, governors are working together to identify the areas of greatest need. Whether this will lead to a recasting of the American state and greater demand for a deeper and more permanent social safety net is a key question in the months ahead.

In the short-term the need for coordinated state action at the national level is self-evident. US leadership globally, to manage the health crisis and its economic impacts, is also vital. But this is unlikely to be forthcoming until America gets its own house in order.




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Webinar: Investing in Mental Health Policy

Members Event

17 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Online

Event participants

Undersecretary Myrna C Cabotaje, Public Health Services Team, Department of Health, Philippines

Alan Jope, CEO, Unilever

Josephine Karwah, Mental Health Advocate

Dr Dévora Kestel, Director, Mental Health and Substance Use Department, World Health Organization

Chair: Robert Yates, Director, Global Health Programme and Executive Director, Centre for Universal Health, Chatham House

Panellists discuss the significance of investing in mental health and the return on the individual, the economy and society. 

Although the economic and societal benefits of investing in health are increasingly recognized, less than two per cent of national health budgets globally are spent on mental health, despite the enormous impact it has on citizens and countries around the world. 

With the global health emergency of COVID-19 accelerating conversations around mental wellness and productivity, governments around the world are under increasing pressure to respond to the immediate challenges of ensuring both physical and mental health. 

Given that mental illness typically rises in times of economic recession and health crises, how are individuals, businesses and societies thinking about this issue? How can governments ensure mental health is integrated in global health coverage? And what role does technology play in mental health provision?

This event was run in partnership with United for Global Mental Health, within the framework of the Speak Your Mind (SYM) nationally led and globally united campaign that calls on leaders to provide quality mental health for all. 

UnitedGMH aims to unite global efforts on mental health and provides advocacy, campaigning and financing support to global institutions, businesses, communities and individual change-makers seeking greater action on global mental health. 

Members Events Team




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Webinar: Weekly COVID-19 Pandemic Briefing

Members Event Webinar

15 April 2020 - 10:00am to 10:45am

Online

Event participants

Professor David Heymann CBE, Distinguished Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Executive Director, Communicable Diseases Cluster, World Health Organization (1998-03)
Chair: Emma Ross, Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House

The coronavirus pandemic, first detected in Wuhan, China, continues to expand with most countries affected facing unprecedented social and economic impacts. At this moment, what do we know – and what do we not know – about the COVID-19 pandemic? 

Join us for the fourth in a weekly series of interactive webinars on the coronavirus with Professor David Heymann helping us to understand the facts and make sense of the latest developments during the global crisis. The focus this week is on strategies for transitioning out of 'lockdown'.

Professor Heymann is a world-leading authority on infectious disease outbreaks. He led the World Health Organization’s response to SARS and has been advising the organization on its response to the coronavirus. 




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Webinar: Big Data, AI and Pandemics

Members Event Webinar

28 April 2020 - 5:00pm to 6:00pm

Online

Event participants

David Aanensen, Director, The Centre for Genomic Pathogen Surveillance
Marietje Schaake, International Policy Director, Stanford University Cyber Policy Center
Stefaan Verhulst, Co-Founder and Chief of Research and Development, NYU Govlab
Chair: Marjorie Buchser, Executive Director, Digital Society Initiative, Chatham House

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to benefit healthcare through a variety of applications including predictive care, treatment recommendations, identification of pathogens and disease patterns as well as the identification of vulnerable groups.

With access to increasingly complex data sets and the rise of sophisticated pattern detection, AI could offer new means to anticipate and mitigate pandemics. However, the risks associated with AI such as bias, infringement on privacy and limited accountability become amplified under the pressurized lens of a global health crisis. 

Emergency measures often neglect standard checks and balances due to time-constraints. Whether temporary or permanent, AI applications during the epidemic have the potential to mark a watershed moment in human history and normalize the deployment of those tools with little public debate.

This webinar discusses the nature of beneficial tech while also identifying issues that arise out of fast-tracking AI solutions during emergencies and pandemics. Can emerging tech help detect and fight viruses? Should surveillance tech be widely accepted and rolled out during times of a global health emergency? And how can policymakers act to ensure the responsible use of data without hindering AI’s full potential?

This webinar is being run in collaboration with Chatham House’s Digital Society Initiative (DSI) and Centre for Universal Health. Our DSI brings together policy and technology communities to help forge a common understanding and jointly address the challenges that rapid advances in technology are causing domestic and international politics.

The Centre for Universal Health is a multi-disciplinary centre established to help accelerate progress towards the health-related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 in particular SDG 3: ‘To ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’.




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Webinar: Weekly COVID-19 Pandemic Briefing

Members Event

22 April 2020 - 10:00am to 10:45am

Online

Event participants

Professor David Heymann CBE, Distinguished Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Executive Director, Communicable Diseases Cluster, World Health Organization (1998-03)
Chair: Emma Ross, Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House

The fifth in a weekly series of interactive webinars on the coronavirus with Professor David Heymann helping us to understand the facts and make sense of the latest developments during the global crisis. 

The coronavirus pandemic continues expand and claim lives as it takes hold across the world. As countries grapple with how best to tackle the virus and the reverberations the pandemic is sending through their societies and economies, understanding of how the virus is behaving and what measures to combat it are working continues to advance. 

