Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.

While China and Russia's general policies towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are similar, the two reveal nuanced differences in addressing specific emergencies. Both express support for the first two pillars of R2P while resisting coercive intervention under its aegis, as they share anxieties of domestic political security and concerns about their international image. Nonetheless, addressing cases like the Syrian crisis, Russian statements are more assertive and even aggressive while Chinese ones are usually vague and reactive. This article highlights the two states’ different tones through computer-assisted text analyses. It argues that diplomatic styles reflect Russian and Chinese perceptions of their own place in the evolving international order. Experiences in past decades create divergent reference points and status prospects for them, which leads to their different strategies in signalling Great Power status. As Beijing is optimistic about its status-rising prospects, it exercises more self-restraint in order to avoid external containments and is reluctant to act as an independent ‘spoiler’. Meanwhile, Moscow interprets its Great Power status more from a frame of ‘loss’ and therefore is inclined to adopt a sterner approach to signal its status. Although their policies complement each other on many occasions, there is nothing akin to a Sino–Russian ‘bloc’.

Global health security is underpinned by the actions taken at a national level to ensure capacities exist to sufficiently prepare for and respond to acute threats and crises. In many contexts, National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs) were first established because of, and in response to, specific public health challenges typically related to infectious diseases.

The Strengthening National Accountability and Preparedness for Global Health Security (SNAP-GHS) project evolved from a series of roundtables and discussions hosted by the Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House, in collaboration with the Graduate Institute of Geneva.

The outcome of the project is a SNAP-GHS Toolkit to support NPHIs in better diagnosing and understanding the challenges to data use within their own institutes, as well as in relation to external stakeholders and agencies. The toolkit is intended to be used for further circulation and dissemination by the International Association of National Public Health Institutes (IANPHI).

The project is led by the Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House in collaboration with the Ethiopian Public Health Institute, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, and the National Institute for Health in Pakistan.

The world’s second-largest Ebola outbreak is ongoing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and experts from around the world have been parachuted in to support the country’s operation to stamp out the outbreak. The signs are encouraging, but we need to remain cautious.

In such emergencies, little thought is usually given to what happens to the body-fluid samples taken during the course of the outbreak after the crisis is over. What gets left behind has considerable implications for global biosecurity.

Having unsecured samples poses the obvious risk of accidental exposures to people who might come into contact with them, but what of the risk of malicious use? Bioterrorists would have ready access to materials that have the characteristics essential to their purpose: the potential to cause disease that is transmissible from person to person, the capacity to result in high fatality rates and, importantly, the ability to cause panic and social disruption at the very mention of them.

Comparisons can be drawn with the significant international impact of the anthrax attacks in the US in 2001. Not only was there a direct effect in the US with five deaths and a further 17 people infected, but there was a paralysis of public health systems in other countries involved in the testing of countless samples from the so-called ‘white-powder incidents’ that followed.

Many laboratory tests were done purely on a precautionary basis to eliminate any possibility of a risk, no matter how remote. However, the UK was also hit when a hoaxer sent envelopes of white powder labelled as anthrax to 15 MPs.

The threat of the pathogen alone resulted in widespread fear, the deployment of officers trained in response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents and the evacuation of a hospital emergency department.

We learned from the 2014–16 West Africa Ebola outbreaks that during the emergency, the future biosecurity implications of the many thousands of samples taken from people were given very little consideration. It is impossible to be sure where they all are and whether they have been secured.

It is widely recognized that the systems needed at the time for tracking and monitoring resources, including those necessary for samples, were weak or absent, and this has to be addressed urgently along with other capacity-building initiatives.

In Sierra Leone, for example, the remaining biosecurity risk is only being addressed after the fact. To help achieve this, the government of Canada is in the process of providing a secure biobank in the Sierra Leonean capital of Freetown. The aim is to provide the proper means of storage for these hazardous samples and to allow them to remain in-country, with Sierra Leonean ownership.

