In a month’s time, the UK will have a new prime minister. The campaign has been dominated by candidates’ views on how to deliver Britain’s withdrawal from the EU by October, alongside some discussion of domestic issues.

But relatively little has been said about international affairs, despite the fact that foreign policy questions are becoming a more partisan issue and Britain is facing crucial questions around Brexit and the wider international context. These will be waiting for whoever finds themselves in Number 10 on 22 July. 

1. How can Britain influence Europe from outside the EU?

Theresa May was fond of saying that Britain is leaving the EU but not leaving Europe. Britain cannot change its geography. It will continue to share many strategic and security interests with the rest of the continent, but it will be outside of Europe’s central political and economic project. A new PM will not only have to negotiate Britain’s new relationship with the EU, but also think about how to influence it as a third country.

An aspect of this will be finding a new way to work with the EU on foreign, security and defence policy that meets the need for autonomy on both sides. How deep this relationship is or how institutionalized it will be is yet to be negotiated and can be shaped by the next PM.

The UK needs to decide how ambitiously it wants to engage with the new defence agenda in the EU (particularly its industrial components), and how to balance these with key bilateral relationships like France and Germany. Amid uncertainty about American security guarantees and Russian aggression, the next PM must also consider what Britain’s security role in Europe should be and NATO’s place within that.

Beyond conventional foreign policy issues, Britain is also going to be heavily shaped and influenced by the rule-making power of the EU, and how the world’s largest market regulates itself, from energy to financial services, consumer products and the environment.

The UK will need a strategy to influence the EU from the outside – something Swiss, Norwegians and Americans will acknowledge is no easy feat. This could include significantly increasing its diplomatic footprint across Europe, working closely with the UK’s private and non-profit sectors, utilizing Britain’s technical expertise in areas like sanctions, and creating new ad hoc groupings to share perspectives and ideas, building on examples like the Northern Future Forum. 

2. Should Britain do business with President Trump?

President Trump represents a fundamental challenge to Britain: an American president whose belligerent unilateralism runs counter to many of Britain’s foreign policy objectives. His frequent and often shameless diplomatic faux pas – from proposing Nigel Farage be the British ambassador to his dog-whistle attacks on the mayor of London – are compounded by real differences of substance on issues like trade, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation.

A new prime minister must decide how to manage relations with the US administration, whether to challenge or condemn a US president when he acts against Britain’s interests, or use flattery or quieter diplomacy to seek to influence him. Theresa May’s strategy of staying politically close to the president and playing to his ego has yielded little in policy terms, though other world leaders have fared little better.

A new PM will face some uncomfortable choices. Will they continue to defend the Iran nuclear deal alongside European allies while the US continues to undermine it? Do they believe a trade deal with America is desirable or achievable with the current administration, and what are they willing to sacrifice to achieve it? Is the American security guarantee for Europe secure with Donald Trump as president? Judgements on these questions should inform Britain's wider strategy, and its objectives for a future relationship with the European Union.

3. Should Britain prioritize economics or security in its relations with China?

Britain faces its own version of the challenge that many countries face – how to balance the economic and investment benefits of a positive relationship with China with concerns about repressive domestic politics and a more assertive Chinese role regionally and globally. This tension has become more acute for two reasons.

First, the economic dislocation of leaving the EU may create a greater reliance on Chinese trade and investment. China is already a major investor in the UK. If Brexit proves to be disorderly, Britain’s need may be all the greater (though China faces economic headwinds as well). Some in Brussels even fear that the economic difficulties of Brexit may make the UK a soft touch for emerging powers from which it seeks inward investment and market access.

Second, the deterioration in US–China relations means the UK may come under increasing pressure from the United States to take a tough line with China. The controversy over Huawei’s role in delivering 5G networks may become a more regular feature of transatlantic debates, with Britain facing Chinese economic pressure on one side and a squeeze from America over security issues on the other, without the weight of the EU behind it.  

A new prime minister should consider whether the UK’s interests are served by a security role in east Asia, and whether it has the capability to play one.

The UK remains a party to the Five Power Defence Arrangements. The Royal Navy has conducted freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea, prompting a rebuke from Beijing. It has also taken steps to deepen security ties with Japan.

But the UK government has struggled to present a coherent position. Some cabinet ministers have sought to open doors to the Chinese market at the same time as others announced their intentions to send aircraft carriers to the Pacific. The next PM will need to find a balance between China and the US, or accept the consequences of more directly taking sides on disputes about trade, technology, and security.

4. How can the contradictions between UK foreign and domestic policy be reconciled?

One of the many problems with the vague and unhelpful slogan ‘Global Britain’ is how it jars with many aspects of domestic policy. This incoherence reduces Britain’s foreign policy credibility and effectiveness.

Britain has actively supported the UN-led Yemen peace process while continuing to support Saudi Arabia’s military campaign through arms sales. Britain wants to build a new ambitious independent trade policy while restricting the migration that is crucial for services trade. British foreign secretaries trumpet the UK’s soft power while the Home Office deports members of the Windrush generation, bungles EU citizenship applications and sets unreasonable burdens for many people seeking visas simply to visit the country.

Global universities are celebrated while international students had their post-study visas cut (a policy that sensibly is likely to be reversed). Britain advocates international tax compliance and transparency while not taking robust steps to regulate the tax haven role played by crown dependencies and overseas territories.

A new prime minister has the chance to get to grips with these inconsistencies and develop foreign and domestic policies which are more coherent and self-re-enforcing.

5. At what level should Britain’s international ambitions be funded?

Successive governments have celebrated the fact the UK is the only Western country to spend 2% of GDP on defence and 0.7% on development. However, this masks some real pressures in the system.

There are significant problems in the defence budget and a growing gap between commitments and committed funds. Meanwhile, the funding of Britain’s diplomacy has been cut by successive governments – Labour, Conservative and coalition – for much of the last 20 years. Numerous bodies have highlighted the problems facing the overstretched and underfunded Foreign Office. Where would defence and diplomacy sit in the new prime minister’s hierarchy of priorities?