Professor Heymann is a world-leading authority on infectious disease outbreaks. He led the World Health Organization’s response to SARS and has been advising the organization on its response to the coronavirus. 

Members Events Team




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Beyond Lockdown: Africa’s Options for Responding to COVID-19

21 April 2020

Ben Shepherd

Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme

Nina van der Mark

Research Analyst, Global Health Programme
The continent’s enormous diversity means that there will be no one African experience of COVID-19, nor a uniform governmental response. But there are some common challenges across the continent, and a chance to get the response right.

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Dakar after the Interior Ministry announced compulsory wearing of masks in public and private services, shops and transport, under penalty of sanctions. Photo by SEYLLOU/AFP via Getty Images.

African policymakers face a dilemma when it comes to COVID-19. The first hope is to prevent the virus from gaining a foothold at all, and many African states have significant experience of managing infectious disease outbreaks. The establishment of the Africa Centre for Disease Control highlights the hugely increased focus on public health in recent years.

But capacities to track, test and isolate vary wildly, notably between neighbours with porous and poorly controlled borders and, in most cases, sustained national-level disease control is difficult. Initial clusters of COVID-19 cases are already established in many places, but a lack of testing capacity makes it hard to know the full extent of transmission.

It is not obvious what African states should do as a response. Lack of information about COVID-19 means the proportion of asymptomatic or mild cases is not known, still less the ways in which this is influenced by human geography and demographics.

Africa is an overwhelmingly young continent with a median age under 20. But it also faces chronic malnutrition, which may weaken immune responses, and infectious diseases such as malaria, TB and HIV are widespread which could worsen the impact of COVID-19, particularly if treatment for these diseases is interrupted.

Complex and unknown

Ultimately, how all these factors interact with COVID-19 is complex and remains largely unknown. Africa may escape with a relatively light toll. Or it could be hit harder than anywhere else.

What is clear, however, is that cost of simply following the rest of the world into lockdown could be high. Africa is relatively rural but has higher populations living in informal settlements than anywhere in the world. Many live in cramped and overcrowded accommodation without clean water or reliable electricity, making handwashing a challenge and working from home impossible.

And the benefits appear limited. The goal of lockdowns in most places is not to eliminate the virus but to accept the economic and social costs as a price worth paying in order to ‘flatten the curve’ of infection and protect healthcare systems from being overwhelmed. But this logic does not hold when many of Africa’s healthcare systems are barely coping with pre-coronavirus levels of disease.

Africa suffers in comparison to much of the rest of the world in terms of access to quality and affordable healthcare, critical care beds and specialist personnel. For example, in 2017, Nigeria had just 120 ICU beds for a country of 200 million, equating to 0.07 per 100,000 inhabitants compared to 12.5 per 100,000 in Italy and 3.6 per 100,000 in China.

The pandemic’s ruinous economic impacts could also be more acute for Africa than anywhere else. The continent is highly vulnerable to potential drops in output and relies heavily on demand from China and Europe. Many states are already facing sharply falling natural resource revenues, and investment, tourism and remittances will suffer - all on top of a high existing debt burden.

Analysis by the World Bank shows that Africa will likely face its first recession in 25 years, with the continental economy contracting by up to 5.1% in 2020. Africa will have scant financial ammunition to use in the fight against COVID-19 with currencies weakening, food prices rising, local agri-food supply chains disrupted and food imports likely to decrease as well. A food security emergency appears a strong possibility.

So, although several states have imposed national lockdowns and others closed major urban centres, lockdowns are difficult to manage and sustain, especially in places where the daily hustle of the informal sector or subsistence agriculture are the only means of survival and where the state has neither the trust of the population nor the capacity to replace lost earnings or meet basic needs.

Of course, this is not simply a binary choice between lockdown or no lockdown - a range of intermediate options exist, such as some restriction on movement, curfews, shutting places of worship, banning only large gatherings, or closing pubs, schools and borders.

A significant number of African states have so far taken this middle path. This will not prevent the virus from spreading nor, in all probability, be enough to ensure adequate healthcare for all Africans infected with COVID-19. But it may help slow the spread and buy invaluable time for African states and partners to prepare.

How this time is used is therefore of paramount importance. Popular trust in the state is low in many African countries so strategies must empower communities, not alienate them. Africa’s experience of previous epidemics and long traditions of collective resilience and community-based crisis response - which persist in many places – are significant strengths.

The right messages must be carried by the right messengers, and policies - including cash transfers and food distribution - implemented sensitively. If not, or if responses become militarized, public consent is unlikely to be sustained for long.




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Webinar: Weekly COVID-19 Pandemic Briefing – The Swedish Approach

Members Event Webinar

29 April 2020 - 10:00am to 11:00am

Online

Event participants

Professor Johan Giesecke, MD, PhD, Professor Emeritus of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Karolinska Institute Medical University, Stockholm; State Epidemiologist, Sweden (1995-05)
Professor David Heymann CBE, Distinguished Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Executive Director, Communicable Diseases Cluster, World Health Organization (1998-03)
Chair: Emma Ross, Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House

The coronavirus pandemic continues to claim lives around the world. As countries grapple with how best to tackle the virus, and the reverberations the pandemic is sending through their societies and economies, scientific understanding of how the COVID-19 virus is behaving and what measures might best combat it continues to advance.

