Seeing geo-strategic rivalry between the US and China as the sole variable in Asia-Pacific security risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, according to a forthcoming Chatham House paper.            

As Xi Jinping’s visit to the US approaches, The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US–China Narrative, warns against deploying Cold War-type narratives that pit the two countries against each other. Such narratives not only misunderstand the complexity of the region and the growing influence of India, Japan and Indonesia, but also risk increasing the likelihood of conflict and of missing vital opportunities for future cooperation.                

The paper, by John Nilsson-Wright, Tim Summers and Xenia Wickett argues that by focusing too heavily on the US and China, policymakers risk narrowing the aperture through which they evaluate policy choices regarding major regional challenges. Some of the key findings include the following:

Military

• Despite rapidly rising defence spending across Asia, the relative importance of traditional military means is declining relative to instruments such as development assistance and cyber offence.
• The militaries of Japan and India are becoming – in very different ways – more versatile and potentially expanding their remits. In the future, there will be a larger number of more capable military powers in the region, including South Korea and Vietnam.
• Current perceptions that the main dynamic is China’s rising military capabilities outstripping others in the region, therefore, need to be tempered. India’s defence spending, for example, as a percentage of GDP has surpassed China’s for the past several decades.

Economics

• Although China has the world’s second-largest economy and – despite recent problems – is growing faster than most major economies, its growth rate is in secular decline. China has gone from near-constant double-digit growth over the past four decades to 7.4 per cent in 2014 and could dip below 7 per cent this year.
• Whilst India’s economy remains notably smaller than those of China, the US and Japan, it will surpass China’s growth rate this year and has a lot of potential.
• If the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is successfully negotiated, the potential for integration and growth between the United States, Japan and the other 10 TPP members may reduce their current trade dependence on China.

Demography

• The demography of Asia is another reason to look beyond the US-China nexus, as China faces the challenge of an aging society, while countries such as India have the advantage of a younger population and decades of demographic dividend ahead of them.
• Likewise populations across much of Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia are growing rapidly and expanding their middle classes. 

The primary objectives of this three-year partnership are to integrate consideration of global health security challenges into the MSC agenda, highlight the threats from infectious diseases and stimulate discussion of the importance of investment in global health, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. 

At the 2016 MSC, the Chatham House Centre on Global Health Security facilitated a roundtable on civilian access to health care during conflict and a panel session entitled 'The Plot Sickens – The Health-Security Nexus'. This marked the first time health security had been featured in the main conference, and highlights the growing significance of health security to broader global stability and security. Chatham House produced, with support from the Gates Foundation, a short film including insights from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Melinda Gates to introduce themes that were discussed as key security threats on the health-security nexus.

Initiated in 2015, the collaboration will continue with a Chatham House roundtable and a plenary session at the MSC’s Core Group Meeting in Addis Ababa in April, and further contributions to the 2017 MSC agenda.

He brings decades of experience as a health economist working in international development and health and is an internationally recognized expert on universal health coverage (UHC) and progressive health financing, operating at the highest political levels.

For the past five years, Rob has led the Centre’s work on Universal Health Coverage (UHC) as director of its UHC Policy Forum, which works on the political economy of UHC reform processes and advises political leaders and government ministries on how to plan, finance and implement national UHC reforms.

He has also worked closely with The Elders on presenting policy options on universal health reforms to heads of state across the world. Before leading the UHC Policy Forum at Chatham House, Rob was a senior health economist at the World Health Organization from 2011 to 2014, after moving from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), where he was a senior health economist. Prior to that, Rob was the deputy head of the Integrated UN Office in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He also spent five years working for the government of Uganda as a senior health economist, on secondment from DFID during the early 2000s.

'I am delighted to welcome Rob Yates as the head of the Centre on Global Health Security. He will bring a wealth of experience to the role at a time of risk but also great opportunity in the sector,' said Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House. 'Rob will continue to work on his own area of expertise – universal health coverage – while ensuring the Centre continues to address other major global health challenges that manifest themselves as foreign policy and international affairs problems.'

Rob replaces David Heymann, who retires from the role as the Centre marks its 10th anniversary but will remain involved in several of the Centre’s projects.

'I would also like to pay tribute to David Heymann, who launched the Centre on Global Health Security in 2009 to examine key global health challenges in international affairs and world politics,' Niblett added. 'Without David the Centre would not have had the impact that it has and I am truly grateful for his hard work and achievements over the last 10 years.'

Yates takes up his post this week.

'I am honoured to become the new head of the Centre on Global Health Security and build on the successes delivered by David Heymann and the team over the last decade,' he said. 'My priority as the new head will be to ensure that our research and activities have a real impact in accelerating progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals by focusing on improving health security and health coverage in countries across the world. Engaging in issues related to the political economy of health and health care reforms will be critical in achieving this impact.'

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, is chair of the NATO Group of Policy Experts, tasked with providing NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the North Atlantic Council with ideas on how to strengthen the Alliance's transatlantic bond ahead of September's  NATO summit in Wales. 

The group's report Collective Defence and Common Security: Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance was published on 10 June for discussion at a NATO conference in Brussels on the transatlantic bond.

 

Executive Summary 

Key points from the Policy Experts report to NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, released at the Conference on Strengthening the Transatlantic Bond in Brussels on 10 June 2014:

• Transatlantic security cannot be taken for granted. Following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, NATO needs to reaffirm its value around the twin objectives of collective defence and common security. 

Upholding peace and stability in Europe 

• The commitment under NATO’s Article V to treat an attack against one as an attack against all must be credible, and NATO members should take concrete steps together to make it so. Tallinn should be as secure as Toronto. 

• There can be no return to a ‘strategic partnership’ between NATO and Russia so long as Russia’s actions threaten European security.

• European governments bear particular responsibility for ensuring their own territorial security. They must invest in the necessary R&D, equipment and deployable capabilities. No amount of ‘smarter’ defence will compensate for a failure to reverse falling defence spending.