The problem is not purely one of funding, but the gap between ambitions, rhetoric and resources. It is not sustainable for British ministers to trumpet Britain’s global ambitions while not properly funding the tools of its influence abroad.

It would be reasonable and understandable for a new prime minister to adjust that ambition and tone down the rhetoric, or alternatively to address resource pressures by investing in diplomacy and defence. But that choice should be informed by a sober reflection on Britain’s international position and interests as it leaves the EU. Brexit offers a chance to revisit assumptions that have guided British policy for a generation. A new prime minister should seize this opportunity.

A realistic vision for the future

All these issues will be more pronounced if the UK leaves the EU with no deal at the end of October. ‘No deal’ would be not simply an economic shock but a diplomatic rupture that will colour the UK’s capacity to negotiate a new relationship with the EU, which will be the first order of business after a ‘no deal’ exit. Trust will be in short supply.

Even if they don’t get to vote on the new prime minister, the public deserves serious answers to these and other questions from the men who want to lead the country. Not the platitudes of ‘Global Britain’ or a reflexive and unexamined British exceptionalism, but a serious, realistic assessment of how Britain will cope with the disruptions of leaving the EU and how it might thrive outside the regional bloc it has been a part of for more than 45 years.

With the new leader of the Conservative party due to be announced on 23 July, what are the prospects for the party and the country?

On Brexit, the new prime minister faces most of the same challenges and constraints as Theresa May. The leadership contenders have outlined their ambitions for a revised deal, but with the EU insisting negotiations are over, their room for manoeuvre appears to be limited. Furthermore, even with a new leader at the helm, important divisions remain among voters about what shape Brexit and the future UK-EU relationship should take. If the EU won’t change the deal, and parliament won’t accept it, how can the deadlock be broken? Is a 'No Deal' Brexit politically deliverable? Or could there be a general election later in 2019? Can the Conservative party survive a pre-Brexit election intact?

Beyond Brexit, what are the other choices, in both domestic and foreign policy, facing the next prime minister? How might the decisions he makes affect the future of the party and British politics more broadly?

In this session, the speaker will share his reflections on the likely result of the leadership election, and what lies beyond it.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

On 13 October 2019, Poland goes to the polls in national elections. On the back of a strong performance in the European elections, the incumbent Law and Justice Party (PiS) is seeking to retain its absolute majority. The election takes place against a background of continued strong economic growth but amid disputes over the direction of social policy and a domestic contest about liberal values. The European Commission and the Polish government have clashed over reforms that the Commission believes could compromise the independence of the judiciary in the Poland. Meanwhile, in foreign policy terms, Poland has sought to develop good working relations with the Trump administration and supported a tough line towards Russia.

The speakers will address the domestic and international significance of the Polish election. Will PiS be able to secure another majority? What would be the implications for the direction of social and political reform in Poland? And how could the elections shift Poland’s approach to politics at the European level and its wider foreign policy?  

What does the UK election result mean for Brexit and forthcoming trade negotiations with the EU?

The most important thing is that it means Brexit will definitely happen. Since the referendum, we’ve had three-and-a-half years of continued uncertainty where all outcomes were still possible. We now know that Brexit will become irreversible from 31 January.

That’s the biggest thing, because I think that will have a big psychological impact on politics, both in the UK and also on the EU side. The EU has been working with a partner that has been unsure about its direction, and perhaps some had still hoped that the process might still be reversed, but that direction is now completely clear.

Obviously the first order of business is to pass the withdrawal agreement, which should be pretty straightforward given the majority that the Conservatives have. That’s a formality now.

Then, the question becomes about the level of ambition for the next year. It is an exceptionally ambitious timetable to negotiate, ratify and implement a new relationship before the end of the transition period in December 2020.

What is achievable by the end of next year?

I think there are three possible outcomes here. One: that timetable doesn’t work and Boris Johnson follows through on his pledge to leave the transition period anyway, leading to a ‘no trade deal’ outcome.

Two: the negotiations are able to deliver something by the end of 2020, either because the depth and ambition of any agreement is relatively low level (what Michel Barnier has called a ‘vital minimum’)  and/or because they come up with some type of compromise on the process which is not called an extension, but something else: a type of temporary agreement or a new implementation period.

This is a situation where you might have a bare-bones agreement for the end of the transition period, but with an extended period of negotiation for different unresolved issues. The EU will probably insist upon level playing field guarantees and fishing access rights as a component of any such agreement.

Three: Boris Johnson breaks his manifesto pledge not to extend the transition. Now, he has stared down the barrel of leaving with no deal before and he made a political judgment that it was better to make significant compromises on his negotiating position than to follow through with ‘no deal’. I suspect he might make that same judgment again.

No option is ideal. The first is the most economically disruptive, the second means the EU will be in an even stronger position to dictate terms and the third means breaking a manifesto pledge.

How important is that end of transition deadline now? It was an important issue for the Brexit Party and hardliners in the European Research Group of Conservative MPs. But given the size of a majority, he may need to worry less about them. Is the transition deadline that important to people who voted Conservative, especially if he can show that he has taken the UK out of the EU by the end of January?

I think there may indeed be some political space for Johnson here, given the size of his majority and given that the first phase of Brexit will have been done, along with the debate about withdrawal.

There will be a lot of difficult, technical negotiations in all sorts of areas, some of which I think will become quite rancorous, but won’t necessarily become front page news in the way some of the first phase of negotiations has, not least because you won’t have the theatre of a hung parliament.

Hopefully, there will be more focus on the substance of the agreement, and the debate will be about the consequences of divergence versus staying more aligned with the EU, which is basically the central question now about the future relationship.

I still think for UK prime ministers to pick arbitrary dates, and then to make domestic political promises based around them, actually undermines the UK’s negotiating position. It would be in Britain’s interest to have more flexibility rather than a ticking clock.

Moving to the other big story from the night, the SNP won 48 of 59 seats in Scotland. How does the debate over Scotland’s future in the United Kingdom play out from here?

The SNP has really strengthened its position, more than many expected. This is now set up for a huge constitutional struggle over the future of the United Kingdom.