Join us for the sixth in a weekly series of interactive webinars on the coronavirus with Professor David Heymann and special guest, Johan Giesecke, helping us to understand the facts and make sense of the latest developments in the global crisis. What strategy has Sweden embraced and why? Can a herd immunity strategy work in the fight against COVID-19? How insightful is it to compare different nations’ approaches and what does the degree of variation reveal?

Professor Heymann is a world-leading authority on infectious disease outbreaks. He led the World Health Organization’s response to SARS and has been advising the organization on its response to the coronavirus. 

Professor Giesecke is professor emeritus of Infectious Disease Epidemiology at the Karolinska Institute Medical University in Stockholm. He was state epidemiologist for Sweden from 1995 to 2005 and the first chief scientist of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) from 2005 to 2014.




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Webinar: Coronavirus Crisis – Implications for an Evolving Cybersecurity Landscape

Corporate Members Event Webinar

7 May 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Neil Walsh, Chief, Cybercrime and Anti-Money Laundering Department, UN Office of Drugs and Crime

Lisa Quest, Head, Public Sector, UK & Ireland, Oliver Wyman

Chair: Joyce Hakmeh, Senior Research Fellow, International Security Programme; Co-Editor, Journal of Cyber Policy, Chatham House

Further speakers to be announced.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a profound impact on the cybersecurity landscape - both amplifying already-existing cyber threats and creating new vulnerabilities for state and non-state actors. The crisis has highlighted the importance of protecting key national and international infrastructures, with the World Health Organization, US Department of Health and Human Services and hospitals across Europe suffering cyber-attacks, undermining their ability to tackle the coronavirus outbreak. Changing patterns of work resulting from widespread lockdowns are also creating new vulnerabilities for organizations with many employees now working from home and using personal devices to work remotely.

In light of these developments, the panellists will discuss the evolving cyber threats resulting from the pandemic. How are they impacting ongoing conversations around cybersecurity? How can governments, private sector and civil society organizations work together to effectively mitigate and respond to them? And what could the implications of such cooperation be beyond the crisis? 

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.




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Webinar: Weekly COVID-19 Pandemic Briefing – The Geopolitics of the Coronavirus

Members Event Webinar

6 May 2020 - 10:00am to 10:45am

Online

Event participants

Professor Ilona Kickbusch, Associate Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Founding Director and Chair, Global Health Centre, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 
Professor David Heymann CBE, Distinguished Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Executive Director, Communicable Diseases Cluster, World Health Organization (1998-03)
Chair: Emma Ross, Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House

The coronavirus pandemic continues to claim lives around the world. As countries grapple with how best to tackle the virus and the reverberations the pandemic is sending through their societies and economies, scientific understanding of how the coronavirus is behaving, and what measures might best combat it, continues to advance.

Join us for the seventh in a weekly series of interactive webinars on the coronavirus with Professor David Heymann and special guest Professor Ilona Kickbusch helping us to understand the facts and make sense of the latest developments in the global crisis.

What will the geopolitics of the pandemic mean for multilateralism? As the US retreats, what dynamics are emerging around other actors and what are the implications for the World Health Organization? Is the EU stepping up to play a bigger role in global health? Will the pandemic galvanize the global cooperation long called for?

Professor Heymann is a world-leading authority on infectious disease outbreaks. He led the World Health Organization’s response to SARS and has been advising the organization on its response to the coronavirus. 

Professor Kickbusch is one of the world’s leading experts in global health diplomacy and governance. She advises international organizations, national governments, NGOs and the private sector on new directions and innovations in global health, governance for health and health promotion.




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Coronavirus Risks Worsening a Food Crisis in the Sahel and West Africa

1 May 2020

Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann

Associate Fellow, Africa Programme

Paul Melly

Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme
In responding to the spread of the coronavirus, the governments of the Sahel and West Africa will need to draw on their collective experience of strategic coordination in emergency planning, and work together to prioritize the flow of food across borders.

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An informal market in the Anyama district of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, is sanitized against the coronavirus. Photo by SIA KAMBOU/AFP via Getty Images.

The COVID-19 pandemic has struck the Sahel and West Africa at a time when the region is already under severe pressure from violent insecurity and the effects of climate change on its land, food and water resources.

By the end of April, there had been 9,513 confirmed coronavirus cases across the 17 countries of the region, and some 231 deaths, with the highest overall numbers recorded in Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Niger and Burkina Faso. Low testing rates mean than these numbers give only a partial picture.

The Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) forecast in early April that almost 17 million people in the Sahel and West Africa (7.1 million in Nigeria alone) will need food and nutritional assistance during the coming lean season in June–August, more than double the number in an average year. The combined impact of violent insecurity and COVID-19 could put more than 50 million other people across the region at risk of food and nutrition crisis.

Rippling across the region

The effects of the collapse in global commodity prices, currency depreciations, rising costs of consumer goods and disruptions to supply chains are rippling across the region. And for major oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Chad and Cameroon, the wipe-out of foreign currency earnings will hammer government revenues just as the cost of food and other critical imports goes up. It is likely that the number of people who suffer the direct health impact of the coronavirus will be far outstripped by the number for whom there will be harsh social and economic costs.