• NATO needs to develop effective responses to the ‘non-linear’ forms of aggression seen during the crisis in Ukraine. But the EU should take the lead in helping its members and neighbours embed good governance practices that will lessen their vulnerability to external destabilization.

•  European countries should reduce their dependence on Russian energy. Russia’s main strength should no longer be Europe’s main vulnerability. 

• NATO’s door should remain open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance. However, existing members must be ready, willing and able to extend the full benefits of Alliance membership to them, including those in Article V.

 Confronting international insecurity 

• NATO should not turn inwards after 2014. Much of the Middle East, and North Africa face a decade of turmoil which will pose direct threats to NATO members. 

• In Asia, unresolved territorial disputes and historical animosities are driving dramatic rises in defence spending. It must be remembered that the Pacific Ocean is the western flank of NATO. 

• In this context, it should not be left to the United States and a handful of others to deploy hard power beyond NATO’s borders. An over-reliance on US power projection will erode the foundations of the transatlantic bond over time. 

• NATO and the EU must also cooperate closely to deliver their comprehensive range of capabilities to manage international crises, from market access and development assistance to military intervention and post-conflict civilian support. 

• Completion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will strengthen the transatlantic community strategically as well as economically.

• NATO needs to differentiate its approach to working with its international partners. In particular, it should develop long-term cooperative arrangements with the small number of countries in Europe and beyond which have contributed actively alongside NATO to international security in recent years. 

• The NATO–Russia Council should continue to operate at ambassadorial and higher levels. This will help the two sides coordinate responses to international crises and potentially rebuild trust on European security. 

• NATO publics are increasingly sceptical about the value of any form of external intervention. Political leaders need to communicate better the deterioration of the security situation in Europe; the importance of international security to their nations' welfare and prosperity; and the need to protect the core values that underpin the Alliance, especially democratic governance, open economies and the rule of law.  

Chatham House press release: Director of Chatham House to Chair New NATO Group of Policy Experts

 

NATO press release: NATO Secretary General to attend conference on Strengthening the Transatlantic Bond

With the Middle East in chaos and the future of many states increasingly uncertain, there is a large amount of attention as to how policy-makers in Europe and the US should respond. In particular, many in Europe are unsure of long-term US policy in light of competing American priorities, budgetary constraints and a public adverse to committing further resources abroad. In this context, it is important that European and American policy-makers understand each other’s positions.

At this all-day event, a group of experts will discuss how US policy towards the Middle East is changing, what this means for Europe and, subsequently, how Europe should respond. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The workshop is held as part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, with support for this event provided by the Delegation of Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defence and the British Embassy in Paris.

While trade and tax remain at the heart of the difficult economic conversations between Europe and the US, a new issue has emerged as a potential source of even greater friction: data.

Growth in the traditional global trade in goods and services has levelled off, but cross-border data flows continue to expand rapidly and the challenges of developing policies that protect privacy, security and innovation are already tremendous. For example, data analytics are driving dramatic productivity gains in industry, particularly for large and complex installations whose safety and efficiency will increasingly depend on flows of those data across jurisdictions. Meanwhile, ‘fintech’ (financial technology) start-ups and large banks alike are testing new modes of accumulating, analysing and deploying customer data to provide less expensive services and manage the risk profile of their businesses.

The rules that govern the collection, transmission and storage of data are perhaps one of the more surprising controversies in the transatlantic relationship. Similar liberal democracies with similar geostrategic interests might be expected to approach the handling of personal, corporate and government data in more or less the same way. And yet the US and its key European partners have struck different balances in the trade-offs between national security and citizens’ rights, between freedom of expression and personal privacy, and between free enterprise and market regulation.

While the US debate on the use of data has often been framed around the trade-off between national security and personal privacy, Europeans often face an even more complex set of concerns that include worries that their digital and technology firms lag behind dominant US competitors. The political and regulatory uncertainty helps neither side, and leaves transatlantic companies struggling to comply with uncertain and conflicting rules in different jurisdictions.

This makes more determined efforts by US and European policymakers to agree basic principles that will guide the usage and protection of personal and commercial data all the more important. While common regulations or even greater alignment among regulators seem out of reach, a ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’ would provide a set of principles for more specific rules amid political landscapes and technological developments that are evolving rapidly. It could also provide the basis for firms, whether in manufacturing or financial services or health care, to draft their own voluntary standards on how they protect data even as they develop new algorithms that improve productivity, safety and customer satisfaction.

Embarrassing leaks, careful denials and endless lawsuits will continue to shape the awkward efforts of policymakers to find common ground around issues like cyberespionage, defence of common networks and the sharing of personal data with law enforcement. Cyberattacks with the aim of disrupting government operations or influencing election campaigns will add still further pressures. These will all serve as a noisy backdrop to a related but separate debate over how commercial firms should exploit the opportunities of global networks and ‘big data’ analytics while protecting national interests and privacy.

Yet, setting common guidelines for commercial data transmission and storage remains crucial both to protect the goods and services that already depend on sophisticated data-gathering and analysis, and to support the next generation of productivity gains and business opportunities.

Global firms yearn for clarity and predictability as they organize themselves to make the most of the data revolution. Neither is likely to become a reality soon. The EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation will take effect in 2018, but its implementation will inevitably be coloured by the fact that American firms currently dominate the information technology business. Last year’s ‘Privacy Shield’ agreement between the US and the EU renews the permission for firms with transatlantic business interests to transfer data, subject to compliance with basic standards of protection, but the agreement remains vulnerable to European court challenges. Britain’s decision to leave the EU adds a further complication, as it establishes its own set of data protection rules that may not easily align with either European or US requirements. Meanwhile, the World Trade Organization continues to debate new rules for digital trade, even as markets like China, Russia and Brazil make up their own.