I think there is a key dilemma for Scottish independence supporters, which is that on the one hand Brexit greatly strengthens the political case for independence. The difference between the political preferences in Scotland and the rest of the UK, particularly in England, is a perfect demonstration of that.

At the same time, once the UK has left the EU, independence becomes much more difficult technically and economically. There will be many of the same difficulties that there have been in discussing Northern Ireland’s relationship with the Republic of Ireland. There will be a difficult debate over the currency. There are all sorts of challenges to creating a trade or regulatory border between England and Scotland. This is particularly true if there is a harder Brexit outcome, where Britain leaves the EU without a large amount of regulatory alignment.

On demands for a second independence referendum, I think in the first instance Boris Johnson will simply refuse to hold one. It’s probably not in his short-term interest to do anything else. Theresa May played it this way in 2017, repeatedly saying ‘now is not the time’.

In a similar way I think Johnson will just try to ride the pressure out, to the point where the SNP will need to face the challenges of advocating independence with the UK outside the EU. The next flashpoint will be the elections to the Scottish Parliament in 2021.

Ultimately, though, it will become a democratically unsustainable position if Scotland continues to vote for the SNP, and refusing to sanction a second independence referendum might only reinforce that sentiment.

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In recent decades, political party systems across Europe have fragmented and electoral volatility has increased. The number of parties represented in parliaments across the continent has grown and the formerly dominant mainstream parties have seen their support base collapse, forcing parties into often uncomfortable and unstable coalitions.

From the United Kingdom to Germany, politicians and commentators talk of such scenarios in often apocalyptic terms and associate it with political instability and policy paralysis.

They shouldn’t. Instead they should focus their energy on making these increasingly competitive political markets work.

The Netherlands is frequently held up as a prime example of this process, which is therefore sometimes referred to as ‘Dutchification’. Its highly proportional political system has created the opportunity for new parties and specific interest groups to win parliamentary representation, ranging from an animal rights party and a party catering specifically to the interests of the elderly.

This has been accompanied by increased electoral volatility. In the 1970s, less than 15% of seats in the Dutch parliament would change party at any election, but in the last election in 2017, this was just over a quarter. The system also created space for the relatively early rise of populist far-right parties, though it was not the cause of their rise.

Nevertheless, despite the regularly difficult coalition politics, it remains one of the most well-governed countries in the world.

A short history of fragmentation

Looking at the effective number of parties represented in parliaments, the number of parties, corrected for their size, provides a good measure of the extent of fragmentation. In the Netherlands this steadily increased from around four in the 1980s to over eight following the election in 2017. Even the populist far-right vote has fragmented, with two parties partly competing for the same electorate. In other countries it has been a more recent phenomenon. Spain remained a de facto two-party system until the financial crisis. Dissatisfaction with both mainstream parties has seen challenger parties on both the left and the right attract significant support, making it harder to form stable coalitions. Political fragmentation decreased slightly in Italy in recent years, but that was from a high base as it shot up in the early 1990s when the post-war political settlement crumbled.

German politics, long a hallmark of stability, is struggling with the decrease in support for the parties that dominated its political scene in the post-war period. The Christian Democrats and Social Democrats only barely managed to win a majority together in the election in 2017, at 53.4% of the vote compared with the 81.3% achieved 30 years earlier. The latest polls suggest they would only get to 40% together if an election were held today.

A similar trend is visible within the European Parliament. Whereas the two largest groups in the European Parliament, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, together won 66% of the vote in the election in 1999, they did not even manage to win a majority together in 2019, taking just 39.5% of the vote.

No crisis of democracy

If electoral volatility and political fragmentation does indeed constitute some sort of crisis of democracy, we should expect to see voters become unhappy about how their national democracy functions. Largely, the opposite seems to be the case.

In the Netherlands, satisfaction with its democracy went up at the same time as Dutchification did its work. Similar trends are visible in other highly fragmented European political systems, often those with very proportional systems. Despite regular minority governments, satisfaction with democracy is above 90% in Denmark and at 80% in Sweden, according to the latest Eurobarometer data.

In comparison, it stood at 52% in the United Kingdom and 53% in France, where the electoral system has, at least on the surface, prevented the kind of fragmentation supposedly plaguing proportional systems.

Satisfaction with democracy seems to be affected by a number of factors. This includes the state of the economy, particularly in countries that were hit the hardest by the global financial and euro zone crises. Nevertheless, the data suggests that, even if we can’t say that Dutchification by definition leads to more satisfaction with democracy, it is clearly not associated with falling faith in the system.

A competitive political market

Dutchification should be seen as accompanying a more competitive political marketplace. A more emancipated, demanding and politically engaged electorate than in the post-war decades is willing to shop around instead of merely vote according to socioeconomic class or other dividing lines, such as religious ones. The fragmented parliaments that emerge as a result provide better representation of different groups within European societies.

This makes life harder for Europe’s political parties and politicians, as they juggle large coalitions, or changing coalitions under minority governments, but provides voters with more choice and democratic renewal. If handled correctly this would also allow more responsiveness to shifts in public opinion.

Such democratic creative destruction in competitive political markets is to be celebrated in a well-functioning democracy. Just as companies prefer to operate in an oligopoly, political parties prefer the stability of limited political competition. But wishing for this kind of stability comes perilously close to preferring stability over proper representation.

Worrying about Dutchification risks confusing a crisis of the traditional mainstream parties with a crisis of democracy. For some countries, particularly those like the Netherlands and Denmark which have longer histories of consensus-based politics and coalition building, this is an easier adjustment. But this should not be an excuse to not attempt to make politics work better as they were forced to go through, arguably still ongoing, adjustment processes too.

Instead of investing in futile attempts to get back to how things were in the old days, or hoping this will somehow magically happen, political leaders and parties across Europe need to reassess how they deal with the new reality of Dutchification.

Perhaps it will be second time lucky. At the end of April, Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will elect a new party leader to follow in the footsteps of Angela Merkel. An emergency party congress has been summoned to do that after the surprise resignation of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Merkel’s chosen successor.