In recent years, valuable protocols and capacities have been put in place by governments in West and Central Africa in response to Ebola and other infectious disease outbreaks.

But inadequate healthcare funding and infrastructure across this region compound the challenge of responding to the spread of the COVID-19 infection – which is testing the resources of even the world’s best-funded public health systems.

Over many years, however, the region has steadily built up structures to tackle humanitarian and development challenges, particularly as regards food security. It has an established system for assessing the risk of food crisis annually and coordinating emergency support to vulnerable communities. Each country monitors climate and weather patterns, transhumance, market systems and agricultural statistics, and terrorist disruption of agricultural productivity, from local community to national and regional level.

The system is coordinated and quality-controlled, using common technical data standards, by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), a regional intergovernmental body established in 1973 in response to a devastating drought. Collective risk assessments allow emergency support to be mobilized through the RPCA.

For almost three months already, countries in Sahelian West Africa have been working with the World Health Organization to prepare national COVID-19 response strategies and strengthen health controls at their borders. Almost all governments have also opted for domestic curfews, and variations of lockdown and market restrictions.

Senegal has been a leader in rapidly developing Africa’s diagnostic capacity, and plans are under way to speed up production of test kits. Niger was swift to develop a national response strategy, to which donors have pledged €194.5 million. While the IMF has agreed emergency financial assistance to help countries address the urgent balance-of-payments, health and social programme needs linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, signing off $3.4 billion for Nigeria, $442 million for Senegal and $130 million for Mauritania.

Steps are also now being taken towards the formulation of a more joined-up regional approach. Notably, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari has been chosen by an extraordinary session of the Economic Community of West African States to coordinate the regional response to COVID-19. As Africa’s biggest economy and home to its largest population, Nigeria is a critical hub for transnational flows of goods and people. Its controversial August 2019 land border closure, in a bid to address smuggling, has already painfully disrupted regional agri-food trade and value chains. The active engagement of the Buhari administration will thus be crucial to the success of a multifaceted regional response.

One of the first tough questions the region’s governments must collectively address is how long to maintain the border shutdowns that were imposed as an initial measure to curb the spread of the virus. Closed borders are detrimental to food security, and disruptive to supply chains and the livelihoods of micro, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs that rely on cross-border trade. The impact of prolonged closures will be all the more profound in a region where welfare systems are largely non-existent or, at best, highly precarious.

Nigeria, in particular, with more than 95 million people already living in extreme poverty, might do well to explore measures to avoid putting food further beyond the reach of people who are seeing their purchasing power evaporate.

In taking further actions to control the spread of the coronavirus, the region’s governments will need to show faith in the system that they have painstakingly developed to monitor and respond to the annual risk of food crisis across the Sahel. This system, and the critical data it offers, will be vital to informing interventions to strengthen the four components of food security – availability, access, stability and utilization – in the context of COVID-19, and for charting a post-pandemic path of recovery.

Above all, careful steps will need to be put in place to ensure that preventing the spread of the coronavirus does not come at the cost of even greater food insecurity for the people of the Sahel and West Africa. The region’s governments must prioritize the flow of food across borders and renew their commitment to strategic coordination and alignment.




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Coronavirus: Public Health Emergency or Pandemic – Does Timing Matter?

1 May 2020

Dr Charles Clift

Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme
The World Health Organization (WHO) has been criticized for delaying its announcements of a public health emergency and a pandemic for COVID-19. But could earlier action have influenced the course of events?

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WHO director-general Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus at the COVID-19 press briefing on March 11, 2020, the day the coronavirus outbreak was classed as a pandemic. Photo by FABRICE COFFRINI/AFP via Getty Images.

The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the spread of COVID-19 to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30 this year and then characterized it as a pandemic on March 11.

Declaring a PHEIC is the highest level of alert that WHO is obliged to declare, and is meant to send a powerful signal to countries of the need for urgent action to combat the spread of the disease, mobilize resources to help low- and middle-income countries in this effort and fund research and development on needed treatments, vaccines and diagnostics. It also obligates countries to share information with WHO.

Once the PHEIC was declared, the virus continued to spread globally, and WHO began to be asked why it had not yet declared the disease a pandemic. But there is no widely accepted definition of a pandemic, generally it is just considered an epidemic which affects many countries globally.

Potentially more deadly

The term has hitherto been applied almost exclusively to new forms of flu, such as H1N1 in 2009 or Spanish flu in 1918, where the lack of population immunity and absence of a vaccine or effective treatments makes the outbreak potentially much more deadly than seasonal flu (which, although global, is not considered a pandemic).

For COVID-19, WHO seemed reluctant to declare a pandemic despite the evidence of global spread. Partly this was because of its influenza origins — WHO’s emergency programme executive director said on March 9 that ‘if this was influenza, we would have called a pandemic ages ago’.

He also expressed concern that the word traditionally meant moving — once there was widespread transmission — from trying to contain the disease by testing, isolating the sick and tracing and quarantining their contacts, to a mitigation approach, implying ‘the disease will spread uncontrolled’.

WHO’s worry was that the world’s reaction to the word pandemic might be there was now nothing to be done to stop its spread, and so countries would effectively give up trying. WHO wanted to send the message that, unlike flu, it could still be pushed back and the spread slowed down.