If this ‘Transatlantic Charter for Data Security and Mobility’ were adopted bilaterally, say as part of the annual reviews of the US–EU Privacy Shield agreement, it could form the basis for broader cooperation on these issues, helping to drive progress in the G7 and G20 and ultimately perhaps in trade agreements under the WTO. It would hardly secure complete alignment on these questions, but it could help establish the framework for a debate that all too often lurches to extremes and risks damaging a fundamental alliance for global stability – along with a fundamental driver of 21st-century economic progress.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Linking health and security has become a mainstream approach to health policy issues over the past two decades. So much so that the discourse of global health security has become close to synonymous with global health, their meanings being considered almost interchangeable. While the debates surrounding the health–security nexus vary in levels of analysis from the global to the national to the individual, this article argues that the consideration of health as a security issue, and the ensuing path dependencies, have shifted in three ways. First, the concept has been broadened to the extent that a multitude of health issues (and others) are constructed as threats to health security. Second, securitizing health has moved beyond a rhetorical device to include the direct involvement of the security sector. Third, the performance of health security has become a security threat in itself. These considerations, the article argues, alter the remit of the global health security narrative; the global health community needs to recognize this shift and adapt its use of security-focused policies accordingly.

The world’s second-largest Ebola outbreak is ongoing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and experts from around the world have been parachuted in to support the country’s operation to stamp out the outbreak. The signs are encouraging, but we need to remain cautious.

In such emergencies, little thought is usually given to what happens to the body-fluid samples taken during the course of the outbreak after the crisis is over. What gets left behind has considerable implications for global biosecurity.

Having unsecured samples poses the obvious risk of accidental exposures to people who might come into contact with them, but what of the risk of malicious use? Bioterrorists would have ready access to materials that have the characteristics essential to their purpose: the potential to cause disease that is transmissible from person to person, the capacity to result in high fatality rates and, importantly, the ability to cause panic and social disruption at the very mention of them.

Comparisons can be drawn with the significant international impact of the anthrax attacks in the US in 2001. Not only was there a direct effect in the US with five deaths and a further 17 people infected, but there was a paralysis of public health systems in other countries involved in the testing of countless samples from the so-called ‘white-powder incidents’ that followed.

Many laboratory tests were done purely on a precautionary basis to eliminate any possibility of a risk, no matter how remote. However, the UK was also hit when a hoaxer sent envelopes of white powder labelled as anthrax to 15 MPs.

The threat of the pathogen alone resulted in widespread fear, the deployment of officers trained in response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents and the evacuation of a hospital emergency department.

We learned from the 2014–16 West Africa Ebola outbreaks that during the emergency, the future biosecurity implications of the many thousands of samples taken from people were given very little consideration. It is impossible to be sure where they all are and whether they have been secured.

It is widely recognized that the systems needed at the time for tracking and monitoring resources, including those necessary for samples, were weak or absent, and this has to be addressed urgently along with other capacity-building initiatives.

In Sierra Leone, for example, the remaining biosecurity risk is only being addressed after the fact. To help achieve this, the government of Canada is in the process of providing a secure biobank in the Sierra Leonean capital of Freetown. The aim is to provide the proper means of storage for these hazardous samples and to allow them to remain in-country, with Sierra Leonean ownership.

However, it is already more three years since the emergency was declared over by the then director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), Margaret Chan, and the biobank and its associated laboratory are yet to be fully operational.

There are many understandable reasons for this delay, including the critical issue of how best to ensure the sustainability of any new facility. But what is clear is that these solutions take time to implement and must be planned for in advance.

The difficulties of responding to an outbreak in a conflict zone have been well documented, and the frequent violence in DRC has undoubtedly caused delays in controlling the outbreak. According to figures from WHO, during 2019 approximately 390 attacks on health facilities in DRC killed 11 and injured 83 healthcare workers and patients.

Not only does the conflict inhibit the response, but it could also increase the risk posed by unsecured samples. There are two main potential concerns.

First is the risk of accidental release during an attack on a health facility, under which circumstances sample containers may be compromised or destroyed. Second is that the samples may be stolen for malicious use or to sell them to a third-party for malicious use. It is very important in all outbreaks to ensure the necessary measures are in place to secure samples; in conflict-affected areas, this is particularly challenging.

The sooner the samples in the DRC are secured, the sooner this risk to global biosecurity is reduced. And preparations for the next emergency must be made without further delay.

The following steps need to be taken:

• Affected countries must ‘own’ the problem, with clear national government commitment to take the required actions.
• Funding partners must coordinate their actions and work closely with the countries to find the best solutions.
• If samples are to be kept in-country, secure biobanks must be established to contain them.
• Sustainable infrastructure must be built for samples to be kept secure into the future.
• An international agreement should be reached on the best approach to take to prepare for the aftermath of global health emergencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a profound impact on the cybersecurity landscape - both amplifying already-existing cyber threats and creating new vulnerabilities for state and non-state actors. The crisis has highlighted the importance of protecting key national and international infrastructures, with the World Health Organization, US Department of Health and Human Services and hospitals across Europe suffering cyber-attacks, undermining their ability to tackle the coronavirus outbreak. Changing patterns of work resulting from widespread lockdowns are also creating new vulnerabilities for organizations with many employees now working from home and using personal devices to work remotely.

In light of these developments, the panellists will discuss the evolving cyber threats resulting from the pandemic. How are they impacting ongoing conversations around cybersecurity? How can governments, private sector and civil society organizations work together to effectively mitigate and respond to them? And what could the implications of such cooperation be beyond the crisis? 

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

Three years ago, as the UK was holding its referendum on Brexit, the EU was rolling out its Global Strategy for a more cohesive and effective security and defence policy. Since then, EU member states have set impressive goals and, as significantly, taken important practical steps to make an EU defence capability a tangible proposition, despite differing collective defence commitments, traditions of neutrality among some member states and very different strategic cultures.