The plan is to leave the decision on who will be the CDU candidate for chancellor at the next election until after Germany’s EU presidency concludes in December. So Merkel will keep her job until 2021, and the new leader will have to learn to live with her.

The three leading candidates are Armin Laschet, Friedrich Merz and Norbert Röttgen, all from the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Two of the three – Merz and Röttgen – were sacked by Merkel from their former jobs. They have not forgotten. Only Armin Laschet, currently CDU leader in North Rhine-Westphalia and state premier, can be described as a Merkel loyalist, true to her centrist mantra.

He is the man to beat, having teamed up with Jens Spahn, the 39-year-old health minister, who is popular with party conservatives. Spahn will run as his deputy, so the team straddles the left-right divide in the party. But the contest still seems set to be a bitter battle between pro- and anti-Merkel factions that could leave the party badly split.

After nearly 15 years as chancellor, and 18 years as CDU leader, Merkel remains the most popular politician in Germany. In spite of criticism that she lacks vision, her caution and predictability appear to be just what most German voters like.

But her term in office has also seen the steady shrinking of the centre ground in German politics, with the rise of the environmentalist Green party and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) at the expense of the centre-right CDU and the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD).

The battle for the soul of the CDU is between those who think Merkel has been too left-wing, and want a more conservative leader to win back AfD voters, and those who believe that the CDU must stay in the centre, and prepare for a future coalition with the Greens. Merz is seen as the former, Laschet and Röttgen the latter.

Unless Laschet emerges as the clear winner in April, the leadership contest is likely to leave Germany sorely distracted by domestic politics just as it takes over the EU presidency in the second half of the year. Instead of Merkel having a triumphant international swansong on the EU stage, she could be battling to protect her inheritance at home.

The one area on which all three leadership candidates seem to agree is foreign policy: they all want Germany to take more leadership and responsibility, and for the European Union to play a bigger role in security, defence and international affairs. They are all Atlanticists, but critical of Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ stance. All are on the record criticizing the chancellor – at least tacitly – for not having a more vigorous foreign policy.

There the similarity ends.

On the right, the 64-year-old Merz is both the most conservative and the most popular with the party grassroots. He fell out with the chancellor when she took over his job as CDU leader in parliament in 2002. He quit politics to become a corporate lawyer (and a millionaire), but never lost his political ambition. He is an economic liberal but socially conservative, a strong critic of Merkel’s migration policy and her lack of clear leadership. Critics say he is a man of the past, and not a team player.

On the EU, he believes Germany is ‘leaving too much to the French’. If France and Germany cannot agree on financial matters, he said at the London School of Economics in February, they should instead forge a stronger EU industrial policy focused on creating more ‘European champions’.

Laschet, the Merkel loyalist, is four years younger, and from the left of the party. Like Merz, he is a former member of the European parliament. In 2015, he defended Merkel’s open border policy to accept refugees stranded in the Balkans. On Russia, however, he is more critical, calling for a new effort to re-engage with Vladimir Putin. Most recently, at the Munich Security Conference, he called for stronger Franco-German relations, and more support for the eurozone reforms proposed by Emmanuel Macron.

As CDU leader in North Rhine-Westphalia, Laschet has the strongest power base. He earned his political spurs there by winning the last state election in 2017, in contrast to Röttgen, who lost to the SPD and Greens five years earlier.

Röttgen, chairman of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee, is the surprise candidate. Once a Merkel favourite, they fell out when she sacked him as environment minister after he lost the North Rhine-Westphalia election. By throwing his hat in the ring, he has forced it to become an open contest. He is independent-minded and outspoken, but not as bitterly hostile to the chancellor as Merz, so he could be a compromise candidate.

Laschet is clearly the man Merkel would find it easiest to live with. The decision will be taken by a party congress, not a grassroots ballot, which gives him a better chance. But Merz is the most eloquent orator and seen as the best campaigner. The challenge for party members is whether they believe it is better to swing right and squeeze the AfD, or stick to the centre to hold onto voters tempted by the Greens, who have replaced the SPD as the second-most popular party in Germany.

The race is wide open. So is the future of the CDU. The only prediction one can make with much certainty is that as long as Merkel remains chancellor, any successor will struggle to get out of her shadow.

This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.

This article adopts a constructive approach to examining the problem of the Indo-Pacific construct. Through reflection on the east Asian experience, it proposes an analytical framework of developmental peace as a constellation of international practices, which means that the more economic development is prioritized by states in regional processes, the more likely it is that a sustainable peace will be achieved. States participating in regional integration comprise a community of practice. On the basis of a shared understanding that development is of overriding importance and underpins security and state legitimacy, the community takes economic development as the anchoring practice; this practice embodies and enacts constitutive rules and fundamental norms for a broader set of practices in regional processes, such as peaceful coexistence and non-interference. The more economic development is prioritized on domestic and regional agendas, the more likely it is that conflicts in the security realm will be relaxed or even resolved to protect security interests. The author draws some useful implications from the developmental peace in east Asia for the Indo-Pacific construct, among which the most important include building shared understandings on the prioritization of economic development, taking advantage of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and using the code of conduct process as a vehicle and best practice to facilitate rule-making for the maritime order. Finally, the author briefly discusses the contributions of the study and limitations of the model.

The new UK government will conduct a review of foreign, security and defence policy in 2020. If the UK decides to use values as a framework for foreign policy this needs to be reflected in its armed forces. One area where this is essential is continuing to deepen inclusivity for LGBTIQ+ personnel, building on the progress made since the ban on their service was lifted in 2000.

I witnessed the ban first-hand as a young officer in the British Army in 1998. As the duty officer I visited soldiers being held in the regimental detention cells to check all was well. One day a corporal, who I knew, was there awaiting discharge from the army having been convicted of being gay. On the one hand, here was service law in action, which was officially protecting the army’s operational effectiveness and an authority not to be questioned at my level. On the other, here was an excellent soldier in a state of turmoil and public humiliation. How extreme this seems now.