In announcing the pandemic two days later, WHO’s director-general Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus reemphasised this point: ‘We cannot say this loudly enough, or clearly enough, or often enough: all countries can still change the course of this pandemic’ and that WHO was deeply concerned ‘by the alarming levels of inaction’.

The evidence suggests that the correct message did in fact get through. On March 13, US president Donald Trump declared a national emergency, referring in passing to WHO’s announcement. On March 12, the UK launched its own strategy to combat the disease. And in the week following WHO’s announcements, at least 16 other countries announced lockdowns of varying rigour including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland. Italy and Greece had both already instituted lockdowns prior to the WHO pandemic announcement.

It is not possible to say for sure that WHO’s announcement precipitated these measures because, by then, the evidence of the rapid spread was all around for governments to see. It may be that Italy’s dramatic nationwide lockdown on March 9 reverberated around European capitals and elsewhere.

But it is difficult to believe the announcement did not have an effect in stimulating government actions, as was intended by Dr Tedros. Considering the speed with which the virus was spreading from late February, might an earlier pandemic announcement by WHO have stimulated earlier aggressive actions by governments?

Declaring a global health emergency — when appropriate — is a key part of WHO’s role in administering the International Health Regulations (IHR). Significantly, negotiations on revisions to the IHR, which had been ongoing in a desultory fashion in WHO since 1995, were accelerated by the experience of the first serious coronavirus outbreak — SARS — in 2002-2003, leading to their final agreement in 2005.

Under the IHR, WHO’s director-general decides whether to declare an emergency based on a set of criteria and on the advice of an emergency committee. IHR defines an emergency as an ‘extraordinary event that constitutes a public health risk through the international spread of disease and potentially requires a coordinated international response’.

In the case of COVID-19, the committee first met on January 22-23 but were unable to reach consensus on a declaration. Following the director-general’s trip to meet President Xi Jinping in Beijing, the committee reconvened on January 30 and this time advised declaring a PHEIC.

But admittedly, public recognition of what a PHEIC means is extremely low. Only six have ever been declared, with the first being the H1N1 flu outbreak which fizzled out quickly, despite possibly causing 280,000 deaths globally. During the H1N1 outbreak, WHO declared a PHEIC in April 2009 and then a pandemic in June, only to rescind both in August as the outbreak was judged to have transitioned to behave like a seasonal flu.

WHO was criticized afterwards for prematurely declaring a PHEIC and overreacting. This then may have impacted the delay in declaring the Ebola outbreak in West Africa as a PHEIC in 2014, long after it became a major crisis. WHO’s former legal counsel has suggested the PHEIC — and other aspects of the IHR framework — may not be effective in stimulating appropriate actions by governments and needs to be reconsidered.

When the time is right to evaluate lessons about the response, it might be appropriate to consider the relative effectiveness of the PHEIC and pandemic announcements and their optimal timing in stimulating appropriate action by governments. The effectiveness of lockdowns in reducing the overall death toll also needs investigation.




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Webinar: Weekly COVID-19 Pandemic Briefing – Vaccines

Members Event Webinar

13 May 2020 - 10:00am to 10:45am
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Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Professor David Heymann CBE, Distinguished Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Executive Director, Communicable Diseases Cluster, World Health Organization (1998-03)
Professor David Salisbury CB, Associate Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House; Director of Immunization, Department of Health, London (2007-13)

Chair: Emma Ross, Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme, Chatham House

As countries grapple with how best to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic and the reverberations it is sending through their societies and economies, scientific understanding of how the virus is behaving, and what measures might best combat it, continues to advance. This briefing will focus on the progress towards and prospects for a coronavirus vaccine, exploring the scientific considerations, the production, distribution and allocation challenges as well as the access politics.

Join us for the eighth in a weekly series of interactive webinars on the coronavirus with Professor David Heymann and special guest, Professor David Salisbury, helping us to understand the facts and make sense of the latest developments in the global crisis. With 80 candidate vaccines reported to be in development, how will scientists and governments select the 'right' one? What should be the role of global leadership and international coordination in the development and distribution of a new vaccine? And can equitable access be ensured across the globe?

Professor Heymann is a world-leading authority on infectious disease outbreaks. He led the World Health Organization’s response to SARS and has been advising the organization on its response to the coronavirus.

Professor Salisbury was director of immunization at the UK Department of Health from 2007 to 2013. He was responsible for the national immunization programme and led the introduction of many new vaccines. He previously chaired the WHO’s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization and served as co-chair of the Pandemic Influenza group of the G7 Global Health Security Initiative.

This event will be livestreamed.