All of these developments have taken place with the UK as reluctant observer. The UK has been traditionally hostile to a deepening of defence collaboration within the EU (and consistent of the view that Europe’s military security was best provided through NATO). But the Brexit referendum vote has placed the UK as a bystander as EU security and defence initiatives have been pursued which have overridden the past red lines of British governments.

There is, however, a Brexit-related paradox in all these developments.

A central goal of the security and defence-related aspects of the EU Global Strategy is for the EU to have the capacity to act independently of the United States and, through indigenous defence industries, the ability to produce the means to make that possible.

With the UK outside the EU, and its opposition absent, it is easier to create a political consensus to push for more defence integration. But without the UK there are diminished collective defence capabilities which would make European strategic autonomy much harder to achieve.  

The May government has been an enthusiast for preserving close security and defence cooperation with the EU. The Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration both seek to provide for a close EU–UK relationship post-Brexit.

However, the Article 50 negotiations have made clear that the EU’s institutions are hostile to special treatment for the UK beyond that normally accorded to a third country. Disagreements over the terms of the UK’s continuing participation in the Gailleo dual-use satellite system, which has a significant security and defence utility, have signalled that there is a strong lobby in Brussels and some national capitals seeking to significantly circumscribe collaboration with Britain.

The scale and capabilities of the UK’s military, its defence expenditure (notably on defence research and development) and its defence industrial base make any British decoupling from the EU’s security and defence a major issue. Disconnecting the UK from EU developments entirely would be a costly political choice for both sides.

And excluding the UK from new initiatives in defence R&D and new defence procurement arrangements would be suboptimal in delivering a stronger European defence, technological and industrial base. Duplicating existing UK capabilities, especially strategic enablers such as strategic airlift, target acquisition and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, would be an unnecessary squandering of already hard-pressed European defence budgets.

At present the common procurement and defence industry plans driven by the EU Global Strategy are embryonic. And significant defence capability decisions are taking place detached from the EU’s plans, which could reinforce a divide between the UK and other member states.

As illustrative, the formal agreement this week between France, Germany and Spain on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) to develop a next-generation stealth fighter is competing with the UK-supported Tempest project that shares the same objective. The 20-year timescales for the delivery of the FCAS and Tempest projects are a reminder that defence procurement decisions are of multi-decade significance.

As the EU’s ambitions are nascent, it is too early to fully assess what might be the impact of any decision by the EU and the UK to keep each other at an arms-length in security and defence cooperation. With a more detached relationship, the UK will have significant concerns if it sees the EU’s common procurement arrangements develop in a manner that actively discriminates against the UK defence industry.

Outside of procurement and defence issues there may be other areas of future concern for the UK – for example, the extent to which the EU might deepen and broaden cooperation with NATO in a manner that makes the collective influence of EU member states within NATO more apparent, or to which the footprint of future EU conflict and security activities in third countries starts to overshadow the activities of the UK.

As the UK has been grappling with Brexit domestically, the EU has been evolving its security and defence policy ambitions. These are developments that will impact on the UK and in which, therefore, it has a stake but as a departing member state it has a weakening ability to shape.

Any aspect of future EU–UK cooperation is hostage to the vagaries of how the Brexit endgame concludes.

The ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy, actively promoted by the United States with support from its allies and partners, is a significant geopolitical response to China's growing power and expanding influence in Asia and beyond. Beijing has adopted various new strategies to cope with the challenges related to FOIP. One of these strategies is to secure a robust relationship with south-east Asia in order to make these regional states either neutral to or less supportive of the Indo-Pacific vision. In addition to economic statecraft and soft power, Beijing believes that it can also tap into the domain of non-traditional security (NTS) to strengthen relations with this region to position itself better in the intensifying regional geopolitical competition. The article addresses the following question: what is the impact of China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asia on Beijing's geopolitical rivalry with other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region? The article argues that China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asian countries may help China maintain its geopolitical standing in the region, but it is unlikely to lead to any dramatic increase of China's strategic influence in the region. This essentially means that Beijing may be able to prevent ASEAN or most ASEAN member states from lending substantive and strong support to the Indo-Pacific construct, but it will not be able to stop ASEAN states from supporting some elements of the FOIP.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been regarded by international society as a major policy tool in China's geo-economic strategy. Under this policy platform, Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructure and industrial sectors across Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific nations. It is widely believed that such huge amount of investment will inevitably generate significant geostrategic repercussions in these regions. In response to the BRI, the United States and other powers have come up with a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. This article attempts to address the following question: what impact is the BRI likely to have on the security ties between China and the other major players in the Indo-Pacific? The author finds that the BRI may significantly transform China's international security policy and the expansion of Beijing's security influence may further intensify the security competition between China and other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The article also proposes a new analytical angle for the study of geo-economics that unpacks the role of economic activities and processes in generating geopolitical intentions and catalysing geopolitical competition.

The president of Malta discusses the current security challenges in the Mediterranean region, reflecting on the role of international cooperation in addressing climate change, migration and refugee flows.

Drawing on his experience as commander of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and director of the CIA, General David Petraeus (Ret) will reflect on the current state of global security focusing in particular on the role of the US within the international security infrastructure and the world order.

This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations of Chatham House. If you'd like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford.

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

The United Nations (UN) Security Council is stuck in a peacekeeping trilemma. This is a situation where the Council's three strategic goals for peacekeeping operations—implementing broad mandates, minimizing peacekeeper casualties and maximizing cost-effectiveness—cannot be achieved simultaneously. This trilemma stems from longstanding competing pressures on how the Council designs UN peacekeeping operations as well as political divisions between peacekeeping's three key groups of stakeholders: the states that authorize peacekeeping mandates, those that provide most of the personnel and field capabilities, and those that pay the majority of the bill. Fortunately, the most negative consequences of the trilemma can be mitigated and perhaps even transcended altogether. Mitigation would require the Council to champion and implement four main reforms: improving peacekeeper performance, holding peacekeepers accountable for misdeeds, adopting prioritized and sequenced mandates, and strengthening the financial basis for UN peacekeeping. Transcending the trilemma would require a more fundamental reconfiguration of the key stakeholder groups in order to create much greater unity of effort behind a re-envisaged peacekeeping enterprise. This is highly unlikely in the current international political context.