On 12 January 2000 Tony Blair’s Labour government announced an immediate lifting of the ban for lesbian, gay and bisexual personnel (LGB) and introduced a new code of conduct for personal relationships. (LGB is the term used by the armed forces to describe those personnel who had been banned prior to 2000.) This followed a landmark ruling in a case taken to the European Court of Human Rights in 1999 by four LGB ex-service personnel – supported by Stonewall – who had been dismissed from service for their sexuality.

Up to that point the Ministry of Defence's long-held position had been that LGB personnel had a negative impact on the morale and cohesion of a unit and damaged operational effectiveness. Service personnel were automatically dismissed if it was discovered they were LGB, even though homosexuality had been decriminalized in the UK by 1967.

Proof that the armed forces had been lagging behind the rest of society was confirmed by the positive response to the change among service personnel, despite a handful of vocal political and military leaders who foresaw negative impacts. The noteworthy service of LGBTIQ+ people in Iraq and Afghanistan only served to debunk any residual myths.

Twenty years on, considerable progress has been made and my memories from 1998 now seem alien. This is a story to celebrate – however in the quest for greater inclusivity there is always room for improvement.

Defence Minister Johnny Mercer last week apologized following recent calls from campaign group Liberty for a fuller apology. In December 2019, the Ministry of Defence announced it was putting in place a scheme to return medals stripped from veterans upon their discharge.

The armed forces today have a range of inclusivity measures to improve workplace culture including assessments of workplace climate and diversity networks supported by champions drawn from senior leadership.

But assessing the actual lived experience for LGBTIQ+ people is challenging due to its subjectivity. This has not been helped by low participation in the 2015 initiative to encourage people to declare confidentially their sexual orientation, designed to facilitate more focused and relevant policies. As of 1 October 2019, only 20.3 per cent of regular service people had declared a sexual orientation.

A measure of positive progress is the annual Stonewall Workplace Equality Index, the definitive benchmarking tool for employers to measure their progress on LGBTIQ+ inclusion in the workplace; 2015 marked the first year in which all three services were placed in the top 100 employers in the UK and in 2019 the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force were placed 15th=, 51st= and 68th respectively.

Nevertheless, LGBTIQ+ service people and those in other protected groups still face challenges. The 2019 Ministry of Defence review of inappropriate behaviour in the armed forces, the Wigston Report, concluded there is an unacceptable level of sexual harassment, bullying and discrimination. It found that 26-36% of LGBTIQ+ service people have experienced negative comments or conduct at work because of their sexual orientation.

The Secretary of State for Defence accepted the report’s 36 recommendations on culture, incident reporting, training and a more effective complaints system. Pivotal to successful implementation will be a coherent strategy driven by fully engaged leaders.

Society is also expecting ever higher standards, particularly in public bodies. The armed forces emphasise their values and standards, including ‘respect for others’, as defining organisational characteristics; individuals are expected to live by them. Only in a genuinely inclusive environment can an individual thrive and operate confidently within a team.

The armed forces also recognize as a priority the need to connect to and reflect society more closely in order to attract and retain talent from across all of society. The armed forces’ active participation in UK Pride is helping to break down barriers in this area.

In a post-Brexit world, the UK’s values, support for human rights and reputation for fairness are distinctive strengths that can have an impact on the world stage and offer a framework for future policy. The armed forces must continue to push and promote greater inclusivity in support. When operating overseas with less liberal regimes, this will be sensitive and require careful handling; however it will be an overt manifestation of a broader policy and a way to communicate strong and consistent values over time.

The armed forces were damagingly behind the times 20 years ago. But good progress has been made since. Inclusion initiatives must continue to be pushed to bring benefits to the individual and the organization as well as demonstrate a values-based foreign policy.

The president of Malta discusses the current security challenges in the Mediterranean region, reflecting on the role of international cooperation in addressing climate change, migration and refugee flows.

In April 2018, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), held in London, saw the creation and the adoption of the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration. The declaration outlines the framework for a concerted effort to advance cybersecurity practices to promote a safe and prosperous cyberspace for Commonwealth citizens, businesses and societies. 

The conference will aim to provide an overview on the progress made on cybersecurity in the Commonwealth since the declaration was announced in 2018. In addition, it will examine future challenges and potential solutions going forward.

This conference is part of the International Security Programme's project on Implementing the Commonwealth Cybersecurity Agenda and will convene a range of senior Commonwealth representatives as well as a selection of civil society and industry stakeholders. This project aims to develop a pan-Commonwealth platform to take the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration forward by means of a holistic, inclusive and representative approach.

Please see below meeting summaries from previous events on Cybersecurity in the Commonwealth:  

• A cyberspace that supports economic and social rights online (London)
• Build the foundations of an effective national cybersecurity response (Barbados)
• Promote stability in cyberspace through international cooperation (Addis Ababa)

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

From the perception of the imminence of threats at the political level to the seizing of initiative through proper timing at the tactical level, temporality is directly related to war and warfare. Yet, despite some analyses of the importance of time at the political/grand strategic level (usually by scholars) and at the tactical level (usually by military professionals) there is surprisingly little discussion of the impact of time on the preparation and the conduct of warfare. This article introduces the concept of ‘wartime paradigm’ as a heuristic device to understand the relationship between the perception of time and the conduct of warfare, and argues that after the Cold War, a specific ‘wartime paradigm’ combining an optimization for speed and an understanding of war as risk management has guided western warfare, from force structure to the conduct of actual operations. It shows how the changing character of warfare directly challenges this wartime paradigm and why, if western forces want to prevail in future conflicts, the establishment of a new wartime paradigm guiding technological improvements and operational concepts is critical.

This year marks the 20^th anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security – the first to recognize the important role of women in peacebuilding. How did the resolution come into being and how significant was its adoption in 2000?  

Well it has quite an amazing history that goes back to other UN resolutions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, which were passed in the 1960s and came into force in the 1970s. These were some of the biggest covenants on human and civil rights at the time but it was only later that people realised, that those who passed them, did not assume that they applied to women.

There was an attempt, subsequently, to pass the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women – commonly called the CEDAW Convention – which was widely adopted in 1979, when 187 out of 194 UN members signed, although the United States was not one of them, and in fact, the US has still not ratified the treaty. But the understanding that women’s rights were not necessarily assumed in human and civil rights action was beginning to gain recognition.