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The transcriptional regulator MEIS2 sets up the ground state for palatal osteogenesis in mice [Gene Regulation]

Haploinsufficiency of Meis homeobox 2 (MEIS2), encoding a transcriptional regulator, is associated with human cleft palate, and Meis2 inactivation leads to abnormal palate development in mice, implicating MEIS2 functions in palate development. However, its functional mechanisms remain unknown. Here we observed widespread MEIS2 expression in the developing palate in mice. Wnt1Cre-mediated Meis2 inactivation in cranial neural crest cells led to a secondary palate cleft. Importantly, about half of the Wnt1Cre;Meis2f/f mice exhibited a submucous cleft, providing a model for studying palatal bone formation and patterning. Consistent with complete absence of palatal bones, the results from integrative analyses of MEIS2 by ChIP sequencing, RNA-Seq, and an assay for transposase-accessible chromatin sequencing identified key osteogenic genes regulated directly by MEIS2, indicating that it plays a fundamental role in palatal osteogenesis. De novo motif analysis uncovered that the MEIS2-bound regions are highly enriched in binding motifs for several key osteogenic transcription factors, particularly short stature homeobox 2 (SHOX2). Comparative ChIP sequencing analyses revealed genome-wide co-occupancy of MEIS2 and SHOX2 in addition to their colocalization in the developing palate and physical interaction, suggesting that SHOX2 and MEIS2 functionally interact. However, although SHOX2 was required for proper palatal bone formation and was a direct downstream target of MEIS2, Shox2 overexpression failed to rescue the palatal bone defects in a Meis2-mutant background. These results, together with the fact that Meis2 expression is associated with high osteogenic potential and required for chromatin accessibility of osteogenic genes, support a vital function of MEIS2 in setting up a ground state for palatal osteogenesis.




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The transcriptional regulator IscR integrates host-derived nitrosative stress and iron starvation in activation of the vvhBA operon in Vibrio vulnificus [Gene Regulation]

For successful infection of their hosts, pathogenic bacteria recognize host-derived signals that induce the expression of virulence factors in a spatiotemporal manner. The fulminating food-borne pathogen Vibrio vulnificus produces a cytolysin/hemolysin protein encoded by the vvhBA operon, which is a virulence factor preferentially expressed upon exposure to murine blood and macrophages. The Fe-S cluster containing transcriptional regulator IscR activates the vvhBA operon in response to nitrosative stress and iron starvation, during which the cellular IscR protein level increases. Here, electrophoretic mobility shift and DNase I protection assays revealed that IscR directly binds downstream of the vvhBA promoter PvvhBA, which is unusual for a positive regulator. We found that in addition to IscR, the transcriptional regulator HlyU activates vvhBA transcription by directly binding upstream of PvvhBA, whereas the histone-like nucleoid-structuring protein (H-NS) represses vvhBA by extensively binding to both downstream and upstream regions of its promoter. Of note, the binding sites of IscR and HlyU overlapped with those of H-NS. We further substantiated that IscR and HlyU outcompete H-NS for binding to the PvvhBA regulatory region, resulting in the release of H-NS repression and vvhBA induction. We conclude that concurrent antirepression by IscR and HlyU at regions both downstream and upstream of PvvhBA provides V. vulnificus with the means of integrating host-derived signal(s) such as nitrosative stress and iron starvation for precise regulation of vvhBA transcription, thereby enabling successful host infection.




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Long noncoding RNA pncRNA-D reduces cyclin D1 gene expression and arrests cell cycle through RNA m6A modification [RNA]

pncRNA-D is an irradiation-induced 602-nt long noncoding RNA transcribed from the promoter region of the cyclin D1 (CCND1) gene. CCND1 expression is predicted to be inhibited through an interplay between pncRNA-D and RNA-binding protein TLS/FUS. Because the pncRNA-D–TLS interaction is essential for pncRNA-D–stimulated CCND1 inhibition, here we studied the possible role of RNA modification in this interaction in HeLa cells. We found that osmotic stress induces pncRNA-D by recruiting RNA polymerase II to its promoter. pncRNA-D was highly m6A-methylated in control cells, but osmotic stress reduced the methylation and also arginine methylation of TLS in the nucleus. Knockdown of the m6A modification enzyme methyltransferase-like 3 (METTL3) prolonged the half-life of pncRNA-D, and among the known m6A recognition proteins, YTH domain-containing 1 (YTHDC1) was responsible for binding m6A of pncRNA-D. Knockdown of METTL3 or YTHDC1 also enhanced the interaction of pncRNA-D with TLS, and results from RNA pulldown assays implicated YTHDC1 in the inhibitory effect on the TLS–pncRNA-D interaction. CRISPR/Cas9-mediated deletion of candidate m6A site decreased the m6A level in pncRNA-D and altered its interaction with the RNA-binding proteins. Of note, a reduction in the m6A modification arrested the cell cycle at the G0/G1 phase, and pncRNA-D knockdown partially reversed this arrest. Moreover, pncRNA-D induction in HeLa cells significantly suppressed cell growth. Collectively, these findings suggest that m6A modification of the long noncoding RNA pncRNA-D plays a role in the regulation of CCND1 gene expression and cell cycle progression.