This year marks the 20^th anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security – the first to recognize the important role of women in peacebuilding. How did the resolution come into being and how significant was its adoption in 2000?  

Well it has quite an amazing history that goes back to other UN resolutions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, which were passed in the 1960s and came into force in the 1970s. These were some of the biggest covenants on human and civil rights at the time but it was only later that people realised, that those who passed them, did not assume that they applied to women.

There was an attempt, subsequently, to pass the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women – commonly called the CEDAW Convention – which was widely adopted in 1979, when 187 out of 194 UN members signed, although the United States was not one of them, and in fact, the US has still not ratified the treaty. But the understanding that women’s rights were not necessarily assumed in human and civil rights action was beginning to gain recognition.

Then, in 1995, Hillary Clinton spoke in Beijing and really put it forward that women’s rights were human rights and also civil rights and we all have to address them as such. So, ‘95 really brought together all the different social groups – women’s groups, human’s rights groups, civil rights groups, and more, who pushed for the women, peace and security agenda to be passed in 2000 at the United Nations. 

The resolution on women, peace and security was a significant moment because it recognized gender equality issues were national security issues – not just social justice issues – and was soon followed by a number of other resolutions which make up the women, peace and security agenda today. 

Conflict has a disproportionate effect on women and girls, with global security threats, such as climate change,  reported to impact women more than men. In light of this, growing numbers of women are now serving on the frontlines of conflicts, in comparison to 1957-1989, when  only 20 women served as UN peacekeepers. In your view, what have been the successes of the women, peace and security agenda so far?

I think some of the successes specific to peacekeeping have been, as you mentioned, that women are increasingly part of peacekeeping forces being deployed to conflict and post-conflict situations.

Importantly, the nature of war is changing – we are no longer primarily engaged in interstate work in some places – it’s mostly intrastate work where there are often ethnic or religious overtones.

In this landscape, women are often caught up in the battle lines. They often become the heads of their households when the men are gone or injured or killed. There have also been instances of rape being used as a weapon of war and other forms of sexual violence being committed in conflict and post-conflict situations even by peacekeepers.

So, having more women as peacekeepers is important because, number one, when women see women peacekeepers, they are much less likely to fear them, and therefore, feel less threatened speaking to them. Number two, women are a less threatening presence so civil society begins to build again. Number three, women peacekeepers give women in the local area a role model of strength showing them that they can play an active role in their own security. Finally, I would say that women peacekeepers are all impressively trained to guard those under their protection.

What other successes have there been more broadly outside of peacekeeping? Well, I think one that is often cited is that there’s a 20 per cent increase in the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years and a 35 per cent increase in the probability of that peace agreement lasting 15 years if women are at the negotiating table. The reason being that women bring things to the table – for example focussing on the root causes of conflict – that men neglect either because they’re not aware of them or it’s not considered an issue of importance to them. 

We have a pretty abysmal history of peace agreements holding so including more women in peace negotiations, given these increases in the probability of agreements holding, seems to me the only logical thing to do.

You mentioned the inclusion of women in peace processes increases the likelihood of agreements succeeding, however, women continue to be underrepresented, comprising under 10 per cent of peace negotiators and under 4 per cent of signatories to peace agreements. Do you think there are any shortcomings with focusing on increasing the presence of women over the positions they hold and how their positions are used to further gender equality?  

I think there are a couple of aspects to this. Importantly, women have been extremely effective in leadership positions, for example, in Liberia. But it is true having women at the table does not necessarily further gender equality in the long-term and I think this was the case in Northern Ireland where the women who were at the table did not include provisions for women. But, I think, we’ve learned since then.

The most important case to cite right now, in my view, is that of women in Afghanistan. They came out of their homes, they went to school, they identified themselves as proponents of gender equality, yet now, with the US-Taliban deal, there were almost no women at the table and not a single provision in the peace agreement that deals with women. So what’s going to happen to all of these women?

Since 2000, the number of agreements referring to women has grown to 28 per cent – more than double the number between 1990-2000. However, some critics have pointed to the gap between theory and practice since many peace agreements still omit a gender perspective on peacekeeping operations. What, in your opinion, have been the failings of realising the women, peace and security agenda so far?

You know, it’s not just critics who point this out, it’s advocates as well, that there is a big gap between rhetoric and implementation. I think the reason for this, in most cases, is political will. It’s the idea that gender equality is an optional luxury – we’ll get to it when we can – and that we have more important issues to work out. Well the agency of 50 per cent of the population should not be seen as an optional luxury.

In all cases, however, it’s a question of power. There are only so many seats at the table where power is doled out and nobody wants to give up theirs to let somebody else sit down. So, I think, there is active resistance to implementing gender equality in the peace and security arena because it would mean sharing power. 

There are also some other reasons. The first is something we call the ‘blind fish’ – people who are simply unaware of gender equality issues – the second, which is interestingly by adamant supporters of the women in peace and security agenda, and that’s they are not given the budget and the authority to carry out the agenda as it should be.

The concept of a feminist foreign policy, which places gender equality and women’s rights at the centre of its foreign policy goals, has been gaining momentum globally. Sweden became the first country in the world to adopt a feminist foreign policy in 2015, and since then, 82 countries have adopted national action plans to raise the role of women in peace processes. How effective have these measures been to furthering women in peace and security? 

That, I think, is one of the issues that women in peace and security advocates, such as myself, are currently looking at because the word ‘feminist’, for better or for worse, is a trigger in many countries.

In many countries, it’s a negative trigger, which is kind of ironic because, if you ask people, ‘Do you believe in gender equality?’, a lot of people will say, ‘Yes absolutely.’  But if you ask people, ‘Are you a feminist?’, a lot of people will say, ‘No not me.’ 