Then, in 1995, Hillary Clinton spoke in Beijing and really put it forward that women’s rights were human rights and also civil rights and we all have to address them as such. So, ‘95 really brought together all the different social groups – women’s groups, human’s rights groups, civil rights groups, and more, who pushed for the women, peace and security agenda to be passed in 2000 at the United Nations. 

The resolution on women, peace and security was a significant moment because it recognized gender equality issues were national security issues – not just social justice issues – and was soon followed by a number of other resolutions which make up the women, peace and security agenda today. 

Conflict has a disproportionate effect on women and girls, with global security threats, such as climate change,  reported to impact women more than men. In light of this, growing numbers of women are now serving on the frontlines of conflicts, in comparison to 1957-1989, when  only 20 women served as UN peacekeepers. In your view, what have been the successes of the women, peace and security agenda so far?

I think some of the successes specific to peacekeeping have been, as you mentioned, that women are increasingly part of peacekeeping forces being deployed to conflict and post-conflict situations.

Importantly, the nature of war is changing – we are no longer primarily engaged in interstate work in some places – it’s mostly intrastate work where there are often ethnic or religious overtones.

In this landscape, women are often caught up in the battle lines. They often become the heads of their households when the men are gone or injured or killed. There have also been instances of rape being used as a weapon of war and other forms of sexual violence being committed in conflict and post-conflict situations even by peacekeepers.

So, having more women as peacekeepers is important because, number one, when women see women peacekeepers, they are much less likely to fear them, and therefore, feel less threatened speaking to them. Number two, women are a less threatening presence so civil society begins to build again. Number three, women peacekeepers give women in the local area a role model of strength showing them that they can play an active role in their own security. Finally, I would say that women peacekeepers are all impressively trained to guard those under their protection.

What other successes have there been more broadly outside of peacekeeping? Well, I think one that is often cited is that there’s a 20 per cent increase in the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years and a 35 per cent increase in the probability of that peace agreement lasting 15 years if women are at the negotiating table. The reason being that women bring things to the table – for example focussing on the root causes of conflict – that men neglect either because they’re not aware of them or it’s not considered an issue of importance to them. 

We have a pretty abysmal history of peace agreements holding so including more women in peace negotiations, given these increases in the probability of agreements holding, seems to me the only logical thing to do.

You mentioned the inclusion of women in peace processes increases the likelihood of agreements succeeding, however, women continue to be underrepresented, comprising under 10 per cent of peace negotiators and under 4 per cent of signatories to peace agreements. Do you think there are any shortcomings with focusing on increasing the presence of women over the positions they hold and how their positions are used to further gender equality?  

I think there are a couple of aspects to this. Importantly, women have been extremely effective in leadership positions, for example, in Liberia. But it is true having women at the table does not necessarily further gender equality in the long-term and I think this was the case in Northern Ireland where the women who were at the table did not include provisions for women. But, I think, we’ve learned since then.

The most important case to cite right now, in my view, is that of women in Afghanistan. They came out of their homes, they went to school, they identified themselves as proponents of gender equality, yet now, with the US-Taliban deal, there were almost no women at the table and not a single provision in the peace agreement that deals with women. So what’s going to happen to all of these women?

Since 2000, the number of agreements referring to women has grown to 28 per cent – more than double the number between 1990-2000. However, some critics have pointed to the gap between theory and practice since many peace agreements still omit a gender perspective on peacekeeping operations. What, in your opinion, have been the failings of realising the women, peace and security agenda so far?

You know, it’s not just critics who point this out, it’s advocates as well, that there is a big gap between rhetoric and implementation. I think the reason for this, in most cases, is political will. It’s the idea that gender equality is an optional luxury – we’ll get to it when we can – and that we have more important issues to work out. Well the agency of 50 per cent of the population should not be seen as an optional luxury.

In all cases, however, it’s a question of power. There are only so many seats at the table where power is doled out and nobody wants to give up theirs to let somebody else sit down. So, I think, there is active resistance to implementing gender equality in the peace and security arena because it would mean sharing power. 

There are also some other reasons. The first is something we call the ‘blind fish’ – people who are simply unaware of gender equality issues – the second, which is interestingly by adamant supporters of the women in peace and security agenda, and that’s they are not given the budget and the authority to carry out the agenda as it should be.

The concept of a feminist foreign policy, which places gender equality and women’s rights at the centre of its foreign policy goals, has been gaining momentum globally. Sweden became the first country in the world to adopt a feminist foreign policy in 2015, and since then, 82 countries have adopted national action plans to raise the role of women in peace processes. How effective have these measures been to furthering women in peace and security? 

That, I think, is one of the issues that women in peace and security advocates, such as myself, are currently looking at because the word ‘feminist’, for better or for worse, is a trigger in many countries.

In many countries, it’s a negative trigger, which is kind of ironic because, if you ask people, ‘Do you believe in gender equality?’, a lot of people will say, ‘Yes absolutely.’  But if you ask people, ‘Are you a feminist?’, a lot of people will say, ‘No not me.’ 

So, the question is, do we aim for a broad goal like a feminist foreign policy which would look at defining peace as, not just the absence of war, but a lot more then than that, such as creating the conditions needed for gender equality and aiming for peace and stability among other broader goals.

Or do we aim to work on a more incremental basis by trying to get more women into peacekeeping, trying to get more women into leadership positions, trying to move gender equality up the agenda as the more effective path forward?

I think the answer to the question is that it depends. If you’re Sweden, Canada or Mexico, a feminist foreign policy might be acceptable. But, if you’re the United States, it’s nowhere near acceptable. Even getting the US Defence Department to take the incremental steps of the women, peace and security agenda has been challenging.

Why do you think that is the case in the United States?

I think a lot of it has to do with power as I mentioned earlier. It has to do with an assumption that women aren’t assertive and don’t see security under the same lens as men, which is true, but which is why they are needed in this space.

I think it also, again, goes back to the point that some see it as an optional luxury rather than an absolute necessity and everybody is too busy – or simply unwilling – to change the status quo.