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Kruppel-like factor 3 (KLF3) suppresses NF-{kappa}B-driven inflammation in mice [Immunology]

Bacterial products such as lipopolysaccharides (or endotoxin) cause systemic inflammation, resulting in a substantial global health burden. The onset, progression, and resolution of the inflammatory response to endotoxin are usually tightly controlled to avoid chronic inflammation. Members of the NF-κB family of transcription factors are key drivers of inflammation that activate sets of genes in response to inflammatory signals. Such responses are typically short-lived and can be suppressed by proteins that act post-translationally, such as the SOCS (suppressor of cytokine signaling) family. Less is known about direct transcriptional regulation of these responses, however. Here, using a combination of in vitro approaches and in vivo animal models, we show that endotoxin treatment induced expression of the well-characterized transcriptional repressor Krüppel-like factor 3 (KLF3), which, in turn, directly repressed the expression of the NF-κB family member RELA/p65. We also observed that KLF3-deficient mice were hypersensitive to endotoxin and exhibited elevated levels of circulating Ly6C+ monocytes and macrophage-derived inflammatory cytokines. These findings reveal that KLF3 is a fundamental suppressor that operates as a feedback inhibitor of RELA/p65 and may be important in facilitating the resolution of inflammation.




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The mRNA levels of heat shock factor 1 are regulated by thermogenic signals via the cAMP-dependent transcription factor ATF3 [Metabolism]

Heat shock factor 1 (HSF1) regulates cellular adaptation to challenges such as heat shock and oxidative and proteotoxic stresses. We have recently reported a previously unappreciated role for HSF1 in the regulation of energy metabolism in fat tissues; however, whether HSF1 is differentially expressed in adipose depots and how its levels are regulated in fat tissues remain unclear. Here, we show that HSF1 levels are higher in brown and subcutaneous fat tissues than in those in the visceral depot and that HSF1 is more abundant in differentiated, thermogenic adipocytes. Gene expression experiments indicated that HSF1 is transcriptionally regulated in fat by agents that modulate cAMP levels, by cold exposure, and by pharmacological stimulation of β-adrenergic signaling. An in silico promoter analysis helped identify a putative response element for activating transcription factor 3 (ATF3) at −258 to −250 base pairs from the HSF1 transcriptional start site, and electrophoretic mobility shift and ChIP assays confirmed ATF3 binding to this sequence. Furthermore, functional assays disclosed that ATF3 is necessary and sufficient for HSF1 regulation. Detailed gene expression analysis revealed that ATF3 is one of the most highly induced ATFs in thermogenic tissues of mice exposed to cold temperatures or treated with the β-adrenergic receptor agonist CL316,243 and that its expression is induced by modulators of cAMP levels in isolated adipocytes. To the best of our knowledge, our results show for the first time that HSF1 is transcriptionally controlled by ATF3 in response to classic stimuli that promote heat generation in thermogenic tissues.




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The histone H4 basic patch regulates SAGA-mediated H2B deubiquitination and histone acetylation [DNA and Chromosomes]

Histone H2B monoubiquitylation (H2Bub1) has central functions in multiple DNA-templated processes, including gene transcription, DNA repair, and replication. H2Bub1 also is required for the trans-histone regulation of H3K4 and H3K79 methylation. Although previous studies have elucidated the basic mechanisms that establish and remove H2Bub1, we have only an incomplete understanding of how H2Bub1 is regulated. We report here that the histone H4 basic patch regulates H2Bub1. Yeast cells with arginine-to-alanine mutations in the H4 basic patch (H42RA) exhibited a significant loss of global H2Bub1. H42RA mutant yeast strains also displayed chemotoxin sensitivities similar to, but less severe than, strains containing a complete loss of H2Bub1. We found that the H4 basic patch regulates H2Bub1 levels independently of interactions with chromatin remodelers and separately from its regulation of H3K79 methylation. To measure H2B ubiquitylation and deubiquitination kinetics in vivo, we used a rapid and reversible optogenetic tool, the light-inducible nuclear exporter, to control the subcellular location of the H2Bub1 E3 ligase, Bre1. The ability of Bre1 to ubiquitylate H2B was unaffected in the H42RA mutant. In contrast, H2Bub1 deubiquitination by SAGA-associated Ubp8, but not by Ubp10, increased in the H42RA mutant. Consistent with a function for the H4 basic patch in regulating SAGA deubiquitinase activity, we also detected increased SAGA-mediated histone acetylation in H4 basic patch mutants. Our findings uncover that the H4 basic patch has a regulatory function in SAGA-mediated histone modifications.




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Inflammatory and mitogenic signals drive interleukin 23 subunit alpha (IL23A) secretion independent of IL12B in intestinal epithelial cells [Signal Transduction]

The heterodimeric cytokine interleukin-23 (IL-23 or IL23A/IL12B) is produced by dendritic cells and macrophages and promotes the proinflammatory and regenerative activities of T helper 17 (Th17) and innate lymphoid cells. A recent study has reported that IL-23 is also secreted by lung adenoma cells and generates an inflammatory and immune-suppressed stroma. Here, we observed that proinflammatory tumor necrosis factor (TNF)/NF-κB and mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAPK) signaling strongly induce IL23A expression in intestinal epithelial cells. Moreover, we identified a strong crosstalk between the NF-κB and MAPK/ERK kinase (MEK) pathways, involving the formation of a transcriptional enhancer complex consisting of proto-oncogene c-Jun (c-Jun), RELA proto-oncogene NF-κB subunit (RelA), RUNX family transcription factor 1 (RUNX1), and RUNX3. Collectively, these proteins induced IL23A secretion, confirmed by immunoprecipitation of endogenous IL23A from activated human colorectal cancer (CRC) cell culture supernatants. Interestingly, IL23A was likely secreted in a noncanonical form, as it was not detected by an ELISA specific for heterodimeric IL-23 likely because IL12B expression is absent in CRC cells. Given recent evidence that IL23A promotes tumor formation, we evaluated the efficacy of MAPK/NF-κB inhibitors in attenuating IL23A expression and found that the MEK inhibitor trametinib and BAY 11–7082 (an IKKα/IκB inhibitor) effectively inhibited IL23A in a subset of human CRC lines with mutant KRAS or BRAFV600E mutations. Together, these results indicate that proinflammatory and mitogenic signals dynamically regulate IL23A in epithelial cells. They further reveal its secretion in a noncanonical form independent of IL12B and that small-molecule inhibitors can attenuate IL23A secretion.