So, the question is, do we aim for a broad goal like a feminist foreign policy which would look at defining peace as, not just the absence of war, but a lot more then than that, such as creating the conditions needed for gender equality and aiming for peace and stability among other broader goals.

Or do we aim to work on a more incremental basis by trying to get more women into peacekeeping, trying to get more women into leadership positions, trying to move gender equality up the agenda as the more effective path forward?

I think the answer to the question is that it depends. If you’re Sweden, Canada or Mexico, a feminist foreign policy might be acceptable. But, if you’re the United States, it’s nowhere near acceptable. Even getting the US Defence Department to take the incremental steps of the women, peace and security agenda has been challenging.

Why do you think that is the case in the United States?

I think a lot of it has to do with power as I mentioned earlier. It has to do with an assumption that women aren’t assertive and don’t see security under the same lens as men, which is true, but which is why they are needed in this space.

I think it also, again, goes back to the point that some see it as an optional luxury rather than an absolute necessity and everybody is too busy – or simply unwilling – to change the status quo.

You mentioned the cases of Liberia and Northern Ireland, but another example that struck me was Rwanda, where women make up 62 per cent of the national legislature, far more proportionally than any other country, following provisions included in its constitution in the aftermath of the genocide of 1994.

Though equal representation between men and women is still far off for most of the world, what does the case of Rwanda and other post-conflict countries demonstrate about how to go about including more women in peacebuilding?

Well, I think the number one way to get more women into political leadership roles, where the women, peace and security agenda could then be implemented, is quotas. 

Many countries use quotas to increase more women in political participation, which Rwanda certainly does, although there are different types. There are quotas that say each political party must have X number of women as candidates and then there are quotas that say the overall number of women in the parliament must reach a certain level. 

So there are different varieties of quotas but they are all used as, kind of, affirmative action methods to at least temporarily bring the numbers up to where women’s voices are inclusive not token. 

Research has shown that until you have at least 33 per cent of a minority in an overall group – so if it’s all men then 33 per cent of this group as women – then you won’t see any change because having one or two will likely be drowned out. But, at about 33 per cent, they’re able to have political power which then means their views and their agendas are seriously considered. So, in Rwanda, that has certainly been the case and that’s been one of the big lessons learned. 

As I mentioned earlier, in Northern Ireland, the lesson learned was that it’s not enough to just have women in on peace agreements. There need to be implementation assurances written into the peace agreement that says it must be taken forward. So, in this vein, women have been learning over the years how to make a difference in male-dominated spaces. 

50 years ago, humans landed on the moon, becoming one of the most significant moments in human history. The stories of women, from Margaret Hamilton, to Katherine Johnson, to JoAnn Morgan, who all helped men take their first steps on the moon at the height of the space race, have since come into the spotlight. How will the inclusion of women need to be considered more in space security as it becomes increasingly important in international relations?

Right now, space security is at a very critical point. We have moved from a situation where there was both co-operation and competition during the space race to a situation of great power competition in space where the United States, China and Russia are, for the first time, overtly weaponizing space. When I say overtly, much of space technology is dual-use, meaning it could be used as a weapon or it could be used as something for non-military purposes.

In the past, the United States and other countries have been very careful, kind of, not to cross the Rubicon into the overt weaponization of space but that’s now ending which I think puts us in a very precarious situation. 

What seems to be missing from considerations of space security at the moment is the most threatening issue – space debris – which can only be dealt with on a multinational basis meaning it inherently requires co-operation. 

So, what I think more women in space security positions would bring, would be that inclusion and the insistence on inclusion as a pillar of space diplomacy.

If there was just a fraction of the money, and manpower, spent on space diplomacy as there is on planning for space warfare, I think we’d all be a lot better off.

How far do current discussions about women in peace and security factor in space security?

Not at all.

Do you see the role of women in space security progressing in the future in spite of this and also despite what some have described as a broader backlash against women around the world whether in the political or in the security space?

I think there have been events over the past five or so years that have made women around the world, if anything, more acutely insistent on their participation than ever before.

We saw the marches in 2017, in the United States and worldwide, in response to what women felt was a rise in authoritarian and misogynistic governments and we have seen the rollbacks in gender equality rights in areas like reproduction too but I don’t think they’re going to take it lying down. The backlash, if anything, is going to spur women to be more, not less, active in all spaces. 

Some have argued for the need of a men, peace and security agenda, to compliment the work on women, with proponents arguing that men are needed to realise gender equality worldwide. How far are men needed as allies to realise the women, peace and security agenda? 

Well, I think, though the women, peace and security agenda has women in the title, it argues for gendered perspectives, that policies affect men and women differently. So, I think it is very important that it not be seen as dealing only with women’s issues – it deals with gendered perspectives. 

In that regard, it is very much needed to have a broadening of all of those involved. I mentioned earlier it was all women’s groups that got the women, peace and security agenda passed and now we need to include men. In fact, I would point out, NATO is a great example of an organization that has recognized the importance of looking at how policies affect men and women, girls and boys. 

So bringing more men in to support gendered perspectives is absolutely essential and looking at gendered perspectives in things like leadership roles is critical as well as gendered perspectives in everything from space policy to nuclear policy to human security issues too.

In your view, what are the greatest challenges to the uptake of gendered perspectives across the board and what, if anything, needs to change in order to realise the goals set out by the UNSC 20 years ago?

On a macro level, we need accountability. We have lots of policies, laws, national action plans and strategies of all kinds but we need accountability.

In the United States, in particular, I very much hope that accountability comes from Congress. In 2017, Congress passed the Women, Peace and Security Act on a bipartisan basis but I think it’s now up to Congress to hold organizations responsible for its implementation. 

On an organizational level, we need to get, as you said, more men involved. But, interestingly, not all women agree, so we need to have more talks among women too, be they liberal, conservative, working, non-working, mothers, not mothers etc. We may have different views but where we’re trying to go is the same and we need to work together better. 