You mentioned the cases of Liberia and Northern Ireland, but another example that struck me was Rwanda, where women make up 62 per cent of the national legislature, far more proportionally than any other country, following provisions included in its constitution in the aftermath of the genocide of 1994.

Though equal representation between men and women is still far off for most of the world, what does the case of Rwanda and other post-conflict countries demonstrate about how to go about including more women in peacebuilding?

Well, I think the number one way to get more women into political leadership roles, where the women, peace and security agenda could then be implemented, is quotas. 

Many countries use quotas to increase more women in political participation, which Rwanda certainly does, although there are different types. There are quotas that say each political party must have X number of women as candidates and then there are quotas that say the overall number of women in the parliament must reach a certain level. 

So there are different varieties of quotas but they are all used as, kind of, affirmative action methods to at least temporarily bring the numbers up to where women’s voices are inclusive not token. 

Research has shown that until you have at least 33 per cent of a minority in an overall group – so if it’s all men then 33 per cent of this group as women – then you won’t see any change because having one or two will likely be drowned out. But, at about 33 per cent, they’re able to have political power which then means their views and their agendas are seriously considered. So, in Rwanda, that has certainly been the case and that’s been one of the big lessons learned. 

As I mentioned earlier, in Northern Ireland, the lesson learned was that it’s not enough to just have women in on peace agreements. There need to be implementation assurances written into the peace agreement that says it must be taken forward. So, in this vein, women have been learning over the years how to make a difference in male-dominated spaces. 

50 years ago, humans landed on the moon, becoming one of the most significant moments in human history. The stories of women, from Margaret Hamilton, to Katherine Johnson, to JoAnn Morgan, who all helped men take their first steps on the moon at the height of the space race, have since come into the spotlight. How will the inclusion of women need to be considered more in space security as it becomes increasingly important in international relations?

Right now, space security is at a very critical point. We have moved from a situation where there was both co-operation and competition during the space race to a situation of great power competition in space where the United States, China and Russia are, for the first time, overtly weaponizing space. When I say overtly, much of space technology is dual-use, meaning it could be used as a weapon or it could be used as something for non-military purposes.

In the past, the United States and other countries have been very careful, kind of, not to cross the Rubicon into the overt weaponization of space but that’s now ending which I think puts us in a very precarious situation. 

What seems to be missing from considerations of space security at the moment is the most threatening issue – space debris – which can only be dealt with on a multinational basis meaning it inherently requires co-operation. 

So, what I think more women in space security positions would bring, would be that inclusion and the insistence on inclusion as a pillar of space diplomacy.

If there was just a fraction of the money, and manpower, spent on space diplomacy as there is on planning for space warfare, I think we’d all be a lot better off.

How far do current discussions about women in peace and security factor in space security?

Not at all.

Do you see the role of women in space security progressing in the future in spite of this and also despite what some have described as a broader backlash against women around the world whether in the political or in the security space?

I think there have been events over the past five or so years that have made women around the world, if anything, more acutely insistent on their participation than ever before.

We saw the marches in 2017, in the United States and worldwide, in response to what women felt was a rise in authoritarian and misogynistic governments and we have seen the rollbacks in gender equality rights in areas like reproduction too but I don’t think they’re going to take it lying down. The backlash, if anything, is going to spur women to be more, not less, active in all spaces. 

Some have argued for the need of a men, peace and security agenda, to compliment the work on women, with proponents arguing that men are needed to realise gender equality worldwide. How far are men needed as allies to realise the women, peace and security agenda? 

Well, I think, though the women, peace and security agenda has women in the title, it argues for gendered perspectives, that policies affect men and women differently. So, I think it is very important that it not be seen as dealing only with women’s issues – it deals with gendered perspectives. 

In that regard, it is very much needed to have a broadening of all of those involved. I mentioned earlier it was all women’s groups that got the women, peace and security agenda passed and now we need to include men. In fact, I would point out, NATO is a great example of an organization that has recognized the importance of looking at how policies affect men and women, girls and boys. 

So bringing more men in to support gendered perspectives is absolutely essential and looking at gendered perspectives in things like leadership roles is critical as well as gendered perspectives in everything from space policy to nuclear policy to human security issues too.

In your view, what are the greatest challenges to the uptake of gendered perspectives across the board and what, if anything, needs to change in order to realise the goals set out by the UNSC 20 years ago?

On a macro level, we need accountability. We have lots of policies, laws, national action plans and strategies of all kinds but we need accountability.

In the United States, in particular, I very much hope that accountability comes from Congress. In 2017, Congress passed the Women, Peace and Security Act on a bipartisan basis but I think it’s now up to Congress to hold organizations responsible for its implementation. 

On an organizational level, we need to get, as you said, more men involved. But, interestingly, not all women agree, so we need to have more talks among women too, be they liberal, conservative, working, non-working, mothers, not mothers etc. We may have different views but where we’re trying to go is the same and we need to work together better. 

I think among the advocates of women, peace and security, there are still issues that are up for debate like do we go for big feminist foreign policies or do we go for incremental change? In addition, are there lynchpin issues such as reproductive rights, women’s healthcare, gender equality or budget? 

You know, in the United States, I wrote in an article that although the US Defence Department gave $4 million for women, peace and security in 2018, which they were patting themselves on the back for, the Military Times pointed out that they are spending $84 million a year on Viagra.

But this is not just in the United States. 140 countries stood up at the UN to advocate for women, peace and security in 2000 but only 25 per cent of those have national action plans and any budget connected to those plans. Everyone everywhere needs to put their money where their mouths are if we are to realise the goals set out by the UNSC 20 years ago.

Images are central to social media communication. Billions of images are shared across different social media platforms every day: photos, cartoons, GIFs and short video clips are exchanged by users, facilitating or framing discourse on participatory sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. Many of these images depict events of extreme violence, which circulate uninhibited by the conventional constraints associated with traditional news media censorship. A question arises here as to how such images mobilize public and policy-making responses to atrocities. This article examines the political dynamics of violent social media images. I argue that the particular qualities of social media can play an important role in how the digital visibility of horrific violence influences policy-making as a response to such atrocities. There is an important connection between the properties of social media platforms that allow user images to reach a global audience in real time and the emotional responses that this level of circulation generates. In turn, the pressure created by events made globally visible through the circulation of violent images and the audience responses to those images puts governments in a position where they are forced to act, which has significant implications for policy-making.