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RNA helicase-regulated processing of the Synechocystis rimO-crhR operon results in differential cistron expression and accumulation of two sRNAs [Gene Regulation]

The arrangement of functionally-related genes in operons is a fundamental element of how genetic information is organized in prokaryotes. This organization ensures coordinated gene expression by co-transcription. Often, however, alternative genetic responses to specific stress conditions demand the discoordination of operon expression. During cold temperature stress, accumulation of the gene encoding the sole Asp–Glu–Ala–Asp (DEAD)-box RNA helicase in Synechocystis sp. PCC 6803, crhR (slr0083), increases 15-fold. Here, we show that crhR is expressed from a dicistronic operon with the methylthiotransferase rimO/miaB (slr0082) gene, followed by rapid processing of the operon transcript into two monocistronic mRNAs. This cleavage event is required for and results in destabilization of the rimO transcript. Results from secondary structure modeling and analysis of RNase E cleavage of the rimO–crhR transcript in vitro suggested that CrhR plays a role in enhancing the rate of the processing in an auto-regulatory manner. Moreover, two putative small RNAs are generated from additional processing, degradation, or both of the rimO transcript. These results suggest a role for the bacterial RNA helicase CrhR in RNase E-dependent mRNA processing in Synechocystis and expand the known range of organisms possessing small RNAs derived from processing of mRNA transcripts.





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Proteomics of the Chloroplast Envelope Membranes from Arabidopsis thaliana

Myriam Ferro
May 1, 2003; 2:325-345
Research




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Distinct and Overlapping Sets of SUMO-1 and SUMO-2 Target Proteins Revealed by Quantitative Proteomics

Alfred C. O. Vertegaal
Dec 1, 2006; 5:2298-2310
Research




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Lysine Acetylation Is a Highly Abundant and Evolutionarily Conserved Modification in Escherichia Coli

Junmei Zhang
Feb 1, 2009; 8:215-225
Research




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Extending the Limits of Quantitative Proteome Profiling with Data-Independent Acquisition and Application to Acetaminophen-Treated Three-Dimensional Liver Microtissues

Roland Bruderer
May 1, 2015; 14:1400-1410
Research




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Parallel Reaction Monitoring for High Resolution and High Mass Accuracy Quantitative, Targeted Proteomics

Amelia C. Peterson
Nov 1, 2012; 11:1475-1488
Technological Innovation and Resources




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Lysine Propionylation and Butyrylation Are Novel Post-translational Modifications in Histones

Yue Chen
May 1, 2007; 6:812-819
Research




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In Vivo Identification of Human Small Ubiquitin-like Modifier Polymerization Sites by High Accuracy Mass Spectrometry and an in Vitro to in Vivo Strategy

Ivan Matic
Jan 1, 2008; 7:132-144
Research




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Fluorescent Proteins as Proteomic Probes

Ileana M. Cristea
Dec 1, 2005; 4:1933-1941
Research




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Global Identification and Characterization of Both O-GlcNAcylation and Phosphorylation at the Murine Synapse

Jonathan C. Trinidad
Aug 1, 2012; 11:215-229
Research




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Large Scale Screening for Novel Rab Effectors Reveals Unexpected Broad Rab Binding Specificity

Mitsunori Fukuda
Jun 1, 2008; 7:1031-1042
Research




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Comparative Proteomic Analysis of Eleven Common Cell Lines Reveals Ubiquitous but Varying Expression of Most Proteins

Tamar Geiger
Mar 1, 2012; 11:M111.014050-M111.014050
Special Issue: Prospects in Space and Time




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Time-resolved Mass Spectrometry of Tyrosine Phosphorylation Sites in the Epidermal Growth Factor Receptor Signaling Network Reveals Dynamic Modules

Yi Zhang
Sep 1, 2005; 4:1240-1250
Research




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A Proteomic Analysis of Human Cilia: Identification of Novel Components

Lawrence E. Ostrowski
Jun 1, 2002; 1:451-465
Research




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Toward a Comprehensive Atlas of the Physical Interactome of Saccharomyces cerevisiae

Sean R. Collins
Mar 1, 2007; 6:439-450
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A Tandem Affinity Tag for Two-step Purification under Fully Denaturing Conditions: Application in Ubiquitin Profiling and Protein Complex Identification Combined with in vivoCross-Linking

Christian Tagwerker
Apr 1, 2006; 5:737-748
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Quantitative Phosphoproteomics of Early Elicitor Signaling in Arabidopsis

Joris J. Benschop
Jul 1, 2007; 6:1198-1214
Research