I think among the advocates of women, peace and security, there are still issues that are up for debate like do we go for big feminist foreign policies or do we go for incremental change? In addition, are there lynchpin issues such as reproductive rights, women’s healthcare, gender equality or budget? 

You know, in the United States, I wrote in an article that although the US Defence Department gave $4 million for women, peace and security in 2018, which they were patting themselves on the back for, the Military Times pointed out that they are spending $84 million a year on Viagra.

But this is not just in the United States. 140 countries stood up at the UN to advocate for women, peace and security in 2000 but only 25 per cent of those have national action plans and any budget connected to those plans. Everyone everywhere needs to put their money where their mouths are if we are to realise the goals set out by the UNSC 20 years ago.

The World Health Organization, US Department of Health and Human Services, and hospitals in Spain, France and the Czech Republic have all suffered cyberattacks during the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.

In the Czech Republic, a successful attack targeted a hospital with one of the country’s biggest COVID-19 testing laboratories, forcing its entire IT network to shut down, urgent surgical operations to be rescheduled, and patients to be moved to nearby hospitals. The attack also delayed dozens of COVID-19 test results and affected the hospital’s data transfer and storage, affecting the healthcare the hospital could provide.

In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS) is already in crisis mode, focused on providing beds and ventilators to respond to one of the largest peacetime threats ever faced. But supporting the health sector goes beyond increasing human resources and equipment capacity.

Health services ill-prepared

Cybersecurity support, both at organizational and individual level, is critical so health professionals can carry on saving lives, safely and securely. Yet this support is currently missing and the health services may be ill-prepared to deal with the aftermath of potential cyberattacks.

When the NHS was hit by the Wannacry ransomware attack in 2017 - one of the largest cyberattacks the UK has witnessed to date – it caused massive disruption, with at least 80 of the 236 trusts across England affected and thousands of appointments and operations cancelled. Fortunately, a ‘kill-switch’ activated by a cybersecurity researcher quickly brought it to a halt.

But the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), has been warning for some time against a cyber attack targeting national critical infrastructure sectors, including the health sector. A similar attack, known as category one (C1) attack, could cripple the UK with devastating consequences. It could happen and we should be prepared.

Although the NHS has taken measures since Wannacry to improve cybersecurity, its enormous IT networks, legacy equipment and the overlap between the operational and information technology (OT/IT) does mean mitigating current potential threats are beyond its ability.

And the threats have radically increased. More NHS staff with access to critical systems and patient health records are increasingly working remotely. The NHS has also extended its physical presence with new premises, such as the Nightingale hospital, potentially the largest temporary hospital in the world.

Radical change frequently means proper cybersecurity protocols are not put in place. Even existing cybersecurity processes had to be side-stepped because of the outbreak, such as the decision by NHS Digital to delay its annual cybersecurity audit until September. During this audit, health and care organizations submit data security and protection toolkits to regulators setting out their cybersecurity and cyber resilience levels.

The decision to delay was made to allow the NHS organizations to focus capacity on responding to COVID-19, but cybersecurity was highlighted as a high risk, and the importance of NHS and Social Care remaining resilient to cyberattacks was stressed.

The NHS is stretched to breaking point. Expecting it to be on top of its cybersecurity during these exceptionally challenging times is unrealistic, and could actually add to the existing risk.

Now is the time where new partnerships and support models should be emerging to support the NHS and help build its resilience. Now is the time where innovative public-private partnerships on cybersecurity should be formed.

Similar to the economic package from the UK chancellor and innovative thinking on ventilator production, the government should oversee a scheme calling on the large cybersecurity capacity within the private sector to step in and assist the NHS. This support can be delivered in many different ways, but it must be mobilized swiftly.

The NCSC for instance has led the formation of the Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP)— a joint industry and UK government initiative to exchange cyber threat information confidentially in real time with the aim of reducing the impact of cyberattacks on UK businesses.

CiSP comprises organizations vetted by NCSC which go through a membership process before being able to join. These members could conduct cybersecurity assessment and penetration testing for NHS organizations, retrospectively assisting in implementing key security controls which may have been overlooked.

They can also help by making sure NHS remote access systems are fully patched and advising on sensible security systems and approved solutions. They can identify critical OT and legacy systems and advise on their security.

The NCSC should continue working with the NHS to enhance provision of public comprehensive guidance on cyber defence and response to potential attack. This would show they are on top of the situation, projecting confidence and reassurance.

It is often said in every crisis lies an opportunity. This is an opportunity for the UK government to show agility in how it deals with cyber threats and how it cooperates with the private sector in creating cyber resilience.

It is an opportunity to lead a much-needed cultural change showing cybersecurity should never be an afterthought.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a profound impact on the cybersecurity landscape - both amplifying already-existing cyber threats and creating new vulnerabilities for state and non-state actors. The crisis has highlighted the importance of protecting key national and international infrastructures, with the World Health Organization, US Department of Health and Human Services and hospitals across Europe suffering cyber-attacks, undermining their ability to tackle the coronavirus outbreak. Changing patterns of work resulting from widespread lockdowns are also creating new vulnerabilities for organizations with many employees now working from home and using personal devices to work remotely.

In light of these developments, the panellists will discuss the evolving cyber threats resulting from the pandemic. How are they impacting ongoing conversations around cybersecurity? How can governments, private sector and civil society organizations work together to effectively mitigate and respond to them? And what could the implications of such cooperation be beyond the crisis? 

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.