However, it is already more three years since the emergency was declared over by the then director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), Margaret Chan, and the biobank and its associated laboratory are yet to be fully operational.

There are many understandable reasons for this delay, including the critical issue of how best to ensure the sustainability of any new facility. But what is clear is that these solutions take time to implement and must be planned for in advance.

The difficulties of responding to an outbreak in a conflict zone have been well documented, and the frequent violence in DRC has undoubtedly caused delays in controlling the outbreak. According to figures from WHO, during 2019 approximately 390 attacks on health facilities in DRC killed 11 and injured 83 healthcare workers and patients.

Not only does the conflict inhibit the response, but it could also increase the risk posed by unsecured samples. There are two main potential concerns.

First is the risk of accidental release during an attack on a health facility, under which circumstances sample containers may be compromised or destroyed. Second is that the samples may be stolen for malicious use or to sell them to a third-party for malicious use. It is very important in all outbreaks to ensure the necessary measures are in place to secure samples; in conflict-affected areas, this is particularly challenging.

The sooner the samples in the DRC are secured, the sooner this risk to global biosecurity is reduced. And preparations for the next emergency must be made without further delay.

The following steps need to be taken:

• Affected countries must ‘own’ the problem, with clear national government commitment to take the required actions.
• Funding partners must coordinate their actions and work closely with the countries to find the best solutions.
• If samples are to be kept in-country, secure biobanks must be established to contain them.
• Sustainable infrastructure must be built for samples to be kept secure into the future.
• An international agreement should be reached on the best approach to take to prepare for the aftermath of global health emergencies.

About the Conference

At a time of geopolitical uncertainty and with multilateralism under pressure, this conference brought together diverse actors to explore the evolving role of international law on critical security and economic issues in the Asia-Pacific. From trade agreements to deep-sea mining, cyberwarfare to territorial disputes, the breadth of the discussion illustrated the growing reach of international law in the region.

Hosted by the International Law Programme and the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House on 27 March 2019, the conference focused on three themes: trade and investment, maritime security and governance, and emerging security challenges. What trends are emerging in terms of engagement with international law in the region, and how can international standards play a greater role in encouraging collaboration and reducing tensions? And, with the eastward shift in geopolitical power, how will Asia-Pacific states shape the future of international law?

The ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy, actively promoted by the United States with support from its allies and partners, is a significant geopolitical response to China's growing power and expanding influence in Asia and beyond. Beijing has adopted various new strategies to cope with the challenges related to FOIP. One of these strategies is to secure a robust relationship with south-east Asia in order to make these regional states either neutral to or less supportive of the Indo-Pacific vision. In addition to economic statecraft and soft power, Beijing believes that it can also tap into the domain of non-traditional security (NTS) to strengthen relations with this region to position itself better in the intensifying regional geopolitical competition. The article addresses the following question: what is the impact of China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asia on Beijing's geopolitical rivalry with other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region? The article argues that China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asian countries may help China maintain its geopolitical standing in the region, but it is unlikely to lead to any dramatic increase of China's strategic influence in the region. This essentially means that Beijing may be able to prevent ASEAN or most ASEAN member states from lending substantive and strong support to the Indo-Pacific construct, but it will not be able to stop ASEAN states from supporting some elements of the FOIP.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been regarded by international society as a major policy tool in China's geo-economic strategy. Under this policy platform, Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructure and industrial sectors across Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific nations. It is widely believed that such huge amount of investment will inevitably generate significant geostrategic repercussions in these regions. In response to the BRI, the United States and other powers have come up with a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. This article attempts to address the following question: what impact is the BRI likely to have on the security ties between China and the other major players in the Indo-Pacific? The author finds that the BRI may significantly transform China's international security policy and the expansion of Beijing's security influence may further intensify the security competition between China and other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The article also proposes a new analytical angle for the study of geo-economics that unpacks the role of economic activities and processes in generating geopolitical intentions and catalysing geopolitical competition.