Soon after assuming power in 1994, President Aliaksandr Lukashenka turned his back on democratic norms and overpowered the Belarusian political elite. However, the influence of the governing elite in Belarus is growing again. It seems likely that the current governing class could rule the country after Lukashenka leaves. It is thus important to study Belarusian elites not only to understand the current regime, but also to better forecast and navigate the political system that will one day replace it. 

This study group aims to disentangle how the Belarusian political system works, outline the types of individuals that make up the Belarusian ruling elite, assess the interaction of the elite and institutions with the West, and suggest changes that Western political actors might make to their approach to the Belarusian ruling class.

Illicit finance not only threatens financial stability and inclusion but also provides support for terrorism and is a primary incentive for human trafficking, the illegal wildlife trade and narcotics smuggling. Frequently, actors capitalize on loopholes and inefficiencies resulting from the lack of a coordinated response to financial crime and an underpowered global system for tracking illicit financial flows. Enhanced public-private partnerships, in addition to investment in tackling financial crime from governments, international bodies and private industries, are necessary to develop regulatory frameworks, effective responses and valuable coordination between law enforcement, policymakers, regulators and financial institutions. But how should businesses structure their efforts so that their business interests are protected and the work they do is of use to others fighting financial crime?

This webinar will explore solutions to enable public-private partnerships to work together to combat financial crime. What do successful partnerships need from each side to ensure that the work being done is efficient and effective? How can the industry’s internal effectiveness impact the ‘real-world’ victims? And what barriers impede public-private partnerships operating as a force for good? 

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

This  event is  part of the US and Americas Programme Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST. 

As governments in the Americas grapple with the economic and health emergencies posed by COVID-19, the region continues to face socioeconomic and political challenges reflected in the protests that erupted in many countries in 2019. According to an annual survey by Latinóbarometro, of 18 countries across Latin America, trust in government dropped from 45 per cent in 2009 to 22 per cent in 2018, and those expressing dissatisfaction with democracy has increased from 51 per cent to 71 per cent. 

Recently re-elected to a new term, Luis Almagro, secretary general of the Organization of American States, will reflect on the state of democracy in the Americas. What are the greatest threats and opportunities to democratic governance and political participation in the region? How can multilateral organizations and states defend democratic institutions and human rights in a changing global environment? To what extent might the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic provide leaders with an opportunity to undemocratically consolidate power? Or, conversely, might the crisis spark a new understanding of the social contract between states and governed and greater consensus around national policies and leadership?  

This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations and selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you'd like to attend, please RSVP to lbedford@chathamhouse.org.

The US government recently announced restrictions on immigration, stating the new measures were necessary due to COVID-19 and the effect the pandemic has had on the US economy. But what is the role of immigrants in the essential official and unofficial services in the COVID-19 stay-at-home era? How is COVID-19 affecting immigration from Central America and Mexico? 

Separately, there have also been instances of outbreaks among detainees in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement centers and claims that immigrants who are returning to Guatemala are spreading the virus. How have US immigration policies affected infection rates in Central America and Mexico and among its citizens?

Arturo Sarukhan, Mexican Ambassador to the US from 2007 - 13, and Anita Isaacs, Benjamin R. Collins Professor of Social Sciences, Haverford College, will join us to discuss the impact COVID-19 is having on migrants.

Chatham House would like to thank BTG Pactual, Cairn Energy plc, Diageo plc, Equinor, Fresnillo Management Services, HSBC Holdings plc and Wintershall Dea for their generous support of the Latin America Initiative.

This event is scheduled to take place from 15:00 – 16:00 BST.

This virtual roundtable has been co-convened by Chatham House and the Aga Khan Foundation.  

While conducting research in fragile and conflict-affected contexts has always presented challenges, the outbreak of COVID-19 creates additional challenges including travel restrictions, ethical challenges, and disruptions to usual modes of working. This virtual roundtable will explore how organizations can adapt their research and monitoring and evaluation models in response to the coronavirus pandemic. This event aims to discuss the research methods being used to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis; the important role of technology; and ways to engage policy and decision-makers during this time.

 

This event is part of the US and Americas Programme Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.

This event will take place from 14:00 – 15:00 BST.

Across the globe, leaders on the local, national and international levels are grappling with the impacts of COVID-19 on their communities and the economy. But the coronavirus pandemic is just one of several existential crises the world is currently facing. Climate change, political instability and growing tensions with China and Russia, along with a lack of strong global leadership, has made it more difficult for individual nations to respond and coalesce in times of crisis.

This discussion will explore how leaders at all levels can best negotiate both the practical issues and the larger questions associated with these ‘grand challenges’. How is current US foreign policy affecting our collective ability to respond to issues such as pandemics or climate change? Has the COVID-19 crisis cemented the US retreat from global leadership and if so, who might step into the breach? How do we maintain momentum on other issues in the midst of a public health disaster of this magnitude? And what is the role of the business community, higher education institutions and other sectors in responding to these crises and shaping future public policy?

This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations and selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you'd like to attend, please RSVP to lbedford@chathamhouse.org.

This meeting will see the launch of the Chatham House-CAGE briefing paper ‘Human Development as Positive Freedom: A World View since 1870’. The author of the paper will argue that while substantial gains in world human development have been achieved since 1870, the main period of improvement actually occurred between World War I and 1970. He will further argue that, despite initial successes in lifting human development, the socialist experiments of the 20th century failed to sustain momentum and then (with the exception of Cuba) stagnated and fell behind prior to the socialist model's ultimate demise. Finally, he will contend that since 1970, while most OECD countries have experienced a second (later life) health transition, all developing regions have fallen behind in this dimension.

The briefing paper is the 12th publication in the Chatham House-CAGE series, published in partnership with the Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) at the University of Warwick.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.