While China and Russia's general policies towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are similar, the two reveal nuanced differences in addressing specific emergencies. Both express support for the first two pillars of R2P while resisting coercive intervention under its aegis, as they share anxieties of domestic political security and concerns about their international image. Nonetheless, addressing cases like the Syrian crisis, Russian statements are more assertive and even aggressive while Chinese ones are usually vague and reactive. This article highlights the two states’ different tones through computer-assisted text analyses. It argues that diplomatic styles reflect Russian and Chinese perceptions of their own place in the evolving international order. Experiences in past decades create divergent reference points and status prospects for them, which leads to their different strategies in signalling Great Power status. As Beijing is optimistic about its status-rising prospects, it exercises more self-restraint in order to avoid external containments and is reluctant to act as an independent ‘spoiler’. Meanwhile, Moscow interprets its Great Power status more from a frame of ‘loss’ and therefore is inclined to adopt a sterner approach to signal its status. Although their policies complement each other on many occasions, there is nothing akin to a Sino–Russian ‘bloc’.

This  event is  part of the US and Americas Programme Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST. 

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a profound impact on the cybersecurity landscape - both amplifying already-existing cyber threats and creating new vulnerabilities for state and non-state actors. The crisis has highlighted the importance of protecting key national and international infrastructures, with the World Health Organization, US Department of Health and Human Services and hospitals across Europe suffering cyber-attacks, undermining their ability to tackle the coronavirus outbreak. Changing patterns of work resulting from widespread lockdowns are also creating new vulnerabilities for organizations with many employees now working from home and using personal devices to work remotely.

In light of these developments, the panellists will discuss the evolving cyber threats resulting from the pandemic. How are they impacting ongoing conversations around cybersecurity? How can governments, private sector and civil society organizations work together to effectively mitigate and respond to them? And what could the implications of such cooperation be beyond the crisis? 

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

The Chagos archipelago in the Indian Ocean has garnered media attention recently after the UK failed to abide by a UN deadline to return the islands to Mauritius. The US has landed in the middle of the dispute as a 1965 agreement with the UK has allowed the US to establish a military base on one of the islands, Diego Garcia, which has since become instrumental in US missions in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. 

In February 2019, an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the Chagos archipelago was unlawfully dismembered from Mauritius, in violation of the right to self-determination and that the United Kingdom is under an obligation to end its administration of the Chagos archipelago ‘as rapidly as possible’. The UN General Assembly subsequently voted overwhelmingly in favour of the UK leaving the islands by the end of November 2019 and the right of the former residents who were removed by the UK to return. The UK does not accept the ICJ and UN rulings and argues that the islands are needed to protect Britain from security threats while Mauritius has made clear the base can remain.

Professor Philippe Sands QC, professor of law at University College London and lead counsel for Mauritius on the ICJ case on Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, will be joining Ambassador Richard Burt, US chief negotiator in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the former Soviet Union for a discussion on the fate of the archipelago including the future of the military base and the right of return of former residents.  

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

In the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election, then-candidate Donald Trump made a series of campaign promises concerning US foreign policy towards the Middle East. Since assuming office, President Trump has withdrawn the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, withdrawn troops from Syria, relocated the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and orchestrated the strike against ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Against a backdrop of Trump's inclination towards withdrawing from the region, countries across the Middle East are being rocked by protests, Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile has threatened to undermine cohesion within NATO and the much hoped for ceasefire in Libya between UN-backed government leader, Fayez al-Sarraj, and opposition leader, Khalifa Haftar, failed to materialize.

In light of the upcoming US elections in November 2020, the future of US national security policy promises to be a prominent issue for the next administration. In this vein, the US and Americas Programme at Chatham House plans a yearlong focus on the pivotal US 2020 elections.

At this event, Dr Kori Schake, director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute will discuss the future of US foreign policy towards the Middle East. How have domestic and party politics in the US – and the unfolding presidential campaign – shaped recent policy decisions by the Trump administration? Should we expect policy objectives in the Middle East to remain consistent or shift under a second Trump term? And what direction could US foreign policy towards the region take under a Democratic administration?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Drawing on his experience as commander of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and director of the CIA, General David Petraeus (Ret) will reflect on the current state of global security focusing in particular on the role of the US within the international security infrastructure and the world order.

This event is only open to Major Corporate Member and Partner organizations of Chatham House. If you'd like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford.

To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

The US and China have entered into an increasingly confrontational relationship over trade and technology. This may force Europe to make difficult choices between the two economic superpowers – or perform a balancing act. Although the recent US-China phase-1 trade deal has eased the relationship for now, the trade and technology tensions are a structural issue and are likely to persist.

The debate over Huawei’s participation in 5G networks is an example of how the UK and other countries may face competing priorities in economic, security and foreign policy. Can Europe avoid a binary choice between the US and China? Is it possible for the EU to position itself as a third global power in trade, technology and standard-setting? What strategies should Europeans adopt to keep the US and China engaged in the rules-based international order and what does the future hold for trade multilateralism?

Sir Simon Fraser will join us for a discussion on Europe’s future role between the US and China. Sir Simon is Managing Partner of Flint Global and Deputy Chairman of Chatham House. He previously served as Permanent Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Head of the UK Diplomatic Service from 2010 to 2015. Prior to that he was Permanent Secretary at the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. He has also served as Director General for Europe in the FCO and Chief of Staff to European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank founding partner AIG and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo plc, and EY for their generous support of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States cemented its role as the leader of a new global order, characterized by the creation of international institutions and treaties like the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. More recently, however, the United States has appeared to take an inward turn, a trend which has been mirrored across the globe and has led to the international order being challenged more now than ever before.

As the Trump administration and US members of Congress attempt to address multiple challenges from a rising China and a disruptive Russia to a nuclear North Korea and shifting Middle East, Senator Chris Coons will offer his vision for restoring American leadership on the world stage.What is the role of Congress in setting and shaping US foreign policy?  How will the outcome of the consequential 2020 elections shape the future of America’s global role? Would a change in administration necessarily increase prospects of American reengagement, and if so, across which international spheres?

This  event is  part of the US and Americas Programme Inaugural Virtual Roundtable Series on the US and the State of the World and will take place virtually only.

Please note this event is taking place between 2pm to 3pm BST. 